Two great questions determined by the principles of reason & divinity I. whether the right to succession in hæreditary kingdoms, be eternal and unalterable? Neg. : II. whether some certain politick reasons may not be sufficient grounds of divorce? Affirm.

TWO Great Questions.

I. Question. Whether the Right to Succession in Heredita∣ry Kingdoms, be Eternal and Unalterable?

CHAP. I.

That the Power and Authority which Princes, or Supreme Magistrates have, is derived to them from God; and that, by these several Wayes, Immediate Deputation, Hereditary Succession, and Election.

BEing about to Discourse of a Point both difficult and dangerous, I mean, The Right of Succession to Supreme Authority, whether it be not limit∣ed by Conditions, and subject to Alterations? I shall in the following Dispute use such Caution in Ar∣guing, and that too, from no worse Topicks than Prin∣ciples of Reason and Divinity, as may, I hope, prove some means of Satisfaction, but none of Distaste. And because this Question about the Alterability of Succession to the Supreme Authority, will receive great Light from a Discussion of what is the Nature of that Right which

Princes have to Succession, and the Nature of that Right be Cleared, by a Consideration of him who gives it, and to what Ends; I shall in the first place state, from what Fountain, Power, and Authority, it is Derived; by what Ways, and to what End.

First, I take it for granted, that no man Naturally and of Himself, has a Right Inherent in Himself to exercise Rule and Government over others; and all men as to a state of Nature to be Born in the same Degree of equality with one another; but yet, that most Men are Born in a state of Subjection to some other, comes thus to pass; because Man, being at the Will, Disposal, and Com∣mand of His Creatour, who gave Him Life and Ex∣istence, and continues it to him, shall be likewise at the Command of whomsoever the Creatour shall transfer a Right to of Government and Command; and only of Him: So that supposing God not to have transfer'd His Right of Dominion over Man, or any part of it to any else, every Man is born in the same condition and relation of Equality, (for though Son-ship doth Oblige to many Offi∣ces of Gratitude and Duty, yet not to such a Subjection as we are handling) and consequently, no one is Naturally a Servant or Subject, nor any one a Prince, till God hath Invested some Person with an Authority of Govern∣ing such a number of Men, and all that shall be born of them. The Inference then is plain, that if men should be naturally equal, and no one subject to other, did not God Depute some one Person to Exercise part of his Au∣thority and Government over others; then, that they are not Equal, is the effect of God's Appointment; and so all Pre-eminence of Power and Authority, is prima∣rily derived from Him. And that this immediate con∣clusion from right Reason, is Consonant to God's Word (and so must all such of necessity be) I shall quote but one place of Scripture, viz. Rom. 13. 1. Let every Soul be subject to the Higher Powers, for there is no Power but of God, the Powers that be are Ordained of God, &c.

This being laid for a Foundation, that all Authority is derived from God; the next Doubt is, how we shall

know to whom He does derive it, that we may give Him due Obedience, and not be imposed on by Usurpers? And this will best be known, if we consider the several ways, by which God Derives this Power to Men: For we may infallibly conclude, that He has no Authority from God, who did not receive it by those ways by which God Con∣fers it; and that He is God's Minister to whom we see Providence has Derived it by some such way, as He makes use of to that purpose: and they are these;

• His own Immediate Choice and Deputation.
• Hereditary and Natural Succession of Kindred.
• And Election by the Common Votes and Suffrages of any People.

Of the first sort, were Moses, Saul, and David; of the second, were Solomon, and Rehoboam, &c. the last was Jeroboam; though God had also foretold to Him by His Prophet, that He should be King over Ten Tribes, and accordingly v. 20. of the 12. Chap. of the 1 of Kings, All Israel, when they had heard that Jeroboam was come again, (out of Egypt) sent and called Him to the Congregation, and made Him King over Israel. Of these three ways of being Inaugurate into the Supreme Power, the First is more Noble and Glorious, for as much as in that, a par∣ticular Approbation of the Person by God Himself, is the Reason of his Advance; but He who Succeeds as next of Blood, owes it to his good Fortune; and He who is Elected by the People, often to some Policy, whereby He Ingratiated himself; but sometimes to his Vertues: and of the two last, Hereditary Succession and Election; the former is more Preferrable, for the inconveniences it a∣voides, which Elections subject a Nation to: And be∣sides, one time with another, it has produced as many Examples of Vertue and Ability to Govern, as the o∣ther.

The Right of Government then being once by God Immediately Transfer'd to any one, after His Decease (unless God immediately by Himself Transfer it to any

other, or the Prince do) Naturally doth pass to the very next of Blood and Kin, and that for these Reasons: Be∣cause He who received Authority from God to Govern a People, received it to this end, to procure that peoples Good and Welfare, to the utmost of His Knowledg; which He would never do, if he took not care that the evils of Anarchy, (to prevent which God had Crowned Him,) might likewise be prevented for the future, by translating His Authority at His Death to some other, who might sustain the Government when He was incapable of bearing it Himself; and on this Reason is founded the Axiom in our common Law, Rex nunquam moritur. Now because Government doth not only intend the Peoples good, but imply the great Honour and Dignity of Him who bears it; the Prince cannot be supposed to wish so great a Dignity (if he declare not himself to the contrary) to any less than Him who may be reasonably supposed most inward in His Affections the next of Kin; and therefore if He die, His silence shall be taken for Consent that the very next in Blood is the Person to whom for love and custom sake He Propagates His Right: (by the very next of Blood meaning that Person, who is e∣steemed so by the Vulgar Account of that Nation; Opi∣nions as to nearness of Blood, among different People, differing) and that Princes may exercise their Authority in provision for the Future after their Decease, and conse∣quently appoint a Successor, is evident from hence, be∣cause the Laws any one of them makes, are not suppo∣sed to cease to be so immediately upon his Death, but to retain their full force for ever after, unless a like Au∣thority repeals them.

Before I proceed further, I must speak to an Objection, which possibly may be raised; That to found the Right of Succession to Government in being lineally Descended or next of Blood and Kin, or appointed by Testament, to Succeed to some one, who Originally, tracing the Line of Princes backwards, derives His Authority from one who Immediately received it, and was Deputed to it by God, is to destroy the Right of most or all Princes, who can∣not

derive their Authority from such a Predecessor, and that it is to take away the old and common Notion of Supreme Authority, being naturally founded in Posteri∣ty: I Answer, that I am of Opinion, that Paternity or Father-hood never did give a Right of Soveraignty over Chil∣dren; that before God Actually and Immediately constituted Governours, and that, not upon the Account of Father∣hood, or Men Chose some to themselves, or voluntarily upon certain Considerations submitted themselves, there were no such Persons in the World as Kings, or Persons possest of Soveraign Authority, or pretending to be so merely as Fathers: and that if no Prince can trace His Authority backwards to him who received it from God Himself immediately, yet he may to him who received it, together with the condition of Hereditary Succession for the Future, from God Immediatly, either by the Election of men, for as much as that first Predecessor could not Reign with∣out the Consent of People (which is the same thing as Choice) or else to him who took the Advantage of a For∣feiture of their Liberty by some Offence, and so in compensation righted himself by enforcing their Subjecti∣on; which is as good a Title to Dominion as any, es∣pecially if by After-Acts and Compacts settled and confirmed.

