CHAP. VIII.
Whether Antioch, Act. 15. Had right to have ended the con∣troversie amongst themselves, if they had been able; and whether their sending to Jerusalem for helpe, or their knowledge that other Churches were troubled with the like evill, or the party a∣mong themselves who were against the truth, doe prove the contrary. And of supremacy of power in Congregations.
BVt though our Author doe not cleere it to us where the suprema∣cie doth lye yet in this pag 423, and 424. He useth an argument from the practise of the Church of Antioch, Act. 15. And our own Doctrine concerning the same to prove that it doth not lye in the Congregation, which argument we are willing to consider. His words are those. That supremacie of power should bee in a Congregation without any power of appealing, I thinke our Brethren cannot teach. For when the Church of Antioch can∣not judge a matter concerning the necessity of keeping Moses Law, they by Natures direction, Act. 15. 2. Decree to send Paul and Barnabas and others to Jerusalem, to the Apostles and Elders, as to an higher Judicature, that there truth may be determined: and then he addeth that Mr. Tompson and my selfe do teach that the Church of Antioch had jus, power to judge and determine the controversie, but because of the difficulty, had not light to judge thereof (alledging for this in the Margent the answer, Chap. 4. Page 42.) Ergo saith he, they must acknowledge Appeales by Natures light warrantable, as well as wee.
Answ. That appeales are warrantable, and warrantable by Natures light till we come to the supreame judicatorie, this we deny not, but have formerly yeelded no lesse. But for that our Brother here aymes at, viz. Appeales from a Congregatio∣nall Church (as not being supreame) to another Iudicatory, this we conceive is not proved by the example of the Church of Antioch, nor by any thing that we have writ∣ten concerning the same And the reason it because Antioch had right and Authority to have ended the matter amongst themselves if ability had served thereto: and their sending to Ierusalem for helpe may argue want of agreement, or imperfection of light, but argues no want of Authority or right within themselves. For it is plain verse 2, Page 30 that Antioch did endeavour to have ended the matter amongst themselves, and had much disputation about it for that end, afore there was any speech of sending to Ieru∣salem. Now this endeavour doth argue their right; for otherwise it had been sinfull, as being a presuming to do that which did not belong to them. This reason we have rendered afore in the place which our Author alledgeth, and he doth not at all re∣move it; and therefore we are still of the same mind as before, that Antioch was not dependant upon the Iurisdiction of other Churches, but had independant power with∣in themselves, as many may have who yet need the help of light from others, for their direction in using their power. Great Kings and Monarchs have received light from their Councellours without any impeac•ment of their independant power, which they have in themselves, and without any ascribing of that power to those their Counsellours. As we said in the place alledged, Antioch may send to Ierusa∣lem for help, and yet this sending neither prove right of Iurisdiction in them who are sent unto, nor want of Iurisdiction in them who do send.
And therefore whereas our Brother saith, Antioch because of the difficulty of the controversie, had not light to judge thereof, Ergo we must acknow∣ledge Appeales to be warrantable, We would rather argue thus, Antioch want∣ed light, Ergo Counsell and light is to be sought elsewhere; and thus we conceive the inference will hold: but to say, Ergo there must be Appeales from the Congregation to others in matter of Iurisdiction, this we conceive will not follow at all. No more then it will follow, Kings or other supreame civill Rulers must seek light and direction from their Counsellours, Ergo there lyes an appeale from them to those Counsellours, which Consequence none will maintain nor affirme.
If the Scriptures had said that Antioch did never attempt to •nd that controversie, as knowing that the ending thereof belonged not to them but to others: or if it had said, that the censuring of these obtruders of Circumcision had been performed by them of Jerusalem, and not by them of Antioch as not belonging to Antioch but to them of Jerusalem, then our Brother might have had some ground from Antioch to prove the necessity or warrantablenesse of appeales from Congregationall Churches to other Iudicatories: but such no such thing is said, we see not how this example can be any ground for the establishing of such appeales, or the taking away from Congre∣gationall Churches their power of Iurisdiction within themselves.
