A treatise of the rickets being a diseas common to children. Wherin (among many other things) is shewed, 1. The essence 2. The causes 3. The signs 4. The remedies of the diseas. Published in Latin by Francis Glisson, George Bate, and Ahasuerus Regemorter; doctors in physick, and fellows of the Colledg of Physitians at London. Translated into English by Phil. Armin.

CHAP. XXV. The Method to practice and Indications in ge∣neral. (Book 25)

THE Method to practice is divided into the Therapeutical and the Prophylactical part, or the Curative and the Preservative. We shall discours of the former in this Chapter, al∣though perhaps we shal here also propound som things which are common both to the Prophylactical part, and the Eugieihal. But the Prophylactical in particular and uncommunicated we reserve for the close of this Tra∣ctate.

The Curative part is usually called the Meth od of Cure, wherof, as of every other art, there are two general instruments, namly, Reason and Experience, the uniting wherof comprehendeth the whol skil of the Artist. Now by experience we understand not only the History of one or more Diseases, and the success of Medicines, but also the observation; that is, the application of the Histories unto those things, which reason dictates in the same af∣fect, and that by way of comprobation or disallowance. In like manner, by reason we mean every operation of the mind, so as we do not only comprehend the third; namly, ratiocination either demonstrative, or probable and Analogal, but also the first and second, that is, a sim∣ple apprehension, comprehension and division. For this

part of Medicine includeth or rather presupposeth the Physiology, Patholog y and Semeiotical part, which cer∣tainly require a manifold exercise of every operation of the understanding. Again, no man can understand any proposition, who doth not first apprehend the simple terms therof, nor any Syllogism, who is ignorant of the Propositions of which it consisteth; so that it is mani∣fest that every operation of the mind doth meet with an employment.

Indication, That noble instrument of the Method of Cure (by the use wherof the Dogmatical Physitians do principally glory to discriminate their Sect from the Empericks) doth likewise vindicate a station among the parts of reason. But because som things both diffi∣cult and obscure do occur concerning this instrument which have not received an unfolding and ful illustrati∣on, from the Neotericks themselvs, we judg it expedi∣ent here briefly to unvail them by an examination. We wil enquire therfore.

First, What is Indication?

Secondly, Unto which operation of the understand∣ing it relateth?

Thirdly, Into what kinds and differences it is distri∣buted?

As for the first, although perhaps many significati∣ons of this word may be found among Authors, yet that is the best and most proper which is delivered by Galen, in his book de Method. Meden. Indication (saith he) is an insinuation or declaration of the consequence, that is of somthing to be don. In this sens Indication may be de∣fined and described to be an objective action of the In∣dicant relatively considered, which representeth to the understanding the thing Indicated, that is, what may be helpful what hurtful, and by consequence what must be

elected and applied, what forsaken and avoided, that this Description or Definition may be the better under∣stood, let us further examin what is here signified by the Indicant? what by the thing indicated? what the action of the Indicant is? of what use distinction is of the thing indicated into helpful or hurtful, into that which must be chosen, and that which must be refu∣sed?

First, Although those terms Indication, Indicant, Indicatum, or the thing Indicated may peradventure be extended to other Arts and Sciences, yet becaus it hath hitherto been only apropriated by the Industry of Phy∣sitians (especially of Galen) to the Method of Practice, their definitions which we shall here declare, shall have respect only to this Method, all other use of them being pretermitted.

The General Definition therfore of the Indicant must be derived from the most general Nature which doth indicate in our Art. The Indicant therfore may be defined in general to be a state of the Body as it is fluxible or movable, or rather, as it is actually influx or motion, relatively considered, namely, as it intimateth what is to be done in that particular.

