Humane prudence, or, The art by which a man may raise himself and fortune to grandeur by A.B.

Sententiae Stellares, OR Maximes of Prudence To be observed by ARTISONS of STATE.

1. THat Government is best tempered, where a few drams of fear are blended with the Peoples love.

2. It is the interest of Princes to make Acts of Grace, peculiarly their own; because they which have commonly the Art to please the People, have commonly the power to raise them.

3. He who putteth off his Hat to the People, giveth his Head to the Prince; for the immoderate Favour of the Multitude, as it can do a Man no good, so it will undo so many as shall trust to it. It was said of the Earl of Sussex, that he

was grown so popular, that he was too dangerous for the times, and the times for him.

4. He that gives a Prince Counsel by his desires, sets Interest which cannot err, by Passions which may.

5. It may sometimes be the Interest of a Prince, not only to remove Grievances, by doing what is desired, but even Jealousies by doing some∣thing which is not expected: For when a Prince does more than his People looks for, he gives them reason to believe that he is not sorry for doing that they desired.

6. In popular Tumults many times nothing is more safe than speed, and greater advantages accrew by Expedition than Delays; for while some are in fear, some in doubt, others ignorant, all may be reduced to the limits of Obedience; and Fury when the first blast is spent, turns commonly to Fear; and those Per∣sons which are the Heads of Rebel∣lion,

whom the People honour and admire at first, are at last plentifully repayed with scorn and contempt.

7. When a Prince seeks the love of his Subjects, he shall find in them enough of fear; but where he seeks their fear he loses their love.

8. Denial from Princes must be supplied with gratious usage, that though they cure not the Sore, yet they may abate the Sense of it; but best it is that all Favours come directly from themselves, Denials and things of bitterness from their Ministers. Therefore if a Prince re∣solve not to answer a Request, the least offensive way is, not to use direct Denial, but by delays prolong the time; and so in place of effect, afford good expectation. Henry the Fourth of France was so courteous, that when he would not answer a Petitioner, he always so obliged him with some good word, that he al∣ways went away satisfied.

9. The more a Prince weakneth himself by giving, the poorer he is of Friends.

10. Equal Authority with the same power, is ever fatal to all great Actions; and therefore one wise General having but a thousand Men, is more to be feared than twenty of equal Authority; for they are commonly of divers Humours, and judging diversly, do rarely what is to be done: And lose time before Resolutions can be taken.

11. Reward and Punishment justly laid, do ballance Government, but it much concerns a Prince, the hand to be equal that holds the Scale; therefore if any Subject doth deserve never so highly of his Prince, if he becomes afterwards a Malefactor, he must be made an example of Justice, without regard of his former Merit. Manlius Capitolinus, though by Valour he had delivered the Ca∣pitol of Rome from the French, who

beleaguered it; yet afterwards growing seditious, was thrown down from the Capitol, which by his great Renown he had formerly delivered.

12. That Prince which scrues up the Pins of Power too high, will break the Strings of the Common-wealth. Wise Princes make use of their Prerogative, as God Almighty doth of his Omipotency, upon ex∣traordinary occasions.

13. The Prince is the Pilot of the Common-wealth, the Laws are his Compass.

14. Reversionary Grants of Pla∣ces of Profit and Houour by Prin∣ces, are the bane and ruin of In∣dustry; but acts of Grace and Bounty are the golden Spur to Vertuous and Generous Spirits.

15. In Holy things he that strikes upon the Anvil of his own Brain, is in danger to have the sparks flie in his face.

16. A Kingdom is like a Ship at Sea, whose Ballast should be the Princes Coffers; which if they be light and empty, she doth nought but tumble up and down, nor can be made to run a direct and steady Course: Therefore it's the interest of Princes to have a good Treasure against all Extremities; for Empty Coffers give an ill sound.

17. That Prince, who upon e∣very Commotion of the Subject, rusheth presently into Open War; is like him who sets his own House a fire to rost his Eggs.

18. That State which goeth out of the Lists of Mediocrity, passeth also the Limits of Safety; while Sparta kept her self within those boundaries that Licurgus presented unto her, she was both safe and flourishing; but attempting to en∣large her Territories by new acquists of other Cities in Greece and Asia, she every day declined.

