A letter in answer to a book entitled, Christianity not mysterious as also, to all those who set up for reason and evidence in opposition to revelation & mysteries / by Peter Browne ...

A LETTER In answer to a BOOK ENTITLED Christianity not Mysterious.

SIR,

WHEN I sent to borrow of you the Book Entitled, Chri∣stianity not Mysterious, I little thought of drawing on my self any trouble beyond the bare reading of it; but since you have desir'd my thoughts of the matters contain'd in it, I was unwilling to resuse. Thô I must free∣ly tell you, what you seem to own in your Letter, that I think my self bet∣ter

imploy'd. And your saying, that it is no neglect in a Shepherd to leave his feeding of the Lambs, and go aside for a while, to beat off any thing that comes to devour or infect them, wo'd not have prevail'd with me, if this had caus'd any intermission in that busi∣ness, which I hope will turn to bet∣ter account when I come to receive my Wages. But having a little time to spare, I shall perform what you desire.

And I have done this the rather, for that you tell me the Book hath made some noise; and that the Author is countenanc'd, and encourag'd by some Men of Sence. I don't much wonder at it; for every Man of Sence is not a Man of true Religion; besides it is not every Man of Reason and Integrity, hath leisure to consider it; and if they have, yet these sort of abstracted Discourses, are out of the road of Men of Business.

What you observe is very true, that the generality of Men who write such Books as these, and talk of them most, are those of a mixt sort of learn∣ing;

Persons of a miscelaneous educa∣tion, who have some insight into most of the Sciences, but are throughly vers't in none. And the talking of Idea's, and running endless divisions upon them, is a cheap and easie way, some Men now adays have taken up, of appearing wise and learned to the world. Whereas the bottom of it all is no more than this, That Men of nice heads have agreed to speak of plain things in a peculiar dialect of their own; which if they were strip't of those terms of Art, and put into plain Language, have nothing in them more than what is obvious to the com∣mon sence and reason of all Men. And the consequence of using them so fre∣quently in matters of Religion is ge∣nerally, what is so visible in this Author, that they darken the Subject; so that the Question is lost in a multitude of Words, and then Men wander far in pursuit of Truth, when they left it behind them at their first setting out.

But before I come to the particu∣lars, I can't but take notice of that un∣reasonableness of People, who never think a Writer sufficiently confuted un∣less we follow him in all his wandrings; whereas in a subject of this nature it is enough to shew where he left the Road, and that he is not yet return'd into it. If a Man were to demolish a Fabrick, there is no necessity of doing it stone by stone; it is abundantly e∣nough if he undermine and destroy those Pillars which are the main sup∣porters of it; for then it falls to the ground, and is no other than a heap of Rubbish, thô many of the materi∣als were very good in themselves.

To any reasonable considering Per∣son it were a sufficient Answer to this whole Book; to shew in short, how he mistakes the Question, and pro∣ceeds in it, all upon two false Suppo∣sitions: One in Logick, in the former part of his Book, viz.

That Evidence is the only ground of Perswasion.

The other in Divinity, in the latter part of it.

That now under the Gospel the Vail is perfectly remov'd.

This wo'd satisfy them that he runs all the while upon a false scent; and they wo'd not take it ill, that we left him to wander by himself. But because these are but few, in compa∣rison of those who take things in the gross, and can't so well discern the connexion and dependance of one thing upon another: And indeed be∣cause Answers are design'd for such as are not able to see into the fallacies, and not for those who are; therefore I shall trace him step by step, and leave nothing in him unanswer'd, that hath any appearance of reasoning.

I shall be so far from endeavouring to contradict him in every thing, that I shall grant him all that possibly I can. The worst of Hereticks speak many

things that are true; and the more we can with justice allow them, the plainer we shall make their Errors appear; and the more difficult it will be for them to proceed, for this obligeth them either to speak to the pinch of the Question, or be silent.

It can't be expected in the compass of a Letter, that I should enter into any nice disquisitions about the nature of Faith in general; or of the myste∣ries of the Gospel in particular; or of the use of Reason in Religion: For I am not now going to write a Book upon this subject; if I were it should not be in answer to him. I shall at present only shew the weakness and ••olly of this Man's arguing; and lay open the Cheats and Fallacies, by which he is either deceiv'd himself, or wo'd impose upon others: That I may relieve the subject he treats of, from that darkness and obscurity in which he has involv'd it, either through ig∣norance or design.

And first, there is great deceit in the very Title of the Book; CHRISTI∣ANITY NOT MYSTERI∣OUS. For by these two words, as it appears by what follows, he wo'd raise a Notion in the heads of People that Christianity, as it is now generally taught and receiv'd among us, is a Re∣ligion made up of dark aenigmatical Al∣lusions, and absurd irrational and un∣intelligible Notions; or else of the plainest things wrapt up in mysterious Rites and Ceremonies; and in short, that our most holy Faith, is no other than one great Riddle.

Whereas Christianity is so far from being Mysterious, that it is the plainest Institution in the World. All the ne∣cessary Points of Faith and Practice are so clear and obvious to every capa∣city, that it is a Religion calculated for all sorts of People: And therefore it is said of the times of the Gospel▪ That God wo'd put his Law into their inward parts, and write it in their Hearts, and they should all know him

even from the least of them to the great∣est. That which this Sophister wo'd have infer'd from hence is, That eve∣ry thing God should reveal in the times of the Gospel, Men should have as full and comprehensive a knowledge of, as they have of a∣ny thing in nature. But 'tis evident this expression was design'd to signify the plainess of the Gospel, as to all matters of obligation upon Mens Con∣sciences, in opposition to the obscurity of the Law; which was so perplex't with a multitude of Rites and Circum∣stances of Duty, that it was trouble∣som and tedious to learn and observe them all. And therefore it is said in the same Text, That they should not then teach every Man his Neighbour; saying, Know the Lord; because all the necessary knowledg of him and his Laws, was then to be rendred plain and easy. And accordingly this is now the glory of our Religion; and its plainess is one great argument of its Excellence and Divinity: not but that there are some things reveal'd in the Gospel, of which we are not now

capable of any clear & distinct know∣ledge. So that there is a great deal of difference between these two ex∣pressions, Christianity not Mysterious, and, There are no Mysteries in Christia∣nity▪ The first is very true, and the last is absolutely false.

Or a Treatise shewing, that there is nothing in the Gospel contrary to Reason.

Who among us ever said there was? but if this had not been added, his Book wo'd have been the shorter by Fourteen Pages; and were it not for this, and many other things in it, as little to the purpose, it had been only a sticht Pamphlet, and cry'd about with Almanacks.

Nor above reason.

This likewise is a dubious saying; for if it signifies that there are no ex∣pressions

in the Gospel, that it is im∣possible for us to know the meaning of, then it is very true: For thô some passages are difficult, yet every thing in the Gospel is intelligible; and were there any expression in it impossible to be understood, so much of it must have been writ to no purpose. But if by not being above reason, be meant that there is nothing spoke of in it, but what we have as compleat and perfect a knowledg of, as we have of any object of our Sences, it is abso∣lutely false; as I hope will sufficiently appear.

And thus the whole Title Page is nothing else, but equivocation and so∣phism. However there is this to be said for it, that it suits the-Book very well; the main drift of which is, to s••t up Natural Religion in opposition to all Revelation; and these same E∣quivocations begun in the Title Page, run through every thing he says.

His Introduction, wherein he pre∣tends to state the Question, requires no Answer; for we grant that the no∣tion of a Mystery is to be taken from the Holy Scriptures, and not from the opinion of any private Doctor, or Coun∣cil, or any infallible Head, So there are Six Pages of Impertinence cut off already.

I shall only take notice, how he sets out with a fling at the Divines, the Men he's all along so angry with, who gravely tell us

That we must adore what we can't comprehend.

Yes, they tell us we must adore God, and yet we cannot comprehend him. Let him prove we can if he's able, and without giving himself or us any farther trouble, we will put the whole Controversy to a short is∣sue and let it lye upon this one point. And if he does not make out, that

we have as full and comprehensive a knowledg of the Nature and Attri∣butes of God, as we have of any Pro∣position in Euclid, then what will this Man deserve for that arrogant expres∣sion of his,

That the Divine Being himself cannot* 1.1 with more reason be accounted Mysteri∣ous, than the most contemptible of his Creatures.

His business here was to have sta∣ted the Question, and let us have known what was the true Notion of a Mystery in Scripture. But instead of this he goes a great way about to tell us, that the true notion of a Mystery is to be taken no where but from thenc••, which no one denies. And therefore since he hath not done it, I must: That both He and I may speak to the purpose, and neither of us here∣after trouble the World with imperti∣nence.

Now the clearest way I can think of, for doing of this, is to instance in some particular Mystery of the Gos∣pel, and in that one for all, to let us see what a Christian Mystery is in the sence of Scripture. I shall take the first I think of, that of the Resurrection of our Bodies.

Saint Paul speaking of this says,* 1.2 Behold I shew you a Mystery, we shall all be chang'd in the twinkling of an eye. Again, St. John speaking of the same* 1.3 matter says, It doth not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him.

From whence we see a Christian Mystery is something which relates to another life, which it was impos∣sible for us to know, without Divine Revelation; and now that it is re∣veal'd we know it but it in part, and cannot fully comprehend it. Or shor∣ter.

It is a Divine Truth reveal'd to us in part.

As particularly this of our being changed at the last day into the likeness of Christ. It is a truth relating to a∣nother life, which could never have enter'd into our heads to think of, un∣less it had been reveal'd to us from Heaven; And now that it is reveal'd to us that we shall be like him, yet we know nothing of the manner of it wherein this likeness will consist.

So that in a Christian Mystery, there is something we do understand, and something that we are wholly ignorant of; and it is call'd a Mystery in respect of both these.

1. It is call'd a Mystery in respect of what we do know of it; because it was a thing so hidden from us, that it was impossible to discover it by those powers of knowledge which we are now endu'd with. As we could never have known from

reason, that good Christians should be chang'd into the likeness of Christ. Now it is this part of the Mystery which makes it an Article of Faith, and o∣bligatory upon our Consciences to be∣lieve it. Because we understand well what it is for a Body to be rais'd, and alter'd for the better, and we know perfectly what it is for one thing to be chang'd into the likeness of another.

2. It is call'd a Mystery in respect of that part of it which as yet we have no notion of; because 'tis utterly im∣possible for us in this life to attain to any knowledg of it by reason assisted with the greatest degree of revelation that is afforded us. And thus it is im∣possible for us in this life to have any notion of the manner of that change▪ into the likeness of Christ, for 'tis ex∣pressly said, That it doth not yet appear what we shall be. From whence I shall infer only thus much at present, that what we do know, and what is yet conceal'd from us, are in gross call'd the same Mystery. And that as we are oblig'd to believe what is reveal'd

of it, so likewise we are at the same time oblig'd from express words of Scripture to believe, that there is more in it than we are now able to compre∣hend. Nay that there is something in it which we have no notion or Idea at all of.

This is the notion of a Mystery in the sence of Scripture; and therefore now we see the Question is not, Whe∣ther a man can believe what he kn••ws nothing of, which no man in his wits ever yet affirm'd; for there is a flat contradiction in the terms; and yet this is the main thing he labours to disprove, and by which he endeavours to confound his Readers. But the Question is,

Whether there be not some things in the Gospel, concerning which we are bound to believe, that there is much more in them than we are now able to compre∣hend. If there be such things, as it appears in this instance of the Resur∣rection,

then there is something in the Gospel that may properly be call'd a Mystery; and in so strict a sence, that nothing else can be call'd a Mystery with so great propriety of Speech, as will appear more fully hereafter.

The case would have been the same, had I taken any other Mystery for an instance, either the eternal Generation of the Son; or the Procession of the Holy Ghost; or the Union of the Di∣vine and Human Nature; or the Ope∣rations of the Holy Spirit in the act of Grace; or the Felicity and Joys of Heaven, &c. and if it be requir'd I am ready to quit this, and take any other for an instance which he shall pitch upon.

Now this is the thing that lay upon him to disprove; but he durst not go about proving or disproving any thing, till he has perplex't the matter in hand, and amus'd his Reader with fantasti∣cal terms and distinctions. If he had mean't honestly, and thought himself able to go through with what he un∣dertook,

he would have spoke plain undisguis'd Reason and proceeded im∣mediately to the proof of the Question. But instead of this he finds it necessary to spend above one third of his Book, in loosing of it: wherefore I must take my leave of it for some time as he doth, to rescue the subject from obscurity, and force this Man to speak plainly and intelligibly.

And first he tells us, That reason is* 1.4 not the man that hath it; nor the things to be reason'd about; nor is it our appe∣tites and desires; nor is it authority. What trifling this is? he should have added, that it was not the Head that forms the Thoughts; nor the Fingers that write them; nor is it the Brain it self; No! nor is my Reason, the rea∣son of another Man. Our Readers are like to be much the wiser for this.

After this he proceedeth to shew* 1.5 what it is, in his second Chapter; the whole substance of which in other words is only this; that it is not Sim∣plex

Apprehensio, nor Judicium, but that it is Discursus that is properly call'd Reason. Which last he will not express by Syllogism, the word for it that is commonly receiv'd: but he must call it, The application of intermediate Idea's to other Idea's that are distant from one* 1.6 another, and ly too far asunder in the mind. And this he explains by the measuring of two Houses with a line; be∣cause you can't take one House in one hand, and the other in another, and so clap them together, to find out which is highest. What is this but ma∣king a Syllogism, by applying the Me∣dius Terminus to the parts of the Ques∣tion? and to what purpose is all this, unless he thinks that his Readers have not learned Logick?

Yes, he hath a drift in it, which is very observable in all our modern Wri∣ters against reveal'd Religion; for un∣less he first lays down false rules of rea∣soning, the consequences he wo'd make, will not appear to be true. Thô he's in the right of it thus far, and it is no more than what is in every common

Logick; Yet what follows is his own, and is both trifling and false.

For first, his four ways of coming to the knowledge of any thing, are very ill put together, and the distinction frivolous. The Experience of the Sences,* 1.7 the Experience of the Mind (i. e.) in usu∣al speaking, Sence and Reason; Human and Divine Revelation. Now at first sight who does not see? that any re∣velation by God or Man, must enter into the mind by one of these two ways, either by our Sences or our Rea∣son; so that there are but these two ways still.

And then as to his making Authority* 1.8 a means only of Information, and * 1.9 Evi∣dence the only ground of Perswasion;

which is the fundamental Error of his Book, and indeed of all these modern Writers who make such a stir about Reason and Evidence; we shall see the falsity of it if we consider Autho∣rity in respect of the Person who is in∣form'd, and of him who gives the In∣formation.

1. In respect of the Person who is inform'd, I grant it is a means of In∣formation; for how comes any one to the knowledge of a thing he was wholly ignorant of before, and which he could not attain of himself? why? by an others revealing it to him.

2. When considered in the Informer, it is a ground of Perswasion; for why do I give my assent to any Propositi∣on related to me from another? be∣cause of the veracity and ability of the Person that makes the Information.

But this cuning man will ask, how can that which is inseparable from a∣nother be the ground of any assent in my mind? I Answer, It is the opini∣on that is in me of his ability and ve∣racity is the cause of my assent. The ground of this opinion indeed is Evi∣dence: But then this Evidence is a ground of perswasion in respect of the worth of the Person only; and that Worth or Authority of his, is the only ground of perswasion in respect of the substance of what he relates to me. From whence it is plain, that though we grant that Evidence in the Mind is a ground of perswasion, yet it is not the only ground. And therefore to make this very clear and undeniable, let us take an instance of two Propositions, wherein these two grounds may be consider'd separately.

The three angles of a Triangle are e∣qual to two right ones.

In a Person who is able to demon∣strate this Proposition, the only ground of his perswasion or assent, is the evi∣dence of it in the Mind: For the rea∣son why he gives his assent to it is; because he finds out the agreement of the extreams by intermediate Idea's, and thus as he speaks, the demonstra∣tion at last becomes self evident.

But as to the substance of this Pro∣position

When Christ appears we shall be like him.

The authority of the Person relat∣ing it, is the only ground of perswasi∣on. For as I should never have known this if it had not been reveal'd, and therefore in this respect Authority is a means of information; so I should never have believed it, if I had not known that this Revelation had come from God. And therefore Authority consider'd in the Revealer, is the only

grounds of my assent to the substance of this Proposition.

But to make this plainer, we must consider that all natural Truths which do not necessarily require Revelation, need no other ground of perswasion but Evidence; but those which do, have both these grounds of perswasion, Evidence and Authority; as will ap∣pear if we distinguish the three things in every relation.

• 1. The meaning of the words.
• 2. The relation it self, or the very act of revelation.
• 3. The * 1.10 substance of the thing in∣tended by the Revelation.

As to the meaning of the words, and truth of the revelation in any propo∣sition, Evidence is the ground of per∣swasion: for why do I believe this Proposition? When Christ appears we

shall be like him. Because I know the meaning of the words; and because there is an evidence in my Mind of its coming from God, from those proofs to my Senses and Reason; which argue the Divine Mission of the Person who relates it; and consequently the Divi∣nity of the relation it self. But as to the Substance of that Proposition, Au∣thority is the only ground of Perswa∣sion, as indeed it is in all relations whatsoever.

And therefore 'tis now plain how* 1.11 Divine and Human Authority differ as well in degrees of Perspicuity as of Certitude. And why? because when a meer man relates any thing to me, thô I allow the veracity of the man, yet it is impossible for him to give such proof to my Sences and my Reason of the reality and substance of what he relates, as God can; And therefore can't raise so great a degree of Evi∣dence in my Mind. Though I suppose this mans relation to be true (so that this relation of his, and one of God's

shall be upon equal Terms as to certi∣tude, being both alike true) yet this assent of mine to what the man relates, is more precarious and worse founded than my faith of any divine propositi∣on; because this is more clear and di∣stinct, as having a degree of Evidence in the mind which the other wants. * 1.12

I shall make this plain by an instance. A man tells me that Rome is swallow'd up by an Earthquake; I have such an opinion of the veracity of the Man, that I give my assent to it and believe it firmly.

Let us suppose afterwards that God reveals this same to me. As yet there is the same degree of perspicuity allow∣ing the ability and veracity of the man; for then both God and he tell truth in this. But if God confirm the relati∣on by a Miracle, this shall raise an E∣vidence

or degree of knowledge in my Mind, beyond any thing the man is able to effect; and consequently the revelation of the same thing from God makes it clearer, and gives it a greater degree of perspicuity than it had before.

But it will be yet more clear, That Authority is a ground of Perswasion, if we consider, that all Evidence in the Mind proceeds from Evidence in the Thing. Now all Truths in them∣selves are equally evident; but in re∣spect of us they are not so: for some we are capable of knowing distinctly, and some we are not, because they are not suited to our present ca∣pacities. In respect of those divine truths, or of that part of them which is suited to our present capacities, Evi∣dence is the ground of perswasion; but in respect of that part of it, which is not suited to our Capacities, as we have seen, Authority is.

And thus we see, how we may give our assent, to many propositions, for the substance of which we have no E∣vidence in the mind. Why then says he a man shall believe what he doth not know, and that is giving his assent to nothing. But this is a quibble and to remove it effectually, let us take up the same propositions again.

The three angles of a Triangle are e∣qual to two right ones.

'Tis plain a man who knows what a Triangle is, and what it is for one Angle to be equal to another, may give his assent to this proposition; though perhaps it may be utterly im∣possible ever to beat the demonstra∣tion into his head. And though he doth not comprehend it, yet he can't be said to be ignorant of it. And the only ground of his assent is, the Au∣thority of some person who is able to demonstrate it.

And thus it is with a divine pro∣position. When Christ appears we shall be like him. Any one who knows what it is for a body to be rais'd, and for one thing to be like another, may give his assent to this proposition; though it be impossible for him to know wherein this likeness will consist, or to demonstrate that it will certainly be so. And therefore the Authority of God is the only grounds of perswa∣sion in this proposition; and no Evi∣dence is necessary any farther than to understand the meaning of the words, and the truth of the revelation it self. So groundless is that main principle of his, that a man can give his assent to nothing but what he comprehends: whereas the contrary is as clear as the light, from what hath been said.

But farther, from this supposition of his, that Authority is only a means of Information, and Evidence the only ground of Perswasion, these two absur∣dities will directly follow.

1. That a man can never be decei∣ved in any thing; for if Evidence in the Mind be the only ground of Per∣wasion, a man can never give his assent but where there is this Evidence: for if there be but one only cause, the effect can never proceed but from that cause; and what is evident (i: e:) what is truly known, can never deceive.

