A free disputation against pretended liberty of conscience tending to resolve doubts moved by Mr. John Goodwin, John Baptist, Dr. Jer. Taylor, the Belgick Arminians, Socinians, and other authors contending for lawlesse liberty, or licentious toleration of sects and heresies. / By Samuel Rutherfurd professor of divinity in the University of St. Andrews.

CHAP. XI. Of the obliging power of Conscience. (Book 11)

LIbertines bewilder themselves,* 1.1 and the Reader, both touching an erroneous conscience, and the obligation thereof, Mr. Williams saith, Such a person (what ever his do∣ctrine be, true or false) suffereth persecution for conscience; as Daniel was cast into the Lions den, and many thousand Christians, and the Apostles were persecuted, because they durst not cease to prea•••• and practise what they beleeved was by God commanded.

But this is a foule mistake, Daniel suffered not for con∣science simply, because he practised what he beleeved to be truth, but because he practised what he truely congr••enter Dei voluntati revelatae, congruously and agreeably to the re∣vealed will of God, he beleeved, and the like is to be said of the Apostles, not the conveniency, and commensurablenesse of their practise, and their conscience simply, but their be∣leeving,

••all modo, such a way made their sufferings to bee suf∣ferings for righteousnesse sake; for then must we say that Paul persecuted with the tongue, the Corinthians for their con∣science, 1 Cor. 15. 34. Awake to righteousnesse and sin not, I speake•• it to your shame, for some have not the knowledge of God. Those that denyed the resurrection; through errour of conscience, said the dead shall not rise againe, for Paul proves by strong arguments that the dead shall rise, and so takes away the errour of their conscience, why then puts he shame and re∣proach on them, and names them fooles, and void of the knowledge of God? and such as beleeved in vaine? it was not in their power to correct the errors of their conscience, and if they maintained, what they beleeved in conscience, was true (as by Pauls demonstrating the truth to their con∣science is evident) they were persecuted for righteousnesse, if out of meere innocent and faultlesse ignorance, they de∣nyed the resurrection, Paul should deale more gently with them, then upbraid them as fooles and Epi••ures who said, Let us eat, for to morrow, we shall dye, if they did all beleeve the Resurrection, and yet professed the contrary, there was no need to take paines as he doth to prove it.

Saul killed the Gibeonites out of zeale to the children of Israel:* 1.2 It is like the blinde ignorant zeale he had, thinking the Cove∣nant that Joshua made with them, did not oblige the posteri∣ty, was the cause of his murthering of them, yet he suffered not in his sons that were hanged for that blinde zeale, as righteous, and following the rule of his conscience in that.

But touching an erring conscience, the question is not whether an erroneous conscience doth so tye, that we must do nothing on the contrary, nor is the question whether the nearest actually obliging rule, be conscience; the Arminians tell us, Though the word of God, of it selfe, and by it selfe, have power to oblige, yet it actually obligeth no man, ex∣cept it be understood, and so is beleeved to bee understood, after we use all possible diligence and prudence, for no man is obliged to follow the true sense of the word against his conscience, though it be erroneous; but we thinke the word of God is both the farrest and nearest, and the onely obli∣ging rule, and that the dytement of the conscience doth nei∣ther