Now, that Election of Princes doth Transfer as full and ample Power and Right to Government as any other way whatsoever, (which being prov'd, though all Prin∣ces may Succeed to such an One as primarily was Elected by the People, will take away all Defect on that account) I Argue thus, that where God doth not immedi∣atly provide for the safety and welfare of any People by giving them Laws, or a sufficiently authorised Law∣giver; there God, and Nature, and Reason do permit and encourage that People, to procure their own welfare, by what honest means are most conducive to it in their judg∣ment, by choosing or pitching upon a Person or Persons to exercise over them Gods Power and Authority, in or∣der to the publick Good; and the Person so Elected Acts by Gods Authority not the Peoples, forasmuch as all Power

is solely Gods, and therefore no one can Act lawfully as a Governour by any Authority but by Gods, though this Authority may be conveyed to Him instrumentally by a Predecessor or the People; and as a Successor in the Government, Acts not by the Authority of His Prede∣cessor who had none Originally of Himself, and therefore could not properly give any, (for He Governed not by His own Authority, but by Gods; and therefore His Suc∣cessor Acts not by His Authority who had none of his own, but by Gods, which the other conveyed to Him) so neither may an Elected Prince be said to govern by the Peoples Authority by whom he was Elected, but by Gods, who empowred these People by right of Nature and Reason, to Depute or Name one to the Government in order to the publick Good, when he himself did not: And such a Prince is subject or accountable to none but God: But if in any Nation the Prince, or He who bears the Title of such, and appears to be so, is accountable to any else, they to whom He is accountable are the Su∣preme Authority, and He only in Name, not really a Prince.

CHAP. II.

That a Disposition in a Prince, proceeding from Opinion or otherwise, to both the Spiritual and Temporal Dammage, and Destruction of a Nation, maketh a Forfeiture of Right to Succession.

HAving Discours'd of the Principle from whence all Humane Power is Derived, Namely God; and of the several wayes by which He Conveys this Authority to Men; that Right and Succession, depends either on the Prince's Will to bestow it on whomsoe∣ver He pleases, whether next of Kin or not; or, in case of Law. to tye it precisely to the next of Kin (which still

is the Princes Will, because his Law) it may depend on the nearness of Alliance, Or, on popular Election; the Question lies thus, whether a Prince having Right to Succession, by those Laws which tye it up precisely to the next in Blood or Kin, may not Lawfully and Rightfully, for some Reasons be Deprived of Succession without Injury done to Him, and both Forfeit and lose his Right to Suc∣cession? And this we shall be able more clearly to De∣cide, after having Considered what Qualifications are necessarily requisite in a Prince, and they are these;

• First, To intend and Design the utmost Good of His Peo∣ple both Spiritual and Temporal.
• Secondly, That Intending and Designing Well, He be not accidentally Disposed either by Opinion or otherwise to both the Spiritual and Temporal Destruction of His People, though contrary to His intent.

Now, I Assert, that either the want of the First of these, or addition of the last, is sufficient Reason and Ground to cut off, and alter Succession, and makes For∣feiture of Right to it, which may be taken without In∣jury or Wrong to the Person so Affected.

For the Proof of this position, I shall first shew, that Hereditary Right to Succession is not of it self in its own Nature Eternal or Unalterable; and Secondly, that the above mentioned Disposition in a Prince, makes a perfect for∣feiture of it.

'Tis used by some as an Argument, to prove that a Right to Succeed to the Soveraign and Monarchical Au∣thority in Hereditary Kingdoms is unalterable and Sacred, because Monarchy, say they, is of Divine Right, and the apparent Heir to it, having his Right from God, His Right is immoveable. I Answer, that I acknowledg not only Monarchy, but all other Forms of Government to be of Divine Right: because there is no Power but is or∣dained of God; (so the Sanhedrim or great Council a∣mong the Jewes being an Aristocracy was by God Constitu∣ted

to be, and continued for a long while the Soveraign Authority on Earth over them) But deny, that any person, who by Ordinary Course or Rule, has a Right to Succes∣sion, has it from God; for Succession is Determinable, ac∣cording to the Will of the Supreme Authority on Earth, and then, He who has Right to Succession, has it by Vertue of those Laws and Determinations of the Supreme Au∣thority which might otherwise have setled it; and not from God; who appointed not Him to Succeed, and there∣fore, gave Him no right to Succession, but he has it from the Supreme Authority on Earth; in which Au∣thority is comprehended a Power of appointing a Suc∣cessor, as I before shewed, that is, of giving the Right of Succession to some Person who can receive that Right from none but Him, and may be deprived of it by Him, because he gave it. But supposing (which I need not) that He has his right to Succession from God, I deny that he has therefore an unalterable Right, because He has his Right from whence He is to have his Power, from God; for neither Right nor any thing else is therefore unchangably appropriated to any Man, because God gave it; for what he gives us, He gives on certain Conditions, on the non-observance of which, the thing given may be impropriated and taken from us; so Life, which I think a Man may as properly call his own as any thing, is given on Condition of obeying God, else our life is Forfeited, and our right to it lost. So that right to Succession is not unalterable supposing it is Gods Gift; but contrariwise, is therefore alterable because it is Gods Gift, that is, bestowed and granted on certain Conditi∣ons to be performed, which not performed do Forfeit it: So that Secondly, the Heir to Succession having no other Reason for His Right to Succession in the Go∣vernment, than there is for Government in general, that is, the safety and welfare of Prince and People; if he be so Disposed as to destroy the Reason of Government, He likewise loses the Reason of Right to Succession in govern∣ment; because no one has right to succeed in Govern∣ment who destroys the very Reason of it, why there

should be any Government at all, even the safety of the People which was the Foundation and Reason of his Right; and he who hath no Reason for a Right hath no Right at all; and being yet a Subject, (for the very words, Heir, and having Right to Succeed, imply, that He is not in actual Possession of the Soveraignty, and therefore in subjection (for between them there is no Medium) He may incur the Forfeiture of every thing he has as a Subject, and so he has the Right of Succession; for, though the Heir to one Kingdom may be Sove∣raign in another, yet is a Subject in the Kingdom to which he is Heir, because he receives Right from ano∣ther; and such an one is less than Him who gives it, and therefore subject; and if he be a Subject, and byassed from the publick good, he is accountable, and may be Censured with Disinheritance. And this the Heir has no great reason to resent in such a Case; For if he be Conscientiously Disposed to both the Spiritual and Temporal Ruine of the Subjects, He then will exact O∣bedience to many things which they will in Consci∣ence know to be Sins, and therefore, be Obliged not to Obey; and so that Prince, had better never have Assumed the Regal Authority, than in his own Opi∣nion be slighted and disrespected, because Disobeyed in what He Commands (though really it be no Disres∣pect to be disobeyed in things not within his Command, but the dishonour lies in enjoyning them) and be forced to turn the Persecutor of his Subjects, to Vindicate the Honour of himself and Commands, and leave his Name to stink upon Earth.

