Two choice and useful treatises the one, Lux orientalis, or, An enquiry into the opinion of the Eastern sages concerning the praeexistence of souls, being a key to unlock the grand mysteries of providence in relation to mans sin and misery : the other, A discourse of truth / by the late Reverend Dr. Rust ... ; with annotations on them both.

CHAP. VIII. (Book 8)

A second general Evasion, viz. that our Reasons cannot tell what God should do, or what is best, overthrown by several considerations. As is also a third, viz. that by the same Argu∣ment God would have been obliged to have made us impeccable, and not liable to Misery.

WHerefore the second general evasion is, That our Reasons cannot con∣clude what God should do, there being vast fetches in the divine wisdom which we com∣prehend not, nor can our natural light de∣termine what is best. I answer (1) Our Saviour himself, who was the best Judge in the case, teacheth us, that the Reason of a man may in some things conclude what God will do, in that saying of his, If ye be∣ing evil, know how to give good things to your Children, much more shall your Father which is in Heaven give his Spirit to them that ask him: Plainly intimating, that we may se∣curely

argue from any thing that is a per∣fection in our selves, to the same in God. And if we, who are imperfectly good, will yet do as much good as we can, for those we love and tender; with greater confidence may we conclude, that God, who is infinite∣ly so, will confer upon his creatures whatever good they are capable of. Thus we see our Saviour owns the capacity of reason in a case that is very near the same that we are dealing in.

And God himself appeals to the reasons of men to judge of the righteousness and equity of his ways. Ye men of Israel and inhabi∣tants of Jerusalem, judge between me and my vineyard; which place I bring to shew that meer natural reason is able to judge in some cases what is fit for God to do, and what is su∣table to his essence and perfections. And if in any,

Methinks (2) its capacity in the case be∣fore us should be own'd as soon as in any. For if reason cannot determine and assure us, that a blessed and happy Being is better than None at all; and consequently, that it was best for our souls to have been, before they were in this state of wretchedness; and thence conclude, that it was very congruous to the divine goodness to have made us in a former and better condition; I think then (1) That it cannot give us the assurance of any thing,

since there is not any principle in Metaphy∣••icks or Geometry more clear than this, viz. That an happy Being, is better than absolute Not∣••eing. And if our reasons can securely determine this, 'tis as much as we need at present. Or ••f this be not certain, how vain are those Learned men that dispute whether a state of the extremest misery a creature is capable ••of, and that everlasting, be not better than Non∣••entity?▪ (2) If we cannot certainly know that it had been Better that we should have existed in a life of happiness, proportion'd to our natures of old, than have been meer nothing, till some few years since; we can never then own and acknowledg the divine goodness to us in any thing we enjoy. For if it might have been as good for us not to Be, as to Be, and happily; Then it might have been as good for us to have wanted any thing else that we enjoy, as to have it; and conse∣quently, we cannot own it as an effect of God's goodness that he hath bestowed any blessing on us. For if Being be not better than Not-being, then 'tis no effect of goodness that we are; and if so, then 'tis not from goodness that we have any thing else, * since all other things are inferiour to the good of Being. If it be said, It had been better indeed for us, to have lived in a former and happier state; but it may be, it had not been so for the universe; and the general good is to be pre∣ferr'd

before that of particulars;

I say then, and it may serve for a (3) an∣swer to the general objection: If we may de∣ny that to be done by almighty goodness, which is undoubtedly best for a whole species of his creatures, meerly on this account, that, for ought we know, it may be for the advan∣tage of some others, though there be not the least appearance of any such matter; we can never then argue any thing from the di∣vine goodness. It can never then be prov'd from that glorious Attribute, that he hath not made some of his creatures on purpose that they might be miserable; nor can it be con∣cluded thence, that he will not annihilate all the pure and spotless Angels; both which I suppose, any sober inquirer will think con∣gruously deducible from the divine goodness. And if to say, for ought we know, It may be best for some other creatures, that those should be miserable, and these annihilated, be e∣nough to disable the Argument; on the same account we shall never be able to prove ought from this, or any other Attribute. I might add,

(2) There is not the least colourable pre∣tence for any such suspicion. For, would the world have been too little to have con∣tain'd those souls, without justling with some others? or, would they by violence have taken any of the priviledges of the other

intellectual Creatures from them? If so, how comes it about that at last they can all so well consist together? And, could o∣ther Creatures have been more disadvan∣tag'd by them, when they were pure and in∣nocent, than they will at last, when they are so many of them debauched and depra∣ved?

(3) If this be enough to answer an Argu∣ment, to say, for ought we know, it may be thus and thus, when there is not the least sign or appearance of any such thing, then nothing can ever be proved, and we are con∣demned to everlasting Scepticism. We should never, for instance, from the order, beauty, and wise contrivance of the things that do appear, prove there is a God, if it were sufficient to answer, That things are indeed so made in this earth, on which we are extant; but, it may be, they are framed very odly, ridi∣culously, and ineptly in some other worlds, which we know nothing of. If this be an∣swering, any thing might be answered. But there is yet another objection against mine Argument from the Divine Goodness, which looks very formidably at a distance, though when we come near it, we shall find, it will not bear the tryal. And it may thus be urged.