First, We affirm that the Indicant doth perpetually imply some state or condition of the Body; wherfore becaus that which is without the Body, and doth not yet affect it, is no state or condition of the Body, it can scarce rightly be said to indicate. The external caus therfore, which doth not yet affect the Body, is not the Indicant, although the aversion of it may possibly be the thing indicated. Secondly, the state of the Body as it is frail, or movable, or rather as it is actually in motion, is required to the Essence of the Indicant. For as Galen most luculently proveth to Thrasyb. If our Bo∣dy

were immutable and perpetual, there were no need of Medicine, but becaus the heat doth continually feed up∣on the moisture, and becaus health it self in the most perfect state is frail and fluxible, yea actually fluitant, and in some measure is already flowed away, manifest it is that the Physitians Art and the Practical Duty of the Physitian are both exceeding requisite. For if the state of the Body and the alteration therof be only con∣sidered absolutely, a bare and naked speculation only re∣sulteth from thence: but if it be considered in order to that which is to be done wherby the Physitian may rightly execute his duty concerning that state, present∣ly it meriteth the denomination of a Practical Instru∣ment, and is invested with the nature of an Indicant. For such a state doth indicate, as it is frail and in mo∣tion that care must be every way had of the health, and that that care must be exercised and practised with all diligence and circumspection. And consequently this very general Indicant doth point out, that which the general scope of the Physitians sought after, but it must not be expected that the consideration of the most ge∣neral Indicant can represent any other thing than a most general action correspondant to the general scope. For if the Physitian desireth a higher prosecution of the particular scope, he ought to descend to more particular Indicants.

Secondly, The thing Indicated is a Medical Action required on the part of the Indicant. For the Indicant primarily and formally denoteth the action, but secon∣darily and by consequence the instrument wherwith the action is perfected. Therfore by way of an appendix let us ad to the proposed Definition, that secondarily, by consequence, and in a concrete acception, it inclu∣deth the Instrument wherwith that action is accom∣plish'd.

First, We say, that the thing indicated is an action For the Physitian useth Indication to that end, that from thence he may collect what is to be done: you will say perhaps, that when the crisis is at hand or legitimat∣ly proceedeth, the thing indicated is an abstinence from, or a suspension of the action, and not the action it self.

We answer, That this abstinence in that very regard that it is enjoyned advisedly and according to art, is e∣vidently contained under some kind of notion of a Me∣dical Action; and the same is to be said of any kind of prohibition of any action in our Art.

Secondly, We say that the thing indicated is a Medi∣cal Action, that is directing the Action to health. For the end of Medicine is health, and therfore that A∣ction which doth aim at health is rightly termed a Me∣dical Action.

Thirdly, We say, That the thing Indicated is an A∣ction requisite and importing at least in respect of the Indicant. For every indicated action ought not pre∣sently to be reduced to Practice, neither can it be sim∣ply said to be requisite, but only in reference to the In∣dicant: wherfore it must be exposed to a further exa∣mination before the exercise of it can be resolved on; and if neither the Spirits do disswade, nor no other con∣tra-Indicant doth more potently resist, then it is sim∣ply requisite, and must be put in practice in its due time, with all possible convenience. And herupon the thing indicated is rightly distinguished into profitable and unprofitable. The thing indicated becomes unprofita∣ble either by defect of Medical matter, wherwith it should be accomplished, or by the presence of a stronger Prohibent, or contra-Indicant.

Again, A thing indicated and profitable is rightly

subdivided into an Indicate, Circumstantiate, and non-Circumstantiate. The first by which is meant an Acti∣on rightly cloathed with circumstances must be prose∣cuted without any delay. The second must be deferred until it have perfectly acquired due circumstances. We say fourthly, That a thing indicated in a concrete and secondary sens doth also include the Instrument, wherby the Indicated Action is perfected. As for example, the state of health doth primarily and formally indicate an act of conservation, but secondarily and by conse∣quence it doth withal indicate the Instrument, wherby we conserve it. This passage of an Indication from the Action to the Instrument doth not seem to depend up∣on the sole vertue of the Indicant, but in part also upon some general certain and commonly received principles, as like things are conserved by the like, things contra∣ry are cured by their contraries, and therfore we indu∣striously said that such an Instrument is the Indication or thing Indicated in a Secondary sens, and by conse∣quence inferred, and becaus it includeth the Action to∣gether with the Istrument, we termed it so likewise in a concrete signification.