Especially, wee see not how this our Brother can alledge the same for such a pur∣pose, considering what himselfe hath written elsewhere in this learned Treatise of his wherein he examines that answer of ours. Two passages in his treatise I propound to consideration, which seeme to me to make for that independant or supreame power in Congregations, which here he is disputing against, the one is that which we touched before in his Page 413. Where he saith that Synods in case of neglect of Presbyteriall Churches are to command the particular Churches whom it concerneth, to do their dutie, as in other particulars there named, so in ex∣communication of offenders; and further that the Synod, Act. 15. Is to remit the censure of Excommunication to the Presbytery of Antioch and Ierusalem, in case of the obstina•ie of these obtruders of Circumcision. Which I conceive is very truly spoken, and thereupon it followes that there was a su∣premacie Page 31 of Iurisdiction in that Church of Antioch, and no necessity of appealing from them to the Iurisdiction of others. For •ith the Synods are only to command the Chur∣ches to do their duty, and to remit the censure of offenders to the Churches them∣selves to whom the offenders belong, it plainly appeareth thereby where the supre∣macie of Iurisdiction doth lye.
The other place is in his Page 307. Where we have these words, viz. The power of Jurisdiction ordinary intensive and quo ad essentiam Ec∣clesiae Ministerialis, according to the intire essence of a Ministeriall Church, is as perfect and compleat in one single Congregation as in a Pro∣vinciall, as in a Nationall. Yea as in the Catholike visible body whereof Christ is the head. Now if there be such perfect & compleat power of Iurisdiction in a single Congregation, I know not how there can be such necessity of Appeales from them to the Iurisdiction of others as he is pleading for, nor how that supreame and independant power in Congregations can be denyed, which here he disputeth a∣gainst. For let this compleat and perfect Power of Iurisdiction be acknowledged as due to such Churches, and appeales from them to other Iurisdictions will be of small necessity or use.
I know indeed this Reverend Author sayeth in the Page last mentioned, and with∣in a few lines of the words which I have here alledged, That a Congregation is so a part of the Presbytery that it hath not a whole intire compleat inten∣sive power over its own members to Excommunicate them—. And therefore the consociated Churches must have a power over the members of a Congregation. Which words I confesse seeme not well to agree with the former, because in the one intire compleat intensive Power is denyed to a Congregation, and in the other the Power of Iurisdiction, ordinary intensive, is said to be as compleat and perfect in the Congregation as in the great Churches. But it is not the latter words but the former which I do stand upon; and by them (as I conceive) the supre∣macie of Congregations is established, and the necessity of appeales from them to o∣ther Iurisdictions is cleerely takes away. For if the Power of Iurisdiction be as intire perfect and compleat in the Congregation as in the greater Churches, as our Bro∣ther expresly affirmes it to be, I know not the reason why there must be appeales from the Iurisdiction of the Congregation unto the Iurisdiction of those other Chur∣ches. If the Power spoken of were more imperfect and incompleat in the Congrega∣tion, then it is in the other Churches, then there might be more reason or •ayrer pretence for those appeales: but sith our Author confesseth it is no more intire com∣pleat and perfect in these then in the Congregation, but as compleat and perfect in the Congregation as it is in the other, I am yet to seeke of a sufficient ground for the necessity of appeales from the Iurisdiction in a Congregation. For is it reasonable to appeale from one Iudicatory to another, and yet the power of Iurisdiction be as intire compleat and perfect in the former from which the appeale is made, as in the latter to which the cause is brought by such appeale? It seemes by such appeales we are not like to be much helper, nor much to mend the matter above what it was before, and therefore the usefulnesse and necessity thereof is still uncl••••.
I thinke the Brethren erre in this to teach that Antioch had power to Page 32 determine the controversie, Act. 15. When the Churches of Syria and Cicilia, to their knowledge were troubled with the like question as verse 24. may cleere,—I doubt much if they had power to determine a questi∣on that so much concerned all the Churches.
