To his ever Honoured Friend, S EDVVARD FILMER of Sutton, in the County of KENT.

HOw great a loss I had in the death of my most dear and honoured Friend, your de∣ceased Father, no man is able to conje∣cture, but he that hath suffered in the like. So af∣fable was his conversation, his discourse so rational, his Judgment so exact in most parts of Learning, and his affections to the Church so exemplary in him, that I never enjoyed a greater felicity in the company of any man living, then I did in his: In which respects I may affirm both with safety and modesty, that we did not onely take sweet counsel together, but walked in the House of God as Friends, I must needs say, I was prepared for that great blow, by the loss of my preferment in the Church of Westminster, which gave me the opportunity of so dear and be∣loved a neighborhood; so that I lost him partly be∣fore he▪ dyed, which made the misery the more supportable, when I was deprived of him for alto∣gether. But I was never more sensible of the infelici∣ty, then I am at this present, in reference to that satisfaction, which I am sure he could have given the Gentleman whom I am to deal with: His eminent abilities in these Political Disputes, exemplified in Page  387 his judicious observations on Aristotles Politiques; as also in some passages on Grotius, Hunton, Hobbs, and other of our late Discoursers about Formes of Government, declare abundantly how fit a Man he might have been, to have dealt in this cause, which I would not willingly should be betrayed by unskilful• handling: And had he pleased to have suffered his Excellent Discourse called Patriarcha to appear in publick, it would have given such satisfaction to all our great Masters in the Schools of Politie, that all other Tractates in that kind, had been found unne∣cessary: But since he cannot be recalled, and that he did not think it fit while he was alive, to gratifie the Nation in publishing that excellent Piece (which might have served for a Catholicon or General An∣swer to all Discourses of this kind) I have adventu∣red on that work, which the Consciousness of my own inability might deter me from, if the desire of satisfying the expectation of such a modest and inge∣nious Adversary, had not over-ruled me: Whatso∣ever I have done therein, as it is now left to the publique Censure, so do I submit it more particu∣larly to your equal Judgement, in whom there is so much of the Father, as renders you a competent Judge in the case between us. Which trouble I had sooner given you, but that the Papers lay so long with a friend in London, before they could finde the way to the Press, that I was put upon the necessity of another Encounter, which was to have prece∣dence of it in the course of the Book. But it comes time enough to interrupt your studies and af∣fairs of greater Moment, to be a Testimony of the confidence I have in your favourable opinion of me, Page  209 and finally to serve as a publique acknowledgment of those many undeserved civilities, which your Fa∣ther, your self, and the rest of your Family, have been from time to time vouchsafed unto,

The Answer of P. H. D. D. to the Letter of J. H. Esq; The Introduction of the whole.

AT my coming to London about Midsommer last, I found some Papers left for me in the way of a Letter (at my accustomed Rendezvouz) with this following Title, viz. The Stumbling Block of Diso∣bedience and Rebellion, cunningly imputed by P. H. unto Calvin; Removed in a Letter to the said P. H. from J. H. By which Title of Superscription, it was easy to know whom you had designed for your Ad∣versary in the two first Letters; and it was not hard for me to find by the two last Letters, with whom I was to deal, having received some advertisment of it from a friend in Oxon, before I set forwards on my journey. The Papers being put into my hands, Page  210 I could no longer defer the curiosity of having them read over to me, then the withdrawing into a more convenient room must of necessity admit; and ha∣ving had them read over to me. I found my self pressed with this Dilemma, that either I must return an answer to you, or confess the whole Book to be answered by you. I found no reason for the last, and therefore thought it more convenient to give you content in the first with as much conveniency as I could. But I had then other fish to fry, where∣of perhaps you may have tasted before this time. Nor was I without other businesses, which as they brought me to the City, so they occasioned a longer stay there then I first intended. In the mean time a book of one Mr. Baxter's was by chance offered to my perusal, in which I found my self concerned, and so concerned, that I thought it safer to venture somewhat on your patience, then to sink under those Reproaches which were laid upon me. In which till I had satisfied both my self and him, I could not give my thoughts the leasure of rendering you that satisfaction which you had required. But having now dispatch'd with him, I shall be the bet∣terable to attend your Motions; and shall there∣fore follow after you step by step as you move be∣fore me. I must confess you are an Adversary whom I look'd not for,

In the Poets words; but then I must confess with∣al that I am fallen into the hands of a generous Adversary, of whom I am sure of fair quarter, if Page  211 I should be vanquished, and no reviling Language (as I have had of late from others) should I win the day; and to be overcome by such an enemy, is a kind of Victory. With this encouragement I put my self into the lists, notwithstanding all those disad∣vantages which appear against me; You coming fresh into the field, well seconded, and dayly exercised in those Political Disputes, which either I have ne∣ver managed, or (being tired and broken with o∣ther businesses) have long since dis-used.

2. But first I am to purge my self (according to the old known Laws of Duel) from having about me any spells, any charmes or Magical spells, from being guilty of that cunning and indirect proceed∣ings which you put upon me. Those two words, cunningly imputed, which I find in your Title, are many in effect, though few in number, and tend to render me shspected of fraud and forgery, as if I had laid a stumbling block before Calvins doors, which bind no Grammatical Construction, or by any Lo∣gical inference can be gathered from them. But if you look upon us both with a single and impartial eye, you will find no such cunning in me, (for I am not of his mind) who said,

Nothing but plain and down▪ right dealing, nothing but what the Scots Commissioners collected from those words of Calvin to justifie their disobedience and rebellion against their own most rightful Queen, whom they had persecuted, and deposed, and dri∣ven out of her Kingdom; a full account whereof Page  212 I have given elsewhere, both in the Preface to that book of which you have undertaken the Confuta∣tion, and in the 128^th Section of my answer to Mr. Baxters Letter, in either of which you may consult it. And secondly, I must crave leave accor∣ding to the Laws of Duell, to take the length of your weapon, that I may fit my own unto it. I mean, that with your leave and liking, I may take the measure of your Letter, transcribing it line for line, and word for word, as it came unto me, that my answer may be fitted and proportioned to it. Without which I can neither manage the Combate, as I ought to do, nor the spectators be delighted with the sight thereof as they ought to be; Nor such as are to judge between us can be enabled to determine as of right they ought, to whom the victory be∣longeth. as you know who said. Now the Copy of your Letter is as followeth.

3. These are the very words of that you Letter to which an answer is required, though to no part thereof, but that which doth concern the Spartan Ephori, and the Iewish Sanhedrim, I can (by any rules of disputation) be required to answer the rest of your discourse, touching the balancing or over∣balancing of such degrees and ranks of men, of which all Government; consist, is utterly Extrinse∣cally and extravagant unto my design; which was not to dispute the severall forms of Government, and in what the differences between them did most especially co•sist; but onely to declare that neither the Spartan Ephori; nor any such popular Magi∣strates as Calvin dreams of, had any authority ori∣ginally Page  231 invested in them to controul their Kings, much less to murder or depose them. Howsoever I shall not purposely pass by any thing, which by your self or any indifferent Reader shall be thought material, without giving you my judgement and o∣pinion in it.

Some things (you say) I writ as a Polititian (a silly one I am, God help me) and some things as a Polititian, and divine too. And as a Polititian▪ I am charged by you to have affirmed, that the Spartan Kings were as absolute Monarchs as any in those times, till Euripon the 3d. King of the Race of Her∣cules, and the 2d. King of the younger house, to procure the favour and good will of the Rascal rabble loosened the raigns of Government, and thereby much diminishing the Regall power. This I affirm indeed, and this you deny; but you neither Answer my Authorities nor confute my Reasons; my Autho∣rities I derive from Plutarch first, who speaking of the said Euripon, whom he calleth Eurition affirms, that till his time the Government of Sparta was, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, sufficiently Monarchical, if it were not more. (And secondly, from Aristotle, who calls the Government of Charilaus, the sixt King of that House (who as you say was generally af∣firmed to be a good man) by the name of a tyran∣ny. And if it might be called a Tyranny then when the Regall power was under such a diminution by the folly of Euripon, there is no question to be made but that the Spartan Kings were absolute Monarchs before any such diminution had been made. To these two proofs you answer nothing, nor say you any thing at all in confutation of the Page  232 Reason by me brought to prove it: Which is, That having acquired the Estate by conquest, and claiming by no other title then by that of Armies, there was no question to be made, but that they Governed in the way of absolute Monarchs; it being not the guise of such as come in by conquest, to covessant and capitu∣late with their Subjects, but to impose their will for a Law upon them: This being the custome of all Kings who claim by conquest, it must belong to you to prove the contrary, and tell me why the Spartan Kings should not observe the same rule in the Acts of Government as all others did. Crowns which are purchased by the Sword seldome sit fast upon the head of the Conquerors, if they deliver up that Sword by which they were purchased: And therefore it was noted for a great error in Julius Cesar (a man of greater parts and power then a King of Sparta) to hope that he might hold that supream Autho∣rity by love of the people, which he got by force of Arms, and was so to hold it.

Against this you object, First, That the Spartan Kings could not be absolute, because they had a Nobili∣ty & Pe•ple to gratifie. But then you should have told us by what rule in Government, the Spartan Kings who preceded Eurypon, could be obliged to gratifie either the People or Nobility of that Country, which they had conquered by the Sword. And whereas you alledge in defence of Eurypon, That his letting loose the Reines of Government, to obtain favour with the people, was a confession of the infirmity of the Monar∣chy, and that his Action in so doing, was not so vo∣luntary in it self, as unavoidable imprudence. It was indeed a plain confession of the infirmity of the Mo∣narch, Page  233 in not being able to hold the Kingdom in the same Estate, in which it had been held by his Father and Grand father: Of the infirmity of the Monar∣chy, that is to say, the form of Government by them established, and to which the Spartans formerly had been accustomed, I cannot think it to be any con∣fession at all; nor can I see how that imprudent Act of his, can be affirmed to have been unavoidable in point of prudence, by that which you produce from the words of Agis, the five and twentieth King of Sparta of the younger house, where he affirms, that a King of Sparta could never come to be equal unto any other King but only by introducing equality a∣mong the people. But first a King of Sparta might be as absolute in his own Dominions as any other King whatsoever of a larger Territory, with whom he could not be thought equal in power and Riches: The absoluteness or Autocraty of Kings (if I may so call it) depending not upon the greatness of their revenues, or extent of Empire, but only in their form of Government. And secondly, I would fain know how by the introducing an equality among the people, could render a poor King of Sparta equal to any other King, either of any greater power or larger Territory. It was not possible for Agis (a• he said himself in his address unto his Mother) se a∣lios reges pecunia aquare posse, to equal other Kings in wealth and riches; and therefore he resolved up∣on some exploit by which his name and reputation might grow great in the sight of the people; and no exploit seemed in his eyes so probable to obtain that name and reputation which he aimed at, then by introducing equality among the people, which Page  234 probably might make him a great King in the love and estimation of the common people (for I must no longer call them the Rascal rabble) though in no bodies else. Nor could the low condition of the Kings of Sparta impose any such necessity upon Eu∣rypon to change the Government, as you say it did; neither Eurypon nor any of his Successors encreas∣ing either in power or riches, by the alteration; and finally, whereas you seem to justifie this necessity by those words of Agis, in which he told his Mother, That a Servant or Lievtenant of Selinus or Ptolomey was worth more then ever were all the Kings of Sparta put together. First, Agis speaks not of any of the Lievtenants of those two Princes, who possibly might amass more treasures then all the Kings of Sparta had done before, but only of the Servants of those Leivtenants; for it is Satraparum famuli, & servi Procuratorum, in the translation of Xyland, with which (not having the Greek by me) I content my self. And secondly, these words being spoken of the Servants of such Lievtenants, and of the Servants of such great Persons, which lived under either of those two Kings, must needs have more of Rheto∣rique in them then of real truth: For Agis did not only tell the people, when he came to put this pro∣ject in execution, that he would devide amongst them his own Fields and Pastures, of which he had ve∣ry many in his own possession; but that he would deliver up ten thousand Talents, to be put into the common Treasury: And if this one King were so rich in Lands, and so stored with Money (Dives agris, dives positis in soenore nummis) it must be very strange to think that a Servant of any of the Princes, or Page  235 Lievtenants of either of the said two Kings, should be worth more then all the Kings of Sparta, were they put together.

4. But here before we can proceed, I must clear my self from that Parenthesis of yours, in which you say, that I commonly call the people by the name of Rascal rabble, as in another place you tell me that I have no better name for them then that; but I hope you do not, and I am sure you cannot gather out of any such words, that I bestow that title on the peo∣ple generally, which either make up the main body of a Common wealth, or comprehend all sorts of people which are not in the Rank and order of titu∣lar Nobility. There is a great difference in the elle∣gancy and propriety of the Latine tongue, between Plebs and Populus, Populus signifying somtimes the agregative body of a State, as, Irasci populo Romano nemo sapienter potest, in the words of Livie. Somtimes all such of a State or Nation that are not in places of command, as, Senatus populus{que} Romanus, in the vulgar stile of Republick: But Plebs is of low∣er alloy, relating unto none but those of inferiour quality, as Laborers, Handicrafts, Artificers, which commonly make up the greatest part of a State or Nation, and yet pass under the account of the Rout or Rabble: And such are they of whom Aristotle telleth us in his Books of Politiques, That they are not only base or wicked Judges in their own Cases, and that many of them differ little from Beasts. You may do well to quarrel him for the one, or not me for the other.

