The darknes of atheism dispelled by the light of nature a physico-theologicall treatise / written by Walter Charleton ...

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD DEMONSTRATED.

CHAP. I.

SECT. I.

ARistotle, though an Ethnick, poysoned * 1.1 with the Macedonian and Grecian Idolatry, nay so given over to that sottish impiety, Polytheisme, that he could be content to make a Goddesse of his Wench, and offer solemn sa∣crifices to her as a Deity, whom his own obscene luxury had degraded from the native dignity of Humanity, to devote his orisons to her for good, whom his own temptations had frequently subdued to evill, as Gassendus (Exercitat. 3.) out of Diogenes Laert. hath accused him; had yet a strong and noble sense of the supreme Being, as may, even by his adversaries, be collected from hence, that he never durst adventure on a Desi∣nition, nay not so much as a Description of its Nature. For

though he spun out his speculations of Immateriall substances, (the onely and proper theme of a Metaphysitian) into a long (but knotty and unequall) thread of 14 Books: yet in the 13 first of all those, he seems little better then wholly silent in all things that immediately concern Theology; and in some few Chapters onely of the last affords us a sparing and timerous dis∣course of the Proprieties, or Attributes of the First Mover. Now the pride and ambition of his wit would never have suffered his pen to have skip't over that subject, which being the most ab∣struse, sublime, and excellent, must by consequence, have ad∣ferred the most of glory and renown unto his memory: had he not been fully convicted, from within, of the immense chasme or gulph, that lay between the utmost extent of his own finite reason, and the incomprehensibility of the Essence of God. This his evasion, or rather supersession, some have been pleased to urge against his honour, as an argument of his Ignorance in nations supernaturall: but, in my construction, tis the clearest demonstration of the Modesty and strength of his Judgment. For whoever shall duely consider, how impossible it must be for humanity, dull, grosse, and narrow humanity, to behold Invisi∣bility, derive Independency, calculate Eternity, circumscribe In∣circumscription, limit Omnipotence, understand Omniscience, &c. and how dangerous a phrensie that brain must be disordered withall, that attempts to describe what he doth not, cannot know: will soon be satisfied, that Amazement, and pious silence is the best Lecture man can read on that immense subject, of which when we have said all we can, we have said nothing, if we look forward upon that inexhaustible abyss of excellencies, which must remain unspoken of, and indeed uncomptehended; that a professed Nescience in this particular, is the complement, or zenith of all other Science, which the minde of man is ca∣pable of in this life; and that Aristotle may better pre∣tend to the title of the divine Philosopher, for writing so little of the Deity, then Plato for writing so much to no pur∣pose, the latter speaking little in much, the former all that can be thought in saying nothing.

And how far the ancient Hebrews (whose frequent visions * 1.2 of Gods reflexive glories, transmitted to them in the necessary allay of sensible natures; as of the pillar of a Cloud, by day, the pillar of Fire, by night, of Smoak, Thunder and Lightning on mount Sinai, at the promulgation of the decalogue, &c. might have encouraged them to pretend a nearer acquaintance with Divinity, then any other nation of the World) were from daring to conceive any positive Adumbration of his Essence: sufficiently appears from that high veneration their law enjoy∣ned towards his very Name, Jehovah. Which was never to be pronounced by any, but the High Priest; in any place, but the Sanctum Sanctorum; at any time, but on the Festival of annual expiation; and in any case, but that of generall benedicti∣on, when the Mercy and goodness of God were to be derived down upon the people by the holy mediation of the anointed successors of Aaron; under penalty of no lesse then death, and particularly that cruel kinde of death appointed for the punish∣ment of Blasphemy: as stands recorded in their Talmud, in the sad case of Teradions son.

Nor can the more illuminated Christian, though the super∣excellence * 1.3 of his faith justly entitle him to this dignity, above all other darker Religions; that he hath the true knowledge of God, (i. e.) that he apprehends him under that Idea, which he hath been pleased to afford of himself, in the sacred mysteries of the Gospell, as of a Trinity of Persons in an Ʋnity of Substance, &c. most judiciously and piously collected and knit together in that admirable Anacephalaeosis or summary of the Christian doctrine, called the Creed of Athanasius; raise the eye of his understanding so high, as to look directly upon the Quiddity, or pure Essence of him whose dwelling is in light inac∣cessible, and invisible: but must think it happiness great enough for the entrancement of his soul, humbly and awefully to speculate him in the shadow of his Attributes, and those onely which mortality is qualified to under∣stand.

This being duly perpended, our Reader needs no other adver∣tisement, * 1.4 that in this Demonstration of the existence of God, from the Idea of him engraven by his own hand on the minde of man, he is not to expect any bold and vain attempt of the description of the Formality or simple Quiddity of that supreme Being, (which is the Fountain of all other Essences, and Soul of all other Causes:) and it remains onely on our part, that we tender him an account both of our designe, or scope, and of the me∣thod our pen observes in the pursuance thereof.

Though we are fully perswaded, with Plato (Lib. 10. de l••gib. p. 871.) upon the conviction of those innate dictates, which the reason of every man whispers in the ••ares of his con∣science (which proved the louder thunder of the two, and spoke more terror to the miscreant Emperor) that time never produced such a prodigy, as an Absolute Atheist, i. e. such a fool as durst indubitate the existence of a Grand-father Principle, or first Intelligence, from whom, as from the main spring in a Watch, or other Automatous Engine, all motion is derived▪ and which constantly animates the great machine of the World: yet have we too much ground to suspect, that the accursed sperme of the Giants is not yet extinct, that every age can furnish us with a precedent of Theomachy, nor need we look beyond our own Annals for a second to Caligula, or want a parallel for Epiou∣rus. Who, though they profest the necessity of a Deity, yet sottishly ran into delusions equivalent to the downright denyall thereof, and sinned as high as blasphemy, in their endevours to cut off those two cardinall and inseparable Attributes of the supreme Essence, viz. Omnipotence, and Omniscient-omnipre∣sence, or Active-ubiquity; not allowing the Creation of the World, out of nothing, to the one, nor the conservation, or Go∣vernment of the same to the other. And having made reflexi∣ous upon the unsuccesfull progress many have made, in their enterprises of confuting this sort of implicite Atheisme, by the per∣swasion of Scripture only; we became of opinion that to enter the lists with a Lucian, or Lucretius, and there contend with him concerning the extent of Gods Providence even to every single and individuall nature, urging no other proof of the Affirmative

but the bare authority of Canonicall Writ (though to us Chri∣stians of undoubted truth and more fiduciary then demonstration) is the ready way to confirm him in his impiety, and stiffen his infidelity, in regard a plain and just exception lies against the Circle. Nor have we any probable way left to break his objecti∣ons, but a sober reception of them in the shield of reason, and a smart retort of arguments desumed from the proper magazine of all temporall knowledge, the Light of Nature. Hereupon, when we had determined with our selves to erect a building of Physicall science, upon those pillars, or principles, which to our judgment appear most solid, firm and permanent, because most sensible in all the operations or effects of Nature, that can any way occurre to the disquisition of Philosophy; as shall be amply common∣strated in the future application of them to particulars: and sub∣mitted our assent to that excellent Rule of the School-men, Nulla res qualiscunque est, intelligi potest, nisi Deus intelligatur prius, revived into an Axiome by the incomparable Des Cartes, in these words; Omnem omnis scientiae certitudinem & veritatem, ab una veri Dei cognitione pendere; adeo ut dum ignoramus Deū esse, & verum esse, nihil omnino de ulla alia re perfecte scire possimus: we conceived it necessary to begin as high as the First Cause, God; and endevour the demons••ration first of his Existence, and con∣sequently (for strict reason will never endure their separation) of those two generall operations of his Wisdome, Power, and Goodness, viz. (1.) the Creation of the world ex nihilo, and and (2.) the continuall Conservation of the same, in its primitive harmony, by his Providence; and this by Arguments so purely extracted from the chief inducements of beleef, that no Atheist, how acute, or refractary soever, can justly except against them.

SECT. II.

TIs an Assertion, which bids defiance to a whole host of Sce∣pticks; * 1.5 that the Soul of man, while she animates this admi∣rable engine, the Body, can apprehend no more of the Formes of Entities, then what she reads in those reflex. Characters, Images or Ideas, which she findes represented to her in the mirrour of Co∣gitation.

Now of those Ideas, or Representations exhibited to the un∣derstanding there are three distinct orders 1. Some are Innate, * 1.6 or Congenial; for that I may understand, what a Thing is, what Truth is, what the act of Cogitation is: I need the assistance, or information of no other nature, but my own. 2. Others are Adventitious, or emergent from external objects; for that I actually hear sounds, see the light of the Sun, feel the heat of fire and become sensible of all other qualities of bodies: I have ever hitherto adjudged these acts of sensation to belong to my essence onely at second hand, as being derivative from other causes, for∣reign and alien to my nature. 3. And finally others are Created, * 1.7 modelled, or coyned in the mint of the Imagination; for the Phansie of the most stupid Ideot is naturally empowerd to forge, or paint to it self, and represent to the mind what images it please; as Chimaeras, Sirens, Harpies, Goblins, &c.

As for those Ideas, on which I look as proceeding from things existent without the circle of my self; I make this enquiry: whe∣ther * 1.8 there be any reason sufficient to perswade me to conceive, that such Ideas are exactly like to those things; whether these Copies or transcripts are drawn to the life, so as in all particulars to resemble their originals? And the determination, wherewith∣all I satisfie my self, is this; that the Affirmative is taught me by nature, as being hitherto instructed, that those Ideas have no dependence at all on my Will: and so, by consequence, proceed not from my self, but are obtruded upon my cognition even a∣gainst my Will. For instance, whether I will, or nill, I am sensi∣ble of the heat of Fire: and therefore think this perception or Idea of heat, to proceed from something distinct from my self, viz. from the heat of that fire, by which I stand, and obvious it is, beyond all hesitancy, that I may judge that this fire doth im∣mit into me rather the similitude of it self, then any thing else. The stability of which reasons, I shall now strictly examine. When I here say, I am thus instructed by Nature; I intend only that I am rapt on, by a certain spontaneous violence, or native propensity, to submit my assent thereunto: not that this declared

unto me to be a firm and uncontrollable truth, by the light of Na∣ture. For I discover a vast and irreconcileable disparity between the Dictates of these two Informers: and the Difference may be stated thus. Whatever things are declared unto me, by the light of Nature; as this, that I am, because I doubt, that 2 and 3 make 5, &c. can never, on any pretence, be doubted of, in re∣gard there can be no other faculty, or Criterion, to whose judge∣ment or decision, I can afford so ample and firme credit, as to that of the light of Nature, which onely can teach me, whether those things are true or false. But as for those Inclinations, or Propensions naturall; I have long since found, by deplorable experience, that by them I have been frequently hurried unto, and in a sort impelled upon this evill, in my solitary disputes with my self concerning my judicature and election of the Good: and therefore am not in any measure convinced, why I should depend upon their information, pursue their conduct, or resigne my assent to their testimony, in other cases. Again, though these Extradvenient Ideas depend not on my Will; yet is that no valid Argument, that therefore of necessity they must pro∣ceed from things without my self: for as those strong Propensi∣ties, though seated in me, and as it were annexed to my very being, doe yet seem clearly distinct from my Will; so also per∣chance there may be another third Faculty within me, which I doe not yet sufficiently understand, that coyns those Ideas, as hi∣therto my conceptions have ever been, that in my dreams such Ideas are created in my brain, without the assistance of any forreign Objects invading my senses. And, lastly, should I grant those Counterfeits, or Ideas, to be desumed from things distinct from my selfe; yet could it be no justifiable inference, that therefore they must in all points resemble those things, or prototypes, from which they were transmitted: yea, in many particulars, I apprehend them to be disproportionate and dissimi∣lar, toto coelo, by inequalities never to be parallels. To instance; I finde within my self two divers Ideas of the Sun, the one taken from my sense, (which I therefore think fit to refer to that classis of Ideas, called Adventitious) representing the Sun in a very small round, of less diameter then a Coach wheel: the other

from the reasons or maximes of Astronomy, i. e. extracted by way of induction, from certain Notions implantate in me, or by any other way whatever composed or modelled; which repre∣sents the Sun in a vast circumference, much larger then the Terraqueous Globe. Now both these cannot exactly respond in magnitude to their Originall, the Sun, existent without me: and reason offers me invincible evidence to assure that image to be the most unlike, which seems to have most neerly streamed from the Sun it self. All which considerations to ample satisfaction evince; that hitherto I have, not upon any scientificall and au∣thentick judgement, but onely upon a certain obscure and blinde impulse from within, beleived, that there are a sort of Entities existent without the sphear of my nature, which, by subtle trans∣fusion through the organs of my senses, convey the Ideas, or Idols of themselves into my mind.

But I have found out another certain way, for the more hap∣py progress of my enquiry, Whether any of those entities whose * 1.9 Ideas sojurn within me, have any reall existence without me; and this is it. These Ideas, considered in this relation, that they are certain modi cogitandi, or means which the soul makes use of, in order to her act of Cogitation; have indeed no dissimilitude, Alogy, or inequality amongst themselves, and all seem to slow from me, in one and the same chanel, after one and the same man∣ner: but considered in this interest, that one represents one thing, a second another, a third another quite different from both; manifest it is, that they hugely differ each from other, as to the degrees of more or lesse objective reality. For doubtlesse, those Ideas, which represent substances, are more something, or (to speak more intelligibly, though more scholastically) contain in them more of objective reality; then those which represent only certain modifications of substances, or meer Accidents: and a∣gain, that Idea, by which I speculate some supreme Essence, or Deity eternall, omniscient, omnipotent, creator and conservator of this great All, &c. seems in severe truth, to comprehend more of objective Reality, or Formall Verity, then such poor Ideas that carry onely the shadowes of some subordinate, dependent

and finite substances. Now evident it is, by the light of Nature, that there must be so much at least, (if not more) in the Cause efficient and Total, as is in the effect of the same Cause. For, I demand, from what can the effect derive its reality, but from the Cause? and how can the Cause bequeath that to the effect, which it self is destitute of? Out of which root spring two branches of ever flourishing truth. (1.) Nihil à nihilo fieri, nothing can be made by nothing. (2.) Id quod magis perfectum est, hoc est, quod plus realitatis in se continet, fieri non posse ab eo, quod minus perfectum est, A more perfect something, i. e. which imports more of objective reality, cannot be produced by a lesse perfect something. So that I may safely infer, that this position hath not its verity restrained to those effects onely, whose Reality is Actual, or Formal; but extended also to those Ideas, in which is considered only their Reality objective. For example; a stone, that never was before, cannot only not now begin to be, unless it be produced by some other thing, which in it self hath formally and eminently what ever is included in the perfect or full nature of the stone; nor can heat be introduced into any subject, that was not formerly hot, unless by something of equal perfection, or at least equivalent to heat: but, besides all this, there cannot be in me the Idea of a stone, unless that Idea be first inserted into me by some cause, wherein there is so much, at least, of reality, as I conceive to be in the stone, or in the heat. For though that Cause transfuse nothing of its Actual, or Formal reality into my Idea; yet am not I therefore to apprehend my Idea to be the less reall, but that the nature of it is such, that it can require no more reality formal ex se, then what it borrowes from my cogitation, whose manner of apprehension it is. But that this my Idea, comprehends this or that objective reality, rather then another: this must of necessity inevitable arise unto it from some other Cause, wherein is so much at least of reality Formal, as the Idea contains of objective. For if I grant any thing to be found in the Idea, which was not in the Cause thereof▪ that something it must derive from nothing: but how imperfect soever that Mo∣dus essendi, or manner of being, whereby a thing is objectively in the Intellect, by an Idea, or representative, be; yet is it not

wholy nothing, and cannot therefore proceed from nothing. Nor have I any cause to suspect, that since the reality, which I consider in my Ideas, is onely objective; that therefore the same reality cannot be formally inherent in the causes of them: but that it is sufficient to their nature, that it be in them only ob∣jectively. For as that Modus essendi objectivus belongs to those Ideas, by the charter of their own peculiar nature; so doth that Modus essendi sormalis properly belong to their causes, (at least to the principal and grand cause) by the law of their essence.

Further though I allow it possible for one Idea to produce * 1.10 another; yet I can never heer admit a possibility of a progress in infinitum, of unravelling the pedigree to a length so immense, as never to goe so high as the Adam, or Grandfather Idea, but must at length arrive at the Ne ultra, or first Idea, whose cause is the Archtype or Protoplast, wherein all that reality is inherent Formally, which is in the Idea only objectively. So that by the light of Nature, I read this unalterable Axiome; that those Ideas or Images of other natures, or entities, which are in my under∣standing, are certain Counter-parts, or resemblances, which, in truth, come short of the perfection of those objects, from which they were desumed, and cannot be conceived to contain any thing greater, or of more perfection then their Causes.

From hence my thoughts advance to this conclusion. If the * 1.11 reality objective of any Idea be so great and excellent, that I may be assured the same cannot be in me, either Formaliter, or Emi∣nenter; and therefore I cannot be the Cause of that Idea: by direct and genuine inference I determine, that I am not alone in the World, but that there is existent in the universe some other Being, which is the father of this Idea. For if I finde no such Idea occur to my minde, in earnest I know no argument, that may make me confident of the existence of any one thing distinct from my self.

Now among these Ideas (that I may range them into di∣stinct * 1.12 orders respective to the severall Degrees of Entities from which they result, or are derived) there is one which holds forth me to my self (concerning which no difficulty can be started, as

to the concernment of the present Demonstration) another which represents God; others which pourtray things meerly Corporeal and Inanimate; others which describe Angels; others resemble Animals; and finally others that shew me other men like my selfe.

As for those Ideas, which represent Men, Animals, or Angels; I easily understand, that such may be composed and made up * 1.13 of other Ideas, which I usually conceive of my self, and other corporeall Entities, and of God: though there were neither Men, nor Animals, nor Angels, in the whole World beside my self. And as for those of Corporeal Entities; in them I meet with no∣thing so great, noble, or excellent, which seems not to have its fountain or origin in my self. For when I make a deep and strict inquisition into them, I discover, that of those things, which they comprehend, there are only very few, which I clearly and distinct∣ly understand; such are Magnitude, or Quantity extended into its three dimensions of Longitude, Latitude, Profundity; Fi∣gure arising from the termination of that extension; Situation of parts, or that position, which parts variously figurated obtain and hold among themselves; and Motion, or the change of situation in the whole, or parts composing the whole: to which may be superadded Substance, Duration, and Number. But as for other things, as Light, Sounds, Odors, Sapors, Heat, Cold, and other tactile qualities; these fall not under the comprehension of my thoughts, but darkly and with as much obscurity as confusion: insomuch that when I have summ'd up all I know of them, it a∣mounts to no more then this; that I am even ignorant whether they be true or false, (i. e.) whether such Ideas, as I conceive of them, be the Ideas of things really existent, or of Non-entities. For though I have faithfully observed, that Falsity, properly and most emphatically so called, or Formal falsity, can be no where found in the world, but in our judgments, or determinations: yet is there another Material falsity in our Ideas, when they repre∣sent a Non-entity for a real Entity, a nothing in stead of a some∣thing. Thus, to exemplifie, the representations which I have of Heat and Cold appear so narrow, dim, and confused; that my most intense and acute speculations cannot acquire from them

any plenary and stable satisfaction, Whether cold be only a priva∣tion of Heat, or Heat no more but the privation of Cold; Whe∣ther both be real and positive qualities, or neither? and since there can be no Ideas, but as of real entities; in regard it is a truth apparent, that cold is nothing else but a privation of heat, that same Idea, which exhibi••s cold as something real and posi∣tive, may justly be reputed false: and so likewise may others of the same series. To such Ideas therefore it is not necessary, that I assigne any other original besides my self; for since they may be materially false, (i. e.) represent nothing under the disguise of something: it is declared unto me by the Light of Nature, that they proceed from nothing, (i. e.) that no other reason can be given, why they are in me, but only this; that something is wanting to my nature, which is requisite to make it absolutely perfect and compleat: and if they were true, yet in respect they exhibit so litle of reality, that I cannot, in the most abstracted contemplation, clearly distinguish that litle from nothing; I see no reason, why they may not worthily be counted the Minervas of my own brain, or the productions of my own thoughts. Now as concerning those things, which are clear and distinct in the Ideas of Corporeal Natures; I have discovered, that some of them also be derived from the Idea of my self: such are Substance, Du∣ration, Number, &c. of the same classis. For when I consider a stone to be a substance, or an entity constituted in a capacity of subsisting per se; and at the same time consider my self also to be a substance (although I conceive my self to be Res cogitans, a thinking ens, and look not upon my self as Res extensa, a quan∣tative or extensive; but upon a stone, as Res extensa, and not cogitans, and that therefore there must be a great dissimilitude between these two conceptions: yet they seem to be reconciled and shake hands in termino substantialitatis) and also when I consider, that I now am, and formerly have been; and when I have various cogitations, whose number I comprehend: I then acquire the Ideas of Duration and Number, which I can after transfer and apply to what other things I please. But for the re∣sidue of particular things, whereof the Ideas of Corporeal Na∣tures are composed: as Extension, Figure, Situation, and Mo∣tion:

these have not their residence in me (since I am nothing else, in propriety of essence, but Res cogitans) formaliter: and yet, in relation that they are only certain Modi substantiae, mo∣dificated substance, and I also am a substance; they seem to be comprehended in me eminenter, by way of transcendency. And so there remains unexamined only the Idea of God; in which I am to consider, whether it include any thing, which cannot be derivative from my self.

By the name God, I understand a certain substance, infinite, * 1.14 independent, omnipotent, omniscient, from which as well my own, as all other dependent natures were derived; by whose incompre∣hensible Wisdome, Power, and Goodness, the universe was created, according to the admirable Idea formed in his own eternall intel∣lect; and is constantly conserved in the same perfect order, and exquisite harmony, which in the beginning he was pleased to institute.

Now so divine, excellent, and perfect are all these Attributes, that when with deep, yet humble and reverentiall thoughts I con∣template them, either conjunctively, or distinctly, I become fully informed, that they are too great and noble, to be derived from so mean, frail, and imperfect a being as my self: and upon this firm foundation I erect to my self this verity; That God doth exist. For though the Idea of a substance be included in me for this cause, that I am a substance: yet it doth not necessarily follow, that therefore I can have the Idea of an infinite substance, since I am my self but finite, unless that Idea first proceed from some substance really infinite. Nor am I obliged to think, that I doe not conceive an infinite, by a true Idea, ••ut, as most schoolmen will have it, by the Negation of a finite, as I understand Rest and Darkness by the negation of Motion and Light: for, on the contrarie, I perspicuously understand, that there is more of Rea∣lity in an infinite substance, then in a finite; and by conse∣quence that the perception of an infinite essence, the Deity, is elder then, and so precedent unto the perception of a finite essence, my self. For I demand of the whole world, by what means possible I should come to understand, that I doubt, desire, &c. (i. e.) that some∣thing

is wanting to my nature, which I finde requisite to make it perfect; if there were in me no Idea of a more perfect being, by comparing whose perfections to my own deficiencies, I am brought to an assured knowledge of the imperfection, and so the subordination and dependence of my own being.

Nor can it be objected that the Idea which I conceive of God is materially false, and therefore possible to be desumed from no∣thing, as those Ideas of Heat and Cold formerly examined: for on the contrary, in this interest, that tis transcendently clear and distinct, and comprehends more of objective reality, then any other Idea, which the minde of man can either conceive, or create; no one is more true per se, nor in which less suspicion of falshood can be detected. This Idea, I say, of the supreme Being, perfect and infinite, is most true; for though it might be imagined possi∣ble, that there is no such entity existent, as my Idea represents: yet cannot it be imagined, that the Idea of this Ens summum can exhibit unto me nothing real, as may the Ideas of Heat, Cold, &c. Moreover, I am confirmed, that this Idea of God, is of all others the most clear and distinct; for whatever of reality, veri∣ty and perfection, I clearly and distinctly perceive in all other Ideas, is radically concentred in this one, as in the Archtype, or universal fountain. Nor can this my beleif be staggered by this weak objection, that I cannot comprehend an infinite, or that, be∣sides these Attributes mentioned in the description of this super∣excellent Idea, there are myriads of other Excellencies in God, which are too resplendent and remote to be gazed upon by the weak and purblind eye of mans understanding, and too numerous to fall under the short Arithmetick of reason, much less to be epitomized or decyphered in the unequall landskip of my cogi∣tations: for I know full well, that it is of the nature of an Infi∣nite, not to be comprehended by me, that am finite; that it is sufficient for me to understand only so much, and to judge all those things, which I perceive to contain, or import any perfecti∣on, and perchance innumerable other dignities, of which I am yet ignorant, to be in God either formally, or eminently. So the Idea, which I conceive of him, is of all others, to which my intellect can extend its power of apprehension, the most perspicuous and distinct.

Notwithstanding, that I may leave no doubt to eclipse the splen∣dor of * 1.15 this assertion, I permit my thoughts to run into this expostu∣lation. Perhaps I have not the just dimensions of my own essence; that I am a far greater and more perfect something, then hitherto I have perceived my self to be; and that all those excellencies, which I speculate in the Idea of God, are in some measure potenti∣ally in my nature, though hitherto they have laine dormant, in Capacity only, and have not been deduced into act: for I al∣ready finde my Cognition much encreased, nor can I discover any impediment, wherefore it may not be every day more and more enlarged even to infinity; nor also, my cognition being so ad∣vanced, why I may not at length, by the benefit and advantage thereof, aspire and arise to all those perfections of God; nor, finally, why this capacity of arriving at all those perfections, may not suffice, upon the stock of its own single power, to the pro∣duction of their true and adequate Idea. And I am answered from my domestick oracle, the Light of Nature; that not one of those illations can stand. For, first, though it be true, that my knowledge may by degrees be very much multiplyed; and that many things are in potentia in me, which are not yet awaked into their proper operations: yet not one of all those properly be∣long to the Idea of God, in which there is nothing at all Poten∣tial; for this very condition, to be capable of augmentation by degrees, is an undeniable argument of imperfection. Secondly, though my cognition should be more and more augmented; ne∣vertheless I understand, that it could never be actually infinite, be∣cause it could never be raised to such an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or zenith, as to be above all possibility of farther access: but my Idea of the di∣vine nature represents him actually infinite, so that nothing is wanting, nothing can be added to the perfection of his nature. And lastly, I perceive that the objective esse of an Idea cannot be produced by a bare potential esse, which (to speak like a me∣taphysician, and properly) is a meer nothing: but only by an Actual, or Formal.

Now albeit there is not one among all these notions, which to my retired and circumspect consideration, doth nor appear a most

serene, noble, and illustrious truth, demonstrable by the light of Nature: yet since, when with more loose and unattentive thoughts I examine them, and when the grosser images of corporeal and sensible natures benight the opticks of my reason; I cannot so easily make it out, why the Idea of a being more noble and per∣fect then my own, must of necessity proceed from some such other being, which is really more perfect; for this respect, I say, I lead on my mind to a further enquiry, viz. Whether or no I, who have this Idea, could have an existence, if there were no such Ens as my Idea adumbrates, really existent? To particular; from what original should my being descend? either from my selfe, or my Parents, or some other essences of perfection infi∣nitely inferior to that of God; for no phansie can be so wild, as to feigne any thing more perfect then, nay not equally perfect with him. Now had I received my being from my selfe, un∣doubtedly I should not then have been subject to those frailties of Dubitation and Desideration, nor would any thing have been wanting to my nature: for at the same instant, when I gave to my self a being, assuredly I should have given unto my self also all those perfections, whereof I have the Idea in my mind, and so I my self should have been God. Nor am I bound to conceive, that those excellencies, wanting to the accomplishment of my nature, can be more difficult to acquire, then those graduall abi∣lities, of which I am already master: for on the contrary, tis ma∣nifest, that it must import infinitely more of difficulty for me to have had a being, (i. e.) for a Cogitant something to be deduced from nothing, then for me being once constituted in a Capacity, to attain to the cognition of many things, whereof I am now actually ignorant, which can be esteemed no more but the Acci∣dents of that substance. And assuredly, had I borrowed the greater, my substantiality, from my own stock of power; I should not have denied unto my self the less, those Accumulati∣ons, or accidentall additions, nor any other of those divine ac∣complishments, which I understand to be included in the Idea of God: why? because no one of those seem more difficult to be acquired; and if any were more difficult for me to aspire unto, tis more then probable I should understand that difficulty,

if I had those Faculties, of which my nature stands possessed, from my own donation, in respect I should find my power to be terminated in them. Nor doe I evade the convictive rigor of these reasons, if I adventure on this supposition; that I have been ever heretofore, as I now am: as if the induction of this hypo∣thesis would be, that therefore I am to trace the genealogy of my essence no higher then my self, or seek out no other cause of my Existence; for in respect that all time may be divided into innu∣merable parts, each whereof hath no necessary dependence on the rest, either precedent, or subsequent; from hence, that I have formerly been, is no valid consequence that therefore I must now be, unlesse some other cause be admitted, which dothfreshly create me in each of those particles, or atoms of time, and particularly in this instant moment, (i. e.) doth constantly conserve me in being. For manifest it must be to any that looks attentively into the nature of Duration; that to the Conservation of any thing through all those several minutes, in which its existence endureth, is required no less then the same power and act, which is neces∣sary to the Creation of the same thing anew, if it were not alrea∣dy existent: and consequently, that the act of Conservation doth not at all, but in the cloudy reason of man, differ from the act of Creation. These things thus stated, I am concerned to propose to my self this interrogation; Whether there be any power inherent in my nature, whereby I may be enabled to conserve my self the same in the future that I am now in the present? for since I am nothing but a meer res cogitans (for here I precisely regard only that part of my self, which is properly and distinctly a Cogitant substance) if there were any such power conservatory radicated in my essence, doubtless I should be conscious of it; but I am convicted, there is none such, and therefore from this one evidence, that I cannot maintain or perpetuate my own being, for the shortest moment imaginable: I judge, that I am subordinate unto, and dependent upon some other Entity distinct from my self. But (to tolerate any doubt in this my meditation, in order to the exclusion of all doubts from the intended result or conclusi∣on) put the case, that this Entitie, to whose sufficiency I owe my Conservation (pardon ò! thou incomprehensible Essence, thou

great and sole Preserver of men, pardon this supposition, that modestly intends only the clearer demonstration of thy Suprema∣cy) is not God; and that I deduce my production from my Parents, or some other cause less perfect then God. For deter∣mination; tis an Axiome, to which every Sceptick will readily condescend, Tantundem ad minimum esse debere in causa, quan∣tum est in effectu, there must be so much at least in the cause, as is found in the effect: and therefore since I am res cogitans, a substance thinking, and having a certain Idea of God in me, what cause soever be at length assigned for the principle or foun∣tain of my being, that cause also must be Ens cogitans, and must possess the Idea of all those perfections, which I ascribe unto God. Now of that cause it may be again enquired, whether it were de∣rived from it self, or from some other Cause; for if from it selfe, then may it bee naturally collected, from what hath preceded in this disquisition, that such a Cause is God. For as it hath the power (or act) of self-existence, or self-conserva∣tion: so also, undoubtedly hath it the ability of actually possessing all such perfections, the Idea whereof it comprehends in it self, (i. e.) all such accomplishments, as I conceive to be concen∣tred in God.

But if from some other cause; then I repeat my question a∣gain * 1.16 concerning this other cause, whether that had its being from it self, or from another, untill I arrive successively at the first Cause, or highest linke in the chain: which also will be God. For no melancholy can be so absurd, as to dream of a progress in infini∣tum in the series of Causes; especially, since I doe not here in∣tend that Cause only, which did in time past produce me, but principally that, which doth conserve me in the present. Nor can it be imagined, that a plurality of Causes met, concurred, and conspired to the making up of my nature, and that from one cause I inherited the Idea of one of the perfections which I attri∣bute to God; from a second the Idea of another; from a third, the Idea of another, &c. so that all those perfections may▪ in∣deed▪ be found severally in the distinct and scattered peices of the Universe, but no where conjoyned and amassed together in one

single Essence, which might be God. For on the contrary, the Ʋnity, Simplicity, Inseparability, or Identity of all those ex∣cellencies in God, is one of the chiefest of those perfections, which I understand to be in him: nor, assuredly, could the Idea of the Ʋnity of all those his Perfections be placed in me by any other cause, from whom I could not acquire the Ideas of other perfecti∣ons also; nor could he have effected, that I should understand them conjoyned and married together by an indissoluble union: unless he had also effected, that I should know what they are, in their distinction.

To expunge the last scruple, and so render this demonstration of the Existence of God, fair and immaculate; have not my * 1.17 Progenitors devolved a being to my Parents, and they devolved the like to me? and may not this Idea of those perfections, which I attribute to God, be implanted radically in this my being so de∣rived down to me by propagation, without the necessary insertion of it, by the immediate hand of any such Supreme nature really existent, in which all those Attributes are Formally inherent, and coessential? By no means. For though I may, in some latitude, allow my Parents to be the causes of my generation; yet cannot I think them to be the cause of my Conservation, since they can∣not conserve themselves: nor have they made me what I am, (i. e.) constituted me to be Res cogitans, an Entitie whose nature is to think; but onely as subordinate and instrumental causes, have contributed certain requisite dispositions, or qualifications to that matter, in which I understand my self, (i. e.) my mind or rational soul (which in this discourse, I constantly take for the whole of my self) to be enshrined. And upon the credit of this consideration, there can be no difficulty taken up to countermand the certitude of my assertion; but I may safely conclude: that from this position, I am existent, and my minde contains a certain Idea of a most perfect being, (i. e.) of God; it is most genuinly and most evidently demonstrated, that God is also Existent.

Having sufficiently assured my self, that this Idea, which I have of the Supreme Being, or most and only perfect Ens, is too ex∣cellent * 1.18 to be desumed from my self, from my Parents, or from other Causes, which import not so much of Reality Formal and Eminent, as the Idea imports of objective: it remains only, that I explore how and when I received this Idea from God. For I never drew it in through the windowes of my senses; nor was it ever obtruded upon me without either my expectation, or no∣tice, as frequently the Ideas of sensible objects are, when those objects offer themselves to the external organs of the senses; nor was it ever modelled, or coyned by me, in the laboratory of my Imagination, since it is not in my power either to detract any thing from, or superadd any thing unto it: Wherefore it must be primitively implanted in, and congenial to my very Essence, no otherwise then as the Idea of my self is implanted, or essentially impressed upon my self. And surely, to a sober and well ordered consideration, it can seem no wonder, that God, when he was pleased to create me, hath imprinted this Idea of himself upon my Soul, that it might remain as an indelible Mark or Signature; whereupon when I reflect my cogitations, I should instantly know and acknowledge my self to be the work of his almighty hand. Nor is it necessary, that this Mark or Impress should be a thing plainly distinct from the work it self, from my Essence; but upon this one ground, that God hath created me; tis very credible; that he created me, in some degree, or respect, after the Similitude and image of himself, and that this Similitude, wherein the Idea of God is included, may be understood by me, by the operation or information of the same Faculty, by which I am impower'd to understand my self: (i. e.) that when I con∣vert the eye of my Soul, my reason, inwards upon my self; I doe not only clearly perceive my self to be an Entity incompleat, dependent on some Superior principle, and indefinitely aspiring ••o greater and better things: but at the same instant, I under∣stand also that Superior Principle, upon which I depend, to possess all those greater accomplishments, not indefinitely and in po∣tentia only, but even infinitely and actually, and so to be God.

And so all the nerves of the Argument may be twisted together * 1.19 into this short (though never-to-be-b••oken) Cord; that I can∣not but acknowledge it an absolute impossibility that I should exist, being of such a nature as I am, (i. e.) having the Idea of God imprinted upon my mind, unless God also did really exist: that very God, I mean, whose Idea is in me, (i. e.) an infinite essence actually possessing all perfections, which though I cannot compre∣hend, yet in some degree I can, with humility and veneration, speculate, through the perspective of profound and abstracted Cogitation.

SECT. III.

NOw in consideration that many of those Metaphysical Terms, and singular expressions, which I have been forced to make use of in the precedent demonstration of the Existence of God, may be conceived either too difficult for the unriper sort of heads, or at least ambiguous, and therefore subject to perversion, as not being sufficiently adequate and restrained to those notions, to which I have applied them; I have thought it requisite to subjoyn the particular Explanation, or proper definition of each, that I could beleive subject to obscurity, or exception.

In the word Cogitation, I comprehend whatsoever is so con∣tained in us, that we are immediately conscious thereof. Thus all * 1.20 the operations of the Will, Intellect, Imagination, and Senses fall under this one notion of Cogitations: and the particle im∣mediately, I have annexed to exclude all those things, that are consequent to these operations, as motion voluntary hath Cogita∣tion for its original, but is it self plainly distinct from cogitation.

••y an Idea, I understand that forme of any Cogitation, by the immediate perception whereof I come to be fully conscious * 1.21 of that particular cogitation; so that I can express no one thing in words, when I understand what I speak, but from thence it is made evident unto me, that I have in me the particular Idea of

that thing, which I signifie by those words. And so I doe not call only those Images depicted or engraven on my Pharisie, Ideas: yea, in this discourse, I doe not allow them to be Ideas as they are depicted in my Phansy corporeal, i. e. in any parcel of my brain; but only as they serve, as certain characters, to in∣forme my minde, when converted upon that part of my brain, where my phansie is seated.

By the objective reality of an Idea, I intend the Entity of that thing represented by that Idea. And according to the same in∣tention, * 1.22 we may say, the Perfection objective, or Artisice ob∣jective, &c. For whatever things we perceive as in the objects of Ideas, the same things in every particular are objectively included in the Ideas of those objects.

The same things are said to be Formally in the objects of Ideas, * 1.23 when they are truly such in them, as we perceive them to be, or when our Ideas expresly respond to their nature: and Eminently, when they are not indeed Talia, but Tanta, equivalent, inso∣much that they may be their convenient substitutes, or serve in their rooms.

A Substance signifies any thing wherein, as in subjecto, is im∣mediately * 1.24 inherent any Quality, or Attribute, whose Idea is in us; or upon which any thing, that we perceive, immediately de∣pends for its existence. For we can have no other Idea of a sub∣stance, precisely so taken, more then this; that it is a thing, wherein either Formally, or Eminently that something which we perceive, or which is objectively in any of our Ideas, hath its ne∣cessary existence: why? because the light of Nature makes au∣thentick that Axiome, Nullum esse nihili reale attributum; or, as Aristotle, Non-ent is non sunt Accidentia.

By the terme Mens, the Mind, I import a substance, whose prime Attribute is Cogitation; for in this place I speak rather of * 1.25 the Mind, then of the Soul, in regard the word Soul is equivocal, and frequently used to express something corporeal.

By a Body is implied that Substance which is the immediate * 1.26 subject of extension local, and other accidents, which presuppose extension, as Figure, Situation, local Motion, &c.

Two substances are said to be really distinguish't, when each * 1.27 of them can realy subsist without the assistance of the other.

That substance, which we understand to be supremely perfect, and wherein we perceive no defect, or limitation of perfection * 1.28 to be involved, is that we call God.

SECT. IV.

THe Achilles, or most potent objection, which not only the * 1.29 feirce Militia of the Pulpit; but even such more temperate heads, as have not been refined to a height sufficient to admit the tincture of abstracted and immaterial notions, may send to en∣counter my Assertion, That I have a clear, distinct, and true Idea of God in my mind, is this: Infinitum, quà infinitum, est ig∣notum, that God being infinite, and therefore incomprehensible, tis impossible for man, while his intellect is muffled up in flesh, to have a clear and distinct Idea of his Being. To instance in a thing, betwixt which and the infinity of God is a vast disparity; let the most Geometrical wit in the World think with the most serious, midnight and fixt attention, upon a Chiliagon, or figure with a 1000 Angles: yet shall he acquire in his mind, but a dark and confused representation or modell thereof, and cannot di∣stinctly either adumbrate or conceive that chiliagonicall figure; because he doth not particularly and totally speculate each one of the 1000 sides, or lateral lines, of which it doth consist. And if so, well may it be doubted, how I can conceive the Idea of an In∣finite, distinctly and without confusion; when I cannot exalt my thoughts to survey all those innumerable perfections, which meet together to the constitution of its infinity.

This doubt I must welcome, and honour, as the laudable * 1.30 effect of that due veneration, or noble zeal, which ought to be

kindled in every brest, upon the sense of that immense dispropor∣tion betwixt the invisibility, infinity, and incomprehensibility of the Creator; and the narrow extent, or, indeed, the comparative nothing of the Creature; nor can I think the debasement of our own limited nature, other then a pious and worthy cognizance of the majesty and incircumscription of his: yet to satisfie, that none can have a more lively apprehension of his own frailties, infirmities and defects, nor a greater esteem of the excellencies and accom∣plishments of God, then my self; and that I more then once look't upon, and throughly examined the weight of this scruple, long before I thought it safe to acquiesce in the Affirmative, I thus answer.

An Infinite, quatenus an infinite, can, in troth, by no means * 1.31 be comprehended; and yet nevertheless it may be understood: in∣somuch as clearly and distinctly to understand the nature of any thing to be such, as that no limits, terminations, or circumscripti∣ons can be found therein; is clearly and distinctly to understand the same to be infinite. And heer I distinguish betwixt Indefini∣tum and Infinitum; calling, properly and precisely, that an in∣finite, in which no limits, terms, or ends can be, on any part, discovered; in which acceptation, God is only infinite: but such things, wherein, under some latitude of reason only, I ac∣knowledge no end or termination; such are the extensions of the imaginary space without Trismegistus his circle, or on the outside of the world; the multitude of Numbers; the divisibili∣ty of the parts of quantity, &c. such I call Indefinite, and not in∣finite, because on some part they must confess a finality, or ter∣mination.

Again, I put a difference between the Formal Reason, or Insi∣nity * 1.32 of an infinite; and the subject of that infinity, or thing which is infinite. Now, as for the Infinity; though we under∣stand that to be most Positive; yet we cannot understand it but only by a kind of Negation, viz. from hence, that we can dis∣cover no limitation in the thing: but as for the subject of this infinity, or infinite thing, we understand it Positively, but not adequately (i. e.) we doe not comprehend all that is intelligible in that thing. Thus when we cast our eyes upon the Sea, though our

sight cannot extend to all and every part thereof, nor measure every inch of its immense vastity; yet may we be properly said to behold the sea. And if we look upon it at a great distance, so that our eyes seem to take it in all at once, we doe not see it but dimly and confusedly, as it were in a thin, blew landskip; as al∣so we doe not imagine a Chiliagon but obscurely and in fractures, when we comprehend all the lateral lines thereof at once: yet if we approach the sea at a very vicine distance, and earnestly fixe our eyes upon any one part thereof, such a vision may be clear and distinct, as also may the imagination of a Chiliagon, if our Phansie extend to no more, then one or two of the sides thereof at once. By the same reason, that God cannot be comprehended by the narrow mind of man, I willingly grant with all the school-men; nor can he be distinctly understood by those, who unadvi∣sedly endevour to comprehend him all at once, and as it were to gaze upon him a far off; in which laudable sense, the most sub∣tile D^r Thom. Aquin. affirmed, Cognoscere Deum esse in aliquo communi, sub quadam confusione, in quantum scilicet Deus est hominis beatitudo, id naturaliter nobis insertum est, that the cog∣nition of the Being of God, is implanted in our minds, under a certain confusion, or cloudy representation▪ but whoever, with a praevious awe, and becoming reverence, shall endevour to single out his perfections, contemplate each successively, not so much to comprehend them, as to be comprehended by them, and im∣ploy all the nerves of their intellect (sequestred from the contagi∣on of sensibility and Corporeity) in the long and wary speculati∣on of them: such happy persons shall assuredly find in him more satisfactory, ample, and easie matter of clear and distinct cogni∣tion, then in all the world beside.

Thirdly, I discriminate an Intellection Adequate, from an In∣tellection Gradual, or conforme to the slender capacity of man. * 1.33 For the First, twere madness beyond the power of Hellebor for any man to dream, that he could understand an Infinite, Conce∣ptu adaequato, by a comprehension fully as large, and exactly pro∣portionate unto that Infinite; nay it may be a very hard question, whether the armes of our understanding be long enough to com∣mensurate the full nature of any Finite object, though nere so

small, by an Idea exactly respondent, and equal in all points: for the other, every sober man is able to find within himself, that the wings of his mind are not so clipt, as that it cannot aspire to the Gradual cognition of an Infinite, finita & ad modulum hu∣mani ingenii accommodata cognitione. If any shall pervert this Distinction to so sinister a latitude, as to retort; that when I confess my understanding too shallow and dark to comprehend an infinite, Conceptu adaequato, I doe at the same time implicitely concede, that I can know no more then a part of an infinite, and indeed the least part which can be said to carry the representation of an infinite no more then the effigies of one single hair to repre∣sent the whole body of a man: I shall smoothly rejoyne, that to affirme, that if we fully comprehend any thing, that thing must be infinite, is a plain and obvious contradiction in terminis; since the Idea of an infinite, if true, cannot be comprehended, Incom∣prehensibility being the formal attribute of an infinite; and yet nevertheless it is evident, that the Idea, which we have of an in∣finite, doth resemble not only some one particular part, but even really and truly the whole thereof, eo modo, quo re∣praesentari debet per humanam ideam, though doubtless a far more accurate and distinct, (i. e.) perfect Idea may be allow∣ed to be in the more luminous and clear intellect of God, of Angels, or other natures more intelligent then man. Thus we doubt not, but a Clown, who never heard of Euclid, or learned one Axiome in Geometry, may notwithstanding have in his mind the Idea of a whole Triangle, when he is once instructed, that a Triangle is a Figure comprehended in three lines, though he remain ignorant of many other things, which a learned Geometrician knowes intelligible in that Figure, and insatiate∣ly speculates in the Idea thereof: for, as to understand a figure included in three lines, is sufficient to acquire the Idea of a whole Triangle; so also to understand a thing not to be comprehended or terminated by any limits or ends, is sufficient to the acquisition of a true and entire Idea of the whole infinite.

This Idea you have of God, is no more then Ens rationis, a * 1.34 meer figment, or Chimaera, that hath no existence at all but in your intellect; and therefore hath no more of perfection, or reality objective then your own mind that framed it.

Ens rationis hath a double signification; (1.) it imports a meer abstracted Notion, devoid of all reality, or a pure Non∣entity; (2.) it signifies every operation of the intellect, or, more plainly, Ens a ratione profectum: in which acceptation, the whole World may be properly styled Ens rationis divinae, or an entity created by a simple and pure act of the divine intellect. Now in this last sense only can I allow that transcendent Idea of God to be Ens rationis, a clear and distinct representation of the most perfect Being, engraven by his own finger upon my understanding: and to that unprevaricate judgment, that shall maturely perpend the contents, and logical connexion of our precedent meditation, it will plainly appear, that we intend such a Perfection, or reality objective in this Idea, which (no less then that Artifice objective, which is in the Idea of any engine most ingeniously fabricated) requires a Cause, wherein all that is really and formally contained, which is included in the Idea only objectively, and at second hand, or by reflexion.