Answ. It is not cleere from verse 24. nor from any part of the Chapter as farre as I can find, that Antioch did know that other Churches were troubled with this questi∣on; and if they had known it, I see nothing therein but they might notwithstanding lawfully end the matter so farre as concerned themselves. For when this question was started amongst them by such as came from Judea and taught this corrupt Doc∣trine at Antioch, the text is very cleere verse 2, that they had much disputation a∣mongst themselves to have ended the matter, afore there was any speech of sending to Ierusalem: which disputation is an argument that they had right to have ended it, if ability had no• been wanting.
And as for our Brothers reason for the contrary taken from their knowledge that the other Churches of Syria and Cicilia were troubled with the like question, there is not one word in the verse alledged to shew that Antioch had knowledge of any such matter, nor is Syria and Cicilia once mentioned therein: And though they be men∣tioned verse 23. Yet neither doth this verse declare that Antioch had any knowledge that this question had ever troubled those other Churches. Say it be true that indeed they had been troubled therewith, and that the Epistle from the Synod doth intimate no lesse, this may prove that when the Epistle came to be read at Antioch, then Anti∣och by this meanes might come to the knowledge thereof; but all this doth not prove that Antioch knew so much afore. And therefore they might endeavour to end the matter amongst themselves, as not knowing for any thing our Author hath yet brought to the contrary, that any other Churches besides themselves were troubled therewith. But suppose they had known so much, I see nothing in this to hinder but Antioch might lawfully cleere up the truth in the question, and censure such of their Church as should obstinately hold and teach that false Doctrine, notwithstanding their knowledge that others had been troubled with the like Doctrine and teachers. Suppose a Christian family be troubled with lying Children, or servants, or such as are disobedient and undutifull in one kind or in another; suppose they also knew that their neighbour families are troubled with the like, shall this knowledge of theirs hinder the Parents or Masters in such a family from censuring or correcting these that are under their government, according to their demerits? If not, why shall An∣tioch be hindered from censuring offending members of their Church, only upon this ground because to their knowledge other Churches are troubled with the like offenders? A City or Corporation is troubled with Drunkards, with theeves, or other vicious and lewd persons, and knoweth that other Cities or Corporations are troubled with the like: A Nationall Church, as Scotland for example, is troubled with obtruders of Ceremonies, Service booke, Episcopacie or other corruptions, and know∣eth that England or other Churches are troubled with the like, shall Scotland now be hindered from removing these corruptions, and the obtruders of them from amongst themselves, only upon this ground, because England to their knowledge is troubled with the like? Or shall the Corporation •ee hindered from punishing theeves and such other malefactors, only for this reason, because to their knowledge other Cor∣porations Page 33 are troubled with the like lewd persons? I suppose it is easie to see the in∣sufficiency and invalidity of such Consequences? And therefore if Antioch did know that other Churches were troubled with the like offenders, as themselves were trou∣bled withall, this needs not to hinder but they may determine questions that arise a∣mongst themselves, and may censure such of their members as shall trouble the Church or Brethren therewith, and obstinately persist in so doing.
This being considered withall, that in thus doing they do not go beyond their line, nor meddle with matters any farther but as they are within their Compasse. For when divers Churches are troubled with the like corruptions in Doctrine or practise, and some one of those Churches by using the Key of Doctrine or discipline or both, doth endeavour the removall of these corruptions, they do not hereby attempt and endea∣vour to remove them out of other Churches (which might be an appearance of stretching their line beyond their compasse) but out of their own Church, and only so farre as concernes themselves, and in so doing no man can justly say they meddle further then their Power doth reach.
But he gives another reason why Antioch had not right to determine the question, And this is taken from the strong party that was in Antioch against the truth, which was such as that they opposed Paul and Barnabas: concer∣ning which he saith, that when the greatest part of a Church as Antioch is against the truth, as is cleere, Act. 15. 2. He beleeveth in that they loose their jus, their right to determine eatenus in so farre; for Christ hath given no Ecclesiasticall right and power to determine against the truth, but onely for truth; and therefore in this, Appeales must be necessary.