He hath no way of evading this, but by saying that the cause of error is the giving assent where there is none, or not sufficient Evidence in the Mind; which destroys every thing he says upon this head, for this supposes that there may be some other cause of assent besides Evidence. But if we suppose Evidence to be the only cause of assent, then it must vary in degrees together with it's cause; so that a clear Evidence shall have a firm assent, and the least degree of Evidence shall have but the least degree of assent; so that still a man can never be deceiv'd in any thing, or in any degree. And for him to say that we may think we have this

Evidence when we have it not, is still supposing that there is some other ground of assent. Nay worse, 'tis supposing that a thing may be Evi∣dent to us, and not Evident at the same time.

2. It will follow that no Person either God or Man, can be believ'd on their word. For what they relate is evident to the Mind, or it is not; If it be, then they give their assent to that Evidence, and not to the Person who relates it. If it be not evident (i: e:) according to him, if he doth not know it perfectly, he must utterly reject it. And thus in a few words he destroys all Faith, both Human and Divine. For thus he proceeds; a man can believe nothing but what he knows; and he knows nothing but what he comprehends; and then he is said to comprehend a thing when he hath a clear and distinct Idea of it, (i: e:) when it is as clear as a Ma∣thematical Demonstration; or as evi∣dent as what he sees with his Eyes, for you know seeing's believing all the World over.

Having thus made it plain that Evi∣dence is not the only ground of Per∣swasion, I come now to consider his clear and distinct Idea's which he lays down as the ground of this Evidence. This opinion carries a face of fairness and probability, and insinuates it self by the common inclinations of men, who are naturally averse to all restraint in thinking as well as acting, and are as uneasy at any fetters upon their Mind as upon their Body. They wou'd not willingly be oblig'd to give their assent to any thing but what they have clear & distinct Idea's of; and if it be not thus in the Christian Religion, even well meaning people are apt to wish it were so.

Now because I design this Letter in answer not only to this Book, but to all the opposers of Revelation and Myste∣ries, upon the like principles of setting up for Reason and Evidence, and clear and distinct notions of every thing they give their assent to, I shall be very particular in the consideration of this point. And I hope to make out

plainly to them, the deep deceit that lies at the bottom of all this; and to convince them that God, by requiring their assent to his Revelations, doth as little violence to their mind as to their body; and that he leaves their Reason as full a scope, and as great a liberty in matters of Religion as in any thing else. So that they will find us as great Sticklers for clear Idea's, strict Reason, and Evidence as they can be for their hearts.

These men speak much truth, but make false inferences, never conside∣ring the difference between these two propositions, but confounding them in all their discourses.

Clear and distinct Idea's are the foun∣dation of all our knowledge and assent, which consider'd in a right sence is undoubtedly true. But for that other which they make a consequence of it, it is absolutely false, viz.

That we can believe nothing but what we have a clear and distinct Idea of. For the clear conceptions we have of

some things, give us a confus'd and imperfect knowledge of others; and it is upon the account of those things whereof we have clear and distinct Idea's, that we give a firm assent to the existence of things whereof we have no Idea at all. So that these two sayings widely differ; as much as truth from falshood.

I can give no assent without clear and distinct Idea's. And

I must have a clear and distinct Idea of every thing I give my assent to.

Now because this is the fundamen∣tal error of all our quaint Reasoners ag••inst Revelation, and the fallacy w••••••••by they impose upon others, I shall express my self as distinctly and p••••••nly in this matter as I can.

But by the way we must observe th•••• since it appears und••niably from w•••••• hath been said, that Evidence is ••o•• ••••e only ground of Perswasion, it is a direct and immediate consequence

from thence; that there is no necessity of having a clear and distinct Idea of what I give my assent to. Not but that I allow there is a necessity of clear and distinct Idea's of some things, to make us give our assent to others; And therefore though Authority be a ground of Perswasion, yet what this man wou'd insinuate doth not follow, viz: That therefore all it's Relations, or any of them are to be receiv'd without Examen. For all the Revelations of God admit of the strictest enquiry, and severest search of our reason: and it is this that enables us to distinguish them from the wild extravagancies of Enthusiast's, and the delusions of the Devil. It is by the help of this that I now shew the difference between his fallacies and the truth of God. And in order to set them both in a clear light, I shall six the signification of this most ambiguous word, which he hath compell'd me to make so much use of, for otherwise we shall but grope for truth in the dark.

What is meant by an Adaequate Idea is sure and fixt (i: e:) a full and comprehensive knowledg of any thing, so as to know all that is knowable in it. But how far short, what men call a clear and distinct Idea comes of that adaequate conception of a thing, is impossible to determine, because our knowledge of things is varied almost in infinite degrees; insomuch that per∣haps we have not Idea's of any two things in nature, that are equally clear and distinct. And therefore to cut of all Metaphysical nicities, and infist upon nothing but genuine Reason; by a clear and distinct Idea, as it relates to this controversy is signified, as clear and distinct a conception as we ordinarily have of the things of this World. For these are the two main things he contends for in his whole Book.

• 1. That we have as clear and distinct Idea's of all things reveal'd to us in the Gospel, as we have of the ordinary Phae∣nomena of Nature. And
• ...

• 2. That we are oblig'd to give our assent to them no farther than we have clear and distinct Idea's of them.

In direct opposition to which, I shall lay down these two propositions.

• 1. That we are so far from having clear and distinct Idea's of those things of another World which are revealed to us, that we have no proper or immediate Idea at all of them. And
• 2. That though we have no proper or immediate Idea of those things, yet we are bound to believe them; and that our assent to them, according to his own prin∣ciple, is founded upon clear and distinct Idea's.

1. As to the first by a proper and immediate Idea I mean, a conception or notion of the thing as it is in it self,

By a mediate or improper Idea I mean, a notion we form of any thing in our Minds by Analogy or * 1.13 Similitude. Whether this distinction hath been made use of or no I know not; but sure I am 'tis a very necessary one, and of excellent use to set the bounds and measures of our knowledge, and to lay open the true nature of our Chris∣tian Faith: that we may clearly ap∣prehend where Knowledge ends, and Faith proceeds alone. And I am per∣swaded a due observation of this di∣stinction, wo'd effectually put an end to all this controversie about mysteries.

Now what I say is this, that we have no proper Idea's of the things of ano∣ther World, but frame to our selves conceptions of them, from those things in this World whereof we have clear and distinct Idea's. And to make this appear, let us consider that there are but two ways of Gods revealing any thing to us; either by giving us new faculties, or by adapting his Re∣velations to those we have, which are our Sences and our Reason. He grants that it is not by giving us any new fa∣culties; and therefore since this is done by adapting himself to those faculties we already have, then 'tis plain that he must make use of such words and notions as fall within their proper sphere.

Now that we can have no proper or immediate Idea from Sence or Rea∣son, of the real nature of any thing relating to another life as it is in it self; or indeed any other notion of them than that of Being in general, will best appear by instancing in the particulars. I shall begin with God

himself and his Attributes, that incom∣prehensible Being which this bold man affirms, to have nothing more myste∣rious in it than a stock or a stone.

1. And first our imagination can frame no likeness or resemblance of God, as it can do of material and sen∣sible Objects; and therefore the Is∣raelites were forbid to represent him by any figure or resemblance, because they saw no similitude. And to the same purpose are many expressions in the Scriptures as Is••i. 40. 18. To whom then will ye liken God? or what likeness will ye compare unto him? So that I hope I have gain'd thus much, that God is more mysterious than a stock or a stone, because we can frame some imagination of these, but none at all of him.

2. But 2dly, as we can form no si∣militude from the Sences, so neither hath the Reason any the least glimps of his real Nature as he is in himself, for

the only way we have of forming an Idea of him is either negatively, by re∣moving from him all the Imperfections of the Creatures, or by enlarging those excellencies we find in these, and attri∣buting them to God. So that he is now incomprehensible to us, not only as we have no clear and distinct know∣ledge of him, but as we have no pro∣per Idea at all of his real nature. And therefore when he made a particular Revelation of himself it was only by the name I AM, which denoted nothing more of him than barely his Existence; and plainly intimated that it was impossible for them to conceive any thing farther of him. For this reason 'tis said that hereafter we shall see him as he is, because we have no knowledg of him now, but by medi∣ation of those Idea's we have of the things of this World. And to make this farther appear let us consider him in those Attributes of his, whereof we are thought to have the most clear and distinct Idea's. And

1. 'Tis reveal'd to us that God is a Spirit, by which we really understand nothing more, than that he is a Being that is not matter; which is so far from a proper immediate Idea, that it is not a positive one; for all the notion we have of a Spirit is that it thinks, and that it moves. As to the first of these, the only reason why we attri∣bute it to a Spirit, is because we can demonstrate that meer matter cannot think; And therefore we conclude it must be something else that can, thô we have no notion at all of what it is. Besides we can't conceive what think∣ing is in a pure Spirit; we know no∣thing of the true manner of that ope∣ration in them, which is answerable to knowledg in us▪ We can conceive thinking now, only as it is perform'd by help of material Organs, and more immediately by the Fibres of the Brain. But when we set our selves to consider it abstractedly from these, we have no Idea at all of it. So that we now form as gross a notion of thinking in a pure Spirit, as we do of it's motion,

when we walk by dragging one Leg after another.

And then as to it's motion, when we say a Spirit moves, we don't make this inference from any knowledge we have of the true nature of it, but because we can prove that matter can't move it self, and thus by denying it to matter, we really do nothing more than give it to something else; but what that something is we know not. For we know not how it moves, or how it communicates this motion to matter. Nor indeed can we distinguish Thought and Motion in a Spirit; and as far as we may make a conjecture of what we have no Idea of, in all likely∣hood they are the same. And there∣fore I can't but wonder that any one* 1.14 sho'd affirm, that we have as clear and distinct an Idea of Spirit as of Body. That we have as good proof for it's existence, as we have for that of mat∣ter I grant; but to say our Idea's of their Modes and Properties are equally clear and distinct, appears to be a very groundless assertion.

2. As for Infinity another Attribute of God, the only way we are said to form a notion of this, is by continu'd accumulation, and then a confus'd Idea of what remains when we are weary of this. But 'tis plain there is not one addition we make but ipso fac∣to we destroy it's being; the very thought of addition, does of all things in the World carry the Mind farthest from the real nature of it. And how little this will help us to any imme∣diate positive Idea of it is plain, be∣cause that when we have imagin'd all the Atoms that go to the composition of the Universe, told as many times over as we can heap up numbers for it, we are as far from any true Idea of Infinity, as when we began to reckon Two. Had I said One, we sho'd in all likelyhood have been nearer it; as an instant of time hath been found a bet∣ter representation of Eternity, than the successions of numberless. Ages. And therefore it were more conducive* 1.15 to true knowledge, to own our igno∣rance, and say it is a perfection which

we know nothing of, but we form a gross, a scanty notion of it by perpe∣tual addition to the widest space, or greatest number, or longest duration we can think of.

3. As to his Omnipresence we have no Idea at all of it, for it is utterly impossible for us to conceive, how the same thing sho'd be here, and there, and every where in the same instant: and therefore we frame to our selves a gross notion of it by that of conti∣nued extension; thô at the same time we are sure this must be utterly incon∣sistent with the real Nature of God.

4. And as for the Prescience of God, we are so far from having any notion of it, that it can't enter into our heads to think how God sho'd actually see a thing that hath no being: for God sees things to come, as we see what is now. So that we can no more conceive it, than we can conceive how a thing may

be, and not be at the same time; and therefore we frame to our selves the best Idea we can of it (i. e.) from those previous Idea's of things in our Mind; which doth not at all represent this Attribute of Prescience as it is in God, who sees them actually and ex parte rei. Nor can we conceive how this Prescience of his is reconcileable with the contingency of things, thô we are sure it is so, from those Prophecies of very minute circumstances, many hun∣dreds of years before they came to pass.

I might thus run through all the Attributes of God, and shew in eve∣ry one of them, how we make to our selves some representations of them, by compounding and enlarging those Idea's we have either of sensible Ob∣jects, or of the operations of our own Minds. And thus we represent the Wisdom, and Power, and Justice, and Holyness, and Mercy, &c. of God, from the scanty notions we have of

these things in our selves, thô they exhibit to us no more of the real nature of these things as they are in God, than continu'd extension doth of his Omnipresence; or a great number doth of his Infinity; or many ages of his Eternity. So that in all our thoughts of that divine Being we don't proceed thus. The nature of God is such, therefore these things follow. But these things are the greatest perfections we are able to conceive, and therefore by help of these we form the best and most honourable Idea of God, that is possible for us in this condition of in∣firmity and blindness that we are now in. Not but that after we have fram'd the biggest Idea of God our Minds are capable of, by the greatest enlargement of these perfections, after all, 'tis as gross a representation of him as Dark∣ness is of Light: and expresseth no∣thing of the reall nature of that in∣comprehensible Being to us, nor do they give us the least glimps of him as he is in himself.

2. But 2dly, As we can have no such proper and immediate Idea of God himself, so neither have we such Idea's of any thing relating to another World. And therefore it is that the Glory of Heaven, is reveal'd to us under the notion of Light; the greatness and splendour of that place, by that of a Kingdom; and the joys of Heaven by sensual pleasures, such as Eating and Drinking; the operation of Grace, by the nourishment of our Bodies, &c. and when God himself is spoke of, 'tis always by analogy with the Members of a Human Body, and the operations of our Minds. Thus he is mention'd as having Hands and Feet, as Seeing, and Hearing, and as being affected with all the passions of a Human Soul; because he hath no other way to speak of himself to us now, since we have neither Words nor Idea's, to think or speak of him after any other manner; or indeed of any other Objects of a∣nother World.

And therefore it is that the Spirit of God in all his Revelations, hath made use, not only of the Words and Phrases commonly receiv'd and under∣stood; but likewise of those common notions in the minds of Men, of things in this World, to represent Truths, which are in respect of us now uncon∣ceivable; and for which there are as yet no capacities in our nature. So that in truth all the Idea's we at present have of the things of another World, are no other than a sort of Types and Figures of things, the real nature of which is totally obscur'd from us.

And this is the literal meaning of* 1.16 those words of St. Paul, That now we see through a Glass darkly, (i. e.) by ana∣logy only with the things of this World. But then Face to Face (i. e.) we shall have as immediate a view of those heavenly Objects, as we have now of these things which only represent them to us. So that when we are said to have these divine Truths reveal'd to us in part, the meaning is not, that any real part of the thing as it is in it self

is exhibited to our view, and the rest obscur'd; or that we have any indi∣stinct view of the thing it self, as we see an Object at a great distance. But the meaning is, that the whole is re∣veal'd to us under the resemblance of some things in this World, whereof we have clear and distinct▪ Idea's.

And thus it is plain that thô we may be said to have Idea's of God and Di∣vine things, yet they are not imme∣diate or proper ones, but a sort of com∣position we make up from our Idea's of Wordly Objects; which at the utmost amounts to no more than a Type or Figure, by which something in ano∣ther World is signified, of which we have no more notion than a Blind-man hath of Light. And now that I am fallen into this Metaphor, which seems well to explain the nature of the thing, let us pursue it a little; and suppose, that to a Man who had never seen or heard any thing of it, it were to be reveal'd that there was such a thing as Light. This man as yet hath neither a name

nor a notion for it, nor any capacity of conceiving what it is in it self. 'Tis plain therefore God wo'd not reveal this to him by the name of Light, a word wholly unknown to him; nor by stamping on his Mind any imme∣diate Idea of the thing it self: for then it were utterly impossible for him to communicate this Revelation to others as blind as himself; for nothing but the same Almighty impression cou'd do that. So that this Revelation must be made by Words and Notions which are already in him. And accordingly when he is told, that it is a thing which can diffuse it self in an instant many thousands of miles round; and enable him to know in a moment what order all things lay at a great distance from him, and what proportion they bore one to another; nay that it cou'd make him know where the Heavens lay; and by the help of this he shou'd there discern at once, a vast and almost infinite number of very pleasant Bo∣dies; and in short that without the help of his Stick or his Hand he shou'd know every thing that lay before him.

After all, 'tis plain this Man wou'd form to himself an Idea of Light from his Touch, he wou'd think it very like feeling, and perhaps call it by that name; because this was the best way he had of distinguishing one thing from ano∣ther: and therefore wou'd conclude that those Bodies he heard of, must needs be wondrous soft and smooth.

Just thus do we conceive the things of another World, so that we may rack our invention, and turn and wind all those Idea's we have into ten Thou∣sand different shapes, and yet never make up any likeness or similitude, of the real Nature of those Objects of another World.

And now I hope, he will grant it a thing possible for God to make such a Revelation as this to a Blind man. And yet by this concession he destroys his whole Book. For upon his Principles it were a thing utterly impossible for any man that was born Blind, to be∣lieve there is such a thing as Light,

upon the testimony either of God or Man, for without the use of one of his Eyes at least, he's so far from having any clear and distinct Idea of it, that he cou'd have no Idea at all of it as it is in it self; and therefore must never believe that there is such a thing. Now it were a very pretty way of revealing the nature of Light to this Man, by opening of his Eyes. Then I must confess Light wou'd be no longer a Mystery to him. And when this Man makes us understand (as he hath un∣dertaken) the nature of God, and the things of another World, as per∣fectly as that man doth the nature of Light when his Eyes are open'd, I will yield. But till then, I must freely own ours to be the case of that Blind man, in respect of all the Mysteries of our Religion: and before this won∣derful Book of his comes out, I am very positive that nothing less than the Almighty Power of God is able to perform what he promises, since it requires the alteration of our whole Nature, and the enlargement of all our Faculties.

But perhaps he will object here, If it be a thing thus impossible for us to have any proper Idea's of these things of ano∣ther World, what necessity was there for any revelation at all of them? wou'd not the immediate Objects of Sense and Reason have done as well, with∣out farther reference to any thing be∣yond them? I answer, no. For the discovery of the things of another World even thus far, is absolutely ne∣cessary to make men good and vertu∣ous. Thô we had ever so great a con∣viction of the innate excellency of Ver∣tue it self, yet this wou'd bind us but like a Spider's Webb. We might per∣haps have admir'd it for it's delicate and excellent contexture, but it wou'd have been of no strength, to restrain the unruly inclinations of our Nature. The excellencies of Vertue, without these Revelations, had been a sort of Bonds and Fetters which wou'd have sat as loose upon us as the Air; they wou'd have serv'd at best only to have rais'd our admiration, but never to have influenc'd our practice. And

therefore since they were thus neces∣sary, and that we are not capable of any knowledge of them by direct and immediate intuition, there was no o∣ther way of revealing them to us, but by analogy with the things of this World. And this Imperfect way of Revelation is sufficient to answer all the ends of God, since it is abundantly enough to all the purposes of Vertue and Holi∣ness: as the motions of the heavenly Bodies represented in a Sphere, is suf∣ficient to answer all the ends of human life, thô the Hypothesis be all very different from it, and represents no∣thing less to us, than the reality of the thing.

It being, as I hope by this time very plain, that we have no such proper or immediate Idea's, either of God or the things of another World, as of the things in this; we may from hence see the spe∣cious trifling of those abstracted Meta∣physical Brains, who bend their endea∣vours to bring down these hidden things to the level of our present ca∣pacities

of knowledge: whereas the fin∣ding out a way of commerce with the Moon, or how to make a visit to the sixt Stars, is a grave and serious thought to it.

The other Proposition I laid down in direct opposition to him was,

2. That thô we have no proper or im∣mediate Ideas of these things, yet that we are bound to believe them. And, That our belief of them is founded upon clear and distinct Idea's. Not of them∣selves, but of those things by which they are represented to us, and because of those proofs we have from thence of their existence to our Senses and our Reason.

And here we are to observe what I made out before, viz. That in every Mystery there are two things to be consider'd. 1. Something that we do comprehend fully, and 2dly Something

that we have no notion at all of. As to this latter part of it, it is wholly ex∣empted from the disquisition of Rea∣son, and Faith alone can reach it, for our Reason fails us where we have no Idea's. So that in respect of this part of the Mystery, these and such like ex∣pressions of his are very true, viz.

That the intermediate Idea can be no* 1.17 proof, where the agreement with both Idea's of the question is not evident. And again.

That when we have no Notions or Idea's of a thing we cannot Reason about it at all. For, as I have shewn, we have no proper immediate Idea's of the things revealed to us in the Gospel; and therefore we can't speak one word of sence about the real nature of them, as they are in themselves.

All beyond this World, as yet, is but a dark and empty Void to us; and we may send out our Reason to range it backward and forward incestantly, till Soul and Body part, and never di∣scover

the least glimps of light, into the true nature of any thing beyond this scanty Sphere of ours. We have no intermediate Ideas to make Inferen∣ces concerning them, and if we had, there cou'd be no application of them to things whereof we have no notion. So that thus far every thing of another World is a mystery to us, and a new born Infant knows as much of them, bating their existence only, as the learn∣edst man in the world.

