Peripateticall institutions. In the way of that eminent person and excellent philosopher Sr. Kenelm Digby. The theoricall part. Also a theologicall appendix of the beginning of the world. / By Thomas White Gent.

LESSON II.

Of the Science of a separated Soul, and its unity vvith the Soul.

1. BUt, all these things being so, now, in the Soul, that time was, they were not; 'tis plain, they are so conjoyn'd to it, that ther's no repugnancy it may be without them: wherefore, so there be a cause, they may be divid••d from it: some kind of divisibility, then, there is between the Soul and the things in it.

2. Not that which is between the parts of a Magnitude; since, here's an indivisi∣bility on both sides, whereas a Magnitude is not made up of indivisibles. Nor, that which is between Matter and Form; since

the Soul, which is before, is able to preex∣ist of it self; and whatever things come in∣to it supervene to a Thing already exist∣ing. Nor that which is between Substance and Quantity; since Quantity is in a Thing, as somewhat of it; but things known are in the Knower as other things which preexist out of him.

3. 'Tis, therefore, a speciall manner of divisibility which is not exactly found in bodies: For, since a body essentially in∣cludes a power or possibility, the unity of a body is by the privation of act on one side; whence follows the unity of act in the Compound: But, a separated Soul is com∣pos'd only of Act or Quiddity, as white or hot, and Existence or Being, as when we say, 'tis: whence, its unity to another a∣ctually existing must be, so, as an act can be joyn'd to an act, that is, by identification or a community of Being: and, after this manner, are in a separated Soul whatever are in it.

4. Whence, first, this is evident, that a separated Soul knows it self: For, since, to be in another, by way of knowing, is di∣stinguish't, in this, from the other man∣ners of inexisting; that, in others, what in∣exists is now no Thing in it self, but that's

in which it is; things know'n, by inexisting, lose not the being what they were, though they acquire the being of that which they were not: for, Heat, in that which is hot, is something of the Subject, nor has any pro∣per Being of its own; but, the hot Subject which is felt is, so, in him that's sensible of it, that he knows 'tis hot; therefore, this Subject to be actually hot is in the person that's sensible of it.

5. In like manner, the Soul exists sub∣stantially, because Being is made some∣thing of the Soul. Again, this, that the Soul is, is in the Soul: for, since the Soul is a certain Power of being all things that exist; and it self also exists; it cannot but, by reason of its intimate conjunction, be present to it self according to this its pow∣er, which is that it cannot but be understood.

6. Again, since all those things are in the Soul which we have, above, recounted; they must needs be, too, all known in the Soul: And, because, 'tis clear, that, in a Syllogism, the Conclusion is nothing but the very Premisses; all is known by a se∣parated Soul, which is deducible out of those things that are in the Soul.

7. And, because, such is the connexi∣on of Truths, that, out of any one, all o∣thers,

may, by links, be drawn in; it comes to passe that a Soul, which knows any whatever sensible Truth, knows intirely all cognoscible things; that is, every Soul penetrates absolutely all things.

8. For, if any Infant never knew its own Being, it is not to be esteem'd to have arriv'd at all to the nature of Man: For, since, even in us, to be sensible of or to know is by suffering from another; we know an∣other thing is, because we know we have suffered from it: but, if we know we have suffered from it, we already know we are: the first knowledge, therefore, even in the body, includes the knowledge of our selves.

9. And, since Passion is a participation of the Thing from which we suffer; it must needs be that the Thing is in us, when we are sensible of it: and, because it does not denominate according to its own pro∣per appellation, but according to the qua∣lity of that wherein it is, (for, we do not call an Eye white or wooden, but a Seeer of white or wood); it must needs be that 'tis in it, as another thing, and as of the nature of the sensitive Subject. Now, the reason why in the body, too, the Soul does not know it self, but the Man, a part of whom it

is, is because 'tis he that is and not it, as has been said.

10. You'l object, this multiplicity of knowledge is fram'd or aggregated, either of severall knots and articles, as it were, so that whatever was knowable in this world by new discourse, the same is, in some sort, a new addition in the Soul; or of one simple knowledge which, eminently and in one formality, in a manner, com∣prehends all these knowledges: but, nei∣ther of these seems possible; not the first, because 'twould be a certain infinity, ei∣ther in act, which is impossible, or in pow∣er, and then 'twould be some continuity and a principle of continuall motion; nor the later, for such an universality seems not to have any thing above it.

11. 'Tis answer'd, the manner of a se∣parated Soul, in some sort, contains both; though 'tis neither way formally: For, since, the parts in formall composition are not actually; 'tis plain, that neither can there be, in this composition of the know∣ledge of a separated Soul, formall knots and articles of discourse, & consequently, no actuall infinity: Again, since one part is not beyond another, that is, extended, as in quantity, but all, by a certain identifica∣on,

grow together; there can be no con∣tinuity between, though the parts be in power, that is, only in the possibility of the Subject.

12. Besides, that this power is not such that there should be any correspondent naturall cause to reduce it into act: but, 'tis only a certain defectibility of act, up∣on which ther's no active power but only a Logicall or a Creative one, which will never act.

13. 'Tis, therefore, a certain actuall Me∣taphysicall composition, in which there is a Logicall possibility that any of these later known things may be away, without hurt∣ing those that were known before; yet so, that it can never come to passe it should be reduc'd into act: Wherefore, 'tis nei∣ther the precise contemplation of one for∣mality precontaining infinite; nor yet any actuall infinity, or naturall divisibility.

14. But, it may be compar'd to the Me∣taphysicall composition of degrees; in which we see Peter or Bucephalus so agree with infinite Things or Animals, that it contracts thence no multiplicity, and yet we may alwaies frame some new apprehen∣sion of them in our Mind.