Two great questions determined by the principles of reason & divinity I. whether the right to succession in hæreditary kingdoms, be eternal and unalterable? Neg. : II. whether some certain politick reasons may not be sufficient grounds of divorce? Affirm.

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Title
Two great questions determined by the principles of reason & divinity I. whether the right to succession in hæreditary kingdoms, be eternal and unalterable? Neg. : II. whether some certain politick reasons may not be sufficient grounds of divorce? Affirm.
Author
Lawrence, William, 1613 or 14-1681 or 2.
Publication
London :: Printed for Richard Janeway ...,
1681.
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Subject terms
Divorce -- Early works to 1800.
Great Britain -- Kings and rulers -- Succession.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A70542.0001.001
Cite this Item
"Two great questions determined by the principles of reason & divinity I. whether the right to succession in hæreditary kingdoms, be eternal and unalterable? Neg. : II. whether some certain politick reasons may not be sufficient grounds of divorce? Affirm." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A70542.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 1, 2025.

Pages

CHAP. II. What is DIVORCE?

What are Sufficient Reasons of Divorce; and the Words of Our Saviour? St. Matth. 5. 31, 32. and Chap. 19. vers. 9. and else∣where, about Divorce, only for the cause of Adultery and Fornication, Considered and Explained.

MArriage, although so strait an Union as nothing more, yet admits of a Dissolution, commonly called Divorce; that is, a Separation of both Man and VVoman, so as to return into the very con∣dition of Liberty, and Singleness of Life, in which they

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were before their Marriage; but this, not lightly, but on great weighty and high Considerations: And this is by the By to be observed, that every Separation of Man and VVoman after Matrimony outwardly Solemnized be∣tween them is not properly Divorce; for Divorce is on∣ly a Separation of Persons, who according to the intent of outward Solemnization, were really and perfectly in a state of Marriage, and that, so as to return into a state of utter Disobligation or Non relation one to the other: but a Separation of Persons not perfectly Married, or of Per∣sons Married if not for ever, so as both shall remain dis∣engaged, is not properly Divorce. When therefore two Persons are Separated and Disjoyned, because the one is naturally Impotent; that is, in Body not Perfect Man or VVoman, (for by natural Impotency, Age, VVeakness, or Barreness is not to be understood; for they are to be born with; but an imperfect or monstrous Body.) Such Se∣paration I say, is not properly Divorce, because none are Divorced but Husband and Wife; and such were not they: For since none are Husband and Wife, but they who are perfectly Married; and the firm Contract of Marriage de∣pend not only on the Consent of the Parties, and Solemni∣zation, but on a supposition that they are what they are taken to be; that is, perfect Man or Woman; (for Mar∣riage supposes the joyning of such together) if either be naturally Impotent, that is, not perfectly Man or VVo∣man, the other is imposed on, and the Consent of that Person to have married a Man or Woman, shall not be adjudged Valid, so as to imply that Persons Consent to Oblige to Cohabitation, with one who is not Man or Wo∣man, whom alone that Person did Consent and intend to have in Marriage; and therefore, such are not joyned toge∣ther by God and Nature, since Nature Abhors such a Conjunction; but without more adoe, are Actually Sin∣gle.

Secondly, If for other Reasons, a Man and VVoman perfectly so, and Married, do Part; that parting is not a real Divorce, so as to be Disengaged from each other; for thus St. Paul, 1 Cor. 7. 10, 11. And unto the Marryed I

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Command; yet not I, but the Lord; Let not the Wife depart from Her Husband, but and if she Dapart, let her remain un∣married, or be reconciled to her Husband; and let not the Husband put away his Wife: In which place St. Paul first Exhorts, that there be no Separation between Man and Wife, that is, that they should not Disagree, so as to part from one another; but if such a Case ever hap∣pens; that their Separation for such a Reason, is not Di∣vorce, doth not dis-unite them, but that the VVoman continues the Mans VVife still, notwithstanding this Separation, and ought not to marry any one else, but that a Reconciliation should be Endeavoured, and both return to each other: but by the last words, Let not the Hus∣band put away his Wife, is not to be understood, as if a Man might by no means, for no Cause, Totally Divorce his VVife; for even our Saviour allows Adultery and For∣nication to be a sufficient Cause; Matth. 5. 32. and 19. 9. &c. In the first place in these VVords, I say unto you that whosoever shall put away his Wife, saving for the Cause of For∣nication, causeth Her to commit Adultery; and whosoever shall Mar∣ry her that is Divorced, committeth Adultery: In the last place thus, I say unto you, whosoever shall put away his Wife, except it be for Fornication, and shall Marry another, Committeth Adul∣tery; and wboso Marrieth her which is put away, doth Commit A∣dultery: which Exception of the Case of Adultery, plain∣ly Proves, that Divorce for some Cause is Lawful, name∣ly for that.