(3) If the Goodness of God always obli∣geth him to do what is best, and best for

his Creatures, How is it then, that we were not made impeccable, and so not obnoxious to misery? Or how doth it consist with that overflowing Goodness of the Deity, that we were let to lie in a long state of silence and insensibility, before we came into these bo∣dies? This seems a pressing difficulty, but yet there's hopes we may dispatch it. There∣fore,

(1) Had we been made impeccable, we should have been another kind of Creatures than now; since we had then wanted the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or liberty of will to good and evil, which is one of our essential Attributes. Con∣sequently, there would have been one spe∣cies of beings wanting to compleat the uni∣verse; and it would have been a slurre to the divine Goodness not to have given be∣ing to such Creatures as in the Idea were fairly possible, and contradicted no other Attribute. Yea, though he foresaw that some would sin and make themselves mise∣rable, yet the foreseen lapse and misery of those, was not an evil great enough to o∣ver-ballance the good the species would reap by being partakers of the divine Goodness in the land of the Living; Therefore how∣ever 'twas goodness to give such Creatures being. But it will be urged upon us, If Liberty to good and ••vil be so essential to our natures, what think we then of the

••lessed souls after the Resurrection; are not they the same Creatures, though without the liberty of sinning? To return to this; I think those that affirm, that the blessed have not this natural liberty, as long as they are uni∣ted to a body, and are capable of resenting it's pleasures, should do well to prove it. * In∣de••d they may be morally immutable and il∣lapsible: but this is grace, not nature; a re∣ward of obedience, not a necessary annex of our Beings. But will it be said, why did not the divine Goodness endue us all with this moral ••ability? Had it not been better for us to have been made in this condition of se∣curity, than in a state so dangerous? My re∣turn to this doubt will be a second An∣swer to the main Objection.

Therefore Secondly, * I doubt not, but that 'tis much better for rational Creatures, that this supream happiness should be the Reward of vertue, rather than entail'd upon our natures. For the procurement of that which we might have mist of, is far more sensibly gratifying, than any necessary and unac∣quired injoyment; we find a greater plea∣sure in what we gain by industry, art, or ver∣tue, than in the things we were born to. And had we been made secure from sin and misery from the first moment of our Being, we should not have put so high a rate and value upon that priviledge.

(3) Had we been at first establisht in an imp••ssibility of lapsing into evil; Then many choice vertues, excellent branches of the di∣vine Life had never been exercis'd, or in∣deed have been at all. Such are Patience, Faith, and Hope; the objects of which are, evil, futurity, and uncertainty. Yea,

(4) Had we been so sixt in an inamissible happiness from the beginning, there had then been no vertue in the world; nor any of that matchless pleasure which attends the ex∣ercise thereof. For vertue is a kind of victo∣ry, and supposeth a conflict. Therefore we say, that God is good and holy, but not ver∣tuous. Take away a possibility of evil, and in the Creature there is no moral goodness. And then no Reward, no Pleasure, no Hap∣piness.

Therefore in sum (5ly), The divine Good∣ness is manifested in making all Creatures sutably to those Idea's of their natures, which he hath in his All-comprehensive Wisdom. And their good and happiness consists in acting ac∣cording to those natures, and in being fur∣nisht with all things necessary for such acti∣ons. Now the divine Wisdom is no arbitrary thing, that can change, or alter those setled immutable Idea's of things that are there re∣presented. It lopps not off essential Attri∣butes of some Beings, to in••culate them up∣on others: But distinctly comprehending

all things, assigns each Being its proper na∣ture, and qualities. And the Divine goodness, according to the wise direction of the eternal Intellect, in like distinct and orderly manner produceth all things: viz. according to all the variety of their respective Idea's in the divine wisdom. * Wherefore as the goodness of God obligeth him not to make every Planet a fixt Star, or every Star a Sun; So neither doth it oblige him to make every de∣gree of Life, a rational Soul, or every Soul, an impeccable Angel. * For this were to tye him to contradictions. Since therefore, such an order of Beings, as rational and hap∣py, though free, and therefore mutable crea∣tures, were distinctly comprehended in the Divine Wisdom; It was an effect of God's Goodness, to bring them into being, even in such a condition, and in such manner, as in their eternal Idea's they were represented.

Thus then we see, it is not contrary to the infinite plenitude of the Divine Goodness * that we should have been made peccable and lyable to defection. And being thus in our very essential constitutions lapsible; 'twas no defect in the goodness of our Maker that he did not interpose by his absolute omnipotence to prevent our actual praevarication and aposta∣sie. Since his goodness obligeth him not to secure us upon any terms whatever, but up∣on such, as may most promote the general

good and advantage. And questionless, 'twas much better that such, as would wilful∣ly depart from the laws of their blessed na∣tures, and break through all restraints of the divine commands, should feel the smart of their disobedience; than that providence should disorder the constitution of nature to prevent the punishment, which they drew up∣on themselves: Since those apostate spirits re∣main instances to those that stand, of the divine justice, and severity against sinners, and so may contribute not a little to their security. And for that long night of silence, in which multi∣tudes ofsouls are buried before they descend into terrestrial matter, it is but the due reward of their former disobedience; for which, con∣sidering the happy circumstances in which they were made, they deserv'd to be nothing for ever. And their re-instating in a condition of life and self-injoyment after so highly cul∣pable delinquencies, is a great instance of the over-flowing fulness of the divine compassion and benignity.

Thus then we see, That Gods making us lapsible and permitting us to fall, is no pre∣judice in the least to the infinite fecundity of his goodness, and his making all things best. So that mine Argument for Praeexistence bot∣tom'd on this Foundation, stands yet firm and immoveable, notwithstanding the rude assault of this objection. From which I pass to a fourth.