A treatise of civil policy: being a resolution of forty three questions concerning prerogative, right and priviledge, in reference to the supream prince and the people. / By Samuel Rutherford professor of divintiy of St Andrews in Scotland.

QUEST. XXII. Whether the power of the King as King be absolute, or dependent and limited by Gods first mould and paterne of a King?

DOctor Ferne sheweth us it was never his purpose to plead for* 1.1 absolutenesse of an Arbitrary commandement, free from all Morall restraint laid on the power by Gods Law; but only he stri∣veth for a power in the King that cannot be resisted by the subject. But truely we never disputed with Royalists of any absolute power in the King, free from Morall subjection to Gods Law 1. Because any bond that Gods Law imposeth on the King, it commeth wholly from God, and the nature of a Divine Law, and not from any volun∣tary* 1.2 contract, or covenant, either expresse, or tacito, betwixt the King and the people who made him King, for if he faile against such a covenant, though he should exceed the cruelty of a King, or a man, and become a Lion and a Nero, a Mother-killer, he should in all his inhumanity and breach of covenant be countable to God, not to any man on earth. 2. To dispute with Royalists, if Gods Law lay any Morall restraint upon the King, nor to dispute whether the King be a rationall man, or no; and whether he can sin against God, and shall cry in the day of Gods wrath (if he be a wicked Prince) Hills fall on us, and cover us, as it is Revel. 6. 15, 16. and whether Tophet be prepared for all workers of iniquity; and cer∣tainly I justifie the Schoole-men in that question: Whether or no God could have created a rationall creature, such a one as by na∣ture

is impeccable, and not naturally capable of sinne before God? if Royalists dispute this question of their absolute Monarch, they are wicked Divines.

2. We plead not at this time (saith the Prelate stealing from Gro∣tius,* 1.3 Barclaius, Arnisaeus, who spake it with more sinewes of rea∣son) for a (masterly, or) despoticall, or rather a slavishing Sove∣raignty, which is Dominium herile, an absolute power, such as the great Turke this day exerciseth over his subjects, and the King of Spaine hath over, and in his territories without Europe: we maintain only regiam potestatem, quae fundatur in paterna, such royall fatherly So∣veraignty as we live under▪ blessed be God, and our predecessors. This (saith he) as it hath its Royall Prerogative inherent to the Crowne naturally, and inseparable from it, so it trencheth not upon the liberty of the person, or the property of the goods of the subject, but in, and by the lawfull and just acts of jurisdiction.

Ans. 1. Here is another absolute power disclaimed to be in the King, he hath not such a masterly and absolute liberty as the Turke hath. Why? Iohn P. P. in such a tender and high point as con∣cerneth soule and body of subjects in three Christian Kingdomes, you should have taught us 1. What bonds and fetters any covenant or paction betwixt the King and people layeth upon the King, why he hath not as King the power of the great Turke. I will tell you▪ The Great Turke may command any of his subjects to leape into a mountaine of fire, and burne himselfe quick, in conscience of obe∣dience to his Law. And what if the subject disobey the Great Turk? if the Great Turke be a lawfull Prince, as you will not deny. And if the King of Spaine should command forraine conquered slaves to doe the like. By your Doctrine neither the one, nor the other were obliged to resist by violence, but to pray, or fly, which both were to* 1.4 speake to stones, and were like the man, who in case of ship-wrack, made his devotion of praying to the waves of the sea, not to enter the place of his b••d and drowne him. But a Christian King hath not this power; Why, and a Christian King (by Royalists doctrine) hath a greater power then the Turke (if greater can be) he hath power to command his subjects to cast themselves into Hell∣fire; that is, to presse on them a service wherein it is written: (Adore the worke of mens hands in the place of the living God) and this is worse then the Turkes commandement of bodily burning quick. And what is left to the Christian Subjects, in this case, is the

very same, and no other then is left to the Turkish and forraigne Spanish subject; Either flee, or make prayers▪ There is no more left to us. 2. Many Royalists maintaine, that England is a conque∣red* 1.5 Nation. Why then, see what power, by law of Conquest, the King of Spaine hath over his slaves, the same must the King of Eng∣land have over his subjects. For, to Royalists, a title by Conquest to a Crown, is as lawfull as a title by birth or election. For lawful∣nesse, in relation to Gods law, is placed in an indivisible point, if we regard the essence of lawfulnesse: And therefore there is nothing left to England, but that all Protestants who take the oath of a Pro∣testant King, to defend the true Protestant Religion, should, after prayers, conveyed to the King through the fingers of Prelates and Papists; leave the Kingdome empty to Papists, Prelates and A∣theists.

