The way to bliss. In three books. Made publick, by Elias Ashmole Esq.

CHAP. I. What BLISSE and HAPPINESSE is.

IF in all orderly Speeches and matters of Learning, a 1.1 it first of all behoveth to agree upon the Thing in hand, what it is, and what is the Reason and Bounds [or definition] of the same: It seem∣eth very needfull in this Discourse of THE WAY TO BLISSE, to shew first what is BLISSE, because it is a thing much in doubt, and in question among the Learned.

He that useth to behold and view the Reason and Nature of things, may easily perceive by the outward shape, and inward gifts of Man, unlike and passing all

other Wights (or living Creatures) that he was made for some notable end and purpose above the rest; and so not for Pleasure, Honour, Health, or enough of need∣full outward things, which they call Riches, nor yet for any other matters, which other Wights void of Wit and Reason, seek and follow. Therefore a Man ought not to make any such thing his End and Happiness, unless he think it reason for the Master and better Workman, to learn of the Servant and worser: For what other pattern and end have we in the world to follow? None at all; because we are the best Creatures in the World.

Then it is without the World, say you, and among the blessed Mindes [or Spirits] above and without all: Neither yet have we found it; for they be our Fellow-servants and Subjects under one Almighty King. Wherefore there remains nothing but GOD and his Happiness to be sought and set before us, not with hope to overtake and reach it, (that were madness) but with desire to attain so much thereof, as the proportion be∣tween Him and us will suffer. Or if the unmeasureable and boundless [or infinite] Blessedness of GOD admit no comparison; It were best (yea, and by the example of the best Men) to make the bounds of our BLISSE so much of the Bliss of GOD, as our whole Power and Nature will hold and carry.

Now then, if we knew that Divine Pattern and Bliss of GOD, all were well: And this, as almost all other truth (especially in case of Life and Manners, for the which it was chiefly written) by the witness and record of Holy Writ, were each to be known and pro∣ved, if that were not too strange, and far off from this

purpose, which is appointed (as you see) to run through the midst of Nature, Reason, and Philosophy.

Wherefore, sithence both in this and all other Mat∣ters, I mean not to lean over-much upon my own de∣vice, because a Man (especially a young man) is apt to swerve, but to call other to counsel with me; and they can be no more but Men, at most endowed with ripe and sound Reason and Judgement, in the course of Kinde [or Nature] and Philosophy: yet we will look, as near as we can, that they be still squared by the Rule of Truth and Reason.

Then, to finde this Happiness of Heaven among Men, to whom were it best to travel? Unto Poets, think you? No; because they take their aim still at a vain Mark b 1.2, the Peoples liking, as we may see by Pindar, one of the best among them, (for I will not draw of the dregs) when he saith, c 1.3 If a man be Rich, and have his Health with a contended Minde, and Honour, let him not care to be a GOD.—A vain and worldly BLISSE, God wot, far from a Divine Na∣ture.

Nor yet need we go to the lower and lesser houses of Philosophy; where, as they be tainted and unsound in other pieces of Learning, so in matter of Manners, they do not well to place our BLISSE in Honour, Plea∣sure, Health, or in such-like outward things; no, nor to set it in good Life alone, and Virtue.

Plato and Aristotle, for their matchless understanding in Natural things, and Divine Light, in the good or∣der of Life and Manners, have been these many Ages best accepted with the best, and followed in all things: Therefore, in this high point of Manners which we

have in hand, let us see what these Men hold, and how near they come to the right line of Truth, whereof we spake before.

To begin with Plato, the Spring of this Philosophy, his Bliss, as he disputes in Philaebus, as near as I could gather, out of so large and scattered a speech, is no∣thing but Pleasure.

And yet this divine Man meaneth not, (lest you should marvel) with that Herd of Swine, (though they were not the broachers of that foul Opinion, but watered their Gardens, as d 1.4 Tully saith, with other mens Springs) to set open all the gates of the Senses, and to let in all that comes; but onely at a few narrow loops, to receive clean Delight, without all grief en∣terlaced; and by name e 1.5 delight in Colours, Concent, and some Smells, in Health, Wisdome, and Virtue. And again he saith in Theaetetus, f 1.6 that Justice and Holi∣ness, together with Wisdome, makes us like unto GOD.

To let these two places serve for him, and to come to Aristotle: As there are two sorts of Men, one dis∣posed to deal with others, which are called worldly-men; and another quite contrarily, bent to live alone, and to seek Knowledge, which are called Philosophers: So he in his Book of Manners, g 1.7 appoints two like several Ends and Blisses; for the first, Virtue, (I mean a do∣ing, and no idle Virtue) garnished and fenced with out∣ward helps and gifts of Body and Fortune; for the next, Knowledge of the best things: and this he setteth before that other, for many reasons vouched toward the end of that Book, but especially because GOD, whom we ought to follow, leadeth the same Life.

These be the best grounds of BLISSE, that ever

any Philosopher hath laid at any time, (for never a one hath quite built it up;) let us see how they be squared.