binde potentially nor actually,* 1.3 but is a meere 〈◊〉〈◊〉, a messenger and an officiall relater of the will and mind to God, to us, and all the obliging power is from the word, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the messenger of a King and Judge, is not the obliging 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that tyes the subject, or the Heraulds promulgation of the Law, is no obliging rule, for promulgation of Heraulds, is common both to just and to unjust lawes, and certainly un∣just lawes from a just Prince lay no band on the conscience or on the man, farre lesse can the promulgation as the pro∣mulgation lay any bands on the conscience, the word of a Messenger and Herauld is at the best but a condition, or the approximation of the obliging power to us, but all the ob∣liging power is from the King and the Judge. It is most false then, that these Libertines say, that the word doth not actually oblige, except it be understood, for the understanding, informa∣tion, and indycement of conscience, doth not adde any actu∣all obligation to the word that it had not before, it onely is a Reporter, to carry both the word and the actuall obli∣gation to the man; the Herauld promulgating the law, addes no obligation actuall or potentiall to the law that it had not before, onely it makes an union, in distance, and neare application and conjunction between the actually obliging law, and the understanding knowledge of the person, or subject, who is obliged to keep the law, though it bee true the fire cannot actually burne, but as timber is cast to it, yet the fire hath from its owne nature both potentiall and actu∣all burning, not from the act of casting the timber in the fire; nor is this a concludent reason, no man is obliged follow how the true sense of the word against his conscience, though erroneous, ergo, the erroneous conscience doth oblige, or ergo, actuall obligation to obedience is not from the word, but from the con∣science; no more then this is a good consequence, no man is obliged to obey the Law in it selfe, iust contrary to the pro∣mulgation of an erring and mistaking Herauld, ergo, the mistaking Heraulds promulgation giveth to the Law actuall obligation over the subject, for it onely followeth, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 we are not to doe contrary to the actuall indic••ment of an erroneous conscience, but not obliged to follow the erro∣neous conscience, nor are we obliged to follow what our

conscience saith is true and good, because, or upon this formall reason and ground, that the conscience saith so, more then we are to beleeve and practise, what the Church or the conscience of others: the Church, the learned and god∣ly say, for we make not the word of the Church the formal object of our faith, but (thus saith the Lord onely) because the Church is but a company of men, and so our faith should depend upon men, even though holy and speaking ingenuously what their conscience dictates as true, which is absurd, ergo, by the same reason, what one mans con∣science, our owne, or others say, is not the formall object of our faith and practises, for so also our faith should de∣pend on man, not on God. And we say the conscience at its best, is but Regula Regulata not, Regula Regulans, nor ought it to have the throne of God, for God is only Regula Regu∣lans. If it were a rule, it is to bee ruled by God, and his word, yea, as we are to try all things and not beleeve with a blind faith what others say, or their conscience propos∣eth to themselves and us, as truth, for then we make a Pope of the consciences of men, under the notion of teachers and Church, so we are not to be ruled without trying, and absolutly by our owne conscience, but to try its dictates by the word of God, otherwise wee make a Pope, and a God of our owne conscience.

Some say, as a right informed conscience obliegeth to doe what it dictates, so an erroneous conscience obliegeth to do according to its prescript. Durandus and others saith, ••gat non obligat, it bindeth that yee cannot doe against it, which some call negative obligation, but non obligat, it obliegeth not as a divine rule,* 1.4 which is positive obligation.

Tannerus saith, A Conscience that invincibly erreth, both bind∣eth, that we cannot doe against it, and obliegeth that we should not follow it. Which hath truth in the matter of fact, a Judge invincibly ignorant of an accused mans innocency, when two or three witnesses doe sweare hee is guilty, doth law∣fully condemne the innocent man, having used all 〈◊〉〈◊〉 diligence to finde out the truth, and not being 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to find it, but this is rather error or ignorance of the fact, than an erronious conscience, for hee proceeds according to the

law, with a well-informed conscience, following what the law saith, by the mouth of two or three witnesses shall every thing be established. The erroneous conscience so long as it remaineth, by the law of nature, layeth on an obligation on a man, not to doe against it, Rom. 14. 14. To 〈…〉〈…〉 the esteemeth any thing to be uncleane, to him it is uncleane, vers. 23. He that doubteth is damned, if he eat, because he eateth not of faith, for whatsoever is not of faith is sinne. So Ambrose, our opinion layeth a law upon us. Gammacheus saith it is a vain distincti∣on of binding and oblieging,* 1.5 Inter ligationem & obligationem. And that we are oblieged to follow an erroneous consciencesse long as it continueth erroneous, because here (saith hee) 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dispute not concerning that which is good, but that which is com∣manded, But if the conscience dictate that something is to be com∣manded and to bee done under paine of sinne, and yet we doe i•• not, we resist conscience, and so we sin, because the obligation is no mere 〈◊〉〈◊〉 good onely,* 1.6 but rather to that which is commanded. The Jesuite M••l∣derus saith the same; Contientiam erroneam & ligare & oblig••re, because an object materially considered is such, an object by 〈◊〉〈◊〉, but it is an object per se, kindly when it is proposed by practicall ••••••∣son, for what is not of faith is sinne, Gal. 5. 3. I testifie to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 one that is circumcised, that hee is debter to doe the whole law.

