An account of Mr. Ferguson, his common-place-book in two letters.

Mr. SHERLOCK HIS ANSWER TO Mr. GLANVILL HIS LETTER.

SIR,

I Have received your Letter, and thank you very heartily for it. I was much puzzled before to give an account of the inequality of M. Ferguson's Style and Reasoning: for his Words are sometimes proper and ele∣gant, his Arguments strong and weighty, at other times his Phrase is barbarous and pedantick, and his Reasonings childish: and I always observed that he writ best upon some trite and beaten Argument, where he had no Adversary; but take him out of the road of Common Places and Phrase-Books, and he could neither write consistently with himself, nor any thing to the purpose. This gave me a great suspicion of the man, that he was a mere Collector, and that his Book was made just as the

Epicuraeans fansie the World was, by the accidental Concourse of Atoms, and may serve for a Confutation of that wild Hypothesis; it being a plain Demonstration, how impossible it is to make a good Book out of the best Common-Places and Collections, unless a wise man have the composing of it.

Upon the receipt of your Letter, which made so pleasant a discovery of the man, I had the Curiosity to enquire a little fur∣ther, and in requital of your kindness, I have here sent you some of his gleanings from other Authors, though so changed and transformed, and found in such ill Company, that I fear those worthy persons will be ashamed to own them.

And because M. Ferg. with the usual confidence of a bold Scot, pretends a very particular Friendship with that excellent Person, Sir Charles Wolseley, I shall first take notice how bold he has made with him; which I suppose he did upon the Authority of that old Saying, All things are common among Friends; and therefore he might challenge as good a right to Sir Charles his Writings, as himself.

M. Ferg. among other things shews the Use and Serviceableness of Reason in proving the Divinity of the Scripture, p. 56, &c. Sir Charles had done this before him, and had managed that Argument like a Scholar and a Gentleman, in his Book entituled, The Reasonableness of Scripture-Belief; from whence our Author has borrowed most of his best Arguments, and many times his Words and Phrases.

M. Ferguson premises, that the Testimony of the Holy Ghost in the Souls and Con∣sciences of men is the most con∣vincing evidence, that such men can have of its (the Scri∣ptures) Divinity, but yet re∣jects it from being a proof

of the Scriptures Divinity to others. Interest of Reason, p. 57

Sir Charles likewise tells us, the Testimony of the Ho∣ly Ghost in the minds and con∣sciences of men to the truth of the Scriptures (though it be the most convincing evidence that can be given to them, &c.) 'tis not to be urged in proof

of the Scriptures against its professed Adversaries. Scri∣pture belief, p. 79

Sir Charles assigns two reasons for this; Mr. Ferguson has divided the second Reason into two, and set the first Reason in the third place.

M. F.

1. The Holy Ghost con∣vinceth no man as to the be∣lief of the Scripture, without enlightning his mind in the grounds and reasons upon which its proceeding from God is evidenced and establi∣shed. There is no conviction begot by the Holy Ghost in the hearts of men, otherwise than by rational evidence, satisfy∣ing our understanding, through discovering the motives and inducements that ascertain the truth of what he would convince us of, Ibid. p. 57

Sir Ch. Wols.

Second Argument the lat∣ter part▪

The Illuminations of the Holy Ghost in the minds of men are no other way to be conceived of, than that he is pleased to propose the right grounds and reasons upon which things are to be belie∣ved, and to convince and sa∣tisfie the understanding, that they are so, and to bring men to acquiesce in conclusions by ascertaining them of the truth of the premises.

M. F.

2. No mans particular assurance obtained thus in way of Illumination by the Holy Ghost, is otherwise ur∣ged as an argument of convi∣ction to another, than by proposing the reasons, which our Faith is erected on. The

way of such mens evidence is communicable to none, unless they could kindle the same rays in the breasts of others, which have irradiated their own, and therefore they must deal with others by produ∣cing the grounds of their con∣viction, not pleading the man∣ner of it, Ibid.

Sir Ch. Wols.

The beginning of the se∣cond Argument.

Whatever evidence the Holy Ghost gives to any man to as∣sure him of the truth of any proposition, that evidence, as such, can never go beyond his own breast, nor can I ever

prove any thing by it, as it is a Divine and infallible Evi∣dence, because such evidence is no way communicable to another but in an ordinary way: Nothing is visible to an∣other in such cases, but the reasons I can produce, the Di∣vine Illumination I have within my self to convince me, that such Reasons are co∣gent and prevailing can never be so demonstrated, as to con∣vince another that has no such Illumination, Ibid. p. 81

I am now Sir perfectly satisfied of what great use that trick is of varying phrases, which we learned at School; for this has made Mr. Ferguson a famous Author, who by the little arts of transpla∣cing words, of turning Nouns into Verbs, or Verbs into Participles, or converting a single word, such as Illumination, into the phrase of kindling Rayes, can make other mens Writings his own. But to proceed,

M. F.

3. The Holy Ghost, as a distinct person in the Deity is not a Principle demonstrable by reason, &c. to prove the Divine Authority of the Scri∣pture by the Testimony of the Holy Ghost, when we cannot otherwise prove a Holy Ghost, but by the Testimony of the

Scripture, is to argue circular∣ly and absurdly, Ibid.