5. In the next place you let us know, That the Monarchy that is or can be absolute, must be founded Page  236 upon an Army planted by military Colonies upon the over balance of Land being in the Dominion of the Prince. And so far I concur in opinion with you, (seeing it proved by late experience amongst our selves) that no Prince can be an absolute Mo∣narch without an Army; that is to say without some standing Forces, to be ready at command up∣on all occasions. But then what reason have you to think that Aristodemus having conquered the Realm of Sparta, did not withal keep up his Army to se∣cure the conquest, and that this Army or some o∣ther was not kept on foot, till the time of Eu∣ripon, who being either of weaker parts, or more apt to be wrought on, or else unwilling to be at the continual charge of paying an Army; might sup∣pose it an high point of Husbandry, to disband his Forces, and cast himself entirely on the love of the people. And secondly, Admitting that of the two former Kings, what reason can you give me why that Army should be planted in Colonies; the ter∣ritory of Sparta (as you say your selfe) being very narrow, and consequently not much room, nor any necessity at all for many such Colonies to be plan∣ted in it. A standing Army answerable to the ex∣tent of the Country, and the number of the old in∣habitants, disposed of in their Summer Camp, and their Winter-Quarters, would have done the work, and done it with less charge and greater readiness, then dispersed in Colonies. And therefore when you say in such general terms, That the Monarchy that is or can be absolute, must be founded upon an Army planted by military Colonies upon the over balance of Land being in the Dominion of the Prince; Page  237 I must profess my self to differ in opinion from you. For then how could a Prince possessed of his Kingdom from a long descent of Royal Ancestors, and exercising absolute power upon his people, be said to be an an absolute Monarch, because his stand∣ing forces cannot be setled or disposed of in any such Colonies, upon the over balance of Land within his Dominion. In Countrys newly conquered, or farre remote fom the chief residence of the Prince, or the seat of the Empire, such Colonies have been thought necessary in the former Ages; the wisdome of the Romans not finding out any better or more present way to serve their Conquest. But then such Colonies wanted not their inconveniencies, and may in time produce the different Effect from that which was expected of them. For being possessed of City, and indowed with Lands, and challenging a property in those Lands and Cities, they came in tract of time by intermariages and alliances to be all one with the old Natives of the Country, and stood as much upon their terms against the incroachments of those Princes under whom they served, and by whose Ancestors they were planted. A better Evi∣dence whereof we can hardly find then in those En∣glish Colonies which were planted in Ireland at the first conquest of that Kingdom; many of which by mutuall correspondency and alliances became so imbodied with the Irish that they degenerated at the last, from the manner and civility of the Eng∣lish Nation, and (passing by the name of the Eng∣lish-Irish) proved as rebellious (if not more then the Irish themselves. What therefore hath been found defective in Colonies, in reference to the first in∣tent Page  236 〈1 page duplicate〉 Page  237 〈1 page duplicate〉 Page  238 of their plantation, the wisdome and experi∣ence of these last ages, have supplyed in Garisons: Which consisting for the most part of single per∣sons, or otherwise living on their pay, and suddenly removed from one place to another, as the nature of the service leads them, are never suffered to stay long enough in any one Town by which they may have opportunity to unite themselves with those of the Neighbourhood or Corporation, in design and interess.

6. But for a further proof of your position, that is to say, that there can be no absolute Monarch who hath a Nobility and People to gratifie, you first instance in the Kings of France, which I as well as others, (and others then as well as I) do account for Absolute: But it is known (say you) That in the whole world there is not a Nobility; nor a People, so frequently flying out, or taking Arms against their Princes, as the Nobility and People of France. This I acknowledge to be true, but affirm withall, that the frequent flyings out of that Nobility and People against their Kings, proceed not from any infirmity in the Monarchy, but from the stirring and busie nature of the French in general, who if they make not Wars abroad, will find work at home; so that we may affirm of them as the Historian doth of the Ancient Spaniaras, Si foras hostem non habent, domi quaerunt. And this the wise Cardinal of Richelieu un∣derstood well enough, when having dismantled Ta∣chel, reduced such Peers as remained in the hands of the Hugonets, and crusht the Faction of the Monsieur now Duke of Orleans, he presently engaged that King in a War with Spain; that so Page  239 the hot and fiery spirits of the French might be e∣vaporated and consumed in a forrain War, which otherwise had they stayed at home, would ever and anon have inflamed the Kingdom. For otherwise that the Kings of France were Absolute Monarchs, there be many reasons to evince; For first, his arbi∣trary Edicts over-rule the Laws, and dispose sove∣raignty of the chiefe concernments of the State, which by the Parliament of Paris, the supream Ju∣dicatory of that Kingdom (and looked on as the chief supporter of the Rights and Liberties of the subject) seldom or never are controled though dis∣puted often. And if the Observation be true which we find in Justine, that in the Monarchies of the first ages, Abitria principum pro legibus erant be of any truth; or if the Maxime which we find in Ju∣stinians Institutes, viz. Quod principi placuerit legis habet vigorem, be any badge or cognisance of an abso∣lute Monarch; the Kings of France may as well por∣tend to such an absoluteness, as any of the Roman Emperours or preceding Monarchs; (ar▪ tell est nostre plaisir, with which formal words he conclu∣deth all his Royal Edicts, are as significant as that Maxime in Justinians Institutes, or the said obser∣vation which we find in Justine. Nor is his absolute power less visible in the raising of Moneys, then in the passing of his Edicts; it being in his power with∣out asking the consent of his people in Parliament, to levy such sums upon the subjects (besides his Ga∣bells, Aides, and accustomed Taxes) as his Trea∣surers under-Treasurers, or other Officers of his Re∣venue shall impose upon them. From the patient bearing of which burthens, the King of France is Page  240 commonly called Rex Asin•rum, or the King of Asses. Nor doth he want such standing Forces, as are sufficient to preserve his power and make good his actions; it being conceived by some, and affirm∣ed by others, that he is able to bring into the field for a sudden service, no less then sixty Companies of Men of Arms, twenty Cornets of light Horse, and five Companies of Harque Bushiers on Horse-Back, which amount to 10000 in the total, toge∣ther with 20 Ensigns. of French Horse, and 40 of Swisses, and yet leave his Garisons well manned, and his Forts and Frontiers well and sufficiently de∣fended. By all which laid together, it is clear and manifest, that the French Kings are absolute Mo∣narchs, and that their Government is as suffici∣ently Dispotical as a man could wish; the frequent flyings out of the Nobility and People, during the Mi∣nority of Lewis the 13th. and the omni-regency of his Mother (for I think there be not many other instances of it) being no sufficient argument to prove the contrary. And this you could not chuse, but see (though it seems you will not) when you tell us within few lines after, that the Government of France, for want of Gratifying the Nobility and People with such Lawes and Liberties as were sit for them, did become Tyrannical; and if it be Ty∣rannical, it, must needs be absolute.

7. You instance secondly, in the rise and progress of the Norman li•e within this Kingdom, concern∣ing which you first suppose that their Monarchy here was founded on a Nobility, or a Nobility and the People, that is to say (for so I am to understand you) upon the love and good affections of the Nobility Page  241 and people of England: And secondly, that being so founded, they were to gratifie the Nobility, or the Nobility and the people with such Laws and Liberties as are fit for them; or else there Government in this Land had become Tyrannical. But first the Monar∣chy of Normans was not founded here on the No∣bility, and the people conjunct or separate. The greatest part of the Nobility, were either lost or forfeited at the battel of Hastins. And most of those that were not engaged in Battel, were either outed of their Estates, which were immediately distributed amongst the Normans, according to their several Ranks & qualities; or forcedly to take them back on such terms and tenures, as the Conquerors was plea∣sed to give them. And that he might make sure work with them, he compelled some of them to fly the Land, and wasted others in his Wars against the French; so that the poor Remainders of them were both few in number, and inconsiderable in power. And then as for the common people, they were so bridled by his Souldiers Garisoned up and down in several Castles (some old, and others of his own erection) that they could never stir against him, but the Souldiers were presently on their backs; and though disperst in several places, were ready to unite together upon all occasions. Nor staid he here but to prevent all practises and contrivances which might be hammered in the night (which the eye of no humane providence could be able to see into or discover) he commanded that no light or fire should be seen in any of their Houses after the ringing of a Bell at eight of the clock, called thence the Cover▪few, or the Cur▪few Bell, as it is called to this very day. Page  242 Which rigorous courses were held also by the Kings succeeding, till there was no male Prince surviving of the Saxon race, and that King Henry •. had mar∣ried a daughter of that line; by means whereof the people seeing no hopes of bettering their condition in the change of time, became obedient to that yoke which was laid upon them, and looked upon their Kings of the House of Normandy as their natural Princes.

8. Nor is your inference better grounded then your suposition; the Norman Kings not gratifying the Nobility and people wi•h such Laws and Liber∣ties as were fit for them, for fear least otherwise the Government (which (you say) we have known by ex∣perience, and no doubt was seen by Eurypon) might be thought tyrannical. What you intend by these words (we have known by experience) as I am loth to understand, so I am not willing to enquire. What had been seen by Eurypon (though you make no doubt of it) I believe you know as little as I; but what was practised by the Normans, I may per∣haps know as much as you; and if I know any thing of them and of their affairs, I must needs know this, that the first Norman Kings did never Court the Nobility or the people of England, by gratifying them with such Laws and Liberties as you speak of here, but governed them for the most part by the Grand Customeiur of the Normans, or in an arbi∣trary way, as to them seemed best: For though sometimes for quietness sake, they promised the abolishing of Dane gelt, and the restoring the Laws of King Edward the Confessor; yet neither was the one abolished till the Raign of King Steven (who Page  243 came in upon a broken Title) nor the other restored, though often promised, till the time of King John, and then extorted from him by force of Arms; so that by this account, the Government of the first sinking of the Norman Race, must become Tyranni∣cal, because they gratified not the people with such Laws and Liberties, as (in your judgment) were fit for them: For having gained the Magna Charta, with the other Charta de Foresta in the time of King John, and being frequently called to Parliaments by the Kings which followed, they had as much as they had reason to expect in those early days. Where by the way (that I may lay all things together which relate to England) I would fain know what ground you have for the position which you give us after∣wards, that is to say, That King Henry 3. instituted his Parliament to be assistant to him in his Govern∣ment. Our ancient Writers tell us, that Par∣liaments or Common Councils, consisting of the Prelates, Peers, and other great men of the Realm, were frequently held in the time of the Sax∣on Kings; and that the Commons were first called to these great Assemblies at the Coronation of King Henry 1. to the end that his succession to the Crown being approved by the Nobility and People, he might have the better colour to exclude his Bro∣ther: And as the Parliament was not instituted by King Henry 3. so I would fain know of whom you learnt, that it was instituted by him, to be assistant to him in his Government, unless it were from some of the Declaration of the Commons in the late long Parliament, in which it is frequently affirmed, That the fundamental Government of this Realm was by Page  244 King, Lords and Commons: For then what did be∣come of the Government of this Kingdom under Henry 3. when he had no such Assistants joyned with him; or what became of the foundation in the intervals of following Parliaments, when there was neither Lords nor Commons, on which the Govern∣ment could be laid: And therefore it must be appa∣rantly necessary, either that the Parliaments were not instituted by King Henry 3. to be his Assistants in the Government, and that the Lords and Com∣mons were not a part of the foundation on which the Government is built; or else that for the great∣est space of time since King H. 3. the Kingdom hath bin under no Government at all for want of such As∣sistants, and such a Principal part of the fundamen∣tals as you speak of there. The Government of such times must be in obeysance at the least, as our Law∣yers phrase it.

But because you make your Proposition in Ge∣neneral terms, and use the rise and progress of the Nor∣man line, for an instance onely: I would fain learn who should be Judge, touching the fitness or un∣fitness of such Laws and Liberties, by which the people, or the Nobility and the People, are to be gratified by their Kings. For if the Kings themselves must judge it, it is not like that they will part with any of their just prerogatives, which might make them less obeyed at home, and lesser feared abroad; but where invincible necessity, or violent importunity might force them to it. And then the Laws and Liberties which were so extorted, were either vi∣olated or anulled, whensoever the Granter was in power to weaken, or make void the grant; for ma∣lus Page  245 diuturnitatis est custos metus, as you know who said, But if the people must be judges of such laws and liberties as were fittest for them, there would be no end of their demands, reasonable in their own nature, and in number infinite. For when they meet with a King of the giving hand, they will press him so to give from one point to another, till he give away Royalty it self; and if they be not satisfied in all their askings, they will be pleased with none of his former Grants.

9. But you go on, and having told us that in such cases, as before, the Government becomes tyrannical, be the Prince otherwise never so good a man, you prove it, first by instancing in Carilaus, King of Spar∣ta, in whose raign the Common-wealth was instituted by Licurgus, who is generally affirmed to have been a good man▪ and yet is said by Aristotle, to have been a Tyrant, and then conclude, that it remaines with me to shew how a good man can otherwise be a Tyrant then by holding Monarchicall Government, with∣out a sufficient balance. But certainly no such thing remains to be shown by me, there being no occasi∣on given you to require it of me, in the Book against Calvin (by which name you call it) which your letter undertakes to answer. The difference between us is, whether the Ephory were ordained by the Kings of Sparta, to curb the Senate, or by the peo∣ple to oppose and controul their Kings; of which hitherto you have said nothing; If you put an hun∣dred questions on the by, I am not bound by any rule of Disputation to make answer to them, or so much as to any one of them as it comes in my way. But in this point I shall not leave you without satis∣faction, Page  246 In order whereunto you may do well to call to mind, that the word Tyrant at the first was used to signifie a just and lawfull King (qui post∣quam tecta Tyranni intravere sui, as we find in O∣vid) though afterwards more frequently used to sig∣nifie such Princes onely, who having supprest the popular Government, in some Cities of Greece, as∣sumed the power unto themselves, or otherwise re∣restrained the people from running in to such dis∣order to which they had formerly been accustom∣ed, but at the last to signifie such merciless men, who having unjustly gained the supream Authority by blood and violence, continued in the same with the like cruelty and injustice. Thus in the second sence and signification of the word, we find mention of the Tyrants of Syracuse, (though some of them were just and moderate Princes) as also of Nabis the Tyrant of Lacedemon, of Alexander the Tyrant of Pherae; And finally the 30. Magistrates which were sent from Sparta, to govern the affairs of Athens (which was before the most Popular and Democratical Government that ever was) are best known by the name of the 30. Tyrants till this pre∣sent time. And in this second sence of the word, the Government of Carilaus, is by Aristotle said to be a Tyranny, not because he supprest any popular Go∣vernment, which had before been setled in Lacedemon, but because he restrained the people from having their own wills as before they had in the time of some of his predecessors, or from living under such an Anarchy as they most desired. And in this sence and signification of the word, any good Prince may be called a Tyrant, if he gratifie Page  247 not his people, or his Nobility and People with such Laws and Liberties as they conceived to be fittest for them; or shall endeavour to retain so much of that soveraign power, derived upon him by a long descent of Royal Ancestors, by which he may be able to defend and protect his subjects. But when you press me to this point, that if I do not grant the former, I must needs confess, that not the favour of the Princes, nor the usurpation of the People, but the infirmity of the Monarchy caused the Commonwealth of Lacedemon, I shall in part confess it, and in part deny it. For I shall willingly confess that the infir∣mity of the Monarchy might occasion the instituti∣on of the Commonwealth, looking upon the Mo∣narchy, as it was broken and unsetled during the raign of Carilaus; and yet shall absolutely deny that there was any such infirmity or insufficiency in the Monarchy, till the reins of Government were let loose by the folly of Euripon.