Answ. There can be no reason, why conscience, because conscience, or because wicked, more obliegeth; then why Will, because wicked will should obliege, since in every wicked conscience actually drawing men to ill, of either heresie or practise, there is something of wicked Will, and though there were nothing of will, or of the affections in an erroneous conscience, yet since conscience as a know∣ing faculty is under the law of God, an erroneous con∣science must bee a transgressing conscience, and it is a contradiction, that a faculty sinning should obliege to obedience to the law of God, in the same conside∣ration, because it sinneth. But these Schoole-••••••∣ties doe not obliege us, wee shall bee unwilling in any tearmes to say that God, or, which is all one, the law of nature, layeth on us an obligation to that which is sinfull, or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 if any thinke he is oblieged to be circumcised, sure he must thinke himselfe oblieged to eate the passeover also, and to

keepe the whole Ceremoniall law, but that the law of na∣ture obliegeth him either so to thinke, and erroneous∣ly beleeve and practise, the whole Ceremoniall Law is ano∣ther thing. It is true, a doubting conscience, that thinks hee is oblieged by the law to abstaine from eating swines flesh, is either oblieged to eate swines flesh, or not to eate, for to eate, or not eate, are opposed by way of contradi∣ction, but there is no apparent contradiction but admit∣eth of some qualification, and modification, set the con∣tradiction in an evangelicall sence, as you must, and then it shall be, there be none in the visible Church, but he must either eate in faith, or not eate in faith, he must either bee circumcised in faith, and in a certaine perswasion that cir∣cumcision is acceptable to God, or hee must not bee cir∣cumcised in faith, &c. For both the Law and Gospell obliege to the action and to all the manner, way, and re∣quisite circumstances of the action, to wit; that it be done in faith, sincerely for God, in a due manner, &c. Now so wee say; hee is neither to eate simply, nor not to eate simply, but either to eate in faith, or to abstaine from eat∣ing in faith, and without an erring and doubting conscience: and we are not to do upon a supposition, that the conscience stand erroneous, nor hath the erroneous conscience any warrant at all, nor commission from the Sovereigne Lord of conscience, to command you to beleeve you must be cir∣cumcised, or upon the supposall of that faith to obliege you to be circumcised, more then any earthly judge hath a warrant from God to command murther or robery; nor is it a law of nature, or of God that you must do absolutely and without trying what an erroneous conscience indites you to do, under paine of sin, nor is it a sin to resist an eroneous con∣science by not doing, or suspending the action, more then it is a sin not to obey an earthly Judge, when he commandeth beside, and contrary to the law of the supreame Law-giver. No wonder they make a Pope of conscience, who make the conscience of the Pope the supream court that obliegeth all men on earth. The reason of this errour is, Papists (and Libertines joyn with them in this) dreame hat as God doth command unerringly, & indeclinably, so hte hath communi∣cated

to Popes and Heraulds, and to every lawful 〈◊〉〈◊〉 under him, and so to the conscience, that they may ••••∣errandly, and indeclinably also command, but they should remember when power of commanding comes out of God, the fountain of authority, now it looseth its absolute unde∣clinablenesse, when it is in conscience, or in any creature, and it is onely conditionall and limited in the streames, whereas it was absolute and soveraigne in the fountaine.