3. All power restrained, that it cannot arise from ten degrees* 1.6 to foureteen, from the Kingly power of Saul, 1 Sam. 8. 9, 11. to the Kingly power of the Great Turke, to fourteen; 1. must either be restrained by Gods law; 2. or by Mans law; or 3. by the innate goodnes and grace of the Prince; or 4. by the providence of God. A restraint from Gods law is vaine: for it is no question between us and Royalists, but God hath laid a morall restraint on Kings, and all men, that they have not morall power to sinne against God. 2. Is the restraint laid on by mans law? What law of man? 1. The Roy∣alist saith, 1. The King, as King, is above all law of man. Then (say I) no law of man can hinder the Kings power of ten, to arise to the Turkish power of foureteen. 2. All law of man, as it is mans law, is seconded either with Ecclesiasticall and spirituall coaction, such as Excommunication; ▪or with Civill and temporall coaction, such as is the Sword, if it be violated. But Royalists deny, that either the sword of the Church in Excommunication, or the Civill sword, should be drawn against the King. 3. This law of man should be produced by this profound Iurist, the P. Prelate, who mocketh at all the Statists and Lawyers of Scotland. It is not a covenant be∣twixt the King and People, at his Coronation: for though there were any such covenant, yet the breach of it doth binde before God, but not before man: nor can I see, or any man else, how a law of man can lay a restraint on the Kings power of two degrees, to can∣cell it within a Law, more then on a power of ten, or fourteene de∣grees. If the King of Spaine, the lawfull Soveraigne of those over-European

people, (as Royalists say) have a power of foureteene de∣grees over those conquered Subjects, as a King; I see not how he hath not the like power over his own Subjects of Spaine, to wit, even of Foureteen: for what agreeth to a King, as a King, (and Kingly power from God he hath as King) he hath it in relation to all Subjects, except it be taken from him in relation to some Sub∣jects, and given by some law of God; or in relation to some other Subjects. Now, no man can produce any such law. 4. The nature of the goodnesse and grace of the Prince, cannot lay bonds on the King, to cancell his power, that he should not usurpe the power of the King of Spaine toward his over-Europeans. 1. Royalists plead for a power due to the King, as King, and that from God; such as Saul had, 1 Sam. 8. 9, 11. 1 Sam. 10. 25. But this power should be a power of grace and goodnesse in the King, as a good man; not in the King, as a King, and due to him by law: And so the King should have his Legall power from God, to be a Tyrant. But if he were not a Tyrant, but should lay limits on his own power, through the goodnesse of his own nature; No thankes to Royalists that he is not a Tyrant: For, actu primo, and as he is a King, (as they say) he is a Tyrant, having from God a Tyrannous power of ten degrees, as Saul had, 1 Sam. 8. and why not of foureteen degrees, as well as the Great Turke, or the King of Spaine? if he use it not, it is his own personall goodnesse, not his officiall and Royall power. 4. The rastraint of Providence laid by God upon any power to doe ill, hin∣dreth only the exercise of the power not to breake forth in as Ty∣rannous acts as ever the King of Spaine, or the great Turke can exercise toward any. Yea, Providence layeth Physicall restraint, and possibly morall, sometimes, upon the exercise of that power that Devils, and the most wicked men of the world hath: but Royalists must shew us that Providence hath laid bounds on the Kings power, and made it fatherlie, and not masterly; so that if it the power ex∣ceed bounds of fatherly power, and passe over to the dispoticall and masterly power, it may be resisted by the Subjects. But that they will not say. 4. This paternall and fatherly power that God hath given to Kings, as Royalists teach, it trencheth not upon the libertie of the Subjects, and propertie of their goods; but in, and by lawfull and just acts of Jurisdiction (saith the P. Prelate:) Well; Then it may trench upon the libertie of soule and body of the Subjects; but in, and by lawfull and just acts of of jurisdiction: But none are to judge

