Two choice and useful treatises the one, Lux orientalis, or, An enquiry into the opinion of the Eastern sages concerning the praeexistence of souls, being a key to unlock the grand mysteries of providence in relation to mans sin and misery : the other, A discourse of truth / by the late Reverend Dr. Rust ... ; with annotations on them both.

CHAP. X. (Book 10)

A third Argument for Praeexistence, from the great variety of mens spe∣culative inclinations; and also the diversity of our Genius's, copiously urged. If these Arguments make Praeexistence but probable, 'tis enough to gain it the Victory.

BUt now I proceed to another Argument. Therefore, Thirdly, If we do but re∣••••ect upon what was said above, against the Souls daily Creation, from that enormous pra∣vity which is so deeply rooted in some mens natures, we may thence have a considerable evidence of Praeexistence. For as this strong natural propensity to vice and impiety cannot possibly consist with the Hypothesis of the souls coming just out of Gods hands pure and

immaculate; so doth it most aptly suit with the doctrine of its praeexistence: which gives a most clear and apposite account of the phae∣nomenon. For let us but conceive the Souls of men to have grown degenerate in a former condition of life, * to have contracted strong and inveterate habits to vice and lewdness, and that in various manners and degrees; we may then easily apprehend, when some mens natures had so incredibly a depraved tincture, and such impetuous, ungovernable, irreclaimable inclinations to what is vitious; while others have nothing near such wret∣ched propensions, but by good education and good discipline are mouldable to vertue; This shews a clear way to unriddle this amazing mystery, without blemishing any of the di∣vine Attributes, or doing the least violence to our faculties.

Nor is it more difficult to conceive, how a soul should awaken out of the state of in∣activity we speak of, with those radical incli∣nations that by long practice it had contracted, * than how a Swallow should return to her old trade of living after her winter sleep and silence; for those customs it hath been ad∣dicted to in the other state, are now so deep∣ly fastened and rooted in the soul, that they are become even another nature.

Now then, if Praeexistence be not the truth, 'tis very strange that it should so ex∣actly

answer the Phaenomena of our natures, when as no other Hypothesis doth any whit tolerably suit them. And if we may con∣clude that false, which is so correspondent to all appearances, when we know nothing else that can yield any probable account of them, and which is not in the least repugnant to any inducement of belief, we then strange∣ly forget our selves when we determine any thing. We can never for instance, conclude the Moon to be the cause of the flux and re∣flux of the Sea, from the answering of her approaches and recesses to its ebbs and swellings. Nor at this rate can the cause of any thing else be determined in nature.

But yet besides, (2) we might another way inforce this Argument, from the strange difference and diversity that there is in mens wits and intellectual craseis, as well as in the dispositions of their wills and appetites. E∣ven the natural tempers of mens minds are as vastly different, as the qualities of their bodies. And 'tis easie to observe in things purely spe∣culative and intellectual, even where neither education or custom have interposed to sophi∣sticate the natural 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that some men are strangely propense to some opinions, which they greedily drink in, as soon as they are duly represented; yea, and find themselves bur∣thened and opprest, while their education hath kept them in a contrary belief, * when

as others are as fatally set against these opi∣nions, and can never be brought favourably to resent them.

Every Soul brings a kind of sense with it into the world, whereby it tastes and relish∣eth what is suitable to its peculiar temper. And notions will never lie easily in a mind, that they are not fitted to; some can ne∣ver apprehend that for other than an Absur∣dity, which others are so clear in, that they almost take it for a First Principle. And yet the former hath all the same evidence as the latter. This I have remarkably taken no∣tice of, in the opinion of the extension of a spirit. Some that I know, and those inqui∣sitive, free, and ingenuous, by all the proof and evidence that is, cannot be reconciled to it. Nor can they conceive any thing ex∣tended, but as a Body. Whereas other deep and impartial searchers into nature, cannot apprehend it any thing at all, if not extend∣ed; but think it must then be a mathematical point, or a meer non-entity.

I could instance in other speculations, which I have observ'd some to be passionate Embracers of upon the first proposal; when as no arguments could prevail on others, to think them tolerable. But there needs no proof of a manifest observation.