Moreover, Seing that the Practical duty of a Physi∣tion hath great affinity with the Indicated action; we shall here consider wherin they unite in some agree∣ment, and wherin they differ among themselves. The general Duty of a Physitian is to attain (as much as in him lies) the end of his Art, namely Health. And that same obtaining of Health is in a manner the most general Indicated Action, yet this is distinguished from the general Duty of a Physitian, becaus the Purchase, and restauration of Health is not alwaies attainable. Therfore although the obtaining of Health be perpetu∣ally Indicated; yet when that is impossible, the Physi∣tian

is disobliged, seing that no man is bound to impos∣sibilities, and so consequently, it is no part of his Du∣ty. In like manner an Indicated Action is somtimes unprofitable for the reasons before alledged, in which case it appertaineth not to the Duty of the Physitian. A∣gain, An Indicated action, though when it is profitable it must be performed in its place, yet so long as it con∣tinues an apparel'd and devested of due circumstances, it presseth not the Duty of a Physitian. For it is the part of a Physitian not only to prescribe things profitable in the Species, but they must be such, regard being had to time, order, and other conditions of a just and re∣gular administration. Finally a profitable Indicated Action being robbed in all its due circumstances doth truly exact the duty of a Physitian. For a Physitian is obliged to execute such actions, and only such, at least when they are conspicuous.

Besides; The scope and intentions of the Physitian having a diverse respect to the Indicated Actions and the Duties of the Physitian, and holding some com∣merce with each of them, we shall likewise here consi∣der in what respect this falleth out. But in the very entrance into this Discours these scopes seem somtimes to be properly distinguishable into little notions or forms of enquiry after every Duty of a Physitian, and the things themselves to be enquired after. The forms of enquiry are nothing else but apt Questions or Inte∣rogations, which subdivide every Duty of a Physitian into so many parts, as it containeth to be distinctly sif∣ted and examined. Argenterius reckons up nine Forms of this kind: First, Whether? Secondly, What? Thirdly, With what matter? Fourthly, How much? Fifthly? Of what kind? Sixthly, After what manner? Seventhly, When? Eighthly, Where? Ninthly, In

what order a thing must be done? Others contract these to fewer Heads, but for further satisfaction the understanding Reader may consult with the Books. The real Scopes or things themselves to be enquired are those very parts, into which each Duty of a Physitian may be aptly distinguished. They are therfore so many in number as there are found parts in that duty to be examined. These Scopes thus found out differ not really, but only in reason from those that are yet to be found out, namely in respect of the diverse relation to the intellect seeking, and actually understanding. From hence it appeareth what affinity there is between these Scopes and the Duty of a Physitian, and also the in∣dicated actions. For the notional Scopes or forms of Scopes, and the things themselves to be enquired after under those forms do both aim at the same mark, name∣ly the distinct invention of all the parts of a Physitians Duty. But the things to be sought out are the parts themselves of the Duty aptly separated and disjoyned from one another the better to facilitate the invention and examination.

Moreover, Those parts of this Duty, in as much as they are found out by the force of Indication, are the very indicated Actions; so that the Scopes invented by the Indication, and the Indicated Actions do really signifie the same things. We say really, becaus the Scopes even when found out differ in reason from them as they are Scopes, seing that besides the Indicated Acti∣ons they seem to note together an intention of prose∣cuting the same Actions, as the Scopes not yet found out do intimate an intention of enquiring into them. Thus much of Indicates or things Indicated.

Thirdly, The action of an Indicant is Objective and

Indicant, as an Object besides it self, doth in som sort in∣sinuate another thing to the understanding. Perhaps som may wonder, how an Object can represent any other thing besides it self.

We answer, Such is the Nature of relatives, that (as such) they cannot be conceived without an implicati∣on of their correlatives. For one relative in his proper consideration doth at least obliquely involve the consi∣deration of another, and by that means it easily ushereth the understanding to the knowledg of the other.

Som may reply, If the force of the Indication be built upon the meer relation of the Indicant to the Indicatum, How coms it to pass that the use therof is restrained sole∣ly to the Art of Medicine?