of these acts of Iurisdiction, whether they be just or not just, but the King, the only Iudge of supreme and absolute authoritie and power. And if the King command the idolatrous service in the obtruded Service-booke, it is a lawfull and a just act of jurisdiction: For to Royalists, who make the Kings power absolute, all acts are so just to the Subject, though he command Idolatrie and Turcisme, that we are to suffer only, and not to resist. 5. The Prelate presumeth that Fatherly power is absolute: But so if a father murther his childe, he is not comptable to the Magistrate therefore; but being absolute over his children, only the Judge of the World, not any power on earth can punish him. 6. We have proved that the Kings power is pa∣ternall or fatherly only, by analogie, and improperly. 7. What is this Prerogative Royall, we shall heare by and by, 8. There is no restraint on Earth, laid upon this fatherly power of the King, but Gods law, which is a morall restraint. If then the King challenge as great a power as the Turke hath, he only sinneth against God; but no mortall man on earth may controll him, as Royalists teach: and who can know what power it is that Royalists plead for, whether a dispoticall power of Lordly power, or a fatherly power? If it be a power above law, such as none on earth may resist it; it is no matter whether it be above law of two degrees, or of twenty, even to the Great Turkes power.

These goe for Oracles, at Court▪ Tacitus. Principi summum re∣rum arbitrium Dii dederunt, subditis obsequii gloria relicta est. Sene∣ca. Indigna digna habenda sunt, Rex quae facit. Salustius. Impun•• quidvis facere, id est, Regem esse. As if to be a King, and to be a God, who cannot erre, were all one. But certainly, these Authors are taxing the Licence of Kings, and not commanding their power.

But that God hath given no absolute and unlimited power to a King, above the law, is evident by this:

Arg. 1. He who in his first institution, is appointed of God, by* 1.7 office, even when he sitteth on the throne, to take heed to read on a written copie of Gods law, that he may learne to feare the Lord his God, and keep all the words of this law, &c. He is not of absolute power above law. But, Deut. 17. 18, 19▪ the King, as King, while he sitteth on the Throne, is to doe this; Ergo, the Assumption is cleare: for this is the law of the King, as King; and not of a man, as a man. But as he sitteth on the Throne, he is to read on the booke of the Law: and ver. 20. Because he is King, his heart is not to be lifted up

above his brethren. And as King, v. 16. he is not to multiply horses, &c. So Polititians make this argument good: They say, Rex est lex viva, animata▪ & loquens lex: The King, as King, is a living, brea∣thing,* 1.8 and speaking Law. And there be three reasons of this: 1. If all were innocent persons, and could doe no violence one to ano∣ther; the Law would rule all, and all men would put the Law in execution, agendo sponte, by doing right of their own accord; and there should be no need of a King to compell men to do right. But now, because men are, by nature, averse to good lawes, therefore there was need of a Ruler, who by office should reduce the Law in∣to practice: and so is the King the Law reduced in practice. 2. The Law is ratio sive mens, the reason or minde, free from all perturba∣tions of anger, lust, hatred, and cannot be tempted to ill; and the King, as a man, may be tempted by his own passions; and therefore as King, he commeth by office out of himselfe to reason and law; and so much as he hath of Law, so much of a King; and in his re∣motest distance from Law and Reason, he is a Tyrant. 3. Abstracta concretis sunt puriora & perfectiora. Iustice is perfecter then a just man, Whitenes perfecter then the white wall: so the neerer the King comes to a Law, for the which he is a King, the neerer to a King; Propter quod unumquodque tale, id ipsum magis tale. Therefore Kings throwing lawes to themselves, as men, whereas they should have conformed themselves to the Law, have erred. Cambyses the sonne of Cyrus, because he loved his own sister, would have the ma∣riage of the brother with the sister, lawfull. Anaxarchus said to Ale∣xander, grieved in minde that he had killed Clytus: Regi ac Iovi Themin atque Iustitiam assidere: Iudgement and Righteousnesse did alway accompanie God and the King in all they doe. But some to this purpose say better; The Law, rather then the King, hath power of life and death.