But neither is the Person so Disinherited at all Injured; for, Injury implies Violence to Right, which I have prov'd he Forfeited, and therefore, That Proceeding just; the whole Argument I will thus sum up: He who is a Subject, (and so is every Heir to the Supreme Power as Heir, as I hinted before) is in a capacity of offending the Supreme Power, and then of being punished: He may offend against the present Soveraigns Authority and care of providing for the future welfare of his

people, by intending and purposing to do such things as would hereafter prove extreamly Damageable and Destructive to the Nation; and if He offend in this kind, a more proper Punishment cannot be applied to Him than such an one as will prevent those Mischiefs, the designing of which brings Him to punishment, and that is Disinheritance; for Civil Punishments ought not pro∣perly to be Vindicative, but remedies for preventing Mis∣chief: Or, if His Intentions and Designs are not evi∣dent by any Hint or Prospect He has given of them by Words or Actions, yet if his Prepossessions, which Himself owns, are such as Naturally and Necessarily tend and lead him to such Designs and Intentions, as being most near∣ly conjoyned with them, though outwardly He makes no Declaration of His intentions; He is, as far as Rea∣son can judg, most dangerously Affected, and unca∣pable to attain the end of Government, the general Welfare; Nay, will hereafter, as far as Men can see, do that, which will be Destructive to their Welfare, the end of Government, insomuch as it were the same thing if they had none: Now, He who destroys the end of Government, doth as ill as destroying Government it self, but since that ought to be Eternal, for the same Rea∣son it ever had a beginning, He Forfeits His Right to it, who is disposed to a Nations extreme Hazard or Destruction, to prevent all which is the only Reason he should Succeed in the Government, and that there should be any such thing at all; which if He will not only not prevent, but is the Person who brings it about, there is no Reason He should Succeed in the Government, he has made a Forfeiture of His Right.

CHAP. III.

That the Forfeiture is made to the Supreme Authority; That it is none unless it be taken Advantage of, whilst He continues a Sub∣ject; but that a Prince once Possest of the Su∣preme Power, cannot be Deposed; That the same Reasons, which Warrant to take the Forfeiture of Him, whilst Heir, if it be not taken then, are afterwards of no Force against Him.

I Above put the Power of Designing a Successor, ei∣ther at Pleasure, or else by some fixed standing Rule and Law, in the Supreme Authority; and therefore, if the Designed Successor make Forfeiture of his Right, it can be to none but Him who conveyed it to Him, His Superiour, for none else could Convey it to him; And for another Reason, the Forfeiture must be made to the Supreme Authority, because the Care of the Fu∣ture Welfare and Safety of the Subjects, against which He was Disposed, belongs properly to the Supreme Magis∣trate, and therefore the power of preventing future Mischiefs and taking the Forfeiture, which is the way to prevent, doth reside solely in Him. For although it cannot be denied, but that the People are mainly Concerned in a matter of that Weight, as is their Spiritual and Tem∣poral Welfare, and so might seem sufficiently warranted of themselves to provide for their own safety, as is eve∣ry one Naturally; Yet may they use only such Means as are to them Lawful, and as may not prove as Great or greater Inconveniences than the thing they would a∣void; and what such are, I shall presently shew.

Every one Naturally hath a Power and Right to

preserve himself, not only by Avoiding, or Flying from that which actually Assaults Him, but by standing and defending Himself against it, Nay, by Offending and As∣saulting that; for the others Violence being Arbitrary, that is, exercised by One who had no Right or Au∣thority so to do, was Unjust, and might therefore not only be Resisted, but returned in the same Degree accord∣ing to the just and natural Laws of Retaliation. and that even Immediately, and by the private hand of the Person Assaulted, forasmuch as the imminent danger could not admit of the delay of expecting a publick Determina∣tion: but in case, one be not actually Assaulted (I speak of private Persons,) it is not lawful either to Kill or Bind Him, who you suspect will be the Aggressor, but to fly from him is Lawful, Or, to endeavour to perswade him who bears Authority over Him, to take away His Arms, or confine him, or make him give Secu∣rity for his keeping the Peace; by this way of preven∣tion, for any one to provide for his own safety, is not only Lawful, but Prudent and Commendable: So in case a Nation fear the future Practices of Him who is now Heir, they may forecast a prevention, by engaging and obtaining of Him, under whose Authority He is, to tye him up by such Rules and Laws, as will put it without his Power to Effect the dreaded Mischief; or by utterly and totally removing Him out of that Place and Capacity, in which alone he can hurt them: But they themselves have not sufficient Authority to tye Him up by Laws, or Disinherit Him, and therefore cannot do it without Injury; and if it so come to pass, that the Supreme Authority will suffer him, whom you suspect will Murther You, to bear Arms, and will not con∣fine Him; if He Assaults you, being a private Man, you have the power of defending your self; but if the Supreme Magistrate will appoint a Successor over a Na∣tion, who that Nation has good reason to suspect will endanger their Lives and Fortunes, and Corrupt them in their Religion, to the hazard of their Souls, they have done all that lawfully they may, for preventing

that Successiòn; but Violently and of their own Au∣thority (which is none) to go about to Disinherit, or Alter the Succession, upon pretence that the Injury done to him is not comparable to the Mischiefs and Inju∣ries prevented; (which though true enough, and there want nothing but a competent Authority to alter the Suc∣cession without Injury, to the Person Disinherited) yet still, it remaining an Injury because they do it who have not sufficient Authority, it is a breach of the Lawes of Chri∣stianity, which allows not evil to be done that good may come of it, or evil be prevented: And supposing my self to speak to Christians, I hope the Laws of our Religion will be judged to Oblige them, as much as any Civil Lawes whatsoever, for Christians ought to suffer Injury rather than do any.

Having then proved this Forfeiture to be made to the Supreme Authority, that the Care and Power of prevent∣ing those 'foreboded Mischiefs resides only in it, the Subject ought in Prudence, and Duty to himself, to endeavour their prevention by moving the Supreme Au∣thority to prevent them, but not otherwise; and if he foresees no remedy, ought to Arm his Conscience from Corruption in Religion and the Spiritual Danger, and his resolution to suffer under the Temporal, and bear Injury when it cannot without Sin be prevented or Op∣posed: And this submission is not only necessarily en∣forced from the Principles of Christianity, but grounded upon Civil and Sate-Policy; for if it were in the Peoples Power to Disinherit whom they would, no Person could ever Succeed, from whom the Multitude might not have Assurance of being Complyed with, in what they pleased; and Mens desires being sometimes Extravagant and Sin∣ful, great Inconveniences must needs ensue too the Govern∣ment by the allowance of them; frequently to a Succes∣sor might be Disinherited by the Faction or ill Disposition of the most, by reason of false and scandalous Imputati∣ons, which they can hear and believe, but not disprove; or on purpose, which is sometimes very Be-witching, to shew their Power: and this must needs make a Govern∣ment

