An account of Mr. Ferguson, his common-place-book in two letters.

Mr. GLANVILL HIS LETTER TO Mr. SHERLOCK.

SIR,

I Lately met with Mr. Ferguson's Book, and was a little surprized to find my self by name concern'd in it, as one of those that had been the occasion of his writing about the Interest of Reason in Re∣ligion. I had in my Discourse of Reason accus'd the Dissenters of decrying the sober use of our Faculties under the misapplied names of vain Phi∣losophy, carnal Reason, and the wisdom of this World; and some others whom he mentions, had spoke to the like purpose: He therefore thought it necessary that they should vindicate themselves from those aspersions, and endeavour to give a stop to those groundless, and unjust clamours, page 9.

Now whether those Accusations are just or not, I appeal to any one that can remember but twenty years past, and hath been in the least acquainted with the Preaching, Writings, and Discourses of those men in their times: How far they are reformed since, I do not know; but I have never heard of their Recantations, nor have they taken any care to convince the world that their private Desks are more sober then their publick Pulpits were. On this occasion, Sir, I cannot but take notice, how hard it is to deal with the people of this sort, when we speak or write against their Opinions, Practices, and Declarations, and those that have been most publick and notorious: If there happen to be two, or three, or some very few unknown per∣sons, of a little different temper, they will be ready to flie upon us as false accusers, and such as traduce the whole Party for the Extravagan∣cies of a few. Thus you know it hath hapned to some excellent late Books, that have given the most just, and lively descriptions of the humour of Non-conformists, which have been vilified and rayl'd at as slanderous Invectives and Abuses; because some few that go with them, are somewhat less foolish, and extravagant then the rest: According to which Rule, it will be untrue to say, that Lions and Bears are wild and dangerous creatures, because some of them have been tam'd and made gentle: and a man may not affirm the Crow is black, because some are greyish: and now and then a Bird of that species by extraordinary accident may be white. If among the Dis∣senters there are so many sober Assertors of the necessity, and useful∣ness of Reason in the affairs of Religion, 'tis very much that they have not all this while stood up, and reprov'd the dangerous Follies, and Extravagancies of their Brethren that have opened the door to Atheism, and Enthusiasm by their ignorant Railings against it. And since they have thought fit to be silent in this matter, how should we know that there are men of such sober principles among them. The Declamations and violent Out-cries against Reason we have heard till our ears have tingled: but the justifications of the judgments of Reason in Religion have been such private whispers, that hitherto we have heard little, or nothing of them from these men: and I might ask Mr. F. how it comes about, that persons so zealous against error, who were still pelting each other both from Press and Pulpit upon every petty difference in opinion, should let pass so many rude Defa∣mations of our Faculties, as they needs must frequently hear, with∣out

the least reproof, or opposition of them, if so many have been so very Orthodox in this point, as he would have us to believe? But I say no more of that.

The Author hath a double justification of his Party against our Charge. We have the first, page 7. They are a people, so far as I know, innocent of all undue reflections upon Reason. The other is, I Robert Ferguson do acknowledge the use of Reason in Religion in 274 pages; ergo, Our late pretended Rational Divines do traduce the Non-conformists in suggesting that they are defamers of Reason, page 62. This is the sum and strength of the whole Discourse, to which a short answer will suffice.

For my part, though I have been drawn into some Philosophical Controversies, yet I never begun any; and though I have received some publick Provocations to ingage in the Disputes of Religion, yet hitherto my disinclination to them hath kept me unconcern'd: But notwithstanding this indisposition, Mr. Ferguson's title, and the men∣tion he made of me, as one of the occasions of his Book, inclined me to look into his Discourse with design of further Vindication of our Faculties, if that Essay had given me any reason for it: But I soon perceived that this supposed Adversary was a Friend, and one that liked my Book so well, as to borrow the main things of his from it; though as he is pleased to say of Des Cartes, He was not so ingenious to confess at whose Breasts he had suckt, nor out of whose Garden he had gathered his best Flowers: And 'twas a little unkindly done of him to mention my Name where he sup∣posed I had erred; and to take no notice of it, when he thought I had done so well as to deserve to be transcribed. Indeed he hath enlarged in the proof of some Principles of Religion by Rea∣son, in which he hath been more beholden to other men: But in the Notions that strictly appertain to the main state of the mat∣ter, he hath been pleased to credit and enforce my Observations by the addition of his Suffrage and Authority. When I saw how Affairs went, I left the close perusal of his Book, and only cur∣sorily skim'd over his Pages, casting my eye here and there, as it hapned; and in that running reading I observ'd these follow∣ing things and Expressions, in which the Gentleman very kind∣ly, and to my great honour hath concur'd with me.

M. Ferguson.

Knowledge then (viz. in the state of Innocence) inha∣bited our minds in no less plenty than Light doth in the universal Luminary. p. 18.

Jos. Glanvill.

Knowledge dwelt in our un∣depraved natures as Light in the Sun, in as great Plenty as Purity. Vanity of Dogma∣tizing. p. 13.

M. F.

It was wonderfully advan∣taged by a delicate and apt disposure of bodily Organs. ibid.

J. G.

Depending on the delicacy and apt disposure of the Or∣gans. Van. Dogm. p. 5.

M. F.

There was no Jarring in our humors till the Fall cau∣sed them. p. 19.

J. G.

There was no jarring or dis∣harmony in the faculties till sin untuned them. Van. Dogm. p. 4.

M. F.

Hindred by the Distempe∣rature of indisposed Organs. ibid.

J. G.

Hindred in its actings by the Distemperature of indispo∣sed Organs. Van. Dogm. ibid.

