A treatise of vse and custome

A TREATISE OF VSE AND CVSTOME.

THat man is not made and brought forth into the World, to eat and drinke, and to take his ease, but for some better thing, is ac∣knowledged by all men, who have any thing left in them of men, (that is, of rationall creatures;) and have not wholly degenerated into brutes. But whether Action, or Contemplation, bee the thing, wherein mans chiefest happinesse in this world doth consist, hath beene a

question of old, and is yet disputed of on both sides. To omit the ancient Fa∣thers, because our purpose is not to insist long upon this point, (whose opinion neverthelesse if any desire to know, let him read them upon the words of Christ unto Martha, Luke x.41, 42.) Aristotle and other Philosophers, that are for Con∣templation, goe upon this ground: That the neerer every man comes unto God, by way of imitation, (as farre as by nature he is capable of it:) the more happy he is: that God doth enjoy himselfe in the fruition and contemplation of his owne goodnesse, infinitnesse, eternitie, and the like; and not in, or by any thing exter∣nall, that he doth cause, or produce with∣out himselfe. On the other side it is al∣ledged, That man, naturally, is animal politicum; that is, borne and brought forth into the World, not every man for himselfe only, but for the good of others also; and that it is one of the fundamen∣tall principles of all publike-weales and societies of men, that the publicke is al∣wayes

by every man, to bee preferred be∣fore his owne private, whether profit, or happinesse. Both which opinions may easily bee reconciled, if both be acknow∣ledged (as I thinke they must of necessi∣tie:) in their severall respects to be true. For certainely, if man bee absolutely and barely by himselfe considered, as a ratio∣nall creature, then Contemplation; if, as naturally sociable, having relation to the World as a Citie, then Action is his end. Action then his end; yet, even then, not action, without all manner of Contempla∣tion. For as we commonly say of the Sci∣ences, that some are speculative, and some practicall; so is it of contemplation too: Some contemplation is meerely specula∣tive; and so it is opposed to Action: some may be termed (though there may seeme to bee some contradiction in the termes:) active, or practicall, because it is the ground and foundation of all actions, that tend to happinesse. For they are not all actions in generall, that make men happy; but such onely, as are good and

vertuous. Which are such, and which are contrarie, cannot bee knowne without the knowledge of good and evill. Nei∣ther is this knowledge (in this state of corruption:) to bee attained unto with∣out much studie and contemplation. And this, all Divines and Philosophers as∣sent unto, that it is not enough, that what wee doe bee laudible of it selfe, and as the Schoole men speake, materially good; except wee know it to bee so, and doe it upon that ground. Then, and not till then, is our action, as it is ours, truely good and commendable. Hence it is, that in the opinion of Aristotle, (the great wonder of Nature:) a learned and well grounded Physician, though missing of his end, is more praise worthy, then an ignorant Empiricke that hath good suc∣cesse; because, saith hee, in his Meta∣physickes, The one understands what hee doth, and goeth upon warrantable grounds, though the ignorance of some particular outward circumstance may hinder the good event: The other doth

hee knoweth not what, nor upon what grounds, but altogether ventureth upon former experiments. Now experience, we know, is the mistris, as of men, so of brutes too: which, though they be irra∣tionall, yet are capable of that know∣ledge that comes by bare experience; and cannot therefore be the proper commen∣dation of those creatures, which are na∣turally rationall. So that what once a grave Senator (Plin. Sec. in Panegyr, ad Traja:) spake of one particular vertue, ambitio & jactantia, & effusio, & quidvis potiùs quàm liberalitas est dicenda, cui ratio non constat; that that liberalitie, that is not grounded upon reason, is rather am∣bition, vaine glory, profusenesse, or any thing else, what you will, then true libe∣ralitie: is as true of any other particular vertue, and appliable to vertue, in gene∣rall; to wit, That Vertue is not Vertue properly, but as it is the frute and effect, of true knowledge and sound reason. Which also made Aristotle to maintaine in his Ethicks (Lib. v. cap. 9.) that justa facere

was no very hard thing, and incidentall unto all men; but justum esse, that is, to doe just actions, upon grounds of reason and no otherwise; to bee a matter of ve∣ry great difficultie. For which reason al∣so, Socrates before him maintained, that Truth and Vertue, were but one thing. And truely in the Scriptures, they are of∣ten taken for one thing. Hence those phrases, To doe the Truth, To commit a lye, and the like. To which if it bee opposed, that truth and vertue must needs differ as much as the will and the understanding, truth being the proper object of the one, and vertue of the other; it might easily, according to the authoritie of Aristotle, and other great Philosophers and Schoole men, be replied, That although the will and the understanding be not all one es∣sentially, yet in matter of action, they come all to one; since that, as they main∣taine, voluntas necessariò determinatur ab intellectu, the will of man is wholly ru∣led and governed, by the motions and prescripts of the understanding. Whence

is that of Aristotle in the same Ethicks, lib. vi. that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that it is not possible, that he that is truely wise and prudent, should bee naught or vicious: And that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that no man is evill, but through ignorance of that which is most ex∣pedient, which is there and elsewhere at large discussed by him and prooved; as it is to this day maintained by many ac∣cute writers.

But not to engage my selfe into these deepe mysteries of profoundest Phylo∣sophy, which may be thought perchance more abstruse then usefull, and admit of variety of opinions; all that I shall in∣ferre upon these premises, which no man, I thinke, will deny, is but this; That Truth and Vertue are of such affini∣tie, that without some more then ordi∣narie insight (by vertue of knowledge and contemplation:) into the one, the o∣ther cannot bee practised as it should; either to afford that inward content and satisfaction to the conscience, which is

the best reward of a vertuous life in this World; or to deserve that commendati∣on from others, (though this bee least of all to bee stood upon:) that otherwise would be due unto it.

Now the knowledge of Truth being a matter of such moment to happinesse, as wee have said; it is much to bee la∣mented, that the search of it should bee so difficult, as it is: so beset with sundry rubbes and impediments; so shadowed with many false colours and lineaments, as it is to bee feared, that many men, af∣ter no small paines and studie to find out what Truth is; in stead of finding what might satisfie them concerning the na∣ture of Truth, begin to doubt whether there be any such thing, in rerum natura; and by consequent, whether any such thing truely and really, as Vertue and Iustice: according to that miserable complaint (though uttered by him up∣on another occasion:) of dying Brutus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. O wretched vertue! hitherto have I

carefully exercised thee as a thing true and reall; but now I see, that thou art meere words and wind. And in very truth if a man shall as it were from some higher place, raised with the wings of philoso∣phicall contemplation, as an indifferent judge, or but spectator, take a generall view of the surface of the earth; diligent∣ly observe and looke into the actions and endeavours of mortall men, hee shall cleerely see, that that which all ingenu∣ous men aime at, and most (even wretch∣ed worldlings:) doe pretend unto, is truth: but that truth so generally profes∣sed, both by the one and by the other, for truth, in some, (whose grosse and earthly temperature is most uncapable of heavenly both thoughts and hopes▪) to bee nothing else, but meere policie, and private secular interests▪ in many o∣thers (of a purer mould or metall, whose meaning is good and sincere:) nothing else, in effect, but meere partialitie, pre∣judice, presumption, resolute obstinacie, and the like; being all the fruits and ef∣fects

of either blind ignorance (the more blind, the more confident, alwaies:) in too much heate, and eagernesse; (the na∣turall distemper of most men:) or lastly, (if not of all these together, yet of some one of them especially:) of long use and custome. Shewes, and colours, and ap∣pearances, and pretences of truth in great store every where; reall and solid truth, hee shall see but little any where: and that too, in many places, either silenced, or forced by unjust violence into cor∣ners.

Vpon one of these impediments, that I have mentioned, I purpose at this time to fixe my contemplation; being one of the chiefest, (if I bee not much mistaken my selfe:) of those many things, that cause truth to bee mistaken by men; and that is, Custome.

That men both in their actions, and in their judgements, are most swaied by custome, hath beene the observation of many wise men of old, and is most ap∣parant by daily experience, to them that

shall observe it with diligence. Non ra∣tione componimur, sed consuetudine, saith Seneca (Epist. 123 and elsewhere) speak∣ing of the actions of men. As those things are, which men are used unto, so are their judgements, saith Aristotle in his Me∣taphysicks, lib. 1. parte 2. c. 3. Rabbi Ben Maimon, (commonly called Ram∣bam; the most judicious Rabbin, that e∣ver was known to the Christian World;) in his excellent booke, called More Ne∣vokim, having insisted out of Alexander Aphrodisaeus, as he professeth himselfe, of three maine particulars, which usually hinder men from the knowledge of truth; addes a fourth of his owne obser∣vation, as considerable in his judgement, if not more, then any of the former: and that is, saith hee, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Custome and Education. What word was used by the Author himselfe, I know not. For he wrote this booke in Arabick; and the He∣brew is but a translation. But the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 here used by the Hebrew transla∣tor for custome, is very proper in this

place; comming from a simple. Verbe, which, among other things, signifieth, fallere, dolosè agere; which is the very thing the Author doth here charge cu∣stome of. Amant enim homines, (saith he;) naturâ id ad quod sunt assuefacti, & pro∣pendent ad illud. And then after some in∣stances taken from daily experience, goes on thus, (as the late Latin Translator ren∣ders him,) Idem planè accidere solet homini insententiis & opinionibus, quibus innutri∣tus est, ut pro amore illarum, ab illis dimo∣veri nequeat. Quae causa est, ut homo saepe non possit apprehendere veritatem, quia sci∣licet illa sequitur, quibus assuefactus est, &c.

Neither is there want of many plausi∣ble pretences to make this power, or ty∣ranny rather (as Saint Chrysostome doth usually stile it:) of custome, to seeme as reasonable, as it is generall. For first, Naturalists tell us, that, Consuetudo tan∣quam altera natura; so Aristotle: and Gallen, elegantly, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Custome is an adscititious Nature. Both Ci∣vilians

and Canonists tell us, not onely that consuetudo optima legis interpres, (that is much that it should be so:) but plain∣ly, that consuetudo derogat legi, abrogat le∣gem; yea some of them, that, consuetudo, illicita, licita facit. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, was the resolution of the Councell of Nice in matters of the Church; and to enquire of the former age, and, to stand up∣on the wayes, and there to looke for the good old wayes, is the way that the Prophet doth teach us both to truth and righte∣ousnesse; to wit, to consult with Anti∣quitie; which is nothing else, but a con∣tinued custome; as custome is nothing else, but actus saepius multiplicati; as it is defi∣ned by Lawyers and Schoole-men. Be∣sides, Philosophers tell us, that, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; that which is in being, and that wee call Truth, are all one. And what is cu∣stome, but that which is in being? And if a∣ny, to shew a difference, shall adde, that Truth is that, which is, hath beene, and shall bee; which is as much, as to say, that it is eternall; wise Salomon seemes

to say as much of custome, when intrea∣ting of the varietie of mens labours and actions, hee useth these words, The thing that hath beene, is that which shall bee; and that which is done, is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the Sunne. Is there any thing whereof it may he said, See this is new? It hath beene already of old times which was before us. So another, a King too, and as wise a King (of a heathen) as Salomon, He (saith he) that seeth the things that are now, hath seene all that either was e∣ver, or ever shall bee. For all things are of one kind, and all like one unto another. And in another place, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, What ever it bee that is now done here, is the same that hath alwayes beene, and ever shall be, and is now done in all places: which is spoken by him, as appeares there, not of things naturall, (lest any man should mistake.) but of mens actions and fashions. Anto. vi.34.x.12.

To these things if any shall reply, that consuetudo, quae non est rationabilis, is not

properly consuetudo, but corruptela; and no wonder, if consuetudo rationabilis, bee granted to be aequivalent to reason, right, or truth: This, if it bee well considered, will rather puzzle the more, then satis∣fie. For the Custome of men, which they live and are guided by, being different according to differences of places and na∣tions; yea so changeable and variable; (I speake it of Customes, in point of right and Iustice, as well as of others:) in the same place, as wee see they are in all places: if it shall bee said of all such ge∣nerally, as of particulars it is commonly by them that are used unto them, that they are rationabiles; will it not hence necessa∣rily follow, that what is right in one place, is in another wrong: what at one time is reason and Truth; at another time is both false and absurd? And what is this, but to make Truth changeable, Pro∣theus like; and appliable to all times and places? That is, in effect, to say with Archilaus, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that nothing is right

or wrong, but by custome and the ordi∣nances of men onely: or with Epicurus, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that righ∣teousnesse of its selfe is nothing, but that whatsoever is expedient for the present, as long as it is expedient, it is just; and no longer just, then it is expedient.

Besides these and the like arguments, taken from the things themselves, some thing may bee inferred even from the words, whereby those things are usually expressed. For words have usually some foundation in the nature of things, and therefore (as wisest men, Aristotle and others, have thought:) in all disputes of the true nature and use of things, much observable. Now in most Languages, right and custome, are expressed by the same words. As for example to instance in the three chiefest; in Hebrew, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, sig∣nifies properly judgement, but it is as often used for custome. So that Interpreters are sometimes put to it, not knowing, or at least not agreeing among themselves, by which of the two it should bee rendred.

As for example, Sam. 8.9. shew them the manner, &c. and v. 11. This will be the man∣ner, &c. In the Hebrew it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which some with the Vulgar and the Septua∣gint, render jus; others, as we, rationem; the manner or custome. The Chaldey pa∣raphrase expresses it by the Greeke word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is ambiguous both in the O∣riginall Greeke (the ambiguitie whereof hath caused errors and mistakes of Inter∣preters not a few in divers ancient Greeke Authors:) and in the derivative Chaldey, for either right or custome. Hence are va∣rietie of opinions, as amongst the Iewes, so amongst the Christians, about the true meaning. But I meddle not with that. Only this I observe, that Homer upon this very subject, speaking of Kings, useth the very word (but that the one is Greeke, and the other is Hebrew:) that Samuel doth; This also, as ambiguous in the Greeke, as the other is in the Hebrew. His words are Odyss. iv. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Where the Scholiast hath noted 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. i. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. But Eustathius, Arch-Bishop

of Thessalonica, more fully, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Aemilius Portus translates it, quod tamen Licet divinis Regibus. And cer∣tainly in those words of the Poet in ano∣ther place, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Gallen did understand by the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, somewhat more, then custome, as should seeme by him in his de Valetudine conservanda, where hee quotes them more then once. Now as in these words, both Hebrew and Greeke, right is taken for custome; so in the Latin, is custome taken for right, or Law. Witnesse, not onely the word con∣suetudo, in latter ages, whereof wee shall have occasion to speake more afterwards; but also mos, of old. So Virgil. Aenid. vi. —pacis{que} imponere morem, i. Legem pacis, saith Servius. As also in the Civill Law, jus and mos, are often joyned toge∣ther to expresse right; though sometimes opposed, I know. Neither are these two Latin words, mos and consuetudo, used in Latin for right and Law onely; but also for nature her selfe; custome, as it seemes,

pretending as much to nature, as it doth to right. So mos by the best Latin Au∣thors, often; and so consuetudo, by sa∣cred authors, sometimes. As for exam∣ple, Gen. 31.35. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which by the Chaldey paraphrase, by the LXX. and the Vulgar, is rendred, consuetudo; the custome of women. Which word consuetudo, made Augustine the Monke (a very pardonable mistake in a Monke:) to thinke worse of women, then they had deserved, im∣puting that unto them as a fault, or vo∣luntary vice, which is their nature. At least hee was so understood by Saint Gre∣gorie; who therefore both by many rea∣sons, and divers examples, prooves unto him at large, that that consuetudo mulie∣rum, though called consuetudo, is in very truth, infirmitas naturae; or naturae super∣fluitas, rather; and therefore not culpa, quia naturaliter accidit; no voluntarie thing in women, but hapning by neces∣sitie of nature, and by consequent, no sinne; no more then either to eate, and drinke; or to bee weary, cold; and the

like. Greg. Epist. lib. xii. Ind. vii. Epist. 31. ad August. resp. 10.

By these things that have hitherto been spoken, it should appeare, that custome of it selfe hath no small affinitie with Truth and right: and it is but too appa∣rant, that they are, by most men, taken for one and the same thing; as hath al∣ready beene said.

But on the other side, wee shall find in ancient, both Philosophers and Fathers, as Iustin. Mart. Cyprian, Greg. Nyss. and others, many serious caveats and admo∣nitions to them that seeke the truth, to be∣ware of custome: and to this purpose Ter∣tullian would haue us to remember, that Christ called himselfe veritatem, non consu∣etudinem: truth, not custome, be it never so generall, or so ancient.

Having therefore oftentimes (not by way of curiositie, but as one that thinkes himselfe bound, to propose unto him∣selfe right and reason, to the utmost of his power, in all his actions:) had occasion to meditate upon those things, viz. of the

power, varietie, validitie, of custome in things either naturall, civill, (for all those have some relation, and mutuall depen∣dance; neither can throughly bee under∣stood, if separated,) or Divine: and what in all those is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (as an ancient Phi∣losopher speaketh:) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the specu∣lation of Truth; I have here put most of those things, that did offer themselves to my consideration, together: perswading my selfe, that if men spent lesse time a∣bout particular Questions; as concerning the right or truth of sundry particulars, in point of either Religion or Philosophy; and more time in the due and rationall consideration of those generall either helpes, or hinderances, that offer them∣selves unto men in the search of what is Truth and right; that there would be, both farre lesse contention, and far more truth in the World, then is at this day. For my part, I shall bee carefull not to vent a∣ny new conceits, or opinions of mine owne unto the World. It is too full alrea∣die of such phantasticks, who both in

their lives and in their opinions, affect nothing more then singularitie. Onely what I have met with in best authors concerning this subject, the considerati∣on whereof I thought might bee usefull unto others, I shall here set downe; and this, rather by way of proposition, then peremptorie determination.

TO beginne with the power of Cu∣stome in things naturall, I will first speake of some parts and faculties, which have beene formerly, and may yet through use and custome be attained unto, though not contrary to nature, yet so rare and extraordinary, as in the judgement of common sense, and for want of expe∣rience, they might seeme altogether un∣possible. By Custome, wee understand practice and exercise, as usually others doe upon this occasion. So (to instance in one), Plutarch, where hee disputes of

the power of custome in point of educati∣on, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith hee, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by custome I meane use and exercise; and af∣terwards hee cals it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; all which words are by him there used as synonima's, or words of the same signification. Now to speake of the power of custome in this kind, and to set out the marveilous efficacie of it, I know not whom wee should more properly be∣ginne with, then with those, whom the Grecians properly called, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or wonder-workers; men, whose profes∣sion it was to amaze the people with strange sights and wonders, (so called ordi∣narily by Greeke Authors, properly and absolutely, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, wonders:) proceeding for the most part from extraordinary either strength, or agilitie, or both. I shall mention them the rather, because it is a speculation that divers Philosphers and Fathers, (but especially Saint Chry∣sostome:) in their morall exhortations often fall upon, and make very good use of it. Hero an ancient Greeke Author

hath written a whole booke of that sub∣ject, but I have not yet seene it. And be∣cause the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is somewhat generall, and may comprehend them that bring strange things to passe, by the helpe either of naturall, or superstitious Ma∣gicke, as well as others; I will therefore here set downe the definition of such as wee understand here properly by the word; as I find it in Nicephorus Grego∣ras; by which they may bee discerned from all others, that have any plea to that common name, He therefore in his eight Booke of his Roman History, treating at large 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of some wonder-workers that came to Constantinople, gives the de∣finition of them, and of their art: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Those things (saith he:) that were done by them, were prodigious indeed, and full of won∣der; yet farre from Diabolicall inchant∣ments,

but meere exercises of a dextruous nature, long practised and accustomed unto those things.

