II. Whence comes the di∣versity of pro∣per names.
Upon the Second Point 'twas said, That a name is an artificial voice representing a thing by humane institution, who being unable to conceive all things at once, distinguish the same by their differences either specifical or individual; the former by appellative names, and the other by proper, as those of Cities, Rivers, Mountains, and particularly those of men, who also give the like to Horses, Dogs, and other domestick creatures. Now since conceptions of the Mind, which represent things, have affinity with them, and words with conceptions, it follows that words have also affinity with things, by the Maxime of Agree∣ment in the same third. Therefore, the wise, to whom alone it belongs to assign names, have made them most conformable to the nature of things. For example, when we pronounce the word Nous, we make an attraction inwards. On the contra∣ry, in pronouncing Vous, we make an expulsion outwards. The same holds in the voices of Animals, and those arising from the sounds of inanimate things. But 'tis particularly observ'd, that proper names have been tokens of good or bad success arri∣ving to the bearers of them, whence arose the reasoning of the Nominal Philosophers, and the Art of Divination, by names call'd Onomatomancy; and whence Socrates advises Fathers to give