2 In the case of an erroneous conscience standing in its vigorous thing, the question is, both, what is commanded, and what is good, for these two are not contrary, but agree well: for the Lords command to Adam (eate not of this fruit) is to Adam the cause why the not eating is good, and the cause of the obligation to what is commanded also, but onely the obligation is (ad modum facti, non ad factum) to the ••••••∣ner of doing, that if we doe, or abstaine, we do it 〈…〉〈…〉, in faith, and perswasion without any jarring between the conscience and the object, but there is no obligation to the fact. On the regular way of doing, I am never ob∣lieged to obey God with an erring conscience, or contrary to the inditement of an erring conscience.

3 The material object being sin, and forbidden by the law of God, is an object by accident, even when it is proposed by practicall reason, if that reason be erroneous, and mis∣informed, as it is in this case, the proposing of practicall reason, doth not make that to bee good or commanded, which of it selfe was neither good nor commanded, but sinfull, it may make it good in the manner of doing, and obliege in the manner of doing, but that is not our questi∣on, but whether the practicall judgement and conscience remaining erroneous, doth both ligare, bind and obliege to the fact that is sinfull, that is denied. And though hee that is circumcised upon the supposall of a blind, erring, and Jewish conscience, thinking the law of shaddowes ob∣liegeth when the body Christ is come, he is a debter to doe the whole Law, and to eate the Passeover, to sacrifice at Jerusa∣lem, to keepe the new-Moones, &c. But how is he debter? He is this way debter, what warrant he hath to be circum∣cised, he hath the same warrant to keepe the Passeover, to

sacrifice, that is, he hath as good reason for to doe all, or is as well obliged upon his false principles he goes on, to keep all the law of ceremonies as to be circumcised, or doe a part onely, but he is erroneously and sinfully made, by himselfe, a debter to the whole Law, but God made him a debter nei∣ther to the one, nor to the other, and in Gods Court, though if he be circumcised, he must be circumcised this way, that is, his conscience must dictate that Gods Law still in force commands him so to doe, but this is but a necessity of sup∣position that falleth upon the manner of the doing, not upon the fact, for no Law of God warranteth him to be cir∣cumcised, and no Law of God makes him debter to doe all the rest of the law of ceremonies, he is obliged neither to be circumcised erroneously, nor to abstaine from circumcision erroneously, but to lay aside his erroneous conscience, and to abstaine from circumcision according to the enditement of a well informed conscience.

So we easily answer that ignorant objection of phanta∣sticall Sectaries,* 1.7 in needlesse Pamphlets and Queries, smel∣ling of non-sense and selfe-conceit, speaking they know not what: If the sword be used against errours to suppresse them, then must the Magistrate command and compell men of tender consci∣ences to sinne,* 1.8 and to doe against the light of their conscience; for what is not of faith, is sinne. And the Spirit himselfe waites and vio∣lates not the liberty of the reasonable soule, by superseding the faculties thereof, but approves every truth to the understanding, and moves the will without violence, with a rationall force: Shall man be more zea∣lous for God, then God is for himselfe? God himselfe doth not force men, but call them to repentance.—If the word (calling) be consi∣dered, whether will it warrant any further meanes then arguments, perswasions, and intreaties (make them as forceable us you can) if you hold the feare of punishment over men, it must be the feare of di∣vine punishment, &c.

Answ. For 1. wee no where teach that the sword is a meanes of converting, but the just vengeance that is in∣flicted by the Minister of God upon false teachers, as upon other evill doers, so it is not destinated by God for spiritual gaining and reducing of hereticks that may repent, but for judiciall expiation of wrongs done to the flock and Christi∣an society.