First then to begin with agilitie, Saint Chrysostome in his nineteenth Homilie ad populum Antiochenum, hath these parti∣cular instances, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to run upon the ground, all parts of the body turning circularly, like a wheele: to draw ones selfe up and downe by the motion and agitation of the armes onely, as if it were with wings: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: to cast up divers swords one after another into the aire, and to receive every one by the handle: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: expressed by him againe in ano∣ther place, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: which, in plaine English, is no more, as I conceive; then what we com∣monly say, to dance upon the rope; or, ire 〈2 pages missing〉〈2 pages missing〉

the said 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or ordinary wonderworkers of his time. Hee doth in∣sist upon this particular at large, calling their heads, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, nayled heads, or heads stickt all over with nayles. And least any should either mistrust the truth of the relation, (though to pre∣vent this I have purposely made choice of such a one as Saint Chrysostome for my warrant:) or at least suspect (as I see di∣vers doe without cause in other matters like unto these; because not acquainted with the power of custome in things of this nature:) some imposture in the actors, I will confirme this last instance of nayled heads, with two pregnant testimo∣nies of approoved and unquestionable experience of latter times: the one taken from Augerius Busbequius, and the other from Iohannes Leunclavius; men of good worth, both; and as good credit, among the learned Cùm jam esset in conspectu Buda (saith Busbequius in his fourth E∣pistle:) veniunt nobis obviam jussu Bassae ex ejus familiâ aliquot, cum pleris{que}▪ Chi∣aussis;

sed in primis visenda juvenum in e∣quis multitudo propter novitatem ornatus, qui erat hujusmodi. In aperto capite, quod eis plerum{que} rasum est, cutem longâ lineâ inciderant, cui vulneri plures pinnas cu∣jus{que} generis inseruerant: ipsi stillantes cru∣entis guttis, dissimulato dolore veluti sensus expertes, laeti & hilares ferebantur. Ante me proximè pedites aliquot ambulabant; ho∣rum unus veluti ansatus subnixis brachiis in∣grediebatur, quorum utrum{que} supra cubitum cultello (quod genus nos Pragenses vocamus:) transfixum habebat. Alius à superiore par∣te umbiculo tenus, nudus incedebat, sic scissa duobus locis infra supra{que} lumborum cute, ut illac trajectam clavam, tanquam è cingulo pendentem haberet. Alius in vertice capitis, equisoleam pluribus clavis fixerat. Sed id vetus erat, clavis ita cum carne coalitis, ut nihil moverentur.

The passage out of Leunclavius is this: Hos sequebantur tres lymphatici robusti ho∣mines, caligis tantum induti, caetera nudi; nisi quod capitis vertex parvo pileolo rubro, & humeri nudi superinjecta, de{que} collo pen∣dente

pelle tigridis, exornabantur. Hi ad concentum Zinganorum tripudiabant, te∣nentes singuli vexillum Turcicum rubri colo∣ris, cujus hastile intra cutem & abdomen ventris, emanante multo sanguine, defixum erat. Hos duo pueri sequebantur, qui cuti frontis perforatae pennas gruis insertas fere∣bant. Secundùm pueros incedebant quatuor virorum paria, pervulneratis lateribus. Primi duo clavas ferreas, quas pusdiganos dicunt: proximi duo nudos acinaces, per cu∣tem transfixos, gestabant. Rursus alii duo sequebantur, quorum unus securim milita∣rem Vngaricam (schacanam vocant) alter oblongum Genizari sclopetum apertis late∣ribus in transfixo corpore portabat. Vltimo loco viri duo robusti spectaculum hoc claude∣bant, qui tempora rectis, latis, & oblongis ensibus, quos Vngari palastos vocant, trans∣fixerant. Horum capulos manibus tenebant: In ensium cuspide pomum erat adfixum, & pomo, penna gruis inserta.

I shall forbeare more particular instan∣ces concerning the many wonders recor∣ded by the ancients, of those wonder wor∣kers:

And the rather indeed, because di∣vers examples in this kind may be excep∣ted against, as examples rather of strange natures, or naturall properties; then in∣stances of the power of custome. For though the art, generally, bee adscribed by the ancients to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (which gave occasion to Arrian the Stoick Phi∣losopher to mention some of them by the way in his chapter 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉:) that is, to use and practice; yet in some of them (for ought wee know:) it might bee nature; or at least, nature concur∣ring. So of prodigious eaters, for exam∣ple; Suetonius tels us of one, much admi∣red by Nero the Roman Emperour, who by custome had brought himselfe, crudam carnem, & quicquid daretur manducare; to eate any kind of thing: And doubt∣lesse it stands with reason that custome may doe much in this kind, as generally in point of eating and drinking: whereof learned Physicians treat at large. Yet that a man should (uno die aprum inte∣grum, centum panes, vervecem & porcel∣lum:

in one day (if not at one meale:) eate a whole boare, a hundred loaves, one wea∣ther, and a hogge, as wee read of one in Aurelians time: I dare not adscribe this unto custome onely: no more then, to de∣voure nettles, thistles, the pith of artichockes, raw and living birds and fishes with their scales and feathers, burning coales and can∣dles, &c. and all these in very great quan∣titie, as Karew in his Survey of Cornwall, recordeth of one Iohn Size of Cornwall. That which makes mee to doubt the more, is, because I read in Columbus, a fa∣mous Anatomist, of one Lazarus in Ve∣nice, surnamed Vitrivorax, or the glasse eater, who made a trade of it, mercede pro∣positâ, vitrum, saxa, lapides, ligna, viva animalia, carbones, pisces è vivario ex∣tractos adhuc salientes, lutum, lineos la∣neos{que} pannos, &c, vorare. Now this man falling at last, after his death, to the hands of Columbus to bee dissected by him, hee did his best (as hee professeth:) by obser∣ving all things in him with more then ordinarie curiositie, to find out a reason in nature of this so strange and unnaturall

qualitie. And his conceit is, that hee did find it; wherein I will not interpose my judgement, but leave the further exami∣nation thereof, to profest Anatomists and Physicians. But generally, of such parti∣cular examples, so extraordinary and be∣yond all example prodigious, I hold it (as I have already said) most safe, to take in nature and custome, as concurring. As expresly, for example, wee reade in Suidas of one Marcellus, who being by na∣ture very watchfull, by long use and cu∣stome had brought himselfe to that passe, as to live without sleepe; or at least, with so little, as could hardly bee observed by any others. For the better satisfaction therefore of the Reader, that hee may cer∣tainely know what custome alone in this kind, can doe, in point of either agilitie or strength; a sure way will bee to consi∣der some particular performances in ei∣ther kind, that have beene more com∣mon and generall, as either to whole Na∣tions, or to certaine professions, together and at one time; and not proper to some few persons, at some times, only.

In point of agilitie, Caesar in his Com∣mentaries testifieth of the old Britans, that usu quotidiano & exercitatione, they had attained to that perfection of horse∣manship, ut in declivi ac praecipiti loco inci∣tatos equos sustinere, & brevi moderari ac flectere; & per temonem percurrere, & in jugo insistere, & inde se in currus citissimè recipere consueverint. This is much, and more perchance then some will easily be∣leeve, that have seene no such examples of activitie in these dayes. Yet more then that in the same kind of exercise, is aver∣red to bee true of some people to this day, by Authors of good credit and authority. So elegant Maffaeus of certaine people Oc∣cidentalis Aethiopiae, which hee cals Ia∣laphos: Hist. Indicae, lib. 1. Exhibitique (saith hee:) per eos dies publicè ludi, con∣vivia, venationes, & spectacula equestria; In quibus Ialophi desultoriâ arte & peri∣tiâ ita se admirabiles praebuere, ut Numidis ipsis (quorum in celeritate motu{que} corporis praecipua laus est:) agilitatis palmam omni∣um judicio consensu{que} eripuerint. Si quidem

tanta erant membrorum vel dexteritate vel robore, ut equi incitatissimi ephippiis nullâ omnino cursus intermissione tum recti insiste∣rent, corpus{que} circumagerent: tum repentè insiderent, dispositos{que} humi lapillos ad unum inde colligerent; tum etiam momentò desili∣rent, resilirent{que}.

But if any shall desire to understand the utmost that long use and exercise can attaine unto in this kind of Agilitie, let them read what Martinus a Boumgarten, (no obscure man and of good credit eve∣ry way;) relates at large in his perigrina∣tions, of the sundry acts and exercises of Chivalrie, performed by the Mamaluques before their Soldan. Certainely had they had wings, I doe not know what they could have done more in that kind, ei∣ther upon, or about horses. But because the booke is not very common to bee had, nor perchance very commonly knowne, I shall not doe amisse I think, to insert here some part of that his relation, His words are:

Alii in pleno cursu equi, ter desilientes: item{que} (equo à cursu suo non cessante:) con∣scendentes, nihilo minus omnes illos scopos sa∣gittis tangebant, nec vel aliquatenus aber∣rabant: Alli sellis non sedentes, sed stantes, licet equi volarent, singulos scopos feriebant. Alii inter plenum & jugem equorum cur∣sum ter arcus remittentes, ter eos loco flagelli capiti circumdantes, ac rursum ter inten∣dentes, aequè tamen ut & caeteri singulos sco∣pos jaculis verberabant. Alii in jugi equo∣rum cursu, licet ad utram{que} partem desilis∣sent non tamen obmittebant, quin & omnes scopos ut & reliqui, singillatim percuterent. Alii ter per equorum terga retrò desilien∣tes, ac rursum currente semper equo, insilien∣tes, à sagittandi munere ad singulos scopos non cessabant. Alii sellis more solito colliga∣tis sedentes, eas interim equo currente, ter solvebant, ac post solutionem sagittantes, ter rursum eas dorso equi colligabant, ter{que} jacu∣lis scopos haud gravatim contingebant. Alii in sellis more consueto insidentes, extra sellam retrò se concitè locabant, ac capite deorsum

misso, rursus erecti, sellas insidebant, hoc{que} ter facto, toties etiam scopos jaculis appete∣bant. Alii in sella justè sedentes, caput in e∣qui ponebant tergum, ac apprehensâ equi caudâ, dentibus eam ingerebant, at{que} illico se erigentes, scopos nequaquam jaculis praete∣ribant. Alii post singulos jactus sagittarum, ensem evaginatum circum caput minitabun∣di rotabant: quo mox vagina recondito, nullum scopum à jaculis esse sinebant immu∣nem. Alii inter nudos & acutissimos enses â dextra ternos, laeva tèrnos, in tenuissimo a∣mictu ita sedebant, ut enses illi (si quò mi∣nùs immoderaté se movissent:) corpora eo∣rum crudeliter configerent: tamen ante & retrò admirabili pernicitate & arte ita se vibrabant, ut prae se, & post tergum (quasi discriminis obliti:) nulli scopo parcerent. Inter hos talia agentes tyrones, unus solus re∣pertus est, qui super duos pernicissima velo∣citate equos currentes, solutis staret pedibus, ac ternas uno impetu, ante & retro simul fun∣deret sagittas. Iterum erat alius, qui itidem solus ex omnibus equo non sellato nec fraenato sedens, ad singulos scopos se in pedes erigens

stabat, perculso{que} scopo dextra laeva{que}, iterum sedebat: donec ad secundos & tertios scopos veniens, iterumse in pedes erigeret, ac sagit∣tandi munus egregiè & mirè expleret. Item & alius insuper repertus est, qui solus ex re∣liquis equo insellato & nudo sedens, ubi ad scopos venisset, in tergo equi supinus jacens, utrum{que} pedem in sublime porrigebat, sic∣que concitè erectus sagittandi officium impi∣grè complebat: Againe, Et operae pretium erat videre tyrones illos, corpore proceros, vestitu armis{que} decoros, gestu ipso admirabi∣les, ea in rapido equorum cursu agere quae etiam in terra stantibus & factu difficillima, & visu stupenda, deni{que} & enarratu incre∣dibilia penè viderentur, &c.

And that the unexpert may the better bee satisfied, that these things are not al∣together impossible to men, who by their profession make it their constant studie and practice; I will adde by the way what some ordinary men of our owne Countrey with a little practice, have per∣formed in our dayes. In the yeare of our Lord 1611▪ in the month of August, the

Bishop of Ely (I thinke I may call him the Bishop of Ely, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and doe none of his worthy predecessors any wrong; but, the Bishop of Ely that then was:) going to Wisby in Cambridg-shire, and ac∣companied with many horses; there met him upon the wayes a plaine Rustick, standing upright upon his horses bare backe; and in that posture did hee gallop so fast, that none of the company could outgoe him, or so much as keepe pase with him. One that was then present made a Memorandum of it in these words: Die primo itineris occurrit nobis rusticus, qui equi sui nudo dorso insistens vehebatur tantâ confidentiâ, ut admitteret ad cursum, neque aliquis nostrum posset consequi eum ita currentem.

In point of strength, first active, the Turkish archer shall bee my instance; A strong Turkish bow (such you must understand as they generally used in for∣mer times before they had so much dege∣nerated from their ancient discipline:)

the string whereof a lustie strong man (qui non assueverit, saith Busbequius in his Epistles:) that hath not beene used unto them, shall not bee able to stirre with all his might so farre, as to loozen a piece of money thrust at one of the extremities betweene the string and the steele; a well practized archer of that Countrey and discipline, will make nothing to draw to his eare. And such is the strength of one of those bowes, (saith learned Barclay, in his Icon animarum, and professeth to have seene it done,) that with a little ar∣row it will pierce through chalybem tres digitos altum (I durst not English it, but that I know the Author to bee a man fa∣mous, and of good credit, in things of this nature at least:) a steele three fingers thicke; and even dart an arrow that shall want a head with such force into a reaso∣nable bigge tree, that the end of it shall be seene on the other side. I bind no man to beleeve it, that hath not seene it▪ yet I know the Authors credit will goe very

farre with them that have knowne him; and that hee is not the onely that hath re∣ported it.

As for strength passive, I will content my selfe with that common example of the Lacedemonian boyes, and youths; the more common and the better attested, the more uncontrollable and the fitter for our purpose. One of their solemne yeare∣ly exercises, that their lawes did oblige them unto, was their 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as they called it; that is, a publike whipping of all their youths at a certaine place, to wit, ad aram Dianae Orthiae. Their youth (saith Plutarch:) being whipped and scourged all day long at the altar of Diana Orthia, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, are wont to indure it, even unto death, often∣times, with joy and exultation, eagerly stri∣ving one with another, who shall hold out longest and suffer most. Tullies relation goes yet beyond this. For having said, as Plutarch, ad necem us{que}, even unto death; he addes, quorum non modo nemo conclama∣vit unquam, sed ne ingemuit quidem; that

none of them (during the time of this blou∣dy exercise:) was ever knowne, either to cry, or so much as to groane. And both these, in other places, professe to have beene eye∣witnesses of their patience, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith Plutarch; Wee have seene our selves many of them dye at the very Altar, with extreamitie of scourging. Ado∣lescentium greges Lacedaemone vidimus ipsi, (saith Tullie,) incredibili contentione cer∣tantes pugnis, calcibus, unguibus, morsu, de∣nique ut exanimarentur, priusquam se vi∣ctos faterentur. But to speake truth, there is nothing more obvious in all Greeke and Latin Authors that are ancient: and therefore these two may well suffice. But this is not all that is to bee wondred at in this matter; but this also, that whilest these boyes were so used, their parents and dearest friends would looke upon them with joy and pleasure, yea exhort them themselves unto patience: adstan∣tibus parentibus & propinquis, saith Tertul∣lian, & uti perseverent adhortantibus. The

word that is used by Plutarch in his Ly∣curgus, speaking of these things, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, practise and exercise, puts mee in mind of the ancient Christian Asceticks, of whom no lesse in point of patience, if not more by farre, might bee related, but that I would not be long.

In all these severall generall instances, it is out of all question, and all Authors that write of them are of that opinion, that Custome and long practise, is to bee looked upon, as the onely cause. The use (which I mentioned before, and therefore will briefly set downe heere, though it be not the thing that I aime at e∣specially:) that divers antient Fathers, Phi∣losophers & others make of these and the like instances, is this: That those great insuperable difficulties, that men usually pretend to meete with in the way that leades unto Vertue and godlinesse, are rather vaine pretences and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (as Saint Chrysostome in a thousand places:) that is, meere want of courage and resolution, then difficulties really hard and insupe∣rable:

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (as Polybius in a place, very ele∣gantly and fully:) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, And therefore that men must not start backe from the prosecuti∣on of any thing that is good and profitable by reason of those seeming difficulties, but be∣take themselves to the power of use and cu∣stome, by which all that good is and laudible, is made possible unto man.

Now in all these it is apparant, that custome is rather supra naturam, then con∣tra naturam, directly. We shall therefore in the next place consider the power of it, even in those things, wherein it is directly opposit unto Nature. The discussion of these things at large, I leave unto profest Naturalists and Physicians. Some few instances will serve my turne, and will sufficiently afford unto them, that are both capable and curious, (I take it in the better sense:) matter of further spe∣culation.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: all excesse

is against nature. So Phylosophers and Physicians. Yet what excesse so unnatu∣rall, that a man, by custome, may not bring himselfe unto? Yea, if a man have once used himselfe unto excesse, it is dan∣gerous for him to returne unto nature and mediocritie, because hee hath used him∣selfe unto excesse. For even things natu∣rally and of themselves hurtfull, through use and custome become expedient and ne∣cessarie. Therefore saith Hippocrates, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Those things that we are used unto, though worse of themselves, use to bee lesse dangerous then better things that we are not used unto. And Aristotle doth instance in Dionysius the Tyrant, who in a dangerous siege having forborne for a while his ryot, fell into a consumption, of which he could not be cured, untill he returned unto his former custome.

What more contrary to Nature then poyson; which therefore among other names is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as the greatest enemie of Nature? Yet by

custome in divers ages both men and wo∣men have beene knowne to bring them∣selves to this passe, as not onely to take most dangerous poysons without hurt, but also to feed upon them and to receive nourishment from them. Wee read of some that have lived upon nothing else. Whereof you may read in Gallen de Simpl. Med. lib. 3.18. Sennert. lib. iv. c. 3. And lib. iii. de Febrib. And although in some of these there might sometimes concurre some secret of Nature in the proper constitution (whereof see Liba∣vius de Venenis, and Gallen 3. de Sim. Med. who shewes a reason in Anatomie, why that poyson which killeth men, is a food unto the Stares:) or otherwise; yet ge∣nerally (which sufficeth us:) that this is adscribed unto custome as the cause, I appeale unto the forenamed Authors, and divers others that have treated of it.

