To the extent possible under law, the Text Creation Partnership has waived all copyright and related or neighboring rights to this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above, according to the terms of the CC0 1.0 Public Domain Dedication (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). This waiver does not extend to any page images or other supplementary files associated with this work, which may be protected by copyright or other license restrictions. Please go to http://www.textcreationpartnership.org/ for more information.
1. AGain, it follows, there is some Thing, for whom 'tis impossible not to exist: For, since an effect is because another is, 'tis clear, the same cannot be the cause of it self: nay, if two should be put, as, adequately, cause and effect to one another, the same would be
put as cause of it self; for, if A be because B is, and B again because A is, 'tis clear, that A is because A is, that is, 'tis cause and effect to it self.
2. Wherefore, since those things that may not-Be need an extrinsecall cause to Be; nor can all things have an extrinse∣call cause, unlesse some two be, reciprocal∣ly, causes to one another: it follows, there must be something which needs not an ex∣trinsecall cause; and consequently, must have, from its intrinsecalls, that it cannot not-Be, and for which it must be impossi∣ble not to Be.
3. Again, since an impossibility of not∣existing imports and carryes Existence a∣long with it; and this impossibility is in∣trinsecall and essentiall to the Thing in which it is; it follows, too, that Existence is essentiall to such a Thing.
4. And, since existence is equally uni∣versall with the notion of Being or Thing, that is, every Thing has an existence cor∣respondent to it, which it may actually have; and Being is the most universall pre∣dicate of that wherein 'tis; it follows, that Existence is the most universall predicate of the Thing to which 'tis essentiall.
5. But, on the other side, because Ex∣istence
being put, the Thing is compleat, as to its essence; nor can any essentiall pre∣dicate supervene to that which exists, but all are presuppos'd to existence: 'tis clear, that, to the most Genericall notion of a Thing to which Existence is essentiall, there can no essentiall Difference super∣vene; and consequently, that, between Things to which existence is essentiall, there can be no essentiall difference, that is, but One only such Thing can exist.
6. There is, therefore, some Thing es∣sentially existing of it self; from which, being but One only, all other Things must, of necessity, receive their birth and existence: Now, such a Thing we con∣ceive to be that we call GOD: There is therefore, a GOD.
7. The notion, therefore, of God's ex∣isting is, that his existence or essence is di∣ametrically and contradictorily oppos'd to not-Being: not, in the Understanding, as a Chimaera is oppos'd to a non-Chimaera; nor, in possibility, as a man to not-a-man; nor, in an irradiate act, as it were, and im∣press'd like a Seal in water, as our being and not-being, running and not-running: but, in the thing it self, by the highest and ulti∣mate actuality, substantially, by the very
essence of Being and exercising, by the very notion of existing, it self substantial∣ly and concentrally within it self and a∣bout it self and upon it self reflected, exer∣cised, and exercising.
8. This is the solidity and stability of the First thing and GOD; whilst, the sta∣bility of all the rest is no other, but to de∣pend and Be from Him.
9. Out of what has been said, is de∣duc'd the most eminent Simplicity and In∣divisibility of God. For, since existence is essentiall to him; and there can be no∣thing in a Thing, neither before nor after existence; 'tis clear, that God is so Ex∣istence, that he is nothing besides, formal∣ly.
10. Therefore, He is not corporeall or compos'd of parts excluding one another: for, a Body, since it has a Being in parts, of necessity includes something besides Ex∣istence, divisible from that.
11. The same is for composition of Matter and Form, Subject and Accidents; for these, since they include something divisible from Being, cannot be pure ex∣isters.
12. Nor is there any room for compo∣sition of Genus and Differentia; since, Dif∣ference
supervenes to a Genus, at least, with a foundation in the Object for so apprehen∣ding it. Ther's, therefore, absolutely, no composition at all in God.
13. But, whatever composition there is in our Understanding concerning God, proceeds out of the pure defect of our un∣derstanding, which cannot adequate the Simplicity of the Divine Essence. GOD, therefore, is pure Being, pure Actuality, the pure Brightnesse of eternall Light.
14. Again, hence 'tis deduc'd that God is Eternall, or, that there is not in God past and future, but only present. For, since God cannot not-Be, by reason of the essentiall exercise of his Being; and, has this essentially, that he cannot not-have-been nor not-be-to-be, but possesses his es∣sence indivisibly: it comes to passe, that 'tis the same thing to God not to-not-have-been and not not-to-be, as to Be what He is; but, there cannot be, either by imagi∣nation or in time, an instant suppos'd, in which God possesses not his Essence; in every moment, therefore, of time whether reall or imaginary, He is his not not-to-have-been and his not not-to-be hereafter, that is, his to-have-been and his to-be.
15. In every instant of time, therefore,
He is in every instant of time past and fu∣ture: not, that the time past and future are; but, that the indivisible existence of God possesses all that length, which pas∣sing times make, contracted▪ by the emi∣nency of his Simplicity, in an indivisible act; and never either loses or gains, be∣cause His repugnancy to not-Being is a∣ctuall Being, and Actually-to-Be is his Es∣sence.