Arg. 2. The power that the King hath (I speak not of his gifts)* 1.9 he hath it from the people, who maketh him King, as I proved be∣fore: but the people have neither formally nor virtually any power absolute to give the King, all the power they have, is a legall and naturall power to guide themselves in peace and godlinesse, and save themselves from unjust violence, by the benefit of Rulers. Now an absolute power above a Lawis a power to doe ill, and to destroy the people, and this the people have not themselves, it being repugnant to nature, that any should have a naturall power in themselves to

destroy themselves, or to inflict upon themselves an evill of punish∣ment to destruction. Though therefore it were given, which yet is not granted, that the people had resigned all power that they have into their King, yet if he use a Tyrannicall power against the peo∣ple for their hurt and destruction, he useth a power that the people never gave him; and against the intention of nature: for they in∣vested a man with power to be their father, and defender for their good, And he faileth against the peoples intention in usurping a•• over power to himselfe, which they never gave, never had, never could give, for they cannot give what they never had, and power to destroy themselves they never had.

3. Arg. All Royall Power, whereby a King is a King, and* 1.10 differenced from a private man, armed with no power of the sword, is from God.

But absolute power to Tyranize over the people, and to destroy* 1.11 them, is not a power from God: Ergo there is not any such royall power absolute. The proposition is evident, because that God who maketh Kings, and disposeth of Crownes, Prov. 8. 15, 16. 2 Sam. 12. 7. Daniel 4. 32. must also create and give that Royall and Offi∣ciall power, by which a King is a King, 1. Because God created man, he must be the Author of his reasonable soule; if God be the Author of things, he must be the Author of their formes, by which they are, that which they are. 2. All power is Gods. 1 Chro. 29. 11 Matth. 6. 13. Ps. 62. 11. Ps. 68. 35. Dan. 2. 37. And that absolute power to Tyrannize, is not from God. 1. Because if this Morall* 1.12 power to sinne be from God, it being formally wickednesse, God must be the Author of sinne. 2. What ever Morall power is from God, the exercises of that power, and the acts thereof must be from God, and so these acts must be Morally good and just; for if the Morall power be of God, as the Author, so must the acts be. Now the acts of a Tyrannicall power are acts of sinfull unjustice and oppression, and cannot be from God. 3. Polititians say, There is no power in Rulers to doe ill, but to helpe and defend the people, as the power of a Physi••ian to destroy; of a Pilot to cast away the ship on a Rock, the power of a Tutor to wast the inheritance of the Orphan, and the power of father and mother to kill their children, and of the mighty to defraud and oppresse, are not powers from God. So Ferdinand Vasquez illustr. quest. l. 1. c. 26. c. 45. Pruckman d. c. 3. §. Soluta potestas. Althus. pol. cap. 9. n. 25.

Barclaim, Grotius, Doct. Ferne, (The P. Prelates wit could come* 1.13 up t̄o it) say, That absolute power to do ill, so as no mortall man can lawfully resist it, is from God; and the King hath this way power from God as no subject ••an resist it, but he must resist the Ordinance of God, and yet the power of tyranny is not simply from God.