What more naturall unto man, then to live upon the Earth, the naturall mo∣ther (both in regard of their beginning

and of their ending:) of all men? Yet we reade of some, who by custome of often swimming and conversing in the waters, have made the waters so naturall unto their bodies, that they could hardly en∣dure the land, and not without present danger of their health. Iovianus Ponta∣nus, writes of one Colon of his times (as I conceive:) a notable Vrinator or diver, who could not indeed continue long to∣gether out of the sea, and would swimme a hundred miles together and above, from one shore to another, and from one Countrey to another, with great speed, and at all times of the yeare. But this I must confesse I take upon trust; for I have not read it in the Author himselfe; but in our learned Iohn Barnes a Benedictine, in his contra Aequivoc. 35.323. Neither doe I know whether hee had brought himselfe to this by custome onely or no. But if this storie bee not to my purpose, this other is I am sure, which I shall now produce out of a certaine Commentator upon Aristotle his Axiomata: who upon

that saying of Aristotle, Consuetudo est al∣tera natura: hath these words: Alibi quanta sit vis consuetudinis explicatiori ser∣mone proditum est: Illis tamen hoc velim ad∣ditum, quod prae sua novitate & infrequenti similis rei eventu pene incredibile erit, ho∣minem quendam patria Syculum, à puero ita natandi consuetudine usitatum, ut deinceps piscium more sub aquis longo tempore ver∣saretur; quibus cum exiret, ut communi ho∣minum usu frueretur, tanto ventriculi do∣lore angebatur, ut valetudinis nanciscendae causa, ad aquas esset redeundum. Quibus rursum immersus, ludi & recreationis gra∣tia, si quando naves mari volarent, in eas sa∣liebat, at{que} post sumptum cibum, iterum de∣scendebat, ubi ad multam us{que} aetatem vitam protraxit. Whether hee meanes it of the same as Pontanus doth, because I have not Pontanus at this time, I cannot tell. To some such kind of men it is not unlikely, that Saint Chrysostome did allude in one of his Homilies (the sixteenth as I remem∣ber:) upon the Epistle to the Hebrewes, where hee tels rich men of their unmerci∣fulnesse

and want of compassion, whose curiositie to satisfie with strange specta∣cles, among other inventions poore men were driven 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to search and ransacke the deepest parts of the Ocean; that some way or other they might extort somewhat from them. But Seneca directly, speaking of the strange inventiōs of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or wonder-wor∣kers of his dayes, reckons among the rest, in immensam altitudinem mergi, ac sine ulla respirandi vice perpeti maria; and againe not long after, penetrare in imum mare; which may give much light to that pas∣sage of Saint Chrysostomes. And among the sundry kinds of exercises Artis Gym∣nasticae, I find that one was, continere spi∣ritum; to hold and keepe in their breaths: it being one of those things (it seemes:) which use and custome can doe much in, as well as in other things.

But it would bee infinite to treat of the power of custome from all particular ex∣amples and instances that occurre in di∣vers writers, Historians, Philosophers,

and others, both old and late. The truth of some of them perchance may bee que∣stioned. I deny it not: though I read not scarce any thing in any of them so strange in this kind, but might be averred and paralell'd, if not as certainely true, at least as possible, by manifest experience, either in the same kind or very like, even in our dayes.

Yet it is not granted by all men, that custome is of such power and efficacie in things naturall. Aristotle seemes in some place to bee one of them, that will not grant it. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith hee in a place, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. One custome may be remooved and taken away by some other custome, but nothing can ever pre∣vaile against Nature. And againe in his Ethicks, Lib. ii. c. 1. as peremptorily 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Nothing that is naturall can bee altered by custome. Others, though they speake not so pe∣remptorily of it, yet they restraine the power of it very much. So Alex. Messa∣ria, a famous Physician, in his Treatise

of the plague, Consuetudinem (saith he) plurimum posse negandum non est; sed ita tamen, ut ne limites naturae transcendat, &c. And Sennertus, (an exact judicious wri∣ter, as most of that profession,) more punctually yet, Pract. Medicinae lib. iii. part 1. sect. ii. c. 2. de longa abstin. Con∣suetudinis (saith hee:) maximam vim esse certum est, non tamen in omnibus locum ha∣bet: sed certa saltem opera sunt, in quae jus habet consuetudo. Etenim in sensus actio∣nes nullam potestatem habet, ne{que} quis potest assuescere, ut non olfaciat, sentiat, vel non respiret, &c.

To this many things might bee oppo∣sed, from certaine experience. In this ve∣ry point de longa abstin. that Sennertus speakes of, Ancient Histories afford ex∣amples to the contrary. Wee read of one Iul. Viator, who to save his life having by little and little used himselfe to ab∣staine from drinking as, being farre gone in a dropsie, naturam (saith Plinie:) fecit consuetudine, did at last turne custome into nature, & in senectam potu abstinuit, and

so lived to be an old man without drinke. And Plinie saith, scimus, as of a thing commonly knowne and not doubted of by any. And Seneca as peremptorily, that assidua meditatione (that is, by custome) quidam omni humore interdixere corpori∣bus. And Lipsius there averreth, that even in our age, there have beene examples of such absolute forbearance, from all man∣ner of drinke. Then for the senses; what shall wee say to Appianus, who tels us of one Geta, a Citizen of Rome, who in the time of the Civill warres, being one of them that was marked and sought after to death, to the end that hee might the better disguise himselfe, among other things counterfeited himselfe to be blind of one eye, and wore I know not what over his concealed eye some yeares. And then his danger being over, when hee thought to have restored his long captive eye to his former libertie, hee found the eye there indeed, but the sight was gone; and so continued blind of that eye to his dying day. And Appianus saith di∣rectly

that it was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for want of use of his eye (that is, because he did use himselfe not to see with it) that he lost it.

But to leave particular instances; how much the ancients did attribute to the power of custome upon the senses, may appeare by that opinion which wee find in many of them, of the Musicke of the Sphaeres, caused as they conceived, by their circumvolution; audible as they affirmed, but not heard, or rather not dis∣cerned, because wee heard it alwayes. What good grounds they had for this o∣pinion, is not to my purpose to enquire at this time. I dare not say that Saint Am∣brose was of that opinion; but that he did not thinke there was any impietie in it, may appeare by his Preface upon the Psalmes. But Saint Anselme plainely, Sep∣tem coelestes orbes cum dulcisona Harmonia volvuntur, ac suavissimi concentus eorum circuitione efficiuntur, &c. de Imagin. mun∣di. But that which from that opinion is here pertinent to my discourse, is, that

they that maintained it, were also, most of them, of opinion, that the reason why wee did not heare it, was meerely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because our eares were accustomed unto it, as you shall find expresly in He∣racledus Ponticus, in his Homericall Alle∣gor. In Aristotle de Coelo. ii.9. and o∣thers. Tullie also aimed at the same rea∣son, in his Somn. Scipion. when he saith, Hoc sonitu oppletae aures obsurduerunt: though his next words adscribe it rather to magnitudini sonitus, then consuetudini; which would import a totall destruction of the sense; and not a deficiencie of it to one particular object onely. This in∣deed is another consideration, but appa∣rantly false; since that upon that ground, all hearing would be quite taken away; as Plinie in his History, Seneca in his Na∣turall Questions expresly affirme of those inhabitants about Nilus, that hee speakes of there; to wit that they are quite deafe. I know there are others yet, that have maintained this coelestiall Harmonie up∣on other grounds. Philo Iudaeus saith di∣rectly

that it is not audible (to us men, that is:) that it doth not reach unto the eares; and the reason why God would not have it audible hee saith, is, lest men ravished with the sweetnesse of it, should give over all care and thought of world∣ly affaires. Yet for the most, as I have al∣ready said, that they grounded, if not their opinions, yet their answers to usuall ob∣jections against it, upon the power of cu∣stome, let Saint Basill tell them that shall make any question of it; Whose words are these: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. But when they that main∣taine this opinion are required to make it good by some sensible evidence, what say they? Why, this they say; that our eares being used to this noise from our first entrance into the world, through this long use and custome from the beginning they have lost the sense of

it. As they who live in Smiths forges, whose eares are perpetually, &c. Which is quite contrary to that of Sennertus, that consue∣tudo in sensus actiones nullam potestatem ha∣bet. And now since that upon this sub∣ject of Custome, I have had occasion to say so much concerning the supposed Coe∣lestiall Harmonie of the Sphaeres, I shall willingly impart unto others what I have met with about it in the written Adver∣saria (for in any printed Book I have not as yet, that I remember:) of a man well knowne unto the world by his writings; though at this time, for some reasons, I shall desire to spare his Name.

Harmonia coelestis 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 viridis supra fidem senectus ultra annum centessimum.

Obtulit mihi more gentis suae & Germa∣norum, librū suum amicorū, Ieremias Plan∣cius Plancii F. qui nunc Amsterdami mini∣strum agit verbi divini: sed editione charta∣rum Geographicarum nomen suum fecit ce∣lebre.

In eo libro inveni haec verba manu Ro∣berti Constantini scripta.

Robore & constantia.

Robertus Constantinus Baro Gyma∣tius, & in Academia Montalbanensi Professor Graecarum literarum, Idem∣que experientia quotidiana 24. anno∣rum, assertor 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 voca∣lis audibilisque contra Aristotelem na∣turalis Philosophiae facile principem omnium, haec 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 occupatiss. exaravi in gratiam hospitis mei, & Au∣ditoris D. Ieremiae Plancii, viri tum pi∣etate, tum doctrina spectabilis. Mon∣talbani anno Domini 1605. Aetatis no∣strae (summo Dei beneficio hucusque tam animo quam corpore ad miracu∣lum integrae:) centessimo, ut 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, tum amici, tum invidi dinumerare sunt consueti. Senex autem nondum est vic∣tus, qui virilia munera 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 obi∣re possit, & viriliter exercere.

Erat manus illius & elegans & firma, ac plane ejusmodi qualem verisimile est fuis∣se in ipso aetatis flore. descripsimus vero heic, & quod invenimus in alio libro simili de causa nobis allato.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Robertus Constantinus Baro Gyma∣tius & Professor Graecarum literarum in Academia Montalbanensi, Idemque assertor audibilis coelestisque harmo∣niae experientiâ quotidianâ plusquam viginti annorum.

Haec raptim exaravi in gratiam ami∣ciss. viri atque eruditiss. D. Iohannis Davini. Montalbani 24. Febr. Anno 1605. Robore & constantia.

Hic est Rob. Constantinus, qui olim apud Iulium Caesarem [Scaligerum] vixit, & postea Lexicon publicavit. Caeterùm de hac

longaevitate ipsius, haud satis fidem illi ha∣beo, nam video ipsum non planè affirmare. Quare more senum indulget sibi, & anno∣rum suorum numerum, nisi fallor, aliquot su∣pra fidem adauget.

So farre those written Adversaria. Of this Constantinus you may read in Thuanus tom. v. of his great age and good worth as a schollar; and that hee was (summus Bezae amicus:) one of Beza's chiefest and dearest acquaintance. But of this preten∣ded sensible knowledge of the Coelestiall Harmonie, not one word there; which hath made me the more willing to insert here, and make publique, what I had else-where in my private possession a∣bout it.

And so much shall suffice at this time concerning the power of custome in things naturall; historically. Now, Phi∣losophically, and speculatively, wee thus proceede.

First that it is not without danger, nor according to exact Truth, to say that Na∣ture is alterable. For what is Nature pro∣perly, but the Order of God? If that bee mutable and violable; then is no more this World a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; or orderly peece, but a masse of confusion; and that is it, that the Atheists, and the opposers of a Provi∣dence would have. Neither can there be any truth properly in those things, the na∣ture whereof is altogether uncertaine; therefore uncertain, because unconstant. And where there is no Truth, there can bee no knowledge. As to the World therefore, confusion; so to the under∣standing, ignorance, from this uncertain∣tie and inconstancie must necessarily en∣sue. As for Miracles, though above na∣ture, yet are they not properly against na∣ture, since they are his proper worke, who is the Author of nature, and there∣fore originally, and sutably to his Na∣ture, did reserve unto himselfe a power to dispense with his owne lawes when∣soever

hee thought fit. All Gods workes of themselves, and in regard of God, are equally naturall, though not in re∣gard of us.

Wee say therefore that custome is not alwayes to be considered as opposit unto Nature, since it is the nature of subluna∣rie things, to bee altered by custome. And when custome hath once through continu∣ance naturalized her selfe into any of them, then custome (to speake properly:) is no more custome, but Nature: accor∣ding to that of old Evenus in Arist. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that long use and exercise, becomes at last nature. Nature then we say, by the ordinance and appointment of its first Author, is two-fold; originall, and secundarie or adventi∣tious, and so Gallen plainely, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, custome is a kind of adventitious, or, adscititious nature. Neither is custome, when it is once become naturall, though adventitious, lesse naturall in regard of the common Nature of the Vniverse, from which at first it received the power

and proprietie, to turne, in time, into na∣ture; then that originall nature: though in regard of the particular subject, that it hath wrought upon, it bee but adventi∣tious. When therefore it is commonly said, that such or such a thing hath lost its nature; it must bee understood of that particular nature and proprietie which it had at the first; not absolutely, as though it had departed from the law of Nature in generall; since that Nature it selfe hath made it so alterable. As of death wee say vulgarly, that it is against nature; though it bee as properly, and truely the worke of Nature, as birth or generation is; and as naturall to the nature of the Vniverse. And so is that true of Aristotle (which wee have spoken before:) that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Nature cannot bee driven away, being understood of Vniversall Na∣ture.

Gallen, a great admirer of Nature, and much to bee admired himselfe, for his painefull travels in the search of it, hath another way to reduce custome unto Na∣ture.

His opinion is, that any mans na∣ture may bee known, or at lest, probab∣ly guest at, by those things that he is used unto. And therefore prefers those Phycsii∣ans that allow unto their patients what∣soever they have been used to, though cō∣trary to art; before them who keepe them strictly to the generall prescripts without respect to their proper constitution: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith hee, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. That is, Most men that use themselves to any thing, whatsoever it bee, they must be concei∣ved to pitch upon such things, as are most su∣table to their owne Nature; for that finding hurt by those things that are contrary unto it, they are forced to forbeare them speedily. Yea plainely, that none can 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, long continue in an evill cu∣stome contrary to their proper constituti∣ons, who are not extremely madde and senselesse. By this, custome and Nature should bee all one: or at least custome for the most part, nothing else but the fruits

and effects of originall Nature. For my part I should easily grant that any mans present constitution (which you may call his Nature, for the time, though im∣properly:) may not unlikely bee judged of, by those things that are customarie un∣to him. But that a mans originall tem∣per and constitution (which is it that Gallen there speakes of:) may so bee knowne, except we shall extend madnesse, and senslesnesse very far, common experi∣ence will disproove. For what general∣ly more naturall unto all men, then tem∣perance and sobrietie? And what more generally practised in the World, among all sorts of men, then excesse, and ryot, and intemperance, in some one kind or other, if not in all? But by the way; If in the judgement of Gallen a heathen, all such are to be reputed as mad men, because they respect their health and corporall welfare no more; what would hee have said of them, had hee beene a Christian, for their wilfull casting away of their soules (so much more precious then the

body, by how much Heaven doth excell the earth:) by the said courses? Certain∣ly madnesse is a far more generall evill, then most men thinke. But this, by the way onely. When Phylosophers dispute (as many doe:) whether Nature or edu∣cation, that is, custome, be more power∣full to frame and fashion a mans life; it would be but an absurd question, scarce fit to be proposed by any sober man, much more unfit to bee so seriously dis∣puted of by learned Philosophers, if na∣ture and custome in this sense come all to one. But I shall here appeale from Gallen unto Gallen himselfe, whose words in his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. upon Hippoc. Prognost. (treating there of the proper and most naturall time of sleepe▪) are these: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. In the dayes of Hippocrates indeed, that which is according to nature, and that which is accor∣ding to custome, was all one. But now it is quite otherwise, &c. And presently againe, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. In these dayes, custome is of more power then nature, &c.

Tullie also his conceit in his Tusculans is not to be omitted; who having spoken of some that had hardned themselves to indure great extremities of heate, and of cold; as also bodily paines in other kinds, intolerable unto others; all this with ei∣ther no sense; or at least, most wonder∣full patience; whereas other men adscribe all this unto custome, hee would have it to bee Nature, even common Nature. For saith he, Nunquam naturam mos vinceret; est enim easemper invicta: It is not a thing possible that custome should prevaile against Nature; for nature it unconquerable. How then, say wee, comes it to passe that other men cannot endure the said extremities, if not against nature? Because, saith hee, we have through custome used our bodies to tendernesse, and so made that intolera∣ble unto them, which by nature is very tolerable; His words are, Sed nos umbris, deliciis, otio, languore, desidia animum infe∣cimus, opinionibus malo{que} more delinitum,

mollivimus, &c. We with our shades and o∣ther wanton inventions and uses; with our idlenesse, loosenesse, long continued lazinesse, have corrupted our minds, and through the power of false opinions and bad customes have softned and effeminated our selves into this tendernesse: &c. There is certainely, though it seemes not perchance so plausi∣ble at first, much truth in this opinion. I appeale unto them, (and they are not a few:) that have maintained, that Nature hath sufficiently fenced man (as well as other creatures:) against all excesse of either heate or cold; and that clothes seeme now necessary, custome to bee the cause, not nature. Synesius a learned Phy∣losopher, at first; and afterwards a wor∣thy father of the Church, also; in his de Calvitio, or, commendation of baldnesse, seemes to be of opinion (seriously; though his subject may seeme but jocular:) that if men did weare neither hats nor hayres upon their heads, their sculs used to the Sunne and to the weather, would in time grow to that hardnesse, as to become al∣most

impenetrable. To this purpose hee first brings a testimonie of Herodotus, of the difference of Aegyptian and Persick sculs, observed by Herodotus himselfe by the direction of the natives of the Coun∣trey; the one being so hard, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that a stone throwne against them would hardly crack them; the other so brittle, that the least knocke would breake them; this difference be∣ing conceived both by the inhabitants themselves, and by Herodotus, to proceed from this cause, because the one were wont to goe bare headed, and shaven from their youths; and the others 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (to use his owne elegant expression:) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, shel∣tered from the Sunne, with hats and o∣ther head-attire. This hee further con∣firmes by an example of his times, there being then (as Synesius relates it:) in the towne, a certaine poore bald pate (not by nature, but art:) who did use to goe up and downe the streets, and to shew him∣selfe at all ordinary great concurses of

people, as at the ordinary races of the Cir∣cus, and the like; so that no man was bet∣ter knowne in the whole towne. This man with his bare head, would butte with a ram (were hee never so stout:) and put him to the worst; suffer tyles to be throwne at his head, and make them flye in pieces: as also endure scalding pitch to bee powred upon his head. This, and the like, to shew (to the great asto∣nishment of the beholders:) the stout∣nesse and unsensiblenesse of his head∣piece. But it might be so naturally; you may thinke perchance. No; it was by cu∣stome; or rather if you will (which is that Tullie would have:) naturally; but no o∣therwise naturally in him, then in other men that would use the meanes. For Sy∣nesius saith expressely, that himselfe could for a need have wrought his own head to this, in case hee had no other meanes to subsist by; but therfore gives God thanks, that hee needed it not. I say therefore, to returne unto Tully, that there is a great deale of truth in that opinion of his. Yet

to stretch nature so farre, as he doth there, even to them, qui cum ad flammam se ap∣plicuerint, sine gemitu aduruntur; who can suffer their bodies to be burnt by degrees, and yet not seeme to feele it; (of whom Lucia∣nus in his Peregrinus speakes, as more particularly, so more incredibly; and yet, I thinke, truely enough:) and the like; I cannot hold that to be according to truth. Neither I thinke would Tullie (as excel∣lent a Philosopher every whit; as he was an excellent Orator:) have affirmed it, but upon such an occasion, having taken upon him in that place, the defence of that unnaturall paradoxe of the Stoicks, That no extremity of bodily paine and tor∣ments, could hinder or lessen a wise mans happinesse in this world; glad therefore of any thing, that had but some colour of truth, though not so solid otherwise. And thus much by the way of Gallen and Tullie their opinions concerning the power of custome.

