Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.

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Title
Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.
Author
Wallis, John, 1616-1703.
Publication
London :: Printed by Richard Bishop, for Samuel Gellibrand at the Signe of the Brazen Serpent in Pauls Church-yard,
1643.
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Subject terms
Brooke, Robert Greville, -- Baron, 1607-1643. -- Nature of truth.
Truth -- Early works to 1800.
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"Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A97067.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 28, 2024.

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CHAP. XI. Whether Time and Place be onely Imaginary.

IN the next Chapter, we are called to consider of the nature of Time and Place: which his Lordship occasionally falls upon, by reason of an Obiection, That lays so strong a siege to his Opinion, that I doubt hi Lordships Answer will hardly raise it. It ariseth from hence;

There ae in the Soule various Operations and Workings, distinct in Time, and distinct in Place: which Distinction, though it may have an externall denomination in respect of Time and Place; yet ariseth not from thence, but is Internall or Intrinsecall to the Operations them∣seves; This Operation is not the Other, and the Other is not This. And thi distinction would remain though the distinct Operations were performed in the same Time, in the same Place: Casr and Pompey were not the same man, though Contemporary. The Water which to day runs down a River, is not the same water with that which yesterdy ran in the same Place, the same Channell. Two Angels, though coexistent at th sme Time in the same Place▪ the same part of the Ayr, are not yet the same Angel. Thus Nutrition, and Volition, or Intellection, though at the same Time, performed by the same Soule resident i the same Body, are yet distinct Acts. And on the contrary, a man remains the same man to Day, that he was Yesterdy; at This place, that he was t Another place; though both Time and Place be altered.

Now there being in the Soule various Actings, distinct both in Time and Place (though they receive not their distinction from either are there not then so many severall Soules▪ (viz. if the Operations be the Souls Essence?) This is the Objection.

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His Lordship supposing all the Difference between these Acts to a∣rise from Time and Place, thinks that if he prove Time and Place to be Nothing, then these Acts will not be Distinct, but the same,; and so may constitute the same Soule.

But, whether Place and Time be any thing or nothing, whether they alter any thing or nothing in this point; Yet sure we are that This Man is not the Other Man. This Soule not Another Soule, This Action is not the Other Action: And so the difficulty remains as hard; there will be various Operations still.

He brings severall Simile's to illustrate it. Complexion Lineaments, Harmony, though they be in themselves Diverse, yet they make up One pleasing Being, which we call Beauty. A Flame arising from divers Thorns is but One Flame. A Stream supplied from severall Springs, is but One Stream. I may adde, Many Members make up One Body; Many Creatures One World. (Yet still One Member is not the Other; The water received from One Spring, is not the same water which came from the Other Spring, though both runne in the same Channell.)

But will he say, So is it in our case? That (in the same manner) seve∣rall Acts doe constitute One Soule? Are these Actions its Integrall Parts, as the Members are of the Body; and severall Waters of One Stream? &c. Are they a Piece of the Whole and make up the totum Com∣positum? Then is the Soule Divisible; Then doth it lose some part of it selfe, and becomes maimed at the cessation of every Action.

But he makes not the Soule perhaps to be constituted of these Acti∣ons, as so many Integrall Parts; But, saith he, The Soule is One Act, distinguished to our Notton by severall apparitions.

If so, then his Simile's drawn from Integrall Parts constituting the whole Compositum, will not hold.

But (secondly) I deny that all these Operations are but one Action in various Shapes. They are all Actions of the same Soule, but they are not all the same Action. The Soule, If you will may be called, One Soule under Various Shapes; But these Various Shapes cannot be said to be One Shape. Like as Wax fashioned successively in several Moulds, is the same Wax in severall Figures; but that these are all the Same Figure, we can∣not say. Actions performed by the same Soule, are all Modi of the Same Thing, of the same Soule; but they are not all the same Modus. This is not the Other.

And this we may hold, whatever become of Time and Place for this Distinction ariseth not from Them. A man is the same Man to day, that

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he was Yesterday, though the Time be not the same. He is the same Man at York, that he was at London, though the Place be not the same. Time and Place doe neither make the Same to be Two, nor Two to be the Same; One to be Two, nor Two to be One: Yet what hinders but that Things and Actions may have an Intrinsicall Difference one from another.