10 More then this is not said by Plutarch, where he tells us that both Kings & People agreed upon the calling home of Licurgus, for remedying such dis∣orders as were grown amongst them. And less is not said by Plutarch then is said by me, where I affirm that whatsoever the Kings lost, the people got no∣thing by the alteration, as being left out of all im∣ployments in affairs of State, and having thirty Ma∣sters instead of two, which you pronounce to be a strange Affirmation, because, say you, it was ordered by the Oracle, that when the people were assem∣bled. The Senate should propose and dismiss the people without suffering them to debate; and if they were not suffered to debate such businesses as were pro∣pounded Page  248 by the Senate, what other imployment could be left them in affairs of State, praeter obse∣quii gloriam, besides the Reputation of obedient Citizens: But for this sore you have a plaister, and tell us that if the people had had no right to debate, they must therefore have had the right to resolve, or elsewhere to be assembled for nothing. It may be neither so nor so, but that the common people of Sparta were called unto the publick assemblies, as the Com∣mons of England were antiently and originally summoned to the Court of Parliament, that is to say, Ad consentiendum, & faciendum to give con∣sent and yield obedience to those Lawes and Ordi∣nances, which by the Great Council of the Peers and Prelates (de communi consilio regni nostri) as the Writ still runneth) should be concluded and a∣greed on. So that you might have spared the Ora∣cle, and Plutarchs Explication of it, or the destant of Tyrteus upon the same; unless you could con∣clude from any of them, or from altogether, that the people of Sparta were possessed of a negative voice, and therewith of a power to frustrate the proceedings of the Kings and Senate, which if they had, the ultimate Result (as you truly say) and con∣sequently the soveraign power in Government must remain in them: And then the Government of Sparta, had been as meerly Popular and Democrati∣cal, as of most other Cities in Greece; but by no means to be accounted for an Aristocratie, by which name Aristotle himselfe, and most of our great Masters in the Schools of Politie do most com∣monly call it. And therefore when Isocrates saith, (as here cited by you) that the Lacedemonians Page  249 flourish'd for this cause especially that their Govern∣ment is Popular. The word (Popular) is not to be understood in the stricter sence, as differing the Go∣vernment from that which they called an Aristocra∣tie, consisting of some part of the people, though the wealthier, better, and more understanding men amongst them, but as it did distinguish them from the Regall or Monarchical Government in which neither the whole body of the People, nor any of the better, wealthier, and more sober men could pretend a share.

11. And now at last you come to the institution of the Ephori, affirmed by me (and I had Plutarch for my Author) to be ordained by Theopompus the 9th. King of the second House (with the consent of Polydorus his Colleague) to curb the insolencies of the Senate, in which (you say) that I make that to be a practise of the Kings against the Senate which by your Author is plain to have been a combination of the Kings, and the Senate against the people: If so, my Author must contradict himself, I am sure of that, For positively, he ascribes the institution of the Ephori to no other end but the controlling of the Senate, nor unto any other person or persons, then to Theopompus, as out of my Book against Calvin, you relate the story: That which you tell us out of Plutarch in another place, is told by Plutarch upon another occasion; which was indeed a combina∣tion of the Kings and Senate against the people, and a just one too. For as your self relates the passage out of Plutarch, the people upon the insolency and predominancy of the Kings and the Senate fell up∣on councel how to defend themselves, and so as∣sum'd Page  250 the power of Debate; and that hereupon the Kings Theopompus and Polydore would have added unto the tenour of the Oracle; that if the people went about by debate to change the Propositions of the Se∣nate, it should be lawful for the Kings and the Senate to null the Result of the people. This I acknowledg to be true. But this makes nothing to the institution of the Ephori, of which Plutarch speaks nothing in that place, though he did soon after. But whereas you subjoyn that the people incensed at the practise, put a bit into the mouth of the Senate by the institution of the Ephori, you make therein a grosser addition to the words of Plutarch, then the two Kings and the Senate did to the words of the Oracle: And then whereas you tell us out of Plato, that the Ephorate was set up against the haereditary power of the Kings; you either do mistake your Author, or else must make him contradict himself as much in this place, as you did Plutarch in the other: Plato affirming in the place which you find cited in the Margin of the Book, against Calvin, (so you please to call it) that Lycurgus did not onely ordain the Senate, but that he did also constitute the Ephorate for the strength and preservation of the Regal power. But granting, that it may be said by Plato in his 3 de legibus (as you cite the place) that the Ephorate was set up against the Hereditary power of Kings; what reason have you to believe, but that Plato might as well be mistaken in the end and purpose, for which the Ephori were ordained, as in the first Author of that institution, which he makes to be Lycurgus himself, contrary to Aristotle, Plutarch, and all other writers. And finally, whereas you tell Page  251 us, That Cicero (agreeing in this point with Plato) hath affirmed, that the Ephori in Lacedemon were so opposite to the Kings, as the Tribune in Rome to the Consuls: You make therein an Argument against your self; and I prove it thus. As the Tribunes of Rome were first ordained to oppose the Consuls, so were the Ephori of Sparta instituted to oppose the Kings; but the Tribunes of Rome were not ordained at first to oppose the Kings, but only to interpose in behalf of the people; therefore the Ephori of Sparta were not instituted to oppose the Kings.

12. The conference between Theopompus and his Queen, touching his unadvisedness in ordaining these popular Officers, and that which might ensue upon it, you relate them no otherwise then I do; but that you slight the womans foresight into busi∣ness, as not worth the noting; indeed it had not been worth the noting, if she had reproved that in the King, which was the fact of the people only: nor have you made any Answer to the other two Arguments, by which I prove that the Ephori were instituted by the Kings, and by none but them; which might make a credulous man believe, that they are unanswerable, because unanswered: And there∣fore being of such weight, I shall add nothing to them, to make them more weightier then they be, but an explication of the second: That second Ar∣gument I derive from the words of Cleomenes (as they stand in Plutarch) in which he lets the people know, that one reason why the Ephori were instituted by the former Kings, was, that the Kings being inga∣ged in forreign wars, might have some cer∣tain friends to sit in judgment in their stead, whom Page  252 they called Ephori. And hereupon I may very well infer thus much, That if the people had first institu∣ted this Ephori (as you say they did) they would have chosen them out of such of their own number whom they might confide in; and not have chosen them out of those, who being the Kings especial friends, must have a different interest from that of the peo∣ple.

13. Your discourse about the Ephori drawing to∣wards an end, you charge me with omitting as well the ruine of the Ballance, as the corruption of the Common wealth, which did thence arise; and you charge it on me to this purpose, That picking up my objections against the Government in vigor, out of the rubbish and dissolution of it, I may cast oust in m•ns eyes. or perswade them that the Ephori (trusting to the power or interest they had in the Commonalty) came to usurp upon the Kings, and to be Tyrants, as th•y are called by Plato and Aristotle. The first of which two charges is against all Reason; for why should I be charged with omitting that which was extrinsecal unto my project and design, it being no part of my intent, to take notice of the several changes and cor∣ruptions in the State of Sparta; but only of the insti∣tution of the Ephori, their insolencies towards their King, and their final ruine. And the other of these charges is against all truth; for how doth it appear, or possibly can be made apparent, that I have used any Article for casting dust into mens eyes, the better to perswade them to give credit to any thing which may serve my turn; when I have said nothing in all this business about the Ephori, but what is justified by the Authority of the most famous States-men, and Page  253 renowned Writers, who have committed to our knowledge, the true condition of Affairs in that Common-wealth; so that you might have spared the story of Hipitadeus, the selling of his lot or his portion of Lands, contrary to the Laws of Lycurgus; the following of that bad example by other men, and the reducing of all the Free-holders in that Common-wealth, to the number of 100. only, un∣less you had found any thing in that Book of mine, which had sounded contrary unto it: But whereas you infer in that which followeth, That the ingrossing the Lands of that Common wealth into such few hands, altered the Government into an Oligarchy, that by this it was no Oligarchy that Agis was mur∣thered, and that in reference to this Oligarchy, Pla∣to and Aristotle called the Government of Sparta by the name of Tyranny; in all these things you may be said to cast dust into the eyes of the Readers, that they may not see the light of truth: For cer∣tainly the Government of the State of Sparta, con∣sisting in the Kings and Senate, remained only as it was before by the Laws of Lycurgus (the superin∣duction of the Ephori being added to it) not altered any thing at all, by the ingrossing of the Lands of that Common-wealth into those few hands: Nor was it by the Authority of those ingrossers (whom you call the Oligarchy) though possible enough at their instigation, that Agis was murthered by the E∣phori: nor was it finally in relation to these Ingrossers that the Government of Sparta was called a tyranny (there was no reason why it should) both by Plato and Aristotle; but only in reference to the unparaleld cruelties and abominable insolencies of the Ephori, Page  254 committed on and against their Kings; it being said by Aristotle in as plain tearms as may be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that the Ephorate (and not the Oligar∣chy of Ingrossers) was an absolute Tyranny. Thus have you fetcht Arguments against an Oligarchy in the State of Sparta, which you find not in it: And for the close of all, you say, That whereas Agis and Cleomenes, by the restitution of the Lots of Licurgus, were assertors of popular power, they are insinuated by me, to have been assertors of Monarchy. But first, the restitution of the Lots of Licurgus, by the industry and endeavours of those two Kings, impro∣ved not at all the power of the people, who were still kept under as before, but only reduced them un∣to that equality in respect of Riches, which might secure them from being trampled on, and insulted over by their fellow Commoners. And secondly, it appears by Plutarch, that the designe of those two Kings in that restitution, was to get glory to the one, and preservation to the other; which could not be effected, but by gaining the good will of the common people, and make them sure unto their side, whensoever they should be ready for that great de∣sign of destroying the Ephori. And so much in An∣swer to that part of your Letter, which concerns the rise, insolencies, and destruction of those popu∣lar Villains, which Calvin makes his first example for opposing Kings.

14. Such being my play (no foul play I am sure) with humane Authors, or as a Polititian; you will next show me whither I have dealt better with the Scripture, or been more carefull as a Divine: But first you must look backwards upon somwhat which Page  255 was said before. And having laid down the words of Calvin, which occasioned this discourse between us. you cannot but confess that what he saith of Demarchy of Athens, is a plain mistake, they be∣ing officers (as you truly say) of another na∣ture; and then why he may not be as much mi∣staken in the Spartan Ephori, and the Roman Tri∣bunes, as in the Athenian Demarchy you can show no reason. For if he be of a fallible spirit in one point, he can be infallible in none. Which mistake, notwithstanding it betrayes his igno∣rance in the Greek Antiquities, you tell us not to be such an one, as destroyes no other part of his Asser∣tion.

First, The supereminent Authority of the Ephori over the Kings, & of the Tribunes over their Consuls, standing good however: The contrary whereof (to use your own words) hath been already proved by Plato, Aristotle, and Plutarch, though you would willingly perswade the Reader that they speak for you. Which said, you put me to it once again as a Polititian, and tell me that no Polititian in the world can show a re•son, Why the Estates in a Gothick Moddel, should be of less power then either the Spar∣tan, Ephori, or the Roman Tribunes. So much I shall be willing to grant, that the Estates in a Gothick Moddel, have as much power in the publick Go∣vernment, and over the persons of their Kings; as the Ephori had over their Kings, and the Tribunes over their Consuls, at their first institution. But that they had the like power in either case, as the Ephori and the Tribunes exercised by violence and usurpation in their severall Cities, no Polititian in the Page  256 world can be able to show me. And this we may the better see by looking on their power in matters which concern the publique, in the Realm of Spaine; the Kings and people whereof (those of Portugal excepted onely) are of Gothick race, and therefore likely to retain most of the Gothick Moddels: And looking on it, we shall find first, that their Curias or General conventions consist there (as in other pla∣ces) of the three Estates, Prelate, Peer, and People.

And secondly, that though the Government of that King, be not so Arbitrary Despotical as it is in France; yet, he both rules and manageth those Conventions to his own contentment. For neither can they meet together but by his appointment; nor are their acts and consultations of any effect, further then as they are confirmed by the Kings consent; nor finally can they sit any longer, or depart any sooner, then as it may stand most with the Kings conveniency. But Bodin goes a little further. And having showed us with what Reverence and Devo∣tion, the the three Estates of France addressed them∣selves to Charles the 8th. in a convention held at Tours, (at what time the Authority of the Assem∣blies was greater and more eminent then it hath been since) affirms expresly, Majorem etiam Obe∣dientiam & majus obsequium Hispanorum regi Ex∣hiberi. The King of Spain hath more obedience and observance from his three Estates, then that which was afforded to the King of France. The General conventions of both Kingdoms being much alike, may seem to have been cast in the same mould (for the French neighbouring the Goths, who then possest those Provinces in the Realm of France which lie on Page  257 the west side of the Loire, could not but know the manner of those Assemblies which Charles Mar∣tel thought good to introduce, and settle in the Realm of France, that giving them some influence in the publick Government, and binding them unto him by so great a favour, he might make use of their Authority to preserve his own, as his Son Pepin af∣ter did to obtain the Crown. But that the. Assem∣bly of Estates in either Kingdom did take upon them to fine, imprison, or to depose or murder any of their Kings, as the Tribunes sometimes did the Con∣suls, and the Ephori did the Kings of Sparta, you cannot easily prove out of all their stories.