Secondly, that Nature in a generall sense is not mutable, that is, cannot exor∣bitate

or go beyond the bounds that were at first set unto it by its author, may ap∣peare, first by those lawes and orders that God hath set inviolably to some subluna∣rie things▪ as to the Sea, so that it shall not overflow the Earth, Iob 38.8, &c. and to the World in generall concerning the sea∣sons of the yeare, that they shall never faile, Gen. 8.22. but especially, by those that it hath set to those purer bodies a∣bove, which as they are not by nature changeable; so doe most firmely and constantly continue in their first office and forme. For as for such alterations, that even in them some Astronomers tell us of, till they bee better knowne and a∣greed upon, we shall not need to take any notice of them; neither indeed are they such alterations, as would crosse, but ra∣ther confirme, what we shall here say.

Sol & Lunasuo lustrantes lumine circum Perdocuere homines annorū tempora verti;

Et certaratione gerirem, at{que} ordine certo: saith old Lucretius. Even they who by

reason of the frailtie and mutabilitie of sublunarie things called this world in scorne, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a meere hotch pot, a masse of confusion, and the like; yet when they looked up, and observed there such glory, such order; such constancie, such immutabilitie; they were driven to acknowledge a rationall power and pro∣vidence over the Whole. And even this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, this mingle mangle, or what ever they will, of sublunarie things; had they well viewed it with more rati∣onall eyes, then they did; as Plinie well in a place speaking of the gnat (If my me∣mory faile me not,) nusquam natura magis tota, quàm in minimis; that the power of Nature was greatest in her lest workes; so would they with admiration have said of it, that nusquam potentior natura, quàm in maximé fragilibus; or if you will have it in the words of Saint Paul (that ye may know God to be the same God in things naturall, as hee is in things spirituall, as in truth, there is but one truth both of things spirituall and naturall:) that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that it is the heighth and perfection of the di∣vine power to shew it selfe most power∣full in those things that are most weake.

Thirdly, it is further to be considered, that where custome makes an alteration, and becomes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ascititious na∣ture; yet doth it seldome so overcome nature originall, but that it hath some force and secret operation in and upon the subject; the lesse visible, the more powerfull; yea the more dangerous; as it prooves oftentimes. So through custome a man may bring himselfe to an habite of intemperance, that it shall not bee in his power, nor safe for his body, perchance to returne unto sobrietie. Yet neither is it at first without danger (it is death unto many to attempt it:) and (if Gallen may be credited:) it is a great chance, if at the last (though the inconvenience of it bee not presently perceived:) it doe not proove some way or other pernicious. What, if some intemperate men attaine to 60. or 80? They may thank the strength

of their nature for it, which bad custome could no sooner overthrow▪ and had they beene sober men, it is more then likely, their life how long soever, might have beene longer by 20. yeares at lest. So, a man through continuall labour and industrie may doe much in the pursuite of some art or science; yet if hee have not a genius to it, a naturall aptitude and dis∣position, he shall never attaine (be his la∣bour never so great:) to any great per∣fection: whereas lesse labour in a way more sutable to his nature, might have made him excellent. Hence is that Prae∣cept of the Poet,

Tu nihil invita, dices facies{que} Minerva;

that we doe nothing invita Minerva, that is, as Tullie doth interpret it in his first de Offic. adversante & repugnante natura. I omit many pregnant passages to this pur∣pose of the two great Naturalists, Hipo∣crates and Gallen; which you may read, either in themselves; or, if that will serve your turne, in Huart, his Examen des In∣genios. They are all for originall nature,

and without it they thinke all labour is lost. So saith Seneca too: Inclinandum quò te vis ingenii defert. Malè enim respon∣dent coacta ingenia, reluctante natura irri∣tus labor est. I must confesse, I am not al∣together of their opinion; neither was Plutarch I am sure; and examples there be (if wee were now to argue the case) good store to the contrary. Neverthelesse, their admonitions, I acknowledge, are to good purpose, that Parents and Masters should carefully observe the naturall in∣clination of youths, before they designe them to any particular profession. This for the most part is the safest way. That's enough, though we say no more.

Fourthly, besides, in many things, when a man hath done all that art can, and industrie; yet cannot he bee secure, but that nature Originall may returne and shew her selfe upon the suddaine; and that to his cost, as it may proove. As for example, wee read of divers, that have taken great paines to tame wild beasts, that they might use them as familiarly, as

wee doe commonly those, which are tame by nature. And we read withall of divers who have found by wofull ex∣perience, that forced nature is of those things, which by a wise man may not be trusted. Witnesse hee of whom Martiall speakes, ii.75.

Verbera securi solitus Leo ferre magistri, Insertam{que} pati blandus in ora manum: Dedidicit pacem, subito feritate reversa, Quanta nec in Lybicis debuit esse jugis:

and, de spectac. x.

Laeserat ingrato Leo perfidus ore ma∣gistrum, Ausus tam notas contemerare manus, &c.

The Poet therefore had some reason, (though it hold not in all things equal∣ly:) when he said,

Naturam expellas furca licet us{que} recurret, Et mala perrumpet furtim fastidia victrix.

Fifthly, it hath beene observed of some free stones, that when they are used in a building if they bee laid in that proper

posture, which they had naturally in their quarries, they grow very hard and durable against both time and weather; if that be changed, that they consume and moulder away in a short time. Certaine∣ly, art may doe much, and custome much; but to follow nature (where nature her∣selfe hath not degenerated:) is alwaies both the surer, and most commendable. And so I shall conclude this part of the power of custome in things naturall, with the words of a Heathen, but such as may become a Christian, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. O nature, from thee are all things, in thee all things subsist, and to thee all tend. What ever it be that fits thee well, fits me likewise, as being part of thee. No∣thing that thy seasons beare, is to me, (as ei∣ther too forward, or too backeward,) unsea∣sonable, &c.

THe ancient Greeke Philosophers said, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, This world is but a change; and the Apostle spea∣king of the World, very elegantly and em∣phatically cals it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, rather then 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, intimating thereby, that this World, to speake of it truely and proper∣ly, is rather a matter of fashion, then of substance. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (saith Theophy∣lact upon the place, lately most elegantly printed in London, as the happy first fruits of a greater harvest of Greeke Manu∣scripts to bee set out here in England, to the great honour of this Realme, and the no lesse contentment of all true lovers of learning:) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Hee cals it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or fa∣shion, to teach us, that all the things of this present world, are but objects of the eye one∣ly, and serve but for a shew, as things meere∣ly

superficiall, without any either stabilitie, or substance in themselves. It is so, if wee consider those things, which, both in re∣gard of their forme and matter, are meere∣ly naturall, and it is so if wee consider those, which have their existence in, and from the will of man. The body of man is not so mutable, as his will is: nor the persons and outward features of men, so different one from another, as their minds. Nova vita, novos mores postulat, saith the Comick. Wee have more reason to say, Novus dies, novos mores. And yet that is more then wee can truely say of many, who in one day shift themselves often, and are not the men that they were; neither in regard of their mind, nor happily of their fashions. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (saith excellently Saint Na∣zianzene to this purpose. Orat. de Spir. Sancto.) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. We are not mixt creatures onely, but also con∣trarie;

both to others and to our owne selves: not continuing truely and intirely the same, not so much as one day, much lesse our whole lives: but both in regard of our bodies and in regard of our soules (or minds:) perpetu∣ally flowing and perpetually changing.

From this mutabilitie and inconstan∣cie of mans will, wee may first deduce Varietie of fashions and customes. But se∣condly, differences of places and times cause difference of fashions and customes; and this of necessitie. For it is not possi∣ble for many reasons, that men that live under different clymates, should all live after one fashion: nor that the inhabi∣tants of one place (the state of things al∣tering often as it doth:) should alwaies live after one sort. Hence are in different places and Kingdomes, at all times; and in the same places and Kingdomes, by certaine revolutions of times, sometimes longer, sometimes shorter, different fa∣shions, different customes, different lawes. Old fables tell us of one Epimenides, who after a continuall sleepe of fiftie yeares a∣waked

with amazement, finding a new world, every where (as of men, so of fa∣shions:) since hee had seene it last. Let this long sleepe goe, as well it may, for a fabulous thing: the effects of it, I am sure; (his amazement, I meane) might have beene credible enough, though the sleepe had beene shorter by many yeares. In some Countries (for all Countries are not equally light and phantasticke; and they are happy Countries, that are lest:) if men should but put on those clothes that they left of but foure or five yeares agoe, and use those fashions that then were in use, they would seeme, even unto them∣selves, ridiculous; and unto many, little lesse then monstrous.

The consideration of this varietie af∣fords, as unto the Naturalists, matter of speculation, how even herein nature de∣lights in varietie; so unto the Divine, matter of indignation, to see the vanitie of mortall men, who for the most part spend themselves wholly, their wits and their lives, upon things so transitorie;

and spend little or no time at all, upon the onely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, (as both Philosophers and the Scriptures are wont to speake:) God, that is, and his service, and the Know∣ledge of his Truth; which are the onely things that are permanent, and have rea∣litie of existence in this World; and there∣fore commended unto us by Christ, as the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of all our many cares and busines∣ses in this World; the one only thing that is profitable & necessary. But to forbeare that which I find already done by divers Divines, Naturalists, and others fully and sufficiently: I shall here onely observe the power and providence of Almightie God, who as hee can out of darkenesse bring forth light, so can turne these wretched effects (in themselves:) of mans frailtie and corruption, to be the meanes, in part, of his happinesse. I say therefore, that what in the Heavens, the Sunne and the Moone, divers Starres and Planets are, for the naturall division of times, to divide the day from the night, to be for signes and for seasons, and for dayes, and for

yeares, Gen. i.14. without which divisi∣on of times and seasons, there would bee no living in this World: so varietie of fashions and customes, serve unto man for the Civill or politicke distinction of the severall times and ages of the World, without which there would be little cer∣taine knowledge, and little or no truth amongst men. By varietie of customes, I here understand also varietie of langua∣ges, and dialects, and words, (all which depend of custome as much, if not more then any other thing of the World be∣sides; as elsewhere shall be shewed▪) as conducing to the knowledge of the Truth in this World, no lesse then varietie of manners. Now to make this good that I have said, I must first of all suppose, which I thinke no man will deny, that by bookes especially wee come to the knowledge of Truth. Of truth in ge∣nerall, by bookes especially; in some peculiar objects of Truth, as in mat∣ters of Historie wee have them one∣ly to trust to. And in matter of bookes,

the Authors of the bookes, and the times when the Authors lived, is mainely con∣siderable. For accordingly doe wee give credite (especially in point of Historie and truth of religion:) to the Bookes themselves, more or lesse, for the most part. In many things, this alone, to know the Author of the booke, is enough to decide many controversies. But what if the Title deceive us, and some 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of some idle braine of our age, represent it selfe unto us upon the stage under the gray haires of authenticke antiquitie? Have there not beene such impostors at all times, who have attempted (would I could say, they have attempted it onely:) to abuse the World with supposititious Titles and Names? What profession so sacred, or so vulgar, that hath not suffered in all ages, by this kind of men? Divines, Lawyers, Phisicians, Philosophers, Hi∣storians, have in all ages complained of them: and in those ages, when by reason of the ignorance of the times, men have not beene able to discover them, what er∣rors

and absurdities, both in matter of knowledge and practise, both in the Church and in the Commonwealth, have ensued thereupon, to those that are lear∣ned, is not unknowne, I am sure; and I may not so far digresse at this time, to sa∣tisfie the ignorant. Of all noble Impostors in this kind, I will instance but in one. Annius Viterbiensis, a Monke by profes∣sion, who lived some two hundred yeares agoe, having attained to more then or∣dinary knowledge both of the tongues and Histories, applyed himselfe by his knowledge and proficiencie, not to helpe, but to cheat the World. To that end hee counterfeited divers ancient Historians of best note and greatest antiquitie, as Berosus, Manetho, Catonis Origines, and the like, which had not beene heard of in many ages; and wrote Comments up∣pon them, himselfe being both Text and Comment, that the World might have the lesse occasion to suspect his fraud: and passed so current for a long time, that even to this day (though followed and

discryed by divers learned men of all na∣tions and professions:) many can scarce perswade themselves, that so many fine Titles and shewes, should be but a piece of juggling. Now what shamefull errors and mistakes in point of History both Ecclesiasticall and Civill, they that have trusted unto him have beene led into by this jugglor, any man may imagine, and many have written of it.

Now the ordinary and surest way ge∣nerally to find out a counterfeit Author in this kind, is by his style, and by an accurate examination of those particular fashions, and customes that he doth either obiter, (which can hardly bee avoyded in any booke of what subject soever it be:) or purposely speake of, how well they fit and sute to the time and place that is pretended. Take away these two 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of words and customes, and it will bee a hard taske for any man to discover and evict the supposititiousnes of any wri∣ting. Hence it is, that in the Scriptures both of the Old and New Testament, by

Gods great providence all things (for the most part:) bee so punctually set downe with all kind of circumstances at large; which though illiterate men perchance passe over by reason of their ignorance, yet men of learning, to whom the state of the World from the beginning with the severall periods, alterations, and revo∣lutions of it (as farre as it can be knowne by ancient bookes and Records:) is not unknowne, receive marveilous satisfacti∣on from them, both for the better con∣firmation of their faith, and the greater contentment of their minds. For this cause men of judgement, that would gladly make use of their owne eyes to see the way that leades unto truth, and not al∣together to depend from the abilitie both and fidelitie of others, have taken so much paines about words; as also to bee well verst in the rites and customes of all ages and places. Neither can it be denyed by men of understanding, but that this way of studie hath beene, next under

God, the chiefest meanes of this blessed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or new birth of learning, which begun not much above a hundred yeares agoe. And I must confesse, I have wondred with my selfe sometimes, that this kind of learning being come to that heighth or perfection as it is in our dayes, no man hath yet laboured for the ease of others, to reduce it to some certaine Me∣thod and rules of art, as it were; as by set∣ting downe the proper words and rites of every age and place, whereby they are discernable from another; by the help whereof, even men of ordinary learning might give a good guesse at the age of e∣very Author that they have occasion to use, nor be altogether so lyable to the im∣postures or falsaries, as they are. Which certainely is feasable enough, if not to perfection, yet to a good degree of pub∣licke utilitie. But on the other side, when I call to mind, that Impostors would bee the first that would make use of this art, to make their forgeries the more passable

(as certainely they would:) then I thinke it very happy, that it is not, neither of it selfe more easie to attaine unto, nor made more common by the labour of others, then it is.

What I have said of the knowledge of old customes and the use thereof, in matter of bookes, is as true in matter of old wri∣tings and evidences of what kind soever. True it is, that nothing should bee more sacred and inviolable amongst men, then publicke instruments, and evidences, whose onely end and use, is, to be witnes∣ses unto the truth, and to protect it from her many enemies, as malice, favour, par∣tialitie, and the like. Yet how rightly Seneca said, Nihil esse tam sacrum quod sa∣crilegum non inveniat, may appeare even in this particular. For it is well knowne, that even of old, many evidences have beene forged to abuse the World withall: and that sometimes, not by one or two secretly combining, but even by many unanimously conspiring together, against the Truth. For example, I find that about

some foure hundred yeares agoe, Gregorie the ninth being then Pope of Rome, and Saint Edmond, Archbishop of Canterbu∣rie, the Monkes of Canterburie were con∣victed to have counterfeited, or adultera∣ted a certaine Charter of Thomas of Bec∣ket, by which they claimed certaine pri∣viledges. For which abominable fact and other enormities, that worthy pious Prelate intended great and severe punish∣ments upon the whole Convent. But they having made Otho the Popes Legate and Edmunds great enemy, their friend, prevailed with the Pope, that the cause might bee referred to the said Otho: And in conclusion, but three of the whole Convent were found guiltie by Otho. And upon this favourable information, and friendly mediation withall of the Le∣gate, the Pope sent a dispensation unto the Monasterie, by which hee did acquit them both from present further trou∣bles, and from future deserved infamie for such an infamous Act. Even those three that were found guilty, it was

judged they had done it in Spiritu simpli∣citatis (so runnes the Dispensation:) and for this their simplicitie, forsooth, they were, not exiled, but confined to certaine places to doe penance. No wonder if o∣thers have made bold in that kind since, if the imputation of simplicitie was the worst that would come of it. Simplicitas digna favore fuit, saith one of the old Po∣ets. If wee looke backe unto better and purer ages, wee shall not find I am sure that Simplicitie, was ever objected unto any as a crime; but in Monckes especial∣ly, that once it was thought their chiefest commendation, I find in many Fathers. But since it is as it is, wee may thanke God, that evidences and old writings as well as other things, have had their pro∣per customes in almost all ages; by the knowledge and consideration whereof the true for the most part, (if the Impostor hath not beene very cunning:) may bee easily knowne from the counterfeit. For not to speake here either of the words themselves or forme of writing, or man∣ner

of orthographie, as well considera∣ble in these, as in bookes; besides these, there are divers other things, that are ob∣servable. There have beene times, when Seales have beene in use, and times when they were not: when such and such seales, and such and such dates; when such and such subscriptions, and superscriptions; and sundry such particulars; much diffe∣ring one from another all of them, accor∣ding to their severall times and places. Those therefore take a very good course, who when they have occasion to set out any ancient Records and evidences, keepe to their originals in all points, as neere as may be, to give the better satisfaction un∣to the learned: which is the course I see (and am heartily glad to see it:) that Sir Henrie Spilman Knight, that learned and painefull Antiquarie, does take in the publication of the English Synods; which (for the good and honour of our English Church:) he is now about. For in very truth, a very small alteration, is enough sometimes to make a true Record

suspected. As for example; That those small Arithmeticall figures (which wee had from the Maures or Arabs, as they from the Indians:) have not beene knowne or in use amongst us Christi∣ans scarce yet foure hundred yeares, hath beeene observed by men perfectly well versed in the knowledge, both of ancient times and writings. They were much to blame therefore, who setting out some writings of above seven hundred yeares antiquitie, and professing to follow the Originalls very exactly and punctually in all circumstances of writing; made no scrupule in lieu of those Roman figures then in use, to put these small ones so late∣ly received, which certainely they found not in those Originals.

In the same Manuscript, where the Dis∣pensation that I have spoken of concer∣ning the falsarie Monkes, is registred; I remember to have read a strange Note, (so it seemed unto me:) concerning an∣cient Charters and evidences, when they first began to bee in use in this Countrey:

which Note because it is of great conse∣quence (in case it should proove true:) for the better conviction of many suppo∣sititious Charters, pretended to be of great antiquitie, I will here set it downe as it is there to be seene.