But as to that other part of them which is knowable by us (i. e.) as far as we are able to conceive these divine things, by analogy with the things of this World, either under the similitude of sensible Objects, or the Operations of our own Mind, they fall intirely under the consideration of our Reason. Thus far we have as clear and distinct Ideas of them, as we have of other ordina∣ry worldly Objects. And in respect of this part of our Christian Mysteries, all these sayings of his are very true, viz.

That nothing reveal'd is more exempt∣ed from the disquisitions of Reason, than the ordinary Pha••nomena of Nature. And

That nothing in the Gospel is contrary to Reason, or above it.

For all the Revelations of God are in a way suitable to those powers of knowledge we have, and he requires us to believe nothing, but what is just and reasonable. For as he says, To act tyrannically does only become the Devil. In respect of this part of the Mystery, all that he contends for holds true. We must have clear and distinct Idea's of the things; we must have interme∣diate Idea's to find out the agreement be∣tween the Extremes. What need I in∣stance in any more particulars? I al∣low him thus far, all the Clearness, Per∣spicuity, Evidence and Reason any man can wish for. And all the request I would make to these Men of Reason is, That they wou'd cease to ask for a rational account, of what neither they

nor we can have any notion of; and that as to every thing else in Religion, they wo'd be as exact, and critical, and severe in their Reasonings as possible they can. And unless they find more reason to believe the truth of those things reveal'd in the Gospel, than it is possible for them to have for what any Man says, then I will allow them to be the only Men of Sence, and that we are only soft and credulous fools.

'Tis every mans native Right and Priviledge to judg and examine every thing, before he gives his assent to it; and 'tis this alone which distinguisheth our Christian Faith from blind Credu∣lity, because it admits of such enquiry. For thô we have no notion of the things themselves, yet we are sufficiently assur'd of the truth of them, from those things we fully understand: And the constant method of arguing in divine things is this; from the things where∣of we have clear and distinct Idea's, we infer the existence of those things whereof we have no Idea at all. As for instance in this Proposition.

This Corruptible shall put on Incor∣ruption.

I have a clear and distinct Idea of what it is for a Body to corrupt and rot; and likewise I know what an a∣thletick habit of body is, and for a person to have a firm constitution, and to remain always in the utmost beauty and vigour of a blooming Youth, which is the best Idea of Incorruption that I can frame to myself now. And the reason I give my assent to this Proposition, is not because I have any, the least notion of that immu∣table state of perfection which a Body shall be rais'd to, and which is here represented under the notion of In∣corruption. But because I have suf∣ficient proof for the truth of it, in this Type or Figure by which it is repre∣sented to me, that it is possible for me to have, (i. e.) the concurring testi∣monies of Prophecies, Miracles, and the Excellency of that Doctrine which they

preach't, who were made the instru∣ments of revealing this to me.

And thus likewise, thô we have no Idea of God as he is in himself, yet we infer his Existence from those clear and distinct Ideas we have of the things of Nature; which is the ve∣ry meaning of the Apostle when he says, All that was to be known of God was manifested in them, for the invisible* 1.18 things of him from the creation of the World are cleerly seen, being understood by the things that are made. It was for want of some Idea of him as he is, that made the Heathen World run into Idolatry, and represent him under the similitude of some of the meanest of his Creatures. And now by Revelati∣on, what we come to know more of him is, that we can have no Idea at all of him as he is in himself: and as it follows it is this will one day render all Infidels without excuse, because thô they had no clear and distinct Ideas of the things of another World, yet God did not leave them without suffi∣cient

proof of their existence; nay greater than it was possible for them to have for any thing else.

From whence we see, that there is an essential difference between Human and Divine Faith, because the proof on which one is grounded is fallible, and that of the other infallible; and consequently a greater degree of knowledg in the one than in the other. This is one reason of using these two words Faith and Knowledg so promis∣cuously in some places of the New Testament, because our belief of a meer man, is but a precarious assent, but the Christian Faith may be called Knowledg in a more peculiar sence, be∣cause we are obliged to believe no∣thing, but what we have infallible prooffor. Which again shews the fal∣sity of that saying of his, which he lays such a stress upon. That Divine and Human Revelations do not differ in degrees o•• perspicuity. For where there is a greater degree of Knowledg, there is a greater degree of Perspecuity, but

in the Christian Faith there is a grea∣ter degree of Knowledg, Ergò.

And now we see plainly the error of those men, who out of a mistaken zeal for the Mysteries of Christianity, have set themselves to defend them, by bringing them down to the level of a man: and endeavour by thin spun notions, to solve the greatest difficulties in them upon the Principles of Reason. These are very rash and inconsiderate attempts; and when all is done, their failing in what they aim at, is the best defence of our Christian Mysteries. If we had not a determinate sence for the words wherein they are reveal'd, they could be no Articles of Faith, And if they cou'd be fully solv'd and explain'd, they wou'd cease to be My∣steries. This hath given the Enemies of our Religion a great advantage, for when they find they are not to be throughly accounted for (as indeed they are not) upon the strength of Reason, together with the assistance of

that degree of Revelation we now have, they utterly reject them, as in∣consistent with those powers of know∣ledge which God hath given us. Ne∣ver distinguishing between that part of a Mystery, which we understand clear∣ly and distinctly, and will admit of the strictest enquiry of the mor••sest Reaso∣ner; and the substance of the thing sig∣nified by it, whereof we have no Idea at all, and therefore nothing can be more absur'd than to raise any Disputes about it.

It wou'd certainly be very pleasant, to hear two such quicksighted blind men as I spoke of, dispute warmly concerning the nature of Light, and how many seeming contradictions they wou'd start concerning it, as, How any thing cou'd be in every point of such a vast space in the same instant? How it was possible for them to touch so many millions of Objects at once? Since this was their chief way of distinguishing one thing from another, &c. and fall

out about these imaginary difficulties irreconcilably. Whereas upon suppo∣sition, that it was reveal'd to them that there was such a thing; which shou'd make them very happy some time or other, when God shou'd open their eyes: Their business was not to consider, whether they were able clear∣ly and distinctly to comprehend the na∣ture of this thing; but whether it were really reveal'd to them, under the no∣tion of such things whereof they had clear and Distinct Idea's. If it were divinely reveal'd, and they had suffi∣cient testimonies for the reality and existence of it, then they wou'd have sufficient reason to believe it, with∣out any clear and distinct Idea of the thing it self.

So that we take a wrong method, against all the Opposers of Revelation and Mysteries, when we go about to explain to them what is really inex∣plicable by us now; many such pro∣phane and impious Books as these have been the consequence of it. We are

neither able to apprehend any thing of these Mysteries, nor if we knew them, cou'd we explain them so as to make other people understand us. 'Tis the greatest Folly, because it is im∣possible; and the greatest Boldness, be∣cause it is searching into what is hid∣den from us; and all these elaborate Intricacies are but mischievous ••rifling. And when Men talk so much, o•• what they have no Idea of, it must always end in darkness and confusion. That part of a Christian Mystery which is intelligible and plain, was ever so; and that part which is mysterious, notwith∣standing all their vain endeavours, will ever be so till we co•••• to another World.

Therefore our way to deal with these men is, to fix the right sence and meaning of those Propositions, where∣in the Mysteries of the Gospel are re∣veal'd to us; and then to insist upon the Proofs we have for the truth of the Revelation, and shew that they are

such as ought to convince any reaso∣nable unprejudic'd man; insomuch that if they do not give their assent to them, they shall be without excuse when they come to be try'd for their Infidelity. Thus we shou'd turn the course of our Thoughts into a right Chanel, and confound all these Ene∣mies of our excellent Religion. For by freely owning (as becomes us) that we have no notion at all of these mysterious things as they are in them∣selves, we cut off a multitude of frivo∣lous and impertinent Objections. And shew these men, that our Christian Faith however is no lazy credulity, or blind implicite assent, since it is built upon a better foundation, than is pos∣sible for any man to lay, without the concurrence of the Almighty Power of God: insomuch that we are ready to join issue with them, upon the Prin∣ciples of Reason, in every point of our Christian Faith, as far as the things reveal'd fall within the compass of it.

And therefore were I to give a rea∣son of my belief of the TRINITY, laying aside all affectation of hard words, and abstruse Metaphysical Noti∣ons, I wou'd do it thus.

I am fully perswaded of the neces∣sity of Revelation in general, in or∣der to all the purposes of Vertue and Piety in this life; and I am convinc'd that those Revelations of the things of another World, which are made in the Gospel, have better proofs of their Divinity than any other whatso∣ever. They have such testimonies of their coming from God, from Prophe∣cies, and Miracles, and the agreeable∣ness of the Doctrines therein con∣tain'd, to our common Notions, that if I use my Reason with the same im∣partiality in these that I do in other things, I must give my assent to them.

In those writings I find this Pro∣position,

There are Three that bear Record in* 1.19 Heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and these Three are one.

* 1.20

From whence, and from many o∣ther passages in the Scriptures, I find that there is a Distinction made in the Godhead, under these three names of Father, Son, and Holy-Ghost, which the Church hath exprest, altogether by the word Trinity, and singly by the word Person. And I think these terms proper enough, to express all that we know of this Mystery.

Now I find no account of the Man∣ner and Nature of this Distinction in the holy Scriptures, any otherwise than that the Son was begotten, and that the Holy Ghost comes from the Father and the Son. I conclude there is some∣thing more than a meer Nominal Di∣stinction, because we are said to be Bap∣tized, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy-Ghost. Which must needs import something more than if that Commission had run thus. Go Baptize all Nations in the name of Jehovah, and of Elohim, and of Adonai. And if there were not something more

intended, than barely that they shou'd do it in the name of God, this were a needless tautology.

Again, I conclude that they are not three distinct different Spirits, for then there must be three Gods, contra∣ry to Reason and Scripture. From all which I infer, there is in the Godhead something more than a meer nominal Distinction, and something less than that of three different Spirits. And because I find each Person seperatly as well as jointly mention'd as God, and Divine Worship allow'd and paid to them. Therefore as that excellent Creed ex∣presseth it, I worship the Trinity in Uni∣ty,* 1.21 and Unity in Trinity; neither con∣founding the Persons, nor dividing the Substance,

Now at the same time I make this profession of my Faith, I allow I have not the least knowledg how strict this Union is, nor how great the Distinction. It is as much beyond my Reason, as

the Glory of God is beyond my Sight; and any man who strives to conceive it himself, or takes pains to explain it to others, is guilty of such a folly, that I can't think of any action in nature ex∣travagant enough to match it. If we saw a Man stretching up his hand with a great deal of Vehemence to pull down a Star, we shou'd certainly conclude him distracted; because 'tis utterly im∣possible for him to reach it, or grasp it if he cou'd. 'Tis the very case of those men, who go about to account for the manner of that Unity, and Distinction for which they have neither Words nor Idea's.

And therefore I say it again, in op∣position to this Insolent Man, that I thus adore what I cannot comprehend. This is one of those Mysteries reveal'd in the Gospel, and it is never the less a Mystery for any thing he hath yet said, or ever will say; for the Union is inexplicable, and will be so to the end of the World. However my assent to this is not precarious and implicite▪

or any easie blind Credulity; but is ••ounded upon clear and distinct Idea's. For there are three things to be done by every reasonable thinking man, concerning any Proposition wherein a Mystery is reveal'd.

• 1. To be sure that he understand well the meaning of the Words.
• 2. That he discern no Contradiction in them.
• 3. That he hath sufficient evidence of the Revelations coming from God.

1. As to the first of these, in respect of the Mystery I am now upon, I un∣derstand very well the meaning of the Words wherein it is reveal'd; and they themselves who oppose this Doctrine understand them as well as I; for if they did not know what was meant by the Words, they wou'd never set themselves to argue against it; for there is no other way of con••uting Nonsence, but saying it is such. So that thus far, if it prove to be true, these Propositions wherein the Trinity is reveal'd, will hold good against them

at the day of Judgment, and render them without Excuse.

2. As to the second thing, I see no Contradiction in it; and if there were, I would utterly reject it. For to say that Three are One, is so far from being a contradiction, that there is nothing more common in ordinary discourse, than for any one to say, that Three or any other greater number of things, are but one; and if every man who spoke such seeming contradictions, were catch't up immediately, and forc'd to explain himself upon all such occasions, it wou'd make conversation very troublesome. As if one shou'd say, that there are three distinct things in a Man, a Body, the Animal Spirits, and an Immaterial Substance, and yet these three are but one; and he shou'd be forc'd to explain himself and say, that his meaning is not, that three men are one man, or that one man is three men. They who cry there is a Contradiction in this Mystery, seem to me neither to know what a Contradiction is, nor what is the Christian Faith concerning

the Trinity. For we don't believe that the Divinity is One & Three in the same sence; then indeed it wou'd be a contradiction. But we affirm the quite contrary, viz. that the God∣head is One & Three in different respects. So that all this noise of Contradiction vanishes, and the whole force of the Objection amounts to no more than this, viz. That we are not able to conceive, in what respect he is one, and in what respect he is three; and there∣fore because we have no clear and di∣stinct Idea of this, we must utterly re∣ject it. I grant we are not able to ac∣count for this, and it is this that makes it a Mystery, and if I cou'd clearly solve the manner of this Union and Distin∣ction it wou'd ••••a••e to be such. Thus much of it is purely the Object of my Faith, and the Authority of God is the only ground of my assent to this part of it. But then

3. I have sufficient proof of this Re∣velation's coming from God. I have for This, all the proof that I have for the Truth of the Scriptures, and the

Divine Mission of the Persons who wrote them; so that I must either re∣ject all reveal'd Religion, or allow This to be an Article of my Faith.

But perhaps this man will Object, that thô he shou'd grant it to be an Article of Faith, yet it is so no far∣ther than we can comprehend it. But I have already made it out at the be∣gining, that both what we do, and what we cannot know are both in gross call'd the same Mystery; and that my assent to what I do not apprehend, is founded upon the Authority of God, but my assent to what I do apprehend is founded upon Evidence: The first assent is properly Faith, the last is Knowledge.

And so likewise if I were to give an account of my belief of the DIVI∣NITY OF THE SON, it shou'd be thus.

I am convinc'd by the Completion of Prophecies, the Miracles he wrought, and the agreablness of his Doctrine to the natural sentiments of our Minds, that whatever Jesus Christ was, He came from God. I find him in many places, assuming to himself the Name, and Titles, and Worship of God. In discoursing with the Jews he useth this form of Speech, Before Abraham was I AM, on purpose to signify to them, that he was that very Divine Being which was reveal'd to Moses under that Name. And sometime after he tells them, that as he was the Son of God, so He and the Father were one. That the Jews understood him in this sence I am sure, because they took up Stones at each of these sayings, to stone him as a Blasphemer, because he made him∣self equal with God. If these expressi∣ons were not to be understood in the sence they took them, he wou'd cer∣tainly have undeceived them, and have made it known, that he was not God in the sence they understood him; but that he was only a God by Deputation,

according to the wild notion of the So∣cinians. But he ••poke the Truth, and the Jews understood him right, That he was eternal God equal with the Father, the very same God who was signify'd by that sacred name I AM. And he hath never undeceiv'd either them or us to this day; but instead thereof hath us'd many expressions to countenance and encourage this notion of him; and therefore if I act like a reasonable man, I am under a necessity either of giving my assent to this▪ or of utterly rejecting him as an Impostor.

Now had he been and Impostor, God who shew'd himself always very jealous of his Honour, wou'd never have confirm'd this Doctrine of his with such repeated Testimonies. If we suppose him to be only a Messenger come from God, and a meer Man who spoke only by his Spirit and Commission, he wou'd never have us'd such expressions as must naturally be misunderstood, and lead thousands into the gross sin of Ido∣latry, which of all others is the most detestable to God. Moses was never

suffer'd to enter into the Land of Cana∣an, for a much less suspicious expressi∣on, and in the heat of passion too Must we bring water out of the Rock? which was a vainglorious insinuation, that they wrought that Miracle by their own immediate power, and pro∣per efficacy. This comes much short of these expressions of our Saviour's, destroy this Temple, and in three days I will raise it again. I have power to lay down my li••e, and I have power to take it up. And before Abraham was I am. And indeed that passage con∣cerning Moses, seems to have been upon Record by the special providence of God for this very purpose, that it might be a good argument of convicti∣on to the Jews of the Divinity of the Son, since this inference was very na∣tural and obvious from it, viz.

If God was so incens'd with Moses for making use of one expression, which seem'd to encroach upon his Prerogative; then how far wou'd he have been from giving testi∣mony, of much more frequent and greater Miracles, to a Person who by many plain∣er expressions, assum'd to himself the full

power and perfection of the Godhead; if he were not really what he gave himself out to be.

For this reason I say because I can't reject him as an Impostor, therefore I believe this Proposition, and confess, the blessed Jesus the Son of God to be Eternal God equal with the Father.

Now thus far I proceed in this My∣stery upon the strictest rules of Reason and Evidence, and my Faith of this Proposition is founded upon clear and distinct Idea's; for I know clearly who I mean by Jesus Christ, (i. e.) that Person who was born of the Virgin Mary, and Crucified under Pontius Pilate; I have a clear and distinct Idea of what it is for one thing to be equal to another; and I apprehend very well what is signify'd by the name of God here, (i. e.) that Divine Being whose necessary Existence, I infer from that clear knowledg I have of his Crea∣tures:

And of whose Nature, thô I have not the least notion as it is in it self, yet I form the best Idea of him I can by enlarging all the Perfections that are discernable in the Creatures. And I have a clear and distinct Idea, of what it is for one Person to be the Son of another. Thus I understand the meaning of the words; nor is there any thing in them contradictory to my rea∣son. And lastly I have clear and di∣stinct Idea's of those miraculous proofs to the senses of men; and of those com∣pletions of Prophecies; and the excel∣lency of that Doctrine they confirm, the agreableness of it to the common notions of Men, and it's natural ten∣dency to make men easy and pleasant and useful to one another. All which raise such an Evidence or Knowledg in my mind of the Divinity of his Mission who reveal'd this Proposition to me, that I must do violence to my Reason if I do not give my assent to it. And thus far it is not so properly and strictly a Mistery.

But when I think of this Proposition again, Jesus the Son of God, is God equal with the Father. I must own at the same time I give my assent to it, I have no knowledg at all of that Eter∣nal Generation, which I form an impro∣per Idea of from the Procreation of one Man from another. Nor have I any notion of this wonderful Union of the Human nature with the Divinity. Nor can I in the least imagine wherein this Equality consists. These and all other things relating to the manner of it, are wholly out of the reach of all my Capacities, and totally obscur'd from me. These are the things which make it a Mystery, and in respect of this part of it, the Authority or Veracity of God, is the only ground of my Perswasion; and my Christian Faith of this Article consists, in thus giving my assent to the existence of things which I have no notion of, when he hath taken care to give me undoubted Testimonies, of the revelation's coming from him. And I trust he will accept of it, because 'tis

no rash inconsiderate assent, but that I use those powers of knowledg I have, as strictly and impartially in this, as I wou'd do in any affair which imme∣diatly concern'd my life.

And thus I hope it plainly appears, how little reason these people have to talk to us of a blind implicite assent or easy credulity, since in our Christian Faith we proceed upon the strictest rules of Reason, and build our assent upon no foundation but what we know to be firm.

And now before I proceed to the o∣ther part of his Book, I shall repeat in short the Principles he lays down ••or himself to go upon in this, and the fol∣lowing Books which he threatens the World with.

The whole summe of his Logick in short then is this.

1. Evidence is the only ground of Perswasion (i. e.) you can never give your assent even to the reallity or existence of any thing, but when you know as much of it as you do of any thing in the World; and comprehend it as fully and perfectly as that 2 and 3 make 5. which is plainly to say, you can never believe any thing, but when it is so clearly known to you, that you can't help believing it; for no man can hinder his assent to a thing he knows perfect∣ly well: as no man can help believing that 2 and 2 make 4. A thing may be very true indeed, and you not believe it; but if this truth be evident to you, your assent must necessarily follow. So that you can believe nothing, but when you can't help it; and when you can't avoid it, then you must believe it;* 1.22 for God hath taken it out of our power to dissent from an evident Proposition. and our kind Disposer hath put us under* 1.23 a Law, of bowing before the Light and Majesty of Evidence, and therefore this Man must make such an Idol of it as totally to exclude all deefrence, or

assent to the Word of the true God. For another Principle of his is

2. That Authority is only a means of Information, (i. e.) you can believe nei∣ther God, nor Man upon their Word, for they can only relate a thing to you, but neither of them can influence your Mind to an assent. So that to speak plainly, 'tis all one in respect of your assent whether God, or Man, or the Devil tells you a thing, for thô you are convinc'd that God always tells truth, and the Devil is a Liar; yet still you believe the thing never the more because it comes from God. Alas! the veracity of God is not to be regarded in the case; no, you must bow before the Light and Majesty of Evidence only.