Answ. The Law saith, Illud possumus quod jure possumus, Papinus* 1.14 F. filius, D. de cond. Just. The Law saith, It is no power which is not lawfull power. The Royalists say, power of Tyranny in so farre as it may be resisted, and is punishable by men, is not from God; but what is the other part of the distinction; it must be, that Tyranni∣call power is simpliciter from God, or in it self it is from God, but as it is punishable or restrainable by subjects, it is not from God: now to be punishable by subjects, is but an accident and tyrannicall power is the subject, yea, and it is an separable accident; for many Tyrants are never punished, and their power is never restrained, such a Tyrant was Saul, and many persecuting Emperours: Now if the Tyrannicall power it self was from God, the argument is yet valid, and remaineth unanswered; and shall not this fall to the ground as false, which Arnisaeus de autho. princ. c. 2. n. 10. Dum contra officium facit, Magistratus non est Magistratus, quippe a quo non injuria, sed jus nasci debeat, l. meminerint. 6. C. unde vi. din. in C. quod quis, 24. n. 4, 5.—Et de ho•• neminem dubitare aut dissentire scribit, Ma∣rant. disp. 1. num. 14. When the Magistrate doth by violence, and without law any thing, in so farre doing against his Office, he is not a Magistrate; then say I, that power by which he doth, is not of God. 2. None doeth then resist the Ordinance of God, who resist the King in Tyrannous acts. 2. If the power, as it cannot be punished by the subject▪ nor restrained, be from God. Ergo, the Tyrannicall power itself, and without this accident (that it can be punished by men) it must be from God also; but the conclusion is absurd, and denied by Royalists. I prove the connexion: For if the King have such a power above all restraint, the power itself, to wit, King Davids power to kill innocent Ʋriah, and defloor Bath∣shebah, without the accident, of being restrained or punished by men, is either from God, or not from God; if it be from God, it must be a power against the sixth and seventh Commandment, which God gave to David, and not to any subject, and so David lied when he confessed this sin▪ and this sin cannot be pardoned because it was no sin; and Kings because Kings, are under no tye of duties

of mercy and truth, and justice to their subjects, contrary to that which Gods Law requireth of all Judges, Deut. 1. 15, 16, 17. and 17. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20. 2 Chro. 19. 6, 7. Rom. 13. 3, 4. If this power be from God, as it is unrestrainable and unpunishable by the subject, it is not from God at all; for how can God give a power to do ill, that is unpunishable by men, and not give that power to do ill; it is unconceiveable: For in this very thing that God giveth to David, a power to murther the innocent, with this respect, That it shall be punishable by God onely, and not by men, God m••st give it as a sinfull power to do ill, which must be a power of dispensati∣on to sin, and so not to be punished by either God, or man, which is contrary to his revealed will in his word: If such a power as not restrainable by man, be from God, by way of permission, as a power to sin in divels, and men is, then it is no Royall power, nor any Ordinance of God, and to resist this power, is not to resist the Or∣dinance of God.

Argum. 4. That power which maketh the benefit of a King, to* 1.15 be no benefit, but a judgement of God, as a making all the people slaves, such as were slaves amongst the Romans and Jews, is not to be asserted by any Christian: but an absolute power to do ill, and to Tyrannize, which is supposed to be an essentiall and constitutive of Kings, to difference them from all Judges, maketh the benefit of a King no benefit, but a judgement of God, as making all the people slaves. That the major may be clear, It is evident to have a King, is a blessing of God, because to have no King is a judgement, Judg. 17. 6. Every man doth what seemeth good in his own eyes, Judg. 18. 1. and 19. 1. and 21. 25. 2. So it is a part of Gods good providence to provide a King for his people, 1 Sam. 16. 1. so 2 Sam. 5. 12. And David perceived that the Lord had established him King over Israel, and that he had exalted his Kingdom, for his people Israels sake, 2 Sam. 15. 2, 3, 6. 2 Sam. 18. 3. Rom. 13. 2, 3, 4. If the King be a thing good in it self, then can he not actu primo, be a curse and a judgement, and essentially a bondage and slavery to the people: also the genuine and intrinsecall end of a King is the good, Rom. 13. 4. and the good of a quiet a peaceable life in all godlinesse and honesty, 1 Tim. 2. 2. and he is by Office, custos utrius∣que tabulae, whose genuine end is to preserve the law from violence, and to defend the subject; he is the peoples debtor for all happy∣nesse possible to be procured by Gods sword, either in peace or