Sanctus Ethelbertus Rex Angliae qui sus∣cepit Christianitatem a Beato Augustino misso a Beato Gregorio Papa Anno Dom. DXCVI. in Ecclesia Christi Cant. dedit eidem August. & successoribus palacium Regium & sedem perpetuam in Civitate Do∣roberniae, quae nunc dicitur Cant. cum Ec∣clesia veteri quae ab Antiquo tempore Roma∣norum ibidem fuerat fabricata, quam ipse∣met Augustinus Sancti Salvatoris nomine de∣dicavit post consecrationem suam Arelatenis factam, Statuit & idem Rex authoritate Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae, ut in Ecclesia Can∣tuar. ordinem Monasticum Monachi in per∣petuum observarent, ne primorum videlicet praedicatio Monachorum, a memoriâ delere∣tur, sed semper recens in mentibus succeden∣tium perseveraret. Dedit etiam idem Rex possessiones amplas praedictis fratribus infra

Civitatem Cant. & extra. & exinde dicta Dorobernensis Ecclesia, propter primatum, & quia inde primò Christiana Religio ema∣navit, & Regnum Anglorum illuminavit, si∣cut Rex ipse tenuit suas terras & consuetudi∣nes liberas & quietas in suo dominio, ita Archiepiscopus & Ecclesia praenominata te∣nuit terras suas & consuetudines suas omni∣no liberas & quietas in suo dominio, & in∣concussé habuit dicta Ecclesia Cantuar. om∣nimodas libertates & consuetudines suas in possessione pacifica sine interruptione cujus∣quam ex consuetudine & antiquo more sine cartis vel monumentis Regiis us{que} ad tempo∣ra Whytredi Regis (who dyed the 23. of Aprill, in the yeare of our Lord, 725. ha∣ving reigned 34. yeares, and sixe months, according to Beda's calculation:) cujus munumenti tenor talis est.

This I commit to the further conside∣ration of the learned antiquaries of this land, not willing in a matter of such mo∣ment, to interpose my judgement either way; and certaine besides, that much may bee said, both for it and against it.

Onely that the matter (to them especially that know nothing but what is now done:) may not appeare altogether in∣credible, I shall put the reader in mind of a passage of Ingulphus, who speaking of the times of William the Conqueror hath this observation. Conferebantur etiam pri∣mò multa praedia nudo verbo abs{que} scripto, vel chartâ, tantum cum Domini gladio, vel galeâ, vel cornu, vel cratera. & plurima te∣nementa cum calcari, cum strigili, cum arcu; & nonnulla cum sagitta. Sed haec initio Reg∣ni sui: posterioribus annis immutatus est iste modus.

So much of the good that comes unto the World, from this varietie of fashions and customes; the wretched effects, in themselves, and the meanes withall, (in this age especially:) of mans vanitie and miserie. We have touched upon it, rather then treated of it. For indeed to speake of it fully, it would require a large Trea∣tise by it selfe. But whatsoever the use of this kind of knowledge be, I thinke there is not (I speake it for the further incou∣ragement

of them that will take paines in this kind:) any kind of knowledge that can afford more content and pleasure to an ingenuous mind. For since that the severall ages of the World differ little one from another, but by those outward markes and recognisances of different rites and customes: Hee that knowes cer∣tainely (as it may be knowne by a practi∣zed Schollar in this kind of learning:) what hath beene the particular estate, if not of all (since there are not bookes ex∣tant of all:) yet of most ages of the World, wherein they differed one from another, and wherein they agreed; what peculiar, and what common to every one; he doth as it were enjoy the memorie, of so many yeares, and so many ages past, even as if hee himselfe had lived all those yeares, and outlasted all those ages. Hence it is, that Antiquaries are so taken with the sight of old things; not as doting (as I take it:) upon the bare either forme or matter (though both oftentimes be very notable in old things:) but because those visible

superviving evidences of antiquitie repre∣sent unto their minds former times, with as strong an impression, as if they were actually present, and in sight as it were: even as old men looke gladly upon those things, that they were wont to see, or have beene otherwise used unto in their younger yeares, as injoying those yeares againe in some sort, in those visible and palpable remembrances. As for those men that have not this knowledge, though they be told that such things bee ancient, yet for want of that knowledge and judgement, which might satisfie them, that they are so in very deed; and because happily, they know little or no∣thing of former ages, the present repre∣sentation whereof, occasioned by those ancient evidences might affect their minds; it is no wonder if the sight of such things, be unto them as either plea∣sing colours to the blind, or sweete Mu∣sicke to the deafe.

And now having done with the good Vses of this Varietie through Gods great

mercy; wee are to consider the bad use of it, (which I feare is more generall:) through corrupt man his wickednes part∣ly, and partly his ignorance. That in things of themselves indifferent, as in matter of eating and drinking; of cloa∣thing, of civill complements, and the like, there should be Varietie of fashions and customes in the World, according to differences of either places or times; can bee neither occasion of wonder, nor of∣fence unto any, that is not a great stranger unto the World; or rather indeed, un∣to reason and common sense it selfe. But in matters of right and wrong; of that which is just, or unjust, lawfull, and unlawfull; that there should be so much difference among nations (all consisting of men reasonable by nature:) not them onely that are of different Religions, but even them that professe but one Truth; yea, in the same nation, at severall times; is that which gives occasion both of wonder and of offence unto many; of er∣ror and wickednesse unto more; and hath

wrought so farre upon some, as to make them peremptorily to affirme, that there is not any reall difference in nature be∣tweene right and wrong, but only in the opinions of men, grounded chiefely up∣on custome. Cùm bonum & malum natura judicetur, & ea sint principia naturae; certè honesta quo{que} & turpia simili ratione dijudi∣canda, & ad naturam referenda sunt. Sed perturbat nos opinionum varietas, hominum∣que dissensio; & quia non idem contingit in sensibus, hos naturâ certos putamus: illa quae alii sic, aliis secus, nec isdem semper uno mo∣do videntur, ficta esse dicimus. So learned and judicious Tullie of the vulgar opini∣ons and judgements of his dayes: and had hee lived in ours, it is very probable hee would have said as much of ours. In∣stances to this purpose taken from ancient times concerning the varietie of mens judgements in point of right and wrong, wee have many in ancient Authors who either of purpose upon this very occasion; or upon some other occasion, and to ano∣ther end, have treated of the different

Lawes, and customes of severall nations. See Plato in his Politico, or Minoe. Bar∣desanes, in Euseb. de Praepar. Evangel. lib. vi.10. Sextus Empiricus, Pyrr. hypot. Ni∣colaus de Mor. gentium, in Stobaeus; not to mention any more. Certainely should wee take all nations of the World (such as have beene accounted moralized and civilized nations, I meane; the wild and barbarous being laid aside:) into consi∣deration, wee may generally conclude, that there is scarce any vertue so much in request in one place, but will be found to bee a vice in another; scarce any vice so much abhorred at one time in one place, but at another time hath beene thought in the same place if not a vertue, yet no unlawfull thing. Those Authors that I have but now mentioned, shall bee my warrant for what I have said, if any will not take it upon my credit. But in point of right and wrong, wee need not to goe so farre, to fetch our instances; neerer times and places unto our selves, and such as wee in many respects are bet∣ter

acquainted with, will afford us suffi∣cient instances. The Civill Law of the Romans, if any Law, might bee thought to be grounded upon reason, both in re∣gard of the Authors of it, men of great worth and fame for their learning; and of the credit that it hath found with most nations in Europe, even to this day. That law thought it good reason to give abso∣lute power unto fathers upon their chil∣dren, power even of life and death, as long as they lived, except by volutary e∣mancipation, or otherwise they had made them free. Children that dispose of them∣selves in marriage without the consent of their parents, are not by that law, lawful∣ly married, and are lyable to great pu∣nishments. Neither of these is now any where thought either Law or reason; though Bodinus I know, in his Politicks is very eager for the one; and Espenseus a learned Sorbonist, hath written a learned discourse concerning the latter, whereby he doth endeavour to proove, that it is not onely against Lawes, but even contra

aequitatem naturalem, that liberi invitis pa∣rentibus, should contrahere matrimonia, sub quorum authoritate, saith hee, & in quorum potestate, Natura, Scriptura, Deus, & ho∣mines, liberos esse voluerunt. cap. 8. Which I take the rather notice of, because hee layes the blame of all this, that it is not so every where as hee would have it, upon vim consuetudinis expresly, the power and tyranny of custome: which hee treates of in the thirteenth chapter. And to the same power of custome it seemes it must be imputed, that some Nations by their lawes and customes, have beene so favou∣rable to stealers of young heires, to dis∣pose of them in marriage at their owne will, against the will of the parents or guardians (of which kind of men you may read at large, Decr. par. ii. Causa. 36.) contrary to the practice of other na∣tions, and to the dictates of reason, and a man would thinke, of common sense it selfe.

By the Roman Lawes (at lest in Trajans time:) the Father, if a sonne dyed with∣out

Issue, and intestate (but however, hee was to have legitimam portionem:) was to inherit, hee alone; sine diminutione, ne socium haberet haereditatis, qui non haberet luctus, saith Plinie in his Panegyrick; which was thought a good reason. For although according to the course of na∣ture, & votum parentum, it bee more proper to children to inherit of their Fa∣thers, then otherwise, yet turbato ordine mortalitatis, as the Civilians speake, when nature her selfe doth alter her course, and takes the child away before the Father, Cur posteris amplior honor quàm majoribus haberetur? curve retrò quo{que} non recurreret aequitas eadem? saith Plinie; who therefore doth highly extoll Trajan for a Constitu∣tion of his to that purpose. And Aristotle upon the same grounds of Nature, goes yet further, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. That it is not lawfull (in point of right and reason grounded upon nature:) for any son upon any termes, to disinherit (ab∣dicare, is more; but includes, disinheriting:) his Father, though a Father have power to

disinherit his son, Arist. Eth. Nicom. lib. viii. cap: ult. Yet in some Countries, though the Sonne die never so wealthy, and the Father survive never so poore and decaid, the Vncle shall inherit before the Father, by reason of a certaine Maxime in Law, that Haereditas descendit, non ascendit, inhe∣ritance doth descend and not ascend, not in the right line that is; but in the collaterall it may; else the Vncle also were exclu∣ded. Yet is the Father granted to be nee∣rer of blood: but nevertheles eo nomine because hee is Father, he is conceived un∣capable. On the other side, that inheri∣tance which they call jure representationis, whereby the Issue of the Eldest sonne, doth inherit before the next in bloud, to witte the younger sonne, is Legall by the Civill Law, and approoved by the pra∣ctice of most Countreys. Yet till within these few yeares, it was otherwise in France generally for many ages together, amongst all sorts of persons, both great and small.

But instances in this kind of the diffe∣rence

of Iudgements and opinions in point of right and wrong, are so many and so obvious to any man that shall but conferre together the Lawes of severall Countries now in force in the principall places of Europe, that one or two are as good as a hundred, and a hundred, if need were, as easie to bee found as one or two. And though some Countries are more constant in their Lawes and customes, then some other are; yet I know none that hath beene so constant, where divers things may not be observed, once forbid∣den and punishable, some; now, legall and lawfull: others, now prohibited, which in former times were lawfull: in a word, no Nation or Countrey (neither Medes, nor Persians excepted:) where cancelling, reversing, and repealing of Lawes, and enacting of others much dif∣ferent, if not contrary, in their place and stead, hath not beene usuall. I speake not this of such alterations onely, as have ne∣cessarily proceeded from alterations of times and circumstances: of which Du∣rantus

in his Speculo Iuris, well and per∣tinently, Nam secundùm varietatem tempo∣rum jura variantur humana, Et nihil pene in semetipso manet, sed currit Natura, mul∣tas evolvens mutationes, quas ne{que} praevide∣re facile est, ne{que} praedicere. Therefore, di∣cunt quidam (saith the addition there:) quod scientia juris Canonici vel Civilis non est propriè scientia, &c. Such alterations, I know, may happen many, much diffe∣rent one from another, though grounded all upon the same reason. But I speake it of such especially, as proceed from varie∣tie of opinions and judgements, in matter of right and wrong.

Now the power of custome in all these changes, alterations, differences accor∣ding to varietie both of times and places, is two-fold.

First in that most of these differences and alterations have their beginning from custome, which by continuance doth not onely get the strength of Law, and goes for Law in all places; but also com∣monly begets Lawes, properly so called.

For that is the originall of most Lawes in most places. And it was both a witty and a true speech of him that first (as I find in Suidas and others:) defined cu∣stome to bee nothing else, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an unwritten Law; as on the other side Law to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a written custome: shewing thereby the difference betweene Law, properly so called; and custome; ve∣ry well; though it will not hold in all. And those Lawes that are thus grounded upon custome, are thought by many as the most acceptable, so the most naturall and obligatorie Lawes that are: as being not the invention of any one single man, but of long Time and experience. Dio Chry∣sostomus is very rethoricall upon this sub∣ject, and more rethoricall then sound sometimes; as when hee saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that it is more pro∣per for men that are free, to bee governed by custome; as for men that serve, by Lawes: whereas indeed true libertie doth con∣sist in this, to bee subject unto reason,

whether commanded unto us by Lawes, or recommended by custome. But certain∣ly it is no new thing for any Kingdome to bee governed by custome: and of the two it may generally be said, that customes were, before written Lawes, if not in all, yet in most Kingdomes. Which I observe the rather, because some learned men I see, are of opinion that jus consuetudina∣rium, and consuetudo in point of Law, are phrases of latter ages onely; and particu∣larly in England, not knowne or used till after the conquest of the Normans. But certainely jus consuetudinarium, whether wee looke upon the word or thing, is of greater antiquitie then so. In all Greeke Authors, as many as I remember, that write of Lawes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Lawes and customes goe still together. In the Ci∣vill Law you shall read, not onely de lon∣ga consuetudine, as part of the Law in ge∣nerall; but also de consuetudinibus muni∣cipiorum, of particular customes of places, to bee kept and observed as Law. But when the word consuetudo came first, ei∣ther

more particularly to be taken pro ser∣vitio feudali (which the Civilians call servitutes praediorum:) for a certaine right that a Lord may challenge, and a Tenant is bound unto by custome; Or yet more generally, for any Ius or due of what kind soever, that a man hath right unto by cu∣stome, I am not able to say certainely. For though this use of the word became most frequent and ordinary since the times of William the Conqueror, yet I find in some ancienter Charters Iura & consuetudines in this very sense: as in a Charter of Knutt, de Portu Sandwici, in these words, Nullus{que} omnino habet ali∣quam consuetudinem in dicto portu, &c. And among the Lawes of King Edmund, con∣firmed by William the Conqueror, the title of one is, De Baronibus, qui suas habent curias & consuetudines. But whether the title bee as ancient, as the Law it selfe, may perchance bee doubted. I am the more inclinable to conceive the Latin consuetudo in this sense, to bee of longer standing then so, (then the times of the

Conqueror, I meane or there abouts:) be∣cause I am sure the Greeke 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is; as may appeare by the Greeke Lawes and Constitutions: as for example, where 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the customes are taken and used for certaine fees (called also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉:) due and payable at the Consecration, or, Inthronization of every Bishop, Archbishop, &c. Soe Constitut. Novell. Iustin. Coll. ix. tit. vi. Nov. 123. c. 3. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. These fees (or customes) onely we al∣low as lawfull to bee payed by every Bishop, &c. and so often in that one Chapter. And since wee are treating of custome, and have said somewhat of the Latin word consuetudo, I thinke it will not bee amisse to examine the originall of our adopted English custome. The Latin consto hath two significations; to coast, and to con∣tinue. From consto, to coast, n being chan∣ged into u, is the french couster of the same signification; from consto, to con∣tinue, it may bee that the french coustume might bee derived; coustume, being in ve∣ry

truth nothing else but a continued, or constant use and fashion, whatever bee the particular object of it. But I thinke it more probable, that it came from couster, to coast; and that coustume at first was properly taken for vectigal, tribute, tolle, or impost money. Now because matters of this nature, as tributes and imposts, are matters which concerne all men general∣ly to take notice of, and such as goe by custome too, (In omnibus vectigalibus ferè consuetudo spectari solet, id{que} principalibus constitutionibus cavetur. D. 39. tit. 4. l. 4. f. 2.) for the most part; it can bee no wonder if custome from that more proper signification, came afterwards to signifie consuetudo or coustume as wee now used it in common speech. So the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in Hebrew, which signifies a measure, com∣monly; and sometimes tribute; is by the Rabbins at this day (as it was by the an∣cient Hebrewes, for ought wee know, though wee have no examples of it in the Scriptures;) commonly used for mores, or consuetudo. And that of this Hebrew middah, not onely the Latin modius, for a

certaine measure, but also modus used for fashion, or custome, in generall is derived, is out of all question. And therefore Ari∣stotle, where he treates de jure naturali & positivo, (Ethic. l. v. c. 7.) that right, or Law, which he cals, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is, that hath no ground in nature, but wholly depends of mens customes and ordinances, according to the variety both of times and places; hee very appositly compares 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to measures; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (saith he:) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. And since Grammarians cannot agree about the derivation of the word mos, some deriving it from meo, some from modus, some from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and some from the Hebrew 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, I know no reason why I may not more probably maintaine that mos (the rather, because it is a monasyllable:) is the pure Hebrew 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 mas, which signifies tribute. But to returne to our English word againe; this is observable of it, that when it is taken for impost or tolle, it is expressed in Latin not by consuetudo, but custuma properly:

as for example, Registri, p. 259. in a Breefe concerning forreigne Merchants: where nevertheles I must acknowledge, that I doe not understand the difference betweene Telonium, which the marginall note saith they are free from; and custu∣ma which the Breefe itselfe charges upon them. For otherwise I should have thought that telonium and custuma had beene all one; but telonium the more common: And this the rather, because I find in the Lawes of Scotland (where the word custuma is more frequent:) teloni∣um and custumam, for the same thing. And thus much concerning the words both English and Latin; though much; yet not too much, I hope, in a Discourse concerning Custome.

Secondly, whatever bee the beginning or occasion of these severall changes, al∣terations and differences, whether cu∣stome or any thing else; yet herein ap∣peares the power of custome, to be no lesse strange and marveilous, in that in pro∣cesse of time it makes all these differences

and alterations, though never so contary, to appeare in the eyes of men, not onely justifiable, but even best, so that all men of all Countries doe generally like their owne Lawes and customes, when once they have beene used unto them, best of any other▪ and are ready, if need be, with great confidence and eagernesse, to main∣taine them to be so against any gaine-say∣ers. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (saith Agathias the Histo∣rian to this purpose:) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. This is apparantly com∣mon to all the nations of the earth, that what law or custome soever they have beene long used unto, they preferre before any other, and deeme them very excellent. Which made Herodotus, that ancient Historian, to blame Cambyses King of Persia, very much, not as uncivill onely, but even as a mad man, in that hee so freely and tart∣ly derided the customes and fashions, whe∣ther Civill or sacred of other Countries, which were deare unto them, and in their

judgement very plausible. And why any man or nation should arrogate so much unto themselves, as to condemne and de∣ride so freely and peremptorily whatsoe∣ver was contrarie to their owne customes, eo nomine, because contrary to their owne, though practized and approoved by o∣ther men and Nations, by nature equally reasonable; Herodotus, it seemes, saw no reason. Now that men generally thinke best of their owne fashions and customes, be they never so contrary, Herodotus doth shew, by relating a triall that Darius made of it, to satisfie himselfe, which was this: The Indians, those that were properly called Calatians, had a custome to eat their Parents and friends after their deaths; whereas the Graecians did use to burne them: both these being equally contrary to the Persians; who of the two proba∣bly, would soonest have beene perswa∣ded to eate their dead, then to burne them, which could not bee without pro∣phaning that which they accounted most holy, to wit, fire. Darius therefore, first

sends for some Graecians, and asked them by themselves what they would take (and he was well able to give it, though they had asked many thousands,) to eat their Parents when they should bee dead. They answered, they would not doe it for the wealth of the World. Then hee sent for those Indians, and proposed unto them likewise upon what terme they would bee content to burne theirs. The very mooving whereof offended them so much, and seemed so prodigious, that in stead of an answer, they humbly be∣sought, he would forbeare such horrible speeches unto them: and so were dismis∣sed. Soe true is that of Pindarus (addes Herodotus:) that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is, custome, is an Vniversall Monarch, or King of all.