Sir Ch. Wols.

1 Argument, Because the Blessed Spirit it self is not a common demonstrable prin∣ciple amongst mankind, &c. to go about to prove the Scriptures by any evidence a∣rising from the Holy Ghost must needs be visibly absurd, because there is no other

way to prove that there is any such being as the Holy Ghost, but by the Scriptures themselves, Ibid.

Master Ferguson having premised this, proceeds to prove the Di∣vine Authority of the Scriptures; and

First, To justifie the neces∣sity of some supernatural Re∣velation in order to the con∣ducting us in Religion, Ibid. p. 62

Sir Ch. Wols.

First, I will endeavour to render it a thing reasonable to be believed that there should be some supernatural law re∣vealed from God, and given to mankind, &c. Ibid. p. 86

M. F.

His first argument is taken from the imperfection of na∣tural light, p. 64

This is largely managed by Sir Charles, p. 87, &c.

His second Argument, That the Religion of men at present towards God is the Religion of sinners, &c. but natural light cannot instruct the world how God will be atoned, Ibid.

Sir Ch.

Mankind in every age have applied to God in a sense of sin, and of guilt contracted by it, and upon that account have ad∣judged it necessary to make some further offering to God for their sins, &c. Now the reason of the world does not issue it self into any positive certainly a∣bout such things, &c. Ibid. p. 133, and p. 145, &c.

Argument 3. All man∣kind hath universally consen∣ted

in this, that besides the light of reason, there ought to be some supernatural Re∣velation from God, &c.

Sir Ch.

Discourses this at large, p. 123. &c. to which M. Fergu∣son

indeed refers his Reader: as also to Camero de verbo Dei: for which he is beholden to Sir Charles's citation of him in the same place.

Master Ferguson's next undertaking is to make it appear, that it is expedient, that this Revelation should be some where or other consigned to writing, ibid. p. 68. This is but just mentioned by Sir Charles Wolseley, and therefore he is forced to have recourse to some other; and he has made a very good choice, no less person than the Reverend Dean of Canterbury, Dr. Tillotson, in his Rule of Faith: where you may find the sum of all Master Ferguson's arguments upon this head, which are of any force; only sometimes to avoid those particular instances, which the Dean gives, he chuseth others with so little judgment, that it would puzzle a very wise man to defend them: And it is pretty to observe how sometimes he varies phrases, and sometimes retains the very same expressions; as to give an instance of each.

M. F. p. 69.

I readily acknowledge, that the Articles and Precepts of Religion, may in some ca∣ses and circumstances be safe∣ly preserved and securely conveyed down from age to age by oral Tradition; name∣ly when the things themselves to be preserved and reported are few, the number of the persons to be instructed in them small; the age of those to whom the successive com∣munication is given, length∣ened

out to several hundreds of years, &c.

Dr. Tillotson, Rule of Faith, p. 33.

We grant that oral Tradi∣tion in some circumstances may be a sufficient way of convey∣ing a Doctrine, &c. in the first ages of the world, when the credenda or Articles of Religion, and the agenda or precepts of it were but few, and such as had the evidence of natural light; when the world was contracted into a few Families in comparison, and the age of man was ordina∣rily

extended to six or seven hundred years, &c.

M. F. p. 71.

I shall only add, that the tradition of the one true God, though most easie to have been preserved, being not only short and plain, but having foundation and evi∣dence in the light of Nature, was nevertheless soon corru∣pted and defaced by the worlds lapsing into Polythe∣ism.

Dr. T. Ibid. p. 187.

The tradition of the one true God, which was the easiest to be preserved of any Doctrine in the world, being short and plain; planted in every mans nature, and perfectly suited to the reason of mankind; and yet this tradition not having past through many hands, &c. was so defaced and corrupted, that the world did lapse into Polytheism and Idolatry.

Where it is pleasant to observe, how Master Ferguson by altering the expression a little, unawares falls into non-sense; that the tra∣dition of the one true God was corrupted and defaced by the worlds lapsing into Polytheism: as if men first lapsed into Polytheism, and this corrupted the tradition of one God: which is as much as to say, that men worshipped a great many Gods, while they believed there was but one; and by this means in time forgot that there was but one God. And indeed our Author is oftentimes very unhappy at varying phrases, and makes either wretched English, or wretched sense of them.

Master Ferguson's next undertaking is, thirdly to prove, that no written Records besides the Bible can lay claim to the priviledge of be∣ing 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of Divine Inspiration: and here he considers the Ethnick Legislators, Poets, and Philosophers; and especially the Alcoran, page 76, &c. all which is done at large by Sir Charles Worsely, page 164, &c. of which Master Ferguson has only given us a short and imperfect abstract.