These various Beings, therfore, not being Differenced by these Circum∣stances of Time and Place, (thugh Different in both,) It is lesse mate∣riall for me to enquire What they are? or Whether they be some thing or nothing? Only I desire to know, wherein the strength of that Argu∣ment consists, which is by us so often urged against Papists and Luthe∣rans, concerning their Transubstantiation, and Consubstantiation; viz. How Christs body can be at the Same Time in Severall Places? For, that i might be successively in all these Places at severall Times, we de∣ny not: Now, if at Severall Times it may be in divers Places; why may it not be so, at the Same Time, if Time and Place be Nothing? Againe, Severall Places at the same Time may contein severall Bodies (v. g Bread, and Christs Body;) now why may not the Same place con••••ine them, if Place be nothing? Why not Together, as well as Successively, if Time be nothing?

All actions, saith he are Nothing if Time be Anything; Because the Time allotted for every Action, be it never so short, may be divided into severall parts, many subdivisions of Time. True. But is there not te same Reason of Actions that is of Time? are not they divisible into as many parts, whereof every parcell answers to a portion of that Time? There is the same reason in every Continuum, be it Magnitude, Distance Time, Place, Duration, Motion, Action, or whatever: They are all equally divisible in semper divisibilia. If it be Actio Instantanea, it is dis∣patched in an Instant, not in Time: If it be Actus Continuus, it is capable of as many divisions as is that Time in which it is performed.

This not being well weighed saith he, hath raised that Question, [How God should see All things?] If in their Existences▪ then they are Coeternall with him: If only in their Causes, then are they not Present. Which difficul∣ty, he supposeth, is dissolved, by making Time to be Nothing, and Al things to be exi••••ent, in their Beings, with God from all Eternity. (Which of how dangerous a consequence it may prove his Lordship is not aware.)

That God befoe the worlds Creation, did co-exist to this Instant; I doe confidently affirm; Yt, that all things present, dd exist before they were produced, I cannot assent; which I doubt not but to recon∣cile,

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(if I were now discussing that question ex professo, and not glan∣cing at it in transitu) allowing notwithstanding to Time and Place, their due reality; not making Temporall and Locall difference to be only Imaginary.

As likewise, How Permanecy in God may consist with Succession in the Creature; and How Acts (of Creation, Preservation, Redemp∣tion, Decree, the Execution of that Decree) may be Eternall, as they prceed from God, though in the Creature recipiantur in Tempore▪ In Place we make no scruple of it, to affirm that anima est tota in toto & tta in qualibet parte, that the Whole Soule may be present to one Point, or part of the Body, without ceasing to be Wholly present to another part; (Or, if possibly in the Soul, and Created Spirituall substances, it may be questioned; yet doubtlesse, in God himselfe, it must needs be granted, that he is Ʋbique Totus:) Now, if it be not repugnant to be coexistent to one Point of Place, without ceasing to coexist to another point though Distant; Why not to one Point of Time, without cea∣sing to be present to another, though Successive?

The next Objection, Concerning the nature of Evill, is of lesse force against his Tenet. For, That Good and Evill may coexist in One entire Act; That there may be some Degrees of Goodnesse in an Action, and yet not that Perfection of Goodnesse, that ought to be; may as well be granted, as That the Twilight hath not [So much] Light, and [So much] positive darknesse, but that it hath not so [Much] Light as the Midday. But yet in the mean time it may be doubted, whether the Nature of Evill be meerly Privative. It is true indeed, The nature of (Moral) Evill is a Non-conformity (or Difformity rather) to Gods Law: But why may not this non-conformity arise ex praesentiâ non debiti, as well as ex ab∣sentiâ debiti, or ex defectu debiti inesse? May not a Line disagree from its measure, by being too Long, as well as by being too Short? The not distinguishing between bonum Metaphysicum, and bonum Morale, may perhaps have caused some errour in this assertion. But I stand not now to decide it: You shall find more of it in the next chapter.

But that which is assumed as a ground of this Assertion, is farre more improbable then the Assertion it selfe. viz. That Contradictions may be simul, semel, & eodem respectu, in the same Subject.

What necessity his Lordship had to embrace this opinion of Anaxa∣goras, Democritus &c. (as he saith,) against Aristotle; I do not discern. Neither can I see, wherein this co-existence of Contradictions doth ap∣peare. For the Presence of an Inferiour Degree, and the Negation of a

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Farther Degree, are no Contradictions, because they are not ad idem. And such a Coexistence Aristotle and his followers will not deny; Else how can they speak of Qualitates Remissae? Nay more, They will grant an Inferiour Degree, to consist, not only with the Negation of a Farther Degree, but even with the Presence of its Contrary; For they deny not but that there may be Contrary qualities in the same Subject in Remissis gradibus, (as Heat and Cold in warm water, though not in gradibus Intensis.