unsetled, and dispose it to Anarchy, Ruin and De∣struction. Now, upon reflection of the inconveniences of a Power in the People to Disinherit, and of those which sometimes may happen for want of that Power in them, when the Ordinary Supreme Authority which hath Pow∣er will not exercise it upon a due Occasion; some Men may possibly fall into a Rage, accusing their ill For∣tune which unavoidably subjects them to Misery on both sides; and Him, who having Power will not use it to secure them from the dangers they fear; but if they consider that He who refuses to Gratify them in this, cannot be imagined not to wish & intend his Peoples good as much as his own, and several wayes formerly has procured it, they have no reason to be disaffected to Him for this, since the Cause of his refusal to comply, must be either that he is not so apprehensive of the danger they Dread, and sees no Reason so to be; or if he be as apprehensive as they, yet perhaps he thinks it not within his Power to deprive the next Legal Heir of Succeeding without injury, forasmuch as He judges his personal Af∣fection or Disposition to any Opinion or Religion, cannot alter and take away his Right; and either, or both these being the Motives which with-hold Him from proceed∣ing as he is desired, and both pertaining to Conscience, which he must satisfy as well as other Men; besides, the Consideration of the Kings Heart being in the Hand of God, and particularly directed and turned by His Providence, His Subjects ought to submit to and Ac∣quiesce in his Pleasure; and so no remedy, but Suc∣ceed he must, and the Forfeiture, not being taken Ad∣vantage of whilst he remained a Subject, after He is once Possest of the Supreme Authority, cannot then be ta∣ken: For, although that Disposition which Forfeited his Right to Succession when He was Heir, may seem to Forfeit his Right to Actual Possession, because no one has a Right to be Possest of that which he had no Right to take into His Possession; yet the Condition of this Forfeiture is such, that, not being taken, the Supreme Ma∣gistrate is supposed not to have judged it a Forfeiture.; and

it belonging properly to his Cognizance to determine, whether it were or no, what he judged was no Forfeiture that he did not take for one, and what He did not take, when he is Dead, no one can take for Him, if to no one he Delegated Authority so to do; and if a Forfeiture is made to a Superiour, and the Supreme Magistrate nei∣ther by himself nor Delegate did take it, no one being Superiour to the Succeeding Heir, no one may take it, either by forcible hindring him to Succeed, or Warring against, or Deposing Him when He is possest; for the Crown once worn taking away all Defects, as say the Law∣yers, and that passing over to the Heir immediately up∣on the expiration of the Predecessor, all Previous Forfei∣tures or present Indispositions are of no force against Him, because there is none on Earth Sufficiently Authorised to take advantage of them. God indeed, if he pleases, by Interposing his Immediate Command, may depose Him; I mean not on the account of His Supreme Intendency over all the World, (for so He may depose a Prince though he be not so evilly affected) but according to the rules of Justice and Reason, as an Offender against Him whose Substitute he is, by overthrowing the Ends of Government: but this God rarely doth; for although Saul for his grie∣vous Offences were rejected by God, yet suffered he Him to live and dye a King without proceeding to actual De∣position, although Samuel had told Him from God, that the Kingdom of Israel was rent from him, that is, from his Tribe and Family.

If it be Objected, That though the Predecessor by a particular application of his Will did not take the forfeiture, because he did not see it, or believed it not; Yet gene∣rally he must be supposed to Will and Design the taking it, forasmuch as he Wills and Designs the Publick well∣fare; and so, though not by a Special Act, Yet by his General Intention of the Peoples good He must be suppo∣sed to have taken the advantage of it.

I answer, That this will not stand good in Policy, as it may do in many other things; because such a belief would put it in the Peoples Power at their pleasure to

Disinherit and Dethrone whomsoever they would, foras∣much as they might frequently upon Distaste, pretend him to have made a Forfeiture, who made none, and so depose him under the Colour of the Predecessor's Impli∣cite and General Will to Disinherit him: and this is so great an Inconvenience and Danger to the Publick, that it's far more eligible to run the hazard of Sometimes having a bad Prince, than of having good ones turned off as bad, or of suffering such ill Consequences as War, and Blood∣shed, and an Unsettled Kingdom, which must attend an attempt to depose even bad Ones, since there is no one but has some Adherents. The Scriptures command Ser∣vants Obedience not only to Gentle, but froward Ma∣sters, Applaud Suffering Wrongfully; and the Primitive Christians did so, even when they were strong enough to resist, and the Souldiers were content to be decima∣ted, and to lay down their Armes, to be wrongfully put to Death, that is for a cause not deserving Death, for professing the Christian Religion; which plainly proves that both the Apostles, and Primitive Christians, who were as well Catechised in the Principles of Religion as we can pretend to be, thought it an Article of their Faith, that it was not lawful for Subjects to Depose or Resist the cruelest Tyrants, though endeavouring their Spiritual destruction by obliging them to Idolatry, and their Temporal by Proscribing them, by Imprisoning and Murthering them if they refused: and this we call Pas∣sive Obedience, that is, submitting to the Supreme Autho∣rity's pleasure even when we are Injured rather then Re∣bel against Him. And thus much to shew, that if the Heir be not Disinherited whilst He remains so, it will after∣wards be too late, and in reason and justice Impossible.

CHAP. IV.

That Mens Throwing themselves wholly upon Providence for Averting these Mischiefs, without making use of Rational, and Mo∣ral Means to prevent them, is Unreasonable, and Absurd.

THe Country-man in the Fable who called upon Hercules, to draw His Cart out of the Mire in which it was set, was bid to apply His own Shoulders to it, and thrust, if he would have it out. Ma∣ny there are, who Idely rely upon Providence to save them from the Dangers they foresee, but will not step a foot themselves, or use the least Industry and Care for preventing those Evils; and because nothing comes to pass without Gods Permission, imagine therefore that nothing is done without His Appointment; and on this ac∣count leave it wholly to him to Provide for their Safe∣ty.

But this careless Opinion I much dislike; because it of∣ten brings Men into Misery, by making them to neg∣lect those Means for their Safety which God frequently puts into their own hands, and so they are undone for want of Care, for presuming God will Save them without the least of their Caution and Circumspection. Nay, some∣times there may be some, whose Honours, Lives and For∣tunes, must stand or fall with a present Condition of a Na∣tion; who know in their Hearts, and are sure, if the Times turn, unless they will turn with them (which 'tis Reasonable many times to believe they may not) they must lose both Lives and Fortunes, and the Spiritual Welfare of all the Subjects be Endangered; yet they are not content not to endeavour the Disinheriting a Successor, with whom all this Mischief comes in, upon a Scru∣ple, that such a Disinheriting is Un-lawful; are not con∣tent

fairly to give way to such a Successor without Oppositi∣on; but are His best Friends, Court and Complement Him most at every turn, and take occasion from their Opini∣on of the unlawfulness to Disinherit Him, to be the strongest maintainers of Him; which is both Imprudent and un∣reasonable Flattery; drudging for one who Laughs at their Sedulousness to their own Ruin. In any Nation, if there be any in such a case so mad, they must not think themselves e're the Honester and Wiser for Courting their own Destructions; submit one would, where it was unlawful to resist, but not invite Him who was to do one a Mischeif.

Tis to be Confessed, that Disinheriting a Prince, per∣verting the Lineal Succession, is a dangerous Precedent, because of the ill Consequences it may draw with it; the Right of Succession ought to be Sacred, and not toucht or medled with, but with the greatest Reverence and Caution, and upon weighty Considerations; but when once People have prevailed on a Prince, to Disinhe∣rit a Legal Heir for real and great Causes, they may of∣ten afterwards prove humoursom; and sometime for no Causes, or not equal, exact and require the doing of it, be∣cause they have an Example and Precedent: This, I say, is a great inconvenience, but is unavoidable; because, as long as Men are Men, they will be subject to Faults; but yet I suppose it not Impossible, but such Laws and Rules may be stated and provided, whereby to procede in such Cases, as would much Alleviate this inconvenience: But shall leave that to Wiser Heads to Determine what they must be. And so much of the First Question.

