Faith vindicated from possibility of falshood, or, The immovable firmness and certainty of the motives to Christian faith asserted against that tenet, which, denying infallibility of authority, subverts its foundation, and renders it uncertain

Objection IV.

A great part of the First Eviction, in case it proceed concerning Truth in us, as it ought, supposes the vulgar Skil∣ful in Logick, and to frame their Thoughts and Assents in the same man∣ner as Artificial Discoursers do.

Answer. It supposes no Skill or Art in the vulgar or Generality of Christians, but onely declares artificially what natu∣rally passes in rational Souls when they Assent upon Evidence. And this it ought to do; For the Art of Logick frames not it's Rules or Observations at ran∣dome, but takes them from the Thing or it's Object (as all other Skills do) that is, from what is found in ra∣tional Souls as rational, or apt to dis∣course: by observing the motions of which when it behaves it self rational∣ly, the Logicians set down Rules how to demean our Thoughts steadily and constantly according to right Reason: So that the manner of working in Arti∣ficial discoursers in this onely differs from that of Natural ones, that the one acts directly the other reflectingly.

For example, a vulgar Soul when it as∣sents interiourly a thing is, or affirms, has truly in it what a Logician call's a Proposition; and that Proposition has truly in it what corresponds to the notions of Subject, Copula, and Predicate; though he reflects not on it, as does a Logician. In the same manner when he gathers the Knowledg of some new Thing, he has truly in that discourse of his what corresponds to Major, Minor and Con∣clusion, nay he has practically in him what necessitates the Consequence or that Maxim [The same is the same with it self] of whose Truth, it being a Prin∣ciple of our Understanding, he cannot possibly be ignorant. Though all this while he reflects not how or by virtue of what he acquires this Knowledg.

And hence Light is afforded us to un∣derstand in common how the vulgar come to have Practical Self-Evidence of divers Truths: For, the Maxims which even scientifical men have of the Ob∣jects of several Sciences, being taken from the Things or the Objects of those Sciences; and (those Maxims being Common or General ones) from the ob∣vious or common Knowledg of those

things, which the vulgar who convers with them cannot chuse but have; A∣gain, nature imbuing them with the Knowledg of that Principle on which the force of all Consequences is Ground∣ed, as also with the knowledg of all those we call Principia Intellectûs, or Principles of our Understanding, hence their rational nature is led directly by a natural course to see evidently and as∣sent to divers Conclusions, without any Reflexion or Speculation; which rude but unerring draught of Knowledg is call'd by me in Sure Footing and elswhere Practical Self-evidence, because 'tis a na∣tural Result of Practice or ordinary converse with those things; An Instance would at once clear this, and, if rightly chosen, be serviceable to the Readers of Sure Footing. An unlearned person that cannot read a word believes fully there was such a man as K. Iames; and that we may not mistake the Question, we will put him to be one that has a hand∣som degree of conversation in the world. We finde him assent to the Affirmative heartily; But the point is how he is led into that Assent, and whether rational∣ly? To ask him a reason why, is boot∣less;

for this puts him to behave him∣self like a Reflecter on his own Thoughts, which he is not: whence we shall find him, upon such a question, at a puzzle to give the particular reason; though, as taught by Experience, he will stand stiffly to it in common that he has a reason for it, and a good one too. To help him out then, the way is to suggest the true reason to him, for then he will easily acknowledg it, finding it experi∣mentally in himself; which done, deny the Goodness of it, and you shall find, he will, as taught by nature stand to it, and deliver himself in some rude saying or other in behalf of it. For example, tell him he believes there was a K. Iames because those who pretend∣ed to live then have told us so; but what if they were mistaken? His an∣swer would in likelihood be to this purpose; what a God's name were they blind in those dayes, that they could not see who was King then? Which expresses naturally his conceit of their Inerrable∣ness in such a point, in case they had eyes, which nature taught him men generally have. Insist farther; Perhaps they were not mistaken, but had a mind

to cozen all England that came after them. Nature will lead him to this or some such kind of Reply; To what purpose should they all make fools of every body? Which words, though rudely ex∣prest, yet couch in themselves the full reason given in Sure Footing, as far as 'tis built on Nature. For, first, it implies that man's nature with which he hath a fair acquaintance in common is to do a thing for a purpose, end or reason. Next, his Interrogatory way is in his rude style, equivalent to a Negative, and so it signifies there could be no reason for it; and, lastly, his standing to his former Tenet implies virtually a Conclusion from the reason given, that the thing could not be done; which involves necessa∣rily a knowledg of that First Principle on which all force of consequence is grounded; and also of that Principle, no Effect can be without a due Cause; both perfectly suppos'd and held by him, though not exprest in his rude Enthy∣meme.

From this discourse is collected what this Practical Self-evidence is; and, that 'tis distinguish'd from Experience in this, that Experience is onely found of

what uses to make the Minor in this vir∣tual discourse, but Practical Self-evi∣dence is of Conclusions deduc't (as it were) from a common maxim naturally known, as the Major; and a Minor (for the most part) experientially, or else Practically known; which, joyn'd with the Self-evident Principle in which the force of Consequence consists, make up that virtual discourse. Again, it differs from Science, in that a man of Science reflectingly sees a Medium iden∣tifying the two Extreames, and is aware of the virtue of those Causes which be∣get Evidence; whereas the other is rather Passive from Natural Impressions than Active by any Self-industry in these Knowledges, and rather feels the force of those Causes in his own Adhesion, than sees it. Secondly, 'Tis collected that this Practical Self-evidence is not∣withstanding, True Knowledge; though, perhaps, it be the sleightest kind of it; in which 'tis differenc't from Opinion built on probabilities. For, seeing such As∣senters have both by Experience or by Common Conversation true Knowledg of the natures of diverse things in com∣mon, which make the Minor, as also by

Nature of all the Principles of our Un∣derstanding, which countervail the ma∣jor, and force the Consequence; it comes to pass that this Practical Self-evidence is intirely and adequately grounded on true Knowledges both as to Premises and Consequence; and cossequently 'tis it self a True Knowledg likewise. Which consideration will help to explain my later Postulatum, and shew by what means 'tis possible all Christians may know their Faith to be True, or the same the A∣postles taught, by the Churches Testi∣monie, because they know the Inerra∣bleness and Veracity of vast and grave multitudes in open matters of Fact which are practiceable daily. And lastly, 'tis collected that what is Practically Self-evident to the Unlearned, is Demonstrable to the Learned: in regard These are capa∣ble of seeing by what virtue the causes of this Self-evidence bred that Knowledg, which the other's incultivated Reason would give no account of.