15. But you go on (and tell me first, that the e∣states in a Gothish Moddel, are such by virtue of their estates, that is of their over ballance in dominion; and then you put it upon me to show both why the over ballance in dominion should not amount to Empire, and practically that it amounteth not to Empire in quiet and well governed times. But this, by your leave, is a strange way of Disputation, by cutting out what •work you please, and sending it to me to make it up as well as I can: But being sent to me, I am bound to dispatch it out of hand for your sa∣tisfaction.

I say then first, that the Estates in a Gothish Moddel, are not such by virtue of their Estates, that is to say, by being above the rest of the people in titles of Honour and Revenue, which you call an over ballance in Dominion. For were it so, they were of power to exercise the same Authority, as you suppose the Tribunes and the Ephori to have done before them in all times alike, and not when Page  258 they are called together by the Kings command. For being Masters of their Estates, as well out of as in those Generall Assemblies and Conventions, and consequently in all times alike; what reason can you show me that they should make no use of that Po∣wer which belongs to them in right of their Estates, but in those General Assemblies and Conventions onely.

Secondly, If they have that power by virtue of their Estates, and yet cannot exercise, but in such Conventions; how doth it come to pass that such Conventions are not of their own appointment, but onely at the pleasure and command of their seve∣ral Kings?

And Thirdly, If they hold and enjoy that Power by virtue of their said Estates, you may do well to show some reason, why all that are above the rest of the people in Titles of Honour and Revenue, should not be called to those assembly of Estates, but onely some few out of every Order, (as in France and Spain) to represent the rest of their se∣veral Orders: For being equal or somewhat near to an equality with one another in Estates and Ho∣nours, those which were pretermitted have the greater wrong, in not being suffered to make use of that natural power which their over balance in domi∣nion hath conferred upon them. And then I would be glad to right whether this over ballance in Dominion be ascribed unto them, in reference to the King or the common people: If in relation to the King, you put the King into no better condition then any one of his subjects by making him accomptable to so many Masters; who may say to him whensoever Page  259 they shall meet together, Redde rationem villicati∣onis tuae, and tell him plainly, That he must give up an account of his stewardship, for he shall be no longer steward. And then have Kings done very ill in rai∣sing so many of their subjects to so great a Power, and calling them together to make use of that po∣wer, which they may make use of if they please to his destruction. And if they have this over-ballance of Dominion, in reference onely to the common peo∣ple, above whom they are raised in Estates and Ho∣nours; what then becomes of that natural liber∣ty of Mankind, that underived Majesty of the com∣mon people which our great Masters in the School of Politie have so much cryed up. The people must needs take it as ill as the King, to be deprived of their natural Liberty, without giving their consent unto it, or to be deposed from that Majesty which is inherent in themselves, without deriving it from any but their first Creator. But on the other side, if the three Estates in a Gothick Moddel, receive that power, which they enjoy in those Conventi∣ons either from the hands of the King, as the Lords Spiritual and Temporal (which make up two of the three Estates) did here in England, or from the hands of the People, as the 3d. Estate have done in all Kingdoms else, (which is the generall opinion and practise of all Nations too) you must stand single by your self in telling me that they have that power by virtue of those Estates which they are possest of. And this may also serve to show you, that an over ballance in Dominion, or the greatness of Estate which some subjects have above the rest, amounteth not to such an Empire as may give them Page  260 any power over Prince or people, unless it can be showed as I think it cannot, that the King doth not over ballance them in the point of Dominion, as they do the rest of their fellow subjects, or that the whole body of the people cannot as well pretend to Dominion over themselves, as any of their fellow∣subjects can pretend to have over them: And then if this Dominion do amount to an Empire also, we shall have three Empires in one Kingdom; that is to say, the King, the three Estates, and the Com∣mon people.

I must confess, I have not weigh'd all Orders and degrees of men in so even a scale as to resolve which of them ballanceth, counter-ballanceth, or over-ballanceth the other; which must be various and uncertain, according to the Lawes of severall Countrys, and the different constitutions of their se∣veral Governments. And I conceive it altogether as impossible to make a new Garment for the Moon, which may as well fit her in the full, as in her wain∣ings and increasings; as to accommodate these Me∣taphisical speculations to the rules of Govern∣ment, which varying in all places must have different forms: And having different forms, must have dif∣ferent ballances according to the Lawes and consti∣tutions of each several Country. And yet I am not altogether so dimme sighted as not to see what these new Notions (which otherwise indeed would prove new Nothings) do most chiefly aim at; the chief design of many of the late Discourses, being ap∣parently no other then to put the supream Govern∣ment into the hands of the common people, or at least into the hands of those whom they shall chuse Page  261 for their Trustees and Representors; which if it could be once effected, the underived Majesty of the common people would not appear so visibly in any one person whatsoever, as in those Trustees and Representors, and then the King or supream Magi∣strate being thus out shined, would seem no other then a Star of the lesser Magnitude, which though moving in an higher sphere, should neither give the light nor impart such influences to the world, as the two Great Luminaries (such as you fancy the E∣states in a Gothick Moddel) in case he prove not rather a falling Star, as perhaps he may. But ho∣ping you will pardon this irruption in me, I proceed unto the second part of your Letter, in which I am said to speak rather like a Divine then a Polititi∣an: And yet not like a Divine neither, but like a Divine as I suppose, and no more then so.

17. But letting all things be as they may, you tell me that I aske of Calvin, in what part of the word of God we may finde any such Authority given to popular Magistrates as he tells us of. And for an answer hereunto, you prepare the way by laying down the constitution of the Government of the people of Israel, which you affirm to have been founded on a popular ballance. And were it so, there is no question to be made, but that a popular ballance even by the Ordinance of God himself in Scripture, both did and may amount to Empire; for who •rt thou O man, which disputest with God, or cal∣lest in question any of the Divine Acts of that hea∣venly providence. The Question will be onely this, Whether the Government of the Israelites was Page  262 founded in a popular ballance, which you say it was, and I think rather that it was not: The rea∣son why I think so I shall show anon, and in the mean time I will look upon the Argument which you suppose it to be proved, We find (say you) the people of Israel iudging the tribe of Benjamine, and by the Oracle of God leavying War against them; Which being an act of soveraign power, declares that Government to be founded on a popular ballance. But first, it appears not by the text, that all the people of Israel did sit as Judges on the tribe of Benjamine, the judgement might be passed (for what you can say to the contrary) by the Elders onely, that is to say, the heads or chiefs of the several families of the tribes of Israel; and nothing but the executi∣on of the sentences by them committed to the peo∣ple.

Secondly, It appears not by the Text, that the War was leavied against the Benjamites by any O∣racle of God, but the contrary rather; For it is said, that the children of Israel were gathered to∣ther as one man, at a place called Mizpeh, that they resolved upon the War, and concluded how to have it carried before they asked Councel of the Lord, Judg. 20. 18. And when they asked councel of the Lord, it was not whether they should proceed in the War or not, (that being a thing resolved be∣fore hand) but which of the tribes should go up first to the battail again the children of Benjamin, as in the Book of Judges, Cap 20. 18. which probably might be the cause of their ill success in the first en∣counter, as having engaged themselves in a bloody War against their brethren, before they sought for Page  263 councel at the Oracle of God, as they should have done. And therefore, Thirdly, this rather showes the people of Israel to be under no Government at all, then to be governed by a Democratical or po∣pular form; and serves as a most excellent com∣mentary on the last words of the book of Judges, viz: In those dayes there was no King in Israel: every Man did that which was right in his own eyes. Had it been under any one form of Government; (Po∣pular or Democratical, call it what you will) every man durst not to have done that which is right in his own eyes, though there had been at that time no King in Israel. And as they were not under any popular Government, by which they might have been restrained from doing what was right in their own eyes; so you confess that they were not at that time under the Government of the Sanhedrim; for speaking of that passage in the first of Judges, where Judah said unto Simeon 〈◊〉 Brother, come up with me into my lot, that we may fight against the Canaanites and I likewise will go with thee into thy lot, so Sime∣on went with him, &c. you thereupon infer, that by this leaguing at their pleasure one with another, it was plain the Sanhedrim, their common Ligament was broken, so that the Sanhedrim being broken, the Kings not instituted, nor any form of popular Go∣vernment set up among them by common consent; nothing remains, but that they must be governed by the Heads or Chiefs of the several Families into which the Tribes were Generally divided in those times. Had there been any such Councel, or esta∣blisht body, as that of the Generall Estates of the united Provinces; or that of the Cantons and their Page  264 Confederates amongst the Switzers, they might have been said to have been under such a popular Government as those people are, though every Tribe had a distinct Government of its own, as those Pro∣vinces and Cantons have.

18. And here I should proceed to the Examina∣tion of that part of your Letter which concerns the Sanhedrim, as being the point of greatest diffe∣rence between us in the present business. But con∣sidering that you have spent so much of your Pa∣per, about the Original institution and authority of the Kings of Israel, and consequently of all those who have enjoyed that power and dignity in their severall Countrys; I shall first lay all together which you have deliver'd on that subject, with my opinion in the same as it comes before me. In or∣der whereunto, I am first to say, that the Govern∣ment of that people, when they were in Aegypt, was under the Heads or Chiefes of their several fa∣milies, who by a paternal right derived on them from their first Father Adam, challenged and en∣joy'd a Fatherly authority over all those who de∣scended of them: And unto these did Moses address himselfe, when he was to communicate from the Lord that most joyful news of their deliverance out of Aegypt, called by the name of Elders in the Book of Exodus, 3. 16. & 4. 29 not called so onely, because they were in honour onely amongst the rest of the people▪ (as you seem to say) but because they were above them also in this point of power. The people else had had no remedy in any differences and debates which might rise amongst them, but Page  265 suing in the Courts of Aegypt; which it was as un∣fit for them to do, as it was amongst the Primitive Christians, to go to Law with one another in Emer∣gent differences, and that before the unbelievers. But this dispersed authority being united in the per∣son of Moses, (as many lines united in one Center from a large circumference) the whole Govern∣ment of the people did remain in him till by the advice of Jethro, they were divided and sub▪divided into several Companies. Each of them having over him their appointed Rulers; By Gods appointment afterwards, a standing Court of 70. Elders, which they called the Sanhedrim, were chosen to bear part of the publick Government (but whether chosen out of the Jethronian Judges or not, we shall see a∣non) Moses being dead, and Josuah who succeeded in the supream Authority, being also gathered by his Fathers, the authority of the Sanhedrim dying also with them, as your self confesseth; the Ordi∣nary Government returned again to the heads of the several Families, as before in Aegypt, the extra∣ordinary being vested in those several Judges, whom God raised up from time to time, to free them from the power of those cruel Enemies, from whose Ty∣ranny they were not able otherwise to have freed themselves. And in this state they stood till the time of Samuel, when being vexed by the Philistines with con•inual Wars, the Ark of God was taken not long before, and their condition no less miserable under the times of Samuel, then it was at the worst, they desire to have a King to fight their Battails, and to go in and out before them, like to other Nations. And that their future King might settle on the surer Page  266 foundation, he had not only the approbation of the Lord, 1 Sam. 8. 22. and the acclamations of the people, chap 10. v. 24. but the Heads and Chief• of the several Families devolved their whole power upon him; the motion being made to Samuel by the Elders of the people, aswell in their own names, as in the names of all the rest of the Tribes, as ap∣pears, 1 Sam. 8. 4.

19. Before this time, that is to say, after the deaths of Moses and Joshua (who were Kings in fact, though not in title) the Israelites had no King to Raign over them but the Lord himself; from whom they first received their Laws, from whose mouth they received direction in all cases of difficul∣ty, and from whose hands they received protection in all times of danger: And when they had any visi∣ble Judge or supream Governour, God did not on∣ly raign in their persons, in regard of that immedi∣ate vocation which they had from him; but also of the gifts of the Spirit, and the co-operation of his Grace and Power: In which respect, the Govern∣ment of the Israelites, during that interval of time, is called by many learned Writers, by the name of Theocratie, or the immediate Government of the Lord himself: And this the Lord himself not ob∣scurely intimates, when he said to Samuel, They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, ne reg∣nem super eos, that I should not raign over them. I know the general stream of Writers, do understand these words as words of dislike and indignation, in that the people seemed to be weary of his Govern∣ment, in their desire of having a King, like to other Nations; but I conceive (with all due reverence un∣to Page  267 those who opine the contrary) that God spake these words rather to comfort Samuel, whom he found much displeased and troubled at the Proposi∣tion of the Elders, as if a greater injury had been of∣fered to himself, then was done to the Prophet; then out of any dislike which he had of the matter: For if he had disliked the matter, that is, that they should have a King like other Nations; he neither would have fore signified it as a blessing on the seed of A∣braham, Gen. 17. or as prerogative of Judah, Gen. 49. nor have foretold the people, that when they should desire a King, they should set him to be King over them, whom the Lord their God shall chuse, Deut. 17. nor would he have commanded Samuel to give them a King as they desired, nor have directed him par∣ticularly to that very man whom he had designed for the Kingdom. But on the contrary say you, we find it otherwise in the Prophet Hosea, where the Lord said unto the people, That he had given them a King in his anger (that is (as you affirm) in Saul) and that he took him away in his wrath (that is (say you) in the Captivity) Hos. 13. 11. And to this pur∣pose you alledge another passage in the same Pro∣phet, ch. 8. v. 4. where it is said, They have set up Kings, and not by me; they have made Princes and I knew it not: But for all this, your explication of the one Text, and your application of the other, are alike erroneous. The Prophet Hosea lived in the time of Jerohoam, son of Joah, King of Israel, and directed the words of his Prophesy to the people chiefly, as they were separated and abstracted from the Realm of Israel. And first, beginning with the last, it appears plainly by the verse foregoing, that Page  268 the words by you cited, are addressed particularly to the house of Israel; and it had been hard dealing in the Prophet, to charge the ten Tribes with setting up of Kings, but not by him, had it been so under∣stood of Saul, as you say it was; when it was the fault (if it were a fault) of all the twelve; and there∣fore saith S. Hierome, Potest hoc quod dicit (ipsi reg∣naverunt, & non, &c.) Etiam de Jeroboham ac∣c•pi filio Nabath, & de ceteris principibus, qui ei in imperio successerint. More positively some learned Writers in the Church of Rome, by whom it is af∣firmed, Hun• locum pertinere ad Reges Israel, quo∣rum primus erat Jeroboham, qui tempore Reaboham, filii Salamonis, Regnum decem Tribuum invasit. And to the same effect saith Deodati amongst the Protestants, viz. The people of their own proper mo∣tion, without enquiring after Gods will, or staying for his command or permission, have chosen and made Kings of their own heads, separating themselves from the lawful Rule of David's posterity, 1 King. 11. 31. And then the meaning of the other Text will be plainly this, I gave thee (or I gave thee leave to have) a King in mine anger, that is to say in Jeroboham the Son of Nebat, who by with-drawing the people from the worship of God, to worship the golden Calves of Dan and Bethel, is said to have made Isra∣el sin, and thereby plagued them irremediously (without repentance) into the heavy anger and dis∣pleasure of the Lord their God: And I took him a∣way in my wrath, that is to say, in the person of Ho∣sheah, the last King of Israel, carried away captive, together with the greatest part of his people, into the land of Assyria; the people being dispersed Page  269 in the several Provinces of that Empire, never re∣turning since that time, to their native Country, nor having any King of their own to raign over them as afore they had. Not to say any thing of many of the Kings of Israel treacherously slain by their own subjects, out of an ambitious desire to obtain the Kingdom; of whom it may be justly said, That God took them away in his wrath, before they had lived out their full time in the course of nature. Nothing in these two Texts which relates to Saul, and the captivity, that is to say, the Captivity of Babylon as you understand it. Such is your play with holy Scripture, when you speak (as you suppose) like a Divine.