To this we answer, We deny not, but this instrument may be extended to other Arts and Sciences, as we have before insinuated. For in moral Philosophy it is lawful to say, that Vertu doth Indicate the protection of her self, and Vice the suppression of it self. But neither doth this kind of relation consist only between the States of things, and the Actions therunto belonging, but also be∣tween the terms meerly speculative; as twice two are four, a man is not a horse. But here we consider the Indicati∣on and the efficacy of the Indicant only in order to the Method of Physick, so as it wil not be here needful to extend the use of this instrument further, neither in∣deed did Galen, because it would contribute little to the scope therof. Yet we affirm, that every relation is not a sufficient basis of an Indication, but it must be such, as hath either an evident conformity and agreement be∣tween the Indicant and Indicatum, wherby they may be fitly marshalled into a proposition of undoubted truth; or a disparity and repugnance of them among themselvs

that so they may aptly be divided from one another; that is, they may be disposed into a negative proposition e∣qually certain. Now because the propositions elected by this indication are certain and evident, not needing any higher proof: from thence it is manifest that every un∣derstanding that is Master of it self, not clouded with a vail of prejudice, nor wittingly ensnared with sceptical Sophisms and fallacies, must necessarily pay an assent unto them so soon as he understandeth the terms. More∣over, the Scepticks themselvs, though in their disputati∣ons they wil lie in wait to traverse any verity, how mani∣fest soever it be, and busy themselvs to equal the most certain principles with things extreamly doubtful, yet in performing the necessaries of life, seing that they re∣lieve hunger by food, hoard up mony, avoyd stripes, and do these and the like things constantly and without any distemper of mind, they plainly discover that they are led by som bad disposition of mind, or governed by a desire of glory, or tickled w^th a hope of victory in the conten∣tion, rather that they doubt really of the truth of such Propositions. In the interim, it must be observed, that the very Indication is fallible and deceitful, where the absolute nature of the Indicant or the Indicatum hath not been exactly understood before. For in this art of Indications, we do not presuppose only that a Physitian should always have learned before, and duly known what al those things are, which we cal according to Nature, as also in what the Essence of a Diseas, and all the parts therof consist, and to have an exact knowledg of all the causes of an Affect. Yea, it is necessary that he under∣stand all Medical actions, and upon occasion be able to render a ready account what alteration is, what heat∣ing, what cooling, &c. what evacuation, purgation, and the section of a vein, &c. what conservation, and the

like. For the Indication doth not make manifest the ab∣solute nature either of the Indicant or the Indicatum; but presupposing this as already known, it representeth only a mutual relation; namly, either a strict connexi∣on and conformity which they retain among themselvs, or a disparity and opposition, wherby they may be for∣med into an undoubted proposition: but the certainty of the indicated proposition cannot exceed the certainty of the knowledg of the Indicant. Therfore if at any time we scruple the certain knowledg of the Nature of the Indicant, it is not safe to trust to the Indication a∣lone, til it shal better be confirmed by som other Rea∣son or experience. But this doubting must not be im∣puted to the Nature of the Indication, but to the igno∣rance of the Indicant.

Moreover, it must be considered that the relation of the Indicant in the Method of practice, doth demon∣strate besides the evidence somwhat of duty in respect of the Indicated action, and that the propositions formed from the Indication do either explicitly, or at least▪ im∣plicitly insinuate that duty. As in this Proposition, a Diseas doth Indicate the ablation of it self, the ablation is decreed and resolved upon, as a requisit action on the part of the Indicant, that is a Diseas: as if one should say, a Diseas requireth or importuneth the removal of it self. Yet this duty of the action is more frequently and indeed much more elegantly expressed by the Participle in dus, as a Diseas is to be taken away: which Proposi∣tion in the fulness of its signification hath a manifest coincidence with the former.

There remaineth stil an objection to be answered con∣cerning the action of the Indicant; and this it is, If the Indication be the very action of the Indicant, how can it be called an operation of the understanding? For all

writers refer the Indication to som generation of the un∣derstanding.

