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SECT. II. (Book 2)
CAP. I. The Proofs of Fact, that seem with the greatest Moral evidence to evince the Inception of Mankind: And first, touching the Antiquity or Novity of History.
I Have now done with those Evidences that in my Understanding seem, quasi ab intrinseco, to evince the Inception of Mankind from that intrinsecal incompossibility and inconsistency that the Sup∣position of the eternal existence thereof bears with his Nature: I now descend to the examination of those Evidences of Fact, which do or may seem to contribute to the proof of what is designed, namely, Novitatem generis humani.
And although that Evidences of Fact of things remote from our Sense cannot be said infallible and demonstrative, because the nature of such matters of fact (simply as they are matters of fact) is not capable (as such) of Demonstration; yet they may be Evidences of high cre∣dibility, and such as no reasonable Man can with any just reason deny his assent unto them.
That which hath been, hath as certainly and infallibly, yea and as necessarily been, as that which is: Omne quod, est, dum est necessariò est, & omne quod fuit, cum jam preteriit necessariò fuit quando fuit, & in prae∣teritis non est contingentia. Only that which is, and is obvious to Sense, hath this advantage of evidence which that which hath been wants, namely, the immediate evidence of Sense, wherein though it is not uni∣versally impossible but that Sense may be deceived, yet because it is the best evidence that we have of matters of fact, we give credit to it as a sensible evidence, and we have reason so to do.
But of things transacted before our time, and out of the immediate reach of our Sense, we may have such an evidence as in reason we ought as reasonable Men to acquiesce in, though the evidence be still in its own nature but moral, and not simply demonstrative or infallible: And the variety of circumstances renders the credibility of such things more or less, according to the various ingredients and contributions of credi∣bility that are concentred in such an evidence.
It is impossible to demonstrate by evidence infallible (or which is all one, by evidence that is impossible to be false) that there was such a Man as Julius Caesar or Augustus, that there was such a Man as William the Conqueror, or King Henry the Eighth, or that such a Man was his Father, or such a Woman his Mother; or that there is such a City as Venice, or Rome, (to me that never saw it,) for all these I have but by relation from others, and it is not impossible but those Histories or informations or relations by which I am informed of these things may be false: And