But suppose God and the Devil speak two contrary Propositions, as in the case of Eve. In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely Die. And, Thou shalt not surely Die. The words of these two Propositions were equally clear to her; she understood the sub∣stance

of them alike; and her Idea's of the things spoke of were equally clear and distinct. What then was the ground of her assent to the latter▪ it cou'd not be Evidence, for according to him, both these Propositions, had equal pretence to her * 1.24 assent upon this score; and therefore nothing remains to be the ground of her assent, but the Authority either of God or of the Devil. And we find by sad experience it was the Authority of the latter that sway'd her.

But 'tis plain, she had a greater de∣gree of Evidence or Knowledg of the truth of the former Proposition, be∣cause she kn••w it came from God who cou'd not lie; and yet we find she rebell'd against this Evidence. Whereas had she been under such a ne∣cessity of bowing before the Light and Majesty of Evidence, she wou'd not in all likelihood have transgress'd as she did; and then he had not now been falling down thus prostrate to Igno rance and Errour.

That which shews the ridiculousness of these two Principles is, that upon them we can never believe any thing that is to come, thô it were the next hour. For thô we understand the mea∣ning of the Words, and that the Pro∣phecie be concerning any of the most familiar Objects of Sense and Reason, so that you have the clearest Knowledg of the thing foretold: yet unless you will allow Authority to be a ground of Perswasion, you can never

believe the truth of the Relation; for no man can have any knowledg or Evi∣dence of this till the thing comes to pass. So that as to the truth of the Relation there is nothing left to be the ground of assent, but the Veracity or Authori∣ty of some Person or another. And thus he utterly destroys the Faith of all Prophecies; for thô they may be true, yet we can never believe them so, till the relation is evident to us; and this can never be evident to us, till the things actually come to pass. So that this is a short way of destroying the credit of every thing in the Gospel, which for the most part speaks of things to come.

I said before that in Divine Propo∣sitions, Evidence was a ground of Per∣swasion in respect of the Relation it self, or act of Revelation; and here I say that in respect of the very same, Autho∣rity is a ground of Perswasion. They are both true; and therefore to make this whole Discourse more clear, and prevent all mistakes as far as I am able,

I shall once for all, shew the diffe rence between Divine and Human Revelations in respect of those three things, which I said were to be con∣sider'd in every Revelation.

1. As to the meaning of the Words, Divine and Human Revelations are upon equal terms. They must be both intelligible alike, and thus far Evi∣dence or Knowledg is the only ground of Perswasion in each of them.

2. As to the substance of the thing reveal'd, in many cases they both a∣gree in this too, viz. That they are equally intelligible; for some of the Revelations of God, are concerning things as knowable by us, as the or∣dinary Phaenomena of Nature. But in respect of a reveal'd Mystery, Di∣vine and Human Revelations are di∣rectly opposite, for the substance of the thing intended by the revelation, in one must be always intelligible, but in the other it is totally obscur'd. But

3. As to the truth of the Relation it self, or the very act of Revelation there is this difference; that in all Human Revelations Authority is the only ground of Perswasion; because no meer Man can give any proof, which shall amount to more than a probabi∣lity or strong presumption. But in Divine Propositions, the truth of the Relation is founded both upon Evi∣dence and Authority. 1. Upon Evi∣dence, as the truth of it is confirmed by Testimonies which are certain and in∣fallible, as Prophecy, or Miracles, &c. which can come from none but God, and therefore create a degree of Know∣ledg beyond what is possible to be had of any relation meerly Human. 2dly. Upon Authority, as this Knowledg is not directly of the thing it self, and therefore that we do not know the truth of it by any direct or immediate intuition. So that these Testimonies are only to convince us that the Re∣velation comes from God, and then we give our assent to the truth of

them, purely upon the account of his Veracity. A third Principle of his is. That

3. Divine and Human Revelations differ not as to Perspicuity. (i. e.) You must understand the meaning of the Words in Divine Propositions as well* 1.25 as Human; for as for unintelligible Relations, we can no more believe them from the Revelation of God, than from that of Man. A very subtil piece of Logick indeed, if he had design'd no more than he spoke. But he hath a farther drift in it; he knew it was not every Reader wou'd distinguish be∣tween the Sence and Meaning of the Proposition, which we grant must be equally clear and perspicuous in both, in order to an assent; and, The reali∣ty and existence of the thing, and truth of the Revelation, in respect of which, the Revelations of God always carry a greater degree of Perspicuity; because of that Evidence in the Mind, occa∣sion'd by such proofs which it is im∣possible

for man to give. What I spoke of this before, I level'd at his design rather than his words, as I am forc'd to do in several other instances.

But he will say perhaps, these proofs may make the Revelation more cer∣tain, but not more clear. I grant they don't explain the words of it. But 'tis plain the Proofs make the Revelation never the more true or certain in it self: But it is in respect of us they make it more certain. And to make a Revelation more certain in respect of us, is to make it more clear; and that is to add a greater degree of Perspicui∣ry to it.

4. We can give our assent to nothing, but what we have clear and distinct Idea's of. (i. e) We can believe no∣thing but what we have the imme∣diate perception of Sense, or Demon∣stration for, or know by direct and im∣mediate Intuition.

Such stuff as this he lays down for Logick, and if you will argue with him, it must be in his own Method, and upon his own Principles; and then to be sure he will be too hard for you. But if you put him out of his Biass, and keep him to plain undisguis'd Rea∣son, and the receiv'd rules of Arguing, you spoil him quite.

Now by this time who so blind as not to see? That the design of this Book is To strike at the Root and Foun∣dation of all reveal'd Religion. And now I have thus brought this Man out of the Clouds, I need not spend much time in striping him of his disguise; for the inferences he wou'd have people make from these Principles, are so glar∣ing and open, that every body may see them. If Authority be no ground of Perswasion, then we must not believe the truth of any Revelation or Prophe∣cy. And if we must give our assent to nothing, but what we have clear and

distinct Idea's of, then farewell all Re∣ligion both natural and reveal'd. For we know all Religion natural and re∣veal'd is ••ounded upon the belief of a Deity, of the Immortality of the Soul, and of Rewards and Punishments in an∣other World; but it is impossible for us now to have as clear and distinct Idea's of these, as we have of a Stock or a Stone; but we infer these truths only from those things whereof we have clear and distinct Idea's; and therefore upon his Principles we must utterly re∣ject them all.

And then since by clear and distinct Idea's he means, As exact and clear a notion as we have even of sensible Objects, in one sentence he excludes all assent even to the reality and existence of every thing in the Gospel that respects another World; and rejects all those Methods of our Salvation, which are spoke of in the Bible, as so many Dreams and Fictions. Thus we must disbe∣lieve the Resurrection and Change of our Bodies; the Happiness of the blest in

Heaven; the Incarnation and Divinity of the Son; the Trinity of Persons in the Godhead; the Operations of the Holy Ghost, &c. nay the whole Christian Religion: Because, as I have sufficiently shewn, we have not such clear and distinct Idea's of these things, as we have of the ordinary Phaenomena of nature.

He cou'd not but see this, and there∣fore we may well conclude this was his drift. But he did not consider at∣the same time, that this wou'd cut off all assent to the very Being of God. And thô I am fully convinc'd, that he is the most inveterate Enemy to reveal'd Religion, that hath lately appear'd in Print; however I can scarce think he is arriv'd to that height of Atheism yet, as to deny the existence of God, thô he has not as clear and distinct an Idea of him, as he has of a Stock or a Stone.

As for his second Section, 'tis all* 1.26 foreign to the matter; and all that he says about seeming contradictions, is

plainly level'd at the Doctrine of the Trinity, thô Transubstantiation be the instance he makes use of. And he proceeds upon the same fundamental Errour he hath hitherto done, That we can believe nothing but what we have a clear and distinct Idea of.

We say as well as he, That there is* 1.27 nothing contrary to Reason in the Gospel.* 1.28 That there is no contradiction in any point of Doctrine in it. That Christi∣anity* 1.29 is a Rational and Intelligible Re∣ligion, which are the things he insists upon in this Section, and goes a great way about to prove very aukwardly. And therefore what can he mean by it, unless it be to make unthinking People fancy we deny all this. If he hath any thing to object against our Doctrine of the Church of England or Ireland, let him speak plainly: but nothing is more vile and disingenuous, than for a man to speak thus indistinct∣ly and confusedly, and talk all in the general with design to make People think us guilty of those errours we detest and abhor. If he has any con∣troversy with us, let him deal honestly,

and instance in any one point of Doe∣trine we believe or teach, that is con∣trary to Reason or Scripture; and make it out as plainly, as I have done his Principles to be such. If not, let him own he had no other design but to expose the Christian Religion, and it's Teachers; and gratify the Rancour of a sort of People, who because of their lewd and debauch'd lives, must naturally hate that Institution, which they shall one day be condemn'd by; and which promises them nothing but Damnation in another World.

This Book which goes under his name, is exactly calculated for them; there is a little superficial shew of Lear∣ning to make it plausible, but not one instance in all the Book of close Reason or Argument. Let him shew me where one link of my Reasoning fails, and I will make it up again so firm, that he shall never be able to un∣do it. Whereas all his whole Dis∣course is a meer Rope of Sand; many bold and false Assertions, sly Insinua∣tions, and several things, nothing at all to the question, huddled up together

on purpose to patch up a Book; and amuse such persons who have just Lo∣gick enough to be impos'd upon by a Fallacy, but not to see through it.

Now after this long digression of* 1.30 two Sections, in his third and last Sec∣tion he comes at length to the matter in dispute, but with what success we shall see.

Here he begins to state the question* 1.31 again, and says a Doctrine above Rea∣son, or a Mystery denotes one of these two things. Either

1▪ A thing intelligible in it self, but* 1.32 cover'd with such a Vail, that Reason cannot penetrate to see what is under it, till it be remov'd.

Which definition agrees perfectly to the Mysteries of the Gospel; for they are all things intelligible in them selves, but in this life so obscur'd from us by this vail of flesh and blood, that with our strongest Imagination and closest Reasonings, we cant penetrate into the true nature of them, till this Vail be remov'd; and then we shall see them clearly. Now this is not the definition that he quarrels with, and if he will admit of this little enlarge∣ment of it, we are both agreed. But the definition he finds fault with, is this.

2. A Mystery is a thing of it's own* 1.33 nature unconceiveable, and not to be judg'd of by our ordinary Faculties and Idea's, tho it be never so clearly re∣veal'd.

I never met with any one Sentence, so fraught with absurdity as this is. For

1. It signifies a thing in it's own na∣ture unconceivable, this is a down∣right falsity. For every Mystery is in it's own nature conceivable; the more truth any thing hath in it the more conceivable it is in it self; the Mysteries of Christianity are the Eternal Truths of God, and therefore are in them∣selves conceivable. But it is in respect of us that they are not so, because of the frail and limited condition of our understandings in this life.

2. Not to be judg'd of by our ordinary Faculties and Idea's, thô it be clearly reveal'd. Now for a thing to be clear∣ly reveald to a Man, and yet that same man know nothing of it (which is his sence of the words, and which he would fasten upon us) is a perfect contra∣diction. For it is no other than saying, that the same man way, and may not know the same thing, at the same time. He can never come off by saying that a thing may be clearly reveal'd, and yet the Person may have no ability to apprehend any thing of it; for all Re∣velation supposes a capacity in the Per∣son

to whom it is made, to apprehend something of it; and therefore 'tis non∣sence to say, that any thing can be clear∣ly reveal'd to a Horse, or a Stock, or a Stone.

3. Besides it is absolutely false, that the Mysteries of our Religion are not to be judg'd of, by our ordinary Faculties and Idea's. It hath already appear'd, that as to the thing signified and in∣tended in the Revelation, we have no Idea, nor faculty to judge of it as it is in it self. But as to all those means, whereby God hath discover'd the rea∣lity and existence of those things to us, we may judg of them all by our ordi∣nary Faculties and Idea's. And to make this plain, let us instance in the same Mystery of the Resurrection.

Our Bodies sown in Corruption, shall be rais'd in Incorruption.

This is one of the reveal'd Mysteries of the Gospel, and yet we are to judg of it by our ordinary Faculties and Idea's. For we have Idea's in our heads of what a body is; what it is to be sown or laid in the ground; what it is to be rais'd; and what it is for a body to be improv'd when it is so. Be∣sides our Faculties of Understanding are imploy'd, in considering those many arguments which prove the truth of this Mystery; and therefore 'tis plain that by our Faculties and Idea's, we can judg of that part of it which is know∣able by us. But he will say, we can't judg of that part of it which is totally obscur'd from us, and therefore so far it is no part of our Faith, and we are wholly unconcern'd in it. But on the contrary, we are bound by express words of Scripture, to believe that this Improvement will be very great, as in 1 John, 3. 2. We know not yet what we shall be, but we know that when he shall appear we shall be like him. Here we are bound to believe that we shall be like Christ, thô we

know not what this likeness is, or wherein it will consist.

4. On this supposition, that a thing is in it's own nature unconceivable, how is it possible for it to be reveal'd? This is another flat Contradiction ex Par∣te Rei, as the first was ex Parte Homi∣nis. A thing is in it's own nature un∣conceivable, and yet it may be reveal'd (i. e.) the same thing may, and may not be reveal'd.

5. He makes a thing's being in it's own nature unconceivable, and not to be perceiv'd by our ordinary Faculties and Idea's, to signify the same thing; whereas they are just as different as Light and Darkness. Thô our capa∣cities are now dark and shallow, yet they will hereafter be improv'd and en∣larg'd; and then we shall have extra∣ordinary Idea's to represent to us what we have no notion of now: And then the thing will be no way unconceivable either in itself, or in respect of us.

These are not all the absurdities in this sentence; and yet it is the very Monster this Knight Errant sets up for himself to engage with. It is the spu∣rious off spring of his own brain, and yet he fathers it upon us, by introdu∣cing it with this expression, It is made to signify, &c. But it was never made to signify this by any besides himself. I shou'd read the Gospel a million of times over before this definition of a Mistery wou'd have come into my head. Here he hath made his own words good; That Contradiction and Mystery are two emphatical ways of saying nothing; He lays down this absurd definition of a Mystery, and then sets himself with a great deal of Solemnity to encounter it, which is in truth no other than for a man to put himself into a ridiculous antick posture, and then quarrel with his shadow for it.

It is hard to tell how to proceed with this man, he has been running away from the Question ever since he

began; and now that he put us in hopes of coming to it again, you see how grossly we are disappointed. I wou'd with all my heart stick by the first definition of a Mystery, which with a little addition I allow to be ve∣ry good.

A Christian Mystery is a Divine Truth intelligible of it self, but so cover'd and obscur'd from us now in this life, that Reason can't penetrate the Vail to see what is under it, till this Vail be re∣mov'd in another life by the glorification of our Bodies. Let him confute this definition if he can, for I will never fall out with him about the other; he shall have it all to himself, 'tis his own Creature, let him be as severe upon it as he pleases. But because he has so blindly mistook the matter, I must tell him once more what it is he is to prove, if he has any controversy with us in this point. He is to prove these two things.

• 1. That there is nothing reveal'd to us in the Gospel but what we have clear and distinct Idea's of, (i. e.) either a full comprehensive knowledg of; or as clear and distinct notions, as we have of any ordinary Object in nature. And
• 2. That we are not oblig'd by Scrip∣ture, to believe that there is any thing intended in some points reveal'd, be∣yond what we are now able thus to compre∣hend.

These are the things which lay up∣on him to prove, if he wou'd have spoke to the purpose.

It is impossible that any man shou'd argue closely, who mistakes the Questi∣on as he does▪ however I shall consider what there is in the rest of his Book that looks like reasoning. He does not proceed to proof yet, but runs upon another Digression, to tell us the

signification of the word Mystery, and particularly what it signify'd among the Gentiles. But what is this to us? it signifies quite another thing among the Christians. But he says not, for in the New Testament Mystery is always* 1.34 us'd in the first sence of the word, or that of the Gentiles, viz.

For things naturally very intelligi∣ble, but so covered by figurative Words* 1.35 or Rites, that Reason cou'd not discover them without special Revelation. This is the description which he gives both of the Gentile, and Christian Myste∣ries in common.

But taking a Christian Mystery even in his own sence, (i. e.) As it was involv'd in Jewish Types and Cere∣monies; yet they differ very much from those mysteries of the Gentiles. For

1. The Christian Mysteries were not discoverable but by the special re∣velation of God, whereas those of the Gentiles were discoverable by the re∣velation of a man.

2. Besides 'tis absolutely false that the things involv'd in the Jewish Types were in their own Nature very intelli∣gible. For they were all of such a Nature, that men cou'd never have arriv'd to the least degree of know∣ledge concerning them by strength of Reason; whereas there was nothing in the Heathen Mysteries but what was in it self very obvious to Reason.

3. The matters contain'd in the Jewish Mysteries and the things inten∣ed by them, were such as concern'd the Eternal salvation of Mens Souls, where∣as the things contain'd in those of the Heathen were to a quite contrary purpose, in order to Idolatry, and many other gross sins. And it is not without very good reason I take notice of this difference here, for thô it doth not hit this discription of his immedi∣ately, because he may perhaps say those were thought to be the concernment of Souls too: yet it is level'd at the main design of his Book, which by this time no man can be ignorant of.

4. The things contain'd in the Jewish Mysteries, the Priests them∣selves were ignorant of; whereas the Heathen Priests for the most part knew the bottom of theirs, and conceal'd them industriously from the People. And this is what he wou'd insinuate of all Christian Priests, viz. That we fully comprehend the meaning of all these things our selves, and palm them upon the People for Mysteries. Which is the occasion of those virulent ex∣pressions of his in this Chapter, That* 1.36 through ignorance or passion we maintain, what was introduc'd by the craft or super∣stition of our fore fathers. And calls it a Gainful Opinion; as if the only de∣sign* 1.37 of Christian Mysteries, were to bring in Money to the Priests. he calls Christianity as it is now receiv'd an Implicite Constitution; and says the* 1.38 Venerable Teachers, play at this small game to amuse the People. But he,* 1.39 like a sharp inquisitive man it seems, has found out our Mysteries, and is resolv'd in his next Book to discover

them all, and lay us open to the World, like Heathen Priests as he makes us.

And now I come to his second Chap∣ter of the third Section, where there* 1.40 is the first appearance of any thing like a reason; there is but one argu∣ment in all that Chapter, and indeed in all the Book; and because he deli∣vers it confus'dly, I will reduce it to form, and then we shall see clearly what force there is in it. And if he thinks I don't do him justice, let him manage it better for himself if he can. The whole strength of his ar∣guing is this

If we have as clear and distinct I∣dea's of every thing reveal'd in the Gos∣pel, as we have of any thing in Nature, then there are no Mysteries in it.

But we have as clear and distinct Idea's of every thing reveal'd in the Gospel as we have of any thing in Nature Therefore There are no Mysteries in the Gospel.

The Minor he proves thus

If we have as clear and distinct Idea's of God and Eternity, as we have of any thing in nature, then we have as clear and distinct Idea's of every thing re∣veal'd in the Gospel, as we have of any thing in Nature.

But we have as clear and distinct I∣dea's* 1.41 of God and Eternity, as we have of any thing in Nature. Ergò

Now do but deny this Minor, and he puts you off to another Book for the proof of it, and this is the whole substance of his reasoning here. But to pass by the Impiety and Prophane∣ness of that saying of his, That the Di∣vine Being it self is not more Myste∣rious than the most contemptible of his Creatures, I will give him a reason why it is impossible for him ever to prove what he pretends. And that is, because even the most glorious of his Creatures are finite and limited, whereas the

nature of God is Infinite; and there∣fore even when we come to Heaven, he will be mysterious to us in a more proper sence than any thing else, be∣cause we shall not even then have as full and comprehensive a knowledg of him, as we shall have of the greatest of his Creatures.

That which he builds upon is this,* 1.42 That nothing can be said to be a Myste∣ry, because we have not an adequate Idea of it, and a distinct view of all it's properties at once. But who ever said that the Mysteries of the Gospel were such only for this reason. I grant him if this were all, then as he says every thing in nature wou'd be a mystery, for we have not a full and perfect know∣ledg of any thing. The true reason why our Christian Mysteries are such in a more peculiar and proper sence is, because the Idea's we have of them are more imperfect and less adequate, than those we have of the ordinary phaenomena of Nature. This is the point in difference between us, Whether

we have as perfect and comprehensive a knowledg of every thing reveal'd in the Gospel, as we have of any thing in Na∣ture. This is what he affirms, and we deny; and for proof as I said be∣fore, he refers us to another Book in reversion. Here he only affirms it boldly, and instead of proving that our notions of these divine things are as ex∣act and full, as the notions we have even of sensible Objects; he spends this whole Chapter in proving by several instances, as of the Table he writes upon; of Rain, and a drop of Water, &c. that we have not an adequate Idea of any thing. But why does he thus beat the Air? who ever deny'd it? and yet this poor hungry thought, is the only appearance of an Argument through his Book; it was for this only the whole was wrote, and the only skill he has shewn in it, is in beating up so little Sence, into all this Froth.