The Second Question. Whether some certain Politick Reasons may not be alone sufficient Grounds of Di∣vorce?

CHAP. I.

Of Marriage, its Institution, Ends, and Ob∣ligation: Of its special Rights and Privile∣ges in the State of Christianity.

I Am very Sensible, this Second Question carries so much the more Difficulty than the First, as it has been less Controverted, and consequently less Understood; that it lies under a far greater Dis∣advantage, by reason of the many more Actually Inte∣rested and concerned in it; the Right of Marriage be∣ing more Mens, than is Right to Succession and Heir-ship in Government, and they generally Prejudicated in their Opinions about it; And lastly, so much the harder Case, as it concerns the Dispossession of those who are Actual∣ly in Possession of a Right, and so owned to be; but the other only the prevention of Succeeding into such Actual Possession. But in order to its Discussion, I will pro∣ceed in the same Method I used in the First, that by inquiring into its Institution, Rights, and Ends, we may better judg of the true Causes of its Dissolution.

The Institution of Marriage seems not to have been Occasional and by accident, as the appointment of most things by God was, but Cotemporary with the very Cre∣ation, and Formation of man it self; so that He was no sooner shaped into the form of Body which we see he has, but he seemed to be Incompleat and Solitary, till such a Companion were given him; for the use and enjoy∣ment of which, in order to another end, Procreation, His Body both in its inward and outward Fabrick, provision and design of Nature appeared to have been purposely Framed, and by it self, as to that end, to be useless and imperfect: Nay, Marriage must have been In∣stituted, and Pre-ordained, even before Mans Creation; for if God, when He said, Let Us make Man, had an Ex∣emplar or Idea before Him, of what manner of Creature He was about to make, He then both saw, that the Creature He should make according to that Pattern, would want such a Companion, because of his inability to procreate without Her; and yet, for which Procreation his Body appeared purposely Designed, by reason of its proper, natural, and convenient Composure for it; Nay, fur∣ther, Designedly and on Purpose made him such a Creature, as should have such a Companion in order to Procreation, because else, all that Aptitude and Structure which now serves to that end, would have been useless; and God have done, what He and Nature never do, something in vain.

Now the Institution, or Reason of Ordaining Marri∣age, depending on its End; and its Immediate, and Na∣tural End, being Procreation and Propagation of a Species of Creatures, and Man's Body apt and suitable for such Procreation, at the Moment of His formation Com∣pleated; it follows, that at the Moment of his formati∣on Compleated, when he was an apt, and fit Creature for the End of Marriage, Procreation, the Institution of Marriage, if not before, yet then Commenc'd; because the Natural Frame of Man, did Necessarily suppose such a thing as Marriage; and therefore, its Institution was Original and Natural, not Occasional: it was designed by

Nature, it self, and therefore needed not to be Instituted with any formal Ceremony, Law, or Circumstance whatsoe∣ver. I confess, that a secondary end of Marriage, namely mutual Society, help and Comfort, seems to have been Occasional: for after God had made Man, and placed Him in the Garden, He said, Gen. 2. 18. That it was not good that Man should be alone, that He would make Him an Help meet for Him; as if, upon consideration of his Solitariness, as having no Creature capable of Conversing with Him, He re∣solved for remedy of that evil, to give Him a Wife: and Adam in the 23 ver. of that Chap. gives another Reason, why a Man should leave his Father and Mother, and cleave to his Wife; because she was taken out of Him, was Bone of his Bone, and Flesh of his Flesh; not that this was the only Reason of Marriage, because Woman was taken out of Man; but that it should be a strong Motive of Love and Inclination to Woman, because she was a piece of Man himself, and therefore He should prefer Her before the Dear Relations of Father and Mother. By which very words, Father and Mother, Adam seems to have un∣derstood the end of Marriage to be Procreation, and what Procreation was; else He could not have known what the words Father and Mother signify; unless you will sup∣pose those Words not Adams, but the Holy Pen-mans by a Prolepsis. From what has been said, 'tis clear, that the two great Ends of Marriage are Procreation, and mutual help; and that He who Marries, is Obliged to intend none o∣ther but those Ends.

Having shewed, that the Institution of Marriage was Co∣temporary with Mans first Creation, that the natural Disposition and Frame of Mans Body, was its very Institution in Nature it self, without further Ceremony, Law, or Circumstance, that Adams Marriage was Consummate, and Perfect without such; yet now since the World is Increased, there is something more requisit to be done, I mean, as to the Contracting, and Solemnization of Matrimony. For when there were none in the VVorld but one Man and one VVoman, and both naturally loving one another, Circumstance and Ceremony were needless, since they are

significative only of our minds to others, but there be∣ing no others but themselves, and their minds sufficiently known to one another, from the very inclinations and dis∣positions of Nature, as Man and Woman in general, and there being no other VVoman for Him to take, or Man for Her; I say, neither Nature nor Reason could re∣quire Circumstance and Ceremony as convenient or useful: but now they must be used as signs and tokens of Con∣sent, that such a particular Man and Woman do agree to Mar∣riage, and to prevent Defrauding one onother by de∣nying the Marriage, (which, if done in secret between themselves only, either might) and to prevent any ones wronging of either, by intruding upon the Right of ei∣ther; which is better secured and known, by being Publick and Solemn, and Acted before VVitness. Further, because all words do not equally express Consent, but some more, some less; 'tis likewise convenient, a determined form of words, whereby to express Consent validly, should be Authorised, and so all refuge to Equivocation, and dubious In∣terpretation of former Promises might be avoided. And to the end, that the Persons consenting to Marriage, might have the stronger Obligation to stand to their Promise, it was thought fit, they should mutually Promise each other, as far as lies in their Power, before God Himself, in the Presence and Hearing of one of his Mini∣sters.

So then, the Ends and Reasons of Marriage, is Pro∣creation and mutual Help; an inducing Motive is the na∣tural Love Man and VVoman bare to each other, as be∣ing originally Flesh of one anothers Flesh; the Essence or Actual Contract of it consists in Consent, and seve∣ral outward Circumstances, are requisite for its Confirmati∣on ad extra, and may not ordinarily be neglected with∣out fault, because they are wholesome and useful Appoint∣ments.

I have been the longer on this Head, because the Notion of any thing being first clearly and at large laid down, 'tis easier after to pass a judgment on it; and that I may pass by nothing which concerns it, I

shall Observe what Advantages and Privileges Christi∣anity has raised it to, beyond what it has in Nature, or in Judaism. It is become the Representation of that Holy Union, Love and Obedience, which is betwixt Christ and His Church, and therefore is accounted now a more honourable Estate than formerly; forasmuch as neither the Jewes nor Heathens tied themselves up to strict Marriages, but using Polygamy, did, as it were, prostitute and dishonour the Marriage-Bed, which be∣came thus common to many; but now the Marriage of two Persons during Life, is enobled and recom∣mended by that Similitude of Christ and His Church; the first owning no other Spouse, the last no other Lord: Besides, that Marriage is not now so easily dissoluble as among the Jewes, nor for such slight Reasons; and last∣ly, there lies now an Obligation on each, to Procure, as far as they can, not only the others Temporal, but Spi∣ritual Comfort and VVelfare. And so much for the Nature, Institution, and Duties of Marriage.