Though we grant your Thesis, that this Idea hath more of Perfection, or objective reality, then your Mind: yet cannot * 1.35 your Assumption stand, that therefore your Mind cannot be the Author of this Idea; since an Effect may have a degree of Per∣fection, or reality, which neither is, nor ever was in the Cause thereof. To instance, common observation teacheth, that Flies, Frogs, &c. insects, as also some Plants are generated by the Sun, rain, and earth mutually cooperating by a kind of seminal con∣fermentation, or fertile putrefaction; and yet in neither of those causes will any man allow so high a Perfection, as that of Vitali∣ty: Ergo, &c.

My Inference is founded on the rock of reason, and therefore * 1.36 too impregnable to be demolished by so feeble a battery. For first, it is indubitate, that there can be no Perfection in Animals de∣voyd

of reason, which is not also in bodies devoyd of Anima∣tion; or if there were, that Perfection must be extradvenient, or derived unto them from some forreign principle: nor are the Sun, rain, and earth the Adequate Causes of Insects, or Animals whose produ••••ion is spontaneous and without other seminalitie, then that analogous sperme of corruption; and it sounds discor∣dant in the harmonious ears of logick for any man, only because he is ignorant of any other Cause that may conduce to the gene∣ra••ion of an insect, (i. e.) hath so many degrees of perfection, as as an Insect hath, therefore to stagger the truth of an Axiome ra∣tified by the Light of Nature. For, Quod nihil sit in effectu, quod non vel simili, vel eminentiori aliquo modo praeextiterit in causa, is a First notion, at which no man can quarel▪ but he must implicitely abjure his own reason: nor doth the ancient and vulgar maxime, à nihilo nihil sieri, differ from it, but only in terminis; because if it be conceded, that any thing is found in the effect, which cannot be found in its cause, it must also be conceded, that this something was made by nothing; nor am I convinced why nothing may not be the cause of something, but only from this evidence to the contrary, that in such a cause there would not be the same, nor any thing equivalent unto that, which is in the effect. Secondly, that my Mind cannot be the Efficient cause of this transcendent Idea, needs neither declarement, nor support, other then this canonical position; that whatsoever reality or perfection is only objectively in our Ideas, must be either formally, or at least eminently in their prototypes, or originals: and upon this one pin hangs all the certification, or assurance, that any man can have of the real existence of any other thing in the world (the supreme Being only excepted) besides himself; for from what hint could we have suspected, that such or such things are existent, without the orb of our own nature, but only from this: that their Idea, or representations have been conveyed into our minds, by the organs of our senses? And that we have a certain Idea, or umbrage of the most potent and most perfect Being; as also, that the Reality objective of this Idea is so excellent, as that it cannot be discovered to be in us either Formally, or Eminently: will be so clear, serene, and orthodox a truth, as to be sworne to

by any, who with thoughts sufficiently constant and attentive (for it is a chief Postulate, or requisite condition on the behalfe of any man, that intends his own satisfact••on in this abstruse particular, ut diu multumque in natura Ent is summe perfecti contemplanda immoretur) shall be pleased to consort their meditations with mine upon this excellent and most necessary subject. For tis not in the power of my pen to obtrude that notion upon any man, the admission and retention whereof immediately depend upon his own cogitation; I mean an assurance of the certitude of this demonstration, when he is resolved not to be divorced from that uncomely grandmother of Error, Prejudice; nor to open the ears of his beleif to the most prevalent charms of argument, or taste those limpid streams, which slow from the fount of all our knowledge, the Light of Nature.

Whereas, upon a profound and calme consideration of all, and * 1.37 each of those Attributes enumerated in your description of that excellent Idea, which you pretend to have of God; as that he is a substance, infinite, independent, superlatively both intelligent and potent by which your self and all the world was created, &c. we find it not demonstratively necessary, that the Idea of such an Ens, wherein all those perfections are concentred and united, should be implanted in your mind immediately by that Ens: we conclude that it may be framed and composed of your several Collections from other external objects. To descend to particu∣lars. (1.) When by the word God, you understand a Substance; Reason, not any Idea, assures you, that God doth exist: Substance and Existence being twins, that cannot live but conjoyned hand in hand. (2.) From the notion Infinite, (i. e.) something that you cannot comprehend nor imagine any limits, or extremes there∣in, so as that your thoughts can ever arrive at a Ne ul••ra: there ariseth unto your mind an Idea not of an Infinity divine; but of the termination or circumscription of your finite nature. (3.) In∣dependent sounds no more then this, that you cannot conceive, or imagine any cause or original of God: from whence tis mani∣fest, that from the terme Independent, you can collect no other Idea, but the memory of your own Ideas, which had their several

originations at such and such times, and therefore are dependent▪ Wherefore, to say that God is independent, is nothing more then that God is in the number of those things, of which you can imagine no original, or Cause: as also, to say that God is infinite, is all one, in the import, with this, that God is in the catalogue of those things, wherein your thoughts can discover no end limitation, or circumscription. And thus every Idea of God is excluded; for what Idea can there be, without either original, or termination? (4.) Superlatively Intelligent; here we de∣sire to be informed, by what kind of Idea you understand the Intellection of God? (5.) Most potent; here also we require by what Idea you can understand potency, which imports things in futuro only, and therefore not existent? undoubtedly we ascend to the cognition of power, by the steps of Memory, and reflexion upon former actions, progressing by the conduct of Ratiocination, thus; thus he hath done, ergo he had power thus to doe, ergo being still the same, he hath power to doe the like again in the fu∣ture. Now all these are Ideas, which may be extracted from ex∣ternal objects. (6.) Creator of all things; we can pourtray to our selves a certain resemblance of a Creation, by drawing the re∣flexions of those things we have seen with our eyes; as when we imagine a man beginning and growing as it were from a point to that figure and magnitude, which he hath in his full stature or vi∣rility: nor are we perswaded that any man can have other Idea then this, at the word Creator; but yet that we can imagine the world to be created, is no obliging argument to prove the crea∣tion. And therefore, though it had been demonstrated by you, that something Infinite, Independent, &c. doth exist; yet could it be no genuine inference, that therefore a Creator doth exist; unless you shall adventure to undertake the justification of this argument; something is existent, which we beleive to have crea∣ted all things beside it self; ergo the world was once created by that something. In fine, when you affirme that the Idea of God, as also of your own Soul, is implantate in and congenial to your Essence, we desire to be instructed, whether the souls of men, when they sleep most profoundly and without dreams, exercise their faculty of Cogitation; or more plainly, whether they think?

if no, then at such times they have no Ideas: and therefore no Idea can be innate, or congenial, for what ever is innate, is al∣ways present.

To the first part of this objection I answer in general; that no one of those Attributes, which belong to my Idea of the supreme * 1.38 Being, can possibly be desumed from External objects, as from an original, or primitive exemplar: because in God we can find no∣thing which holds any analogy, or similitude to those things that are in Corporeal Entities; but whatsoever we contemplate in our Ideas that is dissimilar or disproportionate to corporeal natures, that must proceed not from them but from the cause of that di∣versity in our cogitation. And here I demand, how any man can deduce the Idea of the Intellection of God from corporeal ob∣jects? but what kind of Idea I have thereof, I fully explain, when I say, that by an Idea I intimate all that, which is the forme of any perception: and who is there, that doth not perceive (the Philosopher calls it a reflex act of the intellect) that he doth un∣derstand the nature of this or that object, upon which his cogita∣tions is acting; and by consequence, who hath not an Idea of his own Intellection, which by indefinite extending of it, he forms to an Idea of the divine Intellection, and so of all other of his Attributes?

To the other part I return, in breif; that whereas I have made use of the Idea of God, which is impressed upon the mind of man, as an invincible argument to demonstrate the existence of God; and that in this Idea so immense a Potency is included, that we may understand it to be repugnant to reason, if God doth exist, that any thing besides him in the world can exist unless it be crea∣ted by him, and dependent upon him: it cannot but appear a direct and just induction, that the whole world, or all things else which are in being besides God, were created by him. To untie the last knot concerning the eclipse of this Idea of God, in our midnight sleeps, when all our Faculties disappear; it is required only that I advertise the Reader, that when I affirme that there is a certain Idea of God innate and congenial to us, I doe not mean that this Idea is always obversant, or constantly held forth to the eyes of our mind; for in that sense no Idea can be innate: but only that we have within us a certain Faculty or Power istam

ideam eliciendi, of extracting it; or that by the dignity of our Essence, we are empower'd to speculate that Impress or Signature of the Deity, when we convert our cogitations attentively upon it.

Though we should applaud your superstructure, that the Idea of God is not to be desumed from any other cause but himself; * 1.39 yet can we not but suspect the stability of your Corner-stone, or capital reason thereof, viz. that nothing can be superadded unto, nothing detracted from that Idea. And toward the subversion of it, we need adferre no greater an engine, then our friendly advice, that you would consider how smal a garden-plot of science, well manured, may in process of time be enlarged into a spacious cam∣pania; that tis not impossible for you to be informed, either by men more learned then your self, or by the extraordinary revela∣tion of Angels, or some other communication from other natures more intelligent then man, of many more perfections or Attri∣butes in God, then you have hitherto discovered: that God him∣self may be pleased, by the irradiations of his sacred Spirit, so to illuminate your intellect even in this life of ignorance, as to afford you a brightet reflex of his glories, and so augment your know∣ledge of his excellencies: that your Soul, when she shall have the dark curtain of flesh withdrawn by the rough hand of death, and be advanced to the Beatifical vision; shall know so much more of Divinity, then what you can apprehend now, that in compari∣son thereof your present Idea of it, may well be accompted im∣perfect, and therefore capable of addition: that in your infancy you perceived no such Idea at all; at least it was not so accurate and perfect as at this day, when it hath received the accesses of your more learned speculations: in short, that as you have not attained a full cognition of the perfections of inferior essences, nor can ever hope for it, at once, but must ascend by the successive gradations of new discoveries; so can you not acquire a full cog∣nition of the Perfections of the supreme Ens, at once, but may have your Idea of him made more and more perfect every day, by new additions.

When you reprehend this tenent of mine, that the Idea of God engraven on the mind of man, is uncapable either of Addition, * 1.40

or Substraction, you seem to have no regard to that Rule amongst Philosophers, Essentias rerum esse indivisibiles. For an Idea represents the Essence of a thing; to which, if ought be added, or from which, if ought be substracted, instantly it becomes the Idea of another thing. And by reason of their ignorance of this truth, the Heathen, not conceiving aright of the true God, fell in∣to the wofull delusion of framing to themselves the Ideas of false ones, and chiefly that of Pandora, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in whom all the endowments, or excellen∣cies of all other gods were concentred. But when once we have conceived the Idea of the true God, however more and more perfections may be revealed unto us, which were not formerly known to be in him, yet neverthelesse is not the Idea of him therefore Augmented, but onely made more distinct and ex∣press: in regard all those Accomplishments ought to be compri∣sed in the same Idea first conceived, insomuch as it is supposed to have been true from the very first conception. Thus the Idea of a Triangle receives no inlargement, when severall proprieties are discovered to be therein, which were at first unknown. Nor is our Idea of the Divine Nature formed by us in parcels, or by sensible additions, out of the various perfections or endowments of the Creatures, amassed together, and multiplyed up to the rate of su∣pernaturall: but springs up to us in a moment, perfect and entire, from this one root; that we understand him to be an infinite Ens, so perfect as to be above all amplification, or accesse of more per∣fection. * 1.41

Hitherto you have well calmed all those tumults of Doubts, which arose within us upon the Lecture of your Demonstration of the Existence of God: but yet there remain some few, though considerable scruples, the full and clear solution whereof is requi∣red from you, before you can with reason expect to bring us over to your side.

If the Idea of God be imprest upon you, as a mark or signa∣ture set by an Artificer upon the work of his hands; what is the Modus of that impression? What the Form of that mark? by what means can you discern it? if it be not a thing distinct from

the work it self, from your rational Soul, or Mind; is your Soul then the Idea? is your Mind nought else, but Modus cogitandi, a certain manner of thinking? can your mind be both the signa∣ture impressed, and the subjectum impressionis, or matter upon which it is impre'st? Credible it is, say you, that you are made after the similitude of God: True, by a religious Faith elemented in us by the doctrine of Holy Writ; but how can you make it out from Natural Reason, vnlesse you adventure to make God Hominiforme, like to man? And wherein can that similitude, or typicall analogie consist? Dare you, being a grosse Corporeal Ens, poor despicable Dust and Ashes, presume to resemble your self to that Eternal, Incorporeal, Immense, most Perfect, most Glorious, and (what is of most weight in this particular) Invisible and Incomprehensible Essence? Have you beheld him face to face? Nay, with Moses in the cleft of the rock, have you seen so much as his back parts; so that you are able to describe his a∣spect, and make good the Comparison? But you averre, that tis credible for this reason, Quia creavit; now we retort upon you, that tis therefore incredible: since there is no necessity that the Work should be like its Maker, unlesse in the point of Gene∣ration, where the Production receives a communication of the same nature, that is in the Productor: but you were not Genera∣ted by God, nor because he was your Efficient, can you safely in∣ferre, that therefore you are participant of his Nature; but you were onely created, fashioned by him, according to the exemplar or Idea, which was in the Divine Intellect from all eternity. So it remains, that you have no more justifiable pretence, to affirm that you are like him; then an Engine hath to be thought to bear the image of the Engineer, then a house hath to be conceived like to the Mason, or Carpenter that built it.

Further, (not to supersede a jot of your own sense, which may conduce to the illustration of your Position) you subjoyn, that you plainly perceive the similitude twixt God and Man, when you understand your self to be an Ens incompleat, dependent up∣on some superiour Principle, and indefinitely aspiring to greater and better things: now in our judgement, this is an undeniable ar∣gument of a vast disparity and Dissimilitude, since God, on the

contrary is most complete, most independent, most self-sufficient, as being Maximus & Optimus. In very sooth, a Comparison 'twixt Light and Darkness, 'twixt Heaven and Hell, 'twixt Good and Evil, 'twixt a Spirit and a Body, 'twixt Something and Nothing, may be better endured; as importing infinitely less of Absurdity, infinitely less of Impossibility. In fine, it cannot sound lesse then a Miracle, that other men should not un∣derstand the same that you doe; and chiefly when there is no rea∣son alleadged, why we may not beleive, that God hath impressed the Effigies of his Essence upon others, as well as upon you. We profess, this one argument convinceth us, that the Idea of God is not imprest upon the mind of man, immediately by himself, as a signature, or Characterism to confesse our Creation; viz. that if it were, the Impress would be one and the same in all men; that all men would then conceive God under the same Form and Idea; would allow him the same Attributes; would have the same thoughts of him in all points. But that all Nations, Ages, Reli∣gions, nay and Persons have had various and distinct Ideas of the Divine Nature: is so manifest upon the oath of Experience, that we may well here be silent, as to any other attestation.

When you require me to prove, that the Idea of God is im∣prest upon the mind of man, as a Mark or Signature set by the Maker upon the Work of his hands; and what is the Manner of that Impression; or what the Form of that Mark: I appeal to the decision of any sober Arbiter, whether it be not the same thing, as if, when I had surveyed an excellent Picture, and depre∣hended so much rare art and exquisite skill therein, that I could not judge it to be drawn by any hand but that incomparable one of Apelles; I should affirm that this inimitable Artifice, or per∣fection never to be paralleled, was a certain Mark, or note of Distinction, set by Apelles to all his pieces, whereby they may be discerned from the ruder draughts of other pencils: and you should notwithstanding press me to tell you, what's the Form of that Mark, or Manner of that Signal? Doubtless, such a Que∣stion deserves no other answer but a smile.

Again, to pursue the same adequate Simile, put the case, that

I should averre, that the singular Art, and unrivald skill, where∣by as an infallible sign, the Pictures of Apelles are distinct from the courser paintings of all others in the World; is nothing real∣ly distinct from the Pictures themselves; and that you should ca∣vill at my assertion, and by irregular Logick inferre, that there∣fore those Pictures are nought else but the Artifice or Skill, in an abstracted acception, and so are composed of no matter: Ergo they are onely Modi pingendi, certain manners of painting, &c. Would not your argument be equally both as just and acute, as when you shall thus reason; If there be no distinction between the Idea of God engraven on your Mind, and your mind the sub∣ject, to recipient of this engravement; then is your Mind the Idea, and your self nothing but Modus cogitandi, then are you both the Mark imprest, and the subject of the Impression? I profess sincerely, after a due perpension, I cannot determine, which of the two Inductions carries the greater weight in the impartial ba∣lance of right reason: sure I am, that the Analogie stands fair and even in all points.

Nor can your Contradiction of that vetust and almost Catho∣lick Article, Hominem esse Dei Charagma, that man is made af∣ter the Image of God, founded upon a collection of those various particulars, whereby the Humane Nature is discrepant from the Divine, be found more Dialecticall, or perswasory, then this fee∣ble, because preposterous Enunciation. If any Picture drawn by Apelles did ever exactly resemble Alexander, then was A∣lexander in all parts exactly like that Picture: but the Picture was made up of severall different ingredients or materials, as di∣vers Colours, oyle, wood, vernish, &c. and Alexander compo∣sed of skin, flesh, bones, hair, &c. Ergo, no picture was ever like Alexander, the Disparity between his nature, and the nature of a Picture, being so great, as never to be reconciled in a full analogie. For every temperate brain knows full well, that it is not required to the Formality of an Image, or Pourtracture, to be the same in all points with the Antitype, or Original; but onely that it resem∣ble in some: and we all submit to this Manifest, that that most perfect Faculty (so I speak as not being ignorant, that all the At∣tributes of God are in him Actually; but wanting a word more

significant and convenient to this notion) of cogitation, which we understand to be in God, is in some sort fitly represented by that imperfect one, which is in Man. Further, I cannot but point ob∣liquely at your imprudence, in chosing rather to compare the Cre∣ation of Man by God, with the Mechanick operation of a Mason, or Carpenter, then with the Generation of a Parent; since no pre∣text of reason can justifie that unmannerly Conserence. For though those three manners of acting, Creation, Generation, Fa∣brefaction, stand a whole Genus wide of each from other, and can never be brought neerer then the swords point: yet to argue from a Production Natural to a Divine, is, by a whole climate, a neerer way, then from an Artificial. Again, (to leave no point of a scruple unresolved) though I have long since assented, that the resemblance betwixt God and Man, is not so great as that be∣twixt a Parent and his issue; yet cannot I be brought to hold it impossible, that an operation should ever be inriched with the Ef∣figies of the operator; since Experience whispers me, that I have seen a statuary carve his own statue, out of white Marble, aswell in the proportion and symmetry, as lineaments of each part, so exquisitely resembling, that every common-eye knew him aswell by his Statue, as his statue by him. Nor is your Memory more faithfull, then your Iudgement profound; for when you accuse me to have said, that I evidently perceive the similitude betwixt God and Man, from hence, that I understand my self to be an Ens incomplete, dependent, &c. You make but a confused and perverse rehearsal of my words, which placed in their proper order express the Antitheton, or quite contrary, viz. that from the Imperfection, Subordination, and depending of my own nature, I deduced the highest Perfection, Supremacy, and Indopedency of Gods; that whereas it was essential to me uncessantly to aspire to greater and better things, and that those greater and better things are actually inherent in God: therefore had I in me something of Assinity to those greater and better things, by the incitement whereof I become ambitious and aspiring to them. And truly, this I inserted as an unquestionable remonstrance of the infinite Dissi∣militude, which I understood to be betwixt Divinity and Hu∣manity; with design to prevent both misapprehension and scan∣dal,

to both which, otherwise I had some reason to conceive my self obnoxious. Finally, whereas you make it no less then a won∣der, why all men in general should not understand the same At∣tributes in God, that I doe; since if the Idea of his Divinity be imprest universally and equally, upon the Minds of men, every one hath as great a privilege, by the Charter of his Essence, to speculate the same, as my self: in sober truth you may with equal reason wonder, that since all men know the Idea of a Triangle, why all men doe not yet perceive as many Proprieties and Per∣fections in that figure, as learned Geometricians doe; and why some reason truly, others falsly upon that Idea.

CHAP. II.

That God created the world ex nihilo, proved by Arguments Apodictical.

SECT. I.

THe Existence of God being amply Demonstrated, 'tis a natural consequence, that the whole World, * 1.42 and all things existent therein besides himself, were Created by him. For those Attributes, Omnipo∣tence, Omniscience, and Independence, which are particularly, and in association required to that great Act of Creation, are all (together with all other Perfections, that lie in the ken of mans Cogitation) comprised under the Idea, which we hold of his Essence. Nor can any man deny, that every single En∣tity in the vast ark of the Universe, was created by, and holds its existence by dependence upon God; unless he shall have first de∣nyed, that God doth exist: which our precedent Demonstration hath made appear to be impossible. For at the same time he de∣nies, that God doth exist, he unavoidably precipitates himself into an Absurdity, implicitely denying that himself doth exist: which his very act of denyal contradicts; since, had he no exi∣stence, he could not deny; all men embracing that Axiome, Non-entis non sunt Actus. * 1.43

Upon a serious perpension of the irresistible pressure or weight of this plain and genuine Inference, I once resolved to super∣sede all other Arguments of the Creation of the World out of nothing, by the sole and immediate Goodnesse, Wisdome, and

Power of the Supreme, because most perfect Being; especllialy when I converted my thoughts upon the almost Catholick be∣leif of this truth, every man, at least, every Christian, receiving and retaining it as an Article of Faith: but when my second and more advised meditations had whispered me, that most heads are so indurate by the frost of ignorance, as not to feel the soft touches of a Collaterall and enthymematicall Demonstration; as also, that my proper business was to evince by the testimony of meer Reason, what is commonly embraced upon the single aucto∣rity of Moses pen: I could not but conceive it necessary, in order to the plenary confutation of that as impious, as ridiculous Error of some antient Naturalists, that the World was made by Chance, or Fortune; to endevour the probation of the same, by other more direct and express means of perswasion, deduced from the Magna Charta of all temporal knowledge, the Light of Nature. Now that I may perform this, with that exactness, and satisfacti∣on, which is due to so excellent a subject; I am necessitated to be∣speak my Readers Patience to endure the recital, explanation, and examen of those specious reasons, which deluded the uncir∣cumspect and easie judgements of those unhappy Pagans, who sitting in the Philosophers chair, either founded, or supported, or repaired that detestable opinion, that Fortune was the Author and Architect of this admirable fabrick the Ʋniverse.

Epicurus (for him have I singled out, as the most notorious * 1.44 Patron, though not the Father of this execrable delusion; since the moniments of time assure the invention hereof upon his great Master, Leucippus) being great with a monstrous design to ex∣punge those Characters of Piety and reverence towards the Deity, which the observation of prodigious Meteors, of frequent Eclipses of the two great Lamps of heaven, of Thunder, and Coruscati∣ons, of Earthquakes, of the regular and constant motions of the Sphears, &c. had impressed upon the minds of men; as also to e∣radicate all conceit of the so-much talkt of Compensation of good and evil actions after death openly breaks forth into the in∣solent assertion of these three horrid positions; (1) Quod mun∣dus non sit à Deo constitutus, that the World was not constituted

by God; (2.) Quod mundus à Deo non gubernetur, that the World was not governed by God; (3.) Quod animus noster non supersit à funere, that the soul of man doth not survive the funeral of his body. The First he essayes to declare thus;

Exi∣stimare oportet mundos, uti & sinitam omnem concretionem in immenso inani factam, quidpiam simile cum iis, quas passim observamus, habentem, ortum ex infinita rerum universitate habuisse; & alios quidem majores, alios minores, per proprios quosdam Atomorum quasi Vortices (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) seu convolutio∣nes, seorsim procreatos, &c.

(in Epist. ad Herodotum apud Di∣ogen. Laert. lib. 10.) The substance of all which, and much more to the same intent, may be rendred more plainly thus. That the Celestiall orbs, and all their radiant Furniture the stars, are wheeld about, by a constant and even circumgyration; that they veer perpetually towards that point of the World, unto which they first inclin'd, and never change either the way, or tenor of their Circumvolutions; that they observe the same distance each from other, which they obtained at the instant of their Formati∣on, nor sink down upon, and so crowd or enterfeire each the other; that the Eclipses of the two great Luminaries necessarily succeed upon the conjunction of the same Causes, in our days, as in the infancy of Nature, and may therefore with so much facility, as certainty, be prognosticated and predicted by the rules of Astro∣nomy; in brief, that such and such determinate effects arise from the Concurrence and coefficiencies of such and such particular Causes, &c. all these we are not to referre to any other Principle, or Efficient, but that Fortune, whereby they were so and so dis∣posed in the first Casual Emergency of the World; nor are those constant and setled operations produced by any other necessity, then what fell to their Efficients, at the primitive segregation, con∣course, disposition, coadunation of those Atoms, whereof their bodies are compacted. That before the constitution of the Uni∣verse, there was an infinite Chaos of Atoms, of various figures and magnitudes, in an infinite space, floating hither and thither, hurried up and down, on all sides crowding, impelling, and just∣ling each other, by reason of the Tendency resulting from their own innate Gravity. That after a long, long afflux, reflux, con∣flux,

elevation, depression, coagmentation and other various and successive agitations and molitions of these Atoms, when each or∣der had chanced to confront and meet with others most consimi∣lar and convenient; then at last they all conspired, acquiesced, and fixed in this regular position and situation, which constitutes the Forme of the Universe; as Lucretius (who was deplorably infected with this accurst contagion of Epicurus) hath briesly ex∣prest it;

Quae quia multa modis multis vexata per omne Ex infinito vexantur percita plagis, Omne genus motus, & coetus experiundo, Tandem deveniunt iu tales disposituras, Qualibus haec rebus consist it summa creata, &c.

The Worlds Materials having first been tost, An infinite Time, within an infinite Roome, From this to that uncircumscribed coast, And made by their own Tendency to roame In various Motions; did at last quiesce In these Positions, which they now possess.

That upon the Diacrisis, or segregation of heterogeneal Atoms▪ succeeding upon a circumvolution, gyration, or vertiginous eddy of them, in the confusion of their eternal Chaos; the more gross and ponderous tended towards the Center, or downwards, and in their descent expressed the more gracile and lighter, and impel∣led them upwards, which convening all together in the circum∣ference of the immense vortex, wedged in each other into the form of an integument or cortex, called Coelum or heaven; but the more gross and weighty, crowding to the centrals, were there compacted and coagmentated into a solid mass the Earth: and the remaining matter of a midle nature, upon the concurse of its insensible particles assumed to it self the form of a Humid sub∣stance, and part thereof being afterward circumagitated uncessant∣ly, and so both tornated and calefacted, was graduated into many orbs of Light, the Sun, Moon and Stars: the residue being re∣served

for the compaction of other bodies; &c. And this, if my memory hath proved a faithfull Steward of my readings, is the marrow of Leucippus, Empedocles, Epicurus, and Democritus their doctrine concerning the spontaneous configuration of the Universe.

Tis proverbial amongst Scholars, and long since applyed by an Author of good repute (Aneponymus, in lib. de substant. phy∣sic.) * 1.45 to this particular Case; Nullam esse tam falsam opinionem, quae non habeat aliquid veri admistum; sed tamen illud admistione cujusdam falsi ••bscurari: that no opinion hath so much of fals∣hood, as not to contain some sprinkling of truth; though that spark of truth be so obscured by the cloud of prejudice arising from the discovery of the falsity admixt, that it may require the subtile and decisive judgement of an Oedipus for its discernment and sequestration. And in this heap of dross lies raked up so much pure and rich metall, as▪ if by the chymistry of an industri∣ous hand extracted, may more then fully compensate the pati∣ent Lecture of a short Digression.

In this old Romance of the spontaneous result of the World from a Casual segregation and disposition of that Abysse of A∣toms, which rowled up and down, to and fro, by an impetuous and continual inquietude, estuation, or civil war, caused by their ingenite propensity to motion, in the range of the infinite space; some things sound so harsh and discordant to meer Reason, as they are justly to be abominated; others carry the smooth face of so much Verisimility, as they deserve to be admitted, at least dili∣gently and impartially examined. The Positions we are to reject, are these; (1.) that the Chaos of Atoms was non-principiate, or as antient as Eternity: (2.) that they were not created ex nihilo, ab aliqua beata simul ac immortali Causa, by God: (3.) that they were not becalmd, separated, ranged, and disposed into their pro∣per stations, in that serene order and figure, which they are now of inevitable necessity bound to observe, in every single concreti∣on, or individual Entity, by the artifice of any other Cause, but the blind Ordination, or improvident disposure of Fortune. All which smells so strong of the Fable, and strikes the nosethrills as wel

of the meer Natural man, as the Pious, with such infectious stench, that nothing but the opportunity of confutation can excuse my coming so neer it. And yet notwithstanding, I have never yet found out any justifiable ground, why Atoms may not be repu∣ted Mundi materies, the Material Principle of the Universe, pro∣vided that we allow, that God created that first Matter out of Nothing; that his Wisdome modelled and cast them into that ex∣cellent composure or figure, which the visible World now holds; and that ever since, by reason of the impulsion of their native Ten∣dency, or primitive impression, they strictly conform to the laws of his beneplacuits, and punctually execute those several functi∣ons, which his almighty Will then charged upon their determi∣nate and specifical Concretions. For, with the advantage of these restrictions, the Atoms of Epicurus have more of probabi∣lity, and hold rational through most of those operations, which occurr to the curiosity of the Philosopher, with more familiarity to our conceptions, and less variation or apostasie from the first Hypothesis, then the impossible Materia Prima of Aristotle, then the Substantial Principle of Plato, the Hyle of the Stoicks, or, indeed, then any other imaginable Praeexistent in the immense space. And after a mature confronting, collation, and compa∣rative perpension, of the most general conveniences and congrui∣ties of all; we have found that, from the ground-work of Atoms, we are able to make out what is Material, what Corporeal, what Great, what Little, what Rare, Dense, &c. but from the others we could never deduce the formal attributes of a body, or substance, while the original of all things is determined absolutely devoyd both of Quantity and Quality Actual, and amounts to no higher a degree of reality, then a meer Privation; which a righteous enquiry will soon reduce to nothing.

Nor is that affrighting Dissiculty in the Theory of Atoms, which the eye of every Pedantick Sophister first glances upon, at the ve∣ry mention thereof, more then this shadow of a scruple; viz. how so vast a mass, as this Giant the Universe, could be made up of such minute particles, as Atoms, which every man understands to be much below the perception of sense, and never to be fatho∣med but by the subtile arms of the Intellect? For I dare entrust the

solution of it to any moderate judgement, that shall take the plea∣sure to conceive this Analytick Scale, or degradation of Magni∣tude. Let us grant the globe of Earth, which seems to contain most of corporeity, to be but one part of the Universe composed of many such masses congested, and the law of consequence will compell us to concede, that the globe of the earth may be coag∣mentated of many smaller masses piled one upon another, or of mountains, as Atlas, Caucasus &c. cemented together; that those Mountains may result from an aggregation of rocks, those rocks from an accumulation of stones, those stones from a con∣flux, and ferrumination of grains of sand, that sand from a lesser assembly of dust, that dust from a minor collection of Atoms. This granted, let us have recourse to that famous Demonstration of the glorious Archimed (in Aren.) whereby it is evicted, that twenty five Cyphers, or Arithmetical notes set in successive order, 100000 &c. do exhibite the full number of those Granules of sand, which suffice to make up the vast bulk of the World, ac∣cording to the vulgarly received magnitude thereof, though each of those granules be determined so exiguous, that one grain of Po∣pie seed may contain ten thousand of them. I say, according to the Magnitude vulgarly received; for if, with Aristarchus (whose opinion Copernicus, in the last age, revived) you shall goe higher, and enlarge the extension of the world: yet according to the Al∣gebra of Archimed, will no more then sixty four Cyphers be re∣quired to calculate the number of grains of sand, of the same di∣mensions with the former, which equal the almost incredible va∣stity of the Universe. Now, if you please to goe lower in the quan∣tity of those minute grains, and sink them down even to the tenui∣ty of an Atom; imagine that each of those small particles is com∣posed of ten hundred thousand Atoms, and advance this number by multiplying it into 64, and even then will the number of those particles be exprest by no more then 70. Lower yet, if you think your last division went not so far as insectility, dichotomize those minute particles each into ten hundred millions; and then, upon a just Multiplication made, the number provenient shall not ex∣ceed the reach of 76 Cyphers. Nay drive the matter so far, that your thoughts may even lose themselves in the pursuit; and you

shall still deprehend how easily you may be supplyed with Cy∣phers enough to fulfill the number of all those Atoms, which are necessary to the amassment of a bulk▪ equal to this of the World.

There is yet a fourth incongruity in this doctrine of Epicurus, worthy our explosion; viz. That Atoms had, from all eterni∣ty, a faculty of Motion, or impetuous tendency, inherent in them, and received not the same from any forreign principle, or impres∣sion extradvenient. But yet can I meet with no impediment, that may hinder me from conceiving, that Atoms are perpetually a∣ctive and moveable, by the agitation of that internal tendency, or virtual impression, which the Father of Nature conferred upon them, in the first moment of their miraculous production ex nihi∣lo. And truly, thus refined, the Hypothesis of Atoms is less guil∣ty of either inconvenience or incertitude, then any other concer∣ning the f••rst material principle; nay, it hath thus much more of congruity and satisfaction then all the rest, that it fitly declares the radical Cause of all Motion, activity or energie in second Causes, or natures once removed from the Primus Motor, God: which can by no means be commonstrated from any other suppo∣sition, with the like constancy, correspondence, and perspicuity; especially if we look upon that Form, which the Schools com∣monly conclude on, as the main spring in all motion, or efficient of all activity. For whatever of real Entity they allow to be therein, they desume from no other origine, but the simple and naked Matter: and yet, by unpardonable incircumspection, or forgetfulness, they make that Matter absolutely idle, and devoid of all Motive or active virtue.

Nor did Plato himself miss this consideration, but seems to have held the lamp to posterity, in this particular; for though he re∣strains not his notion to the word, Atoms, yet from his description of an Exiguity, Quam intellectus, non sensus capiat, and from the immediate subjunction of De multitudine illarum, dé{que} mo∣tionibus, alii▪sque facultatibus, congruum prorsus erat Deum providere, quatenus natura necessitati obediens ultrò obsecunda∣ret, &c. (in Timaeo) tis a lawful conjecture, that he pointed di∣rectly upon the sense. These short Animadversions premised, that we may as well supply the Defects, as correct the depravities

of this opinion of Epicurus; suppose we, in short, that God in the first act of his Wisdome and Power, out of the Tohu, or no∣thing, created such a proportionate congeries, or just mass of A∣toms, as was necessary to the constitution of the Universe: sup∣pose we also, that all those Atoms, in the instant of their creation received immediately from God a faculty of self-motion, and con∣sequently of concurring, crowding, justling, repelling, resilition, ex∣silition, and reciprocal complectence, concatenation revinction, &c. according to the respective preordination in the Divine Intellect: and then will all the subsequent operations of nature remain so clear and easie, that a meer Ethnick by the guidance of those two lamps, Sense and Ratiocination, may progress to a physical theo∣ry of them, and thereby salve all the Phaenomena's with less apo∣stasie from first Principles proposed, then by any other hypothe∣sis yet excogitated. A meer Ethnick, I say; for we, who have devolved unto us the inestimable blessing of Moses history of the Creation, have far other thoughts of that method or order, where∣in the World was founded, and finished by God: but the pure Natural man, who wants the illumination of sacred Writ, can follow no other conduct, but what, by the light of nature, appears most consonant to truth. My Digression is now ended, and I re∣turne to the discharge of my Assumption, the redargution of that blasphemous opinion, which ascribes the honour of the Worlds composure to Fortune.

SECT. II.

ANd first I oppose to the Patron of this error, the more noble * 1.46 Auctority of many antient and eminent Philosophers; who, though unhappily born and educated in the midnight of Paga∣nism, had yet their intellectuals, so irradiated by the refulgent Light of Nature, which their Vigilancy and assiduous Contem∣plation always kept, like the Vestal tapours, shining and uneclip∣sed by the Cimmerian foggs of Tradition and Prejudice, that they discovered more then a glimps of Divinity in the original of the World. For

Thales Milesius, being introduced by Diogenes Laertius (in vita ejusdem) as rendring a reason, Cur mundus sit pulcherrimus, * 1.47 of the extreme glory, comeliness, and decency of the World, and exact symmetry observed in all and every part thereof; most wise∣ly sets up his rest, and silences all further dispute, in this full soluti∣on, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, tis the Artifice of God.

That Anaxagoras had found out the same truth, by his retro∣grade tracing of nature up to her first head, or fountain; can be * 1.48 obscure to none, that shall doe his meditations so much right, as to interpret his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Mens, or supreme Intelligence, to be the same with that, which we call God: for even our School-men doe as much, frequently using those appellatives, Summa Intelligentia, and Deus, indifferently and as Synonomas.

Of Pythagoras and Plato we need no other record, then the sin∣gle testimony of Timaeus Locrus, who, being a famous Pythago∣rean, * 1.49 and therefore prudently deputed by Plato to deliver his own sense, in that golden Dialogue concerning Nature, (which in the Commentary of Marsilius Ficinus, signifies no more then Divinitatis instrumentum) in many passages of the debate, or investigation, takes occasion to declare, Deum esse Parentem ac opisicem mundi. Nor can it cost the study of many houres to col∣lect from Plato's other inquest into Divinity called Parmenides (who also was a disciple of Pythagoras) or De uno omnium prin∣cipio, and the now mentioned description of Nature, Timaeus, con∣ferred together; that both Pythagoras and Plato shook hands in that opinion, that the world had its beginning, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not in Time, in regard, as they conceived, it never had beginning, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but in Cogitation, i. e. though it be Non-prin∣cipiate, yet may our thoughts have the licence to assume that there was some praeexistent matter, out of which it was formed. For they both apprehended so absolute a dependence of the world upon God; that God being existent in the World, must of ne∣cessity be reputed the Efficient thereof, insomuch as the World could have no other Cause of its Matter, Distinction, Disposition,

Beauty and ornament. And is not this the same, that our Do∣ctors now admit, while they defend, that the World might have been created by God, had his Wisdome thought fit, from all E∣ternity; and if so, yet notwithstanding he must still have been the Cause of it, in regard of that necessary dependence of the World upon him, for if there were no God, there could be no World: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by the same reason, as though we grant the Sun to∣gether with its light, or a Seal together with its signature, to have been from all Eternity; yet must we grant the Sun to be the Cause of his light, and the Seal to be the Cause of its impression. For they condescend to this, that an Effect may be coaevous to its Cause; and that, though the Cause be not prior Tempore, it sufficeth that it be onely prior Natura, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is the very expressi∣on of Timaeus Locrus. However this may be disputed, yet sure I am, that as well these two Patriarchs of Learning, as all their Sectators and Interpreters were unanimous in this point, That God was Author of the Universe.

What the Stoicks thoughts were, concerning this grand parti∣cular; * 1.50 is publick, and cannot escape the cognizance of any, who have look't into the lives of the Scholiarchs, or Heads of that nu∣merous Sect, amply registred by the even pen of Diogen. Laert. or read Cicero's second Book, De natura Deorum, where he ele∣gantly personates Balbus smartly and profoundly disputing a∣gainst Velleius and Epicurus; whither I remit the unsatisfied Reader, in avoidance of Prolixity.

For the grand signieur of the Schools, Aristotle; truth is, I * 1.51 cannot conceal, that when he maintains (in 8. Physic. & priori∣bus de Coelo) the Universe to be ingenitum, without origination, and contemns that forementioned distinction of Priority, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as excogitated by Pythagoras, and continued by Plato, rather 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for the convenience of Do∣ctrine, then the interest of Truth: he is positive, that he could not admit the World to have had any Author at all; and therefore Simplicius (in 8. Physic. digress. 3.) chiding Philoponus for da∣ring to assert, that the World had its origin and production from

God, according to the testimony of Moses Chronicle, cries out that his doctrine was repugnant to the Fundamentals of his ora∣cle, Arist. and in some sort highly derogatory to the majesty of the assigned Productor; since it tacitly rendred him subject to that imperfection, Mutability, which is incompatible with the con∣stant simplicity of an Essence sufficiently accomplisht for so migh∣ty an action, and implies that he was not the same from all E∣ternity, and but lately became Parens, Conditórque mundi. But yet have I ground enough to stand upon, that Arist. grew wiser, as he grew elder, and that the flame of his reason shined brighter when that of his life burned dim; for in the last exercise of his pen, his book De mundo, which most Antiquaries conclude written in the close of his studies, (cap. 5. & 6.) he sings a palinodia, and makes open profession, that the universal harmony, consonance, and pulchritude of this great machine were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ab universorum Conditore: Confirming the verity of that pious A dage confest and pronounced by all men, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, All from God. That he hinted this from that oraculous Motto, fathered upon Zoroaster, that King and Magus of the antient Ba∣••trians, and contemporany to Ninus and Semiramis, as Eusebi∣us (lib. 10. de praep. Evangel. cap. 3.) accounts; Factor, qui per se operans, fabrifecit mundum doth not want its share of probability, insomuch as the monuments of the Chaldean Learning were ransackt by the Platonicks, and so came to the view of Aristotle, is manifest as well from the circumstance of Time, his life falling not much below the plunder of the Oriental Libraries, as from the Rhapsodies or Excerptions, which the Pytha∣goreans had made out of the relicts of Zoroaster and Trismegi∣stus, and transmitted down to the hands of Plato and his Scholars, who frequently inspersed them upon their own writings, a copious series of which sentential transcriptions hath been not long since be∣queathed to posterity by the bounty of Caesar Longinus. But however, I am inclined to beleive rather, that his second thoughts, and more advanced Contemplations on the excellency and glory of the structure, lighted him to this recantation, and enforced him to confess, that the fabrick of the world was too full of Wisdome and Providence, to have been performed by any thing below the

Highest: for tis warrantable for me to conjecture, that since he had his erudition, at least his education, at the feet of Plato, and so could not be ignorant of any Tradition of moment, which his Master knew; had his judgement been imbued with that lesson in his greener yeers, he could not well have stifled it till immediate∣ly before his death, especially when the knowledge of this great truth might have preserved him from that swarm of Difficulties, which he endured in maintaining his Thesis of the Non-producti∣on, or Eternity of the World. There are, I confess, who stiffely question the propriety of legitimation of this book, De Mundo, owning it upon some younger Composer; who ambitious to have the Minerva of his own colder brain, long lived in estimation, gave it the glorious name of Aristotle, and under the defence of that prosperous title, committed it to the encounter of Censure. To the satisfaction of these, I shall alledge a place or two out of those pieces, which have ever escaped the imputation of spurious; whereby the former sentence is so ratified, that Aristotle may ap∣pear to have had great indignation against their incogitancy and stupidity, who could beleive the world to be once produced, and yet ascribe the production thereof to Fortune. Dignum est, saith he, (in 2. Physic. cap. 4.) admiratione asserert istos, Animalia quidem & Plantas à Fortuna neque esse, neque fieri, sed aut na∣turam aut quandam mentem, aut quampiam aliam Causam ha∣bere (viz. non ex cujusvis semine quidvis nascitur, sed ex hoc quidem olea, ex illo vero homo) coelum autem, & quae sunt sensi∣bilium divinissima, sponte nata fuisse, nec causam ullam, qualem animalia plantaeque sortiuntur, habuisse.

Tis well worthy our admiration, how these men can affirm, that Animals and Plants neither proceed from, nor can be made by Fortune; but must have either Nature, or some Intelligence or other efficient (for the seminalities of things do not fly out in∣to promiscuous and indifferent Generations, but every distinct species hath its seed restrained and determined to the procreati∣on of its like: nor can the fructifying principle of an Olive de∣viate into the production of a Vine; or the sperm of man pro∣duce any thing but man) but as for the Heavens, and other peices of the world, which seem of farre greater alliance to Di∣vinity:

that these are spontaneous and casual in their originals, and have not obtained any Efficient to their Formations, equal to that of Animals or Plants.

And (in 1. de Anim. Part. c. 1.) he speaks expressely to the same purpose, though in other words; which, to prevent the further trouble of the Reader, I shall faith∣fully transcribe. Quamobrem verisimilius dixerim coelum & fa∣ctum esse ab ejusmodi causa; si factum est; & magis esse ob eam causam, quam Animalia caduca at que mortalia: ordo enim, cer∣túsque status-longe magis in ipsis rebus coelestibus, quam in nobis patet; incerta enim, et inconstans, fortuitáque conditio in gene∣re mortali est potius. At illi genus Animalium quódque natura constare, extitisséque censont; coelum autem ipsum Fortuna, spontéque ejusmodi constitisse volunt; in quo tamen nihil Fortu∣noe ac temeritatis deprehendi potest. Again, Caelius Rhodiginus (lib. 17. cap. 34. pag. 814) reports of him, that, though during the greatest part of his life he had ascribed all effects solely to se∣condary and inferiour Causes, yet immediately before his death, when his soul began to be weaned from sensibility, and feel her wings, he most earnestly implored the compassion and forgive∣nesse of the First and Supreme Cause, Primae causae misericordi∣am intentius implorabat, &c. To these I might have annexed a third text of Aristotle, selected by the Master of Roman Elo∣quence, and adaequately engraffed into his second discourse De Natura Deorum: but I conceived the two former to be testimo∣ny sufficient to the stability of my assertion, that he abhorred the absurd usurpation of Fortune.

Now if the meer Naturall Explorator shall but perpend both the Number and Dignity of these more venerable Professors of Science, wholly abating the weight of their Reasons; I cannot doubt, but he will finde them infinitely to overbalance the single School of Epicurus, and of reputation great enough to excuse the conformity of his judgement to theirs: if he look no higher then the point of Auctority.

SECT. III.