But because these Places are generally understood in that rigid Sence, which the VVords without due Atten∣tion, seem to bear, as if no other Cause whatsoever but Adultery and Fornication in the VVoman, is sufficient Cause of a Total Divorce, and so 'tis impossible that my Policick Reasons should be sufficient Cause; I shall clear the Sence and Meaning of the VVords, First, Observing, that e∣ven Adultery it self is partly a Politick Reason of Divorce; forasmuch as Marriage is Instituted for Propagation, and that is mischiev'd, and hindred by nothing more, than promiscuous Embraces; and thence Accrues great Dam∣mage to a Common-Wealth, and its politick Good. Besides, if

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the VVoman do sometimes prove with Child, it being possibly anothers, it shall however be obtruded on the Mothers Husband to Maintain: She then who is found Guilty of this high Crime, shall be Finally Dismist, as one who perverts and hinders the end of Marriage, and endamages the publick if she have not Children; and if she have, greatly injures her Husband, both by dispo∣sing of her self to another, who was Rightfully only His, and probably burthens Him with what ought natural∣ly to be anothers Charge. But to clear the Sence of the above Cited Places.

In the 19. of St. Mat. Ver. 3. we have the Pha∣risees coming to our Lord, and tempting him, by pro∣posing a Branch of Moses's Law, to try whether he would contradict it; and then they had sufficient rea∣son of Accusation against him they thought. They Asked him; Whether it were Lawful for a Man to put away his Wife for Every Cause, according to what is written in Deut. 24. 1. When a Man hath taken a Wife, and Marryed Her, and it come to pass, that she find no favour in his Eyes, because He hath found some Uncleanness in Her, then let him write her a Bill of Divorcement, and give it her in her Hand, and send her out of his House. The Law gave License to put away Wives for Every Cause, for every Dislike; for not finding Favour in their Husbands eyes, for no greater cause than not pleasing their Hu∣mour: What thinkest Thou, Is it Lawful or Agree∣able to the Rules of Equity and Reason, as well as to the strict Letter of the Law? And this Their Question he thus in effect Answers: That such Reasons as these, for which Moses allowed the Jewes to put away their Wives, were not Reasonable nor Equitable, but Extor∣ted from him by them, whose hardness of Heart would be content with nothing less; and therefore it was bet∣ter the Law should be Remitted, and so their hardness become more pardonable, as not being an Offence a∣gainst any Positive Law, but allowed of: But for the future, Divorce shall not be Lawful for any of those Petty Rea∣sons, but for no less than Adultery, which the Law judged

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so Heinous, as to punish with Death it self; but, as all Rigors in the Gospel are Mitigated, so now Adultery shall be punishable only with Divorce; or else, because the Jews now cannot put any Man to Death, have lost Jus vitae & necis; they shall punish it by Divorce, which remains in their power. The whole Scope and Design of which Answer, I judge to be This; That the Jewish Rigor and Moroseness of Divorcing their Wives for every petty Dislike he did not only not approve, but hereafter would not have Adultery it self punisht so se∣verely as formerly, with Death, but only with Divorce; and that Divorce was punishment great enough for Adul∣tery; and that nothing less than Adultery does deserve to be, & must in the Gospel-state be punished with Divorce. And that this Answer does not suppose, but that Offences as great as Adultery, may deserve it as well as Adultery; nor deny, but some Offences may be as great as Adultery, I have this Reason to think; because, in the 6th. Verse, Christ sayes of Man and Wife, That they are no more Twain, but One Flesh, and that Man should not put asunder what God had joyned together; which being generally spoken of all Husbands and Wives; (for, All God hath Joyned together) one might conclude, that because All Husbands and Wives are joyned together by God, and no man must put asunder what God has joyned; therefore it is not Lawful to put them asunder for any Cause whatso∣ever, no not for Adultery, because God did once joyn them together; which being contradictory to the Per∣mission he gives afterwards, for the cause of Adultery, plainly shews, those words are not to be understood in a strict and literal Sence, which excludes even the cause of Adultery. And therefore it is reasonable to suspect, That its not being Lawful to Divorce but for the Cause of Adultery only, is not either strictly and literally to be under∣stood of Adultery, and only that; but that nothing less than Adultery is a sufficient cause, not denying, but something may be as great. I shall state a Case, which I will leave others to Judge, whether it be as Great or no.