The same may be truly affirmed of those positive media (as he calls them) by which the Divine authority of the Scripture may be rationally

demonstrated, which indeed he has cast into a different method; but as far as I observe, has nothing but what is particularly discours'd by Sir Charles from page 179. to the end of the Book.

In one thing indeed Master Ferguson takes the confidence to differ from Sir Charles, whether Miracles be always a certain demonstrati∣on of the truth of any Doctrine? or whether God may▪ not some∣times permit Impostors to work Miracles for the tryal of our Faith? This latter Sir Charles affirms, Mr. Ferguson denies; which is not civilly done to dispute such a nice point with his friend, which he confesses is not very material, when he had borrowed from him all his substantial and material notions. But the best of it is, Sir Charles has no need to stand to his Courtesie in this matter, and it is well for him he has not.

And upon this occasion I cannot but take notice, how Master Ferguson deals with Des Cartes; he charges him with affirming, Deum posse fallere, si velit, that God can deceive, if he please. Now Sir you know very well upon what occasion Des Cartes said this; it was when in order to free his mind from the prejudices of sense and education, and popular opinions, he set himself to doubt, as far as possibly he could, as long as there was the least imaginable pretence for doubting; and therefore doubts whether there be a God, or any thing else: and whether this God be not a deceiver, &c. And Master Ferguson might as well challenge Des Cartes with denying that he himself had any body, or that there were any ex∣ternal objects, such as the Sun, Moon, and Stars; as with affirm∣ing, that God might deceive, if he pleased; for he says the one as much as the other, while he was in this doubting humour, and only upon a design to come to some first Principle, which he could not doubt of; and to lay the foundations of a more certain know∣ledge: and therefore he immediately adds▪ Et certe cum nullam oc∣casionem habeam existimandi aliquem Deum esse deceptorent, neo quidem adhuc satis sciam, utrum sit aliquis Deus, valde tenuis, &, ut ita lo∣quar, metaphysica dubitandi ratio est, quae tantum ex ea opinione depen∣det; ut autem etiam illa tolletur, quamprimum occurret occasio, exami∣nare debeo, an sit Deus, & si sit, an possit esse deceptor, hac enim re ignorata, non videor de ulla alia plane certus esse unquam posse, Medit. Tertia. i. e. Since I have no occasion at all to think, that God is a

deceiver; nor as yet am certain, whether there be a God, or not, this opinion (of Gods power to deceive) is but a very slender and metaphysical reason of doubting: However that we may remove this too, as soon as things are ripe for that inquiry, we must examine whether there be a God? and if there be one, whether he can be a deceiver? for while we are ignorant of this, I cannot see how we can be throughly certain of an thing. And accordingly, when in his method he had proved the being of God, he proves too, that he cannot deceive us, and founds the truth and certainty of our facul∣ties upon it. And in the second objections he is charged with assert∣ing Deum non posse mentiri aut decipere, that God cannot lye or de∣ceive; which they say is contrary to the opinion of many School∣men. And in his Answer to these Objections, to which Master Ferguson refers us, he owns the charge, and defends himself from their exceptions. By this we may see, how well skilled Mr. Fergu∣son is in Des Cartes his Philosophy, or what a brow he has, to charge that upon Des Cartes as his professed opinion; the contrary of which he makes the ground of all certainty.

Such another wise discourse he has, page 123. of Infallibility; the result of which is, that our Faith is infallible, though we are not infallibly assured: but this is beyond my first design, only I could not but take this occasion to show you, what a man of reason this is, when he argues at his own natural rate, and dares forsake his Ma∣sters: and it were very easie to make it appear, that he has not one good argument, but what he has borrowed from some late Modern Authors, who are far enough from being Fanaticks; which is an excellent way of proving, that Fanaticks are great friends to Rea∣son.

But to give you some few instances more of Mr. Ferguson's tran∣scribing from Modern Authors.

M. F. p. 48.

If all things be the result of matter, how comes a principle of reason to be con∣veyed

into us, by that which had it not inherent in it self.

Sir C. W. The unreasonable∣ness of Atheism, page 92. The casual conjunction of these atoms could not make the

world, because it is made with a principle of Reason; and they could not have induced such a principle by chance, unless some way or other they had it inherent in them∣selves before.

M. F.

This Hypothesis suppo∣seth, that to have been the effect of chance which carries in it the characters of a wise contrivance. Ibid.

Dr. Til. Serm. 1. p. 40.

Nothing can be more unrea∣sonable than obstinately to im∣pute an effect to chance, which carries in the very face of it all the arguments and characters of a wise de∣sign and contrivance.

M. F.

If the fabrick of the world be nothing but the result of the casual meeting, and conca∣tenation of Atoms, how comes it to pass, that by their daily motion and just∣ling one another, they do not dance themselves into more worlds. Ibid.

Sir Ch. Ibid. p. 91.

If the dancing motion of these Atoms in this fancied space did by chance first dance the world into this form, &c. what is the reason these Atoms never danced themselves into any thing else.