This of Herodotus, puts mee in mind of a strange custome once practized, and in great request among the great ones of Eu∣rope; which was this: If a Prince dyed out of his Countrey, they would chop his body in severall pieces, and boyle them in a kettle or some such vessell till

all the flesh came from the bones; and so send his bare bones to bee buried in his owne Countrey. Bonifacius the eight, speaking of it, cals it, detestandae feritatis abusum, morem horribilem, Deo abominabi∣lem, hominibus abhorrendum, immanem, im∣pium, crudelem, &c. and if it were so in∣deed, a man might wonder how Princes and Great men of that age came to bee so farre in love with it, as to take order be∣fore hand (as we read of divers; and par∣ticularly of one of our Edwards, King of England, in Froissard:) in their life time, that they might bee so used after their death: but that the same Bonifacius tels us plainely, that it was, vitio consuetudi∣nis, that they were bewitcht to that mind and opinion of theirs. And not to goe from this very subject of the dead, who would not wonder, that Ancient Hea∣thens, having forborne (and detested, I may say of many of them:) the ripping of humane dead bodies as inhumane, cruell, and barbarous; (which is the rea∣son that neither Hippocrates, Aristotle, nor

Gallen, though great, yea incomparable naturalists otherwise, never saw, as many learned men are of opinion, any dead bodies dissected:) that now in our dayes the same thing amongst us Christians is ordinarily practized, and is neither mat∣ter of wonder nor of scandall unto any; though sometimes it bee done in a most unbeseeming manner, and all manner of persons admitted unto it, without respect at all of that Divine fabrick, which Saint Chrysostome, as I remember, saith in one place is much reverenced by the Angels of heaven themselves, in honour to Christs body, and his blessed Incarna∣tion.

The power of custome then by these and the like instances, as in things natu∣rall, so in Civill also, being granted to be very great; the next thing that wee are to consider, is, Whether wee shall grant it such power, as that it can make, if not all things, yet any thing at any time, which is right in reason or by nature, to become wrong, actually in point of practice; and

on the other side, that which reason and nature of themselves are against, to be∣come if not laudible, yet allowable, and justifiable sometimes: that is in effect, whether right and wrong are by nature truely, and so absolutely immutable and invariable; or otherwise. To this we an∣swer;

First, That as there is nothing truly na∣turall, that is not in some sort rationall (if not as capable of reason, yet as the effect of reason, in summo gradu; that is, God; and so rationall▪) Soe there is nothing true∣ly rationall, that is not as truely naturall, both in regard of God, the eternall and infinite cause of all things; and in regard of men, whom God by nature hath made rationall. Whatsoever therefore is groun∣ded upon reason, is truely and absolute∣ly naturall. And so is the morall Law, which treates of humane vertues, and vices: and therefore altogether and in∣dubitably naturall.

These words nature and naturall, are most shamefully mistaken and confoun∣ded

by some Christians that have treated of this subject, to wit, concerning ver∣tues and vices naturall; which have made them to fall into detestable opinions, e∣ven such as Civill Heathens themselves would have abhorred in other heathens. To instance in one; Pontus Hunterus of Delfe in Flanders, in his de libera hominis nativitate, seu liberis natalibus, cap. 2.3.4. hath these words; Illud verò liberum populis omnibus (exceptis Christianis:) le∣ges cum Naturâ reliquere, uxores è sangui∣ne junctis acciperent. Nam haec quo{que} res, Legis est, non naturae: ac qui haec septa tran∣siliunt, non in naturam, sed contra leges pec∣cant. Nullum enim naturae à rerum Creato∣re datum est, ad animalium generationem impedimentum, modo diversi inter se sexus, sanis corporibus conveniant. Non illa Ma∣trem (horresco referens:) nec Sororem; sed pudor, verecundia, ac honestas, legibus orna∣tae, rejiciunt: sanguinem non horret, &c. This man, as appeares by what followes, takes nature here, and so in all this his Discourse, for Natura vegetativa, and na∣tura

sensitiva only; as though there were no such thing in rerum natura as natura rationalis. His rule therefore how wee may know things that are contra naturam, is by the present manifest inconvenience, that ensues to our naturall healths or lives, by those things. So that by him if a man cut his fathers throat, or rip his owne mother, as Nero did, and sleepe not a whit the worse, nor have the worse stomacke to his meate for it, hee doth not crimen contra naturam committere. And this is that Natura, which in another place hee cals them prudentes that obey, notwithstanding any lawes to the contra∣rie. I must confesse he is not the first that hath taken nature in this sense. For by those words Lex naturae, some under∣stand in a strict sense, that law properly which is common unto rationall and ir∣rationall creatures; that is, unto men and beasts. In this sense they say, that Pro∣prium bonum appetere; Vim vi repellere, and the like, is de lege naturae. But it is one thing to speake of the law of nature,

as it is common (though in this sense the word Law, is not so proper neither:) to all naturall creatures; and another thing to dispute of that Law, which is naturall unto man properly, who by nature is ra∣tionall. Iust so some Heathen Nations of old, as Herodotus relates, thought they might lye together in their temples, be∣cause they saw that birds, and other dumbe creatures, that were kept in them for sacrifices, did it freely; whence they inferred that it was not unnaturall, and therefore not displeasing to their Gods; and the reason of this their inference, He∣rodotus gives, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (saith he:) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because they presumed that men and brute beasts, are all of one and the same nature▪ which he for his part thought very absurd. And certainely what Saint Iude speakes of some, wee may conclude of all men ge∣nerally, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, If men though rationall by nature, will confine them∣selves to that naturall knowledge, which

is common to unreasonable creatures as well as to reasonable, they must needs leade a brutish life. I hope I may say without offence, that the ancient Stoicks were farre better Christians then so, who maintaining that mans happinesse did consist, in a life according to Nature, have written so many accurat tracts and dis∣courses, to proove that all vertues (and a∣mong them pudor, verecundia, honestas; which this Hunterus doth most falsly op∣pose unto Nature:) are naturall unto man. They that desire further satisfacti∣on in this point, let them read Saint Chry∣sostome, who in divers places of his workes, but especially in his Homilies ad pop. Antioch. handles it at large, proo∣ving by many reasons, arguments and pregnant instances, that the knowledge of the Morall Law, or, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is by nature.

Secondly, Whatsover commeth with∣in the compasse of reason, properly; be∣longing as properly to the law of na∣ture; it must needs follow, that the law

of nature extends of it selfe very farre; though men through the naturall, or ra∣ther (to speake more properly and phy∣losophically:) unnaturall corruption of their understanding, apprehend it not in its full extent. Now whatsoever falls within the compasse either of reason, or of the law of nature, is of itselfe immu∣table.

Naturalia jura — semper firma, & im∣mutabilia permanent; Soe saith the Civill Rom. Law; and so all writers generally; Aristotle onely excepted, who in a place seemes to say the contrary; to wit, that Some naturall lawes are mutable. His words are, Some because they see 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, lawes and judgements concer∣ning that which is just and right, so diffe∣rent and so variable; are of opinion that nothing is right or just in nature, but by opinion onely. But this is not generally true, saith hee; but in part it is. For how∣ever among the Gods it may very well be, that that which is naturally just and right, is altogether invariable: yet among

us men, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Some part of that law which is by nature, is naturally mutable: and some part of it, is not. Where first it is to be observed, that Ari∣stotle doth distinguish betweene Iura na∣turalia, as not being all (in regard of men:) of one nature. And so farre we follow Aristotle. For it is well observed by Thomas Aquinas, that there are some Iura naturalia, which may be called fun∣damentalia, or principalia; because evident of themselves unto humane reason. O∣thers as it were secundaria, because not so apparant unto man, but elicible, or de∣monstrable from those fundamentals by humane ratiocination. The former I sup∣pose are they that Aristotle would have immutable, but the latter not so. Some interpret Aristotle, as though hee had meant no more then this, that de facto some Iura naturalia are changed or vio∣lated among men; though de jure, or na∣turâ suâ, immutable; because of those words of his, though happily in regard of the

Gods themselves immutable. But that this could not bee his meaning, may appeare, first, because hee saith, some onely are mutable, not all. Whereas there bee no jura fundamentalia, but de facto are viola∣ted, not onely by particular men, but al∣so by whole nations, as may easily ap∣peare to them, that shall peruse the Au∣thors whom wee have before mentio∣ned. Secondly, by that instance that hee brings of things naturall, wherein Na∣ture itselfe, seemes to be unconstant un∣to her selfe. The right hand, saith hee, is by nature the strongest, and so it is in most men; yet in some it is not so. But more of his meaning, by and by.

Thirdly, Naturall reason being gran∣ted, by the fall of man, much impaired and vitiated, it is no wonder if all men reasonable by nature, doe not now agree upon the Iura naturalia; and it ought to bee sufficient unto any reasonable man, to satisfie him, that those jura that are so cal∣led, are truely naturalia, that most men and nations (though not all:) that are ci∣vilized

both by their practice, and their opinions, determine them to be so.

As for example, Some nations (civili∣zed in other things it cannot be denyed:) allowed of theft, some of adultery, or for∣nication; some made no scrupule of in∣cest; what then? Most other nations have condemned them for it; and abstai∣ned from these themselves, as being a∣gainst Nature. That is enough to shew that they were things against nature in∣deed; and enough to make any man in∣excusable in the eyes of God, that makes any question of it. The extravagancie of some men, upon this subject, makes mee the more earnest herein. For whereas in reason, what is allowed by the most, should bee adscribed unto nature; and that which by some is practised to the contrary, to the corruption of nature partly; (which Musonius the Stoick, in Stobaeus cals, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉:) and partly to the power of long custome (tanta est corruptela malae consuetudinis ut ab eâ tanquam igniculi ex∣tinguantur

à naturâ dati, exoriantur{que} & confirmentur contraria vitia, as Tullie very well in a place:) Some goe a quite con∣trary course. What they find practised by some, they take to bee naturall; and the contrary, though there be a major part for it, they adscribe unto the power of custome. Incest is a thing that true nature doth abhorre as much as any thing; and as many good reasons, I dare under∣take, may bee given to proove the unna∣turalnesse of it, as for any thing that is ge∣nerally acknowledged most unnaturall. And if we may beleeve some ancient Hea∣thens, men of no small authoritie in the world, as Aristotle and others, even a∣mong the brutes, some of the more gene∣rous abhorre it naturally. Yet an outlan∣dish writer of Essayes in his long dis∣course of custome would perswade us that all difference and scrupulusnes in this kind proceeds rather from custome, then nature; bringing this among many other particulars, as an argument of the power of custome among men. Many an∣cient

Heathen Philosophers, I must needs say, shewed themselves farre wiser men, who though they had no certaine know∣ledge (as they could not without revela∣tion:) of the fall of man; yet from this very thing, because they saw many men every where, yea some whole nations, make no conscience at all of some things which they saw by the eye of reason were certainely against nature, conclu∣ded that of certainty, the naturall reason and understanding of man, had had a fall; though how or when, they could not tell. Many pregnant passages out of Plato, Plutarch, Hierocles, Plotinus, Proclus, and others might bee produced heere to that purpose, if need were, and had not already upon other occasions beene ob∣served and treated of, (all, or most of them:) by others: And all of them a∣gree in this, that in man himselfe is the cause of this his fall, or blindnesse of his understanding, not in him that made him. Even hee that erreth (in matter of life and practise:) against his will, is im∣pious,

in that hee disagreeth from the nature of the Vniverse, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. For Na∣ture had furnisht him at first with certaine in∣stincts, prenotions and opportunities, by the helpe whereof hee might have attained to the knowledge of truth: which having neglected, hence it is that hee is now not able to discerne that which is false from that which is true: saith another, (a Heathen too:) not in∣feriour to any of those, whom I have named.

Fourthly, As in things naturall, some things to serve the nature of the vniverse, forget and forgoe sometimes their owne particular nature; and are never more na∣turall in a generall sense, then when they are so unnaturall unto themselves, par∣ticularly; (so the water to prevent a va∣cuum, which nature abhorreth, ascends; and the like▪) So must wee conceive in things Civill, a subordination Iurium naturalium; and of reason unto rea∣son.

It is not against reason then, that some things which considered in themselves are against reason, should in a higher and more generall consideration, proove warrantable by reason. Even by our lawes, some things, (say our Lawyers:) may bee done warrantably for a publike good, though contrary to the Lawes o∣therwise. Legally therefore in regard of the Lawes, and their generall end, though illegally, because against the expresse te∣nor of some particular law. So the Civill Law too, tels us of a certaine Ius singula∣re, quod contra tenoris rationem introductum est; and allowes of it. It were neither; neither Ius, nor allowable by law, if it were against all reason; though it bee granted against some. I am perswaded, this is it, and nothing else, that made A∣ristotle say, (as wee have noted before:) that quaedam jura naturalia, were mutabi∣lia: but his termes are dangerous, and therefore to be avoided. It is one of the fundamentall principles of all Common∣wealths, Salus populi; suprema lex esto.

How farre a man may go pro salute popu∣li, contra tenorem rationis, is disputed at large, by them that have written de Iuri∣bus Dominationis, whether Monarchicae, Aristocraticae, or Democraticae. Some are too nice; and some goe too farre; but there is no question, but somewhat there is, that may bee done in this kind; both by the Lawes of God and of men, allow∣able; and warrantable by sound reason. Now custome being a thing of great force in a body politick, as well as in a body naturall, and of much importance every way, either to the peace or disturbance of any Commonwealth; if any thing may bee done at any time rationally, contra te∣norem rationis; it is in point of custome e∣specially. Therefore Thomas Aquinas, where hee undertakes to proove (which hee doth very learnedly and solidly,) that lex and ratio are all one; yet when hee comes to the point of custome, hee is put to a fortè, not knowing well how to de∣termine it; Si autem adhuc maneat ratio, eadem, saith he, propter quam prima lex in∣utilis

erat, non consuetudo legem, sed lex consuetudinem vincit. Nisi fortè propter hoc solum inutilis lex videatur, quoniam non est possibilis secundum consuetudinem patriae, quae erat una de conditionibus legis. Diffici∣le est enim consuetudinem multitudinis re∣movere. Of many customes therefore wee may boldly say, that the unseasonable al∣tering of them is against reason; though considered in themselves they be granted to bee not reasonable. And herein is most true, and applyable that Greeke sentence, or rather Oracle, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; not easily to attempt the stirring of those things, which cannot bee stirred with∣out much stirring; and as much hazzard, as stirring. The reason is given by Au∣gustus in Dio, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Those things saith he, that long continue in one and the same state, are to be preferred before those that are ever upon changing, though it bee for the best in all likelihood. Wee see that most things enjoy their happinesse in their rest; but

above all things, it must needs bee more proper unto estates (so called from their stabilitie:) to bee happy in their setled consistence and permanencie; as being liker unto stages and pageants, then states truely, when alwayes mooving and changing. And besides, not onely the happy being of an estate, but the very be∣ing of it doth depend of its stabilitie, in this kind. For rebus novis studere, hath alwayes beene both the marke and the refuge of ill affected malecontents, who have no other hopes to raise their ruined fortunes, but by the ruines of the present estate that they live in. Alcybiades therfore in Thucydides vi. said well, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; That their governement is sa∣fest, to the Commonwealth, that apply themselves as much as they can to the present Lawes and customes, though they bee not altogether so good of themselves. In this sense must Saint Gregory the Pope his words bee understood, where hee

seemes to adscribe unto custome a power to make things that are bad in themselves to become just and legall. His words are; Si pravae rei aditus antequam diu pa∣tescat, non clauditur, usu fit latior; & erit consuetudine licitum, quod ratione constat esse prohibitum. Greg. Reg. Epist. l. vii. Ind. ii. ep. 120.

Another consideration that should make mee the more averse from altering old customes is, because the reason of some, though grounded at first upon some weightie consideration, cannot e∣qually appeare at all times, those incon∣veniences happily, which in former ages gave occasion to such and such customes being now remooved, and perchance forgotten. Therefore saith the Civill Law, Non omnium quae à majoribus consti∣tuta sunt, ratio reddi potest; Et ideo ratio∣nes eorum, &c. I remember what answer some Turkes made, as it is reported by Busbequius in his Epistles, being asked the reason of a certaine custome of theirs, which seemed very sensles; to wit, That

their forefathers had done it of old; and as they beleeved, not without reason; though now not knowne unto them as they ingenuously confessed. I will not commend this for a good answer to all things; God forbid: In some things I thinke it may hold very well. If a Turke (to instance in some particular:) should aske a Christian, why when any doth snize in our presences (as it is practized in most places of Europe:) wee pray to God to blesse them, or to that purpose; well might hee answer, that our Christian forefathers have done it of old, and that long before them their Gentill forefathers had used it; but the reason, how, and why it first began, neither Christians nor Gen∣tiles can certainely tell us, though divers both Gentiles of old, (as Aristotle &c.) and Christians since have written of it, and have done their utmost to find it out. And now that it hath beene so long pra∣ctized in the World, I should, I must con∣fesse, bee one of them that should make conscience to take it away, though I must

acknowledge with the rest, that the rea∣son, or beginning, is unknowne unto mee. If therefore the reason of many Lawes and customes though very good and warrantable, and perchance necessa∣rie, bee such nevertheles that cannot bee found out but by time and experience; It cannot be safe to resolve upon the alte∣ration of any long continued Law or custome, though wee can give no rea∣son for it, but after long and mature de∣liberation.