We answer, The Indication is indeed an action of the Indicant, but yet an objective action, and that it is u∣nited to the intellective faculty, and abideth in it as in its subject: Moreover, that the understanding a power, both actuated, and as it were informed by its subject. Wherfore although the action of Indication be obje∣ctively attributed to the Indicant, yet subjectively it is ascribed to the Soul, and especially to the intellective part therof, which is as it were the act and form of it. And from hence it wil be most easy to reconcile Galen with himself, who somtimes defineth Indication to be an Emphasis, somtimes a Catalepsis.

Fourthly, It must be examined whether that distin∣ction of an Indicated action, into an action helpful and hurtful may tend. For som may urge, that Galen doth perpetually affirm, that one Indicatum only can be insi∣nuated from one Indicant; and that in his Method. Med. he doth affirm, That they vainly attempt the Method of cure, who are ignorant that one thing is Indicated from one Indicant, and that all who have written of this mat∣ter do seem to attest the same thing,

We answer, That Galen must be understood of the three distinct▪ kinds of Indicants, which must by no means be confounded, nor their Indicates, that is, the things indicated by them. For that which a Diseas doth properly Indicate, must not be attributed to the causes or the Spirits: In like manner that which the causes In∣dicate must not be applyed to the Spirits or the Diseas it self. Finally, that which the Spirits Indicate must nei∣ther be ascribed to the Diseas nor the causes. For in this respect one Indicate answereth to one Indicant, and he that observes not this, must unavoydably confound all

things, and in the employments of art makes an unsuc∣cesful use of this instrument, according to the judgment of Galen. But it must be considered, that in each of these kinds, the Indicatum may be divided into two parts, one wherof is an advantageous action, and to be prosecuted; the other is noxious and to be avoyded▪ yet each of them belongeth to one and the same kind amongst the afore∣said three, and is as it were a middle part of the whole Indicate: For the Spirits direct to an election of such things as may cherish and protect them, and to an avoi∣dance of such things as may in a further degree empair them: and both these actions concur to advance and as∣certain the compleat and final conservation of them. In like manner, both in cure and restauration, and also in caution and prevention, there is found an action as well to be embraced, as abandoned; yet whether of them ex∣ceedeth the bounds of its kind, so that no confusion can from thence be feared. For whilst we cure, we make choice of those things that wil demolish the Diseas, and we deliver the application of such things as wil augment it. In like manner, when we preserve, we take a∣way the causes, and withal we shun the use of thos things that may conspire either the continuation, or future breeding of them. And for this Reason in the definiti∣on which we have presented above of an Indication, we distinguished the action indicated into that which ought to be prosecuted, and that which ought to be waved: which very thing also we were about to do, in the enu∣meration of the particular Indications to this Diseas.

It is now time for us to proceed to the second enquiry propounded at the beginning, namely, Unto which o∣peration of the Intellective faculty the Indication be∣longeth. We say, first, That the Indication doth in som sort include the simple apprehension of each term, both

of the Indicant and the Indicate. For he can never un∣derstand a Proposition who is ignorant of the Terms therof. Yet this knowledg is only preparatory and pre∣supposed in the art of Indications, as we have already noted. We affirm secondly, That composition and di∣vision is an explicit operation of the Intellective faculty in the perception of an Indication. For the Indicant by force of his relation doth represent the Indicate to be aptly continued together into a relative proposition. Now that a Proposition thus constituted may in its own nature be so manifest and evident, that no man can rea∣sonably doubt of the truth therof, or need any cleerer proof, is expresly taught by Galen—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; and again in another place—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Here som calumniate Galen, as if he had devised an art separated from all experience, and quarrelling with Reason; but because Galen intended nothing else, than that Proposi∣tions framed by Indication are of self credit, and need not any comprobation from Reason or Experience, thes Criticks may perceiv their own rashness and retract the scandal. Senertus indeed objecteth, that the Indicati∣on cannot belong to the second operation of the mind, because the Indicate is neither affirmed nor denied of the Indicant. But that learned man was herein mistaken. For although peradventure that the Indicate be neither affirmed nor denied of the Indicant directly, and by the bare Verb Substantive or Copulative (est.) Yet indi∣rectly and obliquely it is manifestly predicated of the same, and after the same manner as it useth to be in re∣lative Propositions. As for example, A sound State is the Indicant of its own conservation; a sickly conditi∣on is the Indicant of som remedy, &c. And if any man wil express the Indicate with his relation to the Indi∣cant