TIs no easie wonder, how any man, whose Faculties are not in * 1.52 disorder, nor the Oeconomie of his head subverted into a Wildness beyond the absurdities of Melancholy adust, can be infatuated into a conceit, that so great, so unform, so durable, so magnificent, and therefore so glorious a work, as this of the World, could be performed by the lesse then feeble, and ignorant hands of Nothing, of Fortune. For however it may be allowed, that this imaginary Deity, may produce some effects extraordinary or miraculous: yet how petite and inconsiderable are those at∣cheivements of Chance, if put in the scale against those more ad∣mirable performances of Reason and Wisdome? Suppose we, that Prodigies may arise from the unequal concurrence of dissimilar and disproportionate Actives and Passives; and Monsters be generated by the casual confusion of distinct seminalities, as well amongst Animals, as Plants: yet how incomparably more pro∣digious are those ordinary propagations in each Classis; which by the certain and invariable law of their peculiar species, are re∣strained to their determinate Forms, and whose Constancy ex∣cludes all pretence of Fortune, or the accidental Efficiency of Chance? I leave to the decision of every sober man, which hath most of the Miracle; that the seed of every Animal should be con∣sined to the procreation of its like in specie, for the most part; and that the Plastick Spirit thereof punctually observe the mo∣dell, or pattern of that Fabrick of the body, from whence it came: or that, upon a preposterous commixture of various and unequal seeds, once in an age; there should succeed the production of some new Heteroclite, or unpatternd Monster, whose Composition is onely contingent, and difform to the Idea of either its Active, or Passive Principle, in the simplicity of their divided Figures. And are not the exquisite Delineations of every Embryon, woven out by the subtile fingers of Archeus, or the Formative spirit; the multiplicity, distinction, elaboration of organs both external,

and internal; the severall Functions, and Offices assigned to those organs, and so artificially contrived, that every one is distinct, yet none independent; every one single, yet all conspiring to the same end, all operative, yet none (per se) locomotive: are not these certain and praeordinate effects, with innumerable others, the meanest whereof we cannot seriously think upon, without a rapture of amazement, more worthy our admiration, then a single irregu∣larity, a spontaneous Monster of Nilus, a bipartite Centaure, a prodigious Insect, &c. whose generations are accounted acciden∣tal, and their configurations not preordained, but the inconside∣rate and extemporary results of Fortune? Perhaps these stupid I∣dolaters of Chance will referre these constant and setled operati∣ons to Nature; but whatever they mean by Nature, how im∣mense a stock of Wisdom must it necessarily be endowed withall, which in all its works so cunningly contrives so great variety of organs, observes such exact Symmetry in all parts, so providently disposeth every member, and fits them to the easie execution of their predestinate functions? If they goe farther, and affirm, that Nature is nothing but the primitive Constitution of the World, which resulted from the casual separation, conflux, and dispositi∣on of its material principle, Atoms; and that it doth constantly persist in the same Method, which it first obtained from Fortune: the answer is easie, that though Nature be constant to that order, in all her productions, which the World obtained in its first com∣posure; yet how ridiculously stupid must he be, who can admit a serious perswasion, that the bodies of Animals, in the beginning could be so exquisitely configurated by meer Chance, and with∣out the direction and indeed the designement of an infinite Wis∣dome; in whose eternal intellect the prototypes of each species were first adumbrated? Let them object again, that every day affords examples of the skill of Fortune, in the production of Froggs, Toads, Flies, and other spontaneous Insects: and I shall soon return, that those Insects or spontaneous Animals have their Causes certain, and by reason of that energie once conferred up∣on their Efficients, must arise to animation in such or such a Fi∣gure, according to the magnitude, number, situation, comple∣xion, quiet, motion, or, in a word, the Temperament of those

particles, out of which their bodies are amassed; and according to the activity of that domestick Heat, which ferments and actu∣ates the matter: Secondly, that our debate is about the original of Nature it self, and of that precise Virtue radically implanted in the seeds of things; or more emphatically, what hand inocula∣ted that procreative power in each seminality, and endowed it with a capacity requisite to the conformation of bodies so admirable in their structure: if there were not some principle in the nonage of the Universe, who infused that Prolifical or fertile Tincture, ordai∣ned that scheme of members, and gave it rules to act by; from which it never fwerves, but upon a disobedience and non-con∣formity of matter. If we lookt no farther then the Cortex or Ex∣teriors of Animals; and there speculated as well the amiable comeliness of their Figures in the whole (for there is no real De∣formity in Nature) as the geometrical Analogie, or convenience betwixt the Members and their Actions, each being respectively configurated to the performance of its peculiar office: 'twere more then sufficient to discover to us the impossibility of their pri∣mitive institution by Fortune. But when we dissect them, prie in∣to their Entrals, and there survey the almost infinite multitude of organs, principal and subordinate; the variety of their uses, some being officiall to Nutrition, some to Vitality, some to Generati∣on, others to Sense, others to Locomotion, none impeding the acti∣vity of another, but all unanimously conspiring to conserve the oeconomy of that Form, which, like the main spring in an Auto∣maton, invigorates, and actuates the whole fabrick: either we must bid dehance to the chief inducement of beleif, and drown the loud clamors of our Conscience, or else fall down, transported with an ecstasie of pious Wonder, and humbly confess, that these are the Impresses of the infinite power and wisdome of an omni∣scient, and omnipotent Creator; but not the Contingencies, or te∣merarious effects of Chance. Thoughts like these had the prudent Gassendus, when, in his detestation of the interest of that Preten∣dress, Fortune (cap. de exortu mundi.) his golden pen dropt this rhetorical logick; Id quod stuporem generat, dispositio interna est in corporibus Animalium. Nam si foret quidem duntaxat multitudo aliqua partium, forte fortuna commistarum, tum ea

posset Fortunae tribui: at in multitudine illa pene innumerabili nullam esse partem, non tantam, non talem, non ubi, non quomo∣do, non cum ea functione, qua congruum est, ut neque inutilis sit, neque esse commodior valeat: rationem prorsus omnem sugit, ut ita fieri non sapientia, sed Fortuna sit constitutum.

Nor doe Animals alone, but Vegetables also, though of an inferior Classis, amply and sensibly testifie the Divinity of their * 1.53 Founder, and confute the Apotheosis of Fortune. Thus, when the Aliment of a Plant, being the aqueous irrigation of the earth in∣sensibly prolected, ascends from the lowest filament of the shag∣gy root up to the Trunck, and thence works up to the extremi∣ties of every branch and twigge; can we imagine, that this thin, insipid juice can be so inspissated, and so ingeniously moulded in∣to a Bud; that bud discriminated and variegated into a larger par∣ticoloured Blossom; that Blossom gradually expanded into a de∣terminate flower, which gratifies our eyes with the beauty of its embroidery, and our nosthrils with the fragrancy of its odour; that Flower lost in the richer emergencie of a Fruit, which hath its fi∣gure, colour, magnitude, odour, sapour, maturity, duration, all certain and constant; and the abridgement, or Epitome of this included in the seed of that fruit, which being insperst upon the earth, is impregnate with a Faculty to expand it self into a second Plant, in all things rivall to the former, and empowered to act all those several Metamorphoses over again, to a perpetuall rejuve∣nescence of that peculiar species: can we, I say, imagine, that all this could arise from a spontaneous range of Atoms, or that Necessity which ensued upon the casual disposition of the First matter; and not rather with devout hymns proclaim the Efficien∣cy of a Glorious and Eternall Cause, whose Essence being incom∣prehensible, and Attributes infinite Intelligence, Goodnesse, Power, Beatitude, Glory, &c. must therefore be the Ordainer, Creater, and Consecrator of all things?

Let us sink our meditations yet one degree lower on the scale of * 1.54 Creatures, and consider how convincively even Inanimates argue for the wisedom of their Maker. Doth not the Sun (to omit the speculation of its glorious Light, and comfortable Influence; the former whereof is so excellent, the other so necessary, that they challenge as due the Admiration of all, and have drawn the Adoration of many ingenious nations) by three prevalent argu∣ments. viz. the Commodiousness of its situation, the Designment of its motion, and the Line or tract of its revolution, sufficiently illustrate the forecast and artifice of its Creator?

First by the universal Convenience of its situation. For had it been placed in any other orb, either inferior, or superior to its * 1.55 own; such horrid incommodities, as are inconsistent with its use and intention, and destructive to the two principal designes of Nature, Conservation and Generation, must unavoidably have followed; nor had the whole fabrick of the Universe been more then one degree removed from the confusion of its originary Chaos. To particular; had the Sun been setled in the lowest sphear, and obtained that place, which the Moon now possesseth: the year had been no longer then a moneth; for in that account of time, it must have fulfilled its course through every part of the Ecliptick, and so the intervalls of seasons had suffered such a con∣traction, that must have been repugnant to their institution, i. e. must have prevented the production of all things; For the Anti∣praxis, or Counter-activity of contrary seasons, immaturely succeeding one upon the neck of another, destroys the principles of Vegetation, and checks the promotion of seminalities. Again, by this unsafe vicinity, or too neer approach to the globe of the earth, its intenser beams had verified the Conflagration of Phaeton; at least proved so intolerable, as that all things must have had the ycie and glutinous temper of the Salamander, or else been tor∣rified into cynders; and to have had no Sun at all, had been the easier misery. For if there be (and some are positive there must be) an intention and remission of heat, respective to the diffe∣rent points, or access and recess of the Sun, in its proper orb;

and that in its Apogaeum, or mountee to the highest point in Cancer, the heat is not so scorching under that Tropick on this side the Aequator, as on the other side, in its Perigaeum or stoop to the lowest point of its excentricity in Capricorne: we cannot with any pretext of reason doubt, that, had the Sun been lodged in the bed of the Moon, it had long since anticipated the general combustion of the last day, and calcined all things to the exiguity of their primitive Atoms. And on the other extreme, had the Sun been appointed to the eight or highest sphear; then must it have been, by reason of the exceeding slow motion assigned to that sphear, so manythousand years in the absolution of its course, as that it must have extended one year to the compute of Platos Jubile; nor could the world (if learned men guess aright concerning its duration) have attained to the period of one revolution. Besides that Hemisphear, which first faced the Sun in the beginning of its tedious gyre, must have enjoyd the curse of a long long day, and consequently have mist the fertile blessing of a vicissitude, or reci∣procal succession of distinct seasons; but the opposite Hemisphear must have, for many myriads of ages, continued as cold, dark and barren as the grave, and so half of the earth had been made to no purpose. And the like discommodities, though more mo∣derate, would have succeeded to the earth, had the Sun obtained a situation in any one of the other six orbs, between the two former extreams.

Secondly, by the appointment of its Circumrotation. For had * 1.56 it remained fixt and not moved at all; then must the world have wanted that necessary division of times and seasons, of Spring and Autumne, Summer and Winter, day and night: and by con∣sequence, the generation and conservation of things dependent on those vicissitudes of Heat and Cold; it being necessary, that the fixation of this Luminary must have caused a perpetual summer in one hemisphear, and as lasting and disconsolate a Winter in the other; or driven nature upon the exigent of making another Sun to irradiate and cherish the opposite half of the earth, it being ex∣perimentally true (and therefore advanced to the dignity of an Axiome by Galilaeo, Philolaus, Niceron, Kircherus, and other

junior Masters in the Opticks) that no spherical luminous body, of what diameter soever, can project its light upon the whole sphear of another at once, or in a fixt position; though it illuminate more then the half of a lesser placed at convenient distance.

Lastly, by the contrivement of its oblique motion along the line * 1.57 Ecliptick. For had its revolution been assigned to any other circle; discommodities no less fatal then the former had unavoi∣dably ensued. First, had it sayled along on either side the Ae∣quator, some parts of the earth could have known no Sun at all, but should have groand under the oppression of perpetual frigi∣dity and opacity; while others had suffered the contrary extream of an everlasting noon, and been parched by the violence of its too constant and perpendicular beams: and so the whole had been inhabitable; an Alternation of Heat and Gold being indi∣spensably requisite aswell to the Conservation and growth of all things in their Individuals, as to their Propagation in Specie. Secondly, had it been confined to the conduct of the Aequator; first unto a parallel sphear, or such who have the Pole for their Zenith, its revolution could have made neither perfect day, nor perfect night; for being in the Aequator, it would intersect their horizon, and be half above, and half below it: and to those, who inhabite under the Aequator, though it made a distinction of day and night, yet would it not make any considerable distinction of seasons; for the Sun being always vertical to them, in that situation, would have introduced a constant Summer, and the perpendicu∣larity of its unremitted heat have exhausted the fructifying humi∣dity of the earth, and so left the womb of our common mother, squalid and barren as the desert Sarra in Africa. Lastly, had it moved directly upon the Aequator, unto what position soever; well might it have described a day, but never measured out a year: for the progression of it from West to East (by the compass of which motion the circle of the year is constituted) had been wan∣ting; in regard that tis impossible that on one and the same circle, observing the same Poles, the Sun should have performed its two contrary motions, one from East to West, which defines the day, the other from West to East, which measures out the year, both at once▪ Now all these palpable inconveniences (with many

other first observed and enumerated to us by a Spanish, and lately most elegantly explained by an English Physician; both which selected this choice subject, as an impregnable argument of the Wisdome of the Creator) were artisicially praevented by the de∣vice of the Suns motion along the Ecliptick, and the obliquity of its annual progress upon the Poles of the Zodiack, full 23 de∣grees, and an half from the Poles of the World.

Now this meditation naturally applies it self, and so clearly demonstrates the forecast and artifice of an infinite Intelligence; that I have nothing left to say, but this; that tis a wonder, which nothing but the delusion of the Father of lies can make out to be∣leif, how Epicurus, being a Philosopher, in many abstrusities of nature acute enough, nay beyond most of his Tutors, as Diogenes Laertius testifies of him; and one that pretended to so much in∣sight in the problems of Astronomy, as to be able to salve all the Phaenomena, or Apparitions above the Terraqueous orb, (in Epist. ad Pythoelem) could yet be so infatuated, as to ascribe the composure, and location of the Sun, and the invention of its regu∣lar, and to all parts convenient motion, to the Temerity and In∣cogitancy of Fortune. Nor could I have conceived it possible that so much of the Scholar, and so much of the Fool could have at once met in one and the same brain; had not I been perswaded thereto, by the agreeing testimonies of many credible Authors, high both in Antiquity and Fame.

If these Arguments reach not, we may descend yet lower (if there be any thing low in Nature) and from the entrals of our * 1.58 Grandmother fetch Stones and Mineral Concretions, to give in evidence against the insolent arrogance of Fortune. For who dares contract the suspicion of madnes so meritoriously, as once to dream that the Magnet obtained its rich endowments of Verticity and Attraction; the Adamant its radiant tralucency and conical angu∣larity; Alum its octohedrical or eight-faced Figure; Salt its Sexangular; Nitre its stiriate or ycicle-resembling; Vitriol its multangular, &c. from a meer accidental and undetermined con∣flux and coalition of their minute and insensible particles: and not from the provident and artificial disposition of them into such

and such situations, as are requisite to the causation of those parti∣cular qualities and Figures, by the discreet and methodicall in∣fluence of an infinite wisdome? If any such there be (and I have reason for more then my fears, that such there are, in these accur∣sed days, when all the Errors of the elder world are revived, de∣sperate Haeresies belched out even by those, who profess to be the Patriots of truth, and horrid Blasphemies applauded as commen∣dable strains of high devotion) who tremble not to deny the Creation of all things by God: these I shall pity, and leave to ponder that exclamation of Gassendus, (de exortu mundi) O quam hebetem esse oportet, aut quam reclamantem habere consci∣entiam, si dum adista attenditur, sola interim Fortuna laudatur!

O how insensible must that man be either of the advisoes of reason, or the convulsions of Conscience; who can consider these things, and yet ascribe the honour of their (reation to Fortune!

And if the Characters of an Infinite Wisdome be so plainly * 1.59 visible in the single and divided peices of the Ʋniverse; how in∣comparably more legible must they be in the Whole, wherein Amplitude holds an aemulous contention with Pulchritude? True it is, the Epicureans were not staggered at the consideration of so vast a mass, instantly addressing themselves for refuge, to an infinite stock of Atoms congested in an infinite space. But this Sanctuary is rotten, and cannot protect the credulity of any, unless it be supported by this additional base; that there was some first Active principle, which by its infinite power first crea∣ted out of nothing, and then congested this mass of Atoms into a Chaos, and after by its infinite wisdome digested the same into that exquisite order which doth now constitute the form of the world. Is it possible for any thing that dares pretend to Hu∣manity, to imagine, or by any specious argument to hope to per∣swade, that so many minute bodies, or Atoms, by the rash and undeterminate conduct of their own innate propensity to motion, indifferently hurried up and down, hither and thither, and by reason of the discord arising from their different quantities, and Figures, apt to maintain an everlasting civil war and confusion;

could notwithstanding by a spontaneous direction meet and unite in that just number, which was sufficient to make up the Globe of the Earth, requisite to compose the body of the Sun, proporti∣oned to the dimensions of the Moon, equal to the several orbs of those radiant Centinels of night, the Stars, whose multitude ex∣ceeds the figures of Arithmetick, and their magnitude never yet rightly explored; in fine, exactly accommodate to the great bo∣dy of the World, whose bounds we know not, and whose dimen∣sions are immense? The conviction of this impossibility they have endevoured (though by running into as great a one) thus to evade, As he (say they) must have been deceived, who having observed the generation of nothing greater then a Flea, could not therefore beleive the generation of an Elephant, as if there could not be found matter enough to arise to so gigantick a body: so are we deceived, while regarding the generation of onely smal things we beleive that the great body of the universe could not be made up by the same means, and after the same manner; as if so vast a proportion of matter could not concur and unite into one Form; nay by so much the more are we deceived, by how much the more proportion the matter of a Flea holds to that of an Elephant, and the matter of an Elephant holds to that of the World; then the matter of the World holds to that mass of Atoms, which is in∣finite in the infinite space. But I may with good reason demand, how they can be assured, that in the imaginary space, without the circumferrence of the world, there is such an inexhaustible abyss of matter, as sufficeth to the generation not onely of this world, but of an infinite multitude of others, fully as large as this: so, well as we are assured, that in this world is contained matter suf∣ficient to the composition of an Elephant, as well as of a Flea? Sure I am, no man ever saw the outside of the world; and if so, is it not a meer Rhodomontado of phansie, or (as Pliny calls it) a high madness, to imagine such an infinite abyss of matter? Let us, however, deal with these, as wise Physicians with Hypochon∣driacks, that they may the more easily cure them, allow them their absurdities; and grant that from eternity there was such an infinity of Atoms, confusedly hurried to and fro, in an infinite space: yet the difficulty will always remain, how in so great a laxity and

infinite liberty of range, so many Atoms could so convene and combine together, as to terminate and setle each other, by reci∣procal coherence and mutual concatenation; how so orderly marshal and dispose their several divisions into such elegant Figures: how adapt those figures to such genuine and constant operations; and all this without the counsell, disposition, and revinction of any other cause, but their own rude and giddy pro∣pensity to motion, and the casual result of their cessation from discord? That Animals have obtained such exquisite forms, re∣spective to their several destinations; this we can refer to the arti∣fice of their peculiar Seminalities, or the cunning of that Forma∣tive virtue, which lying ambuscadoed in the spumous consistence of their genital emissions, and being once awakened into Activity by the excitement of a convenient Matrix, or Receptarie, im∣mediately designes this or that parcel of matter for such or such a part, another for another, and so spins it out into an uniform la∣byrinth of members, at last weaving all those into an ingenious Figure, in all points resembling the Protoplast or first genitor of that species; who received this Seminal Tincture, or faculty prolifical from the immediate bounty of its Creator. But that Atoms, as they are in their naked and incomplex nature, should be allowed to have a Plastick or fabrefactive virtue equal to that conferred upon the seeds of Animals; is a sigment as worthy our spleen, as that ridiculous branch of the same root the Autocthonous, or spontaneous eruption of our first Parents from the confermentation of Water and Earth, and the pro∣duction of mankinde like that of Mushroms: which whimsey is also entituled to Epicurus, by no meaner a tradition then that of Censorinus (de Di. Nat. cap. 2.) whose words, for the more clear and credible transmission of the Fable, I thought it not alto∣gether impertinent here to insert. Nec longe secus Epicurus cre∣didit, limo calefactos uteros nescio quos, radicibus terrae cohaeren∣teis primum increvisse, & infantibus ex se editis ingenitum lactis humorem, natura ministrante praebuisse; quos ita educatos, & adultos genus hominum propagasse. To this we may adde (for a single testimony is not strong enough to oblige any man to beleive so unpardonable a dotage in a grave Philosopher) the

concurrent Auctorities of Lactantius (lib. 2. cap. 7.) Plu∣tarch (5. Placit. 19.) Diogenes Laertius (lib. 2. in vita Ar∣chelai Atheniens.) Diodorus Siculus (lib. 1.) and Macrobius (3. Saturn. 6.) Though, for my part, I conceive this phrensie to have possessed many heads, upon whose skulls corruption had planted growing Perewikes of Moss, many hundreds of years be∣fore Epicurus his was warm; in regard many antient Nations, in particular the Aegyptians and Phoenicians, contending for the honor of seniority, have gloried in the title of Autocthonae, and thought their Eschutcheons sufficiently noble, if charged onely with this impress, Terrae silii. But I return from this my Excursion.

If the World, indeed, were as Ovids Chaos, rudis indigestaque moles, a deformed and promiscuous miscellanie, or masse of Heterogeneities, and the several parts of it variously blended to∣gether without either discrimination or order: then might the pretence of Fortune be more plausible. For should we take a man, who had been born and bred up to maturity of years in some obscure cavern of the earth, and never lookt abroad upon the World, nor heard of more then what immediately con∣cerned his aliment and other natural necessities; on a suddain educe him from his dungeon, and shew him an Animal cut in peices, and all its dissimilar parts, as skin, muscles, fat, veins, ar∣teries, nerves, tendons, ligaments, cartilages, bones, marrow, &c. laied together in a promiscuous heap: doubtless we could not quarrel at his incredulity, if he would not be perswaded, that any thing but Chance had a hand in that confusion. But should we instantly present him another Animal, feeding, walking, and per∣forming all the comely functions of vitality; instruct him in the several uses and actions of all those parts, which he had former∣ly surveyed in the disorder of an heap; then kill that Animal also, and for his farther information, anatomzie its carcase; and exhibite to him the several parts, in all things respondent to the former: tis conjectural that we should finde, that the rudeness of his educati∣on would not so totally have extinguished the Light of Nature in him, as not to have left some spark, by the glimmering where∣of he might discover some more noble Principle then Fortune, to have been the Efficient of that more then ingenious machine.

Now we cannot but observe, that in the great engine of the uni∣verse, nothing is with less order, decency, beauty, uniformity, symmetry, constancy, in a word, with less wisdom, either de••••g∣ned, or finished; then in the smaller organ of an Animal, in the perfection of its integrality. And if so, how neer comes it to an absolute contradiction, that we should acknowledge some noble and prudent Cause, that moulded and compacted all those dif∣ferent parts into one most elegant and accomplisht body, and ex∣actly accommodated that body to the easie execution of its pre∣destinate operations: and yet not acknowledg the same, in the ordi∣nation and construction of the more admirable, because more dif∣ficult fabrick of the Universe? I say, a Contradiction; for if the easier Artifice of an Animal be conceded too hard; assuredly the more difficult machination of the innumerably organ'd World must needs be granted impossible, to be wrought by the impotent and ignorant fingers of Fortune. Quanto enim major operis moles, tanto erit ut sapientiae, ita & potentiae majus argu∣mentum; non quod aliunde elaboratio minutorum corpusculo∣rum non commendet artificem: sed quod in opere ingenti & symmetriam servare industrium, & materiam regere operosum esse videatur.

Lastly, as the Votaries of Fortune have argued à minori ad * 1.60 majus, thus; if the smaller machine of a Hand-worm, wherein the almost invisible (without an engyscope, or magnifying glass) exiguity of the whole frame, the multiplicity of organs, and the variety of respective functions assigned thereunto, may worthily contend, concerning elegance of composure, with the large cap∣tain of the watry regiments, the Whale, may be configured by Chance, or the casual concourse of convenient particles of the First matter: why may not the grosser movement of the Ʋni∣verse be also wrought by the like contingent segregation of disa∣greeing, and convention of consimilar Atoms; whose tumultua∣tion and conslict growing from the antipathy of different magni∣tude and Figure, made the Chaos; and their working themselves into peculiar orders, by the accidental conflux aud mutual cohe∣rence of Homogeneities, made the forme of the World. So we, by

counter-demonstration, may argue à majori ad minus, thus; if Fortune had the power and skill to make the World, why can she not make the more rude and facile movement of a Watch? If Atoms could spontaneously range and combine themselves into the immense batlements of the World: why not also into the narrower structure of a Castle? If they met into the mighty bul∣warks of an Island: why not into the thinner and more fragil rampiers of a Fort? If they could dispose themselves into wide campania's of Herbs and variegated Flowers: why not into a peice of Landskip Tapestry? All which require, as infinitely less of Power, so also of Science.

Should they endevour a subterfuge, by replying; that these are the Effects of Art, and not of Nature: we may prevent their evasion by rejoyning, that since they allow Chance to have an interest even in the operations of Art; why doe they not aswell make her the Founderess of a City, as of the aedifice of a spon∣taneous Animal, whose structure is more difficult? We are not backward to confess, what we lately supposed concerning the dissected and disordered parts of an Animal, that if the World were but a promiscuous heap of different materials, such as stones▪ Timber, Sand, Lime, Clay, Nailes, Tyles, &c. confusedly con∣gested: then could not our choler swell to so high a tide of in∣dignation against the arrogance of Fortune; nor should we be so well provided of arms to fight in defence of a divine contrive∣ment. But since the building of the same is, by infinite transcen∣dency, more durable, more distinct, more symmetrical, and more gorgeous in all its parts, then the most elaborate and mag∣nificent Palace: since the Heart of a Pismire hath more of ma∣gisterial artifice, then the Eschurial; the proboscis or trunk of a Flea more industry in its delicate and sinuous perforation, then all the costly Aquaeducts of Nero's Rome, the Arsenal at Venice, or the two Spanish Engines, one for the traduction and elevation of Water, at Toledo, the other for the automatous coyning of money, at Segovia, both admired by a Person for the most part above admiration, S^r. Kenelme Digby; since the breast or laboratory of a Bee contains more anfractuous convolutions then the Laby∣rinth of Daedalus, and more Cellules then the famous monastery

of S^t. Lawrence, in Spain, for bravery and amplitude of archi∣tecture reputed the eighth wonder of the World: and since the skull of a Louse hath more ventrieles or receptaries for the nu∣merous swarms of Animal spirits, then the spatious Amphitheatre of Rome had seats for the spectators: in sine, since the meanest peice of Nature throwes disparagement and contempt upon the greatest masterpeice of Art; how can it be, that man, noble and ingenious man, should fall so much lower then his incircumspect Father Adam, as to confess the visible influence of Prudence in the easier, and yet, at the same time, deny any cause, but Ignorance to have been exercised in the harder; to admit the managery of an Architect, or knowing principle, in the structure of a house, and yet determine the more magnificent Creation of the Ʋniverse upon the blind disposal of Fortune?

To conclude this unworthy vindication of the injured wisdom * 1.61 of our Maker, by leaving no possible objection unanswered, let us suppose that our opponents should recurre to their old starting hole, or salley port, the Spontaneous motion of Atoms, and urge, that if the materials of a house, or other artificial structure, were endowed with an innate propensity to motion, as the materials of the World were; then might they also, without the direction of any external Agent, onely by reciprocal convention, complicati∣on and revinction, acquire setled and orderly situations, and so dispose themselves into a regular Fabrick: but since they are de∣void of all domestick Activity, the disparity betwixt the operati∣ons of chance, and those of Art, is so great, that an argument drawn from the impossibility of a performance by one, is not conclusive against the possibility of an atcheivement by the other. And when we have supposed this retort, let us also suppose what they would have, viz. that the materials of a house were radically impregnated with a perpetual tendency to motion; and that by the drift of this internal activity, they should from different quar∣ters meet together in one heap, there croud, compress, express, impell, repell, detrude, elevate, circumgyrate, fix each other, and at last by reciprocal combination acquiesce: yet can it never be supposed, by a sober imagination, that the result of all this hurly

burly betwixt those unequal parts, and the peace ensuing upon the casual acquisition of situations proper and convenient to each, would be a well ordered aedifice; nay any thing half so neer allied to architecture as a ruine.

I conceive the wit of Balbus wound up to a very happy strain, when disputing against Velleius (one that blush't not to weare the infamous badge of Epicurus) concerning this monstrous sig∣ment of the worlds Projection from the dissolution of the Chaos, and a fortuitous concursion of the universal matter; he invented this apposite similitude: Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non in∣telligo cur idem non putet, si innumerabiles, unius & viginti for∣mae literarum vel aureae, vel quales-libet aliquo conjiciantur, posse ex his in terram excussis Annales Ennij, ut deinceps legi possint ••ssici; quod nescio anne in uno quidem versu possit tan∣tum valere Fortuna. Upon which we may briefly thus de∣scant; if that congruous series of letters, which is necessary to the lecture of one page, line, or word, can never result from a care∣less congestion of prints; but must be the setled effect of great in∣dustry and diligence in the Compositor: undoubtedly, with no less violence to reason, can any man opinion, that the innume∣rable parts of the World, that observe a far more distinct and elegant order then the characters of any Typographer disposed into words, lines, pages, sheets, should attain to that admirable Form, which they now hold; by a meer fortuitous assembly; and not by the certain and predestinate ordination of some supremely-intelligent Cause.

These reasons, though not woven into that strict method, which * 1.62 is required to fulfill the web of perfect demonstrations; doe yet seem strong enough in their single inferences undeniably to con∣clude the Creation of the Ʋniverse out of no praeexistence, by the sole and immediate Fiat of the same Essence, and if judiciously twisted together into one Syndrome, or complex Argument, must oblige as firmly; since they clearly evince the first Article of the Christians Creed, as an uncontrollable verity, which none, but such degenerate miscreants, in whom the Light of Nature is wholly extinct, or such as are desperatly resolved to shut the eye

of their minde against the splendor of that infallible Criterion, can longer doubt of. And therefore, having determined neither to scan∣dal the intellectuals of my Reader, either by indubitating his facile perception of the force of those proofs already urged, or multiplying others in order to the illustration of that truth, to which he hath formerly submitted his plenary assent; nor unfruit∣fully to spend that time and paper, which I have devoted to the explanation and ratification of other necessary points, on a work of supererogation: I shall onely fringe this exercise with that pertinent and emphatical passage of Lactantius (De Opif. Dei cap. 6.) Tanta ergo qui videat & talia, potest existimare nulla effecta esse consilio, nulla providentia, nulla ratione divina; sed ex Atomis subtilibus, exiguis concreta esse tanta miracula? nonne prodigio simile est, aut natum esse hominem qui haec diceret, ut Leucippum; aut extitisse qui crederet, ut Democritum, qui au∣ditor ejus fuit; vel Epicurum, in quem vanitas omnis de Leucippi sonte prostuxit? and so proceed to the satisfaction of two colla∣teral Scruples.

SECT. IV.

Scruple 1.

THe Curiosity of some, (whether more insolent or vain, is * 1.63 hard to determine,) hath been so audacious, as to adventure upon this Quere; If God made the world, pray what instruments, tools, mechanick engines, what assistants did he make use of in the work?

The Satisfaction.

This is no green impiety (unless it hath lately budded forth again amongst those Human-devils, the Ranters; the report of whose prodigious blasphemies hath sometimes transported me to a hatred, at least a contempt of my self, for being in the same rank of (reatures; and made me wish for a second deluge) but almost half as old as Time, and may be traced as high as the Epoche of the Grecian learning; witness those many secret con∣vulsions of it by Plato (both in his Parmenides and T••m••us) while he frequently affirmes the divine Nature to be Inorganical, and the immediate operations of the universal cause to be above the necessity of Corporeal means: witness also Cicero (most of whose streams came out of the Grecian fountain) who (in 1. De Nat. Deor.) introducing the Atheist, Vellejus disputing a∣gainst Plato and the Stoicks, who held the divine essence to be the Author of the Universe; proposeth the scruple at large, in these Words: Quibus enim oculis intueri potuit vester Plato fabr••∣cam illam tanti operis, qua construi à Deo at que aedificari mu••∣dum facit? quae molitio? quae ferramenta? qui vectes? quae machinae? qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt? &c. That bold∣ness is the daughter of ignorance, is herein plainly verified; for had these unhappy Pagans understood any thing of the majestick essence of divinity, or but apprehended the vast disparity between the efficiency of the Highest, and that of all other Subordinate causes; tis more then probable, they had not been so sawcy with his imperial Attribute, Omnipotence, nor run into that common mistake of flesh and bloud, of measuring the ways of God by the ways of man. True tis, that man hath need of instruments to the performance of any peice of Art, nor can the Geometrician draw his lines without a rule, or describe a circle without the help of his compass; the Carpenter work without his Axe, Saw, and other tools; the Smith without his fire, hammer, anvill, &c. all which the wit of man, sharpned by necessity, hath invented to compensate the insufficiency of his naked hands, made by na∣ture either too soft, too weak, or too obtuse for those difficult

uses: But yet what can impede our assurance of the eternal ex∣istence of a more Noble Essicient; whose Will is infinite Power, and that Power infinite Activity; whose single Let it be done, is both Cause and Means; and whose simple act of Volition not onely the Efficient, but also the Instrument? Do not we ob∣serve (that I may extract an Argument from the evidence of sense) how, in the twinckling of a lovers eye, that comely Arch of colours, the Rain-bow, is painted on the clouds; and yet with∣out either hand, compass, or pencill? doe we not behold whole mountains of ponderous Clouds piled one upon another; and yet neither vessels to lave up, nor engines to sustain that sea of water? And cannot these familiar observations instruct us with more knowledge, then to doubt the fabrication of the world without corporeal organs? Why is our reason so immodest, as to inquire into the ability of the First cause; when alas! it is not large enough to comprehend the efficacy of the weakest Secondary? if the meanest and most ordinary effect of Nature imports so much stupendious industry, as transcends the narrow capacity of man; what audacious ignorance is it in him, to question the e••er∣gie of that Principle, that made Nature her self, and prescribed her rules to act by: from which she cannot vary, without a mi∣raculous dispensation? We are willing forsooth, to profess, that we cannot understand by what artifice the delicate body of a Pismire is configurated▪ animated, and impowered for the noble actions of sense and voluntary motion, nay (for ought we know to the contrary) for that more noble and elaborate office of discourse also: and yet, when we come to contemplate the more magnificent form of the Ʋniverse, shall we degenerate into such impertinent Ideots, as to debate the Mathematick energie of its Creator, and demand how he could operate without Engines to transport, adfer, and winde up the materials, with scaffolds to advance the roof, or servants to assist in several offices requisite? Assuredly, as the frame of that slender Animal doth confess a certain Faculty, by which it was modelled, delineated, and compacted; though the reason and manner of its contexture re∣main in the dark to us: so also doth the huge machine of this visible World proclaim a certain Energeticall principle, of in∣finitly

more potency and perfection, by which it was composed; though the manner and way of its composure be too abstruse and sublime for the discernment of our weak-sighted intellectuals. Now, whether you shall denominate that Energy, a Power di∣vine, or God; it is indifferent: but indispensably necessary, that you acknowledge it to be so great, as by incomputable intervals to exceed the comprehension of the minde of man; nor is it safe for us to attempt the commensuration of it by the unequal mo∣dule, or scale of particular finite Causes, since even from these our reason stands so remote, as to be able at most onely to con∣jecture their dimensions. Upon this consideration, if a Pilot, while he onely sits in the steerage and hands the helme, doth di∣rect the ship in its course, by a far more excellent industry, then all the rude officers inservient thereunto, that stretch their tougher sinewes to hoise and tack about her sayls, and toyle their tawny bodies in other inferior labours: if a Prince, who sits calmely in his throne, doth by a single nod of his sceptre awe millions of his subjects to obedience, and by the magick of a smile or frown con∣jure whole nations into joy or terror; if he, I say, doth govern his people, by a more mysterious and noble influence, then all his subordinate ministers of state, with all their tumultuous pains and travell, either in the transmission, or execution of his mandates: if an Architect, or master-builder, who in his closet onely draws the plat-form, and designes the figure of the structure; doth by his meer designation, operate more exquisitely, and by a more ex∣cellent artifice contribute to the perfection of the work, then all the swarm of bus••ling mechanicks imployd in squaring, or placing the materials: why should we not allow that mighty Pilot, Prince, and Architect of the World to be empowerd with a cer∣tain kind of Efficacy so eminent, that whatever can be thought most absolute and puissant in all other natures, must be infinitely inferior to it? And therefore when we, who have learned our lesson outof the sacred leaves of Moses, say that he made the universe solo nutu, at que simplici volitione, by one simple and entire act of his Will, exprest in that word, Fiat; we speak all that can be understood by us of that miracle.

As for the last part of the Atheists indecent expostulation; viz.

What coadyutors or ministers had God to attend him, and wha•• materials praeexistent and prepared to conform to his disposure? that may be soon resolved, by offering that supereminence, where∣by he is, by infinite excesses, above all other Efficients. For what were the Prerogative of Divinity, if it were subject to the want of the same means, or cooperating Causes, with us despi∣cable and impotent men? To conclude, it will not onely sup∣press all dangerous Curiosities of this kind, but also highly com∣mend our judgments; that we draw a large line of distinction betwixt the Almightiness of the Creator, and the restrained acti∣vity, or rather pure imbecillity of the Creature; ascribe to him a superlative and pancratical energie, or virtue paramont; and on our devout knees proclaim him more able to create, then want either ministers, or matter, whereby, whereon to accom∣plish his Will.

Scruple 2.

The other profane Scruple objected by the Atheist, is this; Cur * 1.64 Deus tamdiu à fabricatione mundi abstinuerit? If God were elder then Time, and the world made in the beginning of time; why did he so long suspend the Fabrication of it?

The Response.

This is also a poyson spit from the accursed jaws of that black Viper, Velleius, against the Stoicks (apud Ciceron. 1. de nat. Deor.) in this squallid stream; isto igitur tam immenso spatio, quaero, cur Pronoea vestra (so according to their own phrase he calls that Minde, or supreme Intelligence, to whom that sober sect of Philosophers justly ascribed the origination of all things except the material Principle, which they erroneously affirmed to have been the Ashes, or cynders of a former World, whose production also they conceived to have been, like that fabulous one of the Phoenix, out of the urne of its predecessor) cessaverit? laborémne fugiebat? and not lately wiped clean off, and its con∣tagious venome cured by the generous antidote of E••sebius, who

(in 1. de praep. Evang. 1.) most expresly, amply, and judicious∣ly opposed it. However, lest this poyson ferment afresh, and again exulcerate the impure Libertines of this Age (not more for its extraordinary Calamities, then unpattern'd Impieties, as well the wonder, as grief of our posterity) and since it cannot but be thought most pertinent to my present scope: I shall en∣devour the total extinction of it, by applying a smart Alexite∣rion of reason.

From an Agent infinite in Wisdome, Power, and Liberty, such as we must allow God to be, no account either of Motives, Means, or Time, ought to be required. It was, according to their measure of time, about six thousand years from the nativity of the Universe, when the unhappy disciples of Epicurus disse∣minated this uncivil interrogation: but had it been created many myriads of myriads of thousands sooner then it was, tis open to conjecture, that they would have insisted on the same sawey de∣mand; since eternity compared to more myriads of years, then all the figures of Arithmetick can amount to the computation of, must yet import a vast tract or slux of Time (for other idi∣ome to express this notion, I could not either recognize, or ex∣cogitate) below the foot of that accompt; and that precedent space might have afforded room enough for the intrusion of the same frivolous quaere. And therefore it becomes us, either not to enquire, why the world was produced, rather then not produced; or allowing its production, to esteem it all one, whether it were produced then, before, or after, in this so great a latitude of Eter∣nity. For the same question now proposed, why God did not de∣termine in himself to create the World, ten millions of years sooner then he did; may also be revived hereafter, concerning these times of ours, if another rand of ten millions more should be un∣ravelled. From whence this modest and truly humane lesson fair∣ly infers it self; that it is oraculous in the greatest wisdome to say, God Created the World in that article of eternity (we may now call it Time) which seemed most opportune to his Wisdom. For, that he had some important reasons so long to deferr the creation, and then onely to contrive and finish it, when he did; though those reasons be cryptick and ignote to us: we may more then

conjecture, from the consideration of his inexhaustible and ever moving abyss of his Prudence, which is the rule to all other his actions. And truely, if Princes ground many of their designe•• upon profound reasons of State, the knowledge whereof is never diffused among their subjects, but lockt up in the cabinet of their own heart: why may not God, who is all Counsel and Prudence, be afforded the prerogative of having some weighty respects, that moved him to create the World, then when he did, rather then either sooner or later? Which respects, for ought we can explore, is Mercy in him to conceal from us: sure I am, tis a pride not much beneath, if not equal to that of Lucifer, in us to dare to enquire. Tis a confest truth, that no man can know the thoughts of another, who is constant to his resolve to reserve them sealed up within his own breast; and can any man be so incurably over∣run with the itch of vanity, when he despaires of pretending cer∣tainly to divine the cogitations of his familiar friend, whose in∣clinations he hath so frequently read in the book of his conversa∣tion: yet to arrogate to himself an ability of searching into the abscondite counsels of him, whom neither Minde nor Sense can touch? Wherefore tis our duty to reclaim our wild curiosities, to set bounds to our inquisitions, and gratefully sate our boulimie of science with this wholsome morsel; that from hence, that the World was once created, we may safely inferre, that the Creator was pleased to declare himself so Potent, that no im∣pediment could intervene betwixt his eternal decree, and the op∣portune execution thereof: so Free, as to be above the impulsion or constraint of any necessity: so Wise, as to prevent all temerity and collusion of Fortune: so Good, that the prescience of mans fu∣ture ingratitude, and so the infertility of his masterpeice, could not dehort him from fulfilling his purpose of conferring that in∣estimable blessing of Existence both upon him, and all things else for his sake.

As for the last clause of this foolish demand, An vigilarit tanto aeternitatis spatio, an verò dormierit mundi opifex? Whe∣ther God continued vigilant, or dormant from eternity, untill he set about the fabrick of this vast All? This includes a manifest incongruity, and speaks a contradiction loud enough to answer

and refute it self. For those two terms, Sleep and Divinity, stand at open defiance, and placed in one notion reciprocally deny each other; the one importing an Affection of a Body, or the effect of the Concidence, or Augustation of the ventricles of the brain, and slender conduits of the nerves in an Animal, caused either by a deficiency, or quiet of the spirits inservient to the Animal Facul∣ties, and causing a temporary and periodical cessation from the offices of sense and Arbitrary motion: the other expres∣sing an Eternal simple Essence, neither opprest with corporeity, nor (therefore) subject to defatigation upon any exolution or wast of spirits; and consequently not capable of sleep. However, to manifest the extreme stupidity of their reply; viz. that if he were perpetually awake, yet we must grant him to have been con∣stantly idle, before he began his work of Creation: I shall vouchsafe them that judicious rejoynder of many Fathers (whose studies were also not rarely infested with these vermine) that in all that precedent tract of eternity (mortality will excuse the ne∣cessary solecisme) he was fully imployed in the most blissfull contemplation of himself. Which is an operation most easie, most quiet, most pleasant; as all Philosophers, who ever have, by the steps of abstracted meditation, advanced their minds so high as token that perfection of beatitude, have observed.

CHAP. III. Why God Created the World.

SECT. I.

THat every Action presupposeth an end, or scope; is Canonical: and hence is it customary amongst * 1.65 men, by so much the more hardly to beleive that such or such a considerable Action was done by such or such a Person; by how much the less either of probable Pleasure, or Emolument may appear to have invited him to that enterprise. Nor was Velleius a stranger to this rule; for fighting the unjust quarrel of that usur∣press, Fortune, and having at first invaded Providence Divine with direct and down-right blowes, unsuccesfully: he at last contrives to wound it with oblique thrusts, and attempts to stab the opinion of the Worlds Creation by God, by striking at the End, or more plainly by cutting off all possibility of either Pleasure or Profit to accrew to him thereby. And in pursuance of this stratagem, he endevours to prove (1.) Conditum non fuisse mundum Dei causa; that the World was not created for Gods sake, (i. e.) that he is no more concerned in the construction of it, then if it had never been altered from its Chaos: (2) neque hominum gratia, nor for the behoof of man, (i. e.) that man hath no juster plea to the Royalty of the World, then the meanest Animal; nor did Nature look with a more amorous and indulgent aspect upon him, then upon any other of her productions.

The First position he essays to illustrate and inferre by a Socra∣tical * 1.66 way of argumentation, or by circumventing our judgements with a chain of Interogatories, all whose links are dependent each upon other, though by a connexion so subtile, as to be impercepti∣ble to the incircumspect; the Abstract whereof, as taken by Cicero (1. De Natur. Deorum) lies in these words. Quid autem erat, quod concupisceret Deus, mundum signis & lumini∣bus, tanquam Aedilis, ornare? Si ut Deus melius habitaret; antea, videlicet tempore infinito, in tenebris, tanquam in gur∣gustio habitaverat? post autem; varietaté ne eum delectari pu∣tamus, qua Coelum & Terras exornatas videmus? quae ista potest esse oblectatio Deo, quae si esset, non ea tamdiu carere potu∣isset?

What politique respect put God upon the servile office of an Aedile? What motive prevailed with him to trim the Universe with gawdy Asterisms, and imbellish the azure roof thereof with variety of refulgent studs? if to better his habitati∣on; tis a signe that forever before he was but ill accommodated with a dark and narrow mansion: But afterwards, can we conceive that he entertained and solaced himself with that va∣riety of beauteous forms, wherewith we observe both stories of this great Palace to be adorned? What delight is that, wherewith divinity can be affected? if any such there be, why would he so long deny himself the fruition of it?

Nor did Velleius want a second to joyne with him in this bloudy design for the assassination of that sacred Truth, That God made the World chiefly for his own Glory; for that witty villain Lucretius (and the finest wits, if not maturely pruned and kept under by the severe hand of Prudence, are the rankest Plants and most apt to run up to the highest impieties) hath digested the challenge into verse, thus:

Quidve novi potuit tanto post ante quietos Inlicere, ut cuperent vitam mut are priorem? Nam gaudere novis rebus debere videtur, Quoi veteres obsunt; sed quoi nil accidit aegri, Tempore in anteacto, cum pulchre degeret aevum, Quid potuit novitatis amorem accendere tai?

An, credo, in tenebris vita, ac moerore jacebat, Donec diluxit rerum genitalis origo? &c. in lib. 5.

After so long Content, what new delight Could th'happy Gods to this great change invite? To affect Innovation, doth confess The present state obnoxious to distress. He only can t'enjoy new things desire, Whom the deficience of the old doth tire. What therefore could Divinity perswade, To leave his antient quiet, for a trade Of Architecture? Can I think, till then Him cloysterd in a dark and narrow Den? &c.

The Refutation.