20. But you have another use to make of the Prophet Hosea, whose words you cite unto a pur∣pose that he never meant, namely to prove that Kings are not of Divine Right: For having said, that such Divines who will alwaies have Kings to be of divine right, are not to be hearkned too, seeing they affirm that which is clean contrary to Scripture; you add, that in this case, said Hosea, they have set up Kings, and not by me, they have made Princes, and I knew it not. But first, these words are not spoken by the Prophet touching the institution of Kings in General, but onely of a particular fact in the ten Tribes of Israel, by with drawing themselves from the house of David, and setting up a King of their own without consulting with the Lord, or craving his approbation and consent in the business. Second∣ly, If it may be said that Kings are not of Divine Right and institution, because God saith here by the Prophet, that some Kings have been set up, but Page  270 not by him, you have more reason to affirm, that Kings are of Divine Right and institution, because he saith in another place, less capable of any such mis∣construction as you make of this) by me Kings reign. All Kings are said to reign by God, because all reign by his appointment, by his permission, at the least. And yet some Kings may be truly said not to reign by him, either because they are set up by the people in a tumultuous and seditious way, against the natural Kings and Princes; or else because they come unto their Crowns by usurpation, blood, and violence, contrary to his will revealed, and the e∣stablisht Laws of their severall Countrys. Which Argument if it should be good, we could not have a stronger against such Papists as hold alwayes (for it seems no mater if they did hold so but somtimes) that the Pope by Divine right is head of the universall Church; then by showing them out of their own Histories, how many Popes have raised themselves into that See, either by open faction, or by secret bribery, and by violent and unjust intrusion. Of whom it may be said, and that not improperly, that though they pretend to be Christs Vicars, and the successors of St. Peter, yet were they never plac't by Christ in St. Peters Chair. Now to dispute from the persons to the power, and from the unjust wayes of acquiring that power, to the original right and institution of it, is such a sorry piece of Logick, as you blaming those who dispute from the folly of a people against an Ordinance of God. For upon what ground else do you lay the foundation of the legall Government (especially amongst the Hebrews) but on the folly of the people. p. 11. the imprudence and importunity of the people p. 14. upon which Page  271 ground also you build the supream authority of the Judges, who onely by the meet folly of the people came to be set up in Israel, p. 13. But certainly if their desires to have a King were folly, and impru∣dence in them, it must be felix fatuitas, a very for∣tunate imprudence, and a succesful folly, I am sure of that, that people never live in a settled condition till they come to the Government of Kings. For was it not by the fortunate conduct of their Kings, that they exterminated the rest of the Canaanites, broke the Amalekites in pieces, and crusht the po∣wer of the Phylistins, growing by that means for∣midable unto all their Neigbours? Was it not by the power and reputation of their Kings, that they gained some strong Towns from the Children of Ammon, and enlarged their Territories by the con∣quest of some parts of Syria; that they grew strong in shipping, and mannaged a wealthy trade from Esion-Geber, in the streights of Babel-Mandel, to the Land of Ophir, in the remotest parts of India? Prosperities sufficient to justifie and endear such bur∣dens, as by the alteration of the Government might be said upon them.

21. From such Divines in Generall, as will al∣ways (I must keep that word) have Kings to be by divine Right, you come to me at last in my own par∣ticular, charging me that at a venture I will have Kings to be of Divine Right, and to be absolute; whereas in truth (say you) if Divine Right be de∣rived unto Kings from these of the Hebrews onely, it is most apparent that no absolute King can be of Di∣vine Right.

And first to answer for my self (for having some∣time Page  272 been a Parson, (I shall take leave to Christen my own Child first) I think that I was never so rash, nor so ill advised, as to speak any thing at aventure in so great a point, as the originall institution and divine right of Kings.

Secondly, I am sure I have not so little studied the Forms of Government, as to affirm any where in that Book against Calvin, as you call it, that all Kings be absolute. The second Sect. of the sixt Chapter, of that Book, being spent for the most part, in shewing the differences between conditio∣nal Kings, and an absolute Monarch.

And Thirdly, They must be as sorry Divines, and as bad Historians as my self, who ascribe the▪ abso∣lute Power, or the Divine right of Kings, to the first institution of a King amongst the Hebrews. For who knows not (if he know any thing in that kind) that there were Kings in Aegypt, and Assyria, as al∣so of Scycionia in Peleponesus, not long after the Flood; Kings of the Aborigines, and the Trojan race in Italy; in that of Athens, Argos and Micenae amongst the Greeks, of the Parthians, Syrians, &c. in the Greater, and of Lydia in the lesser Asia, long time before the Raign of Saul the first, King of the Hebrews: all which were absolute Monarchs in their several Countrys. And as once Tully said, Nulla gens tam barbara, that never Nation was so barba∣rous, but did acknowledge this principle, that there was a God; so will you hardly find any barbarous Nation, who acknowledge not the supream Go∣vernment of Kings: And how then all Nations should agree in giving themselves over to the power and Government of Kings; I believe none cannot Page  273 show me a better reason, then that they either did it by the light of natural reason, by which they found that Government to be fittest for them, or that the first Kings of every Nation, were the heads & fa∣milies that retained that paternal right over all such as descended of them, as might entitle their authority to divine institution. For proof whereof, (since you have such a prejudice against Divines) you need look no farther then your self, who tells us p. 12. That Kings no question, where the ballance is Monarchical, are of Divine right; and if they be good, the greatest blessing that the Government so standing can be capable of; or if you will not stand to this, then look on the first Chapter of Aristotles Politicks, where he makes the Regall Government to stand upon no other bottom then paternal Authority. Initio civitates regibus parebant, &c. At the first (saith he) Cities were Governed by Kings, and so still at this day are such Nations, as descended of men accustomed to the King by Government. For every houshold is governed by the eldest, as it were by a King, and so consequently are the Colonies or Companies multiplyed from thence, governed in like sort for Kindreds sake. Which words of Ari∣stotle seconded by the general practice of all Nati∣ons, I look on as a better Argument of the Original institution & Divine Right of Kings (that great Phi∣losopher in the 4th. Book of his Politicks, cap. 2. gi∣ving unto the Regall Government the attribute of Divinissima, or the most Divine) then to fetch ei∣ther of them from the institution of the first King among the Hebrews, so that you might have spared the labour of showing the inconsequences, of arg¦ing Page  274 from a contingent case to a matter of absolute necessity (as from the making of the first King a∣mongst the Hebrews, to the necessity of making Kings in all other Nations) unless you could have found some adversary to contend withal. And with like thrift you might have saved your self the trou∣ble of proving that the words of Moses in Deut. 17. v. 18. touching recourse to be had unto the Judge (which should be in those dayes) in some certain cases, inferred not a necessity, of having any such supream Judge as God raised up from time to time, to govern and avenge his people in their grea∣test misery, unless you have met with any (which I know not of) which trust as much to that Text of Scripture for those supream Judges, as you re∣ly upon it for the Court of Sanhedrim, of which more anon. The corollary wherewithal you close this passage; I like well enough, had you grounded your discourse on some clearer Text: For I con∣ceive as well as you, that those Judges are not neces∣sitated by the will of God, but foreseen onely by his providence, not imposed by the Law, but provided by i• as an Expedient in case of necessity.

22. But before I come to examine the Text of Scripture, on which you ground both the Authori∣ty of the Sanhedrim, and those supream Judges which governed in their several times the affairs of Israel; I must first see what form of Government it is which you chiefly drive at, and in comparison whereof you so much vilifie and condemn the Re¦gall. And fi•st the Government you drive at, mus• be plainly Popular, and such Popular estate call i• Timocraty, or a Democratie, or what else you please, Page  275 into which the old Agrarian laws must be intro∣duced, for the better settling of equality amongst the people. And such a Common-wealth as this, you fancy to be most agreeable to the natural li∣berty of Mankind, and Divine institution; There is nothing (say you) more clear nor certain in Scrip∣ture, then that the Commonwealth of Israel was insti∣tuted by God, p. 14. and settled on a popular Agra∣rian, p. 12. And that the Restitution of their Com∣mon-wealth was fore-signified in these words of the Prophet, Hosea, I will be thy King, cap. 13. 10. But if you have no better grounds for the Institution, then for the Restitution of this Common-wealth, they are too weak for foundation of so great a buil∣ding. The Prophet speaks in that place particularly to the house of Ephraim, v. 1. the people of the Realm of Israel v. 9. as appears more distinctly by their kissing the Calves (the Golden Calves of Dan and Bethel) v. 2. Of whose reduction to their native Country after their being carried away captive by Salmanasser King of Assyria, there is nothing signi∣fied in the Scripture in the way of prophesie, nor no relation of it as a matter of Fact. Nor can you show me any clear and evident text, by which I may be sure that this Commonwealth was instituted by God, considering that Moses during the whole time of his life governed authoritatively and supreamly without any appeal unto the people, or unto any o∣ther power either co-ordinate with him, or superi∣or to him; which I believe is more thenyou can show me in any Duke of Venice, or any State-holder of the Netherlands, or any other Prince in a Common∣wealth, which onely serve as second Notions in a Page  276 State, to put their business into form, and give date to all publick instruments, as the Keepers of the Li∣berties, not long since in England. Nor do I finde that Josuah abated any thing of that power which Moses had, advising sometime with the Elders of the people, but not governed by them; so that the first Government amongst the Israelites, had more in it of the Regal, then the popular Forms; to which they did desire to return again, upon the apprehen∣sion of the Anarchy, and confusion under which they lived, when there was no King in Israel, as in other Nations. And as for your Agrarian laws (your Popular Ballance, as elsewhere) upon which this Commonwealth is supposed to be settled; I con∣ceive it will be very hard for you to prove that also. For though the Land of Canaan was divided by Lot amongst the Tribes, yet neither had the Tribes themselves their equal portion, nor every family in those Tribes, their equal shares in those une∣qual portions with one another; some of the Tribes enjoying little or nothing of the lot which had fal∣len unto them, and some of the Families of those Tribes, being scattered up and down the Country, as Jacob had prophesied of Simeon in the Book of Gen. which utterly destroyes that popular Agrarian on which this Common-wealth is supposed to be founded, and in which (you say) they might have continued, but that they desired to have a King like other Nations.

23. Your second Argument for a preferring a po∣pular Estate before a Monarchy is derived from reason, and that reason grounded on the natural li∣berty of all mankind; which cannot better be pre∣served Page  277 them in popular Governments. God never required (as you say). of any Man, or any Go∣vernment, that they should live otherwise then accord∣ing to their estate, that there are rules in Scripture to show the duty of a servant to such whose wants have made them servants; but that there is no rule in Scripture that obligeth a man unto the duty of a ser∣vant, which can live of himself. And finally having askt this question, whether God hath less regard of a Nation, then he hath of a man; you tax the Israe∣lites for making themselves servants by desi∣ring a King to be set over them, when they might have continued as they were in a free condition. But first that natural liberty of Mankind, which our great Polititians so much talk of, hath no ground in nature, for as servants are bound by positive Lawes to obey their Masters, so▪ women are bound by the law of Nature to submit themselves unto their Husbands, and children by the same law to be obedient to their parents; This if the Scripture had not taught you, you might have learnt from Aristo∣tle, as he did from Homer, who in the ninth Book of his Odyssees, gives this Aphorism, viz Ʋxori & natis jus dicit quis{que} virorum, That every man gives law to his wife and children: And though the chil∣dren come to such a condition both of age and for∣tunes, that they are well enough able to live of them∣selves, yet do they still continue servants to their natural parents, (for Iu•a patris naturalis, minime solvantur, sath the civil Lawyers) and therefore are required by God to do the duty of servants, till ei∣ther their Fathers free consent, or the Constitution of the Government under which they live, shall Page  278 lease them from it. Secondly, Admitting this na∣tural liberty of all mankind which our late Polititi∣ans so much dream of, yet man in his depraved na∣ture is such a violent head-strong and unruly beast, that he stands as much in need of a •it or bridle, as the Horse or Mule, least otherwise he run head∣long to his own destruction. And therefore if he will not have a King, he must be under the com∣mand of some other Government, aut R•x, au• Senatus habendus est, as once Pacuvius •aid unto those of Capua; and whether he live under the com∣mand of a King, or the power of a Senate, he must be servant unto either; though otherwise he pre∣tend to the ability of a self-subsistence, for unto whomsoever you give your selves servants to obey, his servants ye are unto whom ye obey, saith the Great Apostle. And then the question will be this, whi∣ther the natural liberty of mankind may be best preserved under a Monarchical Government, where he hath but one Master to observe, whose tempe• and affections he may without much difficulty com∣ply withal, under the Government of a Senate or popular State, where he must serve some hundred• of Masters, to every one of which, or to the grea∣ter part of which it is impossible for the wisest man to give any contentment? Supposing Thirdly, That the Q•estion be resolved, in favour of the Popular Government, yet every popular Government is to be ordered by some Lawes, and every Law is the restraining of the use of this pretended liberty, and binds the subject to observance. (Lex, being so called a Ligando, say the old Grammarians) in all such cases, concerning which the Laws are made by what power sover.

