Two choice and useful treatises the one, Lux orientalis, or, An enquiry into the opinion of the Eastern sages concerning the praeexistence of souls, being a key to unlock the grand mysteries of providence in relation to mans sin and misery : the other, A discourse of truth / by the late Reverend Dr. Rust ... ; with annotations on them both.

CHAP. IX. (Book 9)

A (4th.) Objection against the Ar∣gument from God's goodness, viz. That it will conclude as well that the World is infinite and eternal, Answered. The conclusion of the second Argument for Praeexi∣stence.

THerefore fourthly, it will be excepted, If we may argue from the divine good∣ness, which always doth what is best, for the Praeexistence of Souls; then we may as reaso∣nably thence conclude, that the world is both infinite and eternal, since an infinite communi∣cation of goodness is better than a finite. To this, because I doubt I have distrest the Rea∣ders patience already, I answer briefly.

(1) Every one that believes the infinite∣ness of Gods goodness is as much obliged to answer this objection, as I am. For it will be said, infinite goodness doth good infinitely, and consequently the effects to which it doth communicate are infinite. For if they are not so, it might have communicated to more, and thereby have done more good, than now

'tis supposed to do, and by consequence now is not infinite. And to affirm that goodness is infinite, where what it doth and intends to do is but finite, will be said to be a contradiction, since goodness is a relative term, and in God always respects somewhat ad ex∣tra. For he cannot be said to be good to himself, he being a nature that can receive no additional perfection. Wherefore this Ob∣jection makes no more against mine Argument, than it doth against the Infinity of the Divine Goodness, and therefore I am no more con∣cern'd in i•• than others. Yea (2ly.) the Scripture affirms that which is the very strength of mine Argument, viz. That God made all things best; Very Good, saith our Translation: but the Original, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is a particle of the Superlative. And therefore every one that owns its sacred Au∣thority is interested against this Objection. For it urgeth, it had been far more splendid, glo∣rious, and magnificent for God to have made the universe commensurate to his own immen∣sity; and to have produced effects of his power and greatness, where ever he himself is, viz. in infinite space and duration, than to have confined his omnipotence to work only in one little spot of an infinite inane capacity, and to begin to act but t••other day. Thus then the late creation, and finiteness, of the World, seem to conflict with the undoubted oracle of

truth as well as with mine Argument, and there∣fore the Objection drawn thence is of no va∣lidity. (3) Those that have most strenu∣ously defended the orthodox doctrine a∣gainst the old opinion of the eternity and infi∣nity of the world, * have asserted it to be impossible in the nature of the thing. And sure the divine benignity obligeth him not to do contradictions; or such things, as in the very notion of them, are impossible. But in the case of Praeexistence, no such thing can be reasonably pretended, as above hath been declared; and therefore there is no escaping by this Evasion neither. Nor can there any thing else be urged to this purpose, but what whoever believes the infinity of the divine bounty will be concern'd to answer; And therefore 'twill make no more against me, than against a truth on all hands confessed. Let me only add this, That 'tis more be∣coming us, to inlarge our apprehensions of things so, as that they may suit the Divine Bene∣ficence, than to draw it down to a complyance with our little schemes, and narrow models.

Thus then I have done with the Argument for Praeexistence drawn from the Divine Goodness. And I have been the longer on it, because I thought 'twas in vain to propose it, without taking to task the principal of those objections, that must needs arise in the minds of those that are not used to this way of arguing.

And while there was no provision made to stop up those Evasions, that I saw this Argu∣ment obnoxious to; the using of it, I was afraid, would have been a prejudice, rather than a furtherance of the cause I ingaged it in. And therefore I hope the ingenious will par∣don this so necessary piece of tediousness.