For these severall respects, it cannot be thought amisse or unreasonable, that all Lawes and customes should by them, that are subject unto them, generally be main∣tained (in a civill respect, at least:) to bee just and reasonable. And truely, what∣ever may bee alledged against them con∣sidered in themselves, yet in this respect they may be just and reasonable, if they bee not partiall, but extend indifferently unto all, that is, just in the execution, or application; though not in their nature. But besides, if it bee not fit to say unto a

King, (be he never so bad a King:) thou art wicked; and to Princes, yee are ungodly, Iob 34.18. Why should not so much re∣spect be due to any Law or custome from them, (as I said before:) that are subject unto them, who owe their peace and sa∣fetie (next unto God and the King:) to their protection, as that it should not bee lawfull for them to vilifie them, and o∣penly to declaime against them? Cicero saith well, Vt ex medicinâ nihil oportet pu∣tare proficisci, nisi quod ad corporis utilita∣tem spectat; sic a Legibus nihil convenit ar∣bitrari, nisi quod Reipubl. conducat (and that is as much as if he had said, nisi quod justum est, and there is the same reason for both:) proficisci. However it may not be doubted by any man that is wise, that there bee many Lawes and customes in all countries, which though they bee well tolerated and continued for the peace and safetie of the publicke, yet can∣not bee practized by particular men, (as farre forth as they may avoyd it:) with a good conscience, and without great perill

to their souls; as being of themselves most unreasonable. And therefore the same Tullie, who before did teach us, how we may judge and speake of Lawes civilly; elsewhere instructing how to judge, ac∣cording to truth, saith very solidly, Stul∣tissimum est, existimare omnia justa esse, quae sita sunt in populorum institutis aut le∣gibus: to beleeve that every Law or cu∣stome, that is in force and rigidly stood upon in every countrey, is therefore just and good, is absolutely to beleeve with the Epicureans and the like, (whom we have before spoken of:) that reason, and Iustice, is not a matter of truth and reali∣tie, but of meere opinion and conceit. And it must needs follow, quod si populo∣rum jussis, si principum decretis, si sententiis judicum jura constituerentur, jus esset latro∣cinari, jus adulterare, jus testamenta falsa supponere, &c. as the same Author very well in another place of the same booke. These commendations therefore, that or∣dinarie Lawyers of every countrie give usually to their owne proper lawes and

customes, must cautelously be understood; or else they are very dangerous. Though some of them speake plainely enough sometime; as that incomparable Lawyer and Philologist Cujacius, of the customes of France, though refined and reformed a∣gaine and againe; divers whereof he doth acknowledge to bee grounded upon the errors of former Lawyers, though pre∣tended to be right and just of themselves. To which purpose also I understand (with submission to himselfe, and his interpretation:) the Cujacius of this Iland, in his Notes upon Fortescu, that the divers opinions of Interpreters procee∣ding from the weakenesse of mans reason and the severall conveniences of divers States, have made those limitations which the Law of nature hath suffered, very different. And hence it is, &c. Sure I am, that long be∣fore either of them, Tertullian taught us, that the ground of many customes, is ei∣ther ignorance or simplicitie. His words are; consuetudo initium ab aliquâ ignoran∣tiâ vel simplicitate sortita, in usum per suc∣cessionem

corroboratur, de virgin. vel. c. i. Hee might have added (which is added by others:) another ground of many Lawes and customes, which is, wilfull in∣justice, and want of a good conscience, the rarest thing of the world, though no∣thing bee more commonly pretended. It doth therefore much concerne every par∣ticular man, (them especially that take upon them to bee men of judgement and understanding:) as not to controle the received Lawes and customes of their countries, the alteration whereof belon∣geth not unto them: So to understand as neere as they may, what Lawes and cu∣stomes are absolutely good and warranta¦ble in themselves; and which are tole∣rated and maintained onely for the peace and concord of the Commonwealth. Here therefore is a maine difference to be made, betweene those things that the Law doth command, and doth oblige us unto; and those things, which if wee doe, the Law doth allow, but not com∣mand: betweene those things that wee

doe as good subjects unto the King and his Lawes; and those that wee doe of our owne inclination, taking the advan∣tage of the Law. What Christ once said unto his Disciples, If your righteousnesse exceed not the righteousnes of the Scribes and Pharises, (the strictest men for their old lawes and customes that ever were:) you shall never enter into the Kingdome of Hea∣ven; is in this sense applyable unto all men; Such a Legall life, will never bring them unto Heaven. Therefore the Ca∣nonists teach us that consuetudo may libe∣rare à paenis civilibus indeed; but cannot, à paenis gehennae; if in itselfe it bee un∣conscionable and unreasonable. And they are not the Canonists onely, that teach us this doctrine, but even our owne Lawyers, that have taken the greatest paines to uphold the credit, and main∣taine the Iustice of our Lawes. Many un∣learned persons (saith one of them:) be∣leeve that it is lawfull for them to doe with good conscience all things, which if they doe

them, they shall not bee punished therefore by the Law, though the Law doth not warrant them, &c. and so goes on, setting downe for example some particular cases, of those things which a conscionable Chri∣stian is bound unto, to save his soule though hee cannot be compelled unto it by the Law, D^r. and Stud. lib. 1. c. 19. And in such cases (saith the same Author in another place:) he is in conscience as well bound if he will save his soule; as hee were, if hee were compelled thereto by the Law, &c. If there bee not then besides the Law of the Land, a law of reason and conscience to regulat our actions by, we are certainely but in bad case, in point of eternall salvation.

HAving treated hitherto (in this se∣cond part:) of the Varietie, first; then of the power and validitie of cu∣stome in things civill; it will not be im∣proper that I adde somewhat of words also, and of the power that custome hath

in matter of words and speeches. For though many men for want of know∣ledge and experience, thinke that words are but wind, and therefore account no subject that is about words, to bee very materiall, or worthy the studie of a seri∣ous man; yet wiser men know full well that in very truth, there is nothing that setteth men on worke so much, or cau∣seth so much stirre in the World, as words, meere words doe, and have alwayes done; that words have beene the occasion of ma∣ny warres, by which many great Cities and Countries have beene overthrowne; that words have caused bloudy strifes and persecutions even in the Church; not words onely as they were intended, and should have beene understood, but even mistaken through ignorance. It was once said of some ancient Philosophers, Sentit idem Aristo, quod Xenocrates, quod Aristo∣teles; loquitur alio modo, ex hac autem non rerum, sed verborum discordiâ, controver∣sia nata est, &c. A happy thing it were for the World, that words were well un∣derstood

every where; and all 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, all strifes and conten∣tions about words quite taken away. But that will not bee as long as the World in∣dures; it is in vaine to wish it; though not to wish it, be the part of either an ig∣norant, or uncharitable man. But I have nothing to doe with words here, but as custome, my present subject, hath to doe with them: to wit, to shew the power of cu∣stome upon words, and some remarkable effects of this power.

A. Gellius saith well in a place, consue∣tudo omnium rerum domina, sed maximè verborum; and Quintillian yet more fully, that consuetudo est certissima loquendi ma∣gistra, utendum{que} plane sermone, ut numo cui publica forma est: and againe, Ridiculum malle sermonem quo locuti sunt homines, quam quo loquuntur, & sane quid est aliud vetus sermo, quàm vetus loquendi consuetu∣do? So Horace, and divers others, who all agree in this, that vvords and all right speaking goes by custome▪ and whereas in other things custome (as hath beene

shewed:) is an usurper upon right, here her soveraigntie is acknowledged to bee naturall; right and custome in matter of words and language, being in the judge∣ment, of wisest men, but one thing for the most part. Now therefore to speake of it somewhat more distinctly.

First, custome makes vvords, that were but sounds before, to bee vvords, that is, to signifie somewhat. As for example it makes the sound, that those three letters, G. o. and d. being put together, doe make, to signifie unto us of this nation, the Lord and maker of all things. For of itselfe vvhy these three letters should re∣present such a thing, there is no ground in nature; but custome. It is true, the Stoicks of old were of another opinion, and it became a great controversie among Phi∣losophers, vvhether vvords vvere 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by nature: or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by imposition at plea∣sure. Origin, in few vvords, states the question thus; Aristoteles sentit positu nomina, Stoici putant Naturâ esse indita, imitantibus primis editis vocibus res ipsas

ad quas & nomina imposita sint: qua rati∣one & Etymologias inducunt. And A. Gel∣lius to the same purpose, Nomina verba{que} non posita fortuito, sed quadam vi & ratio∣ne naturae facta esse. P. Nigidius in Gram∣maticis Commentariis docet, rem sane in Philosophiae dissertationibus celebrem. Que∣ri enim solitum apud philosophos 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sint, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. Saint Augustine handles it at large in his de Dialectica, to whom and to Gellius I referre them that would know more of it. Hereupon the Stoicks did earnestly bestirre themselves to find out and penetrat into the Etymo∣logie of every word, and to shevv the reason of it in nature; but to speake truth, their labour tended rather to make sport unto the idle, then to give satisfaction unto the soberly curious. Yet the Stoicks were tolerable in comparison of some both of old and of late too, who have proceeded further, laying this for their foundation, that vvords and syllables are of great power and efficacie, and have (some say:) I know not what affinitie

and hidden correspondence with starres and planets. Hereupon some by a cer∣taine art which they call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, undertake in the name of e∣very man, to read his fortune, and to foretell great matters. I could not but mention such, comming so in my way; but I will no more then mention them, their opinions being so apparantly ab∣surd. But vvhy then doth Aristotle, vvho determines it so peremptorily, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that no words are by na∣ture, in many places stand upon vvords so much himselfe, and examine their Ety∣mologies so carefully? To this I say, that though generally vvords goe by custome, yet sometimes they may bee said to bee from nature, or naturall in some sense, that is, set of purpose to set out unto us the nature of such and such a thing. There be many vvords of that nature, it cannot be denyed; in some languages more then others; but in all, some; and in this case, to understand the right Etymologie of a vvord, conduces much to the understan∣ding

of the thing itselfe. Of the nature of it I meane; but not to foretell, or foresee by it any thing future; not more then can bee knowne by the naturall knowledge of the thing itselfe. Some vvords againe may bee called naturall, because they doe when they are uttered and pronounced imitate the nature of the thing itselfe, which they signifie. So for example when wee say in Latin, aeris tinnitum, e∣quorum hinnitum, ovium balatum, tubarum clangorem, stridorem catenarum, Perspi∣cis, saith Saint Augustine, haec verba ita sonare, ut res quae his verbis significantur. So most of them that they call voces ani∣malium propriae; for the most part, both in Greeke and Latin are naturall. Againe, custome doth make some words naturall, in that it gives unto them the power and efficacie of things that are naturall, to produce some naturall effects. Such are those words and sounds, whereby dumme creatures are governed; which though of themselves they be but invalid words and sounds, yet 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (as Plutarch of them in a place:) through custome and skilfull education, become so powerfull, that what can bee done upon dum creatures with blowes, or whips, or any other kind of violence, may bee done with them; and some∣times more. So a man may use himselfe to tremble, or weepe, or laugh, and the like, at certaine words and sounds, which in time shall have that power over his body, that it shall not be in the power of his will to forbeare. Even as the sight of whips and scourges (as wee read in an∣cient stories:) hath beene more power∣full upon slaves in warres, then the sight of more dreadfull and mortall weapons, because the smart of those which they of∣ten felt, as slaves, made them in time to abhorre naturally and irresistibly the ve∣ry sight of them; so words also; Long use and custome may turne them into charmes, to make them operative upon nature, though of themselves they have no naturall power at all. All these things granted (whereof to discourse at large, is

not my present purpose:) it holds still neverthelesse, as we affirmed at first, that generally and for the most part, words are words, that is, are significant by cu∣stome.

Secondly, all difference of words and phrases in point of elegancie, or barbaris∣me, is altogether from custome. Hence it is, that those expressions which in some language are most proper and elegant, in another are most ridiculous and barba∣rous, neither is there any reason at all for the most in nature, either for the one, or for the other, but that use and custome hath so determined it, whose will and pleasure stands for reason in these cases. It is true, that Grammarians have taken great paines to reduce ordinarie words and speeches to some certaintie of analo∣gie, without which Grammar is no Art, and somewhat it is that they have done in this kind for the easier teaching and learning of languages. Yet doth custome herein maintaine the power of her sove∣raigntie upon words and speeches, in

that when shee pleases, she breakes the rules, and strictest bonds of best approo∣ved Analogie, and suffers no rule of Grammar to passe without an exception. All matter of elegancie then or babarisme being but a matter of custome, as it is no wonder to see silly people for want of knowledge, either to vvonder, or to scoffe at the expressions of other languages, vvhen they heare strangers speake the vvords of the Countrey perchance, but use their owne phrases and expressions; So I cannot but wonder that in all ages men that have beene most ambitious to be thought learned, have stood so much upon elegancie, as I find they have done. The ancient Heathens, Philosophers, and others, did object, many things, I know, against the Gospel of Christ; but I doe not find that any thing generally did in very truth make them so averse from it, as the language; most of the New Testa∣ment being vvritten in Greeke words in∣deed, some few excepted; but for the most part, in phrases and expressions that

are meerely Hebrew; and the Latin Translation being a mixture of both, both of Hebrew and Greeke phrases, rather then Latin, that was Latin truely, ac∣cording to the custome of those times. So hard a thing it vvas for them, that had beene used to Plato and Aristotle, and the like, to relish such a style; much lesse to re∣verence it. A style nevertheles, vvhich they would have thought elegant enough, had they beene used to it; as on the other side, that of Plato or Aristotle but course and barbarous, had not the power of custome interposed, and disposed their eares and palates to it. A late writer of Essayes treating of the power of custome; after many strange instances, brings this, as I remember, among others, as one of the strangest; That some certaine people of the World, should bee governed by Lavves that are written in a strange un∣knowne tongue. Certainly if the use of a strange tongue in one Countrey in point of Law (vvhich would not be much bet∣ter understood, though it were in the vul∣gar

tongue:) bee a thing so much to bee admired; I thinke he might have found somewhat that is done in a strange tongue in many Countreys against all grounds of sense or reason, much more to bee wondred at. But whereas some o∣thers, to increase the wonder, deride and defame the said tongue as barbarous, they rather make themselves an instance of the power of custome, that makes them thinke so strange, and speake so scornefully of a tongue once thought very sweet and ele∣gant, by them that were used unto it; then perswade us to wonder at others, that make no wonder of it.

Thirdly, custome advanceth or abaseth words at pleasure, making them that once were vile to become honorable; and those that were honorable to become vile; yea vvords of title, to become words of reproach; and words of reproach to become words of title. What once knave, and ballad were in old English, when David was termed the knave of the Lord; and the song of songs, called the ballad of

ballads; is yet too fresh, to be forgotten. Notarius was once a Title for a Secretarie of State, when Secretaries of State, were at the highest; and then Cancellarius was an obscure name, and of little respect. Now it is quite contrary, and hee would bee thought (and reason he should, since custome hath otherwise commanded it:) to commit a monstrous soloecisme that should now use those Latine words, as they were used when Latin was in use. I doe not know any thing to the contrarie, but that men were as scrupulous to tell a lye in former ages as they are now; nay for some reasons I should thinke more. As first, because the art of equivocation was not then knowne, much lesse the praises of it; and againe, because as Tullie hath taught mee, the ancient Romans were so cautelous in their solemne attestations, as that, were they never so certaine of a thing, yet they avoyded as much as they could, religionis & pudoris causa, vvords of peremptorie and confident asseverati∣on; rather using (which hee cals verbum

consideratissimum:) the vvord, arbitror. Yet a man might have told another men∣tiris, that hee did lye, (of the Latin word I find it observed by others; and of the He∣brew, wee have examples of it in Scrip∣ture, as ii. Reg. iv.16.) without any great either offence, or breach of civilitie; which now to give, though but to ano∣ther bee he never so vile, in the presence of a man of fashion, is greatest incivili∣tie. But of all things in this kind, I most vvonder at that some tell us of the vvord Bastard, which they say was once rather a Title of Honor, among great ones; then a note of infamie. Soe Pontus Honterus: Postremò, saith he, quam longē abfuerit nostrorum nasutulorum opinio, ab ejus tem∣poris nobilium sententia, vel ex eo apparet, quod nothi Burgundi è Philippo Bono nati, omissis Ducum, Comitum, Marchio∣num, Baronum{que} titulis, aliis omnibus praetu∣lerint BASTARDI nomen, scribentes in armorū Gentilitiis scutis publicè ac privatim hoc tantum modo, Corn. Ant. Phil. Bald. Da∣vid, &c. Burgundiae BASTARDVS. Ex 〈2 pages missing〉〈2 pages missing〉

to supreme powers, whether Civill or Ecclesiasticall. Caeremoniae Deorum, san∣ctitas Regum, saith Iulius Caesar in Sueto∣nius; that as religious worship is proper unto the Gods, so unto Kings to be styled and accounted sacred. But numen and al∣taria, and the like, I wonder how Chri∣stian eares could away with; yet allowed (time was:) even to Christian Empe∣rors, and used by them speaking of them∣selves; (as for example in the Code, no∣stris altaribus suggestio offertur, and, de no∣stris altaribus petunt, &c.) which is not likely their Christian eares would have borne, had not the power of custome hardned them unto it. Hee is not a civill man now of late yeares among us, that thinkes much to subscribe himselfe ser∣vant, though it be unto his equall, or in∣ferior. Yet Sulpitius Severus was once soundly chid by Paulinus the Bishop of Nola, for subscribing (or rather proscri∣bing, as the custome was then:) himselfe his servant, in a letter of his. But you shall heare himselfe speake, if you please,

and what hee thought of it: In Epistolae titulo, imitari praestantem in omnibus mihi fraternitatem tuam timui; quia tutius cre∣didi verè scribere. Cave ergo posthac Ser∣vus Christi in libertatem vocatus, hominis, & fratris, & conservi inferioris servum te sub∣scribere: quia peccatum adulationis est ma∣gis, quàm humilitatis justificatio, honorem uni Domino, uni magistro super terram, uni Deo debitum, homini cuilibet, ne dicam mise∣rimo peccatori, deferre. His words are somewhat ambiguous, whether hee meanes uni Domino, uni Magistro, and uni Deo, all of one; or rather (as I rather be∣leeve:) partitively, allowing us the use of this word, to those that are truely our Lords and masters upon earth. But what∣ever his meaning was, it is certaine that the vvord is extreamely abused now a∣dayes; and most abused by them that know least, and care as little to learne what belongs unto true humilitie, and wherein it doth consist. Now in this and the like cases, it were happy if in all pla∣ces (if all places afford such:) some of

the wiser and graver sort of men, would agree by their joynt constancie and gravi∣ty to resist both in matter of fashions that belong unto cloaths, and in those that be∣long unto vvords, the vanitie, ficklenesse, foolishnesse of ordinarie worldly men, vvho have nothing to busie their idle braines with, but to invent and follow new fashions. Then vvere it an easie thing for any sober man to maintaine and embrace consensum prudentum (as wise men prescribe in other things) the consent of some (though fewer in num∣ber:) that are wise; then vulgarem consu∣etudinem, the custome of the common peo∣ple (ordinary wordlings I meane:) which commonly likes that best, which is worst. And certainely they should bee much to blame in my judgement that vvould not doe it. But when a custome in this kind (though vaine, yet not absolute∣ly impious:) is become so generall that a man cannot avoyd it, except he will be singular; a man I thinke may safely e∣nough (in these things which of their na∣ture

are indifferent:) condescend unto it to avoyd singularitie; which alwayes re∣lishes of some vvant of charitie, and is of∣tentimes the effects of a worse disease, pride and selfe-conceit. And so much be spoken concerning vvords.

AS God both in regard of his will, and in regard of his Nature, is ab∣solutely immutable, in a transcen∣dent kind of immutabilitie, beyond all comparison; nay beyond all imagination of man; which Saint Iames to expresse in some sort, after hee had said that there is no variablenesse with God; not content with that, addes elegantly, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or shadow of turning:) So it stands with reason, that both the worship of God, and the opinions of men touching God, should be as invariable; at lest more invariable, then any other thing, the ob∣ject whereof is worldly and mutable.