19. Rather than the least disho∣nour shall fall upon the State, it's prudence, sometimes to preserve the Honour of the Publique, to cast the Male Administration upon some Favorite or Councellor, and offer him a Sacrifice to Justice.

20. Charles the Fifth laid the loss and dishonour he received in the invasion of France, by way of Pro∣vence, to Anthony de Leva. The Spaniard, to cover the Dishonour they received in their attempt against England in Eighty Eight, cast it upon the Duke of Parma in his not joyning with them in convenient time. So did Charles the Sixth of France, upon the Duke of Berry, in his Design of Invading England, as many Wise Princes and States had formerly done.

21. Reputation abroad, and Re∣verence at home, are the Pillars of Safety and Soveraignty.

22. Taxes which the Soveraign

Levies from the Subject, are as Vapors which the Sun exhales from the Earth, and doth return them again in fruitful Showers.

23. Too great a City in a Nati∣on, is like a bad Spleen in the Body Natural, which swells so big as makes all other parts of the Body lean; therefore some sober persons have conceived that it's more Pru∣dence to have three Cities of equal Power, that in Case one should Re∣bel, the other too might Ballance or give Law to the Third. A great City is the fittest Engine to turn an Old Monarchy, into a New Common-wealth.

24. That State which doth not Subsist in Fidelity, can never con∣tinue long in Potency.

25. Wise Princes must sometimes deal with Mutinous Subjects, as the Sun did to take away the Passen∣gers Cloak, not as the ruffling Winds, to blow him down.

26. There is nothing which doth more impoverish a Prince, than Im∣prests of Mony at great usance, for thereby a Prince is brought to one of these two Extremities, either to o∣verthrow his Dominions and Finan∣ces, whereof the French Kings are Examples, or else to play Bankrupt, and pay none, as King Philip of Spain hath done to the Merchants of Genoa, Florence, Ausburgh, and almost to all the Banks in Christendome.

27. Tumults may be raised by Men of little Courage, but must be maintained by Hazard, and ended with the Loss of the most Valiant.

28. In Popular Tumults it's safer for a Prince with some yielding, to condescend to Peace, than by stan∣ing upon high Points of Honour, to Hazard the Issue of a Battle, wherein the King cannot win with∣out his weakning, nor lose without danger of his undoing. Lewis XIII. of France was a sad and mournful instance hereof.

29. When any mischief grows in a State, and becomes formidable, it's many times more Prudence to temporize with it, than by force to attempt the redress of it: For they who go about to quench it, kindle it the more, and suddenly plucks down that mischief upon their Heads, which was then but feared from them: By Courting or dissembling the mischief, if it doth not remove the evil, at least it's put off for a longer time.

30. Charles the Fifth (even he who was Surnamed the Wise) of France, at such time as he was Re∣gent in France, his Father at that time being a Prisoner in England, by evil Counsel of some, being ig∣norant in matters of State, at once suspended all the Officers of France, of whom he suppressed the greatest part, appointing Fifty Commissio∣ners for the hearing such Accusa∣tions, as should be laid against them

for Extortation and Bribery by them committed; whereupon all France was in such a Tumult (by reason of the great number of such as were Male-contents) as that shortly after, for Remedy thereof, he by Decree in the High Court of Parliament in Paris, was forced to abrogate the former Law.

31. It's a noble Ambition, and absolutely necessary for a Prince, to believe none of his Subjects more worthy than himself, nor more fit to govern; when he hath not this good opinion of himself, he suffers himself to be governed by others, whom he believes more fit than himself: and by this means falls into many infelicities. This was the unhappiness of Philip the Third of Spain, though a Prince of eminent parts, yet suffering him∣self to be governed by the Duke of Lerma, he became of so little esteem with his People, and had

no ways to free himself from those Indignities which were cast upon him, but by becoming a Church∣man and a Cardinal.

32. A Wise Prince, when he is obliged to make War, ought to make it powerful and short; and at first to astonish his Enemies with formidable Preparations, be∣cause by this means it returns to good Husbandry; and the Con∣quests made through fear of Arms, reacheth farther than those made by the Arms themselves.