Page  27924. But then say you, these laws are of their own making, not imposed by others, which makes no alteration in the case at all; my fetters not being the easier to me, because they are of my own mak∣ing, then if they were made by the next Smith, or provided for me by some others: Besides which you your self have told us, that all such Kings as claim by Scripture can be but regulated Monarchs, and could of right enact no Law, but by the suffrage of the people, pag. 15. Which is as notable a preservative of the peoples liberty, as ever was enjoyed by them in a popular Government. O but say you, the peo∣ple in a popular Government have a power to chuse the Senate, which they have not in chusing of their King, and that the people with such a Senate, have power to make what Laws they please; and what can follow thereupon, but that a Government so set∣led in a Senate and people must be accounted for a Divine Institution, and be called the Government of God, because it is the Government of Laws and not of men, as you tell us, pag. 11.

But first, how may we be assured, That a Senate so established will not Lord it over the people with greater insolency, and put more heavy pressures on them then ever they suffered under Kings; for be∣ing many in number, and all equal in power, every one of them will endeavour to enrich himself, and serve their turn upon the people, there being no su∣periour power to controul them for it.

And next, how may we be assured, That the people (I mean the whole body of the people) have any power to chuse their Senate, or that the Senate being chosen, they have a power in voting with them Page  280 for the making of Laws. The Famous Senate of the Romans, was ordained by Romulus their first King, their number doubled by Tarquinius Priscus, and a third hundred added by Brutus, which continued in the first times of the Consular Government, the people having no hand at all in the nomination: nor was it otherwise at Athens, though that was the most popular and Democratical Estate that ever was in the World; the main body of the people in each Citty, having as little to do in the choise of the Se∣nate, as they had in making of their Laws.

And first, in the making of their Laws, none of the City of Athens were permitted to vote (or to give their voices) but such as were accounted and en∣rolled for Citizens; and none were either so enrolled or reckoned but the Chief of the City, all Servants, Labourers, Handicrafts-men, and Artificers (which make the far greater part in every City) not passing in account for Citizens, and consequently having no voice nor power, either in making Laws, or elect∣ing Magistrates.

And secondly, as it was in the Democratie of A∣thens, so was it in the Timocratie of Rome; the infinit∣ly greatest part of the Inhabi•an•s having no hand at all in the making of Laws, or in any other Act of Government, of what kind soever: For if a Law were past in Senate, none of inferiour Order had a suffrage in it: If it were made in the general Assem∣bly of the Centuries, those of the Nobility agreeing together, might pass a Law without the rest; and whither they agreed or not, the Law was always p•ssed by the other Centuries, before it came to the sixt, consisting of the poorer sort, which were ne∣ver Page  281 called unto the vote: They did in number far exceed all the other five Centuries.

And finally, if the Law were made in the Assem∣bly of the Tribes, as all the poorer sort (which made up the far greater part of the City) could ne∣ver make any use of their voices in the Assembly of Centuries, so the Nobility (which made up the most considerable part of the City) were quite excluded from having any suffrage or voice at all in the As∣sembly of the Tribes. Admitting finally, that all the Inhabitants of Rome, Athens, Syracuse, &c. had vote in the Election of their Magistrates, and in the making of their Laws; yet what makes this unto those multitudes of people, which live dispersed in the Territories of those mighty Cities, or in any of the remoter Provinces which were subject to them; who being infinitely more in number then the Inhabi∣tants of those several and respective Cities, unto which they were subject, had neither voice in the Election of the Senate, or in the making of their Laws, or in any matter of concernment to their se∣veral Nations; but will they, nill they, they must submit to the will and pleasure of their great Masters in those Cities, under whom they served, though otherwise as able to subsist of themselves, as any of the common sort of people in those Common∣wealths. The like may be observed also, in some Common-wealths of a later standing, in which the greater part of the people have no voice at all, as to the making of their Laws, or chusing such as are to make them for the use of the publique; and therefore are so far from having any part in the publique Go∣vernment, that for the most part they are Governed Page  280 〈1 page duplicate〉 Page  281 〈1 page duplicate〉 Page  282 against their wills. Such an imaginary speculation, such an empty nothing, is the supposed liberty of the people in a popular Government.

25. We must next see (notwithstanding all that hath been said) how much you vilifie and contemn the Regal Government, in respect of that popular, which you chiefly drive at: For having told us, That the Government of the Senate and the people, is that only which is or can be the Government of Laws, and not of men; and that the Government of the Laws, and not of men, is the Government of God, and not of men; You tell us out of Aristotles Politiques, That he that is for the Governmens of Laws, is for the Go∣vernment of God; and he that is for the Government of a man, is for the Government of a Beast: But Ari∣stotle's words must be understood according to Ari∣stotle's time, Cum arbitria Principum pro legibus e∣rant, when the Subjects were Governed by no other Law, then the will of the Prince, and cannot be ap∣lied to any King or Monarch in the Christian world, which have not only the Law of God for a rule in Government; but many positive Laws of their own establishing, for the well ordering of the people in their several Kingdoms.

You tell us secondly, That when the ballance is popular, as in Israel, in the Grecian in the Scicilian Tyrannies, Kings are the direst curse that can befall a Nation.

But first (to pretermit the extream harshness of the expression) so far were Kings from being a curse to the people of Israel, that (admitting the former Government to have been setled on Popular Agra∣rian, as it never was) they proved the greatest tem∣poral Page  283 blessing to them, as before was said, that e∣ver the Nation did enjoy.

And Secondly, you fall from such Kings, as ex∣ercise no other, then a lawful power to the Greci∣an and Scicilian Tyrannies, as if the case in setting up a King over the people of Israel, not onely by Gods approbation, but their own consent, were to be paralelled with those Tyrannies which were e∣rected in some Cities of Greece and Sicily, by Dy•∣nisius and other Monsters of those ages, infamous for their lusts and most barbarous cruelties. For had the change been made by persons of sobriety & mo∣deration, (as that in Rome from a Democraty to a Monarchy, by Augustus Caesar) the alteration might have been for the benefit of the common people, by bringing them from that which Aristotle calls the worst kind of Government, to that which comes nearest to the Government of Almighty God, and is therefore called the most Divine. Nor had the people lost any thing by such change in the point of liberty, which never is enjoyed more peacefully and securely (nunquam libertas gratior extat, quam sub Rege pio, as it is in Claudian) then under the Government of a just and merciful Prince, witness the difference in the Government of the state of Florence, between the tranquillity which all sorts of People do now enjoy under the pro∣tection of the Princes of the House of M•dices, and those confusions and disorders to which they were continually subject in the popular States.

In the Third place, you tell us that a King or so∣veraign Prince, can have no other subsistence or secu∣rity, then by cutting off or tearing up all roots that Page  284 do naturally sheat or spring up into such branches: that is to say, to the free course of Popular Orders; which may perhaps be true in some of the Scicilian and Gretian Tyrannies, where every obstacle was re∣moved, which was conceived to stand in the Ty∣rants way; yet cannot this possibly be made good in any Christian Kings and Princes in these parts of the World, in which we find not any example of cutting off▪ or tearing up such popular Orders (or any roots which branch unto them) as have been settled and confirmed in the times fore-going. Nor are you satisfied with that distinction of the Rabbins, (whose Authority, when it serve• your turn, you do much insist on) viz. that the people of Israel making a King, displeased God not in the matter, but the forms onely, that is to say, in desiring to have a King like other Nations; which is no more then what gene∣rally is affirmed by such Christian Writers as have discoursed on this subject. Take this of Peter Martyr among the rest▪

All which may be, and yet the ballance of a Government may not be onely form but matter: the main matter of their re∣quest (which is the root of the tree you speak of) being to change the Government, and to have a King: the form of their Request (or the formall words in which they made it) being to have a King like other Nations.

Page  28526. Finally you conceive so poorly of the Kings of the Hebrews (and in them, of all other Kings for ought I can see) that they were but regulated Monarchs when they were at the best: And in case of Mal-administration, obnoxious unto corporall punishment from the hands of the Sanhedrim: To prove the first, you tell us they were so tyed up to the Rules of Government prescribed in Deut. 17. that they could neither multiply Horses nor Chariots, nor Silver nor Gold; nay, could of right enact no law (as in those by David) but for the reduction of the Ark for the regulation of the Priests, (for the Election of Solomon) which were made by the suf∣frage of the people. To answer first unto the last, David might gratifie the People in some popular actions, as in the Reduction of the Ark, and grati∣fie himself by the power of the people, as in setling the succession in the person of Solomon; and yet not be obliged to it by that place in Deut. or any other fundamental law, which required it of him. And so the first place is answered, that the Kings of Israel were by that rule prohibited from multiplying Gold and Silver, and Chariots, and Horsemen, in a greater measure then what was necessary for the support of their Estate, and the protection of their people against forrain invasions.

Which if it were not thus, the rule of Go∣vernment prescribed by God in Deut. 17. must b• Page  286 directly contrary unto the manner of the King, (that is to say, the customary practise of those Kings in the course of their Government) which God him∣self describes, 1 Sam. 8. 17. And yet this manner of the King, being told by Samuel unto the People, was so farre from terrifying them, from having a King as they desired, that they cryed out the more vehemently, Nay but we will have a King over us, &c. And which is more, Samuel having again in∣formed ihem at the auguration of Saul, touching the manner of their King; it follows in the Text, •hat Samuel wrote it in a Book, and laid it up be∣fore the Lord, 1 Sam. 20. 25. Which to what pur∣pose it was done, unless it were to serve for a stan∣ding measure both of the Kings power, and the peo∣ples obedience, it is hard to say: And if you look upon the practise of David and his posterity, we shall find how little they conceived themselves to be circum∣scribed within those limits which you have assigned them; of which you cannot take a better survey then what is given you by the excellent, but unfor∣tunate Sir Walter Rawleigh in his conjecture of the causes hindring the reunion of Israel with Judah, during the troubles of that Kingdom, Hist. of the World. Part. 1. cap. 19. Sect. 6. That which comes after in that Author, being a recapitulation onely of the like arbitrary proceedings of Jehoram, and other of the following Kings. I forbear to add, marvelling onely by the way, that the Sanhedrim did not take these Kings to task, for violating the standing rules of their Government laid down (as you affirm) in Deut. 17. and lay some corporall punishment on them, as you say they might.

27. This leads me on to the institution of the Sanhedrim, their power, and period: In the two first whereof you place the greatest part of your strength for defence of Calvin, though possibly you may be mistaken in all three alike. In the first Insti∣tution and authority of the Jethronian Judges, there Page  288 is no difference between us; The first thing you ac∣cept against is, that I make the 70. Elders to be cho∣sen out of the Iethronians; concerning which, you tell me, that I may do you a greater favour then I can suddenly imagine to tell you really, for what cause, or upon what Authority my speech is so positive, that is to say, that God willed Moses to chuse the seventy El∣ders out of those that were chosen in the 18th of Exo∣dus. If I can do you any favour in this, or in any thing else, I shall not be wanting in any thing which I can do for your satisfaction; And therefore you may please to know that my speech is grounded on those words in Numbers 11. v. 1. viz. And the Lord said unto Moses, Gather unto me seventy men of the Elders of Israel▪ whom thou knowest to be Elders of the people, and officers over them; And bring them unto the Tabernacle of the Congregation, that they may stand there with thee, &c. By which you may per∣ceive, that the 70. were not to be chosen out of the Elders onely, but out of the Elders and Officers, and other Officers at that time there were none to be found, but those which were ordained by Moses in Exo. 18. to be Rulers of thousands, Rulers of Hundreds, Rulers of fifties, and Rulers of •ens, for the determining of such smaller differences, and suits in Law that might arise among the people. And Secondly, it is consonant with reason that it should be so, that none should be admitted into the num∣ber of the 70. but such of whose integrity and a∣bilities, there had been some sufficient trial in the lower Courts. Concerning which, take here the Gloss of Deodati on the former words, viz: Elders]

Would you have more, (for I am willing to do you any favour within my power) then know that Ainsworth, a man exceedingly well versed in all the learning of the Hebrews, hath told me in his Notes or Comment on the former Text, that by Officers in this place, And more particularly thus, Our wise men have said, that from the great Sanhedrim they sent into all the Land of Israel, and made diligent enquiry, whom∣soever they found to be wise, and afraid to sinne, and meek, &c. They made him a Judge in his City. And from thence they preferred him to the Gate of the Mountain of the House (of the' Lord) and from whence they promoted him to the Gate of the Court, (of the Sanctuary) and from thence they advanced him to the great Judgement Hall, for which he citeth Mai∣mony (one of the chief Rabbines in all that part) in his Book of the Sanhedrim, cap. 2. Sect. 8. (which gives me very good assurance that the seventy were first chosen by Moses out of the Iethronian or Ru∣ling Elders which were afterwards called Judges in the Gates, because they were chosen out of Page  290 that body in the times succeeding.