Answ. How is it cleere that the greatst part of the Church at Antioch was against the truth? The text doth not say so much, but only this, that certain men which came from Iudea, taught the Brethren and said except ye be Circumcised ye cannot be saved, and that Paul and Barnabas had no small dissension and disputation with them about the matter, and that in the issue they determined that Paul and Barnabas and certaine others should go up to Ierusalem about the question: Thus much the Scripture witnesseth, Act. 15. 1, 2. But whether they that held that corrupt Doctrine at Antioch were the major or the minor part of the Church, the text doth not expresse, except we shall say that where a false Doctrine is taught by some, and greatly oppo∣sed and disputed against by others, there it must needs bee that the greatest part are tainted with that false Doctrine, which wee thinke is no good Consequence. And therefore whereas our Author saith, the greatest part of this Church was against the Truth, and that so much is cleere from verse 2. I answer, first that I do not perceive this cleerenesse, neither from verse 2, nor from any other place of the Chapter.
Nextly, suppose this were cleere, this may argue that they wanted ability and light to end the matter, but must it needs argue that they wanted right though they had been able? Or shall we say that they who want ability to doe things as they should be done, do therefore want right to ••al• in them at all? I conceive it will not fol∣low, Page 34 and the reason is because this right in Churches is Naturall, or Connaturall to e∣very Church, and this want of ability is only accidentall, and therefore this latter cannot totally hinder the former.
That light of government is Naturall or connaturall to every Church, our Bro∣ther own words do testifie Page 341. Where he saith this, viz. Supposing that Christ have a visible Church it is morall that she have power of govern∣ment also, in so farre as she is a Church; yea, power of government upon this supposition is Naturall or rather connaturall. And in Page 307, he saith as was alledged before, That the power of Iurisdiction ordinary intensive—. Is as perfect and compleat in one single Congregation as in a Provinciall, or in a Nationall; yea, as in the Catholike visible body whereof Christ is the head. And in Page 383. He saith, That to a Congregation Christ hath given by an immediate flux from himselfe a politicall Church power intrinsci•ally in it, derived from none but imme∣diately from Iesus Christ: And the like he saith of a Presbyteriall Church. Now whether Antioch was a Congregationall Church as we hold, or a Presbyteriall as is holden by this our Brother, yet it is cleere by those words of his here alledged, that being essentially a Church; it had a politicall Church power intrinscically within it selfe, yet a perfect and compleat power of Iurisdiction, yea and such a power as was naturall or connaturall unto her, as she was a Church. But now the light of know∣ledge whereby they should be enabled well to use this power, did not adde any power unto them which they had not before, not did the want of it, being but accidentall, deprive them of that Power, which was intrinscicall, essentiall and connaturall unto them as they were a Church of Christ. Onely this want did hinder their ability to expresse their power well, but their right as being a thing Connaturall did still remaine.
Our Brother hath a saying or two about the civill Power, which by proportion may well illustrate this that I am speaking o••bo it ye Church-power. In one place he saith thus, There is a two-fold power in a King, one in a King as a King, and this is a like in all, and ordinary regall, coactive: whether the King be an Heathen, a Turke, or a sound believing Christian: there is another pow∣er in a King as such a King, either as a Propheticall King as David and Solomon or as a Christian believing King. And of this latter he saith, that it is not a new regall power, but potestas execuliba, a power or gra∣cious ability to execute the Kingly Power, which he had before as a King; Page 387. &c. 388. •ow why may it not be said in like sort, there is in a Church two-fold Power, one in a Church as it is a Church, and this is a like in all true Churches of Christ, whether the Church in this or that particular questi∣on have light to discerne, and hold the truth, or otherwise: another in a Church, as it is sound believing Church, holding the truth in such or such question; and this is but only a gracious ability to exercise the power which they had before, not adding to them any new Power at all? Againe, in his Page 393. he hath these words. Page 35 Though the King were not a Christian Magistrate, yet hath he a Kingly power to command men as Christians, and it is by accident that he cannot in that state command Christian duties, and service to Christ; because he will not, and cannot command those dutyes remaining ignorant of Christ; even as a King ignorant of necessary civill dutyes cannot command them, not because he wanteth Kingly power to command these civill things, for undeniably he is a Iudge in civill things, but because he hath not know∣ledge of them. And may we not say in like sort, though a Church want the know∣ledge of the truth, in some particular question, yet they have a Church power to deter∣mine such questions, & to command obedience therein, and it is by accident they can∣not in