Tis an Apophthegme fathered (and that not unjustly) upon Epicurus; Facere sapientem omnia sui caussa, that a wiseman * 1.67 in all his actions doth principally regard himself. And could not this learn his Scholars more discretion, then to doubt, whether or no God the Elixir of wisdome, in this weighty operation had an eye upon himself, or reflected upon his own concernment? The Word, God, to a metaphysical consideration, contains reasons more then enough to decide this idle controversie, excited only by a predominion of sensuality. For when there was nothing existent besides himself; tis plain, that he could gratifie nothing besides himself: and as he not only derived the power of operating from himself alone, but also was the exemplar to himself; so also must he be the principal End of his operation. The End I say, non utili∣tatis; as if his Essence were capable of melioration, his Beatitude so remiss, as to admit of Augmentation, his Condition so imperfect, as to be improved by Alteration: sed gloriae, which as he could not want, so was there no reason why he should want. Such was the Freedom of his Will, that no necessity could constrain him to the production of any thing; such the Bounty, that none could re∣strain him from the voluntary profusion of his goodness. When twas indifferent to him, or to constitute a World, or to continue alone; he yet was pleased to follow the propensity of his own

infinity Benignity, and to create: insomuch as he judged it better that there should be other natures beside his own, to which he might impart the overflowings of his goodness; then not. Bet∣ter, I say, not for himself; for as the perpetual Emanation or diffusion of his Goodness upon the creature, since time (the Image of eternity, as Plato (in Timaeo) describes it) began, hath not diminished: so could not the Concentration, or Confinement of it to the orb of his own essence, have lessened his Felicity; which hath Plenitude and Constancy for its supporters, and is therefore raised above the imperfections of Access or Change. And upon this perswasion (I cannot forget to speak after the manner of men) he vouchsafed to constitute all other natures that are be∣sides his own; and more especially Man: not that he might re∣ceive any emolument from them, since himself is all goodness, and by consequence all glory; but that, conferring respective en∣dowments upon them, he might have convenient subjects, whereon to exercise his immense liberality and make known his magnifi∣cence. That since the creation he expects from man the retribu∣tion of Reverence, Adoration, and Obedience; ariseth not ex in∣digentia, from any need he stands in of, or benefit that redounds to him by the unfruitfull homage of man: but▪ ne homines sint erga ipsum ingrati, from his own free Love to prevent mans be∣ing hurried into that misery of Ingratitude. I say, Misery of Ingratitude; for that forlorn hope of hell having once taken possession of the minde of man, instantly brings in a whole host of perturbations, subverts its government, destroys its tranquillity, and so layes it open to the devastation of Infelicity.

And whereas they demand, Why God, if he take any delight in these experiments of his wisedome, Power, and munificence, would so long endure the privation, or rather defect of that de∣light? The solution is obvious, that this kinde of delectation is no more then Accidentary to him, and can adfer infinitely less of addition to that fulness of Beatitude, formally radicated in his Essence; then one smal drop of water superaffused to the im∣mensity of a million of Oceans. For sibi sufficientissimus, All to himself, is his peculiar Motto; since he hath the source of all that's Amiable and Delectable, arising from, and perpetually

flowing round his own most perfect nature, nor can he be af∣fected with the unequal oblation of humane Doxologie, otherwise then by reflecting upon his own Goodness, which freely ordained, formed, and disposed man to that honourable and beatifical duety: and therefore that sentence of the School Divine, Quicquid agit praeter scipsum, ad alterius commodum spectat, deserves our grate∣full assent; for all his Extrinsecall or Emanative operations look directly upon the benefit of that Creature, whom he hath adopted to be the object of his Love, which is Man; obliquely upon the convenience or accommodation of all other Creatures, necessary or adjuvant to the well being of that Favorite; and by reflexion, upon his own munificence. And hence is it manifest, that he adorned the Universe with asterisms, and beautified the heavens with radiant lamps; not that he might better his own habitation, which is impossible, he being a mansion to himself, and his eternal condition being extreme felicity: but provide a more commodious place of residence for men, for whose sake principal∣ly (after that of his own Glory) he intended the Creation, He, doubtless, could want the illumination of neither Sun, nor Moon, whose dwelling is in light inaccessible; nor be enriched by the faint splendor of the Stars, whose glory is so refulgent, that we hyperbolize the lustre of the Meridian Sun, when we define it to be the shadow of its Creator; and since those shining orbs are but pale tapours kindled at his more splendid abyss of light, how infinitely more lucent must his essence be, who is described by some to be Supersubstantialis Lux? (Athanas Kircher in metaphy∣sic. Lucis & umbrae, Epichiremate 5.) Nor can we say less of that admirable variety of forms, wherewith we observe both stories of the World to be adorned; for if they appear so full of Elegance and beauty; how incomparably more fair and amiable must their Maker be, who is the Soul of Pulchritude, and by the Analogy which they hold to the comely ideas in his intellect, all things are determined to perfection? For that mighty Cause, which can give being to so many various perfections, must of ne∣cessity possess all those perfections, modo eminentiori, in a tran∣scendent manner. Wherefore the excellencies of his own nature did, before he was pleased to create others, so amply suffice to the

Accompletion of his beatitude; that they now at this day wholly suffice to the same; nor is he capable of having his Felicity en∣creased by the contributions of any thing without himself. And since all things created, are nought but certain Emissions, or as it were deradiations, which he pleased to diffuse from himself; tis perspicuous, that before that Diffusion he comprehended all natures in his own, as in their Fountain, and therefore could not have his being meliorated by their production; as also, that he may at pleasure, adnihilate all again, with no more detriment to his glory, then the Sun can want those beams, which yesterday it emitted upon my hand.

SECT. II.

Neque Hominum gratiâ.

THis second Position he likewise insinuates, by the fame im∣posture of ensnaring the minde in a complex series of Quae∣stions, * 1.68 after this manner;

If all things were constituted by God for the sake of Man onely, as you affirme, then either for the peculiar interest of Wise men or Fools? if for the sole behoof of Wise men; then a far less provision might have served the turn: for no age could ever glory in the production of ma∣ny such at once; and if all that ever were, or shall be, met toge∣ther into one colonie, a very smal Island might be both large and rich enough to accommodate them with necessaries: and so the greatest part of the creation must be confest supersluous, as to the principal destination thereof? But if for Fools only; then you entangle your selves in a two fold Incongruity. First, you entrench upon the Justice of the Creator, since thereby you im∣plicitely confess, that he was partial in conferring so great a be∣nefit upon those, who must so ill deserve, as not to know right∣ly how to use it: Secondly, you insringe his Providence, by making him not to have had a foresight of the unfruitfulness of his chief design, which must miscarry and be quite lost in a con∣trary

event: Fools being without any dispute, most miserable in that they are Fools; for what can be reputed a more abso∣lute misery, then Fatuity? And if for the conjunctive interest, or promiscuous concernment of both; then do you offer vio∣lence to the goodness of the Archietect; in regard, that during life there unavoidably occur so many bitter discommodities, that wise men cannot sweeten them with the compensation of Commodities: and Fools neither avoid them as they approach, nor endure them when they come, &c.

Nor was Velleius singular in this error; for Lactantius (Lib. 7. cap. 5.) hath accused Epicurus also of words to the same effect; which according to the record of his indictment run thus: Quid enim Deo cultus hominis confert beato, & nulla re indigenti? vel si tantum honoris homini habuit, ut ipsius causâ mundum fabricaret, ut instrueret cum sapientia, ut dominum viventium faceret, eúmque diligeret tanquam filium; cur mortalem fragi∣lemque constituit? cur omnibus malis, quem diligebat, objecit? Cum oprteret & beatum esse hominem, tanquam conjunctum & proximum Deo; & perpetuum, sicut est ipse, ad qu••m colen∣dum & contemplandum figuratus est. What advantage can the barren veneration of man yeeld to God, who is perfectly happy, and knows no indigency? or, if he deigned to bestow so high honour upon man, as to create the whole world for his use, to en∣due him with wisdome, to inagurate him Lord royall of all li∣ving creatures, and love him with as much affection and indul∣gence as a Son; why did he yet make him mortal, and so fatally subject to fragility? why expose him whom he adopted to a filial love, to the invasion of all kinds of evill? when on the contrary, in all reason, man also ought to have been both compleatly hap∣py, as being allied to God, by a very neer assinity; and immor∣tal as God himself, to the worship and contemplation of whom he was configurated.

Lucretius also would not be exempted from acting a part in this tragical scene; but scorning to come behind the most ad∣venturous * 1.69 Bravo, that had bid defiance to Divinity, or be out∣done by any in the fea••s of Atheisme: he not only sucks all the venome in the former Arguments, but adds much of his own also,

and distills it together through his quill into 8 reasons.

1. That God reaps no benefit by the fealty and doxologies of man: Quid enim immortalibus at que beatis gratia nostra queat largirier emolumenti, ut nostra quidquam causa gerere aggre∣derentur?

2. That in case man had never had existence, it could not have been unpleasant not to have been at all. Qui nunqam blan∣dum vitae gustavit amorem, nec fuit in numero; quid obest non esse beatum? What never knew existence, can nere know the want of bliss: Nothing can feel no woe.

3. That the greatest moity of the Earth is wholly barren and unprofitable to man.

Principio, quantum Coeli tegit impetus ingens, Inde avidam partem montes, sylvaeque ferarum Possedère: tonent rupes, vastaeque paludes, Et mare, quod late terrarum distinet oras; Inde duas porro prope partes fervidus ardor, Assiduusque geli casus mortalibus aufert, &c.

4. That even from those narrow cantons of the earth, which are inhabited, men reap no other harvest, but what themselves have sown, with uncessant toyle; nor doe they find any ground fruitfull, but what they have manured with their own industry, and enriched with the salt dew of their own laborious brows:

Quod superest arvi, tamen id natura sua vi Sentibus obducat, ni vis humana resistat, &c.

5. That even those fruits of the earth, which they have so dearly earned, with the profusion of so many showers of sweat, frequently miscarry, and become abortive; the hopes of the husband-man being often frustrated by the unexpected interven∣tion of cross seasons, Ustilagos or Blites, Mildewes, Sulphureous Met••ors, late Frosts, high Winds, &c.

6. That if neither the world, nor men, had ever been existent; their Ideas had never falne under the conception of the divine intellect.

7 That poor, weak, and fragil man is obnoxious to destructi∣on by a thousand divers contingencies; the ravenous appetite of wild Beasts, the deleterious punctures of Serpents, the conflagra∣tion of Lightning, the contusion of Thunderbolts, the eruption of Earth-quakes, the arsenical eructations of Minerals, the epide∣mick contagion of Pes••ilential Diseases, kindled either by Ano∣malous seasons, Tempests, or malignant impressions in the a••r; the invasion of intestine infirmities, upon the civil war often brea∣king out between the Heterogeneities of his bloud, or a mutiny of his Elements; and though he escape all these, yet doth the Palsic hand of Time soon shake down his ounce of sand, and then turn him over to be devoured by oblivion.

8.

Tum porro puer, ut saevis projectus ab undis Navita, nudus humi jacet infans, indigus omni Vitai auxilio, cum primum in luminis oras Nixibus ex a••vo matris natura profudit, Vagituque locum lugubri complet, ut aequum 'st, Quoi tantum in vita restet transire malorum. &c.

That Nature seems more a step-mother to man, then any other Animal; having cast him into the world naked, ••eeble, un∣armed, unprovided for in all but want, and by his early tears por∣tending that deluge of calamities, which in case he be so miserable to survive his birth, must drown all the comforts of his life, and wash him into earth again after a short slight of time; in brief, she exposeth him, as a bastard, to be taken up and nursed by the charity of that giddy headed gossip, Fortune: who hath no sooner smiled him into strength enough to suffer, but she con∣tracts her browes, disinherits and abandons the desolate wretch to all the hardship and afflictions, that the witty malice of Fate (to whom our tortures are pleasures, and the hoarse groans of the rack sound perfect melody) can either invent or inflict.

And thus have we heard, in Summary, the plea of those three eminent Levellers, who endevoured to supplant man of his birth∣right, to take away the prerogative of his nature, and reduce him to no greater a share in the favour of his Maker, then the meanest

of his fellow Animals. It comes now to our turn to examine, whether their Arguments are strong enough to carry the Cause.

The Refutation.

That God, in his atcheivem of the Universe, had a principal re∣gard to Man, above all other the works of his hands; and * 1.70 considered him, tanquam sinem interjectum, as the Mediate or Secondary End, his own Glory being the Immediate or Primary, or, more plainly, the end of that end: is clearly deduceable even from this; that man only among that infinite variety of natures listed in the inventory of the Creation, is constituted in a capacity to satisfie that first end; his intellectuals, or cogitative essence being, by a genial verticity, or spontaneous propension, qualified to admire, in admiration to speculate, in speculation to acknow∣ledge, in acknowledgement to laud the Goodness, Wisdome, and Power of the Worlds Creator; while the ignoble Faculties of all other Animals are terminated in the inferior offices of sense, nor ever attain above the inconsiderate operations of their brutal ap∣petites. And this one reason, if duely perpended, will be found of weight enough to counterpoize all those empty frothy so∣phisms * 1.71 alleaged to the contrary: nor can any aequitable conside∣ration (if I rightly understand its value) allow it to be much less then Apodictical. I say if duely perpended: for we are not rashly to understand this peculiar Adaequation or Praeeminence of man to consist in the bare Ʋprightness of his Figure, which accommodates him Coelum intueri, & erectos ad sidera tollere vultus. For, according to the vulgar acceptation of Erectness, and as it is considered to be a position opposite to Proneness, or the horizontal situation of the Spina dorsi, or rack bones in Ani∣mals progredient with their bellies toward the earth: man hath no reason to boast a singularity therein. Since many other Ani∣mals, as the Penguin, a kind of water fowle frequent upon the straights of Magellan; the devout insect of Province, or Prega Dio, the praying Grashopper, so called because for the most part found in an upright posture answerable to that of man, when his hands

are elevated at his devotions; the Bitour, which my self hath sometimes observed standing upright as an arrow falne perpendi∣cular, and his eyes so advanced, as to shoot their visual beams point blank at the zenith, or vertical point of heaven; all Plane Fishes, that have the apophyses or processes of their spine carried laterally, or made like the teeth of a Comb, as the Thornback, Plaice, Flounder, Soles, &c. and their eyes placed in the upper side of their head, and so pointing directly upward; and diverse others attaining an erectness beyond his, and by reason of the subli∣mimity of their faces taking a far larger prospect of the firmament. For man cannot look so high as the A••quinoctial circle, unless he either recline the spondils of his neck and loyns, or place him∣self in a supine position. And therefore Lactantius, though he conceived his argument impregnable, when he said (Lib. 7. cap. 5.) Quod planius argumentum proferri potest, & mundum hominis, & hominem suâ caussa Deum fecisse, quam quod ex omnibus Ani∣mantibus solus it a formatus est, ut oculi ejus ad coelum directi, facies ad Deum spectans, vultus cum suo parente communis sit? to him that shall literally interpret the same, cannot appear to have stopt the mouth of contradiction: unless perhaps we shall afford him so much favour, as to restrain the erectnes of man to that precise definition of our Master Galen (De usu part. lib. 1.) which allowes those Animals only to have an erect figure whose spines and thigh bones are situate in right lines. For in this strict signification, no Animal (for ought Zoographers, or those that write the Natural Histories of living Creatures have discove∣red, or our selves observed) can exactly fulfill that figure, but man; all others having their thighs pitched at angles, either right, or obtuse, or acute, to their spines. And for this respect was it, that ha∣ving premised, that Man only was constituted in a capacity to sa∣tisfie that prime end of the Creation, the glory of God; I thought ne∣cessary to subjoyn, his intellectual or Cogitative soul being natu∣rally disposed to admire, &c. thereby importing, that the basis of my Argument was fixt upon the very root of his Essence, or better Nature, as Plato calls it, whose propriety is sursum aspicere, to look up to his original, and speculate the excellencies of his Maker. And thus understood, I prefer Plato's etymologie

of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and am perswaded that the primitive Grecian so denominated man, quasi 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Contemplantem quae videt: nor can I conceive that Anaxagoras spake other then tropologically, when being askt, cur natus esset, he smartly and pathetically returned, ut videret coelum & terras; by that figurative expression intending, that man was made not to gape about or gaze upon the external beauties of heaven and earth, with the dull eye of his body: but to have his thoughts sublime, and with the acies of his mind to speculate the Wisdome, &c. of him that made them. Now by virtue of this divine Prerogative is it, that man is of undoubted right entituled to the especial care, and declared to be the Secondary end, or scope of the Creator. But farther to expatiate upon this manifest truth; were to light a candle to shew the Sun in the Meridian.

Nor by the title of Cogitation only, doth man lay claim to this dignity; but he inherits a second endowment also more noble * 1.72 then any other Animal, whereby he is empowerd to fulfill the principal destination of the World, the glory of God: and that is Sermocination or Locution. For the tongue of man only can own that character, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, inserviens sermocinati∣oni instrumentum, and can modulate the inspired aër into arti∣culate sounds, and so intelligibly proclaim the majesty of his Efficient. This Lactantius wisely urged against Epicurus his objective expostulation, Quae utilitas Deo in Homine, ut eum propter se faceret? appositely opposing, scilicet ut esset, qui opera ejus intelligeret, qui providentiam disponendi, rationem faci∣endi, virtutem consummandi & sonsu admirari, & voce prolo∣qui posset, &c. and (in lib. de Ira Dei cap. 13.) more plainly he says, Num & mutorum caussâ Deus laboravit? minimè, quia sunt & rationis & loquelae expertia: sed intelligimus & ipsa eodem modo ad usum hominis à Deo facta, &c.

As for that couchant Dilemma of Velleius, whether the World was intended for the use of wise men, or Fools: tis soon extrica∣ted, by distinguishing the purpose of the Creator into General and Particular: and so returning, that the Goodness of God had a respect to the benefit of all, in general; but of wise men in especial.

Now, if by Wise men, he mean such, whose minds are imbued with the maximes of Virtue, and their lives conform to the up∣right rules of morality (who only, in the judgment of Philoso∣phy, can challenge that Attribute) then is it not easie to doubt, that the beneficence of God was lost to them, or unadvisedly placed upon them: since their opportune, moderate, and grate∣full husbandry of these blessings, though it cannot be extended so high as absolute merit; may yet reach so far as to justifie the pru∣dence of their donation, and manifest the provident collocation of them upon convenient subjects, i. e. upon such as make it the constant business of their lives to learn how rightly to use them, and practise that excellent lesson, of imploying all things to the temporal supportation, comfort, and improvement of themselves, and themselves to magnifie the bounty of that hand, that so free∣ly bestowed them.

And on the other side, if by Fools he intend such as are dege∣nerated from the nobility of their nature, degraded below meer Humanity, that know no good beyond the present blandishments of sensuality, and have sworn themselves voluntary captives to their own luxurious Appetites, (and such was the wise mans fool) then can neither the Justice of God be taxed for conferring such rich favours upon those, that know only how to abuse them; nor his Praevision disparaged, as not foreseeing the miscarriage or unfruitfulness of his charity: since he left it in the arbitrary power of their Wills to make an election of Good or Evill, to turn to the right hand, and pursue the real and true de∣lights of virtue, or deflect on the left, and be lost in the deviations of the only apparent and false pleasures of vice: having set before them the means both of Sapience and Resipiscence, and furnished them with advantages and opportunities either to acquire more knowledge, or at least recant and disclaim their ignorance. Or, if by Fools, he designe such as our common Ideots, in whom the light of Nature is totally eclipsed, by some native distemper, or non-symmetrical configuration, or contingent concussion of the brain, or Presence-Chamber of the Intellect: then also is the case the same with divine Prudence, siquidem ex ipsorum desipientia, caeterorum sapientia efflorescit & collucet magis, since the

stolidity of an ignorant hath this use, that it serves as a foyl to set off the ingenuity of the knowing, and by the incompatible disparity which appears at the conference of those two contraries, infinitely enhanceth the value of wisdom. The satisfactory force of this solution maturely perpended, it can be reputed neither in∣cogitancy nor precipitation in me to omit the prolix appropriati∣on of those pertinent similitudes; that the wary husbandman doth cultivate and prepare his field, as well for the fertility of Pulse, as Wheat; that the most skilfull Gardiner provides room in his nursery for the sprouting of wild, degenerous, and barren plants, as well as for the geniculation of wholsome, generous and fruitful; that Princes account Plebeians, as well as Nobles, members of their Common-wealth; and that Apelles prepared his Tables as well to receive the black of shadowing, as the finer touches of his Pencill, and the brighter gradualities of Colours, in emulation of the life. And this, not only because I conceive the objection already more then refuted, and therefore all that can be superad∣ded may sound as nothing to the purpose: but chiefly because I understand, that the Logick of similes, or the way of probation by Comparatives, is at best but Analogisme; and therefore in∣consistent with my assumption of declining all but Demonstrati∣ons, or Reasons equally convictive.

As for that demand, Why God did not endow his favorite with immortality, but exposed him to the stroke of death; it is manifest that the soul of man is constituted immortal, and shall enjoy a being to all eternity, by the Charter of its Essence, and not ex gratia only, as M^r. Hobbs endevours to assert (in Leviathan) But the demonstration of this grand truth, being too large to be circumscribed by a Parenthesis, or foisted in by way of digression; I have reserved for a singular Chapter in the future.

For those remaining difficulties contained in the Arguments of * 1.73 Lucretius; they are easily salved, by answering succinctly to the

First, that the motive which inclined the divine Will to create the World, was not any possibility of emolument accruable to God from the veneration and gratitude of man: but the volun∣tary * 1.74

distusion of his own communicative goodness, in chief; and the benefit of man, as subservient thereto.

Second, that though that Axiome be undeniable, Non entis non sunt accidentia, and therefore it could have been no trouble to * 1.75 us, not to have been at all; yet that invincible reluctancy against Adnihilation, radicated in every vital entity, is demonstration enough, that to be, is far better then not to be, and we our selves experimentally find, that tis one degree of happiness to have ob∣tained existence; because to be nothing, is a meer Privation; to be something, attains to the perfection of Reality. Upon which ground many have erected a conjecture, the the devill himself would not consent to his own Adnihilation, though he might evade his torments by the bargain: with advantage preferring the miserable condition of something, to the horrid opacity of nothing.

Third, that God made such abundant provision conductive to the utility of men, that both from the Amplitude and Variety of * 1.76 his work, they might collect matter sufficient to incite them to the constant contemplation of his Wisdome, and gratefull acknow∣ledgement of his Munificence: as also, that having observed what of the Creatures were less commodious, they might be di∣rected in their election of the more commodious and beneficial, as well for their Conservation as Delight.

Fourth, that the labours of Agriculture are superfluous, and voluntarily undergon by man, more for the maintainance of his * 1.77 delicacy and inordinate luxury, then the provision of Necessaries to his livelyhood. Since the same liberal earth, which is Mother, Nurse, and Purveyer to all other Animals, cannot be thought in∣hospitable to man only, nor so cruelly penurious as to exclude her best guest from participating the inexhaustible boūty of her table. And though we grant some moderate labour necessary in order to the comfortable sustentation of our prodigal bodies, always upon the expence; yet have we good cause to esteem that more a blessing then a curse, since the sweat of industry is sweet. Not only be∣cause

the active genius of man is constellated for business, and therefore never more opprest then with the burthen of idleness; but also because the sprightly hopes of a wealthy harvest sweeten and compensate the labour of semination. Nor is the contentment which growes from ingenious Husbandry much below any other solace of the mind, in this life; if we may credit the experience of many Princes, who having surfetted on the distractions of royal∣ty, have voluntarily quitted the magnified pleasures of the Court (magnified only by such ambitious Novices, who never discove∣red the gall that lyes at the bottom of those guilded sweets) and with inestimable advantage exchanged the tumult of their palaces for the privacy of Granges; have found it a greater delight to ••ultivate the obedient and gratefull earth, then rule that giddy beast, the multitude; a happier entertainment of the mind, and more wholsome exercise of the body, to hold the easie plough, then sway an unweildy Scepter, and revell in the infatuating pomp of greatness.

Fifth, that those preposterous seasons, Blights, Mildews, Com∣bustions, &c. putrefactive accidents, that make the preguant earth * 1.78 suffer abortion, and so nip the forward hopes of the laborious swain; doe neither intervene so frequently, nor invade so gene∣rally, as to introduce an universal famine, or so cut off all pro∣vision, as not to leave a sufficient stock of Aliment for the susten∣tation of mankind.

Sixth, that the divine Intellect was the universal exemplar * 1.79 to it self, framing the types or ideas both of the world and of man▪ within it self, and accordingly configurating them. This may be evinced by an argument à minori; since even our selves have a power to design and modell some artificial engine, whose pattern or idea we never borrowed from any thing existent without the circle of our selves, but coyned in the solitary recesses of our mind.

Seventh, concerning mans being obnoxious to the injury of many Contingencies, as the voracity of wild beasts, the venome of * 1.80 Serpents, the conflagration of Lightning, the contagion of the

Pestilence, the corruption of swarms of other diseases both epide∣mick and sporadick, &c. that all these are the regular effects of Gods Generall Providence, and have their causes, times, and fina∣lities preordained, and inscribed in the diary of Fate, to whose prescience nothing is contingent. But of this more satisfactorily in our subsequent consideration of universal Providence; whither in strictness of method, it refers it self.

Eight, that this complaint against the unkindness of Nature, * 1.81 for producing man, tender, naked, unarmed, &c. is grosly un∣just. For the imbecillity of our Infancy is necessary to the per∣fection and maturity of those noble organs, contrived for the ad∣ministration of the mandates of that Empress, the Cogitant Soul; and is amply compensated either by the vigor and acuteness of the senses, or by diuturnity of life. It being observed by Natura∣lists, that those Animals which live long, have a long gestation in the womb, a long infancy, and attain but slowly to their maturity and standard of growth; the four general motions of life, Incep∣tion, Augmentation, State, and Declination, carrying set and pro∣portional intervals each to other, as that truly noble Philoso∣pher, Scaliger hath hinted, in his correction of that fabulous tra∣dition of the extreme lo••gaevity of Deer in these words: De ejus vitae longitudine fabulantur, neque enim aut gestatio aut incre∣mentum hinnulorum ejusmodi sunt, ut praestent argumentum longaevi Animalis. As for his being born naked; tis no disfa∣vour, nor neglect in her, for that cumbersom wardrobe of raggs, which man hath gotten upon his back, is become necessary only by the delicacy of his education and custome, not so intended by nature in the primitive simplicity and eucrasie of his constitution; when there needed nothing but the skin either to warme, or adorn the body. Lastly, those Armes, which Nature hath denied him; either he wants not at all, or his own ingenious hands can provide at pleasure.

CHAP. IV. The General Providence of God, DEMONSTRATED.

S••CT. I.

THe Synopsis of my method, exhibited in the hem of the first Section of the first Chapter, was de∣signed * 1.82 as a clue to conduct the thoughts of my Reader along the series of those Attributes of the supreme Ens, which (as being of most gene∣ral concernment, and such as may be clearly de∣monstrated by the Light of Nature, even to those, who either never heard of, or except against the testimony of Holy Writ) I have promised to illustrate, by the conviction of Arguments de∣duced from that catholique Criterion, Reason; to whose Judi∣cature all Nations and Ages have readily submitted their assent: and therefore I am not necessitated here to insert any farther ex∣planation of the connexion and dependence of this Theme upon the precedent; but only, in avoydance of misconception, to ad∣vertise, that when I say, the Creation of the World ex nihilo, and the constant Conservation of the same in its primitive order and harmonious Coefficiency of causes subordinate, are the general operations of the Wisdome and Power of the First cause; I doe not intend, that those are Acts really distinct each from other (for in the demonstration of the Existence of God tis plainly, though succinctly evinced, that the Conservation of the Ʋniverse is no∣thing

but the Act of Creation prolonged or continued) but only conform my theory to the customary notions and terms of the Schools, and yeeld to the necessity of a division in the gross capa∣city of mans understanding, in order to the more gentle enforce∣ment of a stable beleif.

The Act of Conservation of all things in their originary stations, and the perpetual obedience of all second Causes, in their several * 1.83 motions, to the laws of his will, that elemented them; hath ever been called Providence divine: which derived high enough, seems to import, the constant operation of an infinite Wisdom, and infi∣nite Power, combined in the effusion of an infinite Goodness. This Providence (for to that Appellation, as most antient, most com∣mon, and therefore most familiar, I shall adhere) most Clerks have branched into General, whereby the government of the whole Universe is administred: and Particular, or special, whereby God doth take special care of mankind, and regulate the affairs of his master-peice. Now according to this necessary Divi∣sion, must I range my forces into two Files, and draw up one to defeat those Atheists, who have proclaimed open hostility against the First; and the other to subdue those, that have declared against the Second.

The Colonell to that black regiment, that fought against the * 1.84 opinion of the government of the World by the Sceptre of Divine Monarchy, is generally accounted Epicurus; but in the authen∣tique records of Stobaeus (Ecl. Phys. 25.) we may finde him to have been no more then Captain-lievtenant to Leucippus, who of all the Graecian Philosophers, whose doctrines have escaped the spunge of oblivion, was the first that appeared in the field against universal Providence, and not long after surrendred the staffe to Democritus the elder, whose immediate successor was Heraclitus, as we are told by Nemesius (De nat. Homin. 13.) But whoever led up the van, was closely followed by many both of the same and succeeding ages; the most eminent whereof were Dicaear∣chus (Cicero 4. Academ.) Strato (Idem de Divinat. 2.) Ennius (Idem de Nat. Deor. 3.) Lucretius (Libro ejus 2.) Velleius

(Cicero de Nat. Deor. 1.) Lucian (in bis Accus.) who like a facetious villain, personates Jupiter complaining of the oppression of overmuch business; nay the devout Father S. Hieron. (in Comment. in Abac.) seems to have espoused the quarrel, though doubtless upon another interest. His words I shall faithfully tran∣scribe for two important reasons. First because I would not ap∣pear to have fixt a scandal upon so venerable a Pillar of our Church, who otherwise hath deserved so amply of the Christian faith; that the consideration of the transcendent merits of his pious labours had once almost perswaded me to beleive the possi∣bility of justification by works. Secondly, to deliver his memory from the imputation of impiety; for it may be naturally collected from the syntax and scope of his discourse, that it was a noble esteem which he had of the majesty of the Divine Nature, whom he thought too fully taken up with the blisfull contemplation of his own perfections (in truth, the only Felicity God can be ca∣pable of) to be concerned in ordering the trifling occurrences of the world; and not any conceit of the insufficiency of omnipo∣tence, that cast him upon this rock. Caeterum absurdum est (says he) ad hoc Dei deducere majestatem ut sciat per momenta singula, quot nascantur culices, quotve moriantur: quot ci∣micum & pulicum & muscarum sit in terra multitudo: quanti pisces in aqua natent, & qui de minoribus major••m praedae ce∣dere debeant. Non simus tam fatui Adulatores Dei, ut dum po∣tentiam ejus ad ima detrahimus, in nosipsos injuriosi simus, ean∣dem rationabilium, quam irationabilium Providentiam esse dicentes.

So that his diminution of the universality of Providence, may seem the pardonable effect of immoderate devotion, and but a high strained description of the glory of that essence, which in strict truth, can be concerned in nothing but it self; and must then appear to be undervalued, when most magnified by the extension of its influence to petty and trivial mutations, and conceived to act a part in the interludes of Flies, order the militia of Pismires, and decree what, and how many Gnats shall be devoured by swallowes in a summers day. But as for Epicurus, and the rest of that miscreant crew; tis more then probable, that a quite

different interest inveigled them into this dangerous error. For, first, their own writings bare record, that they made it the grand scope of their studies to promote Atheisme, by plotting how to undermine the received beleif of an omnipotent eternal Being, to murder the immortality of the Soul (the basis of all religion) and deride the Compensation of good and evil actions after death. In particular, Epicurus did not blush to profess that the chief end at which his Physiology was collineated, was this; ut mens ex perspectis causis conquiescat, neque aliam eamque divinam sub∣esse causam suspicando, felicitatem interturbet. And Secondly, the grounds upon which they erected this detestable negation of universal Providence, may sufficiently satisfie a heedfull enquirer; that not any intense honour or veneration of the most perfect and happy nature, transported their minds to this height of delusion: but rather a confi••med infidelity of the infinity of his Wisdome and Power, which is affirmed by us, that maintain the diffusion of Pro∣vidence over all, and descry the finger of Divinity in the smallest actions of inferior causes, though ne're so contemptible in the eyes of Humane reason. But a more ample knowledge of this doth offer it self to our thoughts, in the particular examination of their Ar∣guments: to which we therefore immediately address.

The First Argument they drew from the apparent incompati∣bility of business and happiness; or more plainly, from the vast * 1.85 disparity between the blisfull condition or contemplative quiet of the supreme Nature, and the trouble, or disturbance (for so their ignorance unfitly apprehended it) that must arise from the oversight and managery of such infinite variety of Actions, as are every minute performed within the immense Amphitheatre of the World. For Epicurus, indiscreetly attempting to take the altitude of the Divine Intellect, by the unequal Jacobs-staffe of the Humane; rashly inferred, that it could not be extended be∣low the sphear of its own mansion, and that no Intelligence could be so large, as not to be overwhelmed by that Ocean of Cares, that must flow from the multitude and diversity of con∣tinual emergencies here below. This he contracted into that sen∣tence; Quod est beatum & immortale, neque sibi habet, neque

alteri exhibet negotium; which so pleased him, that he reputed it a Cornerstone in the fabrick of science, and enacted it to stand in the front of those Sententiae ratae, which he dared Scepticity withall.

Nor did his sedulous Commentator Lucretius, recede an inch from the same text; but fondly commensurating the power of an Infinite wisdome, by the narrow capacity of his own finite reason, preached to the world; that to ascribe the government of sublunary affairs to the Gods, was impiety in the inference, and must implicitly destroy the fundamentals of their Divinity, which is made up of Beatitude and Immortality, neither of which can consist with the perpetual disquiet, and impetuous anxiety of mind, which the Administration of so vast and tumultuous a Common∣wealth, as this of the World, must introduce. For when he would impose, that the shoulders of Divinity, though a real Atlas, are too weak to sustain so great a weight, as that of Rector Gene∣ral; under a pretext of tender zeal (forsooth) he insimulates those of prophanation, Qui summum illud, quicquid est, tam tristi, atque multiplici ministerio polluunt, as Pliny expresses it: and therefore exclaims.

Nam (proh! Sancta Deûm tranquilla pectora pace, Quae placidum degunt aevum, vitamque serenam) Quis regere immensi summam? Quis habere profundi Indu-manu validas potis est moderanter habenas? Quis pariter Coelos omneis convertere? & omneis Ignibus aethereis terras suffire feraceis? Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore praestò, Nubibus ut faciat tenebras, coelique serena Concutiat sonitu? tum fulmina mittat, & aedeis Saepe suas disturbet? & in diversa recedens Saeviat, exercens telum; quod saepe nocenteis Praeterit, exanimatque indignos, inque merenteis? &c. lib. 2.

Ah! since the happy and immortal Powers In c••lme content melt their eternal houres, Feasting on self-enjoyment; who can keep The rains of Nature? Who command the Deep?

To wind about the ponderous Sphears, what arme Hath strength enough? what Influence can warme The fruitfull earth with Fires aetherial? who Can fill all places, and all actions doe? To veil the face of Light with sable clouds, And wrap the lucid sky in sulph'ry shrouds: Whose Coruscations split the fluid aer, Convell the feet of Rocks, and with despair Affect poor Mortals into Quick silver: then turn, And with Granadoes his own Temples burn: Then dart his flames at Innocence, and wound Virtue, while guilty Vice continues sound?

Their other Argument is extracted from the conceived Ʋn∣certainty and irregularity of Contingencies, and the unaequal * 1.86 dispensation of good and evill; all things seeming to fall out accor∣ding to the giddy lottery of Chance, and as confusedly as if there were no Providence at all. This may be collected as well from that speech of Epicurus, charged upon him by that heroick Cham∣pian of Divine Monarchy, Lactantius; Nulla dispositio est, * 1.87 multa enim facta sunt aliter, quàm fieri debuerunt: as from the context of his Physiology, wherein having made it his Hypo∣thesis, that all bodies both coelestial and sublunary were at first configurated by Fortune, i. e. arose to such and such particular figures, by the casual segregation, convention and complexion of the General matter, divided into several masses; and that, by the inclination of their convenient Figures, they were adliged to such and such peculiar Motions, and accommodated to the ne∣cessary causation of determinate viciffitudes: he proceeds to re∣duce all succeeding events in the World to that primitive series of Causes, which made their own spontaneous eruption out of the Chaos, and attained to the certain rules of their future activity, at the same time they attained to their distinctions and single essences; denominating that chain of causalities, Nature, and holding her to be her own Directress, and by the law of innate tendency ob∣liged to a perpetual continuation of the same motions begun in

the first minute of the worlds composure; according to that ex∣clamation of Pontanus (Lib. 1. de Stellis.)

Quid vexare Deos frustr à juvat? ordine certo Fert Natura vices; labuntur & ordine certo Sydera; tam varios rerum patientia casus. Illa suos peragunt motus, servant que tenorem Sorte datum, &c.

What boot's it man with fruitless praiers to fret The Ears o'th Gods; when Natures Laws are set, Beyond Repeal or Alteration? The radiant Lamps of heaven still move on In their old tracks: nor can the Planets stray, In all their wandrings, from their native way; Or change that Tenor, which at first they got Consign'd unto them, by their proper Lot.

The result of all which is, that Epicurus would perswade, that the Universe is a Commonwealth, wherein every single member is, by the signature and necessity of its particular constitution, instructed in, and impelled upon the praecise performance of its peculiar office; so as not to want the direction of any Superintendent, or to conform to the directions of a General Councel: and seems to allow this only difference between the universal Politie of the World, and the particular Republique of mankind; that in this, men frequently make deflexions from the general scope, by rea∣son of the seductions of their unstable and irregular judgments; but in that, all individuals punctually keep to their primitive assigna∣tions, and so conspire to the satisfaction of the common interest, by reason of the constancy of their natures, and unalterable necessity of their forms. And this Abridgement of his doctrine, Plutarch (de Fato) hath prepared to our hands, when personating Epicurus, he thus argues; Nulla est opus sapientia ordinis instruendi in exercitu, si militum quivis sua sponte noverit locum, ordinem, stationem, quam accipere debet & tueri: neque etiam opus oli∣toribus, Fabrisve murariis, si aqua illeic ultrò afsluat indigen∣tibus irratione plantis; heic lateres, ligna, lapidesque eas, natura duce, motiones at que inclinationes subeant, quibus in sua loca, inque expetitam concinnitatem coeant, &c.

Now for the other part of the Argument, viz. the unequal * 1.88 distribution of Good and Evill, and the ordinary intervention of many effects inconsistent with the justice and righteous admini∣stration of Divinity: this is clearly hinted by Lucretius, who makes it the main scope of his sixth Canto, to alienate mens minds from the beleif of an Ʋniversal moderator, by several instances of events, that seem to hold too visible an affinity to Temerity and Inconsideration, to have any relation at all to the judicious method requisite to Providence; and particularly towers himself over that one example of the Thunder-bolt, as if his reason had slown to a pitch above all possibility of contradiction, when yet the summary of all that bold discourse, abstracted by an impartial hand, amounts to no more then this.

Since we observe the Thunder-bolt (1.) To be, for the most part, discharged on the heads of the Innocent, and not the Guilty: (2.) To batter Sancta Deûm delubra, the Temples of the Gods themselves, more frequently then common buildings: (3.) To be idly spent at random, upon the sea and void Campanias; and so seems not to have been the Artillery of Divine Vengeance, pre∣pared for the punishment of impious mortals: (4.) To be gene∣rated, like other meteors, by natural Causes, being a fulphureous exhalation compacted in the clouds, and thence darted ala volec, or at a venture, on whatever is situate in the level of its projection: it appears an absurdity of timerous superstition to beleive, that every single occurrence is praeordained by Wisdom, or that all ex∣temporary Accidents have their praescripts in the book of Fate.

And these are the Goliah objections, or nerves of the Atheists Remonstrance against Ʋniversal Providence; which though ma∣ny of the Fathers, and particularly S. Clement (in 5. Strom.) have decreed to be filed amongst those impious questions, that deserve no answer but a whip, like the doubts of a Mahometan in point of faith: yet since promise hath made it my duty, to en∣devour the demonstration of the Attributes of the divine nature (such at least as occurre to the contemplation of a meer Philoso∣pher, who hath wholly referred himself to the Testimonies of the Light of Nature) by the conviction of Reason alone; I am confident so clearly and fully to confute, that no man, who

hath not stubbornly put out the eye of his soul, shall in the future remain a Sceptick, as to this particular.

SECT. II. The Vindication.

FIrst I plead the general consent of all Nations and Ages in * 1.89 the acknowledgement of Providence; for, according to the Logical Canons even of Epicurus (apud Gassend. in Animad∣vers. in Canonic. Epicuri) any motion, that is held in common, and by long prescription grown into 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Anticipation, ought not to be doubted of; as being its own Criterion, and from which there lies no farther Appeal.

Now that all Nations have met in one Chorus to proclaim the * 1.90 universal and absolute soveraign••y of Providence, cannot be ob∣scure to any, that have, but with half an eye, glanced on the Records of Antient and Customes of Present; or but con∣sidered, that even the Idolatry of the most stupid and barbarous people that ever lived, doth plainly commonstrate, that they paid both their sacrifices and orizons, as homage to some Power, which held the rains of second Causes, and could dispose them to the production of good or evil events, according to his own bene∣placets; and therefore not only in publique Calamities, as War, Pestilence, Famine, &c. but also in the private distresses of each Family and Person, they immediately addressed themselves to the Sanctuary of their devotions, hoping by that means to appease the anger of that slexible hand, that had the arbitrary donation of happiness and misery.

That all Philosophers also (who being generally reputed wise * 1.91 men, and all their very Tenets exemplary; could not but draw whole shoals of under-heads into the stream of their opinions)

gave in their votes on the side of Providence; cannot cost much oyle to illustrate: it being obvious, first, that

Ecphantus, with most of that elder sect, who gave in their names * 1.92 to the doctrine of Atoms, did yet establish the necessary concessi∣on of some universal Moderator, and unanimously referred the or∣dination of all contingents, as well frequent as rare, auspicious and inauspicious, popular and domestique, to the arbitrary dis∣posal of one common P••lot, who sate at the helme of this great vessel, the Universe. (Leg. Stobaeum in Ecl. Phys.)

Secondly, that those also, who held the World to be Non∣principiate, or to have been so old, as never to have been young, * 1.93 did yet notwithstanding condemn the delirium of Fortune, and concluded the gubernation of all upon the supreme Intelligence. For Plato seems so strongly convicted, and his reason so violently ravished into the armes of Divine Providence; that, though he inclined to the eternity of the World, he yet conceded the pro∣duction thereof in time, as a necessary Hypothesis, or foundati∣on, whereon he might the more firmely crect his superstructure of that magisterial Truth, which otherwise would have been impossi∣ble to be made out, viz. The universal Administration of Pro∣vidence. And thus much he frequently declared, in Lib. de Legi∣bus: in Epinomide, & in Timaeo more expresly; out of which meditation Plutarch (De procreat. Anim. ex Timaeo, & de Fato) collected his tripartite distinction of Providence. Prima enim (says he) & suprema, est Primi Dei intelligentia, sive mavis, voluntas benefica erga res omnes; qua primum singulae divinae res omninò optimè ac pulcherrimò ordinatae sunt: secunda secun∣dorum deorum per coelum incedentium qua res mortales ordinatè siunt, & singulorum generum constantia atque salus procuratur: Tertia non ineptè dieitur Providentia, & Procuratio Geniorum, qui circa terram collocati, humanarum actionum custodes atque inspectores sunt.

And Aristotle, who was much more bold and plain in his assertion of the Worlds eternity, though (in Metaphys. 12. * 1.94 cap. 9.) he pretends an unwillingness to have the majestick sancti∣ty of the supreme Nature disparaged, by being debased to the oversight of petit and inconsiderable affairs transacted heer below;

and therefore limited his jurisdiction to the coelestial orbs: yet was he forced to confess the impossibility of the worlds subsistence in the due harmony and requisite order of all its motions, without the constant regulation thereof by Providence, as Laertius, The∣odoretus, Stobaeus, and other of his most judicious Expositors have assured us. And upon this consideration was it, that the good Father, Origen allowed him to have been one degree less impious then Epicurus. Nay Cicero (2. de Natur. deorum) makes him upon second thoughts, to have professed a recantation, by allow∣ing the ubiquity of the divine Wisdome, and extending the arme of Providence, which he had formerly shortned and terminated in the lowest sphear, even to the meanest of sublunary passages, introducing him disguised (doubtless to prevent the dishonour of unconstancy to his own principles) under a third person telling a story of some, Qui post aevum transactum in locis subterraneis, & repente emersi, intuitique hunc ordinem rerum, ipsum sine numine esse non posse arbitrarentur.

Thirdly, that the Stoicks, albeit upon that vulgar presumption that to assign the procuration of all minute and trivial occurences, * 1.95 to that Nature, which is all Felicity and Quiet, was implicitly to infringe the right hand of its divinity; they abridged its empire, and limited its influence to the more weighty and popular actions of mankind only; were howsoever zealous assertors of Providence; is manifest from that saying of Cotta reproving Balbus, an eminent Stoick (apud Cicer. de natur. Deor. 3.) At enim minora dii neque agellos singulorum, nec viticulas prosequuntur; nec si uredo, aut grando quidpiam nocuit, id Iovi animadvertendum fuit; nec in regnis quidem reges omnia minima curant: sic enim dicitis, &c.

And lastly, that the Academicks and Scepticks were of the * 1.96 same perswasion; however being carried against the stream of all Affirmative learning, by the contrary tide of their own Negative humor, and obliged to fall foul upon all truths, in defence of their own affected Nescience; they have been observed to have had some light skirmishes with the Champians of Providence. Nor need we acquiesce in the bare affirmation hereof, while to any man, that shall with equanimity and attention compare

their tender arguments against the opinion of general Providence, with those more sinewy and vehement reasons of their profest neu∣trality in many other notions; there will offer it self a fair ground for more then conjecture, that they purposely contrived them soft, gentle, and dissoluble, that so they might seem neither to quit their habit of contradiction, nor yet to dare the subversion of that catholick position, to which all men (those few of the black guard of Hell, whom we lately nominated, excepted) had sub∣scribed, and which the dictates of their own domestick oracle, Reason, had confirmed as sacred and uncontrollable. To which we may annex the testimony of Gassendus, who (in Animadvers. in lib. 10. Diogen. Laert. de Physiologia Epicuri pag. 731.) speaking conjunctively of both those sects, saies thus: ut argu∣ment atisunt adversus Providentiam, sic opinioni de providentia suam probabilitatem fecerunt, neque saltem ea fronte fuerunt, ut esse providentiam absolutè inficiarentur.

Now to take the just dimensions of this Argument, let us al∣low it, like Janus, to have two faces; and then survey the aspect * 1.97 of each a part. On one hand it looks Absolute and Apodictical: on the other only Perswasive.

Apodictical; since the universality of any beleif (such especi∣ally, as hath ever been attested even by those, who have made the profoundest search into its fundamentals, and streyned every nerve in the whole body of reason to demolish it,) is no obscure proof, that it must be one of those 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Implantate No∣tions, which the same hand, that made our nature, hath engraven on the table of our minds, and lest it not in the power of our de∣praved Wills totally to obliterate.

That there are some Implantate Notions, no man, who hath but learned the Alphabet of his own Nature, will dispute. Nor is it less certain, that all Philosophers have decreed Anticipation (which Aristotle (in 1. Poster. 1.) calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, praeexistentem cognitionem; and Cicero hath interpreted (1 de Nat. Deor.) notionem menti insitam, & anteceptam quandam in animo informationem) to be the Touch-stone of verity: nay Empiricus himself forgot his custome of Scepticisme, when he came

to this point, and grew positive (advers. Gramm. & advers▪: Ethic.) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that no man could so much as enquire, or doubt of any thing without Praenotion.