You may see Sir, what a youthful fancy Mr. Ferguson has to be so pleased with this metaphor of dancing, which much better be∣comes a Gentleman than a Divine; but yet I perceive Mr. Ferguson has so little skill in the thing, that he spoils all these Metaphors, if he attempts to vary the least word; for I remember I have heard some say, that justling is no very gentile way of dancing.

M. F. p. 50.

To the fortuitous jumbles of blind matter.

Dr. More's Antidote, p. 42.

From a blind fortuitous jumbling of the parts of mat∣ter.

And in the next words some body or other has put a trick on him: for thus he proceeds. The consideration of the Fabrick of things made Plato say, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which I may english in the words of the Holy Ghost, that all things are made in number, weight, and measure, which are not the words of the Holy Ghost, unless he will acknowledge the book of Wisdom to be Canonical Scripture: for there it is, 2 Wisdom 20.

M. F. p. 51.

What convictions are we furnished with of the Being of God, from the innate har∣mony that is in the several parts of the Creation, and the convenient disposure of all the Creatures to a subservi∣ency to one another in mutual offices; chance cannot have linkt one thing to another, nor can contraries combine into a mutual coalition without the influence of a supreme Being, who overrules them.

Sir Charles ibid. p. 42.

The natural rectitude and innate harmony of the world, and the due subordination of things one to another, and to the whole of the world.

Direct contraries are over∣ruled to a perfect harmony and coalition in the propagati∣on of the world, p. 87.

Here Mr. Ferg. has a little altered the phrase, but much for the worse; for to combine into a coalition, I doubt is not good sense.

M. F. p. 52.

Men have rather chosen to worship any thing for a God, than wholly to be without one.

Dr. Till. Serm. p. 55.

Men will rather have any God than none; and rather than want a Deity will wor∣ship any thing.

M. F. p. 53.

For not onely Cicero tells us, that there is nothing so absurd, which some of the Philosophers have not main∣tained: But Aristotle informs us, that there have been some who have held, That a thing might at the same time be, and not be.

Sir Charles ibid. p. 74.

Aristotle tells us, that there were some that affirmed, A thing might be, and might not be at the same time; and Ci∣cero has long since told us, that nothing could be so absurd, that had not some Philosopher for its Patron.

Now though these are very familiar sayings, yet I have reason to think that Mr. Ferg. transcribed them out of Sir Charles, because he has not given us the Latine and Greek of these sayings, as Sir Charles has not; which Mr. Ferg. never fails to do, when he can come easily by it, of which we have an instance or two in the same page.

Ferg. ibid.

Reason becomes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, infected with those evil opi∣nions that proceed from lust; when men are once sunk into the greatest sensualities, their reason becomes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, compliant with their sensual appetites.

Mr. Smith's select Discour∣ses, p. 15.

That reason that is within us, as Plotinus hath well ex∣pressed it, becomes more and more 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, it will be in∣fected with those evil opinions that arise from our corporeal life. Their highest reason is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, comply∣ing with their senses.

M. F. ibid.

Besides men living as if there were no God, can make no apology to the world, but

by espousing such notions, as may justifie them in their courses.

Dr. Till. Serm. p. 104.

For when men live as if there were no God, it becomes expedient for them, that there

should be none.—Besides, that men think it some kind of apo∣logy for their vices, that they do not act contrary to any prin∣ciple they profess.

M. F. p. 63.

There hath been no Nati∣on so savage, nor people so barbarous, who have not ac∣knowledged some kind of external Performances neces∣sary for the expressing of the inward Sentiments of Devo∣tion and Honour, which they bear to the Deity.

Amyrald of Religion, p. 2.

There is no Nation so sa∣vage—no people who do not essay by some kind of Perform∣ances to express the Sentiments of Devotion and Honour they bear towards him.

M. F. p. 132.

Words that are intelligi∣ble, when they are spoken, are as intelligible when they are written.—Now as God can speak as plainly as any of his Creatures can; and as words are at least as easie to be un∣derstood when they are writ∣ten, as when they are spoken; so we have no reason to think, that God affects ob∣scurity, or envies, that men should understand him.

Dr. Till. Rule of Faith, p. 66.

First, Whatever can be spo∣ken in plain and intelligible words, and such as have a cer∣tain sense may be written in the same words.

Secondly, That the same words are as intelligible, when they are written, as when they are spoken.

Thirdly, That God if he please can indite a Book in as plain words as any of his Crea∣tures.

Fourthly, That we have no reason to think that God affects obscurity, and envies, that men should understand him, &c.

M. F. p. 140.

Nor is it any argument, that these Texts of Scripture are not easie to be under∣stood, because some out of prejudice or perverseness have wrested them to a cor∣rupt sense; seeing God did not endite the Bible for the froward or captious, but for such who will read it with a free and unprejudiced mind, and are willing to come to the knowledge of the truth.

Dr. Till. ibid. p. 87.