33. Punishment and Reward are the two Pillars where on all King∣doms are built; the former serves for restraining of vile Spirits, the latter for the encouragement of the generous: The one serves instead of a Bridle the other of a Spur.

34. The love of the Subject is the most sure Basis of the Princes Greatness; and Princes are more secure and better defended by the

love of the People, than by many Troops and Legions. Every Wise Prince must suppose that times of Trouble may come, and then will be necessitated to use the service of Men diversly qualified; therefore his care and study must be in the mean time so to entertain them, that when those storms arise, he may rest assured to command them: For whosoever perswades himself by present Benefits to gain the good will of Men, when Perils are at hand, shall be deceived.

35. It's not safe for a Prince to commit his Secrets to his greatest Favourite, for if he that is con∣cerned will give, the Prince is cer∣tainly betrayed.

36. It concerns a Prince to con∣tain his best Friends within a mo∣derate and convenient Greatness, as to weaken and depress his greatest Enemies.

37. Forreign Succours are most

dangerous, and therefore it must be the last resolve of every wise State; for they are seldom gotten out but by the undoing that State which received them; or else, as most commonly it happens out, they make themselves Masters of it.

38. In all Distempers in a State, Pilae Aureae, are the best Physick; for they ever work safely.

39. Those People which by Arms do endeavour to deliver them∣selves from Oppression, do many times change the Tyrant, but not the Tyranny; and after a Rebellion is suppressed, the King is more King, and the Subject more Sub∣ject.

40. The chief Wisdom and Hap∣piness of a Prince, is to know well to enjoy the Soveraignty of his Power, with the Liberty of his Subjects: Love, Fear, and Re∣verence, are the three Ligaments which tie the Hearts of the Subjects

to their Soveraign: Let the Prince have the first in height, the second in good measure: And of the last so much as he can.

41. That State which doth affect Grandeur, or the Preservation of its Interest, must be bold and daring; in the mean there is no safety: And those attempts which begin with danger, for the most part are crowned with Glory, and end in Honour.

42. That State which will pre∣serve it self in Puissance, must pre∣vent Divisions, to which States are subject; and where People are Factious and apt to Divisions, it's Prudence to soften them with Plea∣sures; for where they are subtile and proud, they must be made voluptuous, so their Wit and Ma∣lice will hurt the less. It's some security that a Faction is deboshed, for it's not safe to suffer sober Men to come to undo the Common-wealth.

As in a Tempest each Wave striving to be highest, rides upon the Neck of that which hasted to the Shore before it, and is it self suppressed by a following: So it happens in a Civil Tempest of the Common-wealth, each Party strive to suppress the other, till a third undiscerned assaults and sup∣press the Conqueror.

43. When a Nation is at War within it self, it's not safe for any State or Prince to attempt the In∣vasion of it, for it will certainly re∣unite them.

44. Whatsoever a Prince doth, it's to be presumed that it was done with great Reason: If he com∣mandeth any thing, every one is bound to believe that he hath good reason to command the same; his Actions are manifest, but his Thoughts are secret. It's our Duty to tollerate the one, and not to murmur against the other; for the

Books of Kings are written in dark Characters, which few can unci∣pher; and their Actions like deep Rivers, whereof we see the course of the stream, but know not the source of it.

45. When a State is jealous of the Obedience and Loyalty of the Metropolis, or Chief City in its Dominions; the only means to se∣cure its Obedience, is to borrow great sums of Money of them; for by that means they will not easily break out into any Action or Re∣bellious Attempts, for fear of losing their Money. Edward the Second of England, being deprived by his own Subjects of his Royal Diadem, had never been restored, if he had not been indebted to the Citizens of London, who upon his coming up to London, purchased him the Favour and Friendship of the greatest part of the City; of which being Master, his Power encreased, and

thereby became so strong, that he subdued most of his Enemies, and thereby recovered his Kingdom.

46. Eumenes understanding that divers Noble Men sought occasions to kill him, to prevent their Ma∣lice against him, pretended that he had need of great sums of Mo∣ney, which he borrowed of them who hated him most, to the end they might give over the seeking of his Death, whereby they were assured to lose all their Money.