And that the Notion of the worlds regiment by universal Providence, is one of those propositions, Quae sunt in nobis adeo antiquae, ut iis, ex quo esse & sentire coepimus, evaserimus infor∣mati: which, like letters carved on the bark of a young plant, are impressed upon our very Intellect, and grow up together with us; is already proved collaterally and upon induction, in our Demonstration of the Existence of God: for therein it is cleared, that the excellent Idea, which we have of the Supreme Beeing, contains all Perfections whatever, and among the rest, that noble Attribute, Creator; which to him that shall attentively consider the nature of Duration, must sound one and the same thing, with Conservator, or Governour.

Only perswasive; since humane Auctority, considered perse, is but an inartificial Argument, and binds not, but when consor∣ted with others more rational, into one syndrome or multi∣plex demonstration: not is the concentration of all mens minds in one and the same assertion, an infallible Criterion of its verity. For the judgement of man in generall lyes open to the encroach∣ments of Error, and the common infirmity of humane nature is not only discoverable in the gross and visible delusions of vulgar heads (whose business is to beleive, not examine) but hath fre∣quently broken out upon the soundest brains, and confest it self Epidemical in the absurd mistakes of the greatest Criticks of Truth, especially in the promotion and transmission of opinions haereditary and traditional.

SECT. III.

LEt us not, therefore, entrust the supportation of so weighty a Truth to that fragile reed of Auctority; but give our selves * 1.98 liberty to imagine, that no man ever beleived or asserted an uni∣versal Providence: and having thus devested our minds of all Prae∣sumption, or Anticipation, expose them as tables newly derased to receive the pure impressions or sincere documents of the Light of Nature; converting our contemplations, First upon the Nature of God, and thence upon the most exact order and confe∣deracy of all secondary causes in the world.

First, I say, let us set our reason a work upon the nature of the First Cause, or Eternal Being; and order our cogitations thus. The same demonstration, whereby the mind of man is convicted of the Existence of God, doth also at the same time violently, but naturally, conclude his nature to be so accomplisht in all Perfecti∣ons, as to be above all Access or Addition. For manifest it is, that by the terme, God, every man doth understand something to which no perfection is wanting: and should it be granted possible, that the mind of man could conceive any perfection more then what is comprehended in the idea, which it holds of the nature of God; yet still would that thing, to which it could ascribe that perfecti∣on, be God. Since tis impossible to cogitate any perfection, which is not the essential propriety of some Nature: and to think any Nature more perfect then the Divine, plainly absurd; because we conceive that to be most perfect, or else we do not conceive it to be God; God, and Absolute Perfection being one and the same thing, and ordinarily conceived as one notion. Now, to be so insinitely Wise, Potent, and Good, as to order all things in the world to the best, to regulate and predetermine the operations of all second Causes, to keep Nature her self sober and in tune▪ and so prevent those discords, which otherwise would in a mo∣ment succeed to the reduction of all to a greater confusion then that of the Chaos; in a word, to conserve all things in existence: this no man will deny to be a Perfection, since we define the per∣fection

of man, by his abilities sor dominion (i. e.) in the judge∣ment of our reason, every man is esteemed by so much the more perfect, by how much the more generous, august, liberal, prudent and benigne mind he is endued withall, and by inference, by how much the more digne he is to bear rule over others. Therefore is this Perfection, Mundo providere, seu singulis rebus consulere, to take care of the world, and provide for the subsistence of every single entity; of necessity to be ascribed to God.

For though that obsolet fallacy, that business imports disquiet, and disquiet contradicts s••licity, be retrived upon us; and our reason seem captived in the snare of this conclusion; That this Perfection, as it stands in relation to Divinity, must be an imper∣fection, as being point blanck repugnant to its nature, which can∣not at once be superlatively happy, and yet subject to multiplicity of business: yet we may soon redeem it to the liberty of truth, by conceiving some nature, wherein these two seeming contraries may be reconciled, (i. e.) the Procuration of affaires may shake hands with extreme beatitude. Nor do we conceive an impossibi∣lity herein; because even among men we daily find, that those Negotiations, which are an oppression to a low, narrow and un∣practised Wit, are but the pleasant diversions and familiar recrea∣tions of a sublime, capacious, and polypragmatical: and by con∣sequence that Nature which is able to sustain the administration of affairs infinite in number and variety, without detriment to its complet happiness; must be conceded, by incomputable degrees of transcendency more perfect, then that whose quiet must suffer diminution by the distraction of cares. Wherefore let us not suffer our cogitations to acquiesce in this imperfect, but vigo∣rously advance to that most perfect Nature, whose propriety it is to be at once both supremely Provident, and supremely Beate. And since we conceive God to be such, it is of necessity inevitable, that we grant Ʋniversal Providence to be his proper Attribute.

For Confirmation, or (more properly) requisite Explanation (for sure no man, whose intellectuals are not suppressed by that intolerable tyrant, profest Incredulity, can longer doubt) of this; let us reflect upon our Idea of the Deity, and therein we shall discover, that tis impossible for the minde of man to conceive

the import of this word, God; and not in the same numerical no∣tion to understand him to be most Wise, most Potent, most Good, or in abstracto, infinite Wisdome, infinite Power, infinite Good∣ness, assimilated, or rather identified into one simple eternal essence. For undoubtedly our minds would speculate the Idea of a poor inconsiderable and imperfect Divinity; if they conceived it subject to circumscription, and apprehended his Intellection so nar∣row as not actually to comprehend all things; his Power so re∣strained, as to know Impossibility; his Goodness so scant and shallow, as to be exhausted in a partial diffusion, or limited by the admixture of Envy, (i. e.) withdrawn from, or denied unto any of the works of his hand, out of a designe to delight, or glory in their infelicity.

Now if God be infinitely wise, he must be Omniscient; and * 1.99 consequently, must understand not only the simple and naked Forms of all natures in the Universe, but hold also a full and clear theory of their Essential proprieties, how and by what kind of activities they operate toward the satisfaction of their praedestinate ends, and in what method they may be most conveniently dispo∣sed to maintain the order and harmony of the whole; and so * 1.100 must know and exercise the due administration of all things in this vast Common-wealth. I say, must know and exercise; for if he understood the politie or method of the worlds Gubernation, only Contemplatively: then would not his Intellection be com∣plet and absolute in all points, and we should have been com∣pelled to recurre to our former device of cogitating some other nature more perfect, which might be actually possessed of both the Theorical and Practical Intelligence. Again, since Sapience doth consist in, and manifest it self chiefly by Action, and the real administration of difficult and important affairs; with what shadow of reason can we argue God to be most Sapient, if we conceive him to be Idle, devoyd of all action, and taking care of nothing?

Secondly, if God be infinitely Potent, then must he be Omni∣potent: and so to his power there is no 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or impossibility. * 1.101

But how can we apprehend this aright, unless we first grant, that having produced all things, and endowed them with faculties re∣spectively inservient to their conducement to the satisfaction of the general end; he doth, through all the independent subdivisions of time, (i. e.) constantly, moderate their activities, in full con∣formity to the prudent rules of his own Will: and how can this be done, unless we allow him to have a hand in all operations, and that both Causes and effects doe so fully and wholly depend upon him, that they can have neither Existence, nor Motion, without the assent and coefficiency of his Beneplacet. Again, Action is the Pathognomonick, or proper manifest of Power; nay, in pre∣cise and orthodox logick, they are Correlatives, or twins that are ••orn, live and dye together; and we are not now to learn, that Gods prime scope in the Creation, was to have an opportunity for the manifestation of his excellencies: if so, can Inactivity declare Supreme Power, or a cessation from acting not induce a suspicion of Lassitude and imbecillity?

Lastly, if God be infinitely good; it necessarily followes, Goodness being Communicative, that all natures must be sensible * 1.102 of, by participating that his inexhaustible goodness. And with what unpardonable incogitancy can that be asserted, while we opinion that he doth concenter his goodness, and when he hath created so many excellent natures, take no care or make no pro∣vision for their welbeing, but abandon them to the impendent mi∣sery of confusion? Might we not justly censure him of Malevo∣lence or Envy, if he should withhold the communication of his perpetual Providence from the works of his own hands; which must unavoydably perish by the Antipathies of their Constitutions, and relaps into their primitive nothing in that moment, when he should intermit his act of Conservation? Nay, so essential is the constant oversight and tuition of the Creator to the subsistence of the Creature; that some contemplative heads have hereupon hinted a conjecture, that nothing shall go to the dissolution of all, at the period of time, but the meer Cessation of Providence, or the dereliction of Nature to the necessary discord of her several peices.

And thus hath the clue of Gods chief Attributes (chief in his relation to the World) in a direct line conducted our single rea∣son to the demonstration of his General Providence; which in∣deed, is the clearest mirror of his superexcellent Nature, and to the opticks of mortality doth afford a lively reflexion of his infinite Wisedome, Power, and Goodness. It succeeds that we en∣devour to look at Providence through the Telescope or Per∣spective of the World.

Since God made the World, as hath been already proved; it cannot but be absurd to imagine, that he instantly deserted it, or * 1.103 having once imprest a virtue of motion upon the greater wheels of this vast machin▪ immediately withdrew his hand from action, leaving them to be carried on by their own rapt or swinge; and all the lesser and subordinate wheels of particular natures to con∣forme to the impulsion of those greater. For though he made all things Perfect, (i. e.) omitted nothing requirable to the integral accomplishment of each Creature, in suo genere: yet since him∣self is the Ʋniversal Soul, that both Materiald and Informed each particle of this great body; in stri••tness of consequence, no∣thing can have existence longer then he shall please, in every minute of its duration, freshly to create it, or (to speak the in∣terest of Providence) to conserve it in being, by a continual com∣munication of it self; all the Actions of Divinity, being real Divinity at second hand, or nothing but Dissusions, or Emanati∣ons of its own essence.

Again, who ever reared a magnificent structure a purpose to ruine it? and since there is no Artificer so unnatural or stupid, as not to desire rather that his Artifice should prosper and continue long by carefull looking to, then be exposed to ruine by neglect or violence: tis infinitely more improbable, that the great Exemplar of all Mechanicks (for no age ever produced a peice of Art, whose pattern was not first in Nature) should so far grow out of love with his own operation, and despise those perfections, which were but the extracts of himself; as to disclaim it, commit it to the imminent disorder and demolition of Fortune, and not make provision of all things conducible to its preservation: especially,

when no Intellect but his own could be large enough to com∣prehend the Idea of the work, no Prudence but his own absolute enough to project the convenient modell of its due gubernation, no Power but his own almighty enough to furnish him with requi∣sites thereto.

Nor can it, with safety, or honour to our judgements, be ima∣gined, that God might, had he so pleased, have constituted the World in such absolute perfection, as that from the minute of its complete existence it might have continued independent, and to all eternity have subsisted by it self, and all its appointed mo∣tions have constantly, without intermission, or variation, succeeded by the direction of their bequeathed impressions, without the assi∣duous moderation of his care, or the minutely supply of his pro∣vidence, since the Universe, according to the Grammar of sound Philosophy, is no Noune Substantive, and enjoyes reality only by a distinction: i. e. is something by dependence upon him, who was eternally contrary to nothing; and being, at that instant, when Omniety informed Nullity into existence, educed out of nothing, by the single Fiat of God, and thence forward continued to be something by the continued Power of the Creator: must unavoidably revert to nothing again, if the perseverance of that identical power be substracted, from which it once obtained to be something. And as Light cannot subsist, if separated from a lucid body; but instantly vanishes into opacity: so cannot the World (which is but a reflexive deradiation from that Light, which is invisible) continue, if the perpetual sourse of that mira∣culous Virtue, which upholds its existence, be withdrawn, but must immediately vanish into nothing. For the Analogy holds in all points, and the dependence of the Creature upon the Crea∣tor, is as highly absolute, as that of Light upon the Sun, or other lucid body. And though there are some things, which being once assisted into determinate essences by their causes, doe afterwards subsist without them, and keep possession of those Forms by their own native force: yet are they such as were still something be∣fore their specification to this or that nature by their causes; since all that natural Causes can doe, is to mould an old matter into a new figure, and so dispose the faculties existent therein, that a

new something may start out of the ruines of an old something. But the World which was nothing before the fruitfull voyce of Elohim called it into something, hath nothing from it self to subsist upon; but must therefore, in the twinckling of an eye, become nothing again, unless its existence be supported and maintained by the constant recruit of the same miraculous Power, which first crea∣ted it. I say, the same miraculous Power; for the Creation doubt∣less was the greatest miracle, that ever was wrought: it being more difficult to turn Nothing into all things, by the bare nutus or vote of the First Cause, then to produce an extraordinary effect by inverting the usual method of Secondary Causes; a harder wonder to make Nature herself, then to praeposter, or transcend her customary rules of acting, to the causation of an effect either against, or above her self. Though to speak rational∣ly, and as men that understand something of Theosophy; nothing can be a miracle to him, to whom all things are not only of equal possibility, but of equal facility also. When therefore we say, that God is the Cause of the world; we are to understand him to be so in the same relation, that the Sun is the Cause of Light: and by consequence, as the Light disappears in the Aer, when the Sun discontinues its Actinobolisme or deradiation in our hemisphear, by visiting the lower; so also must the World disappear and be lost in adnihilation, when God shall please to discontinue his influx of minutely Creation, or (to speak more conform to our praesent scope, though it signifie the same thing in height of truth) to in∣termit his Providence.

Moreover, so immense are the bounds of this vast Empire, the * 1.104 World, so numerous and various its subdivisions, and those again dichotomized into so many myriads of Cantons, or Provinces, and each of those peopled with so many millions of different and discordant natures; that no reason can admit it so much as pro∣bable, that a constant correspondence could be maintained, and a general amity observed though all, without the conserving in∣fluence of a Rector General, or Supervisor, whose Will receives laws from his Wisdome, and gives them to all besides himself. And therefore their thoughts missed not much of the white of

truth, who conceived God to hold the same place in the world, as a Pilot in a ship, a Charioter in his Chariot, a Chantor in a Chorus, a Father in a family, a Monarch in a Kingdome, or a General in an Army. For, as the first preserves from shipwrack, the second from deviation and subversion, the third from discord, the fourth from poverty and desolation, the fifth from divisions, and the last from confusion: so doth the wise oversight of God regulate the efficiencies of all Natural Agents, with such admirable politie, that the whole is preserved in safety, in the direct road that lea∣deth to the general end, in harmony, in prosperity, in union, in perfect order.

To draw a line yet more parallel; we every day observe in the sad experiments of death, what a leaden and unweildly mass of clay the body becomes, so soon as its sprightly Tenant, the Soul, hath surrendred to corruption; and it needs not much proof, that the Soul of this gigantik body, the Universe, is God: therefore when this soul shall withdraw and cease its Animation, must that body fall by its own weight, and suffer dissolution.

Not that therefore, in strictness of sense, or without the latitude of a metaphor, God is a Soul, and the World his Body; but be∣cause the informing and actuating Presence of God is as absolute∣ly necessary to the vitality of the World, and the moderation of all its parts in the due execution of their distinct offices, as the Presence of a soul to the animation of a body, and the regulation of all its members in the requisite administrations of their several functions.

And upon this ground, our zeal ought not to distast that Figu∣rative * 1.105 expression of those mystical and symbolical Philosoph••rs, who call God, the Soul of the World; nor be captious at that rhetorique, which hath comparatively styled him, the Pilot, Empe∣rour, and General of Nature: since tis the most mannerly language mortality can invent, for the explanation of his Government; nor is it probable, that those profound speculators, who first adopted those modest metaphors, to shadow the unutterable infinity of his Wisdome and Power, were ignorant that there ought still this dif∣ference to be allowed, that though a Pilot is not ubiquitary in

all parts of his ship, nor an Emperour actually omnipresent in all places of his dominions, nor a General locally present in all quar∣ters and stations of his Army; yet God is intimately omnipre∣sent in every particle of the world. So that what is uncertainly said of the Soul, Tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte: may be most certainly said of God, Totus in toto, and totus in qualibet parte.

In fine, as the inspection and consideration of the World, hath formerly replenished us with irrefutable Arguments of its Crea∣tion by God: so also may it evince the constant Conservation of it, by the influence of his Providence.

For whoever (though a meer Pagan, whose brain never re∣ceived the impression of either of those two notions, Creator and Providence) shall speculate the world in an Engyscope or magni∣fying Glass, i. e. shal look upon it in the distinction of its several or∣ders of natures observe the commodious disposition of parts so vast in quantity, so infinite in diversity, so symmetrical in proportions, so exquisite in pulchritude: shall contemplate the comeliness, splendor, constancy, conversions, revolutions, vicissitudes, and harmony of celestial bodies: shall thence descend to sublunary, and with sober admiration consider the necessary difference of seasons, the certain-uncertain succession of contrary tempests, the inexhaustible treasury of Jewels, Metals, and other wealthy Mine∣rals concreted in the fertile womb of the earth; the numerous, usefull and elegant stock of vegetables; the swarms of various Animals, and in each of these, the multitude, symmetry, connexi∣on, and destination of organs: I say, whoever shall with atten∣tive thoughts perpend the excellencies of these unimitable Arti∣fices (for all things are Artificiall, Nature being the Art of God) cannot, unless he contradict the testimony of his own Con∣science, and invalidate the evidence of that authentique Criterion, the Light of Nature, but be satisfied; that as nothing less then an infinite Power and Wisdome could contrive and finish, so nothing less then the uncessant vigilancy and moderation of an infinite Pro∣vidence can conserve and regulate them, in order to the mutual benefit each of other, and all conspiring, though in their contenti∣ons, to the promotion of the common interest.

If any shall yet stand out and object, that what I call Provi∣dence, * 1.106 is no other but Nature nicknamed, all those setled motions and regular effects in the world being but the necessary products of its establisht laws, and unalterable method: yet since they all de∣clare an Infinite intelligence in that Nature, which could decree those perfect constitutions, and so strictly oblige all things to ob∣serve them in order to a general and particular good; he must at last by compulsion discover Divinity disguised under the vizard of Nature, by whose counsel and directions all things operate.

Nor can any man with more hopes of safety recurre to For∣tune; or affirme, that there is no Praeordination of contingencies, but that all events are the inconsiderate and extemporary results of Chance: since we have lately beheld the ruines of that Sanctu∣ary, nor dare I be so uncharitable, as to presume that the reason of any thing praetending to humanity, can be so infatuted with the stupid idolatry of that Fairy Queen, as to expect a farther re∣sutation of that delirium.

SECT. IV.

HAving, with perspicuity equal to the highest expectation, demonstrated the necessity of Ʋniversal Providence, from the nature both of the Agent and Patient; God and the World; it remains only that we withdraw that curtain of objections, where∣with the Impiety of its adversaries hath darkned the prospect of less ocular discerners, and terminated the vision of those whose opticks have not been strong enough to transfix it.

The first, we may remember, was that vanity of Epicurus, that the condition of a blissful and immortal Nature (such was his * 1.107 character of Divinity) is inconsistent with the necessary perturba∣tions and perplexities of business.

But alas! how grosly must he delude himself, who fathoms the extent of an Infinite, by the unequal geometry of a Finite, and limits incomprehensible Omniety to the narrow circumscrip∣tions of Humanity; which in comparison is but one remove from Nullity? Had God, indeed, been, as he conceived him, of Humane figure; it had been no error in the Court of Reason to have concluded him not much superior in the capacity of his Intellect: but when the Divine Nature, as himself acknowledged, must transcend all other in perfection and excellencies; how palpable a contradiction did he fall upon, in commensurating the latitude of its Power and Wisdome, by the span of an imperfect and caduce nature, betwixt which and Omnipotent-omniscience are so many degrees of difference, as all the figures and cyphers of Arithmetick cannot amount to their compute, nor is mortality qualified to conceive. To paint a Sound, is a far easier task, then to describe the impervestigable manner of Gods operations: and to deny the possibility of that, whose reason we cannot explore, is to pro∣claim our ignorance of any nature more perfect then our own; and that upon consequence, is to make our nature more imperfect then really it is, by rendring it uncapable of the greatest Truth; nay, of that truth, upon whose certitude, the assurance of all possible cognition doth necessarily depend. This had the rash Epicurus considered, doubtless he never had disparaged the na∣ture of man, by equalizing it to Gods. I say, disparaged; be∣cause to conceive a Finite essence, as perfect as an Infinite, is openly to confess that nature, which can conceive so horrid and sensible an Absurdity, to be far more frail and contemptible, then all other of its actions declare it to be: not but, in direct verity, tis the greatest disparagement, and no less then blasphemy to the infinitely sacred majesty of God, to be put in the scales a∣gainst vile, ignorant, and impotent Man.

And while his thoughts flagged so many sphears below the Empyreum of all perfection, twas no wonder that he was staggered at Ʋniversal Providence; that being a notion impossible to be instilled into any mind, that is not first prepared with the beleif of an Ʋniversal Intelligence.

Again, to draw into a sharper angle, and render the absurdity

of this Comparison more ridiculous; the Reasons why a man, though of the strongest brain▪ and greatest abilities for business, must of necessity suffer disquiet, distractions and wearisome solici∣tude from the multiplicity of cares, are (1.) the narrowness of his Understanding, which cannot he expansed to take in all the re∣mote, proxime, and confederate Causes, events, dependencies, connexions, circumstances, &c. of occurrences: (2.) the short∣ness of his Power, which cannot stretch to furnish him with all things necessary as well to the prevention and remove of all inci∣dent impediments, as to the molition, promotion, and accomple∣tion of his designes: and (3.) the restraint of his Person to Time, Place and distance. But, on the other side, God is Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipraesent; and therefore in the praeordination, direction and compulsion of all things to the causation of those effects, which his Will hath decreed, he knows infinitely less of labour or disquiet, then the healthiest man doth in the motions of respiration, in his soundest sleep.

That God is not subject to the restraint of Time, is manifest * 1.108 from his Eternity; for that is indivisible, and knows no distincti∣on of tenses: and therefore what we (whose imperfect reason cannot compute the duration of things, but by the successive in∣stances, or concatenated moments of time) call Praedestination, is really no praedetermination of what's to come, in respect to God, but an act of his will already accomplisht, and as soon ful∣filled as decreed; and so we may truely say, that in relation to himself, there is no Foreknowledge in God, all things which to our inferior Capacities seem either past, or to come, being actually praesent to him, whose whole duration is altogether, or but one constant and permanent point, one 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, entire in unity, and uncapable of division into successive minutes, or articles.

That he is not subject to the restraint of Place, is evident from his Omniety, his being all in all; Ʋbiquity being the proper and inseparable Attribute of his nature. His being All in All. not only ratione Praesentiae, but ratione Essentiae also; he being the chief Soul not only of all Bodies, but of all Spirits also. And for this reason we cannot offend Theology, if we affirme, that God

is as fully Present in Hell among the accursed, as in Heaven among the blessed natures though not so comfortably; and that the Devils would rejoyce if they could conceive it possible for him to be absent thence: since their existence, and so their Tor∣ments would then cease, his presence being the original and sup∣port of all existence.

Now if all this be amassed into one demonstration, and that duely perpended; I demand as well of the most contumacious in∣fidelity, as the rankest ignorance, what can remain desirable, in order to the full information of our reason; that if there were a million of Worlds, nay as many as there are individuals in this, and in each a 1000000 times more business then in this: yet could the oversight and gubernation of them all, and the regular managery of every the smallest occurrence in them, put Divinity to no more trouble, disquiet, or interruption of felicity, then the simple Act of Volition doth induce upon the soul of man.

However, for further illustration, I cannot think it unnecessary to superadd this; that since Man himself doth ordinarily perform * 1.109 some actions, particularly those, which he is not only qualified and impowered, but also inclined to doe, by the native virtue, or congenial propensity of his Essence, as to Cogitate, Desire, Love, Rejoyce in the manifestation of his good parts or endowments, &c. not only without labour and inquietude, but even with super∣lative delight and content: it cannot but be concordant to reason to assert, that God is so far from sustaining any difficulty, mo∣lestation, or diminution of felicity, in the constant act of Ʋni∣versal Providence; which is the natural effect of his Infinite In∣telligence and Indefatigable Activity, that tis rather a part of his Beatitude so to exercise and manifest his Divinity. Not that the abyss of his Happiness was not full before the World was; but because, being moved by his own immense Goodness to create a convenient subject, whereon to actuate his Munificence, he is pleased still to delight himself in the continued diffusion and com∣munication of his excellencies, by the conservation and regulation of the same, according to the most prudent laws of his Will.

I have often consulted the most knowing and best ordered

minds, with whom I could attain the blessing of a free conversa∣tion (and such, doubtless, are the only competent judges of de∣light) wherein lay the Philosophers stone of Content in this life, and in what actions of their lives they discovered the highest and most permanent pleasure: and they all concurred in this determi∣nation, Aliis prodesse, & quám licet plurimis bene facere. And this upon no slender ground, since the Beatitude of Man doth ra∣dically and totally consist in his appropinquation to God, and we never come so neer him, in this remote vale of tears, as when we go out of our selves to relieve the necessities, lighten the oppressi∣ons, and prevent or repair the ruines of others. For Charity is the only excellence, wherein we may, in some sort, rival our ma∣ker: and were but our Wills constantly fixt upon the practise of this virtue, and our Abilities of doing good but half so infinite as our Wills (for the wings of our Ʋnderstanding are, indeed, but short; but those of our Will are long, and have a liberty to sly at all, as shall be singularly proved in convenient place) we might anticipate no small part of the joys of heaven, while we sojourne upon earth, and should need no other Heraldry to testifie our selves the off-spring of Divinity. Now if it be so intense a delight to the mind of man, which is but a beam deradiated from that immense Sun of Charity, to do good: ought we to think it a trouble to God, who is most intelligent, and so best knows the ne∣cessities of all things; most beneficent, and so most ready to re∣lieve them; most rich, and so not obnoxious to impoverishment by the continual profusion of his favours; to be a general bene∣factor by his Providence?

To conclude; if the visible and perishable Sun can with un∣cessant * 1.110 liberality, diffuse his consolatory and all-impregnating streams of light, heat, and influence on all parts of the sensible or adspectable World; and so concurre to the generation, vitality, growth, perfection and conservation of all sublunary Natures; and this without labour, lassation, or exhaustion: Why should not the Invisible, Ʋnperishable, and Infinite Sun (of which the other is but a dark and contracted shadow) be allowed to have his Wisdome, Power, and Goodness (which Trinity of Attributes

make the unity of Providence, as I have formerly hinted) in all places, and at all times diffused, in their operations, over all his Works, with the same facility.

And as it can be no Interturbation to the serene Felicity, so * 1.111 neither can it be a Dishonour or disparagement to the superexcel∣lent Majesty of God, to transmit the rayes of his Providence to the most minute, and seemingly most trivial and contemptible transactions on this great exchange of the world. And therefore Pliny, who said, necesse est ut Deus tam tristi, tamque multi∣plici ministerio poliuatur; might with less absurdity have affir∣med, that the Sun doth an action much below the dignity of so glorious a creature, and must have the purity of his light suffer di∣minution and contamination, when it projects its radiant beams upon sordid and putrid bodies; when it cooperates to the pro∣duction of Toads, Serpents, worms and other the like base ver∣min; and when it promotes the fertility of noxious and deleteri∣ous weeds, as well as wholsome and medical plants. For those things which appear vile, despicable and ugly to the queazy judg∣ment of man; are not so really to Nature: since she knowes no de∣formity, and therefore all her pieces must be amiable: not really so to the eyes of the Author of Nature, since he hath thought good to configurate them according to the most exact ideas in his own wise intellect; and therefore Beauty is best defined by the confirmity every thing holds to its primitive exemplar in the Intellect of its Creator: not so to themselves, since they have ob∣tained a perfection congruous to their species, and enjoy an abso∣lute pulchritude respective to their distinct kinde; and therefore no Animal is so insensible of the perfection of its Forme, as to desire either to lose, or exchange it.

Again, those Actions, which seem various, cary the face of mul∣tiplicity, and fill up whole sheets, in the diary of man; stand but for an unit in the Arithmetick of Nature and make but a monosyllable in the book of Fate: it being the natural preroga∣tive of Ubiquitary Omnipotence, to doe all things at once.

Consider we, with what ease and quiet the pale and feeble Soul of a Tree can at once provide for the Vegetation as well of each

leafe and blossome, as of the trunck and root, and cook the insipid juice of the earth into an Aliment conveniēt to the conservation and growth of each single fiber and filament both of the cortex or bark, and of the inte••ior and medullary substance: in a word, transfuse a vital influence through each indivisible particle of that great mass, of which it is composed.

Consider we, how easily the more luminous and energetical Soul of an Elephant can at one and the same time, in one and the same blast, or deradiation of virtue, administer its nourishing in∣flux to each particle of that vast body; and omitts not to take care of every single haire among so many myriads as cloth the skin, in its common doale or distribution of Vitality.

And when we have thus gently informed our selves, that tis as easie to the weak and evanid soul of a Plant (which the best Physiology defines to be nothing, but a certain modification of matter volatilized, or a contexture of smooth, globular equal and so of calefactive Atoms, woven by the seminal virtue or plastick Faculty of that particular species, and soon dissolved again, upon a variation of figure and situation of those insensible particles, of which it is composed) to make provision for the lively∣hood & sustentation of all parts in that mass, as for any one of them: that tis as genuine and familiar to the Soul of an Animal (which is also a Corporeal substance, or the more spiritual part of the bloud subtiliated by vital heat, traduced from its genitor) to ani∣mate and govern all parts of its body, as any one: we cannot but acknowledge, that the Procuration and Administration of all the affairs of the world, is as facil and natural to the Providence of God (who is the Soul of all Souls, and the life of Spirits) as to take the care of any one individual Nature.

If the oversight and regency of but half so many different ope∣rations, as that immaterial Empress, which keeps her invisible Court somewhere within us, doth every minute, even when we are fast lockt in the narcotick armes of Morpheus, and all our thoughts keep holy day, order and effect, while she maintains the oeconomy of the body; were charged upon the hands of our un∣derstanding, but for one houre: without question, the burden would prove insupportable, nor could either the skill or strength

of our limited reason, in any measure responsible, suffice to the due administration of so large a Province. When, therefore, to fathom the depth of that immense natural prudence, and sove∣raign virtue, wherewith the soul of man is richly endowed, and which she constantly declares in the prosperous exercise of her Monarchy, with the short line of our intelligence; or to estimate her Providence according to the rate of our cheaper faculties; is both ignorance and unjustice: how infinitely more stupid and un∣warrantable a course doth that wretch take, who adventures to commensurate the superexcellent knowledge and almighty virtue of God, whereby he procures and moderates the affairs of the World?

That man is, for the most, incurious of smal and trivial occur∣rences; is so far from being a wonder, that contrariwise those, who could tripartite their thoughts to the contrivemēt of but three different businesses, at once, as Caesar, have been lookt upon as Prodigies: and he that can lay the grounds of but one popular designe, so as to have it succeed without impediment, or the intervention of cross accidents; is reputed a profound Politician, and his head a whole sphear above the vulgar. This, I am not ignorant, the haughtiness of his spirit hath referred to the fixation of his thoughts upon objects either of his pleasure or ambition; when in modest truth, this pretension of sublimity is but a gloss, or specious vernish to conceal the imbecillity and limitation of his intelligence. For that being two narrow, to be extended to the forecast and reguiation of many things at once; and his stomach too high to descend to a due acknowledgment of the imperfecti∣on of his nature: he guilds over the poverty with the pride of his minde, and endevours to excuse his frailty, by insimulating, that to attend the study of trisles, and in the interim supersed the pro∣jection of matters of importance, is a disparagement to the no∣bility of his Intellectuals. When if his reason were so capacious, as to admit the care of petty affairs, without the confusion, or neg∣lect of others of more concernment; nothing, though nere so mean and ordinary, could seem below the dignity of his Provi∣dence. But that God should be incurious of any action in the world, is absolutely impossible; since contrapugnant to the Ʋni∣versality

of his Cognition and Praesence: for what is Omniscient and Ʋbiquitary, can be ignorant of nothing; and consequently it can be no more either of Profanation to the Sanctity, or disho∣nour to the glorious Majesty of the Deity, to extend his Provi∣dence to the meanest contingents in nature, then it can be to the Soul, to vegetate and inspire each single hair of that body she informs.

SECT. V.

TO their Second objection, that all events in the World are either the non-praedestinate and extemporary results of * 1.112 Chan••e; or the necessary and setled effects of Nature, all Actives and Passives being, by the unalterable laws of their primitive constitutions, firmely adliged unto, and irresistibly impelled upon the causation of determinate effects respective to the energy of their particular consigurations: we as easily as uprightly answer,

First, that to the praedestination of that Almighty Cause, which can and doth dispose the motions of all things according to the praescripts of his own Will, no event can be casual or unexpected; though indeed, if we have regard to the praescience and forecast of man, to whose dim opticks all things are invisible, that stand in the dark of futurity, many events seem meer Accidents, and the most mature determinations of Fate may pass for the rash and inconsiderate hitts of Fortune.

And if so, how audacious a temerity is it in us, so to magnifie our own slender perspicacity, as when we cannot discern why this or that particular concurse and encounter of natural causes should occur, rather then another, and such or such an issue of their confe∣derate activities succeed, rather then another; instantly to con∣clude, that there can be no Superior Cause, or superintendent power, which hath thus or thus ordained and disposed those cer∣tain means to those certain ends, and whose counsels we are not

privy unto? Look we no farther then the ordinary Providence of Princes, and in every Republick our observation shall meet with a thousand events, which in the judgements of their vulgar subjects, and such as stand aloof from the Councel table, are deemed meer Contingents, as never at all designed upon any secret reasons of State; when yet to the Prince himself, and those to whom he hath communicated the mystery of his designations, they really are the intended effects of his Prudence, which had so politickly ordered his affairs, and so wisely prepared all Agents requisite to the bringing about of his purposes, that they could not but hit and be accomplish't accordingly. And is there then, why we should not be confirmed, that in this immense Commonwealth, in whose go∣vernment the most inobservant cannot but take notice of innume∣rable passages so admirable, both in respect of the weak Insturments that served to bring them to pass, and of the obscurity or imper∣vestigability of the Ends, at which they were levelled; that no∣thing less then an infinite Wisdome could contrive, nothing less then an infinite Power effect them: there must of necessity be a Rector General or President Paramont, by whose soveraign dictates all subordinate ministers are set on work, in order to the execution of his pleasure, and in their operations vary not a hairs-bredth from the rules prescribed by his Will; though neither the manner of their activities, nor the Ends to which they are destined fall under the discovery of our pu••blinde reason? For the Polity of God is inscrutable, and may well delight our Piety with wonder, but must empuzle our insolent Curiosity: and the eye of our souls, being in this life far dimmer then that of Moses body, cannot survey so much as the back parts, or dark side of Divinity; much less pry into the maze of his Counsels, and read the invisible decrees of that mystical S••nate, wherein though there be a consult of three Persons, there is yet but one minde▪ which votes without contradiction, and his Volition, deliberation and Election, make but one simple act. For my part, that the wayes of God in the World are past finding out; that there is a Sanctum Sanctorum in the Ark of Providence, into which blind mortality cannot look; and that the cryptick turnings, doublings, and redoublings of that hand, which works all its rarities in the

dark, and sometimes inverts, now and then transcends, and anon infringes the Axloms of Nature (to shew, that as he made, so he can alter her, and tune all her strings to a concord with his will) make a labyrinth to intricate and lose the presumptious reason of man, that dares hope to explore and trace it: this, I say, is de∣monstration enough to me, that there is one Ʋniversal Intelli∣gence, which both moves and directs all individual Agents to act, in order to the accomplishment of some positive end, for the most part best, and many times only known to himself.

Nor is it an illegal process of our reason, but the best logick, as to supernaturals; to conclude not only the excellencies, but even the necessary being of some things, meerly from hence that we cannot fully comprehend them: since their very being above our capacity, is argument both clear and strong enough, that they are not only so as, but more perfect and far greater then we under∣stand them to be; as he that sees but a small part of the sea with a Telescope at distance, may safely conclude that tis exceeding large; because the circumferrence thereof is, by infinite degrees of magnitude, wider then to be drawn into the aperture of his slender tube. Sure I am, at least, that the Antisyllogisme, or Coun∣ter-argument; the understanding of man cannot discover its ab∣struse and mysterious plots, resolve its multiplex aenigma's, nor analyze its method, or series of Causes subordinate, and so by a retrograde chase hunt out its first and chief intention: Ergo, there can be no Providence: is intolerable, and deserves a greater dose of Ellebor, then that absurdity of the blinde man, who concluded there was not, nor could be any such thing as light, or Co∣lours, only because he could not see them. When therefore we shall have run our eager contemplations to a stand, in the wilder∣ness of Providence, and lost our busie thoughts in the maze of Gods secret decrees; all the satisfaction our bold curiosity can re∣turn home with, will be only this: that all occurrences in the World are predetermined, have their Causes, Times, and Ends punctually set down in the Ephemerides of Fate; and though in the incompetent judgment of man, some of them may seem the Peradventures, or temerarious Hits of Chance: yet are they the mature Designations of the supreme Wisdome: though in the

ears of man, they may sound discords to the musick of particular Natures, yet will they at last be found well composed Aers ne∣cessary both to sweeten, and fill up the common Harmony of the Universe. To instance; are there not many Monsters, Hetero∣clites, Equivocal and irregular births, on the earth: many pro∣digious and new-faced Meteors in the upper, and uncertain Ano∣malies or unseasonable Tempests in the lower division of the Aer: many new Phaenomena among the fixed; various encounters, divi••ions, and conspiracies among the erratick stars &c. and yet doe not all these, as Chrotchets and Quavers in a grave and so∣lemn lesson on a Lute, conduce to the advancement of the General Melody? Doth not irregularity render order the more conspicu∣ous and amiable? and Deformity, like the Negro drawn at Cleo∣patra's elbow, serve as a foile to set off Beauty? Are not the Moles on the cheeks of Nature, as those on Venus skin, placed there to illustrate or whiten the snow, and sweeten the feature of her face? Is it not exceeding gracefull in a Comoedian, to temper and endear the sage and weighty scenes of Princes, and Melancho∣ly States-men, with the light interludes of Pantalons, Clowns, and Anticks? Doth not the Painter then shew the most of skill, when he refracts the glaring luster of his lighter Colours, with a veil of Sables; and makes the beauty of his peice more visible by clouding it with a becoming shadom? And without doubt, every man will readily conjoyne his vote to ours, that he is best able to adorn and imbellish a piece of Art, who first contrived and wrought it: and therefore the Perfection and Condecoration of a work doth properly and solely bolong to his hand, that brought it to that height, as to want only ornament; nor is it his part to prescribe what's necessary to the conciliation of graceful∣ness and decorament to an engine, who is ignorant of the modell, and holds not a perfect Idea of the Artifice thereof. Now the im∣portance of all these similes being put together, who can be so ignorant in the Alphabet, or rudiments of ratiocination, as not, at first sight, to spell them into this short lesson, consisting only of two orthodox Positions.

First, that those subitaneous Accidents, which the ignorance or carelesness of the vulgar doth usually refer to the blind sorti∣legies

of Chance; are truely the meer hand of God, and the pru∣dent designes of that Catholick Providence, which hath numbred the sands on the Sea shoar, and weighed the dust of the earth in a balance: which feeds the young Ravens, when they cry, and while the old ones wander for meat: which thundereth marvel∣lously with his voyce; and doth great things, that we cannot com∣prehend: for he saith to the snow, Be thou on the earth; likewise to the smal rain, and to the great rain of his strength: by whose breath frost is given; and the breadth of the waters is straightned: which turneth the bright clouds round about by his Counsels, that they may doe what ever he commandeth them upon the earth: who made the ordinances of heaven, and hath set the dominions thereof in the earth: who can binde the sweet insluences of the Pleiades, and lose the bands of Orion: can bring forth Maza∣roth in his season, and guide Arcturus with his sons, &c.

Secondly, that those Monstrosities, or extraordinary and pro∣digious effects, which the nescience of the multitude cals Irregu∣larities, Perversions, and Deformities of Nature; to wiser con∣siderations, prove themselves to be no wanton excursions, or ran∣dome shots of her hand, made without aim at any final cause; but praeordained, and collineated by that sure one of Divine Pro∣vidence, point blanck at some certain end, private or publick. The former being known only to himself, à priori; and frequent∣ly mistaken by man, a▪ posteriori: the later, indeed, we have a liberty to conjecture, to be either that he leaves the straight, and chalks out this serpentine and crooked line, to satisfie the World of his Prerogative, that himself is the Agent, and Nature but his Instrument, and therefore to be turned, wrenched, altered, and perverted at his pleasure; or else, that his wisdome thinks those spots requisite to enhance the beauty of the whole, those private fewds and petty discords betwixt Individuals, necessary not only to endear, but conserve the peace of the whole.

Both which durable Truths are, with so much piety, as judge∣ment, contracted by that Emperor of the Stoicks as well as of the Romans, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (of whom the smooth Herodian (initio historiae) gives this glorious Character, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: Solus imperatorum sa∣pientiae studium non verbis aut decretorum scientia, sed gravitate morum, vitaeque continentia usurpavit) into one short meditati∣on, in these words; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: Quae ad Deos ut auctores referuntur, ea Providentiae plena esse nemo dubitat. Quae Fortunae vulgò adscribuntur, ne illa quidem extra Natu∣rae leges, fatalemque illum contextum, complexúmque rerum, quae à providentia administrantur. Inde omnia sluunt: adde quod ne∣cessarium est, quicquid est, & toti universo (cujus tu pars es) conducibile. Porro autem quod natura Ʋniversi fert, quódque ad eam facit conservandam, id bonum est unicuivis Ʋniversi par∣ticulae. Conservant autem mundum, quemadmodum elemento∣rum, ita & ex iis concretarum rerum mutationes. Libri 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 primi sect. ultima.

Secondly, that no Natural Agent hath the rains in its own hands, or the liberty to act in a loose and arbitrary way; but all * 1.113 things observe that immutable Tenor, or setled course, which they began to operate in at their first inauguration to essence: pro∣vided that we understand this assertion under a twofold re∣striction.

First, that this Tenor or establisht method, was not instituted * 1.114 by the improvidence of Fortune, as our Atheists would have it; but ordained, enrolled and enacted by the counsel of an infinite Wisdome.

Secondly, that this supernatural Nature, which excogitated * 1.115 and decreed this convenient law, and endowed each single entity

with a Power or Faculty respective to its duty thereto, and obser∣vance or execution thereof; hath not thereby so tied up his own hands, or limited his Praerogative, as not to have reserved to him∣self an absolute superiority, or capacity, at pleasure to infringe, transcend, or pervert it, by giving special dispensation to any of his Creatures, to vary the manner of their Activities, in order to the Causation of any effect, which his own prudence shall think expedient.

For the First and Second of these Positions; viz. that as well * 1.116 the general Law of Nature, as those particular and oeconomical rules, which being engraven not only upon every distinct species, but also upon every single or individual entity, stand both for warrant and directions to them in their several operations; were made and established by the counsel of an infinite Wisdome: may (if we may assume the liberty to aggravate what we have for∣merly adferd toward the attestation of the same subject) be thus demonstrated.

In the whole Scale of Creatures, we finde but five Gradations or roundles, by which our contemplations may orderly ascend to the highest pinnacle, or summity of Nature, and thence take a full survey of all her Provinces at large: and those are Existence, Life, Sense, Locomotion voluntary, and Reason. To speak yet more perspicuously.

First, there are some things, which have obtained a bare Ex∣istence, or meer Being only, and remain devoid of all the other four; such are all simple bodies, as the Heavens, and those four which common Physiology calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Elements; and all 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 inanimate Concretions, or Compositions, as Stones, Metals, Minerals, &c.

Secondly, some have not only Existence, but also Vitality or Vegetability allotted unto them, and yet want sense, and motion arbitrary, as all Vegetables.

A Third Classis is endowed with Being, Life, and Sense; and yet hath not attained so high as Animal or voluntary motion: to which belong all Conchylia, as Oysters, Muscles, Cockles, &c. which Aristotle (3. De Gener. Animal. cap. 2.) for the same

reason, facetiously calls Aquatiles Plantas, a kind of Water Plants; as by an inversion, he calls earthly Plants, Ostrea Ter∣rena, a kind of Land Oysters: because they have not, as he opi∣nioned, the power of translating themselves de loco in locum (though our Democritus Londinensis, that incomparable indaga∣tor of Natures Arcana, D^r. Harvey, hath observed that Oysters protrude, or belch out on the conical extreme of their shells, a cer∣tain Filme or natural saile, by the help whereof they remove, veer, tack about, and so, observing the Tides, conduct themselves to shoars, rocks, and other places of advantage both for their feeding, and quiet) but are tumbled up and down by the impulse of the Current.

Others of a fourth order are admitted to goe higher, and to their Existence, Vitality, and Sensibility, is also superadded Lo∣comotion arbitrary, or the Faculty of removing their stations at pleasure; but yet they are excluded from the perfection of Ratio∣nality, and know nothing good or evill, but by the discernment or discrimination of Sense: as all brute Animals, Quadrupeds, Birds, Fishes, Amphibions, and Insects.

And Lastly, others there are, which being highest in the fa∣vour of their maker, possess all these accumulated endowments together, and have Existence, Life, Sense, Voluntary motion, and Ratiocination contorted together into one excellent Nature, which seems in an epitomy or contraction to comprehend all the others: and these are our selves. Some over pregnant Wits there have been, I well remember, who have added one round more to this Ladder of Corporeal Natures, making the Zoophytes or Plant-Animals an half-pace, or midle step betwixt the 2 and 3 degrees: but untill either an autoptical experiment, or the observation of some, who are more curious of Truth, then exotique Rarities, shall remove those scruples which I have in me, concerning the fidelity of those large stories obtruded upon us by Travellers, of the Herba mimosa, or mimick Plant, described by Christopher Acosta, first, afterwards by Clusius, and since grown traditional amongst all Botanicks; of the Boramez, or Vegetable Lambe of Tartary (no sparing relation whereof was first communicated to the world in the common language of Europe, by Sigismund

Baron of Verbestein (in rerum Moscoviarum Commentariis) then countenanced by the glorious Pen of Jul. Caesar Scaliger (Exercit. 181. Sect. 29.) since made more passant by Fortunius Licetus (Lib. 3. de spont. vivent. ortu, cap. 4.) and Libavius (part 2. singul. exercitat. de Agno vegetabili Scythiae) and now taken for granted by all or most Herbarists of our age; of the Sponge, &c. I shall beg leave to suspend my belief, that there are any such Heteroclites▪ or midle Natures, half Vegetable, half sensible; or, at least, that both Faculties are so conspicuous and eminent in them, as that thence they should deserve really to be accounte a distinct order of Creatures.