war, at home or abroad. For the assumption, it is evident. An ab∣solute and Arbitrary power is a King-law, such as Royalists say God gave to Saul, 1 Sam. 8. 9, 11. and 10. 25. to play the Tyrant, and this power Arbitrary and unlimited above all Laws, is that which 1. Is given of God. 2. Distinguisheth essentially the Kings of Israel from the Iudge, ••aith Banclay, Grotius, Arnisaeus. 3. A constitutive form of a King, therefore it must be actu primo a bene∣fit, and a blessing of God: but if God hath given any such power absolute to a King, as 1. His will must be a law, either to do or suffer all the Tyranny and cruelty of a Tyger, Leopard, or a Nero, and a Julian, then hath God given actu primo, a power to a King as King, to inslave the people and slock of God, redeemed by the blood of God, as the slaves among the Romans and Iews, who were so under their masters, as their bondage was a plague of God, and the lives of the people of God under Pharaoh, who compelled them to work in brick and clay. 2. Though he cut the throats of the people of God, as the Lionnesse Queen Mary did, and command an Army of souldiers to come and burn the Cities of the Land, and kill man, wife, and children; yet in so doing, he doth the part of a King, so as you cannot resist him as a man, and obey him as a King, but must give your necks to him, upon this ground, because this absolute power of his is ordained of God; and there is no power, even to kill, and destroy the innocent, but it is of God, so saith Paul, Rom. 13. If we beleeve Court-Prophets, or rather Lying-Spi∣rits, who perswade the King of Britain, to make war against his three Dominions. Now it is clear, that the distinction of bound and free, continued in Israel even under the most tyrannous Kings, 2 Kings 4. 1. yea, even when the Iews were captives under Aha∣suerus, Esther 7. 4. And what difference should there be between the people of God under their own Kings, and when they were captives under Tyrants, serving wood and stone, and false gods, as was threatned, as a curse in the Law, Deut. 28. 25, 36, 64, 68. If their own Kings by Gods appointment have the same absolute power over them; and if he be a Tyrant, actu primo, that is, if he be indued with absolute power, and so have power to play the Ty∣rant, then must the people of God be actu primo, slaves, and under absolute subjection, for they are relatives, as lord and servant, con∣querour and captive. It is true, they say, Kings by office are fathers, they cannot put forth in action their power to destroy: I answer, it is

their goodnesse of nature, that they put not forth in action, all their absolute power to destroy, which God hath given them as Kings; and therefore thanks are due to their goodnesse, for that they do not actu secundo play the Tyrant; for Royalists teach that by vertue of their office, God hath given to them a Royall power to destroy. Ergo, The Lords people are slaves under them, though they deal not with them as slaves, but that hindereth not, but the people by condition are slaves: so, many Conquerours of old, did deal kindely with these slaves whom they took in war, and dealt with them as sons, but as Conquerours they had power to sell them, to kill them, to put them to work in brick and clay: so say I here,* 1.16 Royall power and a King, cannot be a blessing, and actu primo a favour of God to the people; for the which they are to pray, when they want a King, that they may have one, or to praise God when they have one. But a King must be a curse and a judgement, if he be such a creature as essentially, and in the intention and nature of the thing it self, hath by office a Royall power to destroy, and that from God; for then the people praying (Lord give us a King) should pray (make us slaves, Lord, take our Libertie and power from us, and give a power illimited and absolute to one man, by which he may (if he please) waste us and destroy us, as all the bloody Emperours did the people of God.) Surely, I see not but they should pray for a temp∣tation, and to be led in temptation when they pray God to give them a King, and therefore such a power is a vain thing.

Argum. 5. A power contrary to justice. 2. To peace and the* 1.17 good of the people. 3. That looketh to no law as a rule, and so is unreasonable, and forbidden by the Law of God, and the Civill Law, L. 15. filius de condit. Instit. cannot be a lawfull power, and cannot constitute a lawfull Iudge; but an absolute and unlimited power is such: How can the Iudge be the Minister of God for good to the people, Rom. 13. 4? If he have such a power as a King given him of God to destroy and waste the people?

Argum. 6. An absolute power is contrary to nature, and so un∣lawfull;* 1.18 for it maketh the people give away the naturall power of defending their life against illegall and cruell violence, and maketh a man who hath need to be ruled and lawed by nature, above all rule and law; and one who by nature can sin against his brethren,* 1.19 such a one as cannot sin against any, but God onely, and maketh him a Lion and an unsociall man. What a man is Nero, whose life is

poesie & paintry, Domitian only an Archer. Valentinian only a Pain∣ter, Charles the 9th. of France only an Hunter, Alphonsus Dux Ferra∣riensis only an Astronomer, Philippe of Macedo only a Musitian, and all because they are Kings? This our King denyeth when he saith, Art. 13. There is power legally placed in the Parliament, more then sufficient to prevent and restraine the power of Tyranny. But if they had not power to play the Lions, it is not much that Kings are Musitians, Hunters, &c.