And what if some out of pre∣judice do mistake, or out of per∣verseness do wrest the plainest Texts of Scripture, &c. Is this any argument that those Texts are not sufficiently plain? Can any thing be spo∣ken or written in words so clear, which a perverse or pre∣judiced mind shall not be able to vex and force to another meaning? God did not write the Scriptures for the fro∣ward and the captious, but for those who will read them with a free and unprejudiced mind, and are willing to come to the knowledge of the truth.

M. F. p. 148.

We have the attestation of Reason, which tells us, that nothing is well known, but by that, which hath a just a∣nalogy to it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, every thing is best understood by that which bears a resemblance of it; things of sense and life are onely known by vital and sentient faculties.

As the eye cannot behold the Sun 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

unless it have some resem∣blance of the Sun in it self; no more can any man un∣derstand the things of God in a due manner, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, unless he be made to partake of the Divine I∣mage.

Mr. Smith's select Discour∣ses, p. 2.

All things of sense and life are best known by sentient and vital faculties, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, eve∣ry thing is best known by that which bears a just resemblance and analogy with it.

And as the eye cannot be∣hold the Sun 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, unless it be Sun-like, and hath the form and resem∣blance of the Sun drawn in it; so neither can the Soul of man

behold God 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, unless it be God-like, hath God formed in it, and be made partaker of the Divine Nature.

Where by the change of one little word he has spoiled all; for it is true as Mr. Smith says, that things of life and sense are best known by sentient and vital faculties; but it is false to say as Mr. Ferguson does, that they are onely known this way: for there is a Philosophi∣cal Knowledge of Sounds and Colours, as well as a Sensitive Know∣ledge of them: And Mr. Ferguson acknowledges, that a bad man may have a true knowledge of the meaning of Scripture, though he have not a vital sense of Religion. So easily may an ignorant Scrib∣ler spoil the best Sayings of Wise men.

Thus, Sir, it is pleasant to observe how Mr. Ferguson has borrow∣ed all his Arguments, that are worth any thing, against Des-Cartes his Philosophy, from Dr. More, with a little variation, that I have reason to think, that he never read ten lines in Des-Cartes.

M. F.

The Anonymous Author of Philosophia Scripturae inter∣pres after all his operose and impertinent wrangling—Only instead of Reason, we have Philosophy advanced to a Dictatorship over the Word of God, and Des-Cartes made Master of the Chair. 158.

Dr. More's divine Dialogues 1 part, in the Preface.

The learned Author of Phi∣losophia Scripturae Interpres after an operose, subtile and copious endeavour of evincing, that Philosophy is the best in∣terpreter of Scripture, as if all that pains had been intend∣ed in the behalf of Des-Cartes, to set him in the infallible Chair.—

M. F. p. 249.

Nor will I press his (Des-Cartes) discharging all spirits from place, though that seems consequentially to dis∣charge them from being.

See Dr. More's first Dialogue, p. 136. &c.

M. F.

Nor will I dwell upon his disbanding all Final Causes out of the precincts of Na∣tural Philosophy.

Dr. More ibid. Preface.

A third property of his Phi∣losophy is a seeming modesty in declining all search into the final causes of the Phaenomena of the World.—

M. F. ibid. p. 250.

His attempting to prove, that all the Phaenomena of the Universe might arise out of matter by meer mechanical motion, and that matter a∣lone, supposing such a degree of motion communicated to it—could have produced the Sun, Moon, Stars, Planets, Animals, and the Bodies of Men in such Organization, Order, Beauty and Harmo∣ny, as now they are.

Dr. More ibid.

It is a confessed principle with him, that matter alone with such a degree of motion, as is supposed now in the Universe, will produce all the Phaenome∣na of the World, Sun, Moon, and Stars, Air, Water, Earth, Planets, Animals, and the Bo∣dies of men, in such order and orginazation, as they are found.

M. F. ibid

Neither will I dwell upon his notion of the Conflict be∣tween the Flesh and the Spi∣rit, which the Scripture so emphatically mentions; namely, that it is nothing but the repugnancy of those mo∣tions,

which the Body by its Spirits, and the Soul by her Will endeavour to excite at the same time in the glandu∣la pinealis, or little Kernel, where he supposeth the Soul to be harboured and seated: as if the whole conflict which the Holy Ghost so solemnly describes under the notion of a war betwixt the law of our members, &c. were no∣thing else, but that the Ker∣nel in the midst of the Brain being driven on one side by the Soul, and on the other by the animal Spirits—when the corporeal Spirits by their rude joggings of the glandu∣lous button, endeavour to excite in the Soul a desire of any thing, and the Soul re∣pels it by the Will she hath to avoid the same thing, this constitutes the war, &c.

Dr. More ibid.

The Combat betwixt the superiour and inferiour part of the Soul, the Flesh and the Spi∣rit, as they are termed in Scri∣pture and Divinity, is at last resolved into the ridiculous noddings and joggings of a

small glandulous button in the midst of the Brain, encoun∣tred by the animal Spirits rude∣ly flurting against it. This little sprunt Champion called the Conarion, within which the Soul is entirely cooped up, acts the part of the Spirit, and the animal Spirits of the Flesh; and thus by the Soul thus in∣garrisoned in this Pine-kernel, and bearing her self against the arietations and jurrings of the Spirits in the Ventricles of the Brain, must that solemn Combat be performed which the Holy Ghost calls the war, &c.