Now the Faculties, or essential proprieties of all things being thus incommunicable downward, and each distinct classis so con∣fined to its proper orb of endowments, that it can never advanced upward, and usurpe more perfection then what it already stands possessed of by the Charter of its particular specification; it fol∣lows, that we explore the reason or original of this Limitation, and why those Natures of the first degree, are limited to meer Existence, and cannot aspire to Vegetation: why those of the second are chained down to Existence and Vegetation, without possibility of being ever promoted to Sense; those of the third preferd to Sense, but denied the additional favour of Locomotion voluntary; those of the fourth admitted to Arbitrary motion, but excluded Reason; and those of the highest enriched with all. Either this Necessity must be imposed upon them by Fortune; or by themselves; or by some other principle, which hath the free donation, and so the limitation of all those priviledges or Faculties.

First, not by Fortune; for that she could not institute these assignations, draw this Helix, that still enlargeth into a wider ca∣pacity, nor make this law of Propriety inviolable: is amply ma∣nifest from the Perpetuity, or constant observation of the same by all corporeal entities, every one having their peculiar capacities so defined, circumscribed, and immured, that no one did ever, since the first hour of Time, exceed the bounds of its own species, nor climbeup to the state of its superior; for Constancy and Fortune are Antagonists never to be reconciled, but, like Castor and

Pollux, when one peeps above, the other sculks below the horizon.

Secondly, not by Themselves; for there is in every thing a kind of native Ambition to ennoble its nature, enlarge its power, nay (so much as in it lies) to mount even to infinity, according to that Axiom of Scaliger (Exercit. 9. pag. 52.) Ʋnicuique enti inest appetitio infinitatis. Thus simple Natures covet to become compounds; Compounds spurre on to arrive at Vege∣tables; those affect the dignity of Sense; sensibles grow desirous of musculary Motion, &c. Can wee conceive, that a Plant would continue fixed and nayled down by its own roots to the earth, and there live a cold, dull, unactive life; if it could give to its self motion and abilities for nobler actions? That a Beast would be constant to the gross and heavy operations of meer sense, submit to the burdens, and endure the tyrannous op∣pressions of man; if it could endow it self with the prerogative of Reason, and so become equal to his imperious Lord? Or that man would sit down quiet, and remain subject to the infirmities, calamities, and mortality of his nature; if he had any hopes to better it, to wind up himself to heaven, and there take the wall of Cherubins, nay rival the calme felicity and immortality of God? For so invincible a reluctancy have we against the necessity of our frailties, and so uncessant hormetick a desire to be above them, by the melioration of our state; that we may truly accommodate to our pride, what the eloquent Tertullian spake to express that of some of the Roman Emperours; si ipsi se Deos facere potuis∣sent, certè quidem homines nunquam fuissent, could they have made themselves Gods, doubtless they never would have been men. Seeing therefore, that tis repugnant to that insatiable Appetite of Melioration, even to infinity, radically inherent in every entity create, though (I confess) scarce perceptible in bodies devoid of Animation; to deny to it self any perfection, which is in its own power to give, or acquire: what clearer evidence can be expected, to ensure our reason, that the Ampliation, and Limita∣tion of all Natural Faculties, or endowments, is not in the ar∣bitrary disposition, or elective power of Finite essences; and, by consequence, that the Law of Propriety, or the restriction of every

species to its own orb of activity, was not made by compact a∣mong themselves, but imposed upon them by an Infinite.

This considered, it remains indisputable, that the Distribution and Assignation of those different Qualifications, being neither in the power of Fortune, nor of the Things that enjoy them: it must properly and solely belong to that supernatural Infinite, which is the fountain of Being, Life, Sense, Locomotion and Rea∣son, and therefore had the power freely to give them; being in∣duced to the Collocation of them by the meer invitement of his own Goodness, and directed in the convenient Distribution of them by the Counsel of his own Wisdome.

This Truth, all Ages have held sacred, and the wiser Ethnicks both of Greece and Rome ever engraffed it into their Creed, preaching it to the world, though blended under the Chaos of their symbolical or Hieroglyphical Idolatry. For Homer, cour∣ting the propitious aspect of his best Deity, Jupiter, in a panegy∣ricall Hymn; ascribes to him, as a chief and peculiar Attribute, the power of Circumscribing and Bounding of all things, thus bespeaking him.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c.

Jovem Deorum optimum canam, & maximum, Latesonantem, validissimum, Terminos afferentem, &c.

And Aristotle likewise (de Mundo Tom. 2. pag. 1592.) cals his Infinitum divinum, or God, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Quod ab eo omnia ter∣minata sunt, ac nihil in rerum natura sit infinitum, from his setting bounds to all things, and leaving nothing undefined. Nor was this unacknowledged by the elder Romans; for they had a set form of devotion, and a solemn sacrifice appointed particularly ad Iovem terminalem, as Dionysius Halicarnass. (Antiquit. Roman. Lib. 2. p. 133.) hath transmitted to posterity. To this also seems the sweet tongued Ovid to allude, when in his descri∣ption of the Creation, he saith, Limitibus discrevit omnia certis.

Now the Faculties of all Natural Agents being immediately derived from, and strictly limited by God, so that no one can ever transcend its own, nor usurpe upon anothers confines: the Light of Nature will infer, that all their operations also are prae∣scribed, and both the manner, and end of all their activities pre∣cisely predetermined, nay the very time and place with all other adjuncts and circumstances of their effects appointed by the Pro∣vidence of his Infinite Wisdome.

Hitherto have we confronted only Nature to Fortune; let us therefore now give her one charge more with an Argument de∣sumed à minori, from Art.

Did ever any man, that beheld the curious Mathematicks of Archimedes his Sphear; the automatous flight of Regiomontanus his Eagle; the artificial wings of Architas Dove; or those in∣animate Birds that the ingenious Mathematician, whom the glo∣rious Charles the fifth selected for his companion in his retirement from Empire sent flying in at his window; or but observe the re∣gular motions in a trochiliack Horodix, or Watcht conceive that the motions of those engines were originally spontaneous, institu∣ted by meer chance; or that each wheel assumed to it self, by Lot, its particular figure, situation, axis, number of teeth, and precise measure of circumrotation? Undoubtedly no; but on the con∣trary, instantly concluded, that they were the appointed effects of provident industry, and had their models grounded upon maximes of the highest and most learned reason. And yet is our Atheist so effronted with impudence, as to give check to his own Conscience, by daring to affirme; that the system of the Celesti∣al orbs, the Laws of natural motions, and the Architecture of those admirable organs in the body of an Animal (which are engines, whose Artifice doth, by incomprehensible excesses, tran∣scend our theory in the mathematicks; insomuch that some of the strongest skuls of our age have ventured crazing to finde out the Geometry of the Muscles, or the Mechanicks of Voluntary mo∣tion: and yet are forced, by an host of difficulties, to retire and suspend their hopes of perfecting their designe) were contrived by Fortune, and not by the skill of an Artist infinite in Science and Power. How familiar is this Logick to every mans understan∣ding;

the Figures of all things in the adspectable World, are ex∣actly Geometrical, their actions and uses respectively accommo∣date, their motions constant and regular at all times, their effects certain, and the laws of every distinct species immutable (as to themselves) ergo those Figures, Actions, Ʋses, Motions, and Laws were delineated, appointed, assigned, begun, and enacted, by an Omniscient and omnipotent Providence? And this I con∣ceive sufficient to demonstrate the truth of our First assertion; viz. that that constant Tenor, or establisht method, according to which all Natural causes operate, was instituted and is perpetua∣ted by an Infinite Wisdome.

For the support of our Third Thesis; that though the actions of all Second causes are impulsive and necessary▪ yet those of the First * 1.117 Cause are Elective and Arbitrary; though God hath by the severe laws of Nature, bound up the hands of his Creatures, limited their activities, and punctually consigned them their several provinces: yet he hath reserved his own free, and as an absolute Monarch, can at pleasure alter, transcend, or pervert those Statutes, and give a new Commission to his Ministers to work by a new way, in order to the causation of any extraordinary effect, which his pro∣vidence hath decreed, of universal, or particular benefit: we need erect no other pillar of argument, but that one firme and immoveable basis, the importance of the word, Creator.

For since to be able to produce all things out of nothing, by the single efficacy of his word, or the energetical blast of his will, to en∣dow each distinct species with faculties exactly proportionate and meridional to their distinct destinations, and to entail upon them to the expiration of Times own lease, that estate, in which he en∣fcoffed them at their creation: doth necessarily imply a greater perfection of power, then meerly to vary or innovate their effici∣encies, according to the expedients, emergencies, or occasional de∣signes of his Providence: it remains indisputable upon conse∣quence, that to allow him the Greater, and yet deny him the less: to beleive him to be the Author of that mighty and difficult mi∣racle, the Creation, and yet doubt the supremacy of his Power, by conceiving that he cannot turn Natural Agents out of their

common road, and order their digressions to the effecting of smaller and easier Rarities; must be a manifest Contradiction, and an Absurdity that stabbs it self.

However, that we may not seem to entrust so noble and sacred a * 1.118 Truth, to the protection of one single Reason; it becomes our care to superadd, for the more security, this defence also. If God hath frequently manifested his Supremacy, by working effects as well above, as against the establisht and customary power of natu∣ral Agents, in times past; then, doubtless, is not his arme short∣ned, nor the fountain of his energy dryed up, and he can do the like, in the future: but he frequently hath; ergo, &c.

The Major, I am sure, no man will boggle at, who shall con∣sider, that tis the proper privilege of Divinity, to be still the same, that that virtue, which is extreme, and so above all addi∣tion, must necessarily also be above all decay or diminution: and therefore he that conceives God subject to Mutability, A••••erity, or Deslux, blasphemes the Simplicity, Purity and Eternity of his Essence, and holds but a false Idea of his Nature.

Nor can the Minor require more proof then its bare Prolation; unless the unbeleif of any man shall be so inslexible, as not to bowe at the Convulsion of a truth, which the Records of all Na∣tions, Times, and Religions, lye open to attest; For that there have been observed Prodigious and miraculous accidents, (such as the most obstinate Idolaters of Nature, and those who grew gray in the study of her laws, customes, and secret magnalias, and kept a list of her forces; were surprized with aftonishment at the consideration of: and after a vain and tedious scrutiny into their ab∣struse Causalities, were forced to refer to the immediate arme of a Supernatural efficient) the indisputable monuments of faithfull Antiquity bear witness. And he, who hath not heard of those Three grand Examples (to omit the enumeration of any other, that are not universally beleived by men of all interests and per∣swasions) of the superiority of Gods power to that of his servant, Nature; viz. The Ʋniversal deluge, the Cessation of Oracles, and the total Eclipse of the Sun at the passion of our Redeemer: can give but weak testimony, that he is either Iew, Mahometan, or Christian.

The First being reputed not onely true, but sacred, and there∣foreheld * 1.119 as point of faith in common by all three Religions; nay countenanced even by Pagan stories, and more, their setled ac∣count of time; they computing the second space or intervall of Time (the First being little better to them then Prolepticall, or as the Heathen called it, Adelon, immanifest and obscure, was dated from the beginning of the World to Ogyges Floud, which was about 530 yeers after Noahs) from the Floud to the first Olympiad, which answers to the year of the World 3174. and comes within about 20 years before the foundation of Rome.

The Second being imbraced, and made authentical by the gene∣ral consent of Christians, upon the forced acknowledgment of * 1.120 those, whose interest obliged them to invalidate it; and those not only Pagans surrounded with the horrid darknesse of idolatry, and expecting no day-break from the glorious Sun of Righteous∣ness; but even of the Devil himself: who though the Father of lies, and his honour so highly concerned in the intercision of his impostures and delusions, could not yet dissemble this verity; but at four severall times, and in as many severall places publick∣ly proclaimed it. First, when from his famous Oracle at Delphos he confest himself to be tongue-tied, his fallacious predictions coun∣termanded, and his so solemnly pretended Divinity expired; being able to return no other answer to the great Augustus (whose errand was to have his fortune told him) but this:

Me Puer Hebraeus, Divos Deus ipse gubernans, Cedere sede jubet, tristemque redire sub Orcum; Aris ergo dehinc tacitus discedito nostris.

An Hebrew Child, that God, whose power's above All other Gods, commands me to remove Hence to the Court of sorrow; wherefore, goe, My Altars quit in silence, and nere moe Of Future things from me expect to know.

A second time, when Legion howled out the hideous dirge of their black Prince, and the shoars were heard by Mariners far off at sea to echo their groans into this dismal note; Great Pan is dead: as Plutarch hath reported in his defect of Oracles. A third, about the time of Constantine, so affectionately magnified by Eusebius, in his sad complaint, that his lips were sealed up, his Prognosticks suppressed, and his sophistry fooled, by the Righteous upon earth: as the same Eusebius hath related in Vita Constantini. And again, in his excuse to the Emperour Iulian; who being super∣stitiously curious to foreknow the success of his great expedition into Persia, and therefore addressing himself with exceeding so∣lemnity to the temple of Apollo Daphnes, to anticipate the know∣ledg of his fortune, could notwithstanding worm out of him no other satisfaction but this; that he should first remove the bodies about him, before he could have the liberty to return him an answer: as Theodoret hath registred, who also tells us, that not long after that Temple was consumed by lightning.

But I must heer arrest my Reader with a civil and short Ad∣vertisement, that by the Cessation of Oracles, I may not intend a total and absolute expulsion of that grand Impostor from all his Fanes, Tripods, and other shops wherein he professed his delusi∣ons, at once; as if the Incarnation of Truth had strook him dumb at one blow: but an extermination of him from his me∣tropolitan Temple at Delphos, and an Intercision, Diminution, or sensible Decay of his Amphibologies, Predictions and other Collusions in all other places. For, otherwise, I should not only steal a contradiction upon my self, that unsatisfactory response, which he stammerd out to Iulian, being full 363 years after the nativity of him, that crush't the Serpents head; but also incur the just censure either of being ignorant of, or undecently neg∣lecting those solid reasons, which Plutarch, Suetonius, and our modern learned Wits, Montacutius, and D^•. Browne have ad∣duced to attest the continuation of his ceremonious Legerdemain and solemn cheats practised upon gross and credulous Pagans, in the point of Vaticination, much beyond the rising, setting, and resurrection of the Sun of righteousness, who came down to dispell

those foggs of Hell, and irradiate the poor benighted world with Light supernatural.

And the Last is sworn to by all. For (1) the Christian hath it * 1.121 ratified to him both by sacred and profane Auctority: (2) the Jews, that deny Christ to have bin the true Messias, do yet ac∣knowledg the prodigious Eclipse of the Sun, that renowned his passion: and (3) the Turks, who allow him to have bin no more then a geat and holy Prophet, as their Alcoran frequently intimateth; are yet so zealous of the honour of their antient re∣cords, that they would confute him with a scimiter, who should dare to indubitate the preterition of so remarkable a wonder, which certified the half of the earth of its verity, by the sensible perswasion of a panick terror; insomuch that many of the Jews who beheld it, were so shatterd with fear, that their hearts were rent aswell as the vail of the Temple, and themselves ready to sneak into the graves of those Saints, that were newly risen, to evidence his conquest over death, and give humanity a prelibation or tast of the benefit of his sufferings. Nor was this, as other Eclipses, only Partial and Vertical to Hierusalem; but the darkness was visible to the whole Hemisphear: els, how could the Aegyptian Astronomer take notice of it, and being amazed at the unnatural Apparition, cry out, Aut Deus Naturae patitur, aut machina mundi dissolvitur; as the reverend Father, his namesake, Diony∣sius hath remembred in his Epistle to Polycarpus, and Apollopha∣nes? els, how could the antient Greeks, in their Annals, have filed up a monstrous Defection of the great Luminary, in the 4^th. year of 202. Olympiad; as Phlegon Trallianus noteth••? Now the 4^th. year of the 202. Olympiad jumps even with the 19^th. of Tiberius, and the 33. of the Nativity, which was the 4745. of the Julian period; and therefore that exact synchronisme makes that monstrous Eclipse observed by the more mathematical eyes of the Greeks, to be the same which happened at the death of the Lord of life.

That the Catholique Deluge was purely Supernatural, and the destruction of all Living Creatures upon the sublunary Glo••e * 1.122 (those few that were shifted aboard the Ark, only preserved) by an Abyss of Waters, immediately caused by the revenging Will of that same Fruitfull Spirit, that formerly brooding upon the same abyss of waters, had hatchtt hem into being; though of some difficulty to him, that shall wave all testimonies deduceable from the sacred relation adscribed to Moses: can yet be no im∣possibility to prove, from Considerations meerly Physical. For

First, the vast Quantity of Waters requisite to overflow the whole earth, and prevail upon the high hills, nay exceed the heads of the most lofty mountains by 15 cubits (for mountains there were before the floud; els how could the waters by degrees encreasing, ascend and cover them: and therefore those wanton Wits, which affirm the Antediluvian earth to have had her face a meer Plane or level, without those protuberancies and rugosities, undertake not only a Paradox, but a manifest Absurdity, point blanck re∣pugnant aswell to the Text, as to the natural Necessity of those Inaequalities) could not be powred out from the Receptaries or storehouses of the Ocean; the Earth having as great (if not a greater) share in the Terraqueous Globe, as the Waters, and the perpendicular Altitude of the mountains, by more then two parts of three, at least, transcending the profundity of the deepest Cha∣nel of the Sea, that ever the sounding line of any Mariner did pro∣found, except of that Barathrum or Vorago Aquarum, in mari dulci, between Roest and Leoffelt, described by Olaus Magnus; which yet is but a kind of Sluice or sink, and therefore of no considerable latitude. For that the Eminency of the highest Hills hath scarcely the same proportion to the Semidiametre of the Earth, that there is betwixt 1. & 1000; hath bin frequently demonstrated by many of our best Geographers: and though we descend to Eratosthenes his commensuration, who hath affirmed, that by instruments Dioptrick, and an exact measure of the distan∣ces of Places, he hath certainly found the Altitude of the highest mountains not to exceed ten stadia; we shall not however be provided of water enough in the bowells of the Sea to advance

our inundation, the depth of the profoundest ocean seldom a∣mounting to a 100 Fathom, as Scaliger (38 Exercit. contra Car∣danum) hath upon justifiable grounds declared.

Nor can this immane Collection of Waters be derived, as some have inconsiderately opinioned, from the Whole lower Region of the Aer condensed into clouds, and those comprest into waters. For (to take no strict notice of that large Tohu, Vacuum Coacerva∣tum, or Nothing, which must then have bin introduced, from the surface of the Waters up to the midle region; which Nature could never endure, nor had God any necessity to enforce,) if Aer condensed into Water shrinks into a space or Continent, 400. times less then what it possest before condensation (for since Water weighs 400. times heavier then Aer, as the subtile Galilaeo (Dialog. 1. del moviment. pag. 81.) examining the proporti∣ons of Gravity betwixt those two bodies, demonstratively disco∣vered; it must necessarily carry the same proportion also to Space, or Locality,) then assuredly, when we shall have calcu∣lated the perpendicular height of the Atmosphear, or lower regi∣on of the Aer, and reduced it to the 400^th. part: we shall soon be satisfied, that the Addition which the Aer Aquaefied could bring to the waters of the Sea effused upon the bosome of the earth, cannot suffice to swell the Deluge so high as the semialti∣tude of many lofty mountains, such as Slotus in Norway (which Franc. Patricius, out of Fr. Bacon and Scaliger, hath accounted the highest on the earth,) Athos in Macedonia, Tenariff, Cau∣casus, Atlas, &c. whose tops make large encroachments on the midle region, and seem to invade the Firmament.

Again, to charge this immense Accumulation of Waters upon 40. days rain, though we should conced that rain to be neither Sea evaporated, nor Aer condensed; is not to undo, but entangle the miracle. For taking the Altitude of the mountains according to the calculation of the most moderate Geometry; and then soberly perpending what aggravation to the Waters of the Sea now converted upon the earth, the most violent natural rain of 40. days and nights could probably make, which the most hy∣perbolical conceit cannot advance higher then 40. fathom: we shall easily detect the difficulty.

And secondly, as Nature could not afford the Material Cause of this general Inundation, the Waters; so neither the Mighty Essicient, or Impulsive, that should with such prodigious impe∣tuosity hoyse up so huge a mass of Sea, contrary to the strong re∣nitency, or depressure of its Gravity, drive it from its native easy Currents in the declining veins and cavities of the earth, upon an absolute 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Acclivity on the elevated surface thereof, and make it fall in Cataracts up-hill. For (1) though the Waters desire to stand above the mountains, as the Divine Hebrew Poet hath pleased to phrase it (Psalm 104. vers. 9.) yet they but de∣sire it, and by their own inherent and essential Tendency are ren∣derd uncapable to satisfy that elemental ambition; for water permitted to its own propensity or inclination, immediaiely ten∣deth downward: and therfore he that can conceive a river to desert its declive chanel, and climb a precipice, without the vio∣lence of a Miracle; hath a strong Phansy, but a weak judgement: nor need any man despair to perswade his credulity, that Helmonts ridiculous Romance of the Cause of Earthquaks (viz. that an Angel, or minister of Divine revenge, descends into the Centrals of the Earth, and there with a great Clapper or Sledge giving a mighty Thump against the feet of Rocks, makes a hoarse or grave kind of Bom, which enlarging its sound, rends the foundations thereof, and puts the percussed mass into a rigor, or shaking fit of an Ague.) is a solid and philosophical Verity.

And thirdly, as the Waters could not elevate themselves, so neither could the Attractive Virtue of those Celestial Magnets, the Sun, Moon and Stars, work them out of their depths, by rarefying them into vapours, which mounted up to the midle re∣gion of the Aer, and there encountred by intense Cold, should be reduced to clouds, and those again dissolved in Cataracts. For should we grant, what the Arabian Astrologers returned in answer to the Aegyptian Caliph, who had set them to unty this knot; viz. that there was a great Conjunction of ♄ and ♃ not long before the floud, and the malignant influence of that confe∣deracy much aggravated by another fatal Convention of all the Planets, in the watery signe of Pisces, immediately preceding it, as Sepher Juchasin (fol. 148.) hath delivered; which the

learned Mirandula hath sufficiently disproved, and smiled at yet must the greatness of the Effect manifestly confute the possi∣bility of that for a Cause. First, because Nature hath frequently shewed to the world the like Conjunctions, but never the like event: and again, because those Luminaries are not commissio∣ned with so unlimited a power, and in their strongest conspiracies of insluence can at most but weakly incline or dispose, not at all compell or necessitare; nor are their destinations to ruine, but conserve the world.

If therfore Nature, uniting all her divisions of Waters below the Moon, into one great heap, or Abyss, must yet fall very much short of that immane proportion requisite to furnish out the De∣luge; and though her stock had bin large enough, yet could she not, without apparent destruction of her self, i. e. infringing those fundamental Constitutions, or Elementary Laws, whose constant Tenor only defines her to be Nature, assist to their eruption out of their proper Receptaries, and their preposterous Ascension up hill: truely, I am yet to learn, what can be conceived to remain, but this, that those Decumani Fluctus, those immens Cataracts had both their supply and motion immediatly from that high hand, to which nothing that he wills can be difficult.

With this Problem, I confess, I have more then once impuzled my reason; yet doth the difficulty sometimes enflame my Curio∣sity to enquire out the pervestigable part of the miracle: viz. Whence Omnipotence summoned this mighty Syndrome, or Con∣flux of Waters to appear, at so short a warning, upon the face of the Earth, or in what part of the Universe they were quartered before, and by what wayes and means they were drawn off again and voyded after the Floud? That eminent Master of the Opticks, and excellent Mathematician, Christoph. Scheinerus (in Rosa Vrsina, pag. 693.) discoursing against those who have asserted the Incorruptibility of the Heavens, & quoad partes, & totum, introduceth Ferdinand. Quirinus de Salazar. a Jesuit, in his Comment upon 27. vers. of the 8. chap. of the Proverbs of Sa∣lomon, delivering his opinion derived from others, together with reasons to support it; that there must be a Tehom Rabba, or Abyss of Waters above the Firmament, or betwixt the 8^th. sphear and

the Shecinah, or dwelling place of God. The Texts of Scripture, upon which this opinion is supported, are (1) the 7. vers. of the 1. Chap. of Genes. where the Author of that book describing the several piles or stories of this great building, saith thus; and God made the Firmament, and divided the Waters which were under the Firmament, from the waters which were above the firmament, &c. (2) that of David (Psalm 33. vers. 7.) he layd up the depth in storehouses. (3) that of the Angel to Esdras (2. ch. 4. vers. 7.) proposing questions to puzle weak but proud mor∣tality; How many Springs are above the Firmament, or which are the outgoings of Paradise? (4) that expression of the greatest Naturalist, Salomon; and Wisdome saw him set his compass upon the face of the depth (which the Septuagint, plus de sententia, quam de singulis vocibus soliciti, have rendred, aderam cum se∣cerneret sedem super ventos.) (5) that also of the Psalmist (Psal. 104. vers. 3.) who hath layd the beams of his chambers in the Waters.

Upon these and the like perswasions many of the most learned Rabbines, and after them not a few of our modern Divines, have concluded; that at the Deluge the Floudgates of this Tehom Rabba, were unlockt, and the waters being showred down in Cataracts upon the earth, swell'd the deluge above the mountains. This, indeed, seemed smooth and plausible to my first apprehen∣sions, and promised not only to satisfy, but compensate my for∣mer anxious disquisition: but when I had a little recovered my thoughts out of the pleasant surprise of the novelty, and cast about, by what conveyances or Aquaeducts the tides of this Su∣percelestiall Ocean might be transmitted through so many Orbs (which not a few great Clerks have affirmed to be Solid) with∣out dislocation of any one, at least without interrupting or con∣founding their regular Circumvolutions; which happend not, for the stars kept on their Courses, as the retrograde Calculations of their severall Periods will soon evince: as also, if they were trans∣fused, what became of them afterward, when the fourty days were over? For either they must be returned from whence they came, to replenish that monstrous Vacuity, their absence had made betwixt the 8^th. orb, and the Empyreum; or else continue

heer below, and so perpetuate the Inundation, and so put God to the exigent of making a new supply of Waters above the firma∣ment. When, I say, I had abated the edge of my Credulity with these occurring difficulties, I sadly relapsed into my former in∣certitude. Not but that I am almost perswaded, from the literal sense of those Texts, that betwixt the Shecinah or paradise of God and his blessed retinue, and the 8^th. orb, there is a Tehom Rabba; for I do not see how those places can be otherwise, if rightly, in∣terpreted: but that I cannot yet drive my beleif beyond those two objections, and find it more ready to incline to this Con∣jecture (for tis yet gone no farther) of my own; That God mi∣raculously created a sussicient supply of Waters purposely for the Deluge, and afterwards adnihilated them again. This I am sure, was as easy to him, as any other Course imaginable; less inju∣rious to and inconsistent with the works of the former Creation; and renders the wonder most familiar to our Comprehension. If it be objected upon me, that God put a period to all Creation after the first Hexameron or six days; I shall defend my self, with the barrel of Meal, and cruise of Oyle, that sustaind the Widow and her son in the famin of Zarephath; wherein there was a fresh Creation of two several substances, with all their spe∣cisical Accidents about them every day; or a transmutation of Aer into Meal and Oyle, which was equivalent. And as for the other harsh term of Adnihilation, I say tis equally facil to him to reduce any thing to, as to educe it from Nothing. But this might well have bin spared, it being my proper business to prove that the Deluge was not Naturall; not to digress into a disqui∣sition how or by what cryptick means twas supernatural.

That the Cessation, or (rather) Intercision of Oracles, was an Atcheivem too difficult for the single arm of Nature; I con∣ceive * 1.123 few will dispute, but such ridiculous Ignorants in the Meta∣physicks of Spirits, or Scale of Creatures, as endevour to indu∣bitate the very Existence of Evil, Angels, and refuse to be per∣swaded, that there is any such real Entity▪ as a Devil, without a Demonstration from Sense, and the conviction of an Apparition. But if any shall, the best advice my hast can at this time afford

them, is this; that they would weave their long clue of thoughts into this short and plain Dilemma.

We must grant, either that that black Prophet, Satan, made a voluntary or spontaneous resignation of his usurped Divinity, at the nativity of the Prince of Peace; and of his own accord grew silent, upon the Advent of the Word of Life: or els, that by a Power infinitely more absolute and soveraign then his own, he was compelled to confess the decay of his tyranny by an Exile from his Altars, and himself strucken with an Aphonia, or Palsy in his double tongue, so that all he could utter, was, that he could no longer speak; for one of these two Propositions must be true.

The First cannot; since to make a Voluntary Confession of his Ignorance, Impotency, and subjection, in the face of the World, and especially in those places, where for so many Ages together he had solemnly pretended to Omniscience, Omnipotence, and Supre∣macy; is wholly repugnant to Satans Pride: nor would that strong Ambition, which even in the purity of his nature spurred him beyond the ken of his Angelical wisdome, up to an Attempt of the highest impossibility, (viz. to make himself equal to that Essence, which made him what he was) suffer him to proclaim himself to be less, then what he had made himself appear to be in the esteem of his infatuated Votaries. For notwithstanding the hand of Divino Vengeance had hurled him, (like a prodigious Meteor that durst outface the brighter Sun, from which its splen∣dor was desumed) from the highest heaven into the lowest hell; and degraded him from the most glorious order of Creatures to the most vile, accursed and despicable: yet is his stomach as great, as when he aspired to the throne of Ʋnity; nor hath the ignis rotae, or reverberated flames of hell ever since, bin able to con∣sume that humor of Competition in him. Witness his several impu∣dent invasions of the prerogative of God, by arrogating to himself the tribute of Divine Adoration from his superior, man; nay even from the Sonne of God, when yet he more then suspected his Divinity. Besides, as it seems a manifest Contradiction, that the Author of Pride should freely detect his own shame: so also, that the Father of lies should voluntarily broach a Truth, and such a one as once received must openly impeach him of Delusion,

and discover his Indivinity; cannot but sound a very great im∣probability at least. For how unlikely is it, that that sophistical Spirit, whose Tyranny was founded, supported, and continued solely by his cunning promotion of Error, and his subtil work∣ings upon the deceptible Condition of man; should willingly de∣pose himself, dismantle his strongest holds, proclaim the impo∣stures of his Amphibologies, and divulge his ruine, by rectifying the seduced judgements of his greatest Favourites, and declaring a Ʋerity that must disprove all that ever he sayd before? How dissimilar to Reason, that he who durst adventure upon the highest falshood in the world, to make himself God: should so far forget the maximes of his black Art, as of his own accord to confess himself to be the basest of Entities, a Devil? How remote from all the ways of perswasion, that he who had boasted himself Ʋbiquitary, usurped by a counterfeit title the Monarchy of the World, and given out, that the Prescience of Future Events was not only the natural annex of his Omniscience, but the Preordina∣tion and disposal of them the adjunct of his Providence: should, without the impulsion of a superior, betray himself chained to ut∣ter darknesse, to be but a Slave, that there was a setled law of Fate above his comptroll, as in his excuse to Croesus ruined by his Amphibologie, and that his Providence was at best but Praesagi∣tion from the concurrent inclinations of second Causes, nor his Predictions of things to come, other then artificial Conjectures? To conclude, no man, I suppose, will be able to remember any other Instance of the Devils Fidelity and Veracity (those Con∣fessions of Christs Divinity, and that in the presence of Truth it self, that he came from compassing the earth in quest of whom he might devour, mentioned in holy Writ, excepted;) or produce one sentence of truth ever spoken by him to his own disadvantage, besides this one; that he was commanded to shut up his Oracles, by a Power, which he could never contradict: And therefore the Second Proposition must be true and evident: viz. that his Oracles were silenced by the immediate hand of that Cause, whose Activity is so far above the Power of either Satan or Nature, taken either singly, or combined together, (for the Former is but a languid Agent, if you deny him the auxiliatory concurrence of

the Latter) as Infinitude is above Limitation, Almightiness above Impotency, or Omniscience above Ignorance.

Now to me, this process of Argumentation seems so smooth, familiar and customary, and the whole series of Inductions so ob∣vious to a dialectical consideration; that, when I reflect upon the facility of their occurence to our thoughts, I cannot but extremely wonder, how so many profound and circumspect Philosophers, and those whose threads of life were unraveld in the eager pursuit of knowledge, could referre the cessation of Oracles to Natural necessities, and acquiesce in a confidence of those weak, remote, inconsistent, impertinent and so contemptible reasons, urged by Plutarch, &c. to salve the difficulty of this accident, and serve as a specious Asylum for their puzled curiosities to retreat to.

Lastly, that that generally confest Eclipse of the Sun, (and, indeed, the only one this great Luminary did ever suffer; since * 1.124 we may with more propriety call all others but Partial Inter∣ceptions of his light, by the lesser body of the Moon interposed in a straight line to some part of the Terrestrial Globe) which hap∣pened at the Death of Christ, was above, nay against the funda∣mental constitutions of Nature; is manifest from hence, that on the third of April, or Feria sexta, being the Passion day, in the year Aerae Christi nati 33. (which is synchronical to the 78. of the Julian account) the Sun and Moon were then in opposition diametrical, and the Moon her self totally eclipsed in Libra to the Antipodes of Jerusalem: as may be certified to any man that can read the Celestial Ephemerides backward, i. e. recalculate the pe∣riodical Conjunctions and Oppositions of those two great Lights of heaven, by the Tables of Astronomy. For those Characters of time being punctually restrained to set & certain periods, the Astro∣nomer may as easily attain to the minute of any eclipse in praeterito, as to the prescience of any in futuro; provided that his Hypothesis be sound, and his Schemes erected with exactness correspondent: nay such is the certitude of this rule, as to the strict decision of time, that though the Astronomer may chance to learn of the Historian, that there hath bin an eclipse; yet for the determination of its precise time & place, history must go to school to Astronomy, as Scaliger (de

Emendat. tempor.) hath observed to our hands. Thus when Eusebius and Dio had recorded an Eclipse of the Sun to have falne out a little before the death of Augustus, and so to have been a kind of prodigy portending the fall of so bright a Star; the Astronomers coming after to examine the synchronisme, by their retrograde calculations, found the Historians in a double error: that Eclipse being not of the Sun, but the Moon; and not preceding, but succeeding his funerals.

To assure the miracle yet nearer, let us look back to the Ele∣ments of Astronomy. The Eclipse of the Moon is caused by the Intervention (for so tis according to the most probable Hypothesis of Copernicus) of the opac body of the earth, between her and the original of her light, the Sun; and the Eclipse of the Sun, by the interposition of the Moon betwixt him and the earth: and therefore the Sun cannot be eclipsed, but when he is in Conjunction with the Moon; nor the Moon, but when she is in opposition to the Sun. Yet notwithstanding doth not every monthly conjuncti∣on and opposition of these two lights produce an eclipse to one of the two; but only that Conjunction and Opposition which is Dia∣metrical: i. e. when the Central point of the Sun faceth the Cen∣tral point of the Moon, and that again confronteth the centre of the earth, so directly, that an arrow shot in a streight line from the circumference of the Sun through its Centre, would also per∣pendicularly transfix the Centers of the other two orbs. And this falls out only when the Moons Eccentrick transecteth the Suns, in that line, which is for that reason called the Ecliptick; nor this in more then two points, called by Ptolemy, the Nodi, or knots, and by the Arabians, the Head and Taile of the Dragon.

Again, these Intersections are not constant to one certain point, or place, but circumgyrated by a slow motion, make a circle of 18 years complete; and therefore every 18^th year the Moon must be eclipsed in the same degree of the same signe in the Zodiack, in∣fallibly to the end of the world: which is the rule by which every common Almanack maker doth calculate his predictions of Lunar Eclipses.

Now this being excogitated, and the eclipses retrived back as high as the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or foot of the Julian compute, by revolving the

leaves of the Celestial Volume; we discover that the Moon in∣deed, was naturally eclipsed on the self same day, whereon the Sun prodigiously suffered together with its Author, in the 2 deg. of Libra, the opacity beginning to the horizon of Jerusalem some few minutes before six in the evening: so that the Sun was no sooner set in the West, but the Moon appeared in the East depri∣ved of more then half her light; the Calculation and sigure of which Lunar eclipse, are largely set down by Sethus Calvisius, to the 3 of April, in the 33 year of the Nativity, under Tiberius Caesar, and by Henricus Buntingius, in Chronologiae Catholic. fol. 337. And thereupon we may safely conclude, that the De∣fection of the Moon, on the Passion day, being meerly Natural; that of the Sun on the same day must be Supernatural; it being impossible for the Moon to keep two different stations, or to possess those two opposite points of heaven, which define the Con∣junction and Opposition, at one and the same time. This S. Aug. (3. de Civit. Dei cap. 15.) had respect unto, when he said; Quam solis obscurationem, non ex canonico syderum cursu acci∣disse ostenditur, quod tunc erat Pascha Iudaeorum.

Twas a Dismal day that same, though the King of Terrors was then vanquisht; for Darkness was not only upon, but under the earth, the miraculous obscuration of the Sun in our Hemisphere, of necessity causing a defection of the Moon in the subterraneous one, and so making it more then midnight to the Antipodes: and a second natural eclipse of the Moon succeeding within six hours after; nay, more then all this, Saturn (the signifier of blackness) aggravated this horrid opacity, for at the same time rising from the Horoscope, he beheld both eclipfes in a square malignant aspect.

But though this eclipse was Ʋnnatural to the Sun, per 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: yet twas purely Natural per 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, it being requi∣site, nay necessary for a stream or reflex of Light to suffer a de∣fection, when the Fountain of Light was under a cloud; proper for the Creature to sympathize with the Creator. And therefore, though twas a miracle, yet twas no wonder. The wonder was in the reverse part of the accident; that the most glorious Sun of Righteousness should suffer a dark and unnatural eclipse, to ex∣piate

our deeds of darkness. Nor was that a wonder neither, now I think ont; for twas the natural effect of his infinite love to mankind.

And this, I presume, the most stubborn and prejudicate Atheist * 1.125 will admit, as evidence both strong and clear enough, to evince the verity of our Minor Proposition; viz. that God hath, in times prelapsed, frequently manifested his prerogative of causing effects not only superior, but also contradictory to the ordinary and establisht Laws of Nature, his ordinary instrument, when such effects seemed either necessary, or expedient to his Providence: and therefore our Conclusion, viz. that his arme is not shortned, and he can doe the like in the future, upon any occasional emer∣gency designed by his secret counsel; comes not much short of perfectly Apodictical.

SECT. VI.

WE have now brought our selves to the last Objection urged * 1.126 against Universal Providence; namely, the unequal distribution of good and evil, or the frequent occurence of events which carry too much appearance of Temerity, to be interpreted the mature designes of an infinite Wisdome; and seem too oblique and deflecting towards Partiality, to stand in a right line with the hand of divine Iustice, which must be conceived to discriminate betwixt the Pious and Impious in the Consignation of Happi∣ness and Misery, and accordingly to distribute its benefits in some proportion to the merits, at least the worthy susceptibility of the receivers: this is a member belonging to another head, and falls more properly under the contents of our next Chapter, of the Special or Particular Providence of God; and therefore we shall thither transfer the plenary refutation thereof, making it the sub∣ject of this last section, to blow off those light and cobweb scruples, that were spun by that Spider, Lucretius, when he

composed these verses to alienate mens minds from the fear of an Ʋniversal Moderator.

Caetera, quae fieri in terris, coeloque tuentur Mortales, pavidis quom pendent mentibu'saepe, Efficiunt animos humileis formidine divûm, Depressosque premunt ad terram; proptereà quod Ignorantia caussarum conferre deorum Cogit ad imperium res, & concedere regnum, & Quorum operum causas nulla ratione videre Possunt; haec sieri divino Numine rentur, &c. lib. 6••••.

Those bug-bear Meteors, which the tim'rous eyes Of pavid Mortals wonder at i'th skies; And those unfrequent Prodigies, that appear, On earth (while their weak souls are fool'd by Fear) Are the sole charms, that emasculate, And cheat mens minds to a beleif of Fate, And some vindictive Numen. For, because Men understand not Natures cryptick Laws, Nor her occult Efficiency; they fly, (To salve their Ign'rance) to Divinity: And idly rest in this; what ere befall, Twas caus'd by Providence, that disposeth all.

The Redargution.

True it is, indeed, nor will any thing but ignorance deny that * 1.127 Physiology, or the speculation of Natural Causes hath a power to raise the mind of man to a generous height, from whence it may securely, and without that vertigo or giddiness, which usu∣ally turnes the brains of the multitude, behold the most prodigi∣ous meteors; and look in the threatning face of Lightning with∣out growing pale, while those that stand below become convulst with needless horror, and are ready to be shook to dust with su∣perstitious fear.

True it is also, as Lucretius would have it, that tis unworthy

the constancy and setled courage of a Philosopher, when he sees a bearded comet, hears a loud crack of Thunder, or feels the earth unhinged (all which Natural events common eyes gaze upon as horrid Portents, and dangerous agonies of Nature) instantly to forget his Principles, and run to consult with the superstitious books of the Hetrurians, and other pusillanimous Comments on those pageants, or necessary Phaenomenas, whose Causalities are establisht, and their precise contingencies presageable by the easie prognosticks of meteorology.

But however, though this ought to prevent our fears: yet it cannot be extended to the extinction of our devotion. Though it may commend our knowledge, to smile when the heavens frown: yet it more commends it, if we look above them, and through those visible operations of Nature discover that invisible cause, that made, conserves, and regulates her. Though it demon∣strate our skill in Physicks, to stand unmoved, when the ground trembles: yet will it detect our ignorance in the Metaphysicks, not to fall prostrate in an humble reverence to that awfull majesty, that stretched out the North over the empty place, and hanged the earth upon nothing. And though it be an honour to our Rea∣son, to explore the Abstrusities of Nature, and readily refer her most admirable effects to their proper efficients: yet, at the same time, not to confess that omnipotent Agent, which is the soul of all energy; and the highest link in the Chain of Causes; disho∣nours it even to the most odious shame of Atheisme, which is the greatest ignorance.

Nor is it Religion that makes men Cowards; for the best way * 1.128 to harden the Spirit of man, is first to soften it with the Fear of God: and the noblest Tincture of magnanimity is extracted out of an humble apprehension, and fiduciary acknowledgement of an all observant Deity. This the wise Father well understood, when refuting that impious error of the Poet, Primus in orbe Deos secit timor, he writ this golden Aphorisme; Qui Deum non agnosci••, is non Dominum excutit superbum, sed aversatur op∣timum Parentem; cujus respectu Animus sit non formidine hu∣milis; sed reverentia fiduci••e plenus.

Again, when we ascribe the Monarchy of the World to one supreme Cause, we do not derogate a jot from the Power of se∣cond * 1.129 Causes; but rather confirme and subscribe the Charter of their deputations: since we thereby inferre an assurance, that those Causes are really such as he was pleased to constitute them, that their activities are but emauations of his omnipotence; and their effects the appointments of his Wisdome. And upon this medita∣tion is it, that when we observe unfrequent wildfires in the Clouds, shaggy Meteors in the acr, Trepidations in the earth, and other the like admirable effects resulting from the concourse and con∣spiracy of potent Natural agents; we doe not instantly quench our wonder and check our curiosity, by ascribing the production of them to God, so as if he were the sole and immediate Author of them, and that no other Natural Cause intervened betwixt his Volition and their Contingency: but by supposing him to be the First and General Cause aswell of that particular one, as of all others in the World; and that besides the First there is requi∣red a Second Particular one, whose indagation will fully com∣pensate the sweat and oyle of our study, and which we must not deny, though we cannot discover, but acknowledge it to be ae Natural one, however to obscure for the invention of our perspi∣cacity.

To conclude, out of this one Fountain may be derived streams * 1.130 enough to rince away all those feculent Scruples, which the polluted wit of Lucretius hath scraped off the Thunderbolt, to obstruct the current of Providence. For the Principles of that affrighting Meteor are comprehended under that series of Natural Causes which God permits to act their appointed parts, on the theatre of this sublunary Globe; nor doth he force them from the ordinary road of their essential and proper Activities, upon any extra or∣dinary or new way of violence: and therefore tis as natural an event if this Granado of the clouds fall on the head of an Innocent, as if it fell on the head of the most guilty person; as regular for it to strike the sacred batlements of a Temple, as to light upon an unhallowed roof; and as consonant to the rules of its projection or

explosion, to be shot point blanck at any mark on land, as to be discharged at randome on the Sea.

But here some have, by way of objection, enquired; Why did not God, that he might leave nothing to Chance, at his first insti∣tution of the Laws of Nature, ordain such a series of Causes, both for the Generation and Explosion of the Thunderbolt, and limit their operations to such a certainty of events, as that it should never come to pass, that this Fireball should destroy the Good, and miss the Impious?

This itch of ignorant, and therefore bold, curiosity may easily be mortified by applying this euporiston or obvious solution; that the ends or designes of Particular Providence, in these or the like occurrences, are full of Prudence, as to the intention of God; though full of obscurity, as to the investigation of our unequal Ʋnderstandings: and therefore for us, when we cannot find out these imperceptible ends, therefore to conclude that those Acci∣dents, are meer accidents, and have no ends at all; is not to palliate, but aggravate our ignorance, since tis a rash and open delusion of the judgment of man, to presume that he is acquainted with the secret Counsels of God; a madness beyond the severity of Bethlem, for mortality to pretend ability to read those Arcana Imperii, or mystical decrees of Fate, written in invisible Hierogly∣phicks, which are to hard for the intuition of Angels.

CHAP. V. The especial Providence of God Demonstrated.

SECT. I.

HAving sayled over the immens Ocean of Gods Gene∣ral * 1.131 Providence, by the direction of our own con∣genial Cynosure, the Light of Nature; our next voyage ought to be up the channel of his Parti∣cular or Special: which being the golden River, that constantly invirons the Microcosme, or Isle of Man, and imports all the advantages and mutations of Happiness and Misery, that occurre to humanity during the trade of life; is that point we have thus long coasted about to disco∣ver. But before we put into the mouth of this Euphrates * 1.132, we conceive it necessary first to sound, and send out our Pilot Reason, to detect those Shelves and Rocks cast up by the common Ad∣versary of mankind; upon which many weak vessels have foun∣derd, sprung dangerous leaks of Atheisme, and so sunk down right into that Barathrum of sorrow, which knowes no exhau∣stion, and admits of no regression.

The First of those, we finde to be that contraprovidential Ar∣gument of that Secretary of Hell, Epicurus; Quod beatum est, * 1.133 ac immortale, id neque ira, neque gratia tangi: that those Passi∣ons of Anger and Love are inconsistent with the constant and im∣mutable condition of that Nature, whose simple essence is com∣pounded of Immortality and Beatitude; and therefore, as Busi∣ness and Cares must destroy the Tranquillity, so the affections of Indignation and Placability must subvert the Constancy, or eternal Sameness of divinity; and upon inference, that neither our most servent Impieties can accend, nor our penitential Tears extinguish the Wrath of God.