that state determine rightly, because they will not, being ignorant of the truth therein, not because they want Church-power to determine such matters, but because they have not the knowledge of them. Againe a little after in the same P. he tels us, That Christianity addeth no new fatherly power to a Father over his Children, nor giveth a new husband right to the husband, once an Heathen over his wife; for an heathen Father is as essentially a Father over his Children as a Christian Father, and an heathen husband an heathen master &c. are all as essentially Husband, Masters, &c. as are the Christian husbands, masters, &c. And may we not as well say, soundnesse of knowledge in such or such a particular question addeth no new Church power to a Christian Church over their own members, nor giveth a new Church right over them which they had not before; for a Church that wanteth such knowledge is as essentially a Church, invested with Church power over her members as is another Church? For ought I perceive the cases are alike; and if soundnesse of knowledge do not give to a Church their Church-right in this or that question, how can want of that knowledge deprive them of that right? Sure one would thinke the whole substance of Christianity might do as much for the adding of Kingly right, Fatherly right, Husband right, &c. As soundnesse of knowledge in some one particular question, for the adding of Church right; & that the want of all Christianity should be as available for taking away the Kingly right, the Fatherly right, &c. As the want of knowledge in one particular point for ye taking away of Church-right; and sith we have our Bro∣thers own testimony cleer and full for the one, it seems to me the cases are so parallel and proportionable, that the other is unavoidable: I meane thus, sith in the one case the whole substance of Christianity doth not give power, nor the want thereof take a∣way the same by our Brothers own teaching, I know not how in the other case sound∣nesse of knowledge in one particular question should give power or right, & want of such knowledge take away the same. And so for Antioch in particular, if it were as our Brother supposeth that the greater part of them did hold against the truth in that question about Circumcision, I see not how this could deprive them of their Church right which they had before.
As for our Brothers reason that Christ hath given no Ecclesiasticall right and power to determine against the truth, but onely for the truth, Page 36 This saying I confesse is very true, but doth not suffice for the purpose for which hee brings it, viz. To prove that Antioch being ignorant of the truth in that question a∣bout Circumcision, or holding against the truth therein did thereby lose their Church right to determine. For if this reason be good, then a man may conclude a∣gainst that power in heathen Kings, Parents, and Husbands, to governe their Sub∣jects, children and Wives; which our Brother, as we heard afore, hath granted and taught: For suppose that Antioch were ignorant of the truth in that particular is it not cleere that the Kings, Parents, and Husbands mentioned are ignorant of the truth in many more matters? And it Antioch do hereupon loose their right, because Christ hath given no power to determine against the truth but for the truth, how will it be avoided but by the same reason, •he Kings and the others mentioned must likewise lose their right to governe their own subjects and families? For the Lord gives no right, I hope, to Pagans against the truth, no more then he doth unto Churches. And ther∣fore if the reason be valid and strong in the one case, and for the purpose, for which our Brother brings it, it seemes to be as strong in the other case also, which shall be contrary to what our Brother himselfe doth teach.
In a word▪ Churches and Antioch in particular have right to determine questi∣ons, and they ought to determine only according to the truth: They have formally a right to determine, and when their determinations are according to truth, then they will •ind Ʋi mat••i• which else they will not. They have right to determine in fore Humano, and if their determinations be for matter agreeable to truth, they will be ratifyed in foro Div••o, but not else. Now our Brothers arguing doth seeme to con∣found these two; and because of the latter which is freely granted, he would conclude against the former, which we thinke is not good reasoning; but on the contrary do still thinke, that though Churches ought to give out no determinations but such as are agreeable to truth, and that otherwise their determinations, in respect of the mat∣ter of them will not bind before God, yet for all this they may have right formally and in Foro humano to judge, and to determine of such things.
Moreover, if this were granted for true, that Antioch when they are against the truth do lose their right to determine Controversies, yet we are not hereby much nee∣rer to an issue, unlesse it be determined withall who must be judge whether they be against the truth or no, and the reason is because if they be not against the truth but for it, then I hope, it will be granted that they doo not lose their right at all. The question therefore still remaines, who hath this Ministeriall Power to Iudge whether this or that Church, Antioch or any other be against the truth or for it; and unlesse this be cleered we are but where we were before.