47. He who groweth great on the sudden, seldom governeth him∣self in the change: Extraordinary Favour to Men of weak or bad de∣fects; doth breed Insolency in them, and Discontentment in others; two dangerous Humours in a Common-wealth.

48. Great Persons must not at all be touched, but if they be, they must be made sure from taking Re∣venge; and there is nothing more

dangerous than to bring a great Courage to the place of Execution, and then grant him his Pardon; for he will always remember the Affront and forget the Pardon.

49. Sudden Resolutions are always dangerous, and no less Peril ensueth of slow and doubtful delays.

50. It's the Interest of Princes, that their Servants fortunes should be above Temptation; for many times new Officers to Princes, are like fresh Flies, bite deeper than those which were chased away before them.

51. Princes strike their Enemies more smartly with the Head than with the Hand, and are as much to be feared for their Prudence, as for their Valour.

52. A good Magistrate must be like the Statue of Apollo, which had a Lance in one hand, and a Harp in the other, that is, Reso∣lution to awe on the one side, and

Sweetness to oblige on the other.

53. A Prince hath more reason to fear Money that is spent, than that which is hoarded up; because it's easier for Subjects to oppose a Prince by Popularity, than by Arms.

54. Outward Esteem to a Great Person, is a Skin to Fruit; which though a thin Cover, yet preserves it.

55. No Man can be Merry, that hath more than one Woman in his Bed, more than one Faith in his Heart.

56. What wants a Soveraign (says a flattering Courtier?) Truth, said a serious King.

57. A sound Faith is the best Di∣vinity, a good Conscience the best Law, and Temperance the best Physick.

58. A good Magistrate must be made up of Craterus and Hephesti∣on, who must love the Kings Inte∣rest and his Person: For he that loves not his Interest, hath no kindness for his Person.

59. He that entertains a dange∣rous Design, puts his Head into a Halter, and the Halter into his Hands to whom he first discovers it.

60. The dis-esteem of Religious Ceremonies, argues the decay of the Civil Government. Pious Prin∣ces have first kept their People Re∣ligious, and thereby made them Vertuous and United.

61. Heresies and Errors in the Church, are rather to be suppressed by Discipline, than increased by Disputations; for in many Cases it's Impiety to doubt, and Blasphe∣my to dispute.

62. The Riches of the People are the Princes Safety, but their Poverty his Calamity; for they being Rich will not easily attempt against the Government, For fear of loss; whereas being poor and beggerly, will upon every discon∣tent be apt to break out into Action; for such will think being poor,

that they cannot be worse, but by bold Attempts they may be better.

63. Great Men are the first that find their own Grief, and the last that find their own Faults.

64. Discontent is the greatest weak∣ness of a generous Soul, which is always so intent upon its unhap∣piness, that it forgets its remedies.

65. There is a time when you may say nothing, and a time when you may say something, but never a time when you should say all.

66. Emulation amongst Favori∣tes is the security of Princes.

67. The Lord Chancellor wor∣thily said, That he would not have his Servants gain by his Livings or Decrees, because the first were Gods, the second the Kings: To honest Men your places, said he, are enough, to Knaves too much.

68. When a Cousin of Justice Sir John Fitz-James, urged him for a kindness, Come to my House (saith the

Judg) I will deny you nothing; come to the Kings Court and I must do you Justice.

69. The two main Principles which guide Humane Nature, are Conscience and Law; by the former we are obliged in reference to ano∣ther World, by the latter in refe∣rence to this.

70. Two things break Treaties, Jealousie when Princes are success∣ful, Fear when they are unfortunate.

71. Inconveniences which happen to Government, are sudden and un∣looked for; therefore a Prince must be provided in Omnem Eventum.

72. It's safer for a State by Death to extinguish the Power, or by Pardon to alter the Wills of great Offenders, than to put them to Exile or Abjuration; therefore Henry the Fourth of France, being advised to banish Marshal Byron, he said, That a burning Fire-brand casts more Flame and Smoke out of a Chimney, than in it.

FINIS.