Now because there is no Proof here, there can be no farther Answer: How∣ever since he hath order'd the matter

so as to make it look like Reasoning, to amuse the Minds of unthinking People, I shall shew the difference be∣tween the things reveal'd to us in the Gospel, and the usual Phaenomena of nature with respect to the measures of our knowledg. And therefore

1. Thô we shou'd grant what is absolutely false, and what he was to have given some proof for if he had been able, that the things reveal'd in the Gospel, and the ordinary objects of our sences, were upon the same level as to our knowledg, that we are equally ignorant of both, and comprehend them alike; yet his Inference wou'd not follow from hence, viz That the things reveal'd in the Gospel are not mysteries, in a more proper sence than a Spire of Grass, a Stock or Stone. For thô we are equally ignorant of two things, yet there may be much more behind to be known in one than in the other; and therefore upon this score, may much more properly be call'd a Mystery. For certainly thô we knew

as much of God now as we do of a Stock or a Stone, yet sure he will allow there is infinitely more yet to be known in that Fountain of all Perfection, that rich Treasure of Wisdom, which is so far from being comprehended now, that he shall never be exhausted to all eter∣nity.

We may say the same of all the other Mysteries of Christianity, thô we shou'd grant our Idea's of them were as perfect, and that we knew as much of them now as we do of any thing in nature, yet because they are infinitely more excellent in themselves; and that there is much more behind to be known in them, yet they wou'd deserve the name of Misteries in a much more pro∣per sence than any thing in nature. Especially if we add that they are not only more excellent in themselves, but they are of much greater concernment to us, as they relate to the salvation of our Souls, and our well-being for ever in another World: Which makes them deserve more regard, and conse∣quently

a better name if we have it to give them.

Wherefore we may well wonder what end any man cou'd have in start∣ing such a notion as this is, unless it were to vilify and debase the Doctrines of the Gospel; and cunningly to lessen all reveal'd Religion and it's Teachers in the opinion of men, as if they al∣ready had too great thoughts of God and his Revelations.

2. But there is a yet greater diffe∣rence than this, for the things reveal'd in the Gospel, as to that part of them which makes them Mysterious, are such as exceed our present Capacities of Knowledg; whereas all the things of Nature fall within their Sphere, and are in themselves immediate and proper objects of our Sense and Reason. Thô many of them are such, that we nei∣ther do, nor ever can actually know any thing of them. And to lay this difference open to all, we must con∣sider that this of being above Reason is

an aequivocal expression, and signifies two very different things.

1. It signifies a thing which does not exceed our powers of understanding; but is conceal'd from us, and lies out of our reach, by some accidental impediment or obstruction, which it is impossible for us to remove. And in this Sence it is above our Reason to know certainly, what is at the center of the Earth; or whether there be any Inhabitants in Sa∣turn, or of what species they are; what are the true motions of the Hea∣venly Bodies, and what order they ob∣serve among themselves; and the diffe∣rent configuration of the little parts of matter, &c. That which makes these things above our Reason, is not any thing essential to them, but something accidental. And therefore we find our knowledg very much improv'd, and promoted by the help of Glasses, which discover things that by reason of their smalness, and distance were not preceptible by the naked eye, nor certainly discoverable by Reason. So

that we may say, many things were above our Reason before these helps were found out, which are not so now; and if these helps cou'd be carried on, and improved to that de∣gree, as to lay open to our view the smallest parts of matter, and at the greatest distance; or that a rational ac∣count were given us, of all the Phae∣nomena in Nature, by any intelligent Being superior to ours, we should ap∣prehend it distinctly and perfectly, and then nothing in nature wou'd be above our Reason.

2. To be above our Reason signi∣fies, A thing which in it's own nature ex∣ceeds our present Capacities, and is no proper object of those faculties of know∣ledg which we are now endu'd withall. And in this Sense the nature of God is more properly above our Reason than a Stock or a Stone, Eternity than Time; a Spirit, than a Body; the Joys of Heaven, than Sensual Pleasures; the eternal Generation of the Son, than the ordinary Procreation of Man; the

operations of the Holy Spirit, than the nourishment of our Bodies, &c. There is as yet no proportion between these Objects and our Faculties of Knowledg; our intellectual powers are not yet form'd and so adapted for them, as they are for those things in Nature, which are the proper objects of our Sense and Reason now. So that it is a more improper way of speaking, to say that these things should be clearly reveal'd to us now, as they are in them∣selves; than to say that a nice point in Divinity or Philosophy, shou'd be clear∣ly explain'd to an Infant. They are indeed plainly reveal'd to us as to their reality and existence, but not clearly as to the true nature of the things. Nothing in the World is more evident than that such things are reveal'd to us; but what or how they are in them∣selves, is impossible for us to compre∣hend. And this is what the Apostle means by that saying, That Eye has not seen nor Ear heard, neither have entred* 1.43 into the heart of Man the things which God hath laid up for them that love him. Which Words, thô by the context

they are more immediately spoke of things past, and then reveal'd in part; yet they have a farther reference to the full completion of all these things in another World.

I shall make this whole matter plain by an Instance. A Person who was born blind knows as little of the Sun as he does of the real nature of God; he feels the heat and warmth of it; he is cherish'd by it, and lives and thrives by the secret influences of it; but he neither knows where, nor what it is: and if he had been ever told that all this was the immediate act of God, he wou'd have thought so, for he knows nothing of the Sun besides the name. Now upon this Authors Prin∣ciples, the nature of the Sun, and the nature of God are both equally a My∣stery to this Blind Man. That he is equally ignorant of the true nature of both I grant, however they are not e∣qually a Mystery to him. And that this may appear let us suppose this Mans Eyes were opened; then he

wou'd see clearly that the Sun is a large, round, lucid Body in the Firma∣ment: but he wou'd be hereby ena∣bled to know nothing more of the true nature of God than he did before. And why? because this is beyond the reach of all his natural powers of Know∣ledg; and if all his Senses were im∣prov'd to be a thousand times nice•• than they are, thô he wou'd see much deeper into the nature of all things here, yet the nature of God, and the things relating to another Life wou'd ly as much out of his reach as ever; he wou'd even then know as little of the Glory of God, as that Man did of the Sun before his Eyes were opened. for Light it self is but a Metaphor, a∣dapted to our gross Capacities to sig∣nify the Glory of God, which we are told in the Revelations is to be instead of light in Heaven.

But because this is an Instance only of a sensible Object, let us take ano∣ther of Reason. Let us suppose an illiterate person, who never heard of

Christianity, or the Mathematicks is e∣qually ignorant of these two Propo∣sitions.

• The three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right ones. And this
• We shall be rais'd in the likeness of Christ.

These two Propositions this Derinder of all reveal'd truths will say, are alike mysterious to this Man. Whereas the contrary will evidently appear if we but take this Man and teach him Ma∣thematicks, then he shall perfectly ap∣prehend all that is to be known of that demonstration, and how it is impossible it shou'd be otherwise. But teach him the Gospel, and make him as learned as he is capable in the Christian Religion, he shall know nothing more of that Proposition (thô he shall be better convinc'd of the Truth of it) than he did at first hearing. And why? be∣cause the one was a truth in nature, within the sphere of his intellectual powers; the other is supernatural and he can never have any notion of the manner of it, till he has new Facul∣ties

or those he already hath are great∣ly enlarg'd.

But this matter will clear up farther, if we compare some of the Mysteries of our Religion with those things in Nature which bear the greatest Analogy with them, and by which they are represented to us in the Scriptures.

If we say a Son is like his Father, we immediately conceive in our Minds the same Stature, Countenance, Linea∣ments, and Complection; or the same Humour, Disposition, natural parts and Inclinations, &c. so that we very well apprehend wherein the likeness consists. But when we say we shall rise in the likeness of Christ, here we stop and our Thoughts can reach no farther.

Again when we say one Man is the Son of another, we apprehend very well the manner of natural procreation, and how it is he came to be his Father. But when we say Christ is the Son of

God by an Eternal Generation, we know nothing of the manner of one Spirits producing another; nor can we tell how he came to be born of a Vir∣gin without the concurrence of a Man.

When we say the Spirit of God hath a real influence upon ours in the opera∣tion of Grace, we know much less of the manner of it, than we do of one Bodies moving another by contact: and we know the Food we eat nouri∣sheth us by undergoing several altera∣tions, and then being converted into the substance of our Bodies; but we can't know thus much of the manner how Grace administers strength and comfort to our Souls.

Again we know of time that it is finite and successive, and we can mea∣sure it in certain proportions by the motions of the heavenly Bodies. But as for Eternity, for want of a clear Idea we frame a notion of it from time, and thus by a limited thought we do

little less then destroy it's Being. For as for saying it is a perpetual Now, thô it be the prettiest thought we have of it, yet if we attend to this we shall find, we say nothing more than that the same Instant shall remain for ever; and thus attribute that succession to one Instant of time abstractedly con∣sidered, which we us'd to attribute to things which exist in it. And there∣fore it is as gross a description of Eter∣nity, as a flying Boy is of an Angel.

And yet it is very pleasant to hear how this man talks of it. It is no more above our Reason because we can't apprehend it, than a Circle is be∣cause we may. But why? because Reason goes as far as it can in both. The Circle is to be imagin'd, but Eter∣nity is not essentially imaginable; if it were, Reason wou'd have it as well as the Circle, yes that it wou'd: but you wou'd not have Reason to ima∣gine any▪thing that is not to be imagi∣ned? And yet but a few lines after he will make us imagine it in his next Book as perfectly as that 3 and 2 make 5.

But this is a strange Circle in argu∣ing, to prove that Eternity is not above our Reason, because it is. And you see the cause of this blunder is, because he confounds Idea with Imagination, one of the best distinctions we are behol∣ding to the modern Logicians for. 'Tis plain there are many things we have Idea's of, which we are not able to ima∣gine, and Eternity is one of them. And because we can't frame any ima∣gination of it; it doth not follow that we can't apprehend it at all, for Rea∣son can frame an Idea of it as it doth of the other things of another life (i. e.) by Analogy, and for this reason it is more a Mystery than a Circle which we perfectly imagine.

Once more, thô the Essence of mat∣ter lies hid from us, as well as that of a Spirit, yet we know much more of it's properties, as that it hath Gra∣vity, Extension, Solidity, Impenetrabi∣lity, Divisibility; and this Table on which I write thô I can't actually di∣vide

it into infinite parts, yet I can carry it on in my Mind, and conceive it divisible. Now these are properties of matter which agree to it in general, and are not meer modifications of it. But we know no more of a Spirit but that it thinks (i. e.) just enough to prove it's Existence, and no more; for as to all the different modifications of Thought, it is but thinking still; and therefore is answerable but to that one property of Extension in matter.

Besides we don't attribute this of Thinking immediately and positively to a Spirit; for we don't say a Spirit thinks because we know so much of the real nature of it as to discover this: but we say it thinks because we can prove that matter can't.

Now when I say the Idea we have of a Spirit is not positive, I mean that it is not so in respect of our understan∣ding; because we have no way of at∣tributing it to a Spirit, but by a nega∣tion of it to matter. I must confess if we take a Spirit in the sense that some men do (i. e.) only for a Think∣ing Being, then indeed we come to

the notion of it by Reflection; we find something in us that Thinks, and from thence we immediately attribute it to that Being.

But for any thing that is yet con∣cluded, this Thinking Being may be meer matter; and when we pro∣ceed to infer the existence of an im∣material substance (which is the true notion of a Spirit, as it is distinguish'd from matter, and in which sence God is said to be a Spirit) then the Idea we have of it, is as far from being posi∣tive, as the words by which we ex∣press it. Then we have no other way of conceiving it, but by removing from it Extension, Divisibility, Soli∣dity, &c. which are the properties of Body: and we conclude that the sub∣stance in us that thinks must be imma∣terial, because this operation exceeds the power of meer matter, i. e. while it is such; for if God shou'd alter all the properties of it, so as to make it something else, and not matter, then no one can deny but it may think; but how far this implies a contradiction I shall not now dispute.

So that again I can't but wonder a∣ny one shou'd affirm positively, that we have as clear and distinct Idea's of the Nature and Properties of Spirit, as we have of Body.

Mr Lock's Notion of the Soul is on∣ly* 1.44 that of a thinking substance without any regard either to the materiality, or immateriality of it; tho' one wou'd think he inclines to the former, when he shews this to be the sence of the word Spirit both in Prophane and Di∣vine Authors. However he says after∣wards that the utmost Proof we can have for the immateriality of it will amount only to a Probability; and thus much concerning it he thinks deducible from his Principles, and particularly from his supposition of a System of matter; and adds that he would gladly see a better proof of it either from the Bishop of Worcester or any one else. To speak to this now wou'd be no other then a digression from the busi∣ness I am upon, but I do not dispair of giving him this Demonstration which he wou'd so gladly see; and shewing him

withal 〈…〉〈…〉 〈1 line〉〈1 line〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 how very much he is out in his application of those Texts of Scrip∣ture he makes use of. I know 'tis easy for a person to deny any thing to be demonstration which is not mathe∣matically such; but if it appears that we have as good proof for the imma∣teriality of the Soul, as we can reaso∣nably expect for any natural or moral truth, this is sufficient for the convicti∣on of any, except those who by their Principles are oblig'd to oppose it.

But to return, it is Evident from what hath been said, that we are so far from forming any Idea of Spirit as clear and distinct as that we have of matter, that we can't form a simple Idea of any property in it, which is positive in respect of our understan∣ding; and therefore since simple Idea's are the foundation of all our knowledg as they are laid down by that Delicate and Curious Head, which this man of Forehead only has so grossly mistaken;

that defect in the first principles shall run through all our after Reasonings a∣bout the real nature of it, and render them much more confus'd & imperfect than those concerning matter.

I might say the same of a Spiritual or Glorified Body, that we can frame no Idea of it, but by negation of those imperfections that are incident to us in this frail condition of mortality, and those few passages related of our Sa∣viour's Body after his resurrecton, are wholy unaccountable by us; at least much more than the ordinary appearan∣ces of Nature; as particularly his vani∣shing out of their sight all of a sodain; and appearing in the midst of them, at a time when the doors were shut, &c. and that these things were not any miraculous operations, but the real properties of a glorifi'd Body, is more likely to think; than that he shou'd have rarify'd the Door, or the Walls of the House to get entrance; or have secretly convey'd himself along with them, as some learn∣ed men have endeavour'd to solve

these passages. Nor can we conceive how a body shou'd be divested of it's gravity, so as to mount the Skies as our Saviour's did at his ascension, and as the Bodies of the Saints shall do at the general resurrection. None of these things are to be solv'd upon the com∣mon principles of knowledge that are in us now, because we have not capaci∣ties suitable to the nature of them.

So that now we may wonder what ridiculous meaning this man can have, when he says that all the things which are spoke of in the Gospel, are as con∣sistent with our common notions as Wood and Stone; and that we are as proper∣ly said to comprehend them; and that our Idea's of natural and divine things are equally clear and distinct. A strange fallacious inference this, because we fully comprehend neither, there∣fore we are equally ignorant of both. And to amuse people that can't see this, that he might seem to speak something to the purpose, he borrows a distinction. viz. That between the Nominal and

Real Essence of a thing. How imperti∣nently he hath made use of it in this matter, is very plain from what has been said; which thô we grant it to be a good one, yet it is nothing to the purpose. But it is so far from being a good Distinction, that it seems to me not to be good Sence. For nothing can be more absurd than to suppose two different Essences in the same thing. Nor can any thing be more directly level'd at those glorious Attributes of God, his Goodness and Truth than what it supposes, viz. That we are thus deceiv'd in every thing, and know nothing at all of the true nature of things by those properties that are dis∣cernable by us. And therefore to use his own words, This rather becomes Im∣postors to think, than the tought of God who hath no interest to delude his Crea∣tures, nor wants ability to inform them rightly.

If it had been said in plain language, that there is something in natural things we do apprehend, and something we do not; which means all in that distinction: This wou'd have been Philosophy for

the Vulgar; and therefore to make a Mystery of it, it must be call'd the Nominal and Real Essence of a thing: thô it carry a flat contradiction in Phy∣sicks, and a monstrous consequence in Morality, and lays a foundation for Eternal Scepticisme. But supposing there is a meaning in it both true and innocent, yet it must be own'd this was the most unhappy way of expressing themselves, that possibly they could have light upon.

Thus far as to his arguments from* 1.45 Reason. Now I come to consider those he brings from Scripture: and we are like to have very close reasoning from them, when in the very entrance he again confounds these two Propositions. Whether or no Christianity is Misterious, and whether there are no Misteries in* 1.46 Christianity. Whereas even the latter of them is dubious; for the word Mystery is us'd to signify several things. And therefore to remove all ambiguity, and shew the fallacy of his arguing we will lay aside the Word, and speak to the thing it self, (i. e.) Whether we have

not as clear and distinct Idea's, as full and perfect a knowledge of all things reveal'd to us in Scripture, since the ap∣pearing of Christ in the World, as we have of ordinary sensible Objects.

That we had not before he allows, and therefore he grants they were Mysteries then, but now since the coming of Christ they are not. And the whole substance of his arguing in this long Chapter is this.

If all those things which were signified by the Jewish Rites and Ceremonies are clearly reveal'd to us, then they are no longer hidden from us.

But all those things signified by the Jewish Rites and Ceremonies are clearly reveal'd to us. Therefore

They are no longer hidden from us.

Thus he proves the Minor.

If the Vail is taken away in Christ then they are clearly reveal'd to us.

But the Vail is taken away in Christ. Therefore.

They are clearly reveal'd to us.

And to make this Minor good, he brings all these Texts of Scripture, and Quotations out of the Fathers; to prove that the Vail is taken away, and that they are clearly reveald.

Now if any amongst us had absolutely deny'd that the Vail was taken away▪ and had affirm'd that they were not plainly reveal'd to us, then he might have had an adversary: But there is not a sentence in this Chapter, that looks like a controversy with any but the Jews. If this man wou'd have ar∣gu'd instead of Bantring; he wou'd have distinguisht, and shewn in what sence we deny it, and then have prov'd that the Vail was taken away in that sence that we deny. And therefore since he hath dealt treacherously, I must make him honest, and distinguish for him.

And in order to make this matter very plain, we know that there are four things to be reveal'd concerning any thing that is hid from us. It's Existence, it's Essence, it's Properties, and the Relation it hath to us; and every one apprehends at first reading

how a thing may be clearly reveal'd as to it's Existence, together with the rela∣lation it hath to us, and yet remain to∣tally obscur'd as to it's Essence & Proper∣ties. Now therefore what we say is this.

1. That as to the internal Essence, and real Properties of these divine things reveald to us from Heaven, we are wholly ignorant of them; and know as little of them in this respect now they are reveal'd in the Gospel, as was known before when they were involv'd in Types and Figures.

2. That all these things which we call Mysteries, and now reveal'd to us in the Gospel, while they were vail'd in Types and Figures under the Mo∣saik oeconomy, were very much ob∣scur'd as to their Existence, and as to the concernment of mankind in them; and therefore the Law is said to have had only a shadow of good things to come, i e. Men had but a very dark & imper∣fect knowledg even of the reality, and being, and signification of those things. As of the Eternal generation of the Son, his Incarnation, Crucifixion, Ascention, the Trinity of Persons, Resurrection and

Glorification of the Body, the Operations of the Holy Spirit, &c. They had then no clear and certain knowledg of the reality and existence of any of these things afterwards reveal'd in the Gos∣pel, excepting only that of the Being of the true God, which was reveal'd to them by Moses under the name I AM, which denoted nothing more than his existence.

3. We say that these divine things, which were hidden and obscur'd before the appearing of Christ, were all of them plainly and clearly reveal'd as to their Existence and as to the Relation they have to us, (i e.) as to the rea∣lity and being of these truths, and our concernment in them. And yet they do not cease to be Mysteries still, because they are still infinitely more obscur'd as to their Manner and Properties, than the common objects of nature. So that now it is clearly reveal'd to us that Christ is the Son of God, yet it doth not follow that there∣fore we know as much of the man∣ner of that Eternal Generation of the Son, as we doe how one Man

is said to be the Son of another. Because it is reveal'd to us that there are endless Joys in Heaven, it doth not follow that we know as much of them as we do of sensual pleasures. Because it is clearly reveal'd to us that we shall be rais'd at the last day, in the glorious likeness of Christ; it doth not follow that we know as well what this Glory will be, as we know what it is to be of a Fair and Beautiful Complection; and so in all the rest.

