Peripateticall institutions. In the way of that eminent person and excellent philosopher Sr. Kenelm Digby. The theoricall part. Also a theologicall appendix of the beginning of the world. / By Thomas White Gent.

LESSON XVIII.

Of the five senses of Animals.

1. OUt of what has been said, it ap∣pears, that there are certain Channels spread through the whole body of an Animal, full of a kind of aiery humour; and that they are long and narrow: whence, the least impression made in any extremity of the body must needs, in a moment, run to their fountain, the Brain; and, thence descend to the Heart. These channels, therefore, being any way obstructed, the Animal is sensible of no∣thing without.

2. And, since bodies that make impres∣sion, either do it by their immediate selves, or else by the mediation of some o∣ther body; and, those that act by their immediate selves, either do it in their proper bulk, or broken into parts, or by naturall emissions; and those bodies, by the mediation whereof universally one body acts upon another, are either Aire, or Fire, or light which we see every body bandies against another: It follows, that an Animal, if it be perfect, may be affected

these five ways by the things about it.

3. And, because 'tis evident that these five ways are distinct; the Animal, too, it self will have five distinct dispositions, by which it will be apt to receive these five impressions; to chuse the things that are congruous and refuse those that are noxi∣ous, both in its food and other things be∣longing to its conservation.

4. Again, because these impressions are different; 'tis fit the Organs that are to re∣ceive them be plac'd in severall parts of the Animal: Animals, therefore, have five Senses.

5. 'Tis apparent, too, that the Senses are nothing but certain different degrees of Touches: For, the parts of the same bo∣dy must needs make only a more subtile stroak, of the same nature with the stroak of the whole.

6. And, hence, we distinguish the dif∣ferences of Tasts; so, as, that one pricks, another cutt's, another brushes, another smooth's: the differences of Smels, too, are a-kin to Tasts.

7. But, the differences of Sounds are the same with those of Motions; distin∣guisht by swiftnesse and slownesse, by big∣nesse and smalnesse, Lastly, 'tis evident,

that Fire or Light make stroaks too, by its Activity upon other bodies.

8. It appears, farther, of what nature the Senses must be, and where situated. For, the Touch, being to receive the ex∣cesse of those qualities whereof the body of the Animal consists, requires nothing but a middling kind of Moisture, or the naturall quality of that vapour which fills the Channels; and therefore, like them, 'tis diffus'd through the whole body.

9. The Tast, because it requires a Moist∣nesse which may dissolve the minutest parts, needs an abundance of Moisture, and a site where the food may be dissected. The Smell, by which Aire chiefly enters in∣to the body, requires a site and Organ where the vapours may stick, that, being constipated together, they may act the more powerfully.

10. The Hearing and Sight require a situation near the Brain; in an eminent place, where Motion and Light may come to them more pure; and Organs, which may multiply Light by refraction and Motion by reflection.

11. Nor is it lesse evident, that the Sen∣sation is perfected in that part of the Or∣gan, where chiefly resides that vertue for

which the Sense was made; that is, to transferre to the Brain the action of a bo∣dy without: If the black of the Eye, the hammer of the Eare, the pulp of the Nose doe this; the Sensation also must be plac'd in them.

12. It appears, too, why the Senses are believ'd to consist in a kind of Spirituality and abstraction from matter: For, since they are ordain'd by nature, only that the Animal may be mov'd; the stroak of sen∣sible things is so thin and subtile, that it changes not the quality of the Organ sen∣sibly, and, therefore, 'tis not believ'd to be materiall.

13. And, hence, too, the Sensible object is commonly believ'd to be in the Sense, not as something of the same nature or contrary to it, but purely as another thing; by which mistake, Sensation is thought to be a kind of knowledge.