7. God in making a King to preserve his people, should give li∣berty* 1.20 without all politick restraint, for one man to destroy many; which is contrary to Gods end in the fift Commandement, if one have absolute power to destroy soules and bodies of many thousands.

8. If the Kings of Israel and Iudah were under censures and* 1.21 rebukes of the Prophets, and sinned against God and the people in rejecting these rebukes, and in persecuting the Prophets, and were under this Law not to take their neighbours wife, or his Vine∣yard from him against his will, and the inferiour Iudges were to accept the persons of none in Iudgement, small or great; and if the King yet remaine a brother, notwithstanding he be a King, then is his power not above any Law nor absolute: for what reason? 1. He should be under one Law of God to be executed by men, and not under another Law? Royalists are to shew a difference from Gods Word. 2. His neighbours, brother, or subjects may by vio∣lence keepe back their Vineyards, and chastity from the King: Na∣both may by force keepe his owne Vineyard from Achab; by the Lawes of Scotland, if a subject obtaine a Decree of the King of vio∣lent possession of the Heritages of a subject, he hath by Law, power to cast out, force, apprehend and deliver to prison these who are Tenants, brooking these Lands by the Kings personall Commande∣ment.* 1.22 If a King should force a Damsell, she may violently resist, and by violence, and bodily opposing of violence to violence, defend her owne chastity. Now that the Prophets have rebuked Kings is evident. Samuel rebuked Saul, Nathan David, Elias King Achab. Ieremiah is commanded to Prophesie against the Kings of Iudah Ier. 1. 18. and the Prophets practised it, Ier. 19. 3. c. 21. 2. c. 22. 13, 14, 15. Hos. 5. 1. Kings are guilty before God, because they submitted not their Royall power and greatnesse to the rebukes of the Prophets, but persecuted them.

2 Deut. 17. 20. The King on the Throne remaineth a Brother, Psal. 22. 22. and so the Iudges or three Estates are not to accept of the Person of the King, for his greatnesse, in Iudgement, Deut. 1. 16, 17. and the Iudge is to give out such a sentence in Iudgement as the Lord, with whom there is no iniquity, would give out, if the Lord himselfe were sitting in Iudgement; because the Iudge is in the very stead of God, as his Lievtenant, 2 Chron. 19. 6, 7. Ps. 82. 1, 2. Deut. 1. 17. And with God there is no respect of persons, 2 Chro. 19. 7. 1 Pet. 1. 17. Act. 10. 34. I doe not intend that, any inferiour Iudge sent by the King, is to judge the King, but these who gave him the Throne, and made him King are truely above him, and to judge him without respect of persons, as God would judge himselfe, if he himselfe were sitting in the Beanch.

3. God is the Author of Civill Lawes and Government, and his* 1.23 intention is therein the externall peace and quiet life, and godli∣nesse of his Church and people, and that all Iudges according to their places be Nurse-fathers to the Church, Esay 49. 23. Now God must have appointed sufficient meanes for this end; but there is no sufficient meanes at all, but a meere Anarchy and confusion, if to one man an absolute and unlimited power be given of God, whereby at his pleasure he may obstruct the fountaines of Iustice, and command Lawyers and Lawes to speake not Gods mind, that is Iustice, righte∣ousnesse, safety, true Religion, but the sole lust and pleasure of one man. And 2. this one having absolute and irresistible influence on all the inferiour Instruments of Iustice, may by this power turne all into Anarchy, and put the people in a worse condition, then if there were no Iudge at all in the Land. For that of Polititians, that Ty∣ranny is better then Anarchy, is to be taken Cum grano salis; but I shall never beleeve, that absolute power of one man, which is actu primo, Tyranny is Gods sufficient way of peaceable government. Therefore Barclaius saith nothing for the contrary, when he saith,* 1.24 The Athenians made Draco and Solon absolute Law-givers, For, a facto adjus non valet consequentia. What if a roving people trusting Draco and Solon to be Kings above mortall men, and to be gods, gave them power to make Lawes written, not with Inke, but with blood: Shall other Kings have from God the like Tyrannicall and bloody power from that, to make bloody Lawes? Chytreus, Lib. 2. and Sleidan citeth it. l. 1. Sueton. Sub paena periurii non tenentur fidem sevare regi degeneri.