2. This poore argument will conclude against all 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Magistrates, against murtherers, bloody traitors, for the Lawes of the Minister of God, the King forbids the Eng∣lish Jesuit to stab his Prince, and compells him to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from King-killing, and if this Jesuit abstaine from killing his Sovereigne Lord, and abstain not in faith, but against the light of his Jesuiticall and bloody conscience, which dictates to him, that he is a Protestant Prince and a heretick, and he is obliged in conscience for the advancement of the Ca∣tholicke cause to stabbe him, doth the supreme Magistrate compell this Jesuit to sin? and doth hee force the Jesuits conscience? for to doe in faith hath place in duties of the second Table, as well as in the first, and men out of consci∣ence and in faith, and moved by the Holy Ghosts gracious actings are to obey all lawfull commands of the Magistrate, as to pay tribute, to abstain from murther, treason, adultery, robbing and stealing, if they be subjects of tender consci∣ences, and why then should the Magistrate compell and force men to these duties which are to be done in faith, and in a spirituall manner? for sure the Spirit forces them not to doe these in faith, so the command of the Magistrate mo∣veth every Christian to practise, and act of obedience to mens Lawes for conscience sake, and the Spirit moves the whole powers of the soul, both the understanding and the will without violence, with a rationall force, and why should the Magistrate then be more zealous for God, then God is for himselfe? and all this may be said against all Lawes in the Old Testa∣ment, why should the Magistrate compell men against their faith and conscience not to beleeve, not to practise any such seducing wayes, as to say, Come let us goe serve other Gods, Should Moses be more zealous for God, then God is for himselfe? but the truth is, the Magistrate as the Magistrate doth not meddle with the conscience, not the manner of obedience to Law, whether they be obeyed in faith, or against the light of conscience, that is nothing to him, he commands but the externall actions, preach no heresie, no Familisme, Soci••••∣nisme under the paine of corporall punishment; if Pastors obey this charge hypocritically, not in faith, it is their sin, not the Magistrates, he neither commands thus, preach no heresie, in faith and perswasion, nor yet, in no faith, in no perswa∣sion.

And Augustine tells us the Donatists objected the same,* 1.9 God compelleth none, but hath given men freewill to obey him, contr. petil. l. 2. c. 83. Epist, 48. ad vincention, Contr. Gaudenti••••. l. 1. c. 25 Contr. Cresc. l. 3. c. 51. which I often re-minde the Reader of, and the Donatists also said this compulsion makes hypo∣crites, when they are compelled to goe to heare the word, Augustine answers, Although some that are compelled to beare remain hypocrites and counterfeit, yet for these, such as are sincere, should not have been left ungathered in.

And for that of Gods calling to repentance,* 1.10 he is but an ignorant senselesse man who wrote that booke. The Spirit waits, (saith hee) and violates not liberty. If the meaning bee, the Lord is long-suffering and patient, and lets men goe on in their sins, and in his owne time effectually calleth them, this is a senselesse sense, for God waits not on one out of his longanimity and forbearance, lest he should force freewill, for the freewill is ever alike impotent, rebellious and refra∣ctory, till God subdue it, if the meaning be (as another sense it cannot have) The Spirit waites and violates not liberty, that is, the Spirit waites untill freewill be in a good blood and a congruous disposition to obey, and then the Spirit, for feare of forcing of it, if he should come on it undexte∣rously to worke it against the haire; catcheth the opportu∣nity when he sees it is not on a straine of rebellion, and in a distemper, and then he drawes the freewill without force; the man (I judge) is innocent and uncapable of this school∣heresie of late Jesuits, who devise a Pelagian congruous cal∣ling: and this were nothing to the purpose, and should neither have head nor feet to the matter in hand, for the Spirit who can carry freewill, though most rebelliously di∣stempered his way, is not afraid of freewills contradictori∣ous opposing, but can in every moment subdue freewill without forcing, he never waites on, for such a matter, ex∣cept there bee a time when freewill is to hard a party for the Spirit to yoake withall; or when nature or some prepa∣ratory grace makes it easier for the Spirit to conquiesse, con∣sent at one time more then another.