CHAP. II. What is DIVORCE?

What are Sufficient Reasons of Divorce; and the Words of Our Saviour? St. Matth. 5. 31, 32. and Chap. 19. vers. 9. and else∣where, about Divorce, only for the cause of Adultery and Fornication, Considered and Explained.

MArriage, although so strait an Union as nothing more, yet admits of a Dissolution, commonly called Divorce; that is, a Separation of both Man and VVoman, so as to return into the very con∣dition of Liberty, and Singleness of Life, in which they

were before their Marriage; but this, not lightly, but on great weighty and high Considerations: And this is by the By to be observed, that every Separation of Man and VVoman after Matrimony outwardly Solemnized be∣tween them is not properly Divorce; for Divorce is on∣ly a Separation of Persons, who according to the intent of outward Solemnization, were really and perfectly in a state of Marriage, and that, so as to return into a state of utter Disobligation or Non relation one to the other: but a Separation of Persons not perfectly Married, or of Per∣sons Married if not for ever, so as both shall remain dis∣engaged, is not properly Divorce. When therefore two Persons are Separated and Disjoyned, because the one is naturally Impotent; that is, in Body not Perfect Man or VVoman, (for by natural Impotency, Age, VVeakness, or Barreness is not to be understood; for they are to be born with; but an imperfect or monstrous Body.) Such Se∣paration I say, is not properly Divorce, because none are Divorced but Husband and Wife; and such were not they: For since none are Husband and Wife, but they who are perfectly Married; and the firm Contract of Marriage de∣pend not only on the Consent of the Parties, and Solemni∣zation, but on a supposition that they are what they are taken to be; that is, perfect Man or Woman; (for Mar∣riage supposes the joyning of such together) if either be naturally Impotent, that is, not perfectly Man or VVo∣man, the other is imposed on, and the Consent of that Person to have married a Man or Woman, shall not be adjudged Valid, so as to imply that Persons Consent to Oblige to Cohabitation, with one who is not Man or Wo∣man, whom alone that Person did Consent and intend to have in Marriage; and therefore, such are not joyned toge∣ther by God and Nature, since Nature Abhors such a Conjunction; but without more adoe, are Actually Sin∣gle.

Secondly, If for other Reasons, a Man and VVoman perfectly so, and Married, do Part; that parting is not a real Divorce, so as to be Disengaged from each other; for thus St. Paul, 1 Cor. 7. 10, 11. And unto the Marryed I

Command; yet not I, but the Lord; Let not the Wife depart from Her Husband, but and if she Dapart, let her remain un∣married, or be reconciled to her Husband; and let not the Husband put away his Wife: In which place St. Paul first Exhorts, that there be no Separation between Man and Wife, that is, that they should not Disagree, so as to part from one another; but if such a Case ever hap∣pens; that their Separation for such a Reason, is not Di∣vorce, doth not dis-unite them, but that the VVoman continues the Mans VVife still, notwithstanding this Separation, and ought not to marry any one else, but that a Reconciliation should be Endeavoured, and both return to each other: but by the last words, Let not the Hus∣band put away his Wife, is not to be understood, as if a Man might by no means, for no Cause, Totally Divorce his VVife; for even our Saviour allows Adultery and For∣nication to be a sufficient Cause; Matth. 5. 32. and 19. 9. &c. In the first place in these VVords, I say unto you that whosoever shall put away his Wife, saving for the Cause of For∣nication, causeth Her to commit Adultery; and whosoever shall Mar∣ry her that is Divorced, committeth Adultery: In the last place thus, I say unto you, whosoever shall put away his Wife, except it be for Fornication, and shall Marry another, Committeth Adul∣tery; and wboso Marrieth her which is put away, doth Commit A∣dultery: which Exception of the Case of Adultery, plain∣ly Proves, that Divorce for some Cause is Lawful, name∣ly for that.

But because these Places are generally understood in that rigid Sence, which the VVords without due Atten∣tion, seem to bear, as if no other Cause whatsoever but Adultery and Fornication in the VVoman, is sufficient Cause of a Total Divorce, and so 'tis impossible that my Policick Reasons should be sufficient Cause; I shall clear the Sence and Meaning of the VVords, First, Observing, that e∣ven Adultery it self is partly a Politick Reason of Divorce; forasmuch as Marriage is Instituted for Propagation, and that is mischiev'd, and hindred by nothing more, than promiscuous Embraces; and thence Accrues great Dam∣mage to a Common-Wealth, and its politick Good. Besides, if

the VVoman do sometimes prove with Child, it being possibly anothers, it shall however be obtruded on the Mothers Husband to Maintain: She then who is found Guilty of this high Crime, shall be Finally Dismist, as one who perverts and hinders the end of Marriage, and endamages the publick if she have not Children; and if she have, greatly injures her Husband, both by dispo∣sing of her self to another, who was Rightfully only His, and probably burthens Him with what ought natural∣ly to be anothers Charge. But to clear the Sence of the above Cited Places.

In the 19. of St. Mat. Ver. 3. we have the Pha∣risees coming to our Lord, and tempting him, by pro∣posing a Branch of Moses's Law, to try whether he would contradict it; and then they had sufficient rea∣son of Accusation against him they thought. They Asked him; Whether it were Lawful for a Man to put away his Wife for Every Cause, according to what is written in Deut. 24. 1. When a Man hath taken a Wife, and Marryed Her, and it come to pass, that she find no favour in his Eyes, because He hath found some Uncleanness in Her, then let him write her a Bill of Divorcement, and give it her in her Hand, and send her out of his House. The Law gave License to put away Wives for Every Cause, for every Dislike; for not finding Favour in their Husbands eyes, for no greater cause than not pleasing their Hu∣mour: What thinkest Thou, Is it Lawful or Agree∣able to the Rules of Equity and Reason, as well as to the strict Letter of the Law? And this Their Question he thus in effect Answers: That such Reasons as these, for which Moses allowed the Jewes to put away their Wives, were not Reasonable nor Equitable, but Extor∣ted from him by them, whose hardness of Heart would be content with nothing less; and therefore it was bet∣ter the Law should be Remitted, and so their hardness become more pardonable, as not being an Offence a∣gainst any Positive Law, but allowed of: But for the future, Divorce shall not be Lawful for any of those Petty Rea∣sons, but for no less than Adultery, which the Law judged

so Heinous, as to punish with Death it self; but, as all Rigors in the Gospel are Mitigated, so now Adultery shall be punishable only with Divorce; or else, because the Jews now cannot put any Man to Death, have lost Jus vitae & necis; they shall punish it by Divorce, which remains in their power. The whole Scope and Design of which Answer, I judge to be This; That the Jewish Rigor and Moroseness of Divorcing their Wives for every petty Dislike he did not only not approve, but hereafter would not have Adultery it self punisht so se∣verely as formerly, with Death, but only with Divorce; and that Divorce was punishment great enough for Adul∣tery; and that nothing less than Adultery does deserve to be, & must in the Gospel-state be punished with Divorce. And that this Answer does not suppose, but that Offences as great as Adultery, may deserve it as well as Adultery; nor deny, but some Offences may be as great as Adultery, I have this Reason to think; because, in the 6th. Verse, Christ sayes of Man and Wife, That they are no more Twain, but One Flesh, and that Man should not put asunder what God had joyned together; which being generally spoken of all Husbands and Wives; (for, All God hath Joyned together) one might conclude, that because All Husbands and Wives are joyned together by God, and no man must put asunder what God has joyned; therefore it is not Lawful to put them asunder for any Cause whatso∣ever, no not for Adultery, because God did once joyn them together; which being contradictory to the Per∣mission he gives afterwards, for the cause of Adultery, plainly shews, those words are not to be understood in a strict and literal Sence, which excludes even the cause of Adultery. And therefore it is reasonable to suspect, That its not being Lawful to Divorce but for the Cause of Adultery only, is not either strictly and literally to be under∣stood of Adultery, and only that; but that nothing less than Adultery is a sufficient cause, not denying, but something may be as great. I shall state a Case, which I will leave others to Judge, whether it be as Great or no.