If the stall-fed Epicure may again be justly reproved, and reckoned as an impious person, whom never any heavenly Thoughts touched, for bringing h 1.8 in an idle God, neither ruling the World, nor regarding it; How can Aristotle seem wrongfully accused of Impiety, and for the same banished out of the Academy, if there were no other proof against him, than that he saith in that place, that GOD leadeth no other, than this beholding and gazing Life of his? Is it not an idle, and, as it were, a covetous and envious Life, turned back upon it self, and estranged from all outward Action applied to other? yea, (and that) in his own and all other mens Understanding? Then to encounter him with his wor∣thy Master, Plato; If that were the best Life, or the Life of GOD, why did GOD make the World? He lived so before, if that had been the best Life; i 1.9 But because He was Good, He would have other enjoy his Goodness; and therefore he was busie in Making, and is yet in Ruling the World: And yet indeed, it is no Business, as we reckon it, that is, no Care and Trou∣ble; but an outward Deed and Action, clean contrary to the inward Deed of a musing Minde, onely shooting at his own good Estate, which is Wisdome and Know∣ledge.

But if he deny all this, as it is like he will, because, to encrease the heap of sin, he grants no Beginning; then, what can be greater evidence than his own Wri∣tings, one quite thwarting another, as cross as may be? for in his k 1.10 seventh Book of State, he comes again

and saith, that Every man hath so much BLISSE, as he hath Wisdome and Virtue, even by the witness of GOD himself, who is therefore happy, and not for outward Goods. What can be more divinely spoken, and more cross to that former foul and godless Opinion? Nay, see the force of Truth; he yields again, according to his hea∣venly l 1.11 Master, That, m 1.12 to forestall the Place from the worser sort, good Men ought to take Office upon them, and to manage Affairs of State: Yea and further, n 1.13 If they refuse, (which if they be Wise they will, quoth Zeno) that they may be rightly compelled. Then, if his Wiseman hath Virtue in possession, as no doubt he hath, he must (as we see by his own confession) use it: And the same reason is of GOD Himself in this great City of the World. But o 1.14 Plato by name, thinks these two so nearly tied, and of kin together, as he dare openly deny his Happiness to that Common-wealth, where they be dis-linked, and stand asunder.

Then we see, that in the judgement of these two great Philosophers, where they be best advised, and in deed and truth, the Divine Pattern of BLISSE, which we ought to strive unto, is no more, nor no less, than that worthy couple of Wisdome and Virtue, knit toge∣ther in that band of Fellowship, which may never be parted and set asunder.

But you may say, We have reared our BLISSE aloft, and made it a fair and goodly Work, but more fit for the dwelling of those single and clean Mindes [or Spirits] above, which they call Messengers, [or Angels] than for us Men, so buried here below in these earthly Bodies, as we be scarce able to look up un∣to it: And therefore Aristotle both in his Book of

p 1.15 Manners and of q 1.16 State, with good advice often receiveth in enough of bodily and outward Goods, to help this matter, (though not as any other cause of BLISSE, than the Instrument is of Musick:) and so Plato we see nameth his Servants and Helpers.

Indeed, I grant that this full and high pitch of Hap∣piness, (I mean that measure above set) is free and easie, to free and lively Spirits; but to us impossible without other outward means and helps, which, never∣theless, shall not be counted as any part of the frame of BLISSE, needful to make up the whole; but, as it were, loose and hang-by steps and stairs leading up unto it.

Then if these be so needful as they be, it were as much need to lay them down, and in just account, which those Philosophers do not; lest if there be too few, our Happiness should halt; if again too many, the idle parts might in time infect and marre the rest: As we may fear of Plato his first three Delights, although they be not hurtful of themselves. Without more words, the just sum is this.

To obtain so much Happiness, as our Nature is able to take and hold, the Body had need be first willing and obedient, and then store of outward needful things to be at hand and ready: These every Man knoweth. But for the Body, that is obedient when it is long-liv'd, healthful, young, clear and temperate: when all these helps flock together, we may be happy if we will; if any want, we shall never, do what we can, as we shall hear hereafter.

Then let us marshal, at last, these things in Order, and comparing BLISSE to a Family, make that loving

Couple, Wisdome and Virtue, as Man and Wife, and Heads of the Houshold; the five Properties of the Body, like Children; and Riches, as Servants. These again, if the chief of the Houshold will suffer them to Marry, will beget other two Bond-children, to beau∣tifie the same house, Honour and Pleasure: But the wise and good Housholder will in no wise suffer it, lest his Houshold be troubled with more than may be ruled. And although true and right Honour and Pleasure will perforce follow, yet he shall not regard them, but be minded towards them, as those grave Men were to∣wards Hellen, and often use their saying, r 1.17 Although they be such kinde ones, yet let them go.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Cic. Offic. lib. 1.
• b 1.2

  Terent. Prolog. in Andr. & Plat. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• c 1.3

  Pind. Olym. Od. 5. & Isthm. Od. 5.
• d 1.4

  Cicer. de Nat. Deor. lib. 1.
• e 1.5

  Plat. in Philaeb.
• f 1.6

  Plat. in Timaet.
• g 1.7

  Aristot. Ethic. lib. 10. cap. 7. & 8.
• h 1.8

  Cicer. de Nat. Deor. lib. 2.
• i 1.9

  Plato in Timaeo.
• k 1.10

  Arist. Polit. lib. 7. cap. 1.
• l 1.11

  Plato N. I.
• m 1.12

  Arist. Pol. lib. 7. cap. 3.
• n 1.13

  Arist. Polit. l. b. 2. cap. 7.
• o 1.14

  Plato in A••cibiad. primo, sub fin••m.
• p 1.15

  Arist. Eth. lib. 10 c. 8.
• q 1.16

  Polit. lib. 7. cap. 1.
• r 1.17

  Hom. Ill. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. v. 142. Arist. E••hic. lib. 2. cap. ult.