2. Gods not forcing of freewill is no rule to the Magistrate not to awe men to abstaine from perverting of soules for

fear of the sword, for by the same reason, because Gods Spirit moves the Saints to be subject to every ordinance of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Judge, or good Law, for the Lords sake, and for conscience, for hee must obey this, Rom. 13. 5. 1 Pet. 2. 13. and the Spirit compells not in these more then in the others; so this argument, God must worke faith, give repentance, and make a willing peo∣ple, ergo,* 1.11 the Christian Magistrate cannot with his authority doe it, is all granted. This is but a very rotten rush, a straw, Entbysiasts so argue, God teacheth sufficiently, ergo, the Scriptu•••• and ministery of men are not requisite, the discipline of the godly Magistrate cannot ascend so high as to have influence on the conscience and beget faith no more then the preaching of the word by the Ministers of the Gospel without the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, ergo, the godly Magistrate cannot with the sword keepe the externall man in outward obedience to Gospel-ordinances, it in no sort can can be a good consequence, nor is it good divinity to say with Pelagians and Arminians, that the calling of God extends no further then to arguments, perswasions, intreaties and threatnings, for the calling of God exten∣deth further then to so much as man can doe, in calling of sinners to repentance, but men can act upon the minde, will, and reasonable soule, by arguments, perswasions, intreaties and threatnings, for all that is done by the Ministery of men. But in effectuall calling (of which we here speake) it is certaine, the Lord infuseth a new heart, a new spirit, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 efficaciously to the Son, which is a further and higher 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of omnipotencies, calling and drawing, then all the morall perswasion by arguments, intreaties, and threatnings, per∣formable by men or Angels; so this man is either an igno∣rant or a grosse Arminian.

Now from all this, it is easie to expound that character which the Holy Ghost putteth upon the hereticke,* 1.12 Tit. 3. 10. he is judged or condemned of himselfe, that is, the truth is so clearely opened to him, or he may, if he did not wincke, and shut his eyes, clearely see and beleeve the truth, if he did not knowingly, prudently, and willingly resist the truth, and therefore is condemned by his owne heart.

But Minus Celsus saith,* 1.13 the words carry a farre other sense, to wit, That by sinning he is the authour of his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 condem∣nation,

because in chusing true Religion, be thinkes he both made a right choice, when he hath chosen a false Religion, being deceived by his owne judgement, he falleth into damnation, which, miserable man, he hath created to himselfe, and in which he chuseth to persist, and therefore is to be esehewed. So it is said, the Jews judged themselves unworthy of eternall life, but knowingly they judged not so of them∣selves, but they did so behave themselves as if they made themselves unworthy of eternall life. So I beleeve the hereticke is called selfe-condemned, because he doth those things that renders himselfe wor∣thy of damnation. So Castalio, or he is selfe-condemned, that is, he is damned, though there were none to condemne him but himselfe. So Erasmus.

Answ. He is selfe-condemned, who may be condemned by his owne conscience, though for the present the consci∣ence be burnt with a hot iron, and the man will not permit it to summon, accuse, condemne, no lesse then hee who is actually condemned of his conscience, for it is a laudable act, and a naturall vertue of the conscience to give sentence against a heresie when it ought so to doe, as it is a vice of the conscience to be dumbe at heresies; but if he love the truth, though he cannot actually condemne the heresie, hee is not selfe-condemned.

The hereticke (saith Celsus) is an innocent man, and is not such a man as sins against light, nor maliciously, nor with an ill conscience, nor is his end gaine, pleasure, nor an ambi∣tious lusting after a name, hee seeth none of these are at∣taineable, yea, it is his desire of life eternall, and his ••eale that setteth him on worke, and rather or he dishonour God and deny the knowne truth, and sin against his conscience, he had rather chuse torment, and dye a martyr, and drinke that direfull and bitter cup of death, which was so terrible to Jesus Christ, that it caused him to fall to the earth, sweat blood and water. So he, fol. 14, 15, 16. which if it be true, an hereticke is rather an innocent Angell, then a guilty man, condemned of his owne conscience. Yet Minus C••lsus saith here, he behaveth himselfe as one worthy of damna∣tion, and damned, though none but himselfe condemne him, 1 Joh. 3. 20. For if our heart condemne us, God is greater then our heart and knoweth all things. It is like then, an innocent man is

condemned, and his company to be eschewed as a pestilent wretched man.