Suppose two Persons of different Religions Married,

and one by the avowed necessary and immutable Principles of His or Her Religion, firmly Believes the other to be in a State of Heresy, Damnation, and Enmity to God and true Religion, and that Faith may lawfully be broke with that Person; that 'tis Lawful, Nay, highly Commendable to murther that Person, because His or Her Religion, by this Act, is according to all moral Certainty, sure to be Propagated; which to promote, as far as in this Person lies, is an indispensable Duty; and to compass, is to rescue Multitudes of Souls from Hell, and to cover and expi∣ate for all this Persons private Sins, and to secure to Him or Her self Heaven and Gods Favour, by so merito∣rious an Act: that there is no other probable way of ef∣fecting this great VVork but by this means; that to die in the Attempt, or failing of Success to be afterwards put to Death for it, is a most glorious Martyrdom. I should think a Person in the same Kingdom, City, House, but much more Bed, with such an one, to be very un-secure; and if the Person escapes, it can be At∣tributed to nothing but the others extreme Faint-Hearted∣ness, which one can scarce Imagine any guilty of, who is prepossest by such winning, prevailing, and strong Mo∣tives, as these I have been mentioning: And therefore, between a Sinful, Amorous and Adulterous Love of a Stranger, if it remain still within the Heart, and has not proceeded to Actual Commission; and such Prin∣ciples as believing it Lawful and Meritorious to Murther an Husband or wife, as to the Influence they have on Marriage in order to Dissolution, there is no other dif∣ference but this; That a Man must expect the Actual Commission of Adultery, the bare intention or desire of which is not sufficient Cause of Divorce; besides, that it proceeds not from a Vowed Principle, that 'tis Lawful and Commendable so to do, and therefore that intention may alter; but the imminent danger from those other Prin∣ciples as fixt and unalterable, will not admit of that De∣lay until the Fact be Committed. Separation therefore from such a Person, as to all Society and Converse, is im∣mediatly Necessary, and always, is Natural and agreeable to

Reason, forasmuch as 'tis for the preservation of Life; and a Separation warranted by Reason to be perpetual, can∣not suppose any mutual Obligation, Tye or Relation whatsoever in Reason to remain between them whom good and justifiable Reasons have perpetually Separated; and therefore being thus Separated, not accidentally, but by moral and reasonable Necessity, there shall not remain an Obligation to the Person so Necessitated to remain Bound to the other in the Tye of Marriage; the Duties of which 'tis impossible for one to Satisfy and Perform, because it is absolutely rendred useless by the other: and for disengage∣ment in such a Case as this, there is both Ground and Countenance in Scripture; we have these Words in the 15 Ver. of the 7 Chap. of the 1 Epistle to the Corinth. But if the Un-believing depart, let Him depart; a Brother or Sister is not under Bondage in such a Case: Whence I argue thus, if upon the voluntary Departure of a barely Un-believing Husband or Wife, either from other, neither is so tyed up, but that in such a case of Separation and Depar∣ture, a Christian is not in Bondage; that is, remains not Obliged under the Yoke of that Marriage which the other by final Departing, has Dissolved, but may Marry; Shall not then the Necessitated sending away or Dis∣mission of a Person for the Reasons I have mentioned (since 'tis the same thing, whether a Person depart volun∣tarily, or force himself to be sent away, because the person who caused the Separation must be judged to depart)? Shall not such a Necessity release a Brother or Sister, a Chri∣stian, from being bound, and leave Him or Her at their Liberty to Marry if they please? The only difficulty is, whether one Person believes the other to be throughly so Principled or Perswaded, as that Religion of which that Person is a Member, teaches, and as is necessary to justi∣fy the Divorce.

CHAP. III.

Whether the Case of Princes Marriages be the same with private Mens; And whether they are not sometimes Extraordinarily Indulged and Dispenced with by God?

IF the Case, I in the last Chapter put, were a Prin∣ces, no doubt but that would Aggravate it with Circumstances, as peculiar to Princes as is their Char∣racter and Authority; For a Prince being not only an Hus∣band but a Soveraign, such Principles would be more than doubly Pernicious, because they are directed against a Person, who is not only in a twofold Capacity, and there∣fore doubly Injured, but likewise, because imagining or believing the Destruction of a Prince to be Lawful, is it self an higher Crime than the same belief concerning a private man; because His Right in his Wife as His Subject is more immediate from God and Absolute, than as he is Her Husband; the Right of Dominion being greater than that of Propriety and Use. Besides, the endan∣gering such a Person is not Confined to His own Detri∣ment, but involves all his Subjects in it, as those whose Welfare depends on their Head and Protector; and either the utter Ruin, or extreme Danger of the whole Nation attends His Destruction, especially in the Case of being morally certain after His Death, to be both Spiritually and Temporally enthralled: And therefore, such a Case would so much the more warrant a Divorce, as the breach of a far greater Obligation is more notorious, and of more dangerous Consequence, and less capable of De∣lay, and a stronger and more necessitating Reason to put her away, supposing the Wife to be so Principled as to give just Occasion of such fear and necessity. 'Tis possible, I consess, that one Externally of such or such a Profession

may not be so in Heart, or may not be seasoned with those Doctrines which the Presidents of that Religion judg too apparently startling to Communicate to some of their Disciples: but nothing there is but may be sus∣spected and feared from some mens Importunity, Cunning, Boldness and Impudence. But I will not Insist upon this supposed Case any longer, which under all these Ag∣gravations must needs imply the Lawfulness of Divorce, which I think I can infer Allowable in a Case more mode∣rate, and of less evil Aspect. For I will imagine the Consort not so dangerously disposed and affected, nor to Design any such thing; but that the Prince having no Heir of his Body, to Succeed, to be In∣structed in such a Religion and Principles, as will in∣cline Him to procure the Peoples real good, and that such a destructive and dangerous Religion naturally falls in with him who is the presumtive Heir, as they call it, that is the next of Blood or Kin for want of a nigher; and that this Princess or Queen never had, nor, morally speak∣ing, ever can have, and bring forth an Heir to be so In∣structed and Succeed; and this Conjecture for the Future, grounded on the time past; because she had none then when it was more probable and natural, and without such an Heir so much danger and destruction imminent; the Case thus Stated, I say, prevention of Mischief, which could not give the People Authority to Depose a Prince, because though they may be Injured by Him, yet they never can have Authority to vindicate themselves against Him; will however give a Prince, who has a full Authority over all, Power and Warrant to Divorce a Wife, as be∣ing unavoidably and necessarily forced thereto, though not by Her self, or own Principles, yet so accidentally, as is inse∣parable from Her Marriage; and this necessity is unavoida∣ble, because 'tis absurd, that a Prince should suffer His People to incur such great danger and destruction know∣ingly, upon any pretence whatsoever, and therefore is not to be supposed: For the Christian Maxim of not doing Evil that Good may come of it, would be mis-appli'd here; for, a private Interest or good standing in Competition