by the participle in dus, than the Predication will be direct. As a sound State is to be preserved; a disea∣sed State is to be cured, a Diseas must be removed, &c. If the Learned Senertus can deny these to be Propositi∣ons, he may with the like facility deny that an Indicati∣on belongeth to this Operation of the Understanding; but if he must needs confess that, there is no room left for the denial of this. Now we have said that the Indi∣cation doth belong to the second Operation of the Mind, becaus the Understanding, in reference to the or∣der of time, doth withal comprehend the mutual relation between the Indicant and the Indicate, and thereupon frameth a Proposition, which formation and contexture of the Proposition is the very Indication; and explicit∣ly a second Operation of the Understanding. Now that the Understanding doth together at one time compre∣hend the Indicant and the Indicate in the Indication, is elegantly expressed by Galen in a decompounded word which he useth in the definition therof, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: also in another definition, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

We say Thirdly, That Indication may likewise im∣plicitly be referred to the third operation of the Under∣standing; Becaus in the order of Nature the Under∣standing seemeth first to perceive the evident relation of the Indicant to the Indicate before it can conclude of the certainty of the Proposition from thence resulting. Although in the order of time the Mind (as hath been said) comprehendeth them together; neither is it ne∣cessary to form an explicit Syllogism, for the truth is, The Understanding can comprehend those things toge∣ther at one time, which by the Institution of Nature are termed Successive, as the Sun and Light, Fire and Heat, &c. But in regard that this simultaneous comprehension

of an Indication doth include a certain dependance of the knowledg of the Indicate from the perceived relation of the Indicant, it supposeth also that the said relation is sooner perceived at least in the order of Nature, and that the Indicate is later understood and by an implicit brin∣ging in, for a kind of transition, in respect of the order of Nature doth seem to be here implied from the relati∣on of the Indicant, as the Medius terminus, to the Pro∣position constituted of the Indicant and the Indicate as to the conclusion; and this may be called an implicit reasoning.

We say Fourthly, That by circumlocution and circum∣stances of speech, an Indication may be reduced to an ex∣plicit reasoning or syllogism, or rather, that the same thing which we pursue & argue at by Indication is to be found out and proved by way of Syllogism. For the Reason of the evidance of an Indicated Proposition may explicitly be applied, as the Medius terminus, to infer that propo∣sition. In the interim a Syllogism so pieced together will be either absolutly frivolous and childish, or at the best only explicatory. As if any one who would prove that a Diseas were to be removed, should thus proceed: That which is contrary to Nature is to be removed; A Diseas is contrary to Nature, therfore a Diseas is to be removed. The Medius terminus (that is against Na∣ture) is not the reason of the Relation of a Diseas to the Ablation therof, but it is only an Exposition of the ge∣neral Nature of a Diseas. For whosoever understan∣deth what a Diseas is, doth at the same instant presently conceive somthing not natural. And therfore such a syl∣logism is only expository. Yet we do not suppose it to be alwaies unprofitable, becaus it may somtimes be ser∣viceable to the conviction of a stubborn, or the infor∣mation an ignorant Distemper. Hither also we may

refer the translation of an Indication from the Action to the Instruments by vertue of general Rules: Likes are preserved by their likes, Contraries cured by their contraries.

We say Fifthly, That a Collation of the Indications a∣mong themselvs, wherby we may guide our choice by the consent and dissent of the Indicants to what simply and absolutly ought to be done, doth necessarily involve the third Operation of the Understanding. For the limitati∣on of any Indication supposeth a midle term extraneous to that Indication, which being first understood, the li∣mitation is inferred as a conclusion. For he that findeth out an external for a middle term (thereby to assert the verity of any proposition) doubtless he manifestly argues and disputes. Seing therfore that besides the Indicant and the Indicate a third term, and the affirmation or ne∣gation therof is required to the limitation of an Indica∣tion, evident it is that the third Operation of the Un∣derstanding is requisit to the Invention therof. Ther∣fore although simple Indications may subminister the first rudiments of Method to Practice, yet to the comple∣ment and perfection of disputing the Art must likewise be joyned with it.