Sometimes, Sir, our Author pretends to ancient Learning, and to give an account of the original of Heresies from the Pagan Philo∣sophy; and for this he is beholden to Mr. Gale, in his Preface to the Court of the Gentiles, part 2. which I shall give you a short view of.

M. F. p. 242.

And not to insist on the ill influence that the Phoenician

and Chaldaick Philosophy had on the Iudaick Theology, though it be of easie proof, that their Planetary Deities and Teraphims sprung from thence; not to do any more but mention, that the chief errours of the Pharisees, Sad∣ducees, and Esseans took their rise from the Graecian Philo∣sophy, their Dogms being a mixture of Pythagorean, Pla∣tonick, Stoick, and Epicurean Notions.

Mr. Gale Pref.

We shall begin with the ma∣lignant contagion, which the

Judaick Church received from vain Philosophy: So long as the Judaick Theology continu∣od under its own native habit—it retained its primitive Puri∣ty—But whence sprung this (declension) but from the Phaenician and Chaldaick Phi∣losophy, touching Planetary Deities, and Daemons, called by the Phaenicians Baalim. We no way doubt but to demon∣strate, that the main errours of the Pharisees, Sadducees, and other Judaick Hereticks received their first formation, &c. from Graecian Philosophy, especially the Pythagorean.

M. F. ibid.

Both Irenaeus and Tertulli∣an affirm the errours of the Gnosticks to have sprung from the Platonick Idea's, though I think it not improbable, that both their 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 took their birth from Pythagoreanism.

Gale.

From whence borrowed they (the Gnosticks) their 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉—but from the Mythologick and Symbolick Philosophy of the Pythagore∣ans.

M. F. 243.

Hierom assureth us, that Pelagius suckt all his Do∣ctrines from the Philosophy of Pythagoras and Zeno, and Iansenius fully proves it.

Gale.

Had not the Pelagian Here∣sie the same pestiferous root: this is incomparably well de∣monstrated by Jansenius, &c.

M. F. ibid.

Nor did Samosatenus and Arrius derive their blasphe∣mous opinions concerning the Deity of Christ, save from the Platonick Philoso∣phy.

Gale.

Where had Paulus Samosa∣tenus his blasphemous infusions but from Plotinus? And did not Arrius in like manner de∣rive his blasphemous perswasi∣ons touching Christ, from the same poisoned fountain?

M. F.

It was not therefore with∣out cause, that Tertullian stiled the Philosophers the Patriarks of Hereticks.

Gale.

This Tertullian was great∣ly sensible of, and therefore stiles the Philosophers the Pa∣triarks of Hereticks.

M. F. 245.

The Platonick School at Alexandria was the Semi∣nary of the chiefest and most pestilent errours vented in the Church during the four first Centuries.

Gale.

Vain Philosophy was the chief Seminary of Errours broached in the four first Cen∣turies after Christ.—Samosa∣tenus learnt his blasphemies from Plotinus, successor to Ammonius in his School of Alexandria,—Origen Scholar to Ammonius in his School of Alexandria.

M. F. p. 243.

Holstenius hath shown us, how the Manichean Princi∣ples were framed from the Pythagorean.

Dr. Parker Plat. Theology, p. 89.

Holstenius hath made a paral∣lel between the Pythagorean and Manichean Principles.

M. F. 245.

Ioannes Baptista Crispus hath wrote a Discourse of Plato's Opinions, and hath

at the end of every Chapter shown, what Heresies sprung from each.

Dr. Parker ibid.

Johannes Baptista Crispus in his discussing of Plato's opi∣nions, has at the end of every

Chapter shewn, what Here∣sies sprung from each opini∣on.

M. F. p. 244.

The Popish 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Saint-worship, is nothing but an imitation of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Daemon-wor∣ship of the Pagan Philoso∣phers.

Gale ibid.

The whole Papal 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Saint-worship, is but an imitation of the Pagan 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Daemon-wor∣ship.

M. F. p. 245.

The purity and simplicity of the Gospel was no less corrupted by blending the Dogms of Aristotle with the Articles of Faith, than it had been by mingling the Philosophy of Pythagoras and Plato with the Doctrines of Christ.

Dr. Parker ibid.

They have in the same man∣ner corrupted the simplicity and purity of Christian Religion by blending the Placits of Aristo∣tle with the Articles of Faith, as Manes and Valentinus did by mingling with the Christian Faith the Philosophy of Plato and Pythagoras.

M. F. 247.

Corrupted into an artifici∣al kind of wrangling, and de∣gererated into contentions and unprofitable altercati∣ons.

Gale ibid.

Corrupted into an artificial kind of contentious disputati∣on—and wrangling dispute.