28 But granting this to be as you say, I would have it, you ask me what necessity there should bee in it, that because there lay an appeal to Moses, from those in Exodus, (that is from the Iethronian Judges) therefore there must needs lie an appeal from the seven∣ty Elders the Sanhedrim unto Moses also. Which seems to me to be a contention de non Ente. For neither doth the Scripture say in the 18th of Exodus, that there lay any appeal from the Iethronian Judges to the 70. Elders; nor do I say any where (as I can remember) that there lay any such appeal from the Sanhedrim or 70. Elders to Moses himself, though I think that such appeals might be brought unto him. All which the Scripture sayes concerning the Iethronian Judges, is onely this, That they shall bring every greater matter unto Moses, but that they should judge in every small matter amongst them∣selves, v. 22. which they are said to have done ac∣cordingly, v. 26. But what makes this unto ap∣peals? Appeals are made onely by the party grie∣ved, not by the inferiour Courts themselves to the Courts above them; and therefore when it was said, that they should bring the greatest matters to M•ses, and keep the smaller to themselves, it is to show the bounds and limits of their jurisdiction which they might not pass. Just as the practise is in England, in which the Sheriffs turn, & the Courts of the particular Hundreds determine not in any acti∣on above the value of 40 s. (as here in Abingdon, not above five pounds) All greater causes of what weight or value soever they be, being referred unto the Courts or Judges in Westminster Hall. Nor say Page  291 I any where, that I can remember) that there lay an appeal from the Sanhedrim unto Moses himselfe, though I make no question but there did, and you have said nothing to prove the contrary. For what makes this unto the purpose, that because ome of the Iewish Rabbines & the learned Grotius out of them, have told us, that as in the place of the Jethronian Judges, succeeded their Judges in the Gates, so the Sanhedrim succeeded in the place of Moses; there∣fore there lay no appeal to Moses from the Sanhe∣drim or 70. Elders. For first, this may be under∣stood, no otherwise, then that they came into the place of Moses, after his decease, or rather after the death of Josuah, who succeeded Moses till the first 70 were deceased. And Secondly, it may be understood, that they succeeded in the place of Mo∣ses, during that interval of time which past between the destruction of the Temple, and the captivity of the People, until the setling of the Government in the Race of the Maccabees: & that which happened from the Reign of Herod the Great, to the finall rooting out of that Nation by the Emperour Aerian, of w^ch times most of your great Rabines seem to speak, & in w^ch times neither any of the Kings of Iudah, after their reftitution by Iehoshaphat, or any of the Macca∣beans were in place and power. Moses had otherwise made himselfe of no significancy in the publick Go∣vernment, and stood but for a Cypher in the Arith∣metick of State, if he had not kept unto himself the Dernier Resort in receiving any just appeals from that higher Court, as that both lawfully might, and did from the Courts beneath them. Which solecism in the Arts of Government had been committed by Page  292 Jehoshaphat also, if he had left the Sanhedrim an un∣limitted power, from which there could be no ap∣peal (either Agrarimine or Sententia) to the Kings themselves.

29. But then you say, That we need not go fur∣ther then Scripture for the certainty hereof, where the seventy are chosen, not to stand under Moses, but with him; not to diminish his burden, or bear it under him, with an appeal in difficult cases to him; as is ex∣pressed in the Election of the Jethronian Elders; but to bear it with him, with out any mention of such ap∣peal: On which distinction, between bearing the burden with him, and under him, you raise this con∣clusion, That if the seventy Elders were indeed insti∣tuted to bear the burden with Moses, therefore thence∣forth lay no appeal unto him. But this foundation is too weak, for any Argument of weight to be built upon it; there being no such difference betwixt the tearms, but that by bearing the burden with him, they might also bear it under him, as indeed they did. When Romulus ordained the Senate of Rome to be Assistants to him in the Government, and to bear part of the burden with him, did they not bear it also under him, aswel as with him? And when a King elects some principal persons to be of his Council, and to bear some part of that great bur∣den which is laid upon him, do they not therefore bear their part of the burden, as inferiour Ministers or Counsellors of Estate, but as equals to him? I believe not so; I might enforce this matter further, but that the Scripture is so evident and express against you. You grant that the Jethronian Judges did bear their part of the burden under Moses, and Page  293 yet the Scripture says expresly, Exod. 18. 22. that they did bear the burden with him; and therefore it must follow also, that though the Sanhedrim was said to stand with Moses, and to bear part of the burden with him, yet they did bear it under him also, as the others did; which notwithstanding you conclude, That if the seventy Elders were indeed instituted to bear the burden with Moses, there thenceforth lay no appeal unto Moses. But then you hope to mend the matter, by telling us, that Moses gained in wisedom what he lost in power, and so the change was for the better: For whereas it was said by God to Moses, in Num. 11. viz. And I will take of the spirit which is up∣on thee, and I will put it upon them; these words are so interpreted by all sorts of Expositors, as not to tend unto the diminution of the power of Moses, God's Spirit resting on him in as full a manner as before it did: This you are pleased to grant, and more; for you say it rested in a fuller. How so? Because (say you) you do believe, his wisedom was the greater for this diminution of his power: Where first you take for granted, that the power of Moses was diminsh∣ed by the institution of the seventy Elders, which hitherto you have not proved; and then believe that his wisedom was the greater for it, which is as hard to prove as the other is, For if the Spirit of God, which before rested upon Moses, was not dimi∣nished by any communication of it to the seventy Elders, as the text doth not say it was, you have no reason to believe, that any such comunica∣tion of it to others, to so many as seventy, should make it rest upon him in a fuller measure then it did before; or if you mean that his wisedom was the Page  294 greater, because he had so many able Assistants in the Government with him, you should then turn the Text, and say that God took of the Spirit which was upon the seventy Elders, and put it upon Mo∣ses; for otherwise his wisedom cannot be said to have been greater, for having so many wise Assi∣stants, no more the personal vallour of a Prince may be said to be greater then it is, by having many men of valour in his Council of War, or the beauty of a Queen said to be greater then before, by having many beautiful Ladies attending on her. And so your argument against apealing from the Sanhedrim, as the supream Court, to Moses, as the supream Prince, is brought to nothing: Which notwith∣standing you conceive so highly of the Sanhedrim, because it hath some resemblance to the Senate in a popular estate, that you make it to be a State distinct from the rest of the people; and all this to no other purpose, but to multiply the number of estate in eve∣ry Nation, that Kings, and such as have the power of Kings, may not be ridden only with the bitt and bridle, but a Martingal also: For if the Congrega∣tion of the people, in Law to be made, had such power as was shown (but whither it be shown in your Papers or any where else, I am yet to seek) and that in Law so made, the ultimate appeal lay unto the Sanhedrim (as you can never prove it did, when there was any King in Israel) you ask this Question, Why are not here two Estates in this Common wealth each by Gods own Ordinancce, and both plain in Scripture? Which Argument or Question needs no other Answer, but that, a male suppositis ad non valet Argumentum. ad •ejus concessa (as the Logicians use to tell us). You Page  295 must have plainer Texts of Scripture to prove this Ordinance of God, which here you speak of, or else the Sanhedrim and the people could not mak two di∣stinct Estates in that Common-wealth, as you say they did.

30. Now for the clearer proofs of this, that is to say, that there lay no appeal to Moses from the se∣venty Elders, you have recourse to those words in Deut. 17. 8. where it is said, That if there arise a Controversie within thy gates, too hard for thee in judgment; then shalt thou come unto the Priest and to the Levite, or to the Judge that shall be in those days, and they shall shew thee the sentence of Judgment; up∣on which Text you first deliver this gloss, viz. that by the Judge which shall be in those days, we are to un∣derstand those supream Judges which governed the affairs of Israel, from time to time, betwixt the death of Joshua and the raign of Saul. Secondly, That by the Priests and Levites, we are to understand the Sanhedrim, according to the sense of all Authors, as they stand, both Jewish and Christian. And third∣l•, by these words within thy Gates, the Jethronian Judges, because they sate and gave judgment in the Gates of their Cities. And thereupon you raise this Conclusion, without doubt or hesitancy, That by the clear sence of Scripture, all matter of appeal in Israel lay unto the Sanhedrim: And yet perhaps it may be said, that the sence of that Text of Scripture is not so clear as you would have it, the words being otherwise glossed, and therefore otherwise to be un∣derstood then you seem to do.

For First, How may we be assured, that the Pri•sts and Levites made such a considerable num∣ber Page  294 〈1 page duplicate〉 Page  295 〈1 page duplicate〉 Page  296 in the Sanhedrim, as to be taken in this place for the woole Court; Some which are skilled in all the learning of the Hebrews, telling us that the 70. El∣ders were first chosen by six and six out of every Tribe which make up 72 in all. And yet say they, they passed by the name of the 70. Elders, ad re∣tundationem numeri▪ for the evenness and roundness of the number; even as the 72 Disciples, (Post haec autem designavit dominus & ali•s Septuaginta duos, saith the vular Latin, Luk. 10. 1.) are for the same reason called the seventy. If so there could but six Priests and Levites be chosen into that great Coun∣cil, admitting that the Tribe of Levi were at that time reckoned to be one of the Twelve; and there∣fore it is very improbable, that the Priests and Le∣vites should stand here for all the Sanhedrim; but if the Tribe of Levi were not accounted, at that time amongst the Twelve (as they were not after∣wards) then could there be no Priests or Levites in that Court at all, at the first institution of it; though afterwards when Ten of the Twelve Tribes were fallen from the house of David, the Priests and Levites might be taken in to make up the number. And thereupon it needs must follow, that Moses i• that place did not intend the whole Sanhedrim, by the Priests and Levites, or lookt upon the Priests and Levites as the greatest and most considerable thereof.

Secondly, It is affirmed by some Christian Wri∣ters, that the Priests and Levites here mentioned, are to be understood in their single capacities, and not as parts and members of the Iewish Sanhedrim; for when a matter seemed too hard to be determined Page  297 by the inferiour Judges, they are enjoyned (saith Deodat.) to go to the Priests by way of consulta∣tion and Enquiry, to be informed of the true sence and meaning of Gods Laws: The Priests (being great Lawyers among the people) understanding and experienced in the meaning of Gods Law, ac∣cording to which judgement was to be given in all the cases comprehended therein; for which we can∣not have a better proof then that of the Prophet Mal. cap. 2. 7. where it is said, that the Priests lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek the Law at his mouth; for he is the Messenger of the Lord of Hosts. Nor is it so certain as you make it, that by the Judge who should be in those dayes, we are to un∣derstand, the supream Judge or Judges, or any of them, who governed the affairs of Israel, as afore∣said. For Ainsworth who had well studied the Iewish Rabbines, understands these words of the Sanhe∣drim it self: By the Judge (saith he) is understood the high Councel or Senate of Judges, which were the Chiefs or Heads of the Fathers of Israel. And this he doth not onely say, of his own Authority, but re∣fers himself in generall to the Hebrew Records, and more particularly to Rubbige Maimony in his tract of Rebels, ca. 1. Sect. 4. By both it is agreed, that this direction is not given to the parties themselves, who had any suit or controversie depending in the low Courts, but to the Judges of those Courts, and to them alone; for which I must confess I can see no reason in the Text or context.

31. For if you look into the first words of that chapter, we shal find it to be a general direction to the people of Israel, by which they are commanded not Page  268 to sacrifice to the Lord their God any bullock or sheepe wherein is blemish or any ill favouredness, &c. which no man can conceive to relate onely to the Judges of the lower Courts. Nor find I any variation in the rest that follows, no nor in that which comes af∣ter neiher, v. 14. where those directions do begin which concern the people (and not the Priests or Judges onely) in the Election of their King. And therefore give me leave to think, (and laugh not at me I beseech you for my singularity) that there is no other meaning in that Text but this, i e. That if a doubt or scruple should arise amongst them in their severall dwellings in matters which concerned Re∣ligion, and the right understanding of the law of God, they should have recourse to the Priests and Levites, for satisfaction in the same, according unto that of the Prophet Malachy, that the people were to seek the Law from the mouth of the Priest, as be∣fore we had it. But if it were a civil controversie, matters of difference, which they could not end a∣mongst themselves, and by the interposition of their friends and Neighbours, they should refer it to the Judge or Judges, in whose times they lived to be fi∣nally decided by him. And for this Exposition I have not onely some authority, but some reason al∣so: My Authority shall be taken from the words of Estius, who makes gloss upon the Text, viz. Haec sententia modo sacerdotem modo judicem nominat pro∣pter duplicem magistratum qui erat in populo dei; sa∣cram & civilem; quamvis contingeret aliquando du∣plicem magistratum in eandem personam concurrere. My reasons shall be taken first from that passage in the 12. verse, in which it is said, that the man that Page  299 will do presumptuously, and will not hearken unto the Priest (that standeth to Minister there before the Lord thy God) &c. Where the Priest seems to be considered in personal capacity, as he stands mi∣nistring before the Lord at his holy Altar, not as he sits upon the bench, and acts •with other of the Judges in an open Court. But whether that be so or not; certain I am, that many inconveniences must needs happen amongst the people, if the Text be no otherwise to be understood, as you would have it. It is confest on all hands, that there was some intervall of time from the death of every one of the supream Judges and the advancing of the next, though in Chronologies the years of the succeeding Judges are counted from the death of his Predeces∣sor. And you your selfe confess, p. 14. that the San∣hedrim did not continue long after Josuah: And I can find no restitution of it till the time of Iehoshaphat. For though you tell us, p. 16. that never any King, except David, had Session or Vote in this Councel, by which you intimate, that the Sanhedrim was on foot again in the time of David. Yet you have shewed us neither reason nor authority for it. And therefore you may do me a greater favour (as your own words are) then you suddenly imagine, to tell me really in what Book of Scripture, or in what other Author I may find it written, that either the Sanhedrim was on foot again in the time of David, or that David did at any time sit and vote amongst them. Hereupon I conclude at last, that if the Text be to be under∣stood as you would have it; and as you say it is un∣derstood in the sence of all Authors both Iewish and Christians, then must the people be without reme∣dy Page  300 (at the least without remedy of Appeal) in their suits and controversies during the interval of time betwixt the Judges, and without remedies also in their doubts & scruples touching the meaning of the Law, for the whole space of time which past betwixt the death of Iosuah, and the raign of Iehoshaphat, which comes to 511. years, or there abouts, which I desire you seriously to consider of.