And this is the reason of those seem∣ingly opposite expressions of St. Paul, the one in 2 Cor. 3. 18. where speaking of the Clearness of the Gospel, in oppo∣sition to the Obscurity of the Law he says, We all with open face beholding as in a Glass the glory of the Lord. And yet in 1. Cor. 13, 12. speaking of this same present state of the Gospel, in opposition to our future state in Hea∣ven he says, That now we see through a Glass darkly, but then Face to Face. By the first he denotes the clearness of the Revelation as to the Existence, and Design of those things now under

the Gospel: by the latter, he denotes the present obscurity of them, as to their Manner and Properties.

But it may be objected here that thus they are but Types still, and there∣fore the things contain'd in the Jewish Rites and Ceremonies, are as little re∣veal'd now, as they were before. But whosoever makes this Objection can't but know these two things to be true which I contend for, however we are able to reconcile them, viz. 1. That those things signified by Jewish Rites and Ceremonies since the coming of Christ are more clearly reveal'd to us than they were before. And 2. That now they are more clearly reveal'd to us, yet we have no Idea's of the real Nature or Properties of them, which I have suffi∣ciently prov'd. Whosoever allows these two things, must be of my opi∣nion, whether I were able to answer this objection or no. But it is easy for any one to apprehend, that when I say the Idea's we have of the things of another World, are no other than a sort of Types or Figures; I don't take them in the strictest sence of the Words,

as they are applied to Jewish Rites and Ceremonies; which were all of them actions conversant about exter∣nal Objects, and design'd to represent some divine transaction which was to have it's completion in this life; and even then was to have a farther refe∣rence to something intended by it in a∣nother World. But my meaning is, that the best notion we can frame of a Divine Object, represents nothing of the real nature of the thing to us as it is in it self; if any one finds fault with the word, let them call them by what other name they please, since it is plain they must allow the thing.

And now he sees, if he was really blind before, in what Sence this Vail is remov'd, and in what sence we affirm it to remain. and if he thinks him∣self able to do it, instead of proving operosely what no man denies, that the Vail is taken away in Christ; let him prove the truth of it in that sence which we deny, viz. That it is taken away, not only as to the Reality, and Existence, and Intent, of the things reveal'd which

we allow; but as to the Manner and Properties of them, so that now we have as perfect a notion and compre hensive a knowledg of them, as we have of the Manner and Properties of any thing in nature; or in his own can't, that we have as clear and distinct Idea's of them as of any sensible Objects. As for instance Jonas's being in the Whales belly, was a Type of our Saviours Burial and Resurrection, and therefore now this is reveal'd he must make it out, that there is no∣thing more mysterious in our Saviours Death and Resurrection, than in a mans being carried into a Vault, and walk∣ing out again upon his leggs. The feast of the Passover was a Type of Christ, and represented the Lords Sup∣per; and this now is but a Type of the joys of Heaven, as our Saviour him∣self makes it by those words, Hence* 1.47 forth I shall not drink of this fruit of the Vine, till I drink it new with you in my Father's Kingdom. But this man must shew us the real nature of those plea∣sures which are here signified by the Fruit of the Vine.

And now that it appears what he was to have prov'd; to save me the labour of transcribing, do but look over eve∣ry Text he hath quoted by way of Proof, and try to make his inference from it, and then you will be satisfied that Quaker, or any other Enthusiast never apply'd Scripture so impertinent∣ly. Do but apply this distinction of a thing's being reveal'd as to it's Existence and Design, and the Relation it hath to us only; or as to the manner and pro∣perty of the thing it self, and then the little fallacy will appear which runs through his application of them all. I shall only instance in the two or three first.

1. Cor: 2, 7, 8. We speak the Wis∣dom* 1.48 of God hid in a Mystery, which God ordain'd before the World for our glory, which none of the Princes of this World knew, from whence he makes this inference, viz. That this divine Wisdom was then a Mystery for want of revealing Information. Who de∣nies

it? and to confirm this he adds the following words. Eye hath not seen, nor Ear heard, neither have en∣ter'd into the heart of Man the things which God hath prepar'd for them that love him; but God hath reveal'd them to us by his Spirit, which proves no more than what every body owns, That it was impossible by strength of Reason to have attain'd to the knowledg of those means, which God had appointed for our Salvation, and now they are reveal'd it is only as to the truth and reality of their existence, as to their Intent, and the Relation they have to us; and not as to the Manner and Properties of them.

The things here spoke of which cou'd not have enter'd into the heart of Man, were the Incarnation of the Son, and the Descent of the Holy Ghost; which were the contrivances of infi∣nite Wisdom for the restoration of fallen Man; and this was what the wisest heads among us cou'd never have thought of. These things were obscur'd in Jewish Types and Ceremo∣nies, and at length God reveal'd it

clearly to us, that those were the means he had appointed for our Sal∣vation.

Now the inference this man must make, if he wou'd speak to the pur∣pose is, That therefore we now know as perfectly the manner of that conception wrought by the power of the Holy Ghost in a pure Virgin, as of the ordinary way of Generation; and because it is reveal'd to us that the Holy Ghost works in us, therefore we must know the man∣ner of it as perfectly, as we do that of the nourishment of our Bodies by meat and drink.

The next is, St. Paul used great* 1.49 plainess of Speech, Ergò they had as full and perfect a knowledge of every thing he spoke as they had of a Stock or a Stone. Nay when he spoke to them of the depths of the Wisdom of God, and discours'd to them how he was caught up into Paradise, and heard unspeakable words, without doubt they that heard him had as lively an impression of this whole vision on their imaginations, as

he that saw it; nay as they had of the Man that spoke to them; and we may expect no less from this profound Re∣vealer of Mysteries, than that he will quote us all these unspeakable words in his next Book.

And so by the following quotations he thinks he hath knock'd us down, when any mention is made of the My∣stery being made manifest or known to all Nations. Ergò the very Manner and Properties of those things are laid open to us. And therefore this Man (I warrant you) knows as much of the secret Councils of God now, whose Judgments are unsearchable, and his ways past finding out; as he doth of the dark contrivances of that Caball a∣gainst all reveal'd Religion, where the design of this Book was first laid, and the rest are now a forging. For 'tis well known this Mystery of Iniquity doth already work; but he who hath hitherto hindred, we trust will hinder, till they be taken out of the way, and their wickedness be reveal'd.

And here if I were dispos'd to be merry, I cou'd make better sport with the History of this Man's life, than he has done with the Doctor and his Pa∣rishioner;* 1.50 for I have trac'd him in this too, from the time he first gave out he wou'd be Head of a Sect before he was thirty years of Age, till he be∣came an Author; and from thence to his coming into this King∣dom to spread his Heresies, and put his Designs in Execution. But I am now upon a Subject in Divinity, and not making a Farce; and perhaps I may have another opportunity of giving the World a clear and distinct Idea of this man, who thinks himself so formi∣dable; and swells with the fancy of having run down three Kingdoms only with one cross Question, which is the foundation of all his Book, viz. How can a Man believe what he doth not know?

I come now to consider how he an∣swers those Objections which are made

against this new Hypothesis of his in Religion.

The first sort of Objections he brings* 1.51 are three or four Texts of Scripture, which make nothing against either what he, or we say in this matter; but such as Enthusiasts bring against the use of Reason in Religion. So that they are wholly impertinent, unless he disputes against the Quakers; and therefore I have no more to do here but to take notice of the base disingenuity of the man, who by this wou'd make unthinking or prejudiced people believe, that we are those ignorant perverse Men he speaks of; and put us upon the same level with the rankest En∣thusiasts. Whereas he can't but know that we are as vigorous defenders of the use of Reason in Religion as he can be. 'Tis by this that the truths of all reveal'd Religion are establish'd, and remain unshaken and the same for ever, in spight of all the opposition of their subtilest enemies. 'Tis by this we confute his Errors, 'tis before the Evidence and Light of Reason that all his Operose and laborious Sophisms

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disappear like empty shadows, and vanish into nothing.

When we thus contend for the use of Reason in Religion, then on one side we are charg'd as if we deni'd all Revelation, and when we defend the truth of Revelation, then on the other side we are charg'd with laying aside our Reason; as if we must needs cease to be Men, before we can be Christi∣ans. And therefore I shall state a right notion of this matter as clear as I can in short; and that by these degrees.

1. We allow that Sense and Reason are the only faculties we have of know∣ing or judging of any thing either in Nature or Religion; and we allow that God in all his Revelations applies himself to us by these faculties; and doth not either create any new ones, or make any essential alteration in these we have; for then a Stock or a Stone wou'd be as capable of a Divine Revelation, as a Rational Creature. And therefore

2. We allow that what is not agre∣able to these Powers of knowledg we are already endued with, is not to be receiv'd or entertain'd by us; for o∣therwise God who plac'd these in us, wou'd not be consistent with himself, nor wou'd he have us so.

3. These Powers of knowledg are better suited to the present objects of this life than they are to those of ano∣ther; for otherwise we argue God of want of Wisdom, and Contrivance, and if they were now as well fitted for the Objects of another life, there wou'd be no occasion for a change at the last day.

4. We affirm that all the things of another World, even after they are re∣veal'd are totally obscur'd both from our Senses and our Reason as to the real Nature and Properties of them as they are in themselves. And this I hope I have sufficiently made out; so that if People will believe any thing at all of another life, they must do so without clear and distinct Idea's of them.

5. That since we have not capaci∣ties for them, there is no other way of revealing any thing to us relating to another life, but by Analogy with the things of this World. Thus the Glory and Intellectual Light of Heaven, is reveal'd under the notion of that we have from the Sun; the Generation of the Son of God, under the notion of one Man's proceeding from the Lions of another, &c.

Now therefore let me again distin∣guish these two things in every Reve∣lation or Mystery. 1. That Analogous object of this life, under the notion of which God doth reveal any thing of a∣nother life to us. And 2. The Thing it self that is signified by it. As to the first of these it falls in all respects under the severest censure and trial of our Reason, as to the latter it is wholly exempted from it. As for instance in this Proposition,

The Saints shall reign for ever.

In this Mystery the thing reveal'd is the happy and glorious state of the Saints in Heaven. The Analogous ob∣ject made use of by God for this, is that of the Splendour and Grandure of a Kingdom. In respect of this latter our Reason hath full scope and 'tis not only lawful but commendable, nay our duty to be very punctual and exact in our Scrutiny. And therefore we must know the meaning of the words, and understand the matter of the Proposi∣tion; we must be satisfied that it hath no impossibility or contradiction in it. Nay more, our Reason must be con∣vinc'd, and we must have a clear evi∣dence in our mind, of it's coming from God by such Pr••ofs to Mens Sen∣ses and Reason of it's divinity, as shall convince us that it could come from none but God; such as Miracles and Prophecies, or the agreableness of the thing to our common Notions▪ and I am not to give my assent to it unless I have this Evidence, which I allow thus far to be the ground of Per∣swasion. Thus far we are ready to

joyn issue with any Adversary of Re∣velation and Mysteries purely upon the principles of Reason. And to require it any farther is no other than to de∣mand a rational account from us, of what we grant we have no notion of.

God never requires our Assent to any Proposition, but upon such testimonies and proof as shall cause this Evidence. But as to the thing it self which is sig∣nified by this analogy, as the real state and condition of the blest in Heaven is in this Mystery, it is wholly ex∣empted from the enquiry of Reason. And herein is my Faith that I give my assent to a proposition which is sufficiently prov'd to come from God, thô I have no notion at all of that divine truth which is represented to me under the similitude of some world∣ly Object.

And thus you see how Faith is nicely and most exactly defin'd. The Evi∣dence, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 demonstration of things not seen, because Faith is no such precarious implicite assent, as these Champions for Reason think, but it is

the giving our assent to things which thô we have no notion at all of now, yet the reality and existence of them are demonstrated to us by such proofs as raise up in our minds the greatest degree of Evidence for the truth of the Relation. And it is this that will strike all these Opposers of Faith and Revela∣tion dumb, when they appear at the Tribunal of God; because they will not then have it to say, that God requir'd their assent to any proposition, but what they understood as well as they could understand any thing in this World. And for the Divine Revelation of which, they had sufficient proofs (if they did but consider them) to raise up in their minds an Evidence as clear and distinct as they can have of any thing in this World.

And thus he sees how groundless all those Objections are, and malicious Insinuations against us and our most holy Faith; as if we in any point of it declin'd the strictest examination of Reason. We are so far from distrust∣ing

our cause, or obliging men to walk blindfold, that we give their Reason all the helps we can; and men are never better dispos'd for the belief of our Christian Mysteries than when they fol∣low the guidance and conduct of it. For our whole Christian Faith is grounded upon the strictest Retiocina∣tion.

And therefore having stated the true extent of Reason in the Mysteries of Religion, I shall now proceed to con∣sider* 1.52 his Friend's objection against his Book, viz. That it destroys the nature of FAITH. A shrewd objection it is, and that which he never will evade, thô he had the wisdom of the old Ser∣pent to help him. And that person whosoever he was wou'd have been more his Friend, if he had in time opened to him all the other false and impious consequences of his Book; be∣fore it came abroad to spread infection, and blast the credit of the Christian Faith. But now alas! it is too late, for nothing is so vain as a man of some

parts, where there is not a true sence of Piety to qualify them: And there∣fore he is now to stand by it with his Soul, and venture Damnation rather than lessen himsel•• by a publick Recan∣tation, in the opinion of a half learned and debauch'd sort of people, whose in∣terest it is to run down that Institution, which if it be true must rise up in judg∣ment against them at the last day.* 1.53

The force of the objection lies in this. If we can give our assent to no∣thing but what we have a clear and distinct Idea of in the Mind, so as to believe nothing upon the Worth and Veracity of another person, then there can be no Assent distinct from Know∣ledge; and thus there can be no Faith either Divine or Human. For if a man of whose sincerity you are throughly convinc'd, shou'd tell you That there are a sort of people in the Indie's, who scourge their Idols severely, when any thing goes cross to their expectations, it is impossible for you to believe this un∣less you see it. For thô you know the

meaning of the words, and apprehend clearly what an Idol is, and what it is to scourge it; yet if the relations of ten thousand People, and ever so ma∣ny circumstances concur'd to the truth of it, yet you can never give your as∣sent to it upon any other terms than he did who saw it, for nothing else can give you this evidence or knowledg of the truth and reality of it, which he makes the only ground of our perswa∣sion

And then if we can't give our assent even to the Reality and Existence of any thing, but when we have clear and distinct Idea's of the real modes and pro∣perties of it as it is in it self, then we can believe nothing either of God or of any thing relating to another World; For I have made it sufficiently appear that it is utterly impossible for us now to have such Idea's of them. Therefore now let us see how he endeavours to get over this. My Reader thinks, I war∣rant, that he is going about to recon∣cile the Christian Faith with his Prin∣ciples.

But instead of this, he spends sixteen pages in shewing you there is no such thing as Faith; as you will see plainly. I shall take him in order, and answer every Paragraph because this is the most plausible part of his So∣phistry.

First he tell's us that to be confident* 1.54 of any thing without conceiving it, is no Real Faith or Perswasion; but a rash Presumption, and an obstinate Prejudice.

If he means by not conceiving it, not understanding the meaning of the Pro∣position reveal'd, he is in the right of it; but if he means by conceiving it the having as full and compleat a know∣ledg of the thing reveal'd, as we have of any Phenomena of nature, 'tis abso∣lutely false; for as I have shewn at large, we may give our assent to the Existence of things when we can't conceive any thing at all of their real nature: And that our Christian Faith is however no rash Presumption or obstinate Prejudice, because it is founded upon sufficient

testimonies of the truth and reality of the propositions believ'd, in things whereof we have clear and distinct Idea's.

This is the thing he drives at, viz. that we have a full and compleat know∣ledg of the things believ'd; and to make it plausible he says that God hath no interest to delude his Creatures, nor wants ability to inform them. ••rgo he reveals nothing but what he makes them perfectly comprehend. There∣fore he hath not reveal'd any thing of the eternal Generation, of the Son, the change of our Bodies, the Joys of Hea∣ven, of the operations of the Spirit, &c. because if God had reveal'd them, he wou'd have made you conceive the manner of all these perfectly; and if he did not, it was certainly want of sincerity or ability in him. But let this Blasphemer know, that it is nei∣ther want of Veracity, nor Ability in God that is the reason why we don't conceive these things, but the Weak∣ness and Imperfection of our present state, who have no capacities for them as yet. And therefore as we now give

our assent to the Reality and Existence of what we can't conceive, upon that veracity of God which he hath thus endeavour'd to rob of all it's Au∣thority, and Influence upon our assent; so God will one day manifest his Pow∣er, in bringing all those things to pass, which we can't now conceive; and will so enlarge our Souls that we shall clear∣ly apprehend them, and all the Ob∣jects of another World. He proceeds and says that

God wou'd loose his end if what he said* 1.55 did not agree with our common notions (i. e.) I•• God shou'd speak Nonsence to you in his Revelations you wou'd be never the wiser▪ for if he should re∣veal to you that a thing call'd BLIC∣TRI had a being in nature, and not inform you what this Blictri was, you could not believe it. Now this very Instance which he intends by way of Ridicule of all the Objects of our holy Faith, doth happily shew the true dif∣ference between a rational Assent and a blind Credulity; and is a sufficient con∣futation

of his whole Book. Let us therefore compare these two words BLICTRI, and GLORY.

Of the first I know nothing more than that it is made up of seven Let∣ters, and therefore he that speaks it is a Barbarian to me. And as I know no∣thing of it, so I can believe nothing concerning it, but the uncertain found it makes to my ••••t; and that seven Letters makes two Syllables in writing

As to the other word Glory, I grant I know as little of the real nature of the Glory of God, and of the Saints in Heaven, as I do what that Blictri means; and yet God doth not speak Nonsence, when he reveals to m•• that there is such a thing in Heaven as Glory. For 1st. Thô I have no notion of the thing as it is in it self, yet it is represented to me by the brightness of the Sun, and Glory of a Kingdom, the greatest I∣mages I now am able to frame of it. 2. I am made acquainted with the Re∣lation this Glory hath to me, viz. That it expects me in the Heavens, that I

shall enjoy it, and be made partaker of it; and that it will render me happy beyond all imagination. But I am no more able to conceive that Happiness, than that Glory of God which shall be the cause of it. And 3. It is reveal'd by God with this design that it shou'd be a prevailing motive of my Obedi∣ence, and an incitement to the practice of Vertue and Holiness. 4. I have not capacities at present to apprehend the real nature of it as perfectly as I can apprehend any thing in nature if it were discovered to me. And thus we see how God in all his Revelations doth not speak Nonsence to us, thô we have not clear and distinct Idea's of the things which are reveal'd. Nay thô we have no more Idea of them as they are in themselves, than we have of what Blictri is.

Besides the Text he brings to back* 1.56 this Sophism of his, explains the matter farther and lays open the Fallacy, Heb. 11, 6. He that comes to God must be∣lieve that he is, and that he is a reward∣er

of them that diligently seek him. By which we see all that is knowable of God by us now is his Existence, and the Relation he hath to us, viz That he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him. For I hope he will own that we are bound to believe all we know of God, thô he flatly denies that we are bound to believe any thing more in him than what we know, as well at least as we do any thing else.

He goes on and asks, without con∣ceiving* 1.57 Faith after this manner, (i. e.) without making it nothing else but knowledg, How could Christ be term'd the light of the World? and how could we be said to have the Spirit of Wisdom? (i. e) unless he gives you as clear and distinct Idea's of every thing he reveals, as you have of a Stock or a Stone. I answer by giving us a clear and distinct Revelation of their Existence, of which we should have been wholly ignorant but for him, for thus he hath made us wise unto Salva∣tion, since he hath given us a clear

knowledg of our Duty, and back't his Precepts with the promise of future re∣wards, which we have no notion of; and the best thought we can frame of them is. That they exceed all that we can think or speak.

But says he, That remarkable instance* 1.58 of Abraham's Faith will be objected. Yes 'tis objected, and the way he an∣swers it, is by saying as we do, and leaving his own Opinion to shift for it self. God promised Abraham to give him a numerous Progeny in Isaac; after this, before Isaac hath a Child, God commands him to sacrifice his only Son; He obeys upon this considera∣tion, that God was able to raise him up again, by the same power that he at first rais'd him out of the deadness of Sarah's Womb. Now the question be∣tween him and me, is not Whether this Faith was a firm Perswasion built upon* 1.59 substantial Reasons, which we allow and contend for, and therefore he says no∣thing to the purpose. But the questi∣on is, Whether Abraham gave his Assent

to what he was not able to comprehend, which he must own; unless he proves that Abraham knew as perfectly the whole manner of God's raising a Body from the dead, or from a Womb past Child bearing, as he did the procre∣ation of it in the ordinary way of Na∣ture. Had Abraham been able to de∣monstrate that God wou'd raise his Son, & to conceive exactly the manner how this was to be brought to pass, then indeed it were no Faith but Knowledg; but instead of this he had only the promise of God for it; and knew no more how God wou'd raise him, than he knew how he made the World.