That this poysonous Grape grew upon that wild Vine, Epi∣curus * 1.134 (that we may not seem to belie the Devill) is not only col∣ligible from its stinking odour, and assinity of taste, that it bears to that detestable design of his (in Epist. ad Herodotum) to erase out of the mind of man all the impressions of Religion, by the induction of a beleif, that God doth not observe the good and evil actions of men, in this life, and by consequence shall not com∣pensate them with Felicity, or misery, after death: but manifest upon the asseveration of three judicious and conscientious wit∣nesses, Seneca, Cicero, and Lactantius. For the First chargeth it upon him in these words; (4. de Benefic. 4.) Deus, inquit Epi∣curus, nihil agit, nec magis illum beneficia, quam injuriae tan∣gunt: The Second in these; Dii, inquit Epicurus, neque propi∣tii cuiquam esse solent, neque irati, (3. de Nat. Deor.) the Third, in these; De schola Epicuri est, sicut iram in Deo non esse, it a nec gratiam quidem; nam cum putat Epicurus, alienum esse à Deo malum facere, at que nocere, quod ex affectu iracundiae plerum{que} nascitur, ademit ei etiam beneficentiam, quoniam videbat con∣sequens esse, ut si iram habeat Deus, habeat & gratiam. Itaque ne vitium concederet, etiam virtutis fecit expert••m. Which ar∣gument his disciple Lucretius (who, as Theseus, scorned to forsake his Master, though he led him into hell) hath contracted into this Tristich:

Nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis, Ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri, Nec bene promeritis capitur, neque tangitur ira.

Th' Immortal Nature, placed above the sense Of sorrow, danger, and all indigence, Rich in its own Perfections; neither can Smile at the Good, nor frown at'h Ill of Man.

The import of all which amounts to no higher a sum of reason, then only this; that the Supreme Nature, being wholly imploy∣ed in a blisfull vacancy, and entirely taken up with the superla∣tively-pleasant contemplation of its own excellencies, hath cast the rains upon our own necks, committed the managery of all our affairs to our own providence, and hears neither the clamours of our profane impieties, nor the sighes of our supplications, but stands as unconcerned in, so unregardant of all our actions. Sic enim sese res habet, ut ad prosperam, adversamve fort unam qua∣lis sis, aut quemadmodum vixeris, nihil intersit; as Cotta, per∣sonated by Cicero (3. de Nat. Deor.) or as Caesar in Lucan,

—Nunquam se cur a Deorum Sic premit, ut vestrae vitae, vestraeque saluti Fata vacent—

The Gods are never subject to a Care; Nor doe the Fates look how you Mortals fare.

The Second, objected frequently against the Stoicks, by the Academicks, as that incomparable Atheomastix, Lactantius, * 1.135 hath observed (de ira Dei, cap. 13.) is this; Cur, si Deus om∣nia hominum caussâ fecerit, etiam multa contraria, & inimica, & pestifera nobis reperiantur, tam in mari, quam in terra? If man be the chief object of Gods love, and his welfare the grand intention of his Providence; why then did he create so many powerfull and malicious enemies against him, in all elements, and still expose him to encounter more dangers then his dayes, nay

then his haires can number? If God be an indulgent Father, how dares Nature prove her self so cruel a Stepmother to man? If his Creator intended him for a Favorite, and made him the centre in which all the lines of his blessings should convene to make up a full and constant felicity; how comes it to pass, that the vilest of Creatures insult over him, and make him the point at which all their darts of hostility are levelled, so that his life is made a full and constant infelicity?

The Last, and indeed the most dangerous rock, against which innumerable numbers not only of unhappy Ethnicks, that wan∣ted * 1.136 the Compass of true Religion, and so were forced to steer by the imperfect Chart of their own natural judgment; but also of Christians, who had the inestimable advantage of the Scriptures (the only Loadstone that never deflects from the point or unity of truth) have suffered shipwrack; is this: The calamitous conditi∣on of the Virtuous, and the prosperous estate of the Vitious, in this life.

The most full and accurate description of this Scylla we can meet with amongst many of those venerable Fathers, who with as much profound learning, as strenuous industry, have attempted the remove of it; is given us by Lactantius (lib. 3. cap. 17.) in these words: Videbat Epicurus bonis adversa semper accidere, paupertatem, labores, exilia, carorum amissiones: malos contrà beatos esse, augeri potentia, honoribus affici. Videbat innocentiam minus tutam, scelera impune committi. Videbat sine delectu mo∣rum, sine ordine, ac discrimine annorum, saevire mortem: sed alios ad senectutem pervenire, alios infantes rapi, alios jam ro∣bustos interire, alios in primo adolescentiae flore immaturis fune∣ribus extingui. In bellis potius meliores & vinci, & perire, maxime autem commovebat, homines imprimis religiosos malis affici; iis autem, qui aut Deos omninò negligerent, aut minus piè colerent, vel minora incommoda evenire, vel nulla. To the observation of Epicurus it appeared, that unjust Fortune, not the discriminating hand of Divine Providence, had the dis∣pensation of Happiness and Misery: for Adversity is the com∣mon cognizance of Honesty, and poverty, uncessant and unsuc∣cesfull

labours, banishment, loss of friends, and the like dolefull accidents are alwaies in the lots of Good men: but on the contra∣ry, Prosperity is frequently the pathognomonick of Ʋillainy, and increase of power, accumulation of honours, and other blandish∣ments of fortune are the portion of Wicked men. That the ready way to danger, was to be innocent; and to be extremely nefarious the only hopefull means to attain impunity. That death, like an inconsiderate Tyrant, spares none upon the exceptions of age, sex, dignities, or merits; but, raging in an arbitrary way of cru∣elty, suffers some to unravell their clue of life to the last minute of old age, while he cuts off the threads of others more hopefull in the first rundle of infancy. That he extinguisheth the vital lamp of some, in their brightest and strongest lustre; of others before they are well and throughly kindled; and permits others to shine till they have consumed their last drop of oyle. That the sword of war both conquers and cuts off the most noble and va∣liant heads: while the degenerous and cowardly escape unwoun∣ded. And, what with the greatest violence swayed him from the beleif of Particular Providence, that the most religious had, for the most part, the most afflictions; but those, who either contem∣ned, or neglected, or but coldly affected the worship of the Gods, had either less & lighter misfortunes, or none at all.

Nor did the impiety of Epicurus rest here, but, as if this ob∣jection, though fine enough to entangle the phansies of vulgar slies, were yet too loosly woven to ensnare the judgments of more decisive and penetrating heads; proceeds to reduce it to more closeness and strength, by superadding these sophistical knots. Aut Deus vult tollere mala, & non potest; aut potest, & non vult; aut neque vult, neque potest; aut & vult, & potest. Si vult, & non potest, imbecillis est, ideoque non Deus; si potest, & non vult, invidus est, quod aeque alienum à Deo; si neque vult, neque potest, & invidus & imbecillis est, ideoque neque Deus; si vult & potest, quodsolum Deo convenit, unde ergo mala? aut cur illa non tollit?

Either God is willing to amove those evils from good men, but cannot; or can, and will not; or neither can, nor will; or both will and can. If he hath a will, but not a power, then is

he impotent, and so no God. If he hath a power, but not a will, then is he malevolent and envious, and so no God: for malice and weakness are equally incompetent to the divine Nature. If he want both will and Power, then is he both malevolent and im∣potent; and by consequence no God. If he want neither, as he must not if he be God: whence come those evils? or why doth he not amove them?

And too far did this designe of his succeed; for the contagion * 1.137 of this pestiferous error became so Epidemical, as that it diffused itself not only upon his school, and there corrupted the brains of Philosophers; but dilated even to the infection of the more re∣mote and grosser mindes of Women and Poets (both which Imi∣tation makes easily subject to any impression of falshood) that lived many ages after him. For Women, witness that relation, assured by the records of Atheneus (lib. 13.) of one Danae, daughter to Leontius of the Epicurean sect; who being on her way towards the place appointed for her execution, in the bitter∣ness of her spirit, ejaculated this desperate blasphemy: Non in∣juriâ Deos à multis contemni; nam quodmeum maritum serva∣vi, hanc mihi gratiam rependunt Dii; Laodice autem, quod ma∣ritum suum interfecerit, maximo in honore est. With very good reason are the Gods contemned by many; for that I have faith∣fully preserved my husband from an immature death, do the Gods thus ungratefully gratifie me with this my own unjust and vio∣lent one: but Laodice, because she hath persidiously destroyed hers, doth now live, slourish, and hath her guilty head incircled with a wreath of the most refulgent honours. Whether the crime, for which she was sentenced, might deserve so severe a doom, as death; I dare not determine, our Author being not positive, nor open in that particular: but this I am sure of, that she suffered justly; and therefore though I cannot acquit her Iudges, I may her Executioners. For Poets, witness that confession of Ovid.

Cum rapiant mala Fata bonos, ignoscite fasso, Sollicitor nullos esse putare Deos.

When I see Good men by ill Fates to fall, (Forgive't) I think there are no Gods at all.

Nay the sober Claudian prosesseth, that the Felicity of the most impious and unjust, and the smart Afflictions of the Pious and just persons, here on earth, had often staggered his confidence of Divine Providence, and more then inclined him to become an Apostate from all Religion, and declare himself on the side of Epicurus.

Saepe mihi dubiam traxit sententia mentem, * 1.138 Curarent superi terras; an nullus inesset Rector, & incerto fluerent mortalia casu? Sedcum res hominum tanta caligine volvi Adspicerem, laetosque diu florere nocentes, Vexarique pios: rursus labefacta cadebat Religio, causaeque viam non sponte sequebar Alterius vacuo quae currere semina motu Adsirmat, magnumque novas per I nane figuras Fortuna, non arte regi, quae Numina sensu Ambiguo vel nulla putat, vel nescia nostri.

Oft hath my dubious mind seem'd well assur'd, That Gods above th' affairs on earth procur'd; That one wise Rector all events did guide; Nor Good, nor Ill from Fortunes wheel could slide. But when I saw the Chaos of mens Fates, The Guilty slourish long in smooth estates, And Innocence afflicted; was the heart Of my Religion stab'd, forc'd to take part With the adverse opinion: which concludes That an immense Vacuity includes The Principles of all; in that vast range Fortune, not Art, doth their old Figures change; Gods there are none, or such as doe not know What parts self-ruling Mortals act below.

Concerning this eminent Poet, Claudian, there hath been old

hacking and slashing among Antiquaries, whether he lived in the owle light of Paganisme, or the illuminating day of Christianisme; S^t. Augustine, P. Orosius, and Paul the Diacon (the two for∣mer whereof flourished not long after he was withered) descri∣bing him to be à Christi nomine alienus, and paganus pervica∣cissimus; and Franc. Petrarcha and Landinus having adopted him for a Proselyte, and affirming himself to be not only Chri∣stianae pietati addictus, but also to have bin the composer of this devout Epigram:

Christe potens rerum, redeuntis conditor aevi, Vox summi, sensusque Dei: quem fundit ab alta Mente Pater, &c.

But if he were a Christian, yet could he not want the excuse of very holy Precedents even of that profession, who had fre∣quently stumbled at the same stone. For the Royall Hebrew, whose Muse was the Holy Ghost, though a man after Gods own heart, a Christian by the baptisme of his prophetique faith, and one who had frequently instructed his harp to echo forth Pane∣gyricks of the speciall Providence of the great preserver of men; had yet his confidence sometimes damp't, and judgement eclipsed by the same fogg of error, exhaled from his experience of the prosperity of Libertines. Nor was the shock of this tempta∣tion easily withstood by so strong a Champion; for it made him reel again, as he thus confesseth: My feet were almost gone, my steps had welnigh slipt. For I was envious at the prosperity of the wicked. They are not in trouble, neither are they plagued like other men. Their eyes stand out with fatnesse: they have more then their heart could wish. They are corrupt, and speak wickedly concerning oppression: they speak loftily. They set their mouth against the heavens: and their tongue walketh through the earth. Behold, these are the ungodly, who prosper in the world: they increase in riches. Verily, I have cleansed my heart in vain: and washed my hands in innocency. For all the day long have I bin plagued, and chastened every morning, &c. (Psalm. 73.) To which we may annex that blunt and emphatical lesson of Jesus ben Syrach (Ecclesiastic. 2.) My son, if thou come to

serve the Lord, prepare thy soul for temptation: the concernment of which every man understands to be this: The more righteous, the more afflicted. Here also is a convenient place for their opi∣nion, who affirme the Book of Job to have bin intended as no history (though they conced him to have bin no faigned person, from Ezek. 14. 14. and James 5. 2. but a real example of both Fortunes, in an exceeding measure) but a grave Treatise concer∣ning this subject, viz. the prosperity of the impious, and constant adversity of the pious, comprehending the arguments of both the Opponent and Defendant of Divine Providence. Which is groun∣ded upon strong probability, since, as S^t. Ierom hath observed and attested, in the original Hebrew, from the beginning of the book to the 3 verse of the 3 chapter, where the complaint of Iob begins, all is written in Prose, and thenceforward, during the whole dispute, to the 6^th. verse of the last chapter all in Hexameter verse, where the composer again let loose his pen into prose, whereby it is manifest that the Prose was destined for a Prologue and an Epilogue to the contest in verse. Now every man knows the sor∣rows and sickness of Iob to have bin too intense and urgent, to endure the calme and leasure requiring humor of Poetry either in himself or his friends: and therefore must the book be compo∣sed by some Person not molested with either of those two im∣pediments, but of serene thoughts, and acquainted with the an∣tient custome of disposing their Moral Philosophy into verse.

And there are instances enough to illustrate both the contumacy and large diffusion of this objection. I might have sayd more then enough; the strongest and most military Faith among us, though assisted by the most evident and firm reason, being hardly able justly to boast an absolute conquest of, and constant immunity from the sharpe clandestine assaults of the same scruple: and so no man needing other example to evince the frequent prevalency of it, but what his retired meditations may find alleaged in the inventory of his own frailties, lapses, and temptations; (all which are punctually and orderly registred by that recorder of his soul, which the Divine call's 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Conscience) especially in these evil times, wherein Piety, Wisedom, Iustice, Temperance, Fortitude, Innocence, and all other Graces and Virtues are

deposed, and onely their Contrarics advanced; in a word, where∣in nothing can make a man temporally miserable, but the severe profession of Goodness.

SECT. II.

THat God extends the right hand of his Providence upon the * 1.139 head of man (the Heir of all his blessings, though the youngest of his Creatures) ordering the occurrences of his life, nay the man∣ner and moment of his death, by a paternal and special care, more excellent then that whereby he is pleased to regulate and dispose the operations of all other Entities in the Republique of the World; is amply manifest from hence, Quod majorem sui hominibus, quam caeteris rebus not itiam impressit, that he hath impressed upon the mind of man a knowledg of his Divinity more cleare and distinct, then upon any created natures beside, Angelical and intuitively intellectual spirits only excepted.

For though all the works of God carry, in the front of their distinct Forms, some certain Signatures or Characters, that un∣deniably attest their Creation by an Efficient infinite in Power and Wisedom; and in that respect may be properly enough said, to shew forth the glory of their Maker: and though all Animals do, by a kind of tacit homage, confess their origination from, and constant dependence on one Eternal and Omnipotent Cause; yet are they induced, excited, or rather impelled thereunto, in∣stinctu solum quodam caeco, only by a blind and confused in∣stinct, of which themselves have no possible notion. But as for the Favorite, man, he holds a clear and distinct idea of the Na∣ture of God, as hath formerly bin demonstrated; and hath there∣fore a Logical, assured, and express cognition of his Creator and Conservator, and that so radically united, or identified to his essence, that it can be no Paradox to averr, that this science is part of his soul, though that be a simple, pure, homogeneal, and

so indivisible substance: nay some modern Enquirers into the nature of the soul, have described it to be, Actus simplex Cog∣nitionis omnium, quae cognosci possint, a simple Act, or present Cognition of all things intelligible, i. e. of God, and consequent∣ly, tis not in the power of the most desperate and obdurate Athe∣ist, to erase this idea out of his mind, no more then to change, meliorate, or adnihilate his essence, or prevent the stroke of Death. Now, what could be the Motive, that induced God to ennoble man by the prerogative of this excellent Idea, or repre∣sentation of himself, other then the reflex act of his own infinite Goodness; which in the language of mortality, is Free Love, that flowed in a fuller and richer stream upon man, then upon all the World beside? And what can be the End of this implantate and coessential Knowledg in man, other then this; that he should constantly contemplate, admire, and laud the Perfections of the Donor thereof, and more particularly that concerned Attri∣bute, which moved him to the free Donation, namely his immense Beneficence? This being conceded, it remains a plain and per∣pendicular Inference; that since between God and man there is a greater relation, or Communion (so the learned Gassendus calls it, in Animadvers. in lib. 10. Diogen. Laert: de physiolog. Epicuri. pag. 744.) then betwixt God and any other of his Creatures: therefore also must there be a greater measure of Providence in God for man, then for any other; it being neces∣sary that the Providence of God should hold exact proportion, and be aequilibrated to his Love. This necessity of a parity or aequipondium betwixt Love and Providence Divine, may be conveniently exemplified in our selves; for by how much the more we love our Friends, Wives or Children, by so much the more carefull and provident are we for their conservation and welfare.

Again, our own Experience is both argument and testimony sufficient, that the perscrutation of the mysteries of Nature, and the contemplation of sublime and celestial objects, is proper only to man; no other Animal being constituted in a capacity to rival him in those noble operations. And if so, undoubtedly he must violently stisle tho conviction of his experience in this particular,

who dares deny, that those heavenly beauties, and all the peices of Nature beside were created principally for the use of man, inso∣much as man was created principally to declare the Glory of the Creator. Ad quid enim tantus decor universi, nisi esset homo, qui consideraret, ips••que perspecto hymnum Authori caneret? Tis an Axiome of constant Verity, that Nature makes nothing in vain; and this rule, doubtless, she learned from that Wisdome, which determineth all its actions to certain, adequate, and pro∣per Ends: now we must grant, either that God adorned the Universe with such exquisite pulchritude, and admirable imbel∣lishment of Art, to no purpose at all; and so was more vain and improvident then his instrument, Nature: or else, that he conferred that elegancy and amiable decorament upon it, to this end, that the curious Cogitations of man might be entertained, exercised, and delighted in the speculation and admiration thereof, and through that maze of pleasant wonder be conducted to the true Elyzium, the contemplation of the Fountain of Pulchritude, and entelechia of Excellencies, God. For there is no medium be∣tween these two Contraries, nor any hope of evading the rigour of this Dilemma, upon pretence of neutrality: since God had no other end, wherefore he beautified the World, but his own Glory in chief, and the excitement of the Admiration and Magnificat of man, as subservient thereunto; nor doth the World contain any other Nature, but Man, that is qualified with Faculties requisite to the satisfaction of that end. Quis enim aliquam aliam unquam invenit naturam, quae aedificium hoc tantum conspiciens, in Ar∣chitecti sapientissimi admirationem perinde rapiatur? We well know, that Relatives (secundum esse) positively necessitate the existence each of other; and therefore to allow (what cannot be disallowed, but by incurring a more dangerous absurdity) that God made, and exhibited the Beauty of the World, tanquam ad∣mirandum spectaculum, as a spectacle that cannot but excite Admiration in the speculator; and yet to deny that he provided a fit and respective spectator, such whose Sense should transmit the idea of that Pulchritude to the judicature of a higher Facul∣ty, and that again be thereby impregnated with Admiration (which is nothing but our Reasons being at a stand at the novelty

or excellence of an object occurring to our sense; for what is ei∣ther frequent, or manifest to our cognition, we never admire: and that's the cause, why this Affection of the mind as it is the first of Passions, so it is the only one that wants a Contrary, as the unimitable Des Cartes hath discovered to us, in lib. de pas∣sion. part. 1. articl. 54.) is not only an impious derogation to the wisdome of God, but also a manifest Contradiction to our own reason, which from the existence of the Relatum, a spectacle, immediately concludes the necessary existence of the Correlatnm, a spectator. And that this Spectator can be no other Animal, but man; is too bright a truth to need any other illustration, but what is reflected from it self.

To which Argument, of the Creators adopting man to be his Darling and intimate Favorite, the Logick of every man may superadd many others of equivalent importance, drawn from the consideration of those Praeeminences and Praerogatives, wherewith his Munificence hath bin pleased to ennoble his nature, and ex∣alt him to a neerer Cognation or Affinity to his own glorious Essence, then any other Creature in the Universe; as the excellent contexture and majestique Figure of his Body; the semi-divine Faculties of his Soul; his Monarchy, domination, or royalty over all other sublunary natures, Omnia enim sibi submittit, dum omnia quae in mundo sunt, vel ad usus vitae necessarios re∣fert, vel ad varia genera voluptatum; and lastly that inestima∣ble propriety, the Immortality of his Soul.

Now to direct all this to the mark; since God hath thus pro∣claimed Man to be, next to his own Glory (which is the last of Ends, as his Will is the first of Causes) the grand and principal scope of his mighty work of Creation; and that he made all things, in order to his accommodation and well-being in this life, and allurement, nay manuduction or conduct to immarcescible beatitude after Death: and since his Act of Providence, or the constant Conservation of all things, in the primitive perfection, distinction and order of their Natures, is nothing but his act of Creation prolonged, or spun out through all the independent Atoms, or successive particles of time, as hath bin more then once intimated; beyond all dispute, the Product must be the same

with our Thesis, viz. That Man is the object of Gods special Pro∣vidence, and by consequence, that all occurrences of his life are punctually predetermined, ordered, and brought to pass by the same.

As every man brings into the World with him a certain Pro∣lepticall, or Anticipated Cognition of a Deity, or First Cause * 1.140 of all things, deeply and indelebly stamp'd upon his mind; as hath bin formerly demonstrated: so also holds he, as an Adjunct, or rather a part thereof, a coessentiall Prenotion, that this First Cause, or Supreme Nature, is the Fountain from whence those two different streams of Happiness and Misery, or Good and Evil, the former by Condonation, the other by Permission, are constantly derived: and upon consequence, that all Occurrences of his life, are the just and prudent Designations of its special Providence.

That every man, in whom the Light of Nature is not damp't by Fatuity, either native and temperamental, or casually superve∣nient, hath this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or impress of an especial Providence, de∣creeing and disposing all events, that have, do, or shall befall him; is manifest from hence, that no man, though educated in the wil∣dest ignorance, or highest barbarisme imaginable, but was natural∣ly, and by the advisoes of his intestine Dictator, inclined either to conceive, or imbrace some kind of Religion, as an homage or fealty due from him to that Supreme Power, in whose hands he apprehended the rains of Good and Evil to be held, and whose favour and benigne aspect he thought procurable, and anger at∣toneable by the seasonable addresses of Invocation and Sacrifice.

And in truth, to him, whose meditations shall sink deep e∣nough, it will soon appear, that this Anticipation is the very root of * 1.141 Religion; for though man stood fully perswaded of the Exi∣stence of God, yet would not that alone be argument sufficient to convince him into the necessity of a devout Adoration of him, unless his mind were also possessed with a firme beleif of this pro∣per Attribute of his Nature, which so neerly concerns his felicity or infelicity, viz. his special Providence, which regulates all the affaires, and appoints all the Contingencies of every individual

mans life. For tis the sense of our own Defects, Imperfections, and Dependency, that first leads us to the knowledg of his All suffi∣ciency, Perfections, and Self-subsistence; the apprehension of our Necessities, is the school wherein we first learned our Orizons, and the hope of obtaining Blessings from his immense Bounty, is both the excitement and encouragement of our Devotion: and therefore the Devil spake profoundly and to the purpose, in his expostulation with God concerning the cause of Iobs integrity, Doth Iob serve God for nought? This being duely perpended, I hope I shall not offend Theology, if I affirme, that since to love God aright, is to love him purely and solely because he is God, i. e. all that's truely Good and Amiable; tis impossible for the soul of man, in this life, to love God as she ought to doe: because impossible for her, before her refinement by Glorification, so to cast off all self-interest, as to love him without reflexions upon her self, i. e. without the hopes of being made eternally happy by that love. If this reason bear not out my paradox, I dare any man to the bar of Experience, and boldly appeal to the Conscience of any the most mortified Christian, whether in his most pure, abstracted, and holy raptures of Divine love, he did not always perceive a considerable mixture, and weighty alloy of Ipseity or Selfness.

That the Concession of an Especial Providence in the Supreme Being, whereby he constantly moderateth and disposeth the ope∣rations and products of Second Causes for the induction of Good on the heads of those, whose Virtuous inclinations may, in some latitude of Worthyness, seem to prepare and qualify them for the gratefull Acceptance, and genuine use thereof; and of Evil on those whose Vitiosities and habitual Depravities seem, by the im∣portunity or violence of demerit, to extort it from the Iustice of his Indignation: that this inbred perswasion, I say, is the spark, at which all the Tapors of Religion were first kindled, the very Ethnicks themselves, while groping in the Chaos of Idolatry, have long since discovered. Witness their Magnificent Temples, cost∣ly Hecatombs, human Holocausts, and frequent solemne Invoca∣tions; all which kinds of addresses they generally made use of, and obliged themselves unto, as the only hopefull means as well to atone the displeasure, as conciliate the favour of that Power,

in whose hands they conceived the book of Fate to be kept, and who had the Gardianship of Administration of the Fortunes not only of Cities, nations, and families, but even of every individual Person. Witness also, that Glorious Pagan, Cicero, who deriving the pedegree of Religion, fathers it immediately upon the perswa∣sion of an Especial Providence, (1. de nat. Deor.) in these words; Sunt Philosophi, & fuerunt, qui omnino nullam habere censerent humanarum rerum procurationem Deos. Quorum si vera est sententia, quae potest esse Pietas? quae Religio? Haec enim omnia purè ac castè tribuenda Deorum numini it a sunt, si animadver∣tuntur ab his, & si est aliquid à Diis immortalibus hominum generi tributum. Sin autem Dii neque possunt, nec volunt nos juvare, ncc curant omnino, nec quid agamus animadvertant, nec est quod ab his ad hominum vitam permanare possit: quid est, quod ullos Diis immortalibus cultus, honores, preces adhibeamus? In specie autem sictae simulationis, sicut reliquae virtutes, it a pie∣tas inesse non potest, cum qua simul & sanctitatem, & religionem rolli necesse est. Quibus sublatis, perturbatio vitae sequitur, & magna confusio.

That no man ever entred upon the theatre of the World, but * 1.142 he acted some one Religious part, bringing along with him an irresistible propension to revere and adore that Nature, which he conceived superior to his own, and all others; cannot be obscure to any, whom either Peregrinations, or Books have acquainted with the religious Customes and practises of forreign Nations, either Ancient or Modern. For read we the voluminous mo∣numents of Antiquity, erected by the noble industry of Herodo∣tus, Diodorus, Strabo, Ptolome, Mela, Pliny, Solinus, Iustine, and other senior Historiographers; read we Munster's Cosmo∣graphy, Ortelius his Theatrum Orbis, the Histories of Brasile, written by the judicious pens of Guilelm. Piso, the Hollander and Physician to the States Fleet, of Georg. Marcgravus the Ger∣man, and Iohan. de Laet of Antwerp; and in our Mother tongue, Grimstones Estates and Empires, Purchas his Pilgri∣mage (a work that speaks its venerable Compiler, to have bin a man of many Languages, indefatigable study, vast readings,

large rhapsodies, and strong judgement,) Hackluit's Collection of English Voyages, the several Descriptions of America, toge∣ther with the manners of its various Inhabitants; and other Works of the Neotericks (in all which we find not only the Chorography and Topography, but also the faithfull Morogra∣phy of all the known parts of the World) I say, read we all these, and we shall find them unanimously positive in this point, That there is no Nation but hath its Religion. And therefore, with Arnobius (lib. 1. contr. Gent. pag. 476.) I am bold to demand of the whole world; Quisquamne est hominum, qui non cum istius Principis notione, diem primae nativitatis intra∣verit? Cui non sit ingenitum, imo affixum, & pene in genita∣libus matris non impressum, non insitum; esse Regem ac Domi∣num cunctorum, quaecunque sunt, Moderatorem?

If any shall pull me by the eare, and here object out of Strabo (lib. 13. pag. 382.) that the Calaici, a rude and savage people * 1.143 of old Spain, were absolute Atheists, and worshiped no Gods at all; I answer, that Strabo wrote this particular with no more authenticall a quill, but what he sound drop't from the wings of Fame, himself insinuating as much: for his words are, Calai••is Deum nullum esse, quidam ajunt; there is a certain rumor, or traditional report, raised, dispersed and authorized, where, when, upon what grounds, or by whom, I know not, that the Calaici had no religion among them. And if a quidam sic ajunt, be proof enough to ratifie any historicall position, or assertion; then may Fame aspire to the throne of Truth, Fables become Histories, and strangers may beleive that we Christians are the most abso∣lute Atheists. For Caecilius hath reported of us, that we doe & templa despicere, & Deos despuere: both despise the temples, and despite the Gods; as Arnobius (lib. 8. cont. Gent. pag. 748.) hath informed us. * 1.144

Nor I have forgotten, that the two fierce Nations, the Massa∣getae and Scythians, (whose rudeness and want of Civility, the indiscretion or severity of some hath aggravated into an Atheisti∣cal Barbarisme, and want of all Religion) have bin stigmatiz'd

with the same infamous brand; and therefore to anticipate this exception, I refer the doubting Reader to the testimonies of He∣rodotus and Lucian▪ the former (lib. 4. pag. 278. & 279.) at large expunging that fabulous aspersion, and proving them strict, solemne, and ceremonious Votaries to all the Gods of Greece: the latter (lib. de sacrificiis. p. 57.) deriding them for their superstition, nay such immoderate and frantique zeal, to∣wards the honour of their principal Deity, Diana, as made them embrace the slames, and offer themselves as holocausts unto her.

Moreover, as this inoppugnable propensity to Religion is a * 1.145 Cyence of Gods own ingraffing on the mind of man; so also is it not in the power of any man, though assisted by all the stratagems and legions of Hell, totally to eradicate it thence.

This is a truth confirmed by the Experience of all Ages. For, notwithstanding the insolent pretences, and blasphemous Rhodo∣montadoes of many miscreants, who have gloried in the most exe∣crable cognomen of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and studied to advance their names to the highest pinacle of Fame, by being accounted men of such absolute and fearless Spirits, as that they scorned to own any Being superior to their own, to which they should be accoun∣table for their actions: yet have they bin compelled (so violent are the secret touches of that hand, which converts all things in∣to demostrations of his own Glory) either by the scourge of some sharp calamity, or the rack of some excruciating disease, in their lives, to recant; or at the neer approach of that King of terrors, Death, to confess this their horrid impiety.

Thus the proud and Adamant-hearted Pharaoh, who deri∣ding * 1.146 the Divine Embassy of Moses, in an imperious strain of Sc••rn, and expostulatory bravado, demanded of him; Quis est Jehovah, cujus voci auscultem, dimittendo Israelem? non no∣vi Jehovam, &c. did yet, when the Violentum of Divine Ven∣geance by heavy judgements had convinced him; when the true and real Miracles of Moses had won the garland from those weak Delusions and prestigious impostures of his Magicians, and he beheld their black Art fooled in their vain attempts to

imitate Moses in the visible transformation of Dust into Lice; when the tangible darknes•• that benegroed the horizon of Aegypt, and so made it more then midnight to the eye of his body, had illuminated that of his Soul; and when the frozen Granadoes of the clouds had broke open the iron door of his Conscience; then sends he post for those, whom he had barbarously exiled from his presence, humbles himself before them, and howles out this Palinodia; Peccavi hac vice: Jehovah justissimus, ego ve∣ro & populus meus sumus improbissimi.

Thus Herod Agrippa, who, in the morne, to enhance the estimate of majesty, and stroke that vertiginous and admiring * 1.147 beast, the multitude, had arrayed him in his brightest ornaments of State, thickly imbrodered with plates of Oriental Gold, and studded with Diamonds and all other resplendent Gemms, so that the incident Sun beams seemed to have acquired a greater lustre by reflexion from him, and who by the blast of popular Euges had the wings of his Pride fanned up to so sublime a pitch, that he lost sight of his own Humanity, and vainly conceived the adulatory Hyperbole of his Auditors to be but their just ac∣knowledgement of his Divinity: being wounded by the invisible sword of a revenging Angel, before Sun set, by a fatal experi∣ment confuted both his own and his flatterers blasphemy, and with the hoarse groans of a tortured wretch, cryed out; En ille Ego, vestra appellatione Deus, vitam relinquere jubeor; fatali necessitate mendacium vestrum coarguente: & quem immor∣talem salutastis, ad mortem rapior. Sed ferenda est voluntas coe∣lestis Numinis. (Joseph. 19. Antiquit. p. 565.)

Thus that real Lycaon, Antiochus Epiphanes, who had not only denied, but being enraged by a malitious Phrensy beyond * 1.148 that of Lucifer newly degraded, publickly despited and reviled the Almighty Patron of the Jews, blasphemed his most sacred name, demolished his temples, profaned his consecrated Uten∣sils, violated his religious institutions, and persecuted his wor∣shipers with all the most bloody cruelties, that the wit of an exal∣ted malice could invent, or inflict: being put upon the rack of a

sore and mortal disease (which some have conjectured, and not without good warrant from probability, to have bin a Cancer in his bowells, introduced mediately by Divine Justice, immediate∣ly ••y a fix't melancholy generated by the uncessant stings and convulsions of his guilty Conscience, as by its procatarctick▪ Cause,) and despairing of any case or cure but from his injured enemy, God; he sighes out his Confession. The sleep is gon from my eyes, and my heart faileth for very Care. And I thought with my self, into what tribulation am I come, and how great a sloud of misery is it, wherein I now am? But now I remember the evills that I did at Jerusalem, and that I took all the vessels of Gold and Silver that were therein, and sent to destroy the in∣habitants without a Cause. I perceive therefore, that for this cause, these troubles are come upon me &c. It is meet to be subject unto God, and that a man who is mortal, should not think himself equal unto God through pride. (Maccab. 1. chap. 6. vers. 9, 10, 11.)

Thus the Giant Emperour, Maximinus, as insatiate a * 1.149 Blood-hound to the Christians, as Antiochus had bin to the Jews, novorum suppliciorum inventione sese insolenter efferens, boa∣sting the acuteness of his wit by the invention of new ways of tortures for those patient martyrs, as Eusebius (lib. 1. de vita Constant. cap. 51.) hath described him; and advancing the Ro∣man Eagle in desiance of those who fought under the sanguine standard of the Cross; nay so infatuated with the confidence of his own Greatness and personal strength, that he entertained a con∣ceit, that Death durst not adventure to encounter him, for feare of having his javelin broke about his own crazy skull, and all his skeleton of bones rattled to dust, as Capitolinus tell us: not∣withstanding when he felt himself invaded with a Verminous Ʋl∣cer, or Fistula, in mediis corporis arcanis, which did letificum foetorem exhalare, ut medicorum aliqui incredibilem foetorem fer∣re non valentes, occiderentur, evaporate so contagious and pe∣stilential a stench, that some of his Physicians, not able to endure that mephitis or steam of intense corruption, fell down dead; and understood the same to be supplicium Divinitus illatum, ajudge∣ment

sent from God to retaliate upon him those tortures, which he had caused in the bowells and secret parts of many innocents; then did his flinty heart melt within him, and tandem sentire coe∣pit, quae contra pios Dei cultores impiè gesserat, & haec se pro∣pter insaniam contra Christum praesumptam, merito & ultionis vice, perpeti confessus est, and in the midst of these confessions of his own Guilt, and Gods justice, breathed out his execrable soul from a gangrenous and loathsome body. (Eusebius, lib. 8. Histor. Eccles. cap. 17.)

Thus also that notorious Apostate, Julian, who had not on∣ly renounced the faith of Christ, but proclaimed open and im∣placable * 1.150 hostility against him, and to quench the thirst of his diabolical malice, drank whole Tuns of the pretious blood of his Members; being defeated and mortally wounded in a battaile fought against the Persians: he instantly learned of his awaked Conscience, that the Cause of his present overthrow was his former impiety, and rightly ascribing the Victory to the revenging finger of that God, whose Divinity he had abjured, rather then to the arme of flesh, he threw up his blood into the aer, and together with his black Soul, gasped out this desperate ejaculation; Vicisti Galilaee, vicisti! Thou hast overcome me, oh! thou Jesus of Galile, thou hast overcome me: simul confessus & victoriam, & blasphemiam, at once confessing both Christs conquest and his own detestable blasphemy; as Theodoret (lib. 3. Histor. Eccles. cap. 20.) hath descanted upon those his last (but truest) words.

And thus also Tullus Hostilius (a Cognomen exactly ac∣commodated * 1.151 to his fierce nature,) immediate successor to Numa Pompilius in his throne, though not in his mansuete and pious inclinations; being a man of so rough and martial a temper, that he held Religion to be but a kind of Emollient Cataplasme, prescribed by State Policy to soften and emasculate the minds of men, as Plutarch (in vita Numae pag. 158.) hath noted of him; and thereupon in his prosperity neither acknowledging, nor sacrificing unto any Deity, but his Ferreus Acinaces, or old sword: when cast upon the thorny bed of sickness, he soon

discovered, retracted, and renounced his Atheisme. (which re∣markable mutation of his judgement, Livie (lib. 1. pag. 12.) hath both amply and elegantly described thus, Adeo fracti simul cum corpore sunt spiritus illi seroces, ut qui nihil antea ratus esset minus regium, quam sacris dedere animum; repente om∣nibus magnis parvisque superstitionibus obnoxius degeret, reli∣gionibusque populum impleret. I sayd Mutation of his judge∣ment, not Rectification; nor can I properly allow him so much: since he that runs from one extreme of Atheisme to the other of Polytheisme, shall find himself in the same point of Error, from whence he set forth. For to beleive, that there are more Gods then one, in strictness of truth is to beleive there is none at all; Ʋnity being the essential and inseparable Attribute of the Deity. And therefore we may allow him to have bin superstitious, but never truely religious. Nor did the Judge of all hearts accept of this Change for a Conversion; for the records both of Livy and Eutropius concur in this; Fulmine ictus, cum tota domo sua, con∣flagravit: he, his house, and family were consumed by Light∣ning. A punishment so proportionate to the rules of Divine Justice, that we may therein give a faire conjecture of his guilt: and that which all Atheists have stood convulst at.

Hi sunt, qui trepidant, & ad omnia fulgura pallent, Cum tonat, exanimes, primo quoque murmure coeli. * 1.152

Such Villains quake at Thunder, and each flash Of Lightning doth their Souls with Terror quash.

A like example of the impossibility of extinguishing this spark of Religion, which the Creator hath kindled in the breast of * 1.153 every man, doth Diogenes Laertius afford us (in vit. Bionis) in the recantation of Bion of Borysthenes. Who continuing (or ra∣ther only pretending to continue) in profest Atheisme, till he was arrested by sickness, that rough Serjeant of Death, and then af∣frighed into an acknowledgement of that truth, he had so long stisled: inductus est poenitentiam agere super iis, quae peccarat in Doum, was induced to become a penitentiary for those offences he had prepetrated against the sacred majesty of God.

To conclude therefore; as Lucilius sayd of Homer, Nemo qui culpat Homerum, perpetuo culpat; so may we more truely say of God, Nemo qui Deum negat, perpetuo negat, no man who denys God, doth constantly deny him. For all men have confuted, disavowed, or repented that impiety at or before their death, which they seemed with so much impudence and pride, to cherish in their lives. This the sweet-tongued Tertullian (Apolog. cap. 17.) profoundly observed, when he distilled the quintessence or spirit of all we have sayd, concerning this asserti∣on, into this short sentence: Anima, licet carcere corporis pressa, licet institutionibus pravis circumscripta, licet libidinibus & concupiscentiis evigorata, licet falsis Diis exancillata, cum tamen resipiscit, ut ex crapula, ut ex somno, ut ex aliqua vale∣tudine, & sanitatem suam patitur, Deum nominat.

I shall not gainsay, but that tis possible (I am sorry, I might * 1.154 have sayd, too frequent) to have this ingravement of Divinity on the mind of man, obscured, and buried under the dust raised in the summer of Prosperity; for as Lactantius (lib. 2. cap. 1.) most solidly, tum maxime Deus ex hominum memoria elabitur, cum benesiciis ejus fruentes honorem dare Divinae indulgentiae deberent, men are then most prone to forget God, when being sated with the accumulations of his immense bounty, they have the greatest reason to remember him: yet I shall confidently affirme, that the least gust of Affliction, in the winter of Adver∣sity, soon blows that dust off again, and renders the Characters faire and legible to the first reflexive or inward glance of the soul. Si qua enim necessitas gravis presserit, tum demum recordan∣tur; si belli terror infremuerit, si alimenta frugibus longa siccitas denegaverit, si saeva tempestas, si grando ingruerit: ad Deum protinus confugiunt, à Deo petitur auxilium, Deus, ut subveniat, oratur; si quis in mari vento saeviente jacta∣tur, hunc invocat; si quis aliqua vi afflictatur, hunc pro∣tinus implorat, &c. as the same Lactantius.

Now to abstract all this to a smaller bulk, such as may be no * 1.155 burthen to the weakest memory, and reduce our Argument in∣to a sharper point, so that it may, with the greater facility, sink into the thickest skull; If Religion be a Plant radicated in the soul of man, so deeply and firmely, that though the damp of a barbarous education may for a while retard, or the rankness of those Weeds of Sensuality, the Honours and Delights of this World, conceal the germination of it: yet will it, at some time or other, early or late, and always in the Winter of Calamity, shoot up and bud forth into an absolute Demonstration of the dependence of our Happiness and Misery on the Will of the Su∣preme Being: and if the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or full Perswasion of an Especial Providence, as a relative Attribute of the Supreme Be∣ing, whereby all the various Occurrences of every individual mans life are predetermined and disposed, bee the Seed from whence this Plant of Religion hath its root; both which Propo∣sitions we conceive sufficiently proved: then doe not I see, how the subtilest Wit can evade the rigour of the Inference, or Conclusion, viz. That all the affaires of man are regulated by the Special Providence of God.

SECT. III.

THus far have we Demostrated the Necessity of Gods Speci∣al * 1.156 Providence; and our next business is to remove those Rocks cast up by the Pioners of Satan, to obstruct the Current of mans cleare and full beleif thereof.

As for the First, Deum neque ira, neque gratia tangi; this may without much difficulty be dejected, by answering, that it can no way infringe the Immutability or constant Sameness of the Divine Nature, to affirme it to be capable of Anger and Placability: provided that we understand neither of these as a

Passion, but (as the Schoolemen precisely speak) in effectu exe∣quutionem, potius quàm in Affectu perturbationem, rather an execution in Effect, then a Perturbation in Affect. As for An∣ger; if a Wise-man can so conserve the serenity and tranquillity of his mind, as to chastise or severely punish his disobedient servant, without any passion or internal commotion at all: 'tis very hard, if God, the Fountain of Wisdome, cannot be ad∣mitted to conserve the constant and immutable peace or calme of his Beatitude, when he punisheth the improbous actions of men. For Justice is a virtue, which to speak strictly, cannot frown, which abhor's the society of a Passion, and only actuates the mind into a noble and commendable Zeal, not an illiberall or rough Perturbation. And upon the consideration of this was it, that the first Preservers of Equity, knowing it not to be impossible for the breast of a Magistrate to be inflamed, beyond this mo∣derate heat, into an excess of Indignation against a Malefactor; therefore wisely provided, that the Judge should square his Sentence by the direct and impartial rule of the Law; which some Civilians have therefore wittily defined to be Ira sedata, Anger without Choler, Indignation refracted, or the sword of Vengeance put in the hand of Mercy. As for the Contrary to Anger, viz. Grace, or Placability; why this also may not be adscribed to God, as fully consistent to the Eternal plenitude and immu tability of the Divine Beatitude, I cannot understand: provided that we accept it absque gestiente laetitia, and as an effect infinitely remote from that kind of Passionate Joy, which tickles the heart of man into a suddain paroxysme of delight, upon the apprehension of a gratefull and pleasing Object, either in the anticipation of Hope, or actual fruition. The Reason is the im∣mense Goodness of his Nature, which being in perpetual Effusion, without possibility of exhaustion, or an Ocean that replenisheth all things with Amability, yet suffers no diminution of its own fulness; doth more then incline him to be pleased with, or ac∣cept of as gratefull, that in man, which is originally but an Ex∣tract of his own Delightfulness, or himself gratefully returned to himself by reflexion from us. This the Schoolemen most ju∣diciously pondered, when they establisht as Canonical, Deum

exercere gratiam, ea naturae sinceritate, qua Bonus est. Nor are we to deny this Placency or Delight to God, since it is so far from infringing this constant and equall tenor of his essential Felicity, that in some sort it mainly conduceth to the Conser∣vation thereof; insomuch as to be uncessantly exercised in a liberal Benefaction to other Natures, is to doe what is most con∣sentaneous and genuine to the swindge or Verticity of his own: and so to do, all men, doubtless, will allow to be the highest and most permanent Delight in the World.

Nor is it a legal process in the common Pleas of Reason, to argue thus; God hath left us to act our own parts, in the world, therefore he takes no farther care of us, and therefore all the Occurrences of our lives are either the necessary subsequents, or collaterall Adjuncts of our own either natural, or moral Acti∣ons: for though it be most true, that he hath endowed us with an absolute Freedom of our Wills (an evidence of his exceeding Grace and Benignity,) and that, indeed, which supports the ne∣cessity of our Rationality; for if our Wills were subject to com∣pulsion, undoubtedly we should have little or no use at all of our Reason, since then our Objects would be both judged of and elected to our hands) and so permitted us the enjoyment of our own intire liberty: yet hath he, out of a compassionate preno∣tion of the Deceptibility of our judgement, prescribed us rules, whereby our Ʋnderstanding may be directed in the selection of Good, and devitation of evill.

To speak more expresly; he hath set on our right hand real and true Good, on our left only specious and apparent: the Ele∣ction of either is dependent on our Will, our Will is guided by our Iudgement, and our Iudgement is the Determination or resolve of our Intellect (for, without dispute, though common Physio∣logy hath founded this Liberty on the indifferency of the Will; yet is it radicated in the indifferency of the Intellect, or Cogno∣scent Faculty, primarily, and in the Will only secondarily, inso∣much as that ever follows the manuduction of the Intellect,) but yet that he might in a manner direct us in our choyce, he hath annexed Happiness as a reward to invite us to the one, and Misery as a punishment to deter us from the other: and therefore

tis manifest, that God wills the felicity of all men, more then themselves can desire it.

And hence comes it to be a truth, that on one side Fortune (respectu nostri) frequently puts in for a share in the playing of our Cards; but yet still the Special Providence of God super∣vises her hand, and manageth the whole game: and on the other, that our own Prudence doth many times conduce to our winning of the stake; but yet still 'twas the Goodness of God that gave us that Prudence, and takes great delight to see us use it, as we ought to do, to our own advantage.