Therefore before I go further, I would demand, whence comes this meer notional or

speculative variety? * Were his difference a∣bout sensibles, yea, or about things depen∣ding on the imagination, the influence of the body might then be suspected for a cause. But since it is in the most abstracted Theories that have nothing to do with the grosser phantasmes; since this diversity is found in minds that have the greatest care to free themselves from the deceptions of sense, and intanglements of the body, what can we con∣clude, but that the soul it self is the immediate subject of all this variety, and that it came prae∣judiced and praepossessed into this body with some implicit notions that it had learnt in a∣nother? And if this congruity to some opi∣nions, and averseness to others be congenial to us, and not advenient from any thing in this state, 'tis methinks clear that we were in a former. * For the Soul in its first and pure nature hath no idiosyncrasies, that is, hath no proper natural inclinations which are not competent to others of the same kind and condition. Be sure, they are not fatally de∣termin'd by their natures to false and errone∣ous apprehensions. And therefore since we find this determination to one or other fals∣hood in many, if not most in this state, and since 'tis very unlikely 'tis derived only from the body, custom, or education, what can we conceive on't, but that our Souls were tain∣ted with these peculiar and wrong corrupti∣ons

before we were extant upon this stage of Earth?

Besides, 'tis easie to observe the strange and wonderful variety of our genius's; one mans nature inclining him to one kind of study and imployment, anothers to what is very different. Some almost from their ve∣ry cradles will be addicted to the making of figures, and in little mechanical contrivan∣ces; others love to be riming almost as soon as they can speak plainly, and are taken up in small essays of Poetry. Some will be scraw∣ling Pictures, and others take as great de∣light in some pretty offers at Musick and vo∣cal harmony. Infinite almost are the ways in which this pure natural diversity doth discover it self. * Now to say that all this variety proceeds primarily from the meer temper of our bodies, is me thinks a very poor and un∣satisfying Account. * For those that are the most like in the Temper, Air, Complexion of their bodies, are yet of a vastly differing Ge∣nius. Yea, they that have been made of the same clay, cast in the same mould, and have layn at once in the same natural bed, the womb; yea whose bodies have been as like as their state and fortunes, and their education and usages the same, yet even they do not unfrequently differ as much from each other in their genius and dispositions of the mind, as those that in all these par∣ticulars

are of very different condition. Besides, there are all kind of makes, forms, dispositions, tempers, and complexions of body, that are addicted by their natures to the same exercises and imployments: so that to ascribe this to any peculiarity in the body, is me seems a very improbable solution of the Phaenome∣non. And to say all these inclinations are from custom or education, is the way not to be believed, since all experience testifies the contrary.

What then can we conjecture is the cause of all this diversity, but that we had taken a great delight and pleasure in some things like and analogous unto these, in a former conditi∣on, which now again begins to put forth it self, when we are awakened out of our silent recess into a state of action? And though the imployments, pleasures and exercises of our former life, were without question very dif∣ferent from these in the present estate; yet 'tis no doubt, but that some of them were more confamiliar and analogous to some of our transactions, than others: so that as any ex∣ercise or imployment here is more suitable to the particular dispositions that were praedo∣minant in the other state, with the more pe∣culiar kindness is it regarded by us, and the more greedily do our inclinations now fasten on it. Thus if a Musician should be inter∣dicted the use of all musical instruments, and

yet might have his choice of any other Art or Profession, 'tis likely he would betake himself to Limning or Poetry; these exer∣cises requiring the same disposition of wil and genius, as his beloved Musick did. And we in like manner, being by the ••ate of our wretched descent hindred from the direct exercising our selves about the objects of our former delights and pleasures, do yet as soon as we are able, take to those things which do most correspond to that genius that formerly inspired us.

And now 'tis time to take leave of the Ar∣guments from Reason that give evidence for Praeexistence. If any one think that they are not so demonstrative, but that they may be answered, or at least evaded; I pray him to consider how many demonstrations he ever met with, that a good wit, resolv'd in a contrary cause, could not shu••••le from the edge of. Or, let it be granted, that the Ar∣guments I have alledged are no infallible or necessary proofs; yet if they render my cause but probable, yea but possible, I have won what I contended for. For it having been made manifest by as good evidence as I think can be brought for any thing, that the way of new creations is most inconsistent with the honor of the blessed Attributes of God: And that the other of Traduction is most impossible and contradictio••s in the nature of things:

* There being now no other way left but Prae-existence, if that be probable or but barely pos∣sible, 'tis enough to give it the victory. And whether all that hath been said prove so much or no, I leave to the indifferent to de∣termine. I think he that will say it doth not, can bring few proofs for any thing, which according to his way of judging will de∣serve to be called Demonstrations.