After this he lays down several Ob∣servations* 1.60 to prove there can be no such thing as Faith, (i. e.) an assent di∣stinct from Knowledg.

1. If Faith were not a Perswasion re∣sulting from a comprehension of the thing believ'd, there could be no degrees in it. I answer this is false like all the rest, for thô I know nothing more of a thing

than it's Existence, and the Relation it hath to me, and therefore am fat from comprehending it; Yet my assent to the truth of it, shall vary in degrees ei∣ther according to the Proofs I have for it, or according as I weigh and consider them.

2. The Subject of Faith must be intelli∣gible* 1.61 to all, since the belief thereof is com∣manded under no less a penalty than Dam∣nation. Who doubts it? let him if he can produce one proposition we believe which is not intelligible. But because we don't fully comprehend the thing spoke of, are we therefore wholly igno∣rant of any thing relating to it, & must we reject it all as Fallacy & Imposture? If it be said He that believeth not shall be damn'd, Mark 16, 16. then what will become of him that takes all this pains to shew there is no such thing as Faith? especially since the Belief there mean't is something plainly distinct from Knowledg. For sure he doth not think the meaning of that text is this, He that hath not as full and comprehensive a know∣ledg of God and the things reveal'd, as he

hath of any thing in Nature, shall be Damn'd, which is all his notion of Faith. Again.

3. If any part of Scripture were unin∣telligible* 1.62 it could never be rightly tran∣slated. A very wise observation, who ever question'd it? But as I have shewn there is a great deal of difference between understanding the meaning of the words, and, having a comprehensive knowledg of the thing intended by them▪ As I understand very well the mean∣ing of these words. When Christ ap∣pears we shall be like him, thô I am wholly ignorant wherein this like∣ness will consist; ••o that I can how∣ever translate the sence of that Propo∣sition exactly and perfectly. And therefore 'tis such Wretches as He who affirm the contrary, that plentifully fur∣nish the Atheistical and Prophane, with all the matter of their objections against Scripture. But I hope in time God will put it into the hearts of our Gover∣nours to remedy these disorders.

4. Except Faith signifies an intelligi∣ble* 1.63 Perswasion, we cannot give others a reason of our Hope. 'Tis very true, it is an Intelligible Perswasion, and grounded upon the strictest Reason. But he with a hardy confidence open∣ly pretends, that we deny people are to examine and understand their Faith; and so runs into a comparison between Christ and the Idol of the Siameses upon our Principles. Now he is past all Reason and Modesty, and therefore I have no more to do here but deliver him up into the hands of our Gover∣nours. We may confute his Errors, but 'tis They only can suppress his Inso∣lence; We only can endeavour to heal those who are already Infected, 'tis They alone can hinder the Infection from spreading farther.

5. That either the Apostles cou'd not* 1.64 write more intelligibly of the reputed Mysteries, or they would not. I answer that all that we are able to understand of these Real Mysteries they have made so plain, that they could not, neither

need they have made them more plain and intelligible. As for the other part of them, they knew as little of it as we do; and therefore we don't Rail at them as he doth at all the Clergy, as if they had industriously conceal'd any thing from us which they knew themselves.

He goes on, 'Tis affirm'd that God hath a right to require the assent of his Creatures to what they can't comprehend. Yes he has, and accordingly doth re∣quire it. And again I say 'tis Blasphe∣my to affirm that in this he is guilty of such a Tyranny as only becomes the Devil. He requires our assent to the Eternal generation of the Son; the Tri∣nity of Persons, and Divinity of Christ; the Resurrection of our Bodies and change of them into the likeness of Christ &c. thô we can't comprehend them. And yet he is so far from acting like a Tyrant in this, that he acts like a merciful God, and a tender Father. For he herein condescends to our capacities, and Reveals the methods of our Salva∣tion,

and the future state of Heaven to us, after such a manner as we are able to understand them; and promis∣eth that if they have that influence up∣on us which he designs, (i. e) to ex∣cite our Gratitude, and make us Ver∣tuous and Holy; he will at the resur∣rection of our bodies, give us capaci∣ties to see them clearly as they are in themselves. So that these Mysteries are to be understood at last, but not till we come to another World. And therefore God doth not reveal them only to puzzle our heads, but for wise and* 1.65 excellent ends, viz. to bring mankind to salvation by such Methods, as are consistent with the Freedom of his na∣ture.

From all these Observations he con* 1.66 cludes, That to give our Assent to any thing above Reason in his sence is con∣tradictory. 1. To the ends of Religion, whereas I have shewn at large that up∣on this supposition, there can be no Religion at all either natural or re∣veal'd. 2. To the nature of man, (i. e.)

because no man can believe what he knows nothing of, but this Quibble I have sufficiently remov'd. And 3. To the goodness and wisdom of God, who as he intimated before, is as much a Ty∣rant as the Devil for requiring us to be∣lieve any thing we can't comprehend.

If God had requir'd us to give our ass••nt to what we knew nothing at all of, he would have requir'd Impossibili∣ties; if he had requir'd us to give our ass••nt to what we had no Proof or Evi∣dence for, he wou'd have requir'd what was Unreasonable; but when he adapts the Revelation of things which we can∣not comprehend to our capacities, under the notions of things which we do ap∣prehend clearly and fully, it is the great∣est argument of his wisdom. And when he requires no assent from us without sufficient Arguments of Con∣viction to any consi••••••ing unprejudic'd person. It is a great instance of his Goodness. And these revelations of things above our Reason to compre∣hend, as they are most power••ul in∣citements to Gratitude here; so they will be the subject of our Praise and

Thanksgiving hereafter, when the Vail is perfectly remov'd, and that we are enabled to apprehend them clearly.

Now after all this pains to shew that* 1.67 there is no such thing as Faith distinct from Knowledg He says this will be objected against him. He is in the right of it, this will be ever obj••cted against him, till he recants his Error publickly.

But how doth he endeavour to e∣vade it? Why. That knowledg which is the present & immediate view o•• a thing is not Faith. He says well. But what is.

Faith is only the understanding what is believ'd He will stand by it with Soul and Body that Faith is nothing else. That the understanding what is believ'd is necessary in order to Faith no one denies; but any man of com∣mon Sence may see, that this and the other definition are the same; for pray what is understanding what is believ'd, but having a present immediate know∣ledg of it, unless he will say a man

can't believe a thing till he hath for∣got he knew it. That which consti∣tutes the formal act of Faith as it is distinct from Knowledg, is an Assent upon the Authority of another Person. But according to him Authority is no ground of Perswasion, and Faith is on∣ly the understanding what is believ'd, Therefore there can be no such thing as any Assent distinct from Knowledg.

And now have I done this man any Wrong, by charging him with endeavou∣ring to destroy the Faith of the Gospel, and to overthrow the whole Christian Religion. In the face of a Christian Government, and in Defiance of all Laws and Power Ecclesiastical and Civil; He tells them plainly that Faith is nothing more than understand∣ing what is beliv'd (i. e.) there is no such thing as Faith distinct from know∣ledg; and consequently the Faith of Christians is nothing but Implicite Assent and blind Credulity.

And therefore here again I wou'd deliver him into the hands of the Magistrate, not mov'd by any heat of

passion but by such a Zeal as becomes every Christian to have for his Religion.

But here he pleads a Toleration, but* 1.68 for what? I hope there is no Tolera∣tion for Blasphemy and Prophaness; and thô men are allow'd to believe what they please themselves, yet sure they may be restrain'd from industri∣ously spreading such Impious Notions as are destructive of all Religion, and from openly reviling the Christian Faith as Imposture and Implicite blind Credulity.

Again 'tis objected against him That* 1.69 his notions of Faith makes Revelation useless. Yes it doth, for thô we un∣derstand the Words of the Proposition reveal'd ever so well, and comprehend the thing spoke of as fully as we do a Stock or a Stone; yet we can never give our assent to the truth of the Re∣lation; because that after all is done we must take this upon the Word of another. But much more doth it make all the Revelations of the Gospel useless, because we have no clear and

distinct Idea's of them, and therefore must utterly reject them all upon this score likewise.

But in opposition to all that can be said, this Positive Man asserts here, what he hath been Asserting from the be∣ginning of his Book, but gives no reason for; That Revelation is only of use to inform us, whilst the Evidence of it's subject perswades us. Then reply we, if so you must believe all Relations true or false indifferently, when you understand the meaning of the Words, and know the nature of the thing spo∣ken of. Nay if two contrary Proposi∣tions equally intelligible be related he must believe them both.

And therefore now I hope he won't take it ill of the World, if they believe me when I inform them, that this Book which goes under his name, was the joint Endeavours of a secret Club, who set themselves with a great deal of Industry to destroy all Reveal'd Re∣ligion. And that they have made use of this Man as a Tool only, and have

pusht him before them, to try with what safety such Principles as these may be openly avow'd in opposition to all that is establish't among us; that they might follow and openly maintain what they have been forging in secret Ca∣bals.

Now this is a matter of Fact, and whosoever reads this must believe it, because they understand the meaning of the Words and know the nature of every thing that is spoke of in them; for Faith is nothing else but understan∣ding what is believ'd, and if they un∣derstand* 1.70 what is spoke of they must bow before the Light and Majesty of this knowledg. And therefore I hope he will never contradict me in this or any thing else I relate of him; for if he says the contrary then either the World must believe us both when we relate two contrary Propositions or they must be sway'd one way or the other by his Authority or Mine; and whether they believe him or me it will sufficiently confute him, for it will shew that Authority may be a ground

of Perswasion as well as a means of In∣formation. If they believe neither of us, then it will appear they are not un∣der such a necessity of bowing before the Light and Majesty of that Evi∣dence he contends ••or in all relations.

The last objection he raises against this Principle of his, is that passage, 1. Pet. 2, 12. Where there is this ex∣pression, Which things the Angels desire to look into. The things spoken o•• here are the methods of our Salvation by the Incarnation of the Son of God, and Descent of the Holy Ghost. and 'tis said in the time present that the An∣gels Desire to look into them. And I think it a natural inference from hence, that these things yet are Myste∣ries even to them in a great degree; which we need not much wonder at when they don't so much as know when the day of Judgment will be, and therefore we may the less wonder they are Mysteries to us.

But we will suppose that this expres∣sion is mean't of the time past. And

then let me ask him these two Ques••i∣ons concerning it.

1. Whether the Angels did believe those things they are said to enquire into, or no? if they did believe them, then we find 'tis very possible to be∣lieve things that we can't comprehend; for if the Angels understood them fully when they believ'd, why shou'd they desire to search into them?

2. Whether, now these things are come to pass, he will assert that we have as full and comprehensive a knowledg of them all as the Angels have. If we have not, then we may believe things we do not comprehend. If we have, then there is no difference between ours and the state of the B••est in Hea∣ven, at least in respect of knowledge.

The last Objection he brings against* 1.71 his own Principles is That which is drawn from the consideration of Miracles. And this likewise is so strong an objecti∣on against him, that the very supposi∣tion

of one true Miracle wrought in confirmation of any point of Doctrine, quite overthrows his whole Book. For

1. The thing it self is in a great de∣gree Mysterious, and therefore if he will allow these things related of our Saviour to be true Miracles, he must al∣low there are Mysteries in Chris••••••nity. But he endeavours to evade this by the same Quibble he did the Doc••r••nes of the Gospel being Mysterious, ••••z▪* 1.72 by saying the miraculous action mu•••• be something in it self Intelligible and Possible. Who denies it? but it is however Mysterious still..: And to lay open this Fallacy we must distin∣guish the two things that are to be consider'd in every Miracle. And 1. The substance of the thing perform'd we grant must be very Intelligible and Possible, for as he says Contradiction is only another word for Impossible or no∣thing. 2. The manner of performing it, which is totally obscur'd from us, and lies out of the reach of all our Capacities. As to instance in that Miracle of our Saviours F••••ding five

thousand People with five Loaves▪ We understand very well what it is, for a great number of men to eat and be sa∣tisfied; and what it is for a small quantity of Bread to be encreas'd to a mighty bulk: but as to the manner how this was perform'd, we are wholly ignorant of it, thô we know well how Corn is encreas'd in the ordinary way of nature.

But he will object here as he did concerning the Doctrines, viz. That at this rate All the Phenomena of Na∣ture are miraculous, for we know not the true manner of any one of them. And this is the main drift of this Chap∣ter, to give us a wrong notion of a Miracle, viz. That it is nothing more* 1.73 than the dextrous management of second causes, and not any immediate effect of Almighty God; and therefore in the close he tells us That Miracles are wrought according to the laws of Na∣ture, thô above it's ordinary operations, which are therefore supernaturally assisted. ▪ And this is the reason of that

bold and arrogant expression of his, That could he tell how a Miracle was wrought, he believes he might do as much himself. For there is nothing more in it than in a Chymical Ope∣ration, and if he were Philosopher enough, he would work any Miracle of them all.

But the true notion of a Miracle is, that it is An operation wrought by the immediate power of God, not by Assisting only, but Over-ruling the laws of Nature; not only by hastning and accelerating it's Operations, but sometimes by an in∣stantaneous production, of what was never to be effected by the united force of all natural causes. As to instance in the Raising a Body from the Dead, all the united force of nature with the most dextrous management, wou'd not be able to effect this; all the E••tracting, Mollifying, Mixing, In∣fusing, Consolidating, &c. And the ministry not only of Thousands but of Millions at once wou'd not be able to unite a Soul and Body again, when

once they are seperated: nothing less than the Almighty immediate act of God is able to effect this, and that without the concurrence of any natural cause.

Again, there are some Miraculous Operations which are so far from being according to the laws of nature, that they are contrary to them. As that of the Sun's going back or standing still, all the laws of nature are dispos'd for it's motion, or at least for the mo∣tion of our Earth which makes it seem to us to move.

Again, The making Iron to swim* 1.74 Were this effect produc'd by Mollify∣ing, Consolidating &c. or any Ope∣ration which shou'd convert the sub∣stance of Iron into that of Wood, then we could not say that Iron swam, but something else; or if the water were condensed to support it, then it wou'd be Ice and not water; and if any thing of this nature were don of a sodain••t wou'd however be miraculous, but not contrary to nature. But for a so∣lid

piece of Iron while it remains such, to swim in Water no way condens'd, this is not only above but contrary to the laws of nature.

And so likewise for Fire not to burn, is contrary to nature. Indeed if there were nothing more in it than what this man supposes▪ that it is don by repelling the heat, and keeping off the flames, then it might be according to* 1.75 the laws of nature, and there are ma∣ny things which by an instantaneous application might extinguish the Fire. But to hinder fire from burning while it remains such, and combustible mat∣ter actually in it, this is contrary to the laws of nature.

But all those Miracles which are not so directly contrary to nature, can't however be said to be according to the laws of nature. And I take these two expressions to be directly opposite. Which he makes the same, Miracles are according to the laws of nature. And, they are above the operations of

it. For to instance in the first Miracle our Saviour wrought, that of Turn∣ing Water into Wine. The production of Wine according to the laws of na∣ture. must have been by accelerating the growth of the Vine, and ripening the Grape sodainly, by application of all those things in nature which could forward it: but to turn Water imme∣diatly into Wine, without any of these methods, was to produce it afer a manner wholly different from all the laws of nature.

Upon his Principles we have no way, from the nature of the thing, of distin∣guishing between the Delusions of the* 1.76 Divel, those celebrated Feats of Goblins, and Witches, and Conjurers which he speaks of; and those which are wrought by the Finger of God. For without doubt the Divel is a great Philosopher, and can manag•• second Causes, so as to produce Effects accor∣ding to the laws of nature, which shall appear very strange to us. But we are sure nothing less than that power which is the Author of Nature, can work any

real effect contrary to it, or above it. The Divel indeed may delude mens senses, so as to make them think that Real which is only an Appearance; as it is likely he did to mimick that miracle of turning Aarons Rod into a Serpent; for that of the Magicines was not a real Conversion, but effected by their Enchantments, or as 'tis in the original by their Wiles and Jugling. For we find when they endeavour'd to imitate Moses, in the instantaneous production of any real thing with Life, there the Divel fail'd them, and they were forc'd to own it was the Fin∣ger of God.

And thus we see plainly, how this Man strikes at the foundation of all Reveal'd Religion, by undermining one of the main Pillars on which the Faith and Credit of it is founded. You see his drift all along in every thing he says, is to take away all Operations a∣bove the Laws of Nature, and all Doctrines above the reach of Reason; and then all the Religion of Men is consequently resolv'd into Infidelity,

an Heathenism. So that any one who wishes Christianity to be true, must hope at least that this Mans Principles are false, since they are so utterly in∣consistent.

2. But 2dly, As miracles being in a great degree Mysterious is an un∣answerable objection against him; so they are altogether useless and imper∣tinent upon his Principles. He owns* 1.77 that God does not work them at random, but for some end; and this end he owns is for the confirmation of some Divine* 1.78 Doctrine. But why for the confirma∣tion of a Doctrine? for he hath told us over and over, that it is only the Evidence or immediate knowledg of the Doctrine it self can perswade us. That Faith is nothing more than the knowing what is beleiv'd &c. And therefore all Miracles for the confirmation of any Doctrine are needless and superflu∣ous. If they are so evident to our Sen∣ses or our Reason that we know them to be true, what necessity is there of farther conviction? if a thing be so

evident to m•• Senses or Reason that I know it to be true, nothing can make me surer of it.

So that we see the reason of Mi∣racles is, that they may be a proof of something that we cannot compre∣hend.

But it may be objected here that at this rate, if both the Doctrines and Mi∣racles are mysterious, Then you prove one Mystery by another. I answer that they are not equally mysterious, for a misterious Doctrine is totally obscur'd from us, both as to the manner and substance of the thing signified, as it is in it self. But in a Miracle the sub∣stance of the thing is obvious and in∣telligible, and the Manner only of the operation is conceal'd. And therefore in so doing, that which is more myste∣rious is prov'd by that which is less so.

But this Blunderer will tell you,* 1.79 that the Doctrines themselves are very

knowable in all respects, but Miracles are wholly obscur'd as to the m••nner of them; And yet in the s••me breath Own, that these obscure Miracles, are for confirmation of these plain Do∣ctrines This is another pi••c•• o•• his Lo∣gick, to prove Notum per Ignotius.

He can't say that thô the Doctrines are plain, yet that they came from God is not so; and therefore Mira∣cles were to assure us of this. For if the knowing they come from God makes us give our assent to them, then Authority is a ground of Perswasion. And besides if they have that Evi∣dence of their truth in themselves, which he contends for, let them come from whence they will we must give our assent to them.

And now I am come to his last* 1.80 Chapter, wherein he pretends to give an account When, Why, and by Whom Mysteries were brought into Christianity. There is not here so much as a pre∣tence of reasoning, but several vile In∣sinuations

against all the Primitive Christians, against the Clergy of all Ages, and against Christianity it self, making it as it is now profest only a sort of Heathenism, and the Ministers of it in all respects no better than Pagan Priests.

By the title of this Chapter he was to have shewn how these Mysteries came into Christianity, but instead of this (of which he says not a word) he talks in general how some Cere∣monies were introduc'd, and some Do∣ctrines abus'd to superstition. The dis∣pute all along was about Mysteries, and now it is turn'd to Ceremonies; of which he speaks too after a confused manner, making no difference between the Orthodox and Heretical Professors, but charging all the mistakes and errors of every Sect indifferently, upon the whole body of Christians in the ge∣neral. That miscarriages and errors crept in, and that the Christian Reli∣gion was corrupted and abus'd by ma∣ny in the Primitive times to supersti∣tion is without all doubt; it is so

now, and is like to be so to the end of the World, for it must needs be that Offences come. But what is all this to those who are not guilty of these things? suppose every thing in this Chapter true, what is all this to us? who in the celebration of Baptism and the Supper, have rejected all these numerous Rites and superstitious Ceremonies which he speaks of.

As for those Ceremonies retain'd by us, it is time enough to defend them when he says any thing against them; and proves, either that the Worship of God and Celebration of the Sacraments can be perform'd without any Ceremonies. Or, That those which we have retain'd are unlawful.

All he wou'd insinuate here of them, is that they were in use among the Heathens; and the force of what he says, if it hath any, is this. Heathens us'd a White Garment in their Idola∣trous Worship, they had certain Times and Places, and Persons, and Actions, appropriated to the Worship of their Idols; therefore 'tis unlawful to have

any thing of this nature in the Wor∣ship of the true God.