I doubt, Sir, you already censure me for a very idle person, who can spend my time in such an unprofitable pursuit of this Author; and therefore though I can scarce open an English Author of any ac∣count, without making some new discoveries of Mr. Ferguson's pil∣fering humour, I shall now for a conclusion principally confine my self to his discourse of Metaphors, Chap 2. which he has almost intirely stole from Vossius and Glassius, not excepting his Greek and Latine Citations, with which he makes such a flourish and boast of Learning.

M. F. p. 283.

Origen especially seems to have made it his business to find out Mystical and Cabba∣listical Senses in the plainest parts of Scripture, which made one of the Ancients themselves say of him, Inge∣nii lusus pro Dei mysteriis ven∣ditat; he obtrudes the sport∣ings of his fancy for religi∣ous and sacred Mysteries: and as another expresses it, Ingenii sui acumina putat esse Ecclesiae. Sacramenta. This practice of some Primitive Writers in and about the Scripture influenced Porphy∣rius to deride the Gospel, as containing nothing▪ certain in it.

Glass. Philologia sacra, p. 298.

Intolerabilis est Origenis—audacia, qui omnia omnino quantumlibet simplicitèr dicta in allegorias mutavit, unde Hieronimus justisfimé de eo conqueritur, Ingenium suum facit Ecclesiae Sacramentum; & alius haud ignobilis pater, Origines sui ingenii lusus pro Dei mysteriis venditar.

At que haec Scripturas inter∣pretandi, vel torquendi potius ratio▪ Porphyrium induxit o∣lim, ut irrideret Christianam doctrinam, & scriberet eam nihil habere certi.

M. F. 298.

This may serve as an apo∣logy for Aristotle's confound∣ing Synechdoches and Alle∣gories with Metaphors: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Which occa∣sioned Cicero to observe, that Aristotle▪ used the term Meta∣phor in a larger acceptation

than after-Rhetoricians are wont to take it.

Which account of Cicero and Aristotle, together with the Greek Quotation, you have in Vossius Instir. Orat. lib. 4. p. 84.

M. F. Ibid.

Terms thus applied are called by Hermogenes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

Glass. lib. 5. p. 1045.

Unde Hermogeni, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

M. F. p. 301.

In every Metaphor three things are carefully to be at∣tended to, the original and proper signification of the word, the signification to which it is transferred, and the similitude, analogy, and proportion, &c.

Voss. ibid. lib. 4. p. 85.

In omni metaphorâ tria re∣quiruntur, significatio propria, aliena, & similitudo aut pro∣portio.

M. F. Ibid.

Christ is not onely meta∣phorically stiled a Lion, but Tyrants are likewise so deno∣minated, whereas cruelty and salvageness are the rea∣son of transferring the term to the latter, so fortitude and victoriousness are the grounds of applying it to the other.

Glass. ibid. p. 1113.

Leo ad Christum significan∣dum transfertur, & ad impios & tyrannos, Christus Leo di∣citur ob fortitudinem & victo∣riam, tyranni ob atrocitatem & rapacitatem.

His distinctions between a Metaphor and other Tropes and Pa∣rables are all taken out of Glassius and Vossius.

M. F. p. 305.

By a Parable I mean a Symbolick form of speech,

where by a well appropri∣ated similitude from some feigned story, some moral truth is insinuated to the minds of men to make it the better apprehended and un∣derstood.

Gale Court of the Gentiles, part 2. p. 97. cited from Diodate.

This was a fashion of teach∣ing used among the Iews, fol∣lowed

by our Lord, and very profitable to make the truth un∣derstood, and to insinuate the apprehension thereof into the minds of the auditors, by a well appropriated similitude, taken from a feigned story.

His discourse of Allegories, which immediately follows, is prin∣cipally owing to Glassius, p. 1395. and whether he has not taken not onely his Notions, but his Greek words and sayings concerning those descriptions of God which we call Anthropopathies, from the same Author, I will leave any man to judge who will compare them.

M. F. p. 315.

Under Metaphors are com∣prehended 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in which humane parts, &c. are ascribed to God; in such forms of speech God by a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or condescen∣sion, declares the infinite properties of his nature.—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He decyphers what himself is, and doth by things that fall under our apprehension; and what is thus said of God 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, after the manner of men, must be understood of him 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in a way suit∣able to the Divine Nature.

Glassius p. 1116.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 est meta∣phora, qua quod creaturis & praesertim homini propriè com∣petit, ad Deum transfertur, vocatur & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 con∣descensio—v—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 quae de Deo dicun∣tur, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, h. est, con∣venienter Deo intelligenda sunt.