M. F. takes the whole sub∣stance of his Discourse about the Understanding in the state of Innocence, and after, under the Fall. p. 18, 19. out of▪

I. G. in his Vanity of Dog∣matizing. p. 4, 5, &c.

M. F.

The vast Volumes of the School-men are stuft with Peripatetical Depravations. p. 246.

J. G.

The Volumes of the School∣men are deplorable evidence of Peripatetical Depravations. Van. Dogm. p. 166.

M. F.

Their Scholastick Contro∣versies are resolved into the Subtilties of his (Aristotle's) Philosophy. ibid.

J. G.

These Scholastick Controver∣sies are ultimately resolved in∣to the Subtilties of his (Ari∣stotle's) Philosophy. V. D p. 167

M. F.

Speaking of the Union of the Soul and Body saith,—How this can be is a Knot too hard for Human Reason to untie. p. 490.

J. G.

Saith of the same,—It is a Knot too hard for our degraded Intellects to untie. Van. Dog. Ed. 2. p. 15.

M. F.

How a pure Spirit should be cemented to an earthly clod,—is a Riddle that no Hypothesis of Philosophy can resolve us about. p. 490.

J. G.

How the purer Spirit is uni∣ted to this Clod,—is a Riddle that must be left to the coming of Elias. Van. Dog. Ed. 2. ibid.

M. F.

To affirm it, viz. the uni∣ter of Soul and Body to be of a middle nature partaking of the affections and adjuncts of both, is that which our rea∣sonable Faculties will never allow us to subscribe to. ibid.

J. G.

To suppose an uniter of mid∣dle constitution that should par∣take of some of the qualities of both is unwarranted by any of our faculties. Van. Dogm. p. 21.

M. F.

How that which penetrates a Body without giving a jog to, or receiving any from it, should either impress a mo∣tion upon, or receive an im∣pression from it, is unconcei∣vable. p. 496.

J. G.

How that which penetrates all Bodies without the least jog or obstruction, should impress a motion on any is by his own confession alike unconceivable. Van. Dogm. Ed. 2. p. 17.

M. F. treats of the incom∣prehensibility of the union of the parts of matter. p. 483, 484, &c. the substance of all which is taken out of

I. G. in his Scepsis Scienti∣fica, p. 37, 38, 39. and his Answer to White, p. 41, 42, &c.

M. F. endeavours to shew the unconceivableness of the union of the Soul and Body, p. 489, 490, 491, &c. and again p. 495, 496. all out of

I. G. in his Scepsis Scienti∣fica. p. 15, 16.

M. F.

The reproach which Iu∣lian slanderously fastned up∣on the Primitive Christians, that they had no ground for their Faith, but that their wisdom was only to believe, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. p. 62.

J. G.

The charge of Julian the A∣postate against the Primitive Christians, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 That their wisdom was to believe; as if they had no ground for their Faith. Of Reason, p. 218.

M. F.

He is worse than an Enthu∣siast, who affirms, that the way to be a Christian is first to be a Brute. p. 20.

J. G.

Saith, that in the Enthusi∣astick Divinity,—The way to be a Christian is first to be a Brute. Of Reason, p. 223.

M. F.

Men being misled by their senses, affections, interests and imaginations do many times mingle errors and false con∣ceits with the genuine Di∣ctates of their minds, and then appeal to them as the principles of truth and rea∣son, when they are indeed nothing else but the vain ima∣ges of our Fansies, and the conclusions of ignorance and mistake. p. 241.

J. G.

Liable to be mis-led by our senses, and affections, and inte∣rests, and imaginations, so that we many times mingle errors and false conceits with the ge∣nuine dictates of our minds, and appeal to them as the prin∣ciples of truth and reason, when they are but the vain images of our Fansies, or the false conclu∣sions of ignorance and mistake. Of Reason, p. 196, 197.

M. F.

Whatsoever is proved by reason we are firmly to be∣lieve it, though there be ma∣ny things in the theory of it, that are wholly unconceiva∣ble. p. 198.

J. G.

What is—clearly proved by reason ought to be believed, though there are many things in the theory and manner of it unconceivable. Philosoph. Pia, p. 82.

Thus, Sir, I have given you some Instances among many, of the faithfulness of M. Ferguson's Memory, or of his Phrase-Book: There is no doubt but they have furnished him as well out of other Writers, but I have neither the humor nor the leisure to make further search after stoln Goods: Only I cannot but take notice to you that this is the Man that divers of his Party glo∣ry in, as their elegant and rational Writer, and urge him as a great proof of the partiality and injustice of those who will not allow Non-Conformists to write either good Sense or good Language; If either of these be in his Book, you may ghess by this Specimen how little Honour is reflected upon them from it: And if others would claim their Feathers, as I have called for some of mine, I believe, he would have scarce enough left to cover theirs or his own nakedness.

I remember such Discoveries were once made upon another Champion of the Cause, M. Hickman; who had also furnished his Pack with Lace and Ribband borrowed from his Neighbours Shops. 'Tis pity but these men had Judgments to choose, for then they would put better Books into the hands of their Ad∣mirers. But when they take this Liberty, I would advise them not to fall foul upon the Owners, while they have their Goods in their hands; nor to pick their Pockets then when they are confidently pleading their own Truth and Honesty against them: If this Gentleman had let me alone, I had likely never known this quality of his; but unluckily he hath detected himself, as

he did that warned his Chapman, to whom he had sold a stoln Horse, not to let him drink of such a Water, which was in a Ground out of which he had taken him.

Upon the whole matter, Sir, I desire you to deal gently with this Adversary, lest unawares you should smite some of your Friends, and among the rest,

Your affectionate Friend and Servant, Ios. Glanvill.