But to draw towards an end of this passage about the Church of Antioch: whether they had right to determine Controversies when ability failed, or whether they did when lose that right, I will here transcribe a few words of our Brother as I find them in his second, 331. Page. Wherein he either cleerely yeeldeth the cause, and saith the same that we do or I am much mistaken. The words are these, There is a diffe∣rence between ability to judge, and right or power to judge. A presbyteri∣all Church, (and he disputeth in six Pages together to prove Antioch such a one, Page 470. 471. &c. sequ.) may have right, jus, and Ecclesi∣astic•ll law to judge of a point, to the judging whereof they want ability: Page 37 therefore de facto, it belongeth to an higher Synod where more learned men are, though de jure the Presbytery may judge it. These words I wish to be well considered. For whereas in the place we have been speaking of, he saith Antioch, the greater part of them being against the truth, did lose their jus, their right to determine, for which as wee have heard, he gives this reason, because Christ hath given no right and power to determine against the truth but for it, yet now wee see he grants distinction between ability and right, and saith, a Presbyteriall Church may still retaine this latter of their right, even then, when they want the other of a∣bility. Which two sayings whether they do perfectly agree, and whether in the latter of them he do not plainly come up to us, against whom he hath been disputing in the former, I leaue it to the wise in heart, and especially to himselfe to consider. For, for my part I must confesse that these two sayings, A Presbyteriall Church as Anti∣och may have right, jus to judge a point, to the judging whereof they may want a∣bility; and, Antioch a Presbyteriall Church wanting ability did thereby lose their right, or jus to determine the point, these two I say, are such sayings as are not easie for me to reconcile.
Lastly, if it be said our Brother doth not deny unto Antioch, or a Church in error all power simply to determine, but only to determine tali mode, that is, to determine against the truth; for his words are, they lose their jus their right eatenus, in so far. I answer, he hath such a word indeed, as eatenus, in so farre: but if any shall say he meant no more in this dispute, but only that such a Church hath no right to deter∣mine against the truth, I conceive that he that shall so say, shall therein impute some fault unto our Brother, even the fault of wresting Mr. Tompsons Tenent and mine, and suggesting against us unto his Reader, as if we had held such a thing as we never wrote nor thought. For it is plain, that our Brother in his Pag. 424. is disputing a∣gainst us; For he saith, that we teach the Church of Antioch had jus, power to judge and determine the controversie, but because of the difficul∣ty had not light to judge thereof, And sets down Master Tompsons name and mine as the men that so teach, in Answer, Page 42. And a few lines after he saith, I thinke the Brethren erre in this, to teach, that Antioch had power to determine the Controversie, Act. 15. And then hee gives two reasons for the contrary. So that it is manifest that he intends this dispute against us. Now what have we said in this matter? Have we delivered any such thing, that Antioch had right to determine against the truth? Let the Answer be viewed in the place which he al∣ledgeth, viz. Page 42. And I am sure no such grosse Tenent will be there found, no nor any where else in our writing. That which we have said, is this, that Antioch had right to have determined the matter if ability had served thereto: but for right to determine against the truth, we never spake one word that soundeth that way. Our Brother therefore intending this dispute against us, and plainly expressing so much, and our Tenent being no other then as I have said, it must therefore needs follow that his intendment is, that Antioch had no right to determine that matter. But for right to determine against the truth, he cannot confute such a Tenent as ours, we ne∣ver having delivered any such thing, but he must withall be culpable of manifest mistaking and mis-reporting of us to the World; and we are, and must be slow to Page 38 believe that a man of such worth would willingly do us such wrong. It remains there∣fore, that right to determine and not right to determine against the truth, is the thing which he oppos•t• as ours, and therefore it is that in this sence and meaning I have here applyed my answer.
The 〈…〉 thus much; That Antioch had right to determine against the 〈…〉 that may soone be con•uted, but the Tenent is none of ours: That 〈…〉 to determine, is indeed our Tenent, and whether this be con•uted 〈…〉, let the wise and Iudicious consider.