32. And yet the matter were the less, if having given the Sanhedrim the Dernier Resort, or the su∣pream power in all appeals; you did not ascribe to them an authority also to controul their Kings. For proof whereof you tell us that both Skickardus and Grotius, with the full consent of the Talmudists, have assured you, that if the King came to violate the Laws and the Statutes, it was in the power of the Sanhe∣drim to bring him unto corporall punishment. How far Skickardus hath assured you I am not able to say, not being directed by you to any Book or Books of his where it may be found. But if you find no more in Skickardus then you do in Grotius, you will have little cause to brag of this discovery. For Grotius in his first Book, de jure belli &c. cap. 3.) and not cap. 1. as is mistaken in the print) first telleth us thus, viz. Samuel jus regum describens satis ostendit ad∣versus Regis injurias nullam in populo relictam po∣testatem, &c. Samuel, saith he, describing the power of the King of Israel showes plainly, that the peo∣ple had no power to relieve themselves from the oppressions of their Kings, according unto that of some antient Writers on those words of David, A∣gainst thee onely have I sinned, Psal. 51. And to show how absolutely Kings were exempted from Page  301 such punishments, he presently subjoyns the testi∣mony of Barnach monus an Hebrew. In dictis Rabi∣norum titulo de judicibus, which is this nulla creatura judicat regem sed benedictus; that is to say, that no creature judgeth (or can judge) the King, but one∣ly God for ever blessed. According unto which I find a memorable Rule in Bracton, an old English Lawyer, relating to the Kings of England, viz. Omnem esse sub rege, & ipsum sub nullo, sed tantum sub deo, That every man is under the King, but the King is under none but God. Betwixt which pas∣sages, so plainly destructive of the power ascribed to the Sanhedrim; Grotius interlopes this follow∣ing passage from some Iewish Writers, viz. Video consentire Hebraeos regi in eas leges quae de officio re∣gis scriptae extabant, peccanti inflicta verbera, sed•a a∣pud illos infamiâ carebant, & a rege in signum peni∣tentiae sponte suscipiebantur; ideo{que} non a lictore, sed ab eo quem legisset ipse probatur, & suo arbitrio verberibus statuebat modum. I have put down the words at large, that the learned and judicious Rea∣der may see what he is to trust to in this point. The sence whereof is this in English, viz. that stripes were inflicted on the King, if he transgressed those Lawes which had been written touching the Regal office; But that those stripes carried not with them any mark of infamy, but were voluntary undergone by him in testimony of his repentance; upon which ground, the said stripes were not laid upon him by a common Officer, but by some one or other of his own appointment, it being also in his power to li∣mit both the the number and severity of those stripes which they were to give him. Nothing in all this which concerns the Sanhedrim, nothing which Page  302 speaks of such a power as the bringing of the Kings unto corporal •punishment; this punishment being onely such as the Kings had condemned themselves unto in the way of penance, for their transgression of the Laws: This is enough to show how little credit is to be given to the full and general con∣sent of the Talmudists, whom Grotius builds upon, for proving the supream power in the Sanhedrim, in bringing their Kings to corporal punishment which they never had. And yet to make the matter clea∣rer, he presently subjoyns these words unto those before (but whether they be his own words, or the words of some of his Hebrew Writers, let them judge that list) viz. a paenis autem coactivis adeo li∣beri erant reges, ut etiam excalceationis lex quippe cum ignominia conjuncta in ipsis cessaret. There Kings (saith he) were so far exempted from the coactive power of Law, that they were not liable to the penance of going barefoot, because it car∣ried with it a mark of infamy. If there be any other place in Grotius, which may serve your turn, you must first direct me where to find it, before you can expect it should have an answer.

33. The Talmudists having failed you, you have recourse unto the Scripture, and to the Au∣thority of Josephus, a right good Historian, but with no more advantage to the point in hand, then if you had never lookt upon them: You tell us of a Restitution of the Sanhedrim was made by King Je∣hoshaphat, as I think it was, for so I find it, 2 Chron. 19. v. 8. Moreover (saith the Text) in Jerusalem did Jehoshaphat set of the Levites, and of the Priests, Page  303 and the chief of the Fathers in Israel, for the judge∣ment of the Lord, and for controversies when they re∣turn to Jerusalem. But how can you inferre from hence, that by the manner of this Restitution, (ad∣mitting that it relates unto the Sanhedrim, as I think •it may, though other Writers make it doubtful) doth so plainly show that ever under the Monarchy the power of the Sanhedrim was co-ordinate with that of the King, which consequent if it can be rationally collected from that text of Scripture, or any which depends upon it, I have lost my Logick. Jehoshaphat, though a just King, and a godly man, could neither be so unskilful in his own affairs, or so careless of the regalities of his posterity, as to e∣rect another power which might be co-ordinate with his own, and might hereafter give a check to himself and them in all Acts of Government; But then supposing Jehoshaphat to be so improvident, as to erect a power which was to be co-ordinate with him; yet being but a co-ordinate power, it gave them no Authority to bring their King to corporal punishment, as you say they did. I know it is a rule in Logick, Co-ordinate se invicem supplent, that one co-ordinate doth supply the defects of another. But I never heard of any such Maxime, as, Co-ordinata se invicem tollent, that one co-ordinate power may destroy the other; and if it hath no power to de∣stroy the other, then can it pretend to no po∣wer correcting the other, which is the next degree to a totall destruction. For, par in parem non habet potestatem, as the saying is; Besides all which, if any such power had been given the Sanhedrim ei∣ther at the first institution of it▪ by Almighty God, Page  304 or at the Restitution by Jehoshaphat, there is no question to be made, but that we should have either found it in the Original Grant, or by some exempli∣cations of it in point of practise; but finding neither of the two in the Book of God, or in any appro∣ved humane Authors, I take it for a very strong Ar∣gument, that no such power was ever given them, Non apparentium, & non existentium, eandem esse rationem, was a good maxime in the Schools, and I build upon it.

34, But on the contrary, you hope to help your self by two examples, one of them being taken out of the Prophet Jeremiah, the other out of the Jew∣ish Antiquities; you instance first in Zedekias, who to the Sanhedrim demanding the Prophet Jere∣miah, made answer, Behold he is in your hands; for the King is not he that can do any thing without you. Out of which words you would infer, First, that the King (according to the opinion of some of the Tal∣mudists) was not to judge in some cases; which whe∣ther he was or not, is not much material; most Kings conceiving it most agreeable to their own ease, & the content of their Subjects, to divolve that power upon their Judges, obliged by oath to administer equal Justice betwixt the King and his people. You infer secondly from those words, that the Sanhedrim were co-ordinate with the Kings of Judah, though there be no such matter in them. My answer unto this ob∣jection, and my reasons for it, you must needs have met with in the Book against Calvin, as you call it; of which since you have took no notice, I am forced to bring them here to a repetition. My answer is, That Calvin (whom it most concerned to have it so) Page  305 finds fault with them who did expound the place, to that end or purpose which you most desire, or though the King did speak so honourably of his Prin∣ces, ac si nihil iis sit negandum,, as if nothing was to be denied them; whereas he rather doth conceive that it was, amarulenta Regis quaerimonia, a sad and bitter complaint of the poor captivated King against his Councellors, by whom he was so over-ballanced, ut velit nolit cedere iis cogeretur, that he was forced to yield to them, whether he would or not; which he punctually and expresly calls, inexcusabilem arrogantiam, an intolerable piece of sawciness in those Princes, and an exclusion of the King from his legal rights. This makes the matter plain enough, that the Princes (by whom you understand the San∣hedrim) had no such power in Calvins Judgment, as might make them equal to the King, or legally ena∣ble them to controul his rections; but the reason which I there give makes the matter plainer; and my reason is, that Calvin, who is said by some, to have composed his Expositions on the Scripture ac∣cording to the Doctrine of his institutions, would not have lost so fair an evidence, for the advancing of his popular Magistracy, and consequently of the three Estates in most Christian Kingdomes, had he conceived, he could have made it serviceable to his end and purpose: for then how easy had it been for it, in stead of the Demarchy of Athens, in which you say he was mistaken to have understood the Jewish Sanhedrim, in which he could not be mistaken, if you judge aright: Besides we are not very sure, that the Princes mentioned in that place, did make up the Sanhedrim, or came unto the King in the name of Page  306 Councell, of which some of them might be mem∣bers, but rather that they were the Peers and most powerful men of the Realm of Judah, out of whose Families the Kings did use to chuse their wives. Who being incensed▪ against the Prophet, and knowing that the King was not able to dispute the point with them, as the case then stood, pre∣ferred the executing of their malice against the one, before their duty to the other. But granting that by Princes here, we must mean the Sanhedrim, and that the Sanhedrim taking the advantage of those broken and unsetled times carried some things with an high hand against that King, yet this is no sufficient proof, that either by the rules of their in∣stitution, or their Restitution, they were co-ordinate with their Kings, or superiour to them. Great Coun∣cils, commonly are intent upon all advantages, by which they may improve their power, as in the mi∣nority of Kings, or the unsetledness of the times, or when they meet with such weak Princes, who either for want of natural courage, or a right understand∣ing of their own affairs, suffer them by little and little to get ground upon them. But then I hope you will not argue a facto adjus, that because they did it therefore they might lawfully do it; that maxime of the Civil Lawyers, id possumus, quod jure possu∣mus; being as undeniably true in the case of the Sanhedrim, or any other publick Council, as in that of any private person.

35. Your second example is that of Herod and Hircanus, which you found also in the Book against Calvin, by which name you call it; but press it quite beyond my purpose. Baronius had affirmed of the Page  307 Sanhedrim, (as you also do) Eorum summam esse potestatem qui de lege cognoscerent, & Prophetis & simul de regibus judicarent, that they had power of judicature over the Law, the Prophets and the Kings themselves, which false position he confirms by as false an instance, affirming in the very next words, horum judicio Herodem regem postulatum esse, That Herod being then actually King of Jurie, was con∣vented by them, for which he cites Josephus with the like integrity, so that I had no other business with Baronius, then to prove that Herod was not King, when he was summoned to appear before the San∣hedrim; and having proved that point, I had done my business without any shufflings and Evasions as you put upon me. But since Hircanus must be brought in also to act his part in a controversie of which I was not bound to take any notice. I must let you know, that if Hircanus could not by power save Herod from the hands of the Sanhedrim, and therefore shifted him away, as you say by art; it was not for want of power in the King, but for want of spirit in the man. For first, Hircanus at that time was no more King of the Jews then Herod was, though he be sometimes called so by my self, and others, because he succeeded in the Kingdom, and was actually in possession of it, upon the death of Alexandra. But having afterwards relinquished the Kingdom to Aristobulus, and not restored a∣gain by Pompey, when the differences betwixt them came to be decided, he was forced to content him∣self with the Dignity and Title of High Priest, and was no other at such time as this business hap∣ned. But granting that he was then King, yet living Page  308 in a broken and distracted time, and being a Prince of little judgement and less courage, every one had their ends upon him▪ and made him yield to any thing which was offered to him. So that this Ar∣gument comes into as little purpose as that before of Zedekias; and therefore for a further answer to it, I refer you thither, without giving any more trouble to my self or you. But when you add, and add it out of Grotius, that this Court continued till Herod the G. who caused them all to be put to death except Sameas only; it must needs follow hereupon, that Herod did not onely destroy the Members of that Court, but the Court it selfe. For when you say, that this Court continued till Herod the Great, you tell us in effect that it contiued no longer; and by so doing, you must either contradict the four Evangelists, who make frequent mention of this Councel, as Mat. 5. 22. Joh. 11. 47. &c. or the general current of Interpreters which have written on them. Nor am I much moved with that which you say from Grotius (supposing that he hath the Talmudists or his Au•hors in it) that is to say, that God punished the Sanhedrim for neglect of their duty, in not supressing by their power, (as they ought to have done • he insolencies of Herod, in exalting him∣self against the Laws For I believe that neither Grotius, nor the Talmudists, or any who depends upon them, were of Gods councel in the business, or can tell us any more of it then another man: And therefore if the three Estates in a Gothish Mod∣del, have no better legs to stand upon then the au∣thority of the Talmudists, and the power of the Sanhedrim, they can pretend to no such power af∣ter Page  309 the persons, or actions of soveraign Princes, as Calvin hath ascribed unto them.

36. But you draw towards a conclusion, and so do I, you tell me upon confidence of your former Ar∣guments, and take it as a matter proved, that there never lay an appeal from the Sanhedrim unto Moses, nor to any other Magistrate (excepting one∣ly when they lived under the Provincial Govern∣ment of some forrain Princes) as also that they had power upon their Kings. You tell me that I must confess that the three Estates concerned in Parlia∣ment, or any other Popular Magistrate Calvin doth dream of, are to be left in that condition in which Calvin finds them. And so perhaps I may when I see this proved, which as yet I do not, though there be no necessity on my part to make such confession, and much less to acknowledge that the whose book is answered, by your endeavour to make answer to some passages in it. Had it been proved (unanswer∣ably that the Ephori of Sparta, by the first Rules of their institution, had a jurisdiction over their Kings, and the Sanhedrim also over theirs, which are the on∣ly two points to which you have endeavoured to return an answer) you have no more reason to ex∣pect that I should acknowledge the whole Book to be fully answered, then that you or any man may be said to have confuted all the Works of Cardi∣nal Bellarmine, because he hath confuted two or three of his chief Objections. And thus in order to your expectation of hearing further from me, which you seem to hope for, rather then out of any desires engaging my self either with fresh Adversaries or Page  310 new disputes. I must needs say, that I look upon you as a generous and ingenious Adversary, as be∣fore I did: Of whose society and friendship I should count it no crime, to be ambitious, had not my great decay of •ight, (beside other infirmities growing on me) rendered me more desirous of a private and retired life, then of such an agreeable conver∣sation. But the window of my shop being almost shut, & almost all my Wares plundered with the loss of my Library, it is high time for me to give over this trade, leaving to nimbler Pens the managing of these Political Discourses, wherewith mine hath been already dulled.