Custome a man would thinke of all things in the world should have lesse to doe with things of this nature. But it is quite otherwise. For in very truth of all things in the World, there is nothing ge∣nerally that goes by custome so much as religion doth, both in point of practice, and in point of opinions. So that there is nothing so horrible of itselfe, or so ridi∣culous in the judgement of reason and common sense in point of opinions, which long custome (if men bee not very warie of it, and with best care and dili∣gence use those meanes to prevent it, that sound reason and true philosophie doe prescribe:) will not make most plausible and acceptable: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, custome having once got the strength of long continuance, insinuates er∣rors and impostures (bee they never so grosse:) into the minds of most men under the shape and representation of genuine truth: So Iustin Martyr; who fetcheth hence especially the origine of Idolatrie.

And Origin addes that of all Customes, none sticke so fast in the mind when once settled there, none so hard to bee wiped and washed off, as those which he elegantly cals 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is, the customes of opinion and doctrine, bee they right or wrong. To this wee may adde the observation of Nicetas the Greeke Historian, from domesticke ex∣perience, who having particularly instan∣ced, in the ancient Christian inhabitants of the Pousgusian poole, then halfe Tur∣kish in their rites and customes, concludes upon it generally, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Long cu∣stome hath more power then either nature or religion. Hence it is perchance that the Hebrew 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 properly, which often signifies custome, is also taken sometimes for religion or doctrine.

Now the reason why custome can doe more in point of religion, then it can in other things, is first, because the object of religion, is of all others the furthest off both from the senses, and from the reach

of humane reason; which makes men the more apt, in things so abstruse and so far exceeding the strength of humane ratioci∣nation, to content themselves with what they have received from their forefathers, presuming that they had it by some reve∣lation, or other from above. This made Aristotle, who did not love to speake of things, but upon demonstrable grounds of reason and nature, not to meddle much in all his writings, with things di∣vine; concerning either God or religion; as hee himselfe gives the reason of it, in his de part▪ animalium, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. profes∣sing there that hee preferred the know∣ledge of things divine, farre beyond any other knowledge; but could say but lit∣tle of it nevertheles for want of certaine grounds. Plato, hee was altogether for Divinitie, it is true; the immortalitie of the soule, and the rewards of a godly life in the world to come, and the like, being his chiefest subject in almost all his Trea∣tises:

for which, as hee was much admi∣red by the ancient Fathers of the Church, so in all ages hee hath beene knowne by the Title of Divine Plato. Yet Plato himselfe doth ingenuously acknowledge the imperfection of his knowledge in this kind as both deficient and uncer∣taine. Witnesse this divine passage of his, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. In another place hee saith plainely, that without 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, some divine reve∣lation from above, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to know the certaintie of these things in this world, is either absolutely impossible, or extreamely difficult. If therefore Pla∣to himselfe, coeteris philosophis gentium longè late{que} praelatus, saith Saint Augu∣stine; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that admirable Philosopher (saith Eusebius:) who of all Heathen Philosophers and writers, was the onely, that reached unto the very porch of Truths Sacrarie: if he ne∣vertheles, was so much to seeke him∣selfe, and so unsatisfyed; no wonder if

ordinarie men, unto whon the day starre of heavenly truth was not, or is not yet arisen, have thought it their safest course in all ages, in point of religion especial∣ly, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, (as Athe∣nagoras the Christian Philosopher speakes and shewes in the beginning of his Apo∣logie;) to keepe them closely to the rites and customes of their forefathers, bee they never so ridiculous and absurd.

Another reason why custome is so powerfull in matters of Religion, is be∣cause men for the most part, every where are for the things of this present World, as profit, or pleasure, or the like; as for those things that belong unto their soules, they thinke of them as matters of another world indeed; that is, as matters that doe not much concerne them, and for which they see no reason why they should overmuch trouble their thoughts. It is true, that faction and violent opposi∣tion are taken for zeale in most places; and those men thought vulgarly very re∣ligious, that hate them most fiercely, that

are not of their opinions; of which kind of men there is store enough in all places, and of all professions. But religion, or faith well grounded (and if it be not well grounded, how we can be ready to give an account of it unto others, as Saint Pe∣ter would have us, I know not:) is quite another thing. Wee speake not here of illiterate men or women, whose capaci∣tie (for no man is accountable for more then hee hath received, so hee make good use of it to his utmost:) doth not reach to such either preparation or examination, as both the Scriptures and right reason doe require, to proceed rationally and with judgement in such a businesse. It is to bee feared that of them that want not judgement and capacitie in other things of the world which they take more to heart, there are but few to bee found in no place, that make that use of either (all prejudice and partialitie being layd aside:) that were fitting in matter of religion. And so it comes to passe that eve∣ry where and generally, though few be∣leeve

it, or suspect it, yet in very truth, the beleefe of most men if it bee well looked into, is rather custome, then any thing else.

But to the end that the power of cu∣stome in matter of Religion, may the bet∣ter appeare unto them that are none of the most quicksighted of themselves, nor disposed to take any great paines by the helpe of long tedious philosophicall spe∣culations to penetrate into the truth of things, wee will here take into our con∣sideration some one of the many religi∣ons that have beene in great use and re∣quest among men in former dayes: and of all the rest, wee will make choice of that purposely, which in the judgement of all men that were not bred and obliged unto it, hath ever beene accounted the most ridiculous, unnaturall and prodi∣gious. I will not therefore here speake of them that have worshipped the Sunne and the Moone, and the starres, &c. the most glorious objects that sensuall wor∣shippers could pitch upon; and which

some ancients grounding upon a wrong interpretation of the words of Moses, Deut. 4.19. seeme to bee of opinion that it was in some manner permitted to the Nations of the world to doe, till the comming of Christ. Nor yet of them, that have worshipped stocks and stones, the worke of their owne hands, whose plausible pretence for their grosse idola∣trie hath beene in all ages, that they wor∣shipped not the figures themselves in sight, but the invisible Deities represen∣ted unto them by those figures. Those that I will instance in shall be they, whose religion was to worship those things, which reason and nature in the judge∣ment of all other nations hath made unto man either contemptible or abominable; the ancient Aegyptians I meane, whose greatest Deities by them adored with all possible reverence, were dogges, and cats; toades and crocodiles, and the like. Of whom among others the Latin Satyrist vvorthily,

Quis nescit Volusi Bithinica qualia demens Aegyptus portenta colat? croco∣dilon adorat Pars haec: illa pavet staturam ser∣pentibus ibim Effigies sacri nitet aurea cerco∣pitheci, &c.

How they came first to resolve upon such horrible worship, they that have most curiously searched into it, as Diod. Siculus, and others, could never, though they purposely conferred with the most learned Aegyptians of those dayes, find out certainely. It is most likely, that they were at first compelled unto it by their princes and governours for some politick ends and considerations. But in after ages, when this worship, how strange and uncouth soever at first, was once be∣come customarie and hereditary unto them, with what approbation of judge∣ment and affection of heart (to the ready forsaking of their goods, lives, and liber∣ties

for it:) they then did embrace and practise it, ancient histories, such as can∣not by any sober man bee questioned, beare record unto this day. I will not bring here what we read in some of them, because it may be questioned with more colour, of great advantages in wars wittingly and willingly forgone by the Aegyptians by reason of their superstiti∣on; yea how they have chosen rather to yeeld themselves unto their enemies, when they might have had the best of it, then to violate though but the bare signes and pictures of those beasts which were sacred unto them. But the testimo∣nie of Diod. Siculus, (whose words a∣mong others, are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. This superstition of theirs cleaveth so fast unto their soules (or, is so penetratively infused into their ve∣ry soules:) and so immoovably bent and affe∣cted are they every one of them to the worship of these creatures, &c.) and those instan∣ces

that hee brings, whereof he was an eye witnesse, of their zeale to their reli∣gion, no man can question with any co∣lour of reason. And Tullie speakes of it, as of a thing known to all the World, and whereof examples were obvious in his dayes; Aegyptiorum morem (saith he, and marke by the way, that hee cals it morem; by which word he closely adscribes it un∣to custome:) quis ignorat? quorum imbutae mentes pravitatis erroribus, quamvis carni∣ficinam priùs subierint, quàm ibim aut aspi∣dem, aut felem, aut canem, aut crocodilum violent; quorum etiam si imprudentes quip∣piam fecerint, paenam nullam recusent. Such was their zeale to their religion, against nature, reason, and common sense, groun∣ded upon custome onely: whereby it may appeare, that bare zeale, without due observation of other circumstances, is but a weake and uncertaine triall of the Truth.

Now to instance (as I have former∣ly:) in some things of our dayes like∣wise, and in our owne practise; it will

bee hard for me to find an instance that will be generally thought so pertinent, because though the matter bee of itselfe never so strange, yet custome having made it familiar, it will not seeme strange unto ordinary men, whose understanding, though they know it not, is blinded by it; the more dangerously blinded, the lesse they suspect it to be so. But to them that are yet free, or at least will hereafter use the meanes to vindicat themselves into the libertie of a sound judgement accor∣ding to truth and reason: to them I dare boldly say, that it is not more strange (not more strange; I say no more:) ei∣ther that some people of the World should worship no God at all; or that some should with those ancient Aegypti∣ans, whom we have spoken of, worship dogs and cats for their Gods; then that Christians, contrarie, not onely to rea∣son and even common sense it selfe, but also to the direct example of Christ, the founder of their religion, should behave themselves so prophanely in their Chur∣ches

erected to the honour of their God; and make so little reckoning of them, as they doe in many places of Europe; and not onely doe it, but in some places (which is strangest of all:) thinke them∣selves the purer and sounder Christians, that they doe so. Were it but for the sake of Iewes and Gentiles, who cannot but abhorre that Religion, that allowes of such profanesse in and about places de∣dicated to the worship of God; were there no more in it then so; Yet it is ap∣parantly against the lawes of true Chri∣stianitie (which of all others, are most se∣vere against all wilfull scandals:) that such irreverence should be allowed. I am the bolder to say, that it is against true Christianitie, because I know it was not so, when true Christianitie did most flourish. And truely, he that should have seene in the times of the primitive Church devout Christians not daring so much as to touch a Bible without first washing of their hands in token of reve∣rence; and in their Churches in great hu∣militie

stooping sometimes to the very ground, (whence as I take it, are those 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, salutations, or kissings of the holy pavements, mentioned in the Ius Orientale:) yea directly, ter∣ramfronte concutientes, as Saint Augustine speakes in a place; or as Saint Chrysostome, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, prostrating themselves quite downe, and beating the ground with their foreheads, (which though it were not absolutely re∣quired of any, but such as were either to bee baptized, or did solemne penance; whence 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 for prostratio, as Billius hath long agoe taught us: yet was volun∣tarily performed by them of the devouter sort, as appeares by Saint Chrysostome, tom. vi. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. who cals them there 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that did it, in oppo∣sition to cold careles worshippers:) and the like: And should now see holy Bibles prophanely tossed up and downe as they are; ordinarie men entring into Churches, with such gesture and countenance, ra∣ther as if they entred with authoritie to

dispossesse God, then to humble them∣selves before him; and in time of divine service carrying themselves in them ac∣cordingly; moreover, divers making no conscience to doe that about and against consecrated walls of Churches, which common civilitie doth prompt us to for∣beare about private houses, those of our betters at lest; certainely he would hard∣ly be brought to beleeve that things so contrary could proceed from men of the same Religion; or rather indeed, to be∣leeve; that men that had any sense of any religion at all, be it what it will, could be so securely and senselesly prophane. How∣ever, though it bee not unlikely in this atheisticall age, that many doe it because they have said in their hearts that there is no God; and in this sacrilegious age of pur∣pose, because it concernes their profit and ungodly designes, that consecrated places bee made common, and profaned; Yet God forbid wee should judge so unchari∣tably of all that offend in this kind; but rather judge and beleeve, that it is no∣thing

else but the power of custome, and the want of due consideration, that leads them into it, and makes them insensible of their impietie. One thing I am sure of, what ever wee thinke of the busines, that Turkes and Pagans (what advantages so∣ever wee have over them in other re∣spects:) may sooner hope to bring us in time to their religion, by their outward apparant reverence and devotion in du∣ties of religion; then we hope ever by all our knowledge to doe good upon them, as long as wee continue so prophane. I presse it the more, that the power of custome, which makes us so unsensibly (though otherwise, I make no question, many of us affectionately desiring the conversion of Iewes and Gentiles:) to passe over all these considerations, and to doe still what we have done, bee it right or wrong, may the better appeare.

So much being spoken hitherto of the power of custome in matters of religion, and having sufficiently (as I conceive)

shewed it here also to bee great; wee are now (according to the method that wee have followed in the two former parts:) to proceed to the consideration of the va∣liditie of it, according to right and rea∣son; and that both in point of doctrine, and in point of practise; that is, in the a∣gendis and the credendis (for there is no Re∣ligion but hath these two parts:) of Reli∣gion. And herein as of my selfe I am ve∣ry willing to be but short; so when I con∣sider the things themselves, I doe not see that I shall need to be very long. For Re∣ligion, though it goe beyond Nature and policie very farre, yet it is grounded in part upon the same foundations, as both Nature and policie are. As for example; particulars in things naturall, must yeeld and conforme to the generall if need bee, though it be against their owne particular nature. So water to prevent a vacuum; and the like. A maine ground of policie, Salus populi suprema lex esto. So in matter of Christianitie too: as it is, fully both

and very elegantly, expressed by Saint Chrysostome in these words, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. This is the rule of perfect Christianitie, this the utmost bounds, (or, exact definition:) this the highest top of it, to seeke those things that are profitable to the publicke. Many things therefore for∣merly delivered, are here applyable. But yet to expresse my selfe somewhat more particularly herein also, we thus briefly;

First, In those things that are of the very substance of religion, and trench up∣on the principall end of it, whether in matter of practise or doctrine, custome is not considerable.

The end, as all men know that are wise, is the principall thing in all things. And to this purpose is Aristotles doctrine in the first of his Ethicks of difference of ends, some principall and absolute (which in his phrase wee may call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉:) some secondarie and sub∣ordinat,

of very good use and moment. In the holy Scriptures, though a man meete with many changes, varieties, and alterations, according to varietie of times and places; yet hee that shall read and observe them with due care and dili∣gence, may observe the great things of the Law, as one of the Prophets cals them; or as it is in the New Testament, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the weightier matters of the Law, to be still the same. These to un∣derstand truely, and carefully to practise, is true Religion both and happines.

Secondly, In things externall condu∣cing more or lesse (so they conduce, though but in a lesse degree; and not crosse directly:) to the maine end, supe∣riors may yeeld, sometimes if they see occasion; and inferiors if wise and ra∣tionall, must alwayes submit unto cu∣stome; though otherwise of it selfe, per∣chance, not so fit and commendable.

Superiors cannot propose unto them∣selves a better example to imitate, then God himselfe. God did indulge many

things unto the Iewes, which otherwise hee would not have liked, because they had beene long used to the superstitions of the Aegyptians. So say divers of the Fathers; and rightly, I thinke: and this in God, they call properly, his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or condescention. Of Christ and his Apostles something might bee said, and hath beene said by others to this purpose. But certaine it is, that the ancient Fathers of the Primitive Church, men Apostoli∣call, and others (as it is acknowledged by all men that know any thing of Anti∣quitie:) in instituting rites and ceremo∣nies Ecclesiasticall, had great respect un∣to those rites and customes, whether sacred or Civill, that the first Christians had beene used unto, before their conversion unto Christianisme. Now if this course bee warrantable; where the change is ab∣solute from one Religion to another; it must needs bee more plausible and expe∣dient in point of reformation; wherein the more we yeeld unto custome in things not so substantiall, the more likely wee

are to speed in the redresse of more mate∣riall abuses. As for inferiors, to them properly belong the words of Saint Au∣gustine, In iis rebus de quibus nihil statuit scriptura divina, mos populi Dei, vel insti∣tuta majorum pro lege tenenda sunt. In those things that are not apparantly con∣trary to the word of God, for private men, though otherwise upon grounds never so plausible to oppose their opini∣on to either custome or authoritie, where∣by the peace of the Church may bee in danger; though it may goe for zeale in this World, yet certainely in the world to come, and before an higher Iudge, it will be found (and for such punished, I feare) either grosse wilfull Ignorance, or ex∣treme arrogancie.

Thirdly, In matters of doctrine and truth, though every truth bee precious of itselfe, and ever to be preferred before any privat ends, yet all truth is not alwayes seasonable to be divulged, where the er∣ror is generall, and cannot bee opposed without much scandall.

As there be customes in matter of acti∣on, so in matter of opinion too; since (as hath beene shewed:) opinions goe by custome, as much as any thing: Whence it is that in the Ius Orientale, you shall find 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or, customes divided into 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is customes in point of doctrine, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, customes in point of discipline, or practice; that is, rites and ceremonies. In matter of opinion then the power of custome is in some degree consi∣derable, as well as in other things. Civili∣ans tell us, that Error aliquando jus facit; and our common Lawyers also; that a Common error by their Law, for publicke quiets sake goeth for a Law. Finch of Law, p. 40. I will not stand to examine upon what ground they speake it; because I doe not meane to ground upon them; though I could not but take notice of their words by the way. Nolite sanctum canibus; and, keepe thy faith to thy selfe, (not generally to be understood, wee doe not meane, but in some cases onely:) and some other such passages, are more to our

purpose by farre, then any thing that the Law either common or Civill can tell us. But the argument is ticklish. I leave the rest to the Angelicall Doctor in his 22^ae. q. 43. a. 7. Vtrum bona spiritualia sint propter scandalum dimittenda. So farre at least, I could wish al men would take it to heart, as not easily for their owne onely privat ends and purposes (as many are ready to doe:) to vent abroad either old things justly and legally antiquated; or new things of their owne devising (the un∣happy fruits of extravagant braines:) that may any wise tend to innovation, and to the prejudice of publicke tranquility.

My conclusion is this, That it is the part of a wise rationall man, as to consider diligently how farre forth custome both in matter of Religion and in other things is considerable, lest hee trouble himselfe and others without cause: So to consider as diligently wherein it is altogether a∣gainst reason, lest conforming to the vul∣gar in those things, hee himselfe become one of them; that is, a man that is led by

custome and not by reason; which is as much (if we may speake freely:) as if we said, a thing that hath the shape of a man, but may more truly & properly be called abrute. And because this cannot be done without much labour and search, I must exhort all men that thinke truth and rea∣son so much worth, to spare no paines, no studie, if they meane to speed. It is true, we live in an age, when Idlenesse is so much in fashion among all sorts of men, that it is a hard thing for any man of what profession soever, to bee indu∣strious more then ordinary, and not to suffer, even in his reputation, for it. Which cannot but bee a great discouragement unto many, who otherwise as rationall men, have a good mind to improove themselves in their better part. But let them propose unto themselves the exam∣ples of men famous in former ages for their indefatigablenes in this kind; and let them consider withall, that the reward is great. Though they adspire not to bee famous in the World, nor ever live to be∣nefit

others by their paines (which ne∣vertheles all good men must propose un∣to themselves, if it may be:) yet they shall not loose the fruit of their labours. If o∣thers doe not, yet themselves (which is the maine:) shall reape them. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for it is the priviledge (as is observed by some of the ancient worthies:) of a soule that is reasonable, (a rationall man, he meanes;) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉:) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: that whereas plants, trees, and other creatures, that are not reasonable, beare unto others, and not for themselves, shee reapes her owne fruites; and whensoever, or wheresoever her life doth end, be it sooner, or later, she may have her owne end never∣thelesse. With which words, wee shall here end.

FINIS.