I confess, Sir, I am very sick of this undertaking; for it is so far from being pleasant, that it is grievous to me, to write one line meerly to expose any man: but I thought it necessary to take down the confidence of this Author, who makes a great shew of ancient and modern Learning, by transcribing out of some late Writers, whose credit and reputation at the same time he endeavours to un∣dermine. I am glad to find, that he reads so good Books, which I doubt not, but would make him wiser in time, if he would consi∣der, as well as read: It is no fault indeed to use those arguments, which have been used by other men, and it is possible sometimes to hit upon the very same expressions, or some very like; but when a man shall run through a book, and take the whole Series of Argu∣ments, without owning his Masters; when he shall take out whole Sentences and Paragraphs out of so many Authors, of so vastly dif∣ferent styles, it plainly discovers an empty Head, a barren Fancy, and a vain-glorious Mind▪

It were easie to transcribe a great part of Glassius and Vossius, con∣cerning the nature and use of Metaphors and Allegories, and the rules of expounding them, which Mr. Ferguson has onely transla∣ted, and from whence he has borrowed his Greek and Latine Cita∣tions, out of ancient and modern Authors, but I consider this would too much swell a Letter, and you may do it your self if you have the curiosity: And therefore I shall onely farther observe, that whereas this Author falls upon Dr. Parker at every turn, and chal∣lenges, and provokes and scorns him; there is no Person whom he does so much Ape, as the Doctor: He borrows divers of his ex∣pressions from him, gawdy Metaphors, phantastick Allegories▪ thwack∣ing Contradictions, rampant and empty Schemes of Speech, and the like; and many times transcribes whole Sentences and Paragraphs from him, of which I have given some instances above, and shall adde but two or three more here.

M. F. p. 133.

Heraclitus grew famous by the onely obscurity of his writings. It is said of Ari∣stotle▪ that being reproved by

Alexander for publishing his Acroamaticks, he should make this reply, that they were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ made pub∣lick, yet they were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not published.

Dr. Parker Plat. Theol. p. 70.

Neither is Heraclitus his name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 because of the ob∣scurity of his writings, less fa∣mous; and no less common is

Aristotle's Epistle* 1.1 to Alexander, that though he had made his books pub∣lick, yet he had not published them.

Where because he would not say the very same thing that the Dr. did, he runs into a very ridiculous mistake. For though Heraclitus▪ his name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 was famous, because of the obscurity of his wri∣tings, yet it is a wild conceit, that the obscurity of his writings was the onely thing that made him famous.

M. F. p. 321.

When any thing is mani∣fested by a Metaphor, the thing it self is not fully ex∣pressed, but only some simi∣litude between it and an∣other.

Dr. Parker ibid. p. 75.

When any is expressed by a Metaphor, the thing it self is not expressed, but onely some similitude observed or made by fancy.

M. F. p. 323.

For men to discourse in metaphorical terms of things, whose nature and pro∣perties they are wholly igno∣rant of, is plainly to trifle; seeing while we know not the true Idea's of things, we can onely imagine some resem∣blances.

Dr. Parker ibid.

To discourse of the nature of things in metaphorical terms, is to sport and trifle; but 'tis still more phantastick, to talk metaphorically of those things, of whose Idea's we are utterly ignorant.

Nay, Sir, it is still more pleasant to observe, that our Author can∣not complement his Patron without imitating Dr. Parker: For who∣ever reads Mr. Ferguson's Dedication to Mr. Papilion, and Dr. Par∣kers to Dr. Bathurst, will▪ find that the manner of Address, the Com∣position,

Complement, and Fancy is Dr Parkers, though Mr. Fergu∣son has a little varied the words.

M. F. Ep. dedic.

Sir, it cost me no long de∣liberation to whom I should direct these discourses, the obligations I am under to you, and your Family, ren∣dring them yours by the ti∣tle of a just debt, the inter∣est you have in me by an en∣tail of peculiar kindnesses, gives you a right to my Stu∣dies, and the fruits of them.

Dr. P. Ded. of his Plat. Theol.

Reverend Sir,

I shall not need to argue the decency and fitness of this ad∣dress—because your absolute and unalienable right to all the fruits of my Studies, has made it due and necessary.

M. F.

The declining the imputa∣tion of ingratitude is my plea for prefixing your name to these Papers.

Dr. Parker.

I cannot alienate any thing that is theirs from being yours, without being guilty at once of the greatest injustice and in∣gratitude

M. F.

Though the concerning you in their behalf may seem an injury, yet not to have done it, would have been a crime.

Dr. Parker.

So that if to present you with so mean a trifle be unhandsome, yet not to have done it would have been unjust.

M. F.

You must be content to forgive such offences, as your self have made the result and effects of duty.

Dr. Parker.

Though I do but injure your name by concerning its Autho∣rity in behalf of so worthless a trifle, yet an injury, that is the result of duty and grati∣tude, may hope for not onely your pardon, but (Sir, such is

your candour) your acceptance too.

M. F.

Were there any indecency in this address, yet the laws of gratitude supersede those of congruity.

Dr. Parker.

The obligations of duty can∣cel all the laws of indecency.

This, Sir, I hope is enough to satisfie the world of Mr. Ferguson's great Learning, and how he came by it: It had been very easie to have given many more instances of this nature, but I took those which came first to hand: I need make no reflexions upon the whole▪ since you have done it so well already; and therefore have no more to do, but to subscribe my self

Your very affectionate Friend and Brother, VV. Sherlock.

Notes

• * 1.1

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Plut. in Alex.