Doth he so, sayth the Atheist, how comes it about then, that * 1.157 he frequently turnes a deaf eare to our most earnest Prayers, and but rarely grants our Petitions? For how few barren wombs have bin cured of their sterility, by the fumes of sacrifices? and how few Mariners preserved from naufrage, by the appension of their Votive tables? or who hath observed such holy magick in the perishing Seamans pious sighes, as to have husht the dread∣full scolding of the waves and winds? For answer let us re∣turn,

That the most indulgent Father doth not always condescend to the importunate desires of his child: that as well Pious, as Impious men may be included in the same ship, that's banded up and down by the wanton Billows of the Sea; that the Good may be lost, and the Bad escape the fury of the tempest: and all this consist both with the Goodness and righteous Providence of God. The Reason in brief (for the full solution of this Pa∣rallaxis of Iustice doth more properly belong to our refutation of the last Objection, concerning the apparent Prosperity of the Vitious, and the calamitous condition of the Virtuous, in this life) is this; God in his Wisdome knows our real necessities, and understands what's most convenient for us. This the acute Saty∣rist handsomly expresseth thus;

—Si Consilium vis, * 1.158 Permittes ipsis expendere Numinibus, quid Conveniat nobis rebusque sit utile nostris: Nam pro jucundis aptissima quaeque dabunt Dii.

Carior est illis Homo, quàm sibi. Nos animorum Impulsu, & magna, caecaque cupidine ducti Conjugium petimus, partumque Ʋxoris, at illi Norunt qui Pueri, qualisque futura sit Ʋxor. &c.

Would'st be advis'd to choose the best? refer That choyce unto the Gods, who cannot err. For better then our selves our wants they know: And will true joys, for false delights, bestow. Their love to us transcends our own By blind Affections spur'd, and fury of the mind, We Wife and Sons desire; the Gods above Know what that Wife, and how those Sons will prove.

As for the second Rock, Cur si Deus omnia hominum caussa * 1.159 fecerit, etiam multa contraria, imò & pestisera nobis reperian∣tur, tam in mari quàm in terra? this also may easily be remo∣ved, by digesting our meditations into this short reply.

The Creator, having formed the machine of mans body in∣to a Figure fit to receive the majestick charagme of Divinity, as the last act of his hand, and the accompletion of his most ex∣quisite Artifice, breathed into him a Wise, intelligent, or cogno∣scent Soul; that by the transcendent operations thereof, man might justly intitle himself to the Empire of the Creatures, sub∣jugate them to the dominion of his unconfined Will, and accom∣modate all things either to the reliefe of his Necessities, or the promotion of his Delights. This done, he set before him Good and Evill; and this upon the highest reason: because he had en∣dowed him with Sapience, whose basis is founded in the actual discernement of those two Contraries For no man can make an election of the Better, and know what's really Good, unless at the same time he know also what's really Evill, and how to re∣ject and avoyd the Worse. Those two objects, though absolute Contraries, are yet perfect Relatives; though irreconcileable Enemies, are yet cosubsistent Twins, and live so connexed hand in hand, that the ablation of the one necessitates the ablation of the other. Good and Evill therefore being thus blended together,

and in this miscellany proposed to man; then begins that Criterion, Wisdome to exercise its Faculties, display its discretive energy, and immediately exploring the difference, affects the Good sor Ʋtility, but rejects the Evill for Safety. As therefore there are innumerable Goods offered to the judgement of man, which he may with happiness enjoy; so also are there as many Evills, which he may with caution abhor. For if there were nothing evill, nothing dangerous, in short, nothing hurtfull to man; pray, what stead could his Reason stand him in? And hence is it manifest, that whoever strikes at the necessity of Evill, at the same time cuts off the necessity of Wisdome, and downright adnulls the use of the Intellect: since if God had created no∣thing that might prove noxious to man, to what purpose would his Cogitation, Intellect, Science and Reason have served? For then to what object soever he had extended his hand, though at adventure; yet would that have bin by nature fit and com∣modious for him.

To illustrate this by a familiar, yet in all points respondent * 1.160 Example; if any man make a feast for a company of Infants, and prepare a liberal table of many both pleasant and wholsom meats for them; though they are not wise enough to make their own choyce, by rational judgement, but pursue the inclination of their Sensual Appetite: yet can they not choose amiss, all things good and gratefull being praeelected to their hands. And if so, of what disadvantage is their Ignorance, or of what ad∣vantage could their Intelligence, were they arrived at so much maturity, be unto them? Truely, none at all; for as they could know no want of the one, so could they receive no damage by the continuation of the other. But if among those many pleasant and nutritive dishes the master should mingle as many either bitter and distastfull, or poysonous; then doubtless must the greedy Wretches be deceived through their ignorance of Good and Evill, unless Wisdome step in to their protection, and informe them what is safe, and what destructive, and so direct them in the Delection of the one and Refusall of the other. Now clearly the Case is the same, in all particulars, twixt God and Man, as to

the point of Good and Evill: and therefore we may conclude, with Lactantius; Propter mala opus nobis esse sapientia, quae nisi fuissent proposita, rationale Animal non essemus: had there bin no evill for man to avoyd, he never had bin endowed with a rational Soul.

The last, and greatest Rock, upon whose shelves Myriads * 1.161 have bin split and shipwrackt in their judgements, our memory tells us is this; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; Qua ratione, si curae Deo res humanae sunt, malis est benè, & bonis malè?

This, I confess, to the first and supersicial survey of my medi∣tations, appeared montainous and flinty, and such as might re∣quire both a larger Current of acuteness to dissolve it, then what runs in the shallow chanel of my braines; and a greater strength of Argument to dislodge and crane it up piece aster piece, then the lax and feeble nerves of my Reason could afford: but to my second and penetrating thoughts, it discovered it self to be, like those objects we look upon through the magnifying glass of Fear, great only at a distance, and devoyd of all Solidity, nay in reality no more then a heap of mud heaved up by the back of that subterraneous Mole, the Devil. For though Ex∣perience assures us, that this field of the World hath a strange and preposterous soyle, wherein Weeds most commonly prosper, and usefull Plants wither: yet a profound scrutiny into the bu∣siness, shall soon detect, that there is an admirable Providence in the distribution of Good and Evill, or Prosperity and Adversity.

First therefore, let us seriously examine the inside of those Good things, that are showred down on the laps of Evill men, and make their tides of Fortune high and smooth; while the streams of Good mens lives seem to run low, sink down to the lowest ebbs, and are constantly ruffled by the contrary gusts of Afflicti∣ons. Certain it is, that nothing can be affirmed to be really Good, but only Virtue, or at least that, which being contempered, impregnated and qualifyed by Virtue, doth positively conduce to our Well-being: and as certain it is, that Evill men want

this Ʋniversal Ferment, or Elixir, Virtue, which only hath a power to convert all things into Good; and therefore cannot they either receive, or use those things called the Goods of For∣tune, with that temper and moderation of mind, which is requi∣site to the perfect assimilation of them into their well-being; and upon consequence, those abused Goods instantly alter their Property, and degenerate into Evils, Vice, like a depraved stomach, having a power to corrupt the best things into the worst. And this the reason is, why those Blessings, which the bounty of Providence hath ordained for our refreshment and consolation in this tedious pilgrimage on earth, and furtherances or contributions towards our easier purchase of immarcescible Felicity in heaven, when Death shall have evacuated our Faith; such as Vigor, health, and beauty of Body, ingenuity of disposi∣tion, longevity, multitude of Friends, equality in marriage, fer∣tility of issue, education in civility and learning, science, wealth, nobility of blood, absoluteness in power and government, &c. when they come into the polluting hands of Vitious men, they instantly suffer a total castration of their Goodness, a depravation of their benignity, and putrify into perfect Curses: the posses∣sion of them raising uncessant tempests and distracting storms of Passions in the obnubilated region of their minds; nor permit∣ting that comfortable sun of true Content to shine clearly forth, and make one faire day, during their whole lives.

For though the Mole-eyed multitude, whose sight is always terminated in the gawdy outsight, admire even to envy the lustre of splendid Vice, cry up the happiness of wealth, and beleive that the Rich man, though nere so unjust and sinfull, doth every mo∣ment surfeit with variety of Delights: yet if his Conscience were strictly examined, twould soon confess, that all his luxurious Viands are but Pils of Coloqyntida nearly gilded, or Apples of Sodom, whose Vermilian rind doth emulate the blushes of Aurora, but are within nothing but sulphureous dust; that his magnificent Buildings are but a more strong and spatious Prison; his nu∣merous Attendants, but so many plummets superadded to that oppressing weight of cares, which keeps his mind in the perpetual motion of inquietude; his troop of Adulators, but a swarme of

hungry Fleas that molest him by sucking, or a nest of Tarantu∣la's, whose titillations prove venenate and poyson his sobriety into a phrensy of deadly jollity; that his bed of down growes every night more full of thorns; that his baggs of treasure, like the massy statue of Jupiter on the Asse's back, oppress and gall him; in short, that he never tasted any one sincere and limpid drop of pleasure in his life.

And this one truth brancheth it self into the manifestation of two others;

First, that those golden showers which Providence raineth into the bosomes of Vitious men, are no more then Bona fucata, re∣al Evils couched under the specious hatchment of apparent Goods; fruit whose Cortex is sweet and beautifull, but Kernels full of amaritude and loathsom venom; and all the magnified presents of Fortune, like Pandora's Box, have glorious outsides, but contain millions of infections and pestilential Evils.

Secondly, that the Possessors of them, by reason of the exorbi∣tances, and habitual depravities of their minds, seem uncapable and therefore, in the judgement of the Supreme Wisdome, abso∣lutely unworthy of more solid and substantial Goods; Provi∣dence dealing with these, as a Wise General with Cowards, who are assigned to the sordid offices of common Sutlers, and Baggage-Carriers, while the generous and heroical are appointed to Arms, difficulties, and encounters. Cum videris bonos acceptosque Diis viros, laborare, sudare, per arduum ascendere; malos autem lascivientes & voluptatibus fluere: Cogita, filiorum nos mo∣destia delectari, Vernularum licentia; illos disciplina tristiori cotineri, horum ali audaciam. Idem tibi de Deo liqueat, bonuno virum in deliciis non habet; experitur, indurat, sibi illum prae∣parat. Seneca (de Providentia.)

Nay, more then all this, should we grant that the Cornu Co∣pia, or affluence of the Goods of Fortune makes one step, or gradation in the ascent to the Palace of Temporal Happiness: yet can we not infer, that Vitious men are therefore neerer to the top, then those indigent and tatterd Lazarusse's, that ly groveling below, because they are mounted thereon; since, as Iamblicus (in Protrept.) hath most prudently observed, Malice ever drinks

the greatest part of her own poyson; since the continually excru∣ciating torture, resulting from the sense of their own impiety, ten times more dejects them, towards the abyss of misery, then the fruition of those goods can advance them; since that sharp∣beaked Vultur, an Evil Conscience, never ceaseth day nor night to dilacerate their hearts, but racks them into a most severe con∣demnation of themselves, which doubtless is the keenest arrow in the quiver of Divine Revenge, and that affliction which best de∣fines the terrible essence of Hell.

To all which we may justly superadd this, that the brightest and longest days of Fortune have ever closed in the blackest and most tragical nights of Sorrow; that the Plays of Libertines have always proved Come-tragedies, and their pompous Masks finished in dismal Catastrophes; nor can the records of the whole world produce one Example of Sinfull Greatness, that hath not, either before, or at his eternal Adieu, by woefull experi∣ment manifested the truth of this maxime; That none can ever arrive at the Elizium of true Felicity, who constantly pursue it through the gardens of Sensuality: that the Rose of happiness grows on the prickly stem of Virtue: and that the just discharge of our duties to God and Man, in all things, to the utmost of our abilities, is the only means of acquiring that Philosophers stone, Content, the only Summum Bonum in nature.

Lastly, as to that seeming 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 that the hand of Gods Bounty is observed to be extended early and long on the heads * 1.162 of Impious men; but, on the contrary, that of Justice either late, or not at all, in this life: though we grant the Question, yet shall we soon salve the scruple, by considering, that his Providence observes this method, for two important Reasons: First in re∣spect of themselves, and Secondly in respect of the Virtuous. (1.) Of themselves; God, in order to the manifestation of his infinite Goodness, therefore conferr's a plentifull portion of his benefits upon them, that by the blandishments of their sense he might allure them to a desire of those delights, whose pleasantness consists in this, that they infinitely transcend the apprehension of Sense; and that the fragrant odor of his temporal Mercies

might attract their minds to the affectation of Virtue, and thence lead their thoughts on to a gratefull and reverentiall Contempla∣tion of him, that both made them out of nothing, and bestowed them freely, upon no motive of worthiness in the receivers: and in order to the manifestation of his Longanimity, and Clemency, he therefore suspends their punishment, ut tempus habeant, quo in se descendant, atque resipiscant, as the holy Father expresseth it, that they may have both time enough to discover, and opportu∣nities to repent and reforme their heynous enormities. (2.) Of the Virtuous, in a threefold respect; first, that he might become an Exemplar of mansuetude, patience, and longsuffering to them; secondly, that the tyranny and oppression of Ungodly men might serve to actuate and exercise those Virtues in them which other∣wise had wanted an opportunity to display their Soveraign and all-conquering efficacy: and thirdly, that they might extract to themselves a Cordial out of the poysonous Fate of others: i. e. when they shall observe those, who dayly bathed themselves in rivers of Voluptuousness, to be by Divine revenge on a suddain precipitated into the black Sea of misery, they may recruite their Confidence, that the same Justice will, in his own appointed time, more then compensate their momentany objections, and convert their night of obscurity and trouble into a glorious day of inter∣minable Delectation.

Having thus precisely dissected the Apparent Good, which Di∣vine * 1.163 Providence allots to Evil men, as their portion to this life; and found it to be, as painted fire, bright but comfortless, or such at best, whose Abuse aggravates the Guilt, and upon consequence, the misery of the receivers: it will no less conduce to the recti∣fication of our distorted judgements, and so to the cure of our de∣praved Affections, to anatomize also the other Ventricle in the heart of the objection, viz. the Apparent Evil frequently assig∣ned to Good men.

If Felicity be the Daughter of Virtue, as the Philosopher most judiciously, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, perfectae virtutis actio est beatitudo (magn. Moral. lib. 1. cap. 4.) and Virtue the daughter of Wisdome, as the same, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Virtutes omnes, in Animae parte rationali sint, necesse est, (lib. ejusd. cap. 1.) and if the Wisdome of God be infinitely more perfect then the Wisdome of man, as all justly confess; then assuredly can they only be happy, who conform their Wills to the Will of the Highest Wisdome: now Good men, in all conditions of their lives, and all the changes of Fortune, still submit their desires and affecti∣ons to the Will of Divine Providence; therefore are they con∣stantly happy, and consequently those seeming Evils, which befall them, prove real Goods, that implicite resignation of themselves, and that equanimity wherewith they entertain those External Evils, instantly altering their malignity, dulcifying their amaritude, and converting them unto Intrinsick Bles∣sings.

This Argument (without ostentation, I profess it) was the ground * 1.164 upon which I erected me a Sanctuary to secure my judgement in, when the multiplied stormes of Adversity, raised by the im∣petuous winds of our Civil Wars, had beaten me from all other probability of shelter. For taking this for my Hypothesis, that man, in this life, wants only so much of Happiness, as he doth of Obedience, so much of Content, as he doth of absolute Conformi∣ty to the good will of Providence; I inferred, that no man can be truely miserable, but he that makes himself so, nor any man re∣ally happy, but he that hath pared off the bias of Affection from his mind, and fitted it to run smooth and even in the levell of Indifferency, as to the Goods of Fortune, having no other mark, but Fiat Voluntas Dei. And, having first humbly implored the assistance of Divine Grace to enable me to reduce this excel∣lent lesson into practice, I wore it as a sacred charme or Penta∣cle on my breast, and thereby become Shot-free from all the bullets of an angry Fortune: nor did I feel that to be a consi∣derable loss, which the conquest and rapine of an insulting Ene∣my called my totall ruine; but could with more constant and in∣ternal alacrity sing Paeans to Heaven, for this victory over my Pusillanimity, then did the triumphant Foe, for his, over my Royal Master and his loyal Armies.

Let us take away those things, which the delusion of Sensua∣lity call's Evils, and Virtue must then be, what the mistaken * 1.165 Libertine will have it, a bare Notion, or empty Terme, as neer of kin to a Chimera, as one of Plato's Ideas: For what would become of Magnanimity, if there were no danger? what of Patience, if there were no sufferings, &c. Marcet sine adversa∣rio virtus, and every man knows that the Insignia, or Coat-arms of a gallant mind, is a Palme tree, that thrives by oppression, with an orient Pyropus, or Carbuncle suspended on its trunk, which deradiates the most refulgent splendor in the darkest night, as S^t Austin (lib. 2. de doctrina Christiana, cap. 16.) out of ancient Lapidaries hath affirmed, and Bernhard. Caesius (de mi∣neral. p. 556.) on the testimonies of many modern Mineralo∣gists, asserted. This the Orator glanced at, when in derision of their ignorant Malice, who had attempted to blast the Laurel on Cato's front; he smiles out this character of a well-ordered Mind: At etiam co negotio M. Catonis splendorem maculare voluer unt, ignari quid gravitas, quid integritas, quid magnitudo animi, quid denique Virtus valenet; quae in tempestate saevae quiet a est, & lucet in tenebris, & pulsa loco manet tamen, at que haeret in patria, splendet que per se semper, neque alienis unquam sordibus obsolescit. (or at. pro P. Sextio.)

I sayd, those things which the delusion of Sensuality call's * 1.166 Evils; for tis no Kenodox or novelty of my own, that the palate of the body is no competent judge of the sweets of the Soul; that the bitterest Potions, are the most magisterial Julebs to extinguish the fevers of Lust; and the abstinence of Poverty, the surest prophylactick to prevent the Tumors and Instammations of the mind; that a wise man is sensible of more true delight▪ in one Affliction, then Nero or Lucullus ever felt in all the pom∣pous and studied luxury of their lives; and that the tears of sor∣row are not half so Salt, nor corroding, as those expressed by im∣moderate Laughter. This those Heroes well experimented, who even in the Calmes of their state, have voluntarily cast all the Goods of Fortune over board; as unnecessary luggage, that might

hazard sinking of their vessels, in a storme, but could never pass for currant merchandise on the exchange of Happiness. What a voluminous Legend could a good Collector make of those Prin∣ces, who have gladly resigned their imperial Scepters, for a more portable and smoother Shepheards staff? of those Potentates, who have with smiles quitted the noyse and tumult of their mag∣nificent Palaces, for the soft murmurs of a Wilderness? of those Croesusses, who have cut off the ponderous bunches of Wealth from their own wearied backs, and reduced their spacious Treasuries to a scrip and bottle? of those holy Prelates, who have relinquished their Episcopia, or ample Sees, and retired themselves to some coole and silent Hermitage? How many victorious Generals have thrown down their leading staves, in the heads of their mighty and obedient Armies, and withdrawn into obscure Cottages, there to learn a nobler militia of con∣quering their rebellious Passions? How many Noble Persons, as high in Honour and Power, as Ambition it self could wish, have chearfully torn off their venerable Purple, and disguised themselves in contemptible raggs; changed their august and Dithyrambick Titles into a vulgar and easy Monosyllable; and left their native soyle for a contemplative recess in some empty Island? in fine, of those Worthies, who in their spring of life, their canicular days of pleasure, the Jubile of unphysick't Health, the Zenith of Riches and Honour; have contentedly shook hands with all this vexatious Vanity, and fervently courted not only the loathsome solitude of Prison, but even that affrighting Sceleton, Death: as those things which promised more real con∣tent, then all their former enjoyments? And since they did all this upon no necessity, but that compulsion of their own rectified Wills: what reason have we to account Poverty, Exile, Sor∣row, obscurity, sickness, Imprisonment, nay Death it self, such absolute Evils of themselves, as never to be alienated from their malignity, and converted into Goods, by the Chymistry of a Virtuous mind? What reason have we to conceive, that those Generous Spirits would have complained of the injustice of Gods Providence; if he had bin pleased to have allotted them the same apparent Evils, and consigned them to the same sufferings?

The Wiseman considers, that if the rapine of his Enemies, the oppression of Tyranny, the devouring jaws of Fire, or other sinister Accident deprive him of his estate; yet notwithstanding he loseth nothing, that was properly his own: if he be tormented in his body; that his raggs of Flesh are torn off, his mud-walled Cottage shattered, but that impatible Tenant, his Soul, remains whole and invulnerable. In a word, as the tall Olympus advan∣ceth his intemerated head above the clouds, and with a smooth front looks down upon the pageantry of Thunder, and other vaporing Meteors of the Aer: so doth the head of a Virtuous Person stand above the Clouds of Misfortunes, and with a mag∣nanimous bravery bid defiance to Adversity, in all the Foggs of trouble still conserving the serenity of his mind imperturbed. Nihil accidere bono viro mali potest. Non miscentur Contraria. Quemadmodum tot amnes tantum supernè dejectorum imbrium, tanta medicatorum vis sontium, non mutant saporem maris, nec remittunt quidem: ita adversarum rerum impetus viri fortis non vertit animum, manet in statu, & quicquid evenit, in suum colorem trahit. Est enim omnibus externis potentior. Nec hoc dico, non sentit illa, sed vincit, & alioquin quietus placidusque contra incurrentia attollitur: Omnia adversa, exercitationes put at, &c. sayth the grave Seneca (lib. de Provi∣dentia.) Who having tuned his meditations to this heigh Key, falls not only into a profuse Encomium of that saying of his admi∣red Cynick, Demetrius; Nihil mihi videtur infelicius co, cui * 1.167 nil unquam evenit adversi, nothing in my judgement can be more unhappy, then he who never tasted of Adversity: but into this Parodox also, that the condition of Regulus, in his nayled barrel, was as far from real Infelicity, as that of the great Me∣caenas solacing his pamperd limbs on a couch of down. For weighing the constant and invincible Patience of the one, against the perpetual Anxiety or civil war in the breast of the other, he concludes, quod dubium sit, an electione Fati data, plures Re∣guli nasci, quàm Mecaenates velint; that it may be disputed whether or no, if men might elect their own Fates, the greater number would not rather choose to be born under the angry starrs of the former, then the slattering constellation of the latter:

so indifferent are those things to a Wise man, which the judge∣ment of the Sense hath denominated Good and Evil.

This magnanimous temper of a Virtuous Mind, those Ideots * 1.168 never so much as heard of, who have objected; that it would have bin more consistent with the justice of Divine Providence, rather constantly to have preserved Good men from affliction, then to subject them to the malice and oppression of Evil men, and afterward seem to vindicate their integrity, and compensate their sufferings, by a late remuneration of happiness, and the punishment of their Oppressors.

For even Good men themselves esteem those acute Afflictions, as a Diploma or Testimonial of their genuine Education in the Academy of Virtue, and, like Veteran Souldiers, produce the scars of their wounds, as so many indeleble characters of Valour, and consequently of Honour. They look upon their smartest stripes, as the faire impresses of Gods paternal Affection; and re∣turn him a patient submission to his frequent chastisements, as the most gratefull sacrifice of Gratitude, their frail and indigent con∣dition can afford. They account their temporal Dejections, not only an undeniable symbol of his Special Favour, in this mili∣tary state; since they manifest them to be elected by him, non ad mollitiem, sed ad tolerantiam, not to dull and inglorious effemi∣nacy, but honourable hardship, and masculine atchievments: but also as an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Earnest of their eternal advancement, in the Jubile, when he shall distribute his triumphant wreaths of Laurel, such whose Verdure shall know no decay, till the impos∣sible period of Eternity. Thus the Valiant, with noble emulation, contend for priority in enterprises of the highest difficulty and most eminent danger; and then think themselves in most grace and reputation with their General, when he vouchsafes them the honour of the Forlorn Hope, and consignes them to encounter a whole Host of Deaths. Thus the Lacedemonian yongsters mea∣sured the affection of their Parents, and Tutors, not by their indulgence; but the severity of their chastisements: and em∣braced their smartest flagellations as welcome opportunities to experiment their Constancy. And thus the Wives of Ruscia

estimate their Husbands love, not by the frequency of their Conjugall Embraces, but of their Castigations: and then be∣waile themselves as more then halfe repudiated, when their matri∣monial Lords neglect to afford them the benevolence of the Lash. And yet for all this shall man, noble man, who is the Souldier, Sonne, and spouse of Providence, so far forget his courage, constancy, and duety, as to repine against those things as Evil; which are, by the Supreme Wisdome, intended for his Good, nay which a mind, imbued with the soveraigne Tincture of Virtue, hath a power, were they real Evils, to convert into inestimable Benefits?

I doe not only assent unto, but gratefully applaud their judge∣ments, * 1.169 who have defined the essence of Good and Evil, in this life, by the Truth or Falshood of Opinion; experience infor∣ming me, that the Sensual Appetite of some apprehendeth many things under the title of absolute and transcendent Goods, which the Rational Appetites of others abhorr, as positive and detestable Evils.

And therefore, when the soul sits in consult upon the Electi∣on of Good, she ought first to wipe her eyes from all the dust of Sensual Prejudice, and resolve that the Vote of Temporal in∣terest shall goe for nothing, but disturbance and seduction; fix∣ing her Cogitations only upon that pathognomonick, or proper and inseparable, and therefore infallible signe, by which the Wis∣dome of God hath described what's really Good; and that is, an indifferency to all objects but himself, or a free and totall re∣signation of our Wills to his, or more precisely, if he hath ap∣pointed it.

This most excellent lesson, that Stoical Emperor, Marcus * 1.170 Antoninus had often read by the meer light of Nature, and en∣devouring to reduce it into practice, whispers this maxime to himself: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; opinioni autem mali aut boni adsentire mens

non debet (lib. de seipso 5. numer. 18.) and in one short me∣ditation states the whole Controversie concerning the good and evill occurrences to man; which for that reason, I heer present to the Reader. Dicit aliquis: infelicem me, cui hoc acciderit! quinimo, felicem me, qui hunc casum sine dolore perferam, & nec praesentibus frangar, nec futura extimescam! Nam uni∣cuique tale quid potuit accidere: at non cujusvis erat, sine dolore cum casum excipere. Cur igitur illud potius infortunio, quàm hoc felicitati adscribts? Aut cur id infelicitatem homi∣nis appellas, in quo nihil mali passa est hominis natura? An verò tibi humanae naturae damnum videri potest id, quod non est contra propositum naturae ejus? Quod ergo naturae propositum esse didicisti? Num casus iste efficere poterit, quo minus sis justus, magnanimus, temperans, prudens, circumspectus, tutus ab errore, verecundus, liber? aut adimere omninò quic∣quam eorum, quae hominis naturae sunt propria? Proinde quo∣ties inciderit quicquam quod ad dolorem te provocet; recorda∣re ••ujus praecepti: non illud quod accidit infortunium verè esse, sed quòd fortiter illud feras, id felicitati tribuendum esse. (lib. 4. numero 31.)

Some man [perchance] says, that I am unhappy, to whom this infortune hath hapned! Nay, rather may he say, that I am happy, who can endure this misfortune without grief; and am neither dejected with the present, nor afraid of future Accidents. For the like might have befalne any other man: but 'twas not in the power of every one to sustain that mis∣fortune without grief. Why, therefore, doe you ascribe that rather to misfortune, then this to Felicity? or why account that to be an infelicity of man, wherein the Nature of man hath suffered nothing of Evil? Can that seem to you to be an Injury to Humane Nature, which is not contrary to the in∣tention thereof? What, therefore, hast thou learned the Intention of Nature to be? Can this misfortune effect, that thou mayest be less just, magnanimous, temperate, prudent, circumspect, superior to error, modest, free? Or can it take from thee any of those things, which are proper to the Nature of man? So often, therefore, as any Accident shall occur,

which may provoke thee to grief; remember this Precept: that what happens, is not truely Misfortune; but that thou canst bear it nobly, is a Happiness.

More then this, I can not, need not say, in order to the refutati∣on of this Objection: and therefore I remit the unsatisfied to the more profound, elegant, and ample discourse of the learned Mornaeus Du Plessis (lib. de veritate Christianae Religionis, cap. 12.) on the same subject; and leave the satisfied to the calme enjoyment of their perswasion.

CHAP. VI. The Mobility of the Terme of Mans Life, asserted.

SECT. I.

HAving thus by Apodictical and uncontrollable Reasons made it manifest, that all things in the Uni∣verse, * 1.171 as well Generals, as Particulars, Contingents as Necessaries, are in the means, manner, oppor∣tunity and finality of their Operations, precisely predetermined, disposed, and procured by the General Providence of God; that all Occurrences of every individual mans life, are the prescripts and consignations or allotments of his Special and Paternal Providence; and by the meer Light of Nature dis∣pelled all those clouds, which either ancient Ethnicisme, or mo∣dern Atheisme hath exha••ed from the abyss of Hell, to obscure the splendor of both those excellent truths: it remains only, that we deduce the influence of Divine Providence down to the Ca∣tastrophe, or Exit of life, or prove the extension of it to the point of Death; and endevour a compendious and plain decision of that tedious and enigmatical Controversie, An terminus Vitae humanae sit immobilis? Whether the period of every individual mans life be so immoveably fixt by the Special Providence of God, that it can be neither by any negligence, immoderate and

inordinate use of those things Physicians call the Six Nonnatu∣rals, or suddain Casualities, anticipated or abbreviated; nor by prudence, temperance, convenient Medicaments, or caution, pro∣lated or prolonged?

For the first; viz.

That God is the sole Moderator▪ though not the Author of * 1.172 Death (for reason will not endure that we conceive him to have created a Privation;) or, more plainly, that the hand of his Pro∣vidence guides the dart of that inevitable and victorious Enemy to life; this is a position so frequently and amply illustrated by the pens of many the most learned and judicious men of all ages, religions, and professions; and so genuinely and directly inferri∣ble from the Context and importance of those Arguments for∣merly introduced, in order to the Demonstration of the interest of Providence, even in the smallest interludes of Nature, and most apparently fortuitous effects of all subordinate Causes: that, should we run out into any profuse probation thereof, in this place, the most patient and candid Reader could not but frown at the attempt, and justly censure it, non only as unnecessa∣ry and supercrogatory, but also as scandalous and derogatory to his own Dialectical and Collective habilities. And therefore humbly referring him as well to his own easy recognition of no∣tions formerly collected from the lecture of other more mature and nervous Discourses on the same Theorem; as his fami∣liar Inductions upon many propositions inspersed upon the leaves of this our cold and dull Decembers Exercise: I shall, in avoydance of an undecent Chasme, or Vacuity, insert only two concise and obvious Arguments, as Corollaries, or an∣nexes inservient to the same perswasion. * 1.173

Argument I.

The life, and consequently the Death of every man necessarily depends upon the absolute Will of the Creator, and so upon the Decrees or resolves of his Providence; or upon some other Principle extraneous, alien, and superior to the nature of man;

or upon man himself. Not upon any Third or Neutral Princi∣ple; for that must be either the Epicureans Fortune; or the Stoicks Anus Fatidica or Fate; or Homers Lottery; or Py∣thagoras his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, mentioned by Plutarch (de placit. 1.) or the Jews Angelus mortis, or their terrible she Devil Zilith described by our many-tongued Gregory (in tract. de Episcopo puerorum, out of the Glossa Talmud, in Nidda, fol. 24) and er∣roneously conceived, by Gassarel (Ʋnheard of Curiosities, pag. 317.) to be the same with Lucina of the Romans, for the one was thought propitious to parturient women, the other so hostile and malignant, that the Hebrew Wives, so soon as they fell in travel, caused this proscription to be written on the doore of their bed-chamber, Adim, Chavah, chouts Lilith; Adam, Eve, keep out Lilith; or the Astrologers Helec and Alcoco∣den, and the like 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of the Planets called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Fridariae, derided by Archangelus a Burgo novo (in Comment. in dogmat. Cabalist.) and Scalger (in Comment. in Manilium) or the Numbers, Ideas, or grand Revolution of Plato; or the Malus Deus of the Manachees; or Helena, aliàs Selene, of Simon Magus; or Hesiods Pandora; or the great Beldam Mylitta, aliàs Alytta, of the Ethnicks; or the Turks Nassub, aliàs Ctusura, vvhich signifies the Goddess Fortune; or Paracelsus his Anima mundi Platonica, or rather the Macro∣cosmical Harmony of the Universe, and the Microcosmical Con∣cordance with the invisible signatures of the Ascendent; or that Hermetico-magical Lamp of life and death, lately invented and cryed up by Ernestus Burchgravius, but most judiciously ex∣tinguisht by Sennertus (de Consensu Chymicorum cum Galen. cap. 18.) or that Internal man of Paracelsus, named Ens syde∣rium, Olympicum, Gabalim, &c. by that vaine admirer and promoter of Hermetical Follies, Oswaldus Crollius (in Basil. Chym. praefat. admonit. p. 6. 4. & 65.) or the implacable Strix, or Erinnys of the Gentiles; or, finally, some such fantastique Hobgoblin, that hath no more of reality, then what it borrows from the confused and obscure idea of it self, conceived in the luxuriant womb of a perturbed or deluded Imagination: but every sober man already knows, that all these are absolute Chi∣maera's,

hatched in the adled brains of mad men, Poets, and ido∣latrous Pagans; and so below our laughter, much more our serious Confutation. Not upon Man himself, or any domestick Con∣servatory essentially inherent to his Nature. For that absurdity once conceded, entangles our reason in two the highest Impossi∣bilities imaginable▪ (1) it confounds the Relative Maximes of Nature, breaks her chain of Dependence, and inferrs a second Self-existence beside Divinity; for, dreaming that a Principiate Entity actually existent, gave to it self existence; that a Future something derives its 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Futurition immediately and solely from it self; and that nothing can, by its own power, at∣taine to be something, i. e. that which is neither Potentia, nor Actus, can endow it self with the perfection of both Power and Act; we must be carried upon this rock, that there is in the World a second something 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Non principiate, Causeless, and Self-sufficient, besides God; which is a falshood far beyond the two Principles of all things imagi∣ned by the Manichees, and more ridiculous then the Devils pro∣mise to make our Saviour Monarch of the World. (2) It im∣ports an absolute power in man to make himself immortal; a Delusion that never found entertainement in the brain of the most desperate Hypochondriack, nor durst the Father of lies ever suggest it to his most credulous vassals. It follows there∣fore of pure necessity, that as God is the Author of life; so also can he alone dispose of the issues of Death, and that the end, as well as the beginning and mutations of all things are subject to the moderation of his Providence. * 1.174

Argument 2.

A confest Verity it is, that all Natural Motion must proceed from one First Motor, which can be no other but God, untill we can find out something coequal to him in Eternity; and a position never yet disputed, that the life of man is a Natural Motion, to which the Apostle seemes to allude in his sacred axiome, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in God we live, move and have our being (Act. 17. ver. 28.) and of parallel certainty

it is, that every motion hath its determinate beginning, durati∣on, and period, dependent on the Will of the First Mover: therefore must the end as necessarily as the beginning and con∣tinuation of mans life, his Death as well as his conception, nativity, and maturity be certainly commensurated, desined, and limited by the Special Providence of God. Frequent glimpses of this Argument have I perceived in the mounments of the most Ethnical Philosophers; nor shall our thoughts want the patronage of great probability, if we conjecture, that our Patriarch, Galen (in most other things, but weakly armed against their censure, who have assaulted his memory with the detestable Epithite, '〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an Atheist of the highest Classis) had his mind touched with the same Magnet, at that time, when he wheeled about from his old position of a meer Naturalist, and pointed directly at the pole of Divine Providence, in these words, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (2. de usu part.) God hath done all things, that he had for∣merly decreed to doe.

SECT. II.

For the second;

MOre then sufficient reason had I, to call it a Tedious and * 1.175 Aenigmatical Controversie. For, first, the obscurity of the Subject (being such whose clear imperceptibility hath wor∣thily listed it among the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or secrets of Gods Councel, proposed rather to excite and entertain our reverential Wonder, then exercise our sawcy Curiosity) hath unhinged the brains of most, who have essayd to explain it, and lost their judgements in a wilderness of various opinions, discrepant 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as far as heaven and earth each from other, and left future enquiry instructed rather what to avoyd, then what to sol∣low: insomuch that the learned and profound Job. Beverovicius, whose slame of scrutiny had kindled the most erudite and heroical Wits, on this side the line, into a desire and attempt to afford him satisfaction in this particular; when he had received, perused and indifferently perpended their severall Epistolical responses, found himself still perplex't with his former tremor of Scepticisme, and therefore confessed; super hac re nuper plures consului, qui an sibi ipsis satisfecerint nescio, mihi certè penitùs satisfacere non po∣tuerunt; in tanta it aque opinionum varietate equidem ferè dixe∣rim cum Xenophonte apud Varronem, Hominis est hec opinari, Dei scire. And again, whosoever deserves the Laurel at this Olympick exercise, by deciding the quaestion on the side of Truth; must first reconcile those inveterate Antipathies between absolute Fate and mans Freewill: must clearly distinguish between the certain Prescience, and immutable Predestination, or Predeter∣mination, of the Divine Intellect and Will, (a task not to be undertaken after dinner, nor performed upon one legg; as must

soon appear to him, who sufficiently excogitates, how hardly the blunt edge of mans understanding can divide betwixt the Prae∣vidence of God, and his positive Decrees setled from all eternity: since Cognition, Election, Volition, and Decretion make but one simple and entire act in his Intellect; nor can reason make out, how God can Foresce meer Contingents, while they are yet in the nothing of Futurity, unless because he hath pre-ordained the means, place, time, and other circumstantial requi∣sites to their respective Contingencies) must determine that troublesome Doubt of the Schoolemen, whether any of Gods Decrees are Hypothetical or Conditionate, and so subject to mutation upon mans observation, or non-observation of the Con∣dition, or proviso on his part to be performed? and, lastly, must solve that Scruple, An Scientia conditionata certam ponit futurorum scientiam, or, An condition at a Dei volunt as ullum faci∣at decretum de futurorum eventu? Whether the hypothetical or conditionate Will of God (if any such there be) doth import an absolute and immutable Decree, concerning the event of things to come? Problems, about which not only the gravest Phi∣losophers have stretched the membranes of their brains, and with great anxiety hack't and slash't for many ages together; but even the Church her self hath disputed so hotly, that she hath rent her seamless coate of Faith into such numerous and wide Schismes, that we her sonnes may sooner expect the conversion of the Jews, then a full reconciliation and reunion of all her Sects. Nor am I subject to so uncurable a Phrensy of Vanity, as not to know how immense a disproportion lyeth between the utmost extent of my short judgement, and the center of the nec∣rest of these Abstrusities; but acknowledging the decision of any one of them as far above my Presumption, as Capacity, I think it both honour and satisfaction enough for me, to have collected so much light from the beams of Mersennus, Episcopius and others, as may serve to conduct the mind of the ingenious Reader into a midle way betwixt the Absolute Fatality of the Stoicks, on one extreme; and the absolute Fortune of the Epi∣cureans, on the other. The First whereof strains the cord of Predestination up to the height of inevitable Necessity; and so

leaves nothing in the power either of Mans Free-will, or the con∣spiracies of Second Causes; nay chain's up the hands of the First Cause in fetters of Adamant, according to that of the Poet.

Fatis agimur, cedite fatis. Non sollicitae possunt curae Mutare rati stamina fusi. Quicquid patimur mortale genus, Quicquid agimus, venit ex alto. Non illa Deo vertisse licet Quae nexa suis currunt Causis.

By Fate we are impell'd; submit To what the Destinies think fit. That thread, by 'th Fatal Damsels spun, By our Cares can nere b' undone. What we act, what undergoe, From their fixt Decrees doth slow. Jove himself cannot controll What doe's from linked Causes rowl.

As also that of Sencca (de providentia, where he had the reason to speak it:) Quicquid est, quod nos sic vivere jussit, sic mori: eadem necessitate & Deos alligat. irrevocabilis hu∣mana pariter ac divina cursus vehit, ille ipse omnium Condiror ac Rector scripsit quidem Fata, sed sequitur. semper paret: semel jussit. The Others cut it quite asunder, and so relaxing the ligaments of Providence Divine, leave all Events to the loose and undetermined results or hits of meer Chance: but both concurring in the most bloody Error of Irreligion. But the concernement of our present Theme will lead us into a more particular, express, and ample enquiry, how that long Civil war betwixt these three different Notions of Fate, Fortune, and Free-will, I may be conciliated and brought to a full Com∣bination and Consistence with Divine Providence.

In the meane time, that we may, both with more decent Method, and perspicuity, attain to some verisimilous (at least) * 1.176 solution of our present Problem, viz. Whether the Term of mans life (in individuo) be so immoveably prefixt by the De∣crees of Divine Providence, as that neither temperance or care on mans part can extend, nor the violence of second Causes, si∣tuate without the o••b of his mo••eration, accelerate it? Necessary it is, that we seriously examine and search into the marrow of two things conductive to the right stating, and consequently the right understanding of the Question: (1) What we are to un∣derstand by the Term of Life: (2) In what sense we are to un∣derstand this Term to be sixt, or moveable.

What we are to understand by the Term of Life.

Concerning the First; obvious it is, that all things, or causes inservient both to the Conservation of life and the adduction of * 1.177 its period, Death, fall under the contents of three General heads; for either they must refer to those that are Necessary, or such as, by the ordinary course of Nature, no man can subsist with∣out, to which classis belong our Aliment, Aer, sleep, &c. or (2) Non necessary or Fortuitous, which no way conduce to the Fomentation or fewel of our Vital Flame, but point blank to the Extinction of it; and therefore the instinct of nature perswades every man to avoyd them; such are Shipwracks, stabbs, shots, precipices, halters, &c. causes of immature, suddain and violent deaths: or (3) Meerely Supernatural, or the Will of God, which as it is impossible (without Special Divine Revelation) for us to foreknow, so also to alter, or prevent. Upon these three pillars was it, that Laurentius Joubertus erected his triple Diffe∣rence of the Term of mans life; making one Supernatural, such as the Breath of our nostrils was pleased to assign to most of the Antediluvian Patriarchs, or Seminaries of Humanity, either in order to the more expedite multiplication of mankind, to the more advantageous invention and propagation of Arts and Sci∣ences, or for some other considerable respect, at which our

ignorance can only squint by conjecture: which being long since cancelled, Art sits down in a contented despaire to reno∣vate, nor can the records of the world afford us the story of any impudence, that durst rant so high, as to promise it, except that of a certain Mountebanck Greek, derided by Galen, and our late Nugipolyloquides, Paracelsus; both which experimentally confuted their own unpardonable Arrogance, before their sands had run out 50 years. Another Natural, which Physiologie defines by that space of time, during which our radical Balsam, or the oleaginous Fewel of our vital Lamp, maintains the inn••te Heate, or Flame of life, untill the total exhaustion of the one, causeth a total privation of the other; or, more plainly, that cir∣cle of time, which comprehends the seven Segments or Ages of man; which, though prestitute and limited, by the Governour of Nature, according to the compute of the Psalmist, to 80. years, of Plato to 81. of the Aegyptians to 100. (Caelius Rodi∣ginus, 19. antiq. Lect. cap. 21. & Ioh. Langius, lib. 1. Epist. Medicinal. 79.) of the best of the Sibylls to a 100. as is exprest in those 2. verses corrected by the incomparable Salmasius (Pliniarum observat. pag. 77.)

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And of the ancient Jews, to 120. (Ioseph. Antiq. Iudaic. lib. 1.) is yet left to some considerable latitude, and hath more or less of Duration, respective to the more or less durability of the Princi∣ples of life, i. e. the Eucrasy, or Dyscrasy of the body, in every individual; provided that neither the oyle be inquinated by crude, or putrid Supplies, nor prodigally depredated by immode∣rate intension of its consumer, the Flame, nor that immaturely either suffocated, or wasted by Diseases, or suddainly extingui∣shed by violent Accidents; which make the third Difference, or Accidentary Term of life.

But as for the first branch of this Ternary, the Metaphysical, or Supernatural Term of mans life, dependent on the Divine Will immediately; since according to the doctrine of Nicholaus Florentinus (in Serm.) the Conciliator (in different. Medicis)

and Joubertus (in Errorib. popular.) it concerns only the first Age of the World: this place may very conveniently want any farther consideration thereof; nor can it much avail to the at∣chievement of our design, to insist upon more then the two last.

By the Term of life, therefore, we ought to understand either * 1.178 (1) that period of every individual mans days, which is caused by a sensible decay, and total dissolution of the ligaments, which chain the Soul to the Body; or, more expresly, by an extinction of his Vital Flame, naturally succeeding upon a consumption of its Pabulum, or fewel, the Radical Moysture, when both those Principles of life are permitted to their natural and proper te∣nor, i. e. when no Preternatural Cause intervenes, and by Cor∣ruption anticipates the dissolution of that Disposition or Tem∣perament of the Elements of the body, upon which the subsi∣stence of life doth necessarily depend: or (2) the end of every mans life, in general, whensoever, and by what means soever, either Diseases, or violent and unexpected Accidents, introduced; without any respect to the gradual and successive declination, and consequent cessation of the Natural Temperament, in the maras∣mus of old age.

Now from the acceptation of the Term of Life, in the First signification, there genuinly emerge Two Questions:

First, Whether this Term of life, which is circumscribed, per * 1.179 ipsius temperamenti defluxum & decursum, by the natural De∣flux., or wearing out of the requisite Temperament of the body, and which we may, without impropriety, call a kind of mature, easy and spontaneous falling asunder of the Ligaments of life; be absolutely and definitely fixt, so that God hath constituted to leave the nature of every Individual to its own moderation, nor by any means to interrupt or alter its course prescribed: i. e. not by any means to procure, that this Deflux of the Tempera∣ment should have more or less duration, then what may natu∣rally be expected from the more or less durability thereof, de∣pendent on the more or less perfect proportion, that the Passive

and Active Principles hold each to other; or, more plainly, that the Renitency or Resistence of the Oyle holds to the depre∣datory and consumptive Activity of the Flame.

Secondly, if this Term of life be thus Fixt, and that God in∣deed hath decreed not to intend or prolong that Deflux of the Temperament, beyond the point of its natural Durability; whether yet notwithstanding, without alteration of his Decree of com∣mitting Nature to its own establish'•• course, he may not, be∣ing thereunto moved by our repentance, prayers, and piety, cor••ect those depravities, and repaire those violent decays of that our temperamental Constitution, occasioned by intemperance, diseases, extraneous Accidents, or other means whatever; and so hin∣der the otherwise impendent immature Collabascence, and precipitous Dissolution thereof? In a word; Whether, though God hath predetermined, that no man shall exceed that Term of life, to which the Durability of his individual Temperament, or the strength of his particular Constitution may, in proba∣bility, be extended; his Special Providence doth not yet suffer, that, by reason of putrefactive and destructive Preter-natural Causes occurrent, the temperament may be vitiated, impaired, and ruined: and so not hold out to that point of time, to which otherwise, in respect of its primigenious and native con∣dition, it might have lasted?

But if we understand the Term of life in the second significa∣tion; * 1.180 then the Question must be: Whether the immature or preternatural Period of every individual mans life, by what means soever, either disease, famine, war, wounds, nausrage, decollation, suspension, suffocation, luxury, drunkeness, solli∣citude, grief, &c. occasioned, be so precisely fixt by Destiny; that no prudence or caution on his part can transpose, nor danger of fortuitous Accidents invading, accelerate or pre∣vert it? In short; Whether the