The Heathens us'd washings, Ergò* 1.81 Baptism is unlawful. The Heathens used Eating and Drinking in honour of their G••ds, Ergò the Eating and Drinking in remembr••nce of Christ is superstitious. And thus by a direct and immediate consequence he destroys the Doctrine of the Sacraments Let him i•• he can, shew wh••t else can pos∣sibly be inferred from all this ridiculous incoherent s••uff.

What he would insinuate here con∣cerning the Sacraments is, that by a multitude of Ceremonies we obscure the nature of them, we make them Misterious, and do not celebrate them wi••h that simplicity they were at first instituted. But let him in his next Bo••k shew, what it is that we know our selves concerning the Sacraments, which we conceal from the People. In short let him make out that he hath any other drift in this whole Chapter,

than to shew that there is no diffe∣rence between Christianity and Hea∣thenism.

All this is by way of Amusement to People who do not know when a man speaks to the purpose; Ceremonies are not Mysteries, nor do they make a thing Mysterious. Those things which we call Mysteries, are the Nature and Attributes of God; the Eternal Gene∣ration and Incarnation of the Son, and Procession of the Holy Ghost; The Uni∣on of the Divine and Human Natures in Christ; the Resurrection of our Bodies; the Operations and Influences of the Ho∣ly Spirit of God upon ours; the Tri∣nity of Persons in the Godhead; the Glo∣ry and Felicity of the Saints in Heaven; The Solemnity of the last Judgment &c. These are the Mysterious Do∣ctrines of our Religion. Let him shew us When, Why, and by Whom these re∣puted Mysteries, as he calls them, were brought into Christianity. For we af∣firm that they were brought into Christianity by Christ himself; who a∣lone

was able to reveal them. That they came in at the first publication of the Gospel; and with design to make us wise unto Salvation; and therefore we own our selves so fond of them, that we* 1.82 will hazard any thing, Life and all rather than part with them.

And thus I have gon through his Book, and answered every thing that look'd like Reasoning in it. If he will shew me where I have overlook'd any thing that hath the appearance of an Argument; or where my Answer fails, I will promise him not to let it pass. And if any are offended with my manner of treating him, I doubt not but they will be satisfied▪ if they but consider what St. Paul said to Elyma•• the Sor∣cerer upon a like occasion▪ O full of all* 1.83 Subtilty and all Mischief, thou Child of the Devil, thou Enemy of all Righteous∣ness, wilt thou not cease to pervert the right ways of the Lord?

In the next Book he speaks of, he has two things to perform.

1. To shew that we are not oblig'd by Scripture, to believe that there is any thing, in any point of the Christi∣an Faith, which we do not compre∣hend as fully and perfectly, as we do the common objects of this World.

2. To discover to all the World those secrets in Religion, which the Clergy have industriously conceal'd from the Laity, under the notion of Mysteries, and make them so plain that they shall cease to be such; so that every one of them shall be as wise as e're a Priest of us all. And indeed he is much to blame that defers it all this while; He that pretends so much Zeal and Concern for the Vulgar, shou'd not let them remain so long in Ignorance, to be thus miserably im∣pos'd upon, by the craft and cunning of their Priests.

What strange unheard of Design this Man has in that second Book, which is

now a forging, is hard to tell. For by it he is to inform the World of things they never heard or thought of; He is to reveal to us more than ever Jesus Christ hath done; and what never yet cou'd enter into the heart of Man to think, or into his imagina∣tion to frame any true and proper notion of. I•• The World had any o∣pinion of his abilities to perform what he pretends with this hardy confidence, we shou'd all of us expect this wonder∣full Book with much impatience. Cer∣tainly by all these promises of so much New Light to the World, which hath liv'd in darkness so many hundred Years, we can't guess he designs to be no more than Head of an ordinary Sect, but to be as famous an Impostor as Mahomet, He hath laid a fair foundation for it, for he a••er's posi∣tively in one place, that if he knew the way how a Miracle was wrought he wou'd work it himself. And again he openly says, That nothing related in the Gospel is Mysterious, either as to the manner or Substance of the thing, and therefore

'tis not unlikely that we shall have this man shortly confirming his Doctrines with Miracles.

For my part, I can't imagine how he will go about what he hath under∣taken; however thus much I dare ven∣ture to promise him, that whenever any thing is built upon that Rotten Foundation which is here laid, by the Grace of God I will pull it down.

When this Book of his comes out (which after all will tell us no more concerning these Mysteries, than what we have heard an hundred times over; but by what he promises must take place of the Bible it self, which gives us no such clear and distinct Idea's of the things of another World) Then we shall give a better guess at the de∣sign of the Man. In the mean time,* 1.84 I shall only say a little more concern∣ing the Pretended, and the Real Drift of this Book. And

1. The Pretended Drift of it is▪ To free the Christian Religion from that Darkness and Obscurity, in which it is involv'd by the Contrivance of it's

Preachers, only to gain a Reputation •••• their Person•• and Profession; and •••• make it such a Religion as God design'd it, (i. e.) a Religion for all Men. But how doth he go about this? by scraps of Metaphysical Abstractions, which were tolerable where he found them, but spoilt in the Application. By talking of Adequate, Inadequate, and Interme∣diate Idea's; by the Nominal and Real Essence of things; by Irivolous distinctions between the Means of Information, and grounds of Perswasion; and by littl•• Niceties concerning the degrees of Per∣spic••ity i•• Divine and Human Revela∣tions &c. This is the method this grand Reformer takes, to restore Christianity to it's Native Simplicity, and make it a Religion for all People▪ Whereas it is not One of ten Thousand that knows the meaning of any of these Words and Phrases, by which he darkens what is in it self▪ Plain and Obvious, and renders every thing in Religion a Mystery to them. And yet this is the very man that talks so much against the new converted Philoso∣phers,* 1.85 for confounding their Philasophy

••nd Di••inity together, and by that means rendering every thing abstruce by Terms. And who rails at our Cler∣gy for darkning every thing in Reli∣gion, and industriously concealing it from the People.

2. As to the Real design of thi•• man, 'tis plain it is no other than what he formerly declar'd, and wha•• he openly affects, viz. to be the Head of a Sect. and set up for a Reformer. For besides many General Expressions, he hath several very particular ones to this purpose, as where he says, That* 1.86 the very Nature and use of the Sacra∣ments are absolutely perverted and de∣stroy'd, and are not yet fully restor'd by the purest Reformations in Christen▪ do••. And that expression in the close of his Book. Because several turn'd Lib••rti••es and Atheists, when Priest∣••raft was laid ••o open at the Reforma∣tion; were Luther, C••lvin, or Zwin∣glius to be blam'd for it? which is spoke by way of Defence of that great Re∣formation

he intends, whatever the ill consequences of it are.

Now the Method he hath taken to effect this grand design of his, is first to Amuse the generality of people with a little shew of Learning, by hard Words, and several impertinent Quo∣tations to get a reputation among them.

His next Business was, to insinuate into the minds of people a disesteem of the Religion they now Profess, and make them believe that Christianity, as it is now receiv'd, is no better than Heathenism; which he doth by com∣paring* 1.87 them in several instances, and tells us plainly He hath said enough to shew how the Divine Institutions of Christianity, through the Craft and* 1.88 Ambition of Priests and Philosophers, did degenerate into meer Paganism. He calls our Principles narrow bigoted Tenets. And in short says they are a Mystery of Iniquity. He calls the pre∣sent Theology, the Gibberish of our

Divinity Schools, and the Language of the Beast. He wou'd have no Cere∣monies,* 1.89 no Times, Places or Particular Actions for the Worship of God, &c.* 1.90

And notwithstanding all these vi∣rulent Expressions, and many more through his whole Book, against the Religion profest and establish't among us; He says, That such is the deplo∣rable* 1.91 condition of our Age, that a man dares not openly and directly own what he thinks of Divine Matters, if it but v••∣ry slightly differ from what is receiv'd by any Party; or that is establish't by Law. And therefore He that hath o∣penly said so much already, what is it he wou'd not say, were it not for the Laws? Undoubtedly he hath a great deal more to say, whenever this new SECT of his becomes so numerous, that they shall outbrave the Laws, and labour for a Publick Reformation of all the Mysterious Doctrines of the Gos∣pel.

Had this Man made any of the Mysteries of our Religion more clear

and intelligible than they were before, He had don worthily; and might have hop'd for a Reward from God, and Esteem from Men; And the Ministers of the Gospel wou'd have been so far from resenting it, that they wou'd have thank'd him for it, and not fail'd to have acquainted their People with it. But by this Scurrilous Libel upon all these Doctrines which are the ground and foundation of Christianity; and by Railing at all the Teachers and Professors of it for sixteen hundred Years, as if they had all been Fools, and Knaves, and Bigots at the best, till He appear'd in the World; He is justly become odious and detestable by all Men, who have any concern lest for the Christian Religion.

'Tis true he hath set his Forehead like a Flint, and is prepar'd with Obsti∣nacy and Resolution against all that can be said or done against him. For God knows he no more values this ridiculous* 1.92 Nick-name of an Heretick, than Paul did before him. But sure there is a* 1.93 great deal of difference between St.

Paul's being call'd a Heretick for Preaching the Resurrection of the Dead,* 1.94 and saying the manner of it is Myste∣rious. And this Man's Contradicting him, and saying the Manner of it is not Mysterious; and by his Principels un∣dermining the foundation of all Re∣veal'd and Natural Religion.

Another way of effecting what he designs, is by loading the Clergie in general with Reproaches, and charging them with most detestible Frauds to serve the vilest ends. He declares himself in his Preface An open inplaca∣ble Enemy to all Clergy-men, who make a meer Trade of Religion, and build an unjust Authority upon the Consciences of the Laity (i. e.) to all Clergy-men who are not of his opinion, he is a profest Adversary; and He hopes every good and Wise Man will be the same. Nay the whole Race and Order, he calls an Usurpation on Mankind, and* 1.95 a Diabolical and Antichristian Tyranny;* 1.96 and says that by the assistance of Myste∣ries we first erected our selves into a distinct Order, and one seperate Body;

us if there were no such Order institu∣ted and appointed by our Blessed Sa∣viour. And to make us sure that this is his Opinion, He says plainly, He* 1.97 sees no reason why all men indifferently, shou'd not as lawfully teach, as they are bound to practice their Religion. And again, why Women might not enjoy the Priviledg of instructing others, in the Religious Duties they are bound to practice themselves, He wants still to be inform'd. That they may teach their Children and Servants in private, all the World allows; So that his mean∣ing is, that they may Preach in pub∣lick as well as men, thô this be con∣trary to the express words of Scrip∣ture.

He insinuates every where that our Profession is but a Craft; and calls it a Trade; and our Religious Mysteries a* 1.98 Contrivance only to bring us Gain and Credit: as if we had no sence at all of Religion, and that a little Vain glory and profit were all our aim.

He levels the whole Book mainly at the Clergy, and doth all he can to render us odious in the sight of the People. And to do it more effectual∣ly, he all along makes the Clergy and Laity two opposite Parties, and endea∣vours to raise in them jealousies and suspicions of our gulling and abusing them, in order to prejudice and in∣cense them against us. And that his Sophistry might pass upon them the better, he paints us out under the no∣tion of Heathen Priests; he draws their Picture, and then leaves the Lai∣ty to mistake it for ours; endeavou∣ring everywhere, to make all People of his Faith, who thinks that Priests of all Religions are the same.

What this Man advances here, is but a Branch of that bitter Root of So∣cinianism, which hath opened a Door for introducing and reviving many of those Heresies, which have formerly infested the Church, and troubled the Faith of Christians. These Men dif∣fer among themselves, and there is as great variety of them as there were of

the Arrians formerly; yet they all a∣gree in Destroying Reveal'd Religion and the establisht Doctrine of that Church, of which they yet profess them∣selves Members. Thus these Vermin en∣gendred in the Body of it, at the same time they strike at one another, do all equally contribute to devour the whole, from whence they first deriv'd their life and being.

I hope I need not here enter into a Defence of our Order, or make any long Apology for the Ministers of the Gospel. This one Book of his, is a sufficient Proof of the Necessity and Usefulness of the Clergy; for had it not been for us, such ridiculous Sophisms as these might have pass'd with the People for sound Reasoning. If it were not for them, whose business it is to confute the Arguments of these pretenders to Reason, to lay open their Fallacies, and detect their Villanous Designs; there wou'd not, in a little time, be so much as a Face of Religion omong us. And if the Experiment were not too dangerous, and the consequences of it

never to be retriev'd, there cou'd not be a greater demonstration of the Ne∣cessity and Usefulness of the Clergy, than the universal desisting of their en∣deavours only for a very short space, For then all Religion would degenerate into Barbarity and Heathenism.

If we are guilty of all these Villa∣nies with which this Man brands us, there is no punishment either in this World, or the next too bad for us. But if we are not, and that this Man doth not make out what he so posi∣tively asserts, then what will he de∣serve? We appeal to any Power that is able to take account of the matter; And if the strength of all Laws Eccle∣fiastical and Civil should once be so re∣lax't, that every one may openly vent what they please against the Christi∣an Religion, and it's Teachers, without restraint (which God forbid) then we must leave it to him to defend his own Cause.

The World is at this time so dispos'd for the reception of all Discourses that

seem to set up Reason and Evidence in opposition to the Reveal'd and Mysteri∣rious Doctrines of Christianity, that nothing less than the Interposition of Authority, can stop this current of In∣fidelity and Prophaness which threatens to overwhelm these Nations.

How far Men in Power, according to their several stations, are oblidg'd to intermedle in point of Conscience, I shall not now enquire. But sure I am in point of Policy, it is become no less than necessary. For the writers of this Strein have given broad Hints, that they are as little Friends to our Go∣vernment, as our Religion. This Man can say, That Magistrates are made for the People, and every one knows, what Doctrines of Rebellion men are wont to insinuate by this saying. And again he says. That God alone, and such as are inspir'd by him can prescribe Injuncti∣ons* 1.99 relating to the World to come, whilst Human Powers regulate the Affairs of this. By which 'tis plain his meaning is, that they have nothing to do, to meddle any way in the Affairs of Religion

Now what would this man have said, if he durst have spoke as plainly of Government as he hath done of Reli∣gion?

Whosoever observes these men's way of writing as to this one point, will be convinc'd they deserve to be look'd too; Their Numbers grow Formida∣ble, They begin to speak out their Infidelity and Prophaness, as plain as some of them do Treason; they are se∣cretly forming themselves into Clubs & Caballs, and have their Emissaries into all parts, which are supported by Con∣tributions: And I make little doubt, but that their design is at length to shew us, That all Dominion as well as Religion is founded in Reason.

Notes

• * 1.1

  P: 87: Last Edi∣tion.
• * 1.2

  1 Cor: 15: 51, 52.
• * 1.3

  1 Joh: 3: 2.
• * 1.4

  P. 8, 9, 10
• * 1.5

  P. 11.
• * 1.6

  P. 13.
• * 1.7

  P. 18.
• * 1.8

  P. 16.
• * 1.9

  To make what is to be said upon this head more intelligible, the Reader may take notice that by Evidence he means nothing more than the knowledge of a thing in the Mind. So that these two Expressions are the same. Evidence is the only ground of Perswasion, and, You can give your assent to nothing but what you know. All the difference is, that one is plain, and the other affectedly obscure. But I must use his own Cant, otherwise thô I speak ever so much to the purpose, he will not think himself an∣swer'd.
• * 1.10

  To prevent all ambiguity, I do not take the word Substance here strictly, as it is oppos'd to the modes and accidents of the thing, but as it includes them.
• * 1.11

  P. 43. & 128.
• * 1.12

  That which may make this Paragraph obscure, is the mistaking Evidence in the Mind, or Knowledge, for those proofs which are only the cause of it.
• * 1.13

  Not that worldly Objects can have any real likeness or resemblance of the things reveal'd, but they are such as God hath made choice of for that purpose; and therefore we may make this inference from his Wisdom, that they bear the greatest analogy with them, of any things that fall within the compass of our knowledge now.
• * 1.14

  Lock of H. U. B. 2. C. 23.
• * 1.15

  Lock of H. U.
• * 1.16

  1. Cor. 13. 12.
• * 1.17

  P. 14.
• * 1.18

  Rom. 1. 19.
• * 1.19

  1 Joh. 57.
• * 1.20

  Thô we grant this Text was not quoted by the Nicene Council against the Arrians, and is not found in many ancient Copies. Nay thô we shou'd grant that it was not originally in the Epistle of St. John, it is however a good Argument for the Doctrine of the Trinity. For

  If it was a Marginal Note, and so crept into the Text, this however shews it to have been the Opinion of the most Ancient and Primitive Christians, who put this Comment to the Text.

  If they say this was put in by the Orthodox, it was done in opposition to Hereticks, and this was a suffici∣ent evidence of their firm belief of the Doctrine of the Trinity then.

  But if this Text was expung'd by the Arrians, who, as St. Ambrose observes of them, were remarkable for this sort of fraudulent dealing with the Scriptures, then there was a great deal of reason for restoring of it.

  Thô it be not in some Copies, yet it is in others, and those very antient And that which may give us a strong presumption that it is genuine, is that it was quoted by St. Cyprian a considerable time before the Nicene Council: and before the Arrian Heresy ran so high, or that it was so much for the interest of a∣ny party either to insert, or expunge it.

  But however this be, we are sure the Scriptures with it are all of a piece, and very consistent with themselves. For the substance of this Text is plainly exprest in other places, which they don't deny to be genuine. And we make no question but if it were in the power of our modern Hereticks of the same rank, these too wou'd be left out of all those Copies, which shou'd be transmitted to posterity.
• * 1.21

  Athe.
• * 1.22

  P. 22.
• * 1.23

  P. 23.
• * 1.24

  It may be thought that I have taken a wrong Instance, because at first sight, it looks as if it was the consent only of her Will without any delusion of her Understanding. But on second thoughts you will find, this is no other than to disbelieve the truth of the History, which records this false perswasion of her Understan∣ding as the temptation which prevail'd upon her; for the consent of her Will did not follow, till the Devil had remov'd her Objection from that saying of Gods, in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely dye.
• * 1.25

  P. 42.
• * 1.26

  Sect. 2.
• * 1.27

  P. 25.
• * 1.28

  P. 26.
• * 1.29

  P. 46.
• * 1.30

  Sect. 3.
• * 1.31

  P. 6••.
• * 1.32

  P. 66.
• * 1.33

  P. 66.
• * 1.34

  P. 68.
• * 1.35

  P. 73.
• * 1.36

  P. 72.
• * 1.37

  P. 73.
• * 1.38

  P. 73.
• * 1.39

  P. 74.
• * 1.40

  P. 74.
• * 1.41

  P. 86.
• * 1.42

  P. 75.
• * 1.43

  1. Cor. 2. 9.
• * 1.44

  Letter to the Bp. of Worces: P. 69, 70, 71.
• * 1.45

  Sect▪ 3. C. 3.
• * 1.46

  P. 90.
• * 1.47

  Math. 26. 27.
• * 1.48

  P. 90.
• * 1.49

  •• Cor. 3. 12. 13.
• * 1.50

  P. 109.
• * 1.51

  Sect. 3. C. 4. P. 120.
• * 1.52

  P. 126.
• * 1.53

  P. 126.
• * 1.54

  P. 127
• * 1.55

  P. 12••.
• * 1.56

  P. 129.
• * 1.57

  P. 130.
• * 1.58

  P. 131.
• * 1.59

  P. 132.
• * 1.60

  P. 133.
• * 1.61

  P. 134.
• * 1.62

  P. 135.
• * 1.63

  P. 136.
• * 1.64

  P. 137.
• * 1.65

  P. 138.
• * 1.66

  P. 139.
• * 1.67

  P. 139.
• * 1.68

  P. 110.
• * 1.69

  P. 140.
• * 1.70

  P. 139.
• * 1.71

  C. 5. P. 144.
• * 1.72

  P. 145.
• * 1.73

  P. 150.
• * 1.74

  2. Kings 6. 6.
• * 1.75

  P. 145.
• * 1.76

  P. 147▪
• * 1.77

  P. 146.
• * 1.78

  P. 150.
• * 1.79

  P▪ 150.
• * 1.80

  Sect. 3. C. 4. P. 151.
• * 1.81

  P. 157.
• * 1.82

  P. 120.
• * 1.83

  Acts. 13. 01.
• * 1.84

  P. 150.
• * 1.85

  P. 154
• * 1.86

  P. 165.
• * 1.87

  Sect. 3. C. 6.
• * 1.88

  P. 163.
• * 1.89

  P. 141.
• * 1.90

  P. 167.
• * 1.91

  Preface. P. 2.
• * 1.92

  P. 172.
• * 1.93

  Acts. 24. 14.
• * 1.94

  1 Cor. 15. 5.
• * 1.95

  P. 166.
• * 1.96

  Preface. P. 22.
• * 1.97

  Preface to the Lady's Religion.
• * 1.98

  Preface. P. 19.
• * 1.99

  Pref.