We affirm Sixthly, That the election of the Physical Matter in particular, and the apt and prudent admini∣stration therof, doth not only imploy every Operation of the Understanding, but that it also requireth experience; for without this, who can sufficiently understand to ad∣minister a dose of Scamony or of any other purging Me∣dicament, or know what humors such and such a Plant draweth away by a peculiar propriety? Again, in Me∣dicines alterant there may perhaps lurk som hidden qua∣lity, which may be hurtful to the Patient, and this with∣out experience cannot be discerned. We conclude ther∣fore

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(the proper force and use of Indications being con∣tinued) that to a compleat method of Medicine all the dictates of Reason, and the contributions of Experience are pre-required.

We now proceed to the Third Title propounded at first, namly, Into what kinds and differences Indica∣tion is distributed. Som differences may easily be ob∣served by what hath already been spoken, which therfore we shal here omit. Now here we distinguish Indicati∣on into general, succeeding, and specifical. The general is derived from the general Indicant, the succeeding frō the intermediat kinds of Indicants, and the specifical from the lowest Species of them. We have already no∣ted that the general Indicant is the very state of the Bo∣dy considered in general, as it is frail and in motion; this state indicateth that health must be intended, which is the most general physical action, and the most gene∣ral Indicate; yet this action is in som sort concrete, and equally includeth two general actions in the ab∣stract, namly Conservation and Correction. For the ge∣neral state aforesaid is also concrete, and comprehendeth two like Considerations in the abstract, namly, one of the parts yet qualified according to the prescript of Na∣ture, which require a pure Conservation: The second of the parts somwhat degenerated from their integrity, which in like manner require a pure correction. These two actions are perpetually conjoyned in every work of Art. For he that conserveth, withal correcteth, that is, he rectifieth som irregularities; and he which correct∣eth, hath at the same time conservation for the object of his Undertakings. The complication of these acti∣ons is so subtil, that it seemeth to have posed that most acute Physitian Argenterius, who in his Book Off. Med▪ affirmeth Conservation to be that very Correction,

which is exercised in the art of maintaining health. But his Error is twofold. First, because he supposeth Cor∣rection and Conservation in 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to be one and the same action, when indeed they are two distinct actions, however they are complicated in the Exercises of Art. For they are indicated (as we said before) from the se∣veral Considerations of the Indicant, and Conservation hath respect to those things which are according to Na∣ture; but Correction reflecteth upon preter-natural faultiness. Moreover, They are perfected by instru∣ments formally distinct, yea opposit: For Correction even in the very art of defending health, is accomplisht by Contraries, but Conservation by Homogeneals; as in this Art we help Emptiness by taking Nourishment, contrary indeed to the Emptiness, but homogeneal to the Parts which are to be nourished: Therfore although these Actions be complicated in the Execution, yet in∣deed they are formally distinct, and ought distinctly to be entertain'd by the Understanding. The Second Er∣ror of Argenterius is, because he granteth the correction of Errors only to be the General Action of al Medicin, when as Conservation is equally universal and alike ex∣ercised in al the works of Art.

No man doubteth but we conserve in the Hygienal part, and that we correct. Also Galen demonstrats in his Book, whether the matters of preserving health be∣long to a Physitian. You will say, That Galen in that place doth prove every Medicinal Action to be correc∣tion, and that conservation is comprehended under the latitude of correction. But Galen must not be so under∣stood, as if he intended correction to be a kind of con∣servation, seing that (as we have shewed before) con∣servation and correction even in this art of preserving health are actions formally different and differently di∣stinguished:

for Galen's meaning is, that every Medi∣cal action when it is actually administred, doth imply and comprehend correction, and in that respect may be called Correction, and so by consequence Correction will be the general Action of all Medicine; yet Galen confesseth Conservation to be equally general. For what hinders but there may be two general abstracted Actions in Physick? That doth not destroy, if any man have such conceptions, the unity of the Art, it rather indeed confirms it. For the unity of an Art consisteth in some community, which may be attributed to all the parts therof; and this union is to be esteemed so much the more firm, as all the parts of art are reciprocally con∣joyned among themselvs by more communities. If ther∣fore there are two general Actions, and those common to all the parts of Medicine, so much the more firmly will those parts conspire the advancement of the Art. Wherfore he contradicts not Galen, that affirms con∣servation also to be a general Action of all Medicine; seing that the scope of Galen was only to shew the uni∣ty of the Medical art by the community of that general Action, namely Correction; now he might as easily have shewed it, if the nature of the thing had required it, by the community of Conservation. For in the Hy∣gienal part of the most noble circumstance is the Con∣servation of the whol concrete action, and therupon the whol action is denominated from the more principal part, and the Art it self an Art conservative. Although otherwise (as hath been said) it also includes Correcti∣on. But in the Prophylactical part the principal scope of the Medical Action is preservation, namely the cor∣rection of the caus of the imminent Diseas: yet this is so performed, and by such means which the present spirits can allow, but in no wise by such things as may

destroy them. And therfore also in the Prophylactical part regard is had to the Spirits, and their conser∣vation is Indicated.

Now after the same manner the whole concrete Acti∣on (although as hath been said, it also includeth Conservation) is called Preservation and Precaution from the more Noble part. Finally, In the Therapeutical part, although in like manner the whol concrete action be called Curation, and the art it self a Curative Science from the principal part of the action, yet to speak pro∣perly and truly all this action of cure may be divided in∣to three abstracted parts, and evidently distinct; namly, into the Cure of the cause, the Cure of the Diseas, and the conservation of the Spirits. For the Vital or Con∣servative Indication doth evidently, and by the unani∣mous grant of all Physitians belong also to this part of Medicine, and must be consulted of in every curative a∣ction before it be undertaken. From whence it is ma∣nifest that this part likewise of Medicine doth perpetu∣tually conserve, that is, provide and foresee in every Cure, least the Spirits should receive more detriment than profit from the prescribed remedies. Al these things therfore being thorowly weighed, we conclude, That a general Indicate is a certain concrete thing, and may be properly distinguished into two general abstracted acti∣ons which are exercised in every part of Medicine, and that in the work of art they pertually make one compleat or complicated action.

Moreover, The general Indicant, namely the State of the Body, as frail and in motion may be divided, besides the parts or obstracted considerations already proposed, into three kinds, or rather three succeeding kinds equally and alike concrete: namely, into a sound state, a diseased state and a neutrality. These three

Species are the subjects of the three kinds of Method to Practice; namely the sound state of the Hygienal part, the diseased state of the Therapeutical, and the Neutral of the Prophylactical part. These three states are also concrete Indicants, and respectively Indicate what is particularly to be done, or what the Physitians Duty is in all those Arts: namely a sound state indicateth the conservation of health; a diseased state the removal of some affect, and the Neutral state that the caus of an imminent malady ought to be corrected least it break out into a Diseas. Now these three Indicates are alike concrete, and each of them as we have proved above, abstractively includeth both Conservation and Corre∣ction.

Finally, In a Diseased state the action of correcting is dissolved into two Species; into the correction of Caus, and the correction of the Diseas, and so here may be discovered three kinds of abstracted actions. For a diseased state brancheth it self into three Species evidently abstracted, into the Essence of a Diseas, the causes of a Diseas, and the Spirits or those things which remain in this state according to Nature. For those things which are preternatural and indicate correction in general, are here separated (as hath been said) into two parts, namely into the Essence of a Diseas, and the Causes of a Diseas; and therfore there are three parts of this state, each of which do formally and di∣stinctly Indicate. Three kinds therfore (that we may put an end to this matter) of Indications are to be considered in this state; namely, from the Essence of the Diseas, the Curative; from the Causes the Preser∣vative, and from the Spirits the Vital or Conservative. To the Causes we refer all impediments of cure, as also vehement Symptoms, and such as divert the Progress of

the Cure to themselvs, for in this respect they are in∣vested with the Nature of Causes. And thus much of Indications in general.