with the publick, ceases to be a real Right if inconsistent with the publick, inasmuch as every Subject doth implicitly and tacitly relinquish His Right, Possession and Pretentions to every thing which cannot consist with the Common Good; and then to make void such a Right, is not to do Evil, and so the necessity remains unavoidable; but still with this Proviso and not else, That the Prince may pro∣ceed thus, if He believe the probability and certainty of such a destructive Religion's coming in, if He Die without other Heir than He has already; Or that, if it do come in, He believes it as Dangerous and Destructive as others do: else His Conscience is bound, and He Obliged to follow it. In the last place, to strengthen the belief of this Maxim, on which the stress of the Dispute depends, that what was once a Mans full and undoubted Right and Propriety, if it ever after prove utterly inconsistent with the publick Good, finally ceases to be His Right or Pro∣priety; and that to deprive him of the Possession of that thing, is not an Injury, nor doing Evil that Good may come of it, I will in short, endeavour to make out, by shewing, That God doth Himself Dispence in such Cases, with Princes forc't Actions. I might insist on a tacit Consent of every Subject to this purpose, because Government is not Fixed and setled without such a Consent, but shall rather conclude with the strongest Proof, the Authority of Scripture.

The Apostles had a Power given them by our Savi∣our, That what soever they did bind on Earth should be Bound in Heaven, and whatsoever they did loose on Earth should be loosed in Heaven; and whosoever Sins they did Remit they were Remitted, and whosoever Sins they did Retain, they were Retained. Which Apo∣stolical Power of Loosing and Binding, Remitting and Re∣taining, the Learned observe, and Expound to be the power of admitting into the Number and Fellowship of the Faithful, upon Repentance, and Exclusion or Banish∣ment from it for Sins Scandalous, and putting them into a state of unworthyness, to partake of the Christian Mysteries, and be reputed a Member of Christ; and this is called Ex∣communication; from which too, upon unfeigned Repen∣tance,

they had Authority to Release; now this Power is commonly called the Power of the Keyes, is an ordi∣nary jurisdiction derived from the Apostles to their Succes∣sors, who exercise such an Authority to this day. Now, This jurisdiction seems to derive from the abovementioned Texts, on which 'tis grounded, so universal an extent, as if no one whatsoever, not Princes themselves, were exempt from it, the words Whatsoever and Whomsoever being Univer∣sal; and in common Speech Excluding none, but com∣prehending all. And some men, namely the Romanists, who catched at the least outward appearance or countenance from Scripture for erecting the Popes Unlimited Power, sup∣pose these places of Scripture to confer on Church Go∣vernours a Jurisdiction, Authority, and Right of Govern∣ment over Princes Themselves, so as to Censure, and Actually Excommunicate them; because 'tis said, That Whatsoever they did bind on Earth, should be bound in Heaven: But neither in the Apostles practise nor examples of Antiquity can we find ever such an Authority to have been exercised over Princes, though no doubt, occasion might often e∣nough occur. And Conformably to this, the best Reformed Church, (I mean That of England) Teaches, That 'tis not Lawful to Excommunicate Princes; that is, denounce them to be No Members of Christ and his Church. For, al∣though this Power is for Edification, and not for Destruction; and no doubt every Christian Prince, like every other Pri∣vate Christian, is intrusted to the care of some Spiritual Pa∣stor or Pastors to Instruct him, and give Account for his Soul, if it be lost through their default; and therefore they might seem to have Power of using all means for His Salvation as they may for others, and this of Excom∣munication being such, they might therefore Excommunicate Him; (I mean not from the Visible Company of the Faithful, for that they cannot, but from Participation of the Mysteries and Ordinances of our Religion, and from being a Member of Christ's Invisible Church); But this neither they did nor we do, on this Supposition, and Maxim in Divinity, that Princes are, and ought to be Exempt from common and ordinary Rules, which others

are Subject to, if so be the Obliging a Prince to those Rules, would be occasion of Dammage and Danger to the Common-Wealth, as subjecting him to Church-Censures, tho never so deservedly, would necessarily be; for it would look as if he had a Superiour on Earth, though real∣ly it were only a Superiours Delegate; and subject Him to be despised and slighted by some, who would value themselves above him, as not so near to Gods Favour and Commnunion as themselves; it would occasion dis∣cord between the Prince and the Church, and hazard the taking away all just Authority, nay, the expulsion of Chri∣stianity it self: and therefore rather than endanger the publick Peace and Tranquillity, the Prince should be Ex∣empt from an Ordinance and Institution of Christ Himself, which in Reason doth touch Him as well as any else; Will it not then follow, that rather than manifestly ha∣zard the both Spiritual and Temporal good of His People, a Divorce, being the only remedy, may as well be war∣ranted; and He as well freed from the dangerous Tye of Marriage in such a Case, as from Excommunication it self? Nay, we find God himself Dispensing with an Eter∣nal and Natural Law for the sake of the Publick Spiritual Good. God Dispensed with the Natural Law of doing no Murther, and that within the near Relation of Fa∣ther and Son, and commanded Abraham to flay Isaac, that He might thus give a rare Example of his Faith for all the Church of God afterwards to imitate, both Jewes and Christians: and David in extremity of Hunger was In∣dulged, and that not immediatly by God, but by the prudential rational deduction of Ahimelech the Priest, that a Case of necessity did sufficiently Dispense, was Indulged, I say eating the Shew-bread against a positive Law, that none but the Priests alone should eat it, and yet did not do Evil, in eating the forbidden Bread, that Good might come of it, the preservation of his Life; and that was all the good it did, because his Life, at that time not being King, had no other Influence on the publick Good, than as afterwards he was to be King.

I Conclude therefore, that if not only the publick

good cannot be procured, but the greatest and highest Mis∣chiefs be prevented without the Divorce of a Person whose Marriage hinders the only remedy and prevention of those great Mischiefs, introduction of Idolatry, Supersti∣tion, and Defection from the true Religion; that a per∣petual Separation of that Person from the Prince is made necessary to the avoiding those Mischiefs, and because those Mischiefs must and ought to be, and may law∣fully, by this way of Separation be Avoided; (Christi∣anity it self, for the prevention of like Mischiefs dispen∣sing with Him in another as solemn an Ordinance of Reli∣gion,) this Separation so necessitated shall not leave any Tye or Obligation on the Prince which is inconsistent with perpetual necessary, not accidental Separation, and such a Tye is Marriage, but that the Prince is thus dis-ingaged sin∣gle and free to pursue the averting those dreadful, de∣structive, and otherwise certain Mischiefs which would Ensue to the ruine of the greatest Publick Good, both Spiritual and Temporal; the procurement of which cannot be prejudiced by any private Interest or Right, for that ceases to be so, when it stands in competition with the Publick; but dispenseth with the Annulling that Right and Propriety, by a prudential, rational, and true Inference from an unavoidable Necessity.

FINIS.