Suppose two Persons of different Religions Married,

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and one by the avowed necessary and immutable Principles of His or Her Religion, firmly Believes the other to be in a State of Heresy, Damnation, and Enmity to God and true Religion, and that Faith may lawfully be broke with that Person; that 'tis Lawful, Nay, highly Commendable to murther that Person, because His or Her Religion, by this Act, is according to all moral Certainty, sure to be Propagated; which to promote, as far as in this Person lies, is an indispensable Duty; and to compass, is to rescue Multitudes of Souls from Hell, and to cover and expi∣ate for all this Persons private Sins, and to secure to Him or Her self Heaven and Gods Favour, by so merito∣rious an Act: that there is no other probable way of ef∣fecting this great VVork but by this means; that to die in the Attempt, or failing of Success to be afterwards put to Death for it, is a most glorious Martyrdom. I should think a Person in the same Kingdom, City, House, but much more Bed, with such an one, to be very un-secure; and if the Person escapes, it can be At∣tributed to nothing but the others extreme Faint-Hearted∣ness, which one can scarce Imagine any guilty of, who is prepossest by such winning, prevailing, and strong Mo∣tives, as these I have been mentioning: And therefore, between a Sinful, Amorous and Adulterous Love of a Stranger, if it remain still within the Heart, and has not proceeded to Actual Commission; and such Prin∣ciples as believing it Lawful and Meritorious to Murther an Husband or wife, as to the Influence they have on Marriage in order to Dissolution, there is no other dif∣ference but this; That a Man must expect the Actual Commission of Adultery, the bare intention or desire of which is not sufficient Cause of Divorce; besides, that it proceeds not from a Vowed Principle, that 'tis Lawful and Commendable so to do, and therefore that intention may alter; but the imminent danger from those other Prin∣ciples as fixt and unalterable, will not admit of that De∣lay until the Fact be Committed. Separation therefore from such a Person, as to all Society and Converse, is im∣mediatly Necessary, and always, is Natural and agreeable to

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Reason, forasmuch as 'tis for the preservation of Life; and a Separation warranted by Reason to be perpetual, can∣not suppose any mutual Obligation, Tye or Relation whatsoever in Reason to remain between them whom good and justifiable Reasons have perpetually Separated; and therefore being thus Separated, not accidentally, but by moral and reasonable Necessity, there shall not remain an Obligation to the Person so Necessitated to remain Bound to the other in the Tye of Marriage; the Duties of which 'tis impossible for one to Satisfy and Perform, because it is absolutely rendred useless by the other: and for disengage∣ment in such a Case as this, there is both Ground and Countenance in Scripture; we have these Words in the 15 Ver. of the 7 Chap. of the 1 Epistle to the Corinth. But if the Un-believing depart, let Him depart; a Brother or Sister is not under Bondage in such a Case: Whence I argue thus, if upon the voluntary Departure of a barely Un-believing Husband or Wife, either from other, neither is so tyed up, but that in such a case of Separation and Depar∣ture, a Christian is not in Bondage; that is, remains not Obliged under the Yoke of that Marriage which the other by final Departing, has Dissolved, but may Marry; Shall not then the Necessitated sending away or Dis∣mission of a Person for the Reasons I have mentioned (since 'tis the same thing, whether a Person depart volun∣tarily, or force himself to be sent away, because the person who caused the Separation must be judged to depart)? Shall not such a Necessity release a Brother or Sister, a Chri∣stian, from being bound, and leave Him or Her at their Liberty to Marry if they please? The only difficulty is, whether one Person believes the other to be throughly so Principled or Perswaded, as that Religion of which that Person is a Member, teaches, and as is necessary to justi∣fy the Divorce.

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