Yet the Arminians say, though discipline is to be exercised on hereticks condemned by themselves,* 1.14 yet are they bewitched with A great prejudice—so as heresie is a vice of nature rather then of free∣will. And in another place, onely nature, by no fault of heretickes, void of grace, begetteth these errours, and not freewill despising the help of grace; they are seduced not of their owne accord, but by necessity of nature,* 1.15 for they seduce not because they will seduce, but because they cannot seduce.

It needs not an answer, that they say, the Jews judged them∣selves unworthy of life eternall, not knowingly, for knowingly they did it, Act. 13. v. 45. they spake against the convincing and enlightning Gospel, contradicting and blaspheming. So ••. 14. 1, 2. for which sin against the Holy Ghost, Paid turned from them, and preacheth the Gospel to the Gentiles; yea Minus Celsus will have the Jewes to erre innocently in that malicious fact.

Answ. To forbid marriage and meats, can hardly be ar∣raigned as fundamentall errours, nor the Authours such as must deny the Scriptures to be the word of God, yet they are such as depart from the faith, teach doctrines of devils, speke lyes in hypocrisie, and have their conscience burnt with an hot iron; and if hereticks be as innocent as their sin, if it be but a fault of nature, as blindnesse from the wombe, or deafnesse, not of will, but of nature, why are they to be rebuked, accused, condemned of their owne conscience? But they little know the heart of man, who finde not malice, prejudice, pride, desire of glory, to hold up a faction, often gaine and hunger for court to lodge with errours of the minde; and whereas Libertines say we promote truth with blood, we re∣tort it thus, they promote heresie with the sword, and deny thousands of Atheists, bloody men their way, because the•••• purse, the Parliament, the sword, the Army is on their side.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Bloody Tenet c 3 p. 19.
• * 1.2

  R••monst. Apo c. 25 245. Nam v••rbu•• Dei eti∣amsi vin obli∣gandi ex se & p••rse habeat, actu t••••en non obligat quen∣quam nisi intel∣lectum & sic pr••ut adhibi••a omni possibili diligentia & prudentia ••••ncl∣ligendum esse creditur, re••no enim obligatur, ad verum v••rbi divini sensu •• sequ••dum con∣tra conscientiam suam erro••••am.
• * 1.3

  The state of the question touching the obligation that conscience layeth on us.
• * 1.4

  Tanner. Jesuit•• to 2. in 12. disp. 2. q 4. dub. 2. n. 21.
• * 1.5

  Lib. de paradi∣so opinio nostra nobis legem in ponit. Ph••. Gam∣macheu. in 12. q. 19. de act••. hum. c. 2. sect. 173.
• * 1.6

  Malderus 12 q. 19. a••t 5, ••. dis. 84.
• * 1.7

  Ancient bonds of liberty of Conscience, se. 1. c. 6. p. 26.
• * 1.8

  Though the Magistrate pu∣nish false tea∣chers it fol∣loweth not that he com∣pels them to sinne against their consci∣ence.
• * 1.9

  Augustin contr. Gau••e••ti•• n, l. •• c. 24. Et si ficti aliq ••i perseve∣r••••••, non uti∣que ••••op er ipsos 〈◊〉〈◊〉 fucra••t col∣ligendi quos vi∣den••••s ver••••e••.
• * 1.10

  Gods way and manner of cal∣ling, is no ground why the magistrate should not pu∣nish false tea∣chers.
• * 1.11

  Ancient bonds of liberty of Conscience, s. 1 c. 6. p. 26.
• * 1.12

  Who is the self condemned heretick, Tit. 3. 1.
• * 1.13

  〈…〉〈…〉 sect. ••. 1. 13.
• * 1.14

  R••monst. vi. di. l. 2. c. 8. Ut heresis natu∣rae potius quam vitium vo unta∣tis sit.
• * 1.15

  L. 11. c. 2. Er∣r••ces istos sola parit natura per nullam ipsoram culpam destituta gratia, non vo∣luntas auxilium gratia aspernata Seducuntur non sponte sua sed naturae necessita∣te seducunt enim non quia seduce∣re volunt, sed quia non possunt non seducere.