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1.OUt of what has been said, 'tis evident, that a Humane Soul perishes not at the dissolu∣tion of its Body: For, since, whilst it exists in the Body, it has imma∣nent acts which cannot belong to a Body; it must of necessity have, of its proper self, the vertue of a Thing, or, of receiving
Existence: Since, therefore, ther's nothing farther requir'd to exist, in a thing alrea∣dy existing, but the having in it self a pow∣er of sustaining existence; and, 'tis plain, that, the body being taken away, this pow∣er is not withdrawn, (since 'tis in the Soul, apart from and besides the Body); 'tis evident that, by the dissolution of the Bo∣dy, the Soul is not dissolv'd.
2. Adde to this, that, since there is no other substantiall divisibility, but of Form and Matter; and Matter is not necessary to the Souls existence; ther's no divisi∣bility in the Subject of existence, as exi∣stence is in the Soul, by means whereof the Soul can be alienated from Being.
3. We see, too, that all mortality of Bodies either proceeds from contrariety, or from the divisibility of a quantitative Subject; whereof, since neither is to be found in the Soul separated, 'tis plain, that 'Tis not subject to corruption.
4. You'l object, if the Soul in the bo∣dy is capable of existence, 'tis capable of action or of a Motive power; as quantita∣tive parts, though they have a common existence, yet act upon one another. 'Tis answer'd, quantitative parts are accessory to and find the Substance already perfect:
but formall parts (at least essentiall ones) do not presuppose the Substance esta∣blisht; whence, the active power follows not any one, but all.
5. You'l say, that Existence, too, sup∣poses all the parts of a Thing, as 'tis a Thing: wherefore, neither will the Soul be capable of existence in the Body. 'Tis answer'd, that action belongs to the Soul in the Body as existence does: For, exi∣stence makes not the Soul, while 'tis in the Body, to be a Thing; for that's primely of the whole, and the whole Man is the Thing; but it makes the Soul to be That which may be a Thing: So, also, 'tis not absolutely a principle of acting, but 'tis a principle by which action becomes other then 'twould be without it; and conse∣quently, it has a Being, whence action may be, but not whence 'tis.
6. It appears, again, that the Soul sepa∣rated is not, truly, the same Thing with the Soul in the Body; but is substantially chang'd. For, first 'twas joyn'd substanti∣ally to the Body and was one with it: but, 'tis clear, that when, by division, more things are made of one, the Thing divided is chang'd; especially when the Unity it self was substantiall, as in the present case;
since the Soul adheres to the corporeall Substance, not by quantity, but by identi∣fication.
7. Again, the Soul, now separated, is the immediate and adequate Subject of its own existence: whereas, in the body, the Man himself was the Thing, and the Soul only a part of the Thing, or, whereby the Thing was. Yet, 'tis the same Thing, as to its notion and definition; since it consists of those predicates it had in the Body.
8. You'l object, In the Body, it had not a power of receiving existence in it self; therefore, neither will it have out of the Body: for a part and a Thing are of an intirely different kind, and vastly distinct from one another. 'Tis answer'd, that, as, in the parts of a Magnitude, 'tis manifest, that they are neither Things, nor only parts of a Thing; but something between, which is so a part, that it may be some kind of whole: So, it repugns not, that there should be something in formall parts which is, de facto, a part, and yet may be a whole; and that should be a kind of Middle thing, which has enough in it self to become a whole, yet should not actu∣ally be a whole: Whence, when the Soul is separated, there is not any thing added
to it, to make it more capable of existence, but that is withdrawn from it, which hin∣dred it from existing.
9. Now, he that desires to frame to him∣self, in some sort, a notion of a separated Soul; let him ponder with himself that object which corresponds to the words Man or Animal, as such: which when he shall see, abstracts from Place and Time, and is a Substance by the only ne∣cessity of the Terms; let him conceive the like of a separated Soul.
10. Then, let him attentively consider some self-evident and most naturall pro∣position: in which, when he shall have contemplated that the object is in the Soul with its proper existence and, as it were, by it; let him think a separated Soul is a Substance that is all other things, by the very connexion of Existences.
11. Lastly, when, in Bodies, he shall observe that Motion proceeds from the quality of the Mover & a certain impulse; and that this impulse is deriv'd again from another impulse, and so up even to that which is first mov'd, and beyond: let him imagine the Soul is a kind of principle of such impulse; whatsoever thing that must be.
12. What is said of the Substance of the Soul, undoubtedly must be understood, too, of its proper Accidents; for, since they depend only upon it, (being some∣thing of it, nay even the very Soul), and it would be more imperfect without them; they must run the same fortune with it, unlesse some speciall reason interpose.
13. Whatever things, therefore, were in the Man, according to his Soul, at the instant of his Death, remain in the Soul after separation: wherefore, all his Reso∣lutions or Iudgements, whether specula∣tive or practicall, shall remain in it; where, since they cannot be without Apprehensi∣ons, even they, too, shall remain: And, since all things, which are made to follow out of or have connexion with these, are in a separated Soul, in vertue of these, its Science must needs be extended to all those; all such, therefore, which have once been in it and are not blotted out, after death all remain.
14. Since, therefore, in a Soul ther's an infinite capacity; and ther's no oppositi∣on of apprehensions among themselves, nor any other opposition, but of contra∣diction, whereby the same is affirm'd to be and not-be: all the apprehensions, scrap'd
up together in the whole life, and judge∣ments unretracted must, of necessity, re∣main; unlesse some speciall Cause with∣stand.
15. The whole Notion, therefore, of the past life, all the particular acquaintan∣ces of Familiars and other Individuums, all Sciences and Arts, attain'd in the life time, survive after Death.