But if Anaxagoras, or any other, will contend, That perfect Con∣tradictions may t and together, That the Presence of an inferiour degree, may stand with the Absence or Negation of the Same degree; It will be in vain to dispute against it. For when I have proved it to be False, they will grant it is so, and affirm withall, That notwithstanding its Falshood, yet may it also be True, because Contradictions are not Incon∣sistent. (Another adversary perhaps would deale more sharply with his Lordship upon this point: I passe it.)

He proceeds to shew by divers similitudes, How the same thing may take divers shapes in our Apprehension; And consequently, that the se∣verall Apparitions of Truth do not forthwith evince the Variety of Truth. All which we deny not, For otherwise we cannot acknowledge that there is any distinctio Rationis; Rationall distinctions being no o∣ther but inadaequati conceptus ejusdem rei. That there is therefore a Ratio∣nall Distinction, we deny not; But that there is Only a Rationall Di∣stinction, and not also a Reall distinction; this is that we deny. Some things we acknowledge to be only Ratione distincta, but Other things we contend to have a Reall distinction. Which must be overthrown be∣fore he can conclude, that all the actions of reason which seem severall, are but on, a fixt intire Ʋnity.

He toucheth lastly, upon Copernicus his Opinion, Which, he saith, hath been confuted these many yeares by the three leading Senses. (And yet his margent saith, that sense is confuted by Him.) For we [See] the circum∣volutions of the Heavens: we [Feel] our selves upon a stable Foundation; We [Heare] not from the Volutations of the Earth such a black Cant as her heavy rowlings would rumble forth.

But (not to dispute the truth of Copernicus his Opinion) I think I may affirm that Neither of these Testimonies of Sense do any way contra∣dict his Assertion. For, first, I deny that we [See] the Revolution of the Heavens. We discern indeed, (and that Truly,) that the Starres at se∣verall times have severall Positions in respect of our Horizon; (and this

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is all:) But whether this diversity of Position arise from the Motion of the One, or the Other, or Both, our Sight determins not; Affirming only That there is such a diverse Positure. 2 Our sense of [Feeling] assures us of thus much, That the Earth is such a Foundation as upon which we rest; and, that we remain in the same Positure in respect of the Earth and the Air circumstant; Which may be as well if all jointly Move together, as if all jointly stand still. A man in a Ship under Hatches up∣on a smooth water, supposeth himselfe to sit fast upon his Seat, (and he doth so;) and he seeth all things about him to remain at the same Di∣stance, in the same Positure, discerning no alteration: Yet this hinders not but that He and They may be joyntly moved Together, without being thrown from off his seat, upon which he may sit as firm as if he were on shore. And 3 for the sense of [Hearing,] I see no reason, why it should be more blamed for not hearing the sound of the Earths Voluta∣tion; then for not hearing the Pythagorian Harmony. If the vast Cele∣stiall Spheres, whose almost every Starre doth farre exceed the Terre∣striall Globe, be whirled about with such a silent motion, as that the quickest Eare cannot discern it; Why may not the Earth, a farrelesser body, passe as quietly, without such a dismall Cant, such an hideous Noise, as his Lordship doth suppose? For Noise doth not arise meerly from Motion; but from the Crossing or Thwarting of severall motions, from the Clashing and Collision of one Body against another, by reason that the One (standing) interrupts the Other in its Motion, or Both mo∣ving according to severall motions do mutually hinder each others pro∣gresse: Whereas, if all moved the same Way, with the same Speed, (as is supposed in the Motion of the Earth, and the things adjoyning) there would be no such Clashing, or Interruption of one another, and (con∣sequently) no Noise.

The Senses Testimony therefore doth not contradict the Opinion of Copernicus, The Eye tells us, that the Starres and We are at severall times in severall Positures, but, whether it proceed from Their motion or from Ours, it affirmeth not. Our Feeling informs us, that we are not tossed from Place to Place, that is, from one part of the Earths Su∣perficies to another, but remain upon the same part of its Surface: But whether we jointly move together, or jointly rest immovable, it de∣termins not. The Eare can tell us, That it hears no Noise, (for how can it since there is none?) But it doth not say, There is no Motion. These Witnesses therefore can testifie nothing in this cause; Except we should suborn them, and put that into their Mouths, which is not

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within their Knowledge, Or falsify the Records, by supposing them to say That, which they say not.

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