9. He who is regulated by Law, and sweareth to the three E∣states* 1.25 to be regulated by Law, and accepteth the Crown Covenant∣wise, and so as the Estates would refuse to make him their King, if either he should refuse to sweare, or if they did beleeve certainly that he would breake his oath; he hath no illimited and absolute power from God or the People: for, faedus conditionatum, aut pre∣missio conditionalis mutua, facit jus alteri in alterum: A mutuall conditionall Covenant giveth law and power over one to another. But from that which hath been said; The King sweareth to the three Estates, to be regulated by Law; He accepteth the Crowne upon the tenor of a mutuall covenant, &c. for if he should, as King, sweare to be King, that is, one who hath absolute power above a Law; and also to be regulated by a Law: he should sweare things contradictorie, that is, that he should be their King, having abso∣lute power over them, and according to that power to rule them: and he should sweare, not to be their King, and to rule them, not according to absolute power, but according to Law. If therefore this absolute power be essentiall to a King, as a King; no King can lawfully take the oath to governe according to Law: for then he should sweare not to reigne as King, and not be their King; For how could he be their King, wanting that which God hath made es∣sentiall to a King, as a King?

Notes

• * 1.1

  Ferne par. 3. Defence. Sect. 3. pag. pag. 1••.
• * 1.2

  The question is not, if the King be so ab∣solute as he is freed from all Morall re∣straint com∣ming from Gods Law.
• * 1.3

  Sacr. sanc. Maj. cap. 14. p. 1••3.
• * 1.4

  No resisting of the most Tur∣kish Tyran by the Royalists way.
• * 1.5

  An absolute King more ab∣solute then the Great Turke, by Royalists way.
• * 1.6

  No law at all, by Royalists way, to im∣pede a King from a super∣inundation of overflowing Tyrann••▪
• * 1.7

  1 Arg. against Absolutenesse of Kings.
• * 1.8

  Why the King a breathing Law? three reasons.
• * 1.9

  2. Argument against an ab∣solute King: The People have no abso∣lute power o∣ver themselves, and so cannot make over any such power to the King.
• * 1.10

  Arg. 3.
• * 1.11

  Against an ab∣solute Prince.
• * 1.12

  Power Tyran∣nicall is not from God.
• * 1.13

  Barclaius contr. Monarcho. l. 2. pag. 62.
• * 1.14

  That evasion removed, Ty∣rannicall pow∣er is not from God, but a power to do ill, so as no mortall man may resist, is from God.
• * 1.15

  Argum. 4. Against an ab∣solute Prince. A King as a King must be a plague, i•• God be the Creator of an absolute Prince.
• * 1.16

  The goodnesse of an absolute Prince in not putting forth his power in actuall de∣stroying of the people, hinder∣eth not the power to be actu primo, Tyrannicall.
• * 1.17

  Argum. 5. Against abso∣lute Princes. An absolute Prince against justice, peace, reason, law, &c.
• * 1.18

  Argum. 6. Against an ab∣solute Prince.
• * 1.19

  It is against▪ nature.
• * 1.20

  Arg. 7. Against an ab∣solute Prince, contrary to the fift Comman∣dement.
• * 1.21

  Arg. 8. Against an ab∣solute Prince. The King re∣maineth a bro∣ther when he is King, and may be rebuked, may not take his neighbours vineyard from him.
• * 1.22

  A Damsell forced by the King may vio∣lently resist.
• * 1.23

  No sufficient meanes against all cruelties and unjust vio∣lences, if an ab∣solute Prince be from God, all goe to con∣fusion.
• * 1.24

  Barclaius cont, Monarch. l. 2▪ pag. 76, 77.
• * 1.25

  9. Argument against an ab∣solute Prince. The conditi∣ons tacite or expresse, upon which the Prince recei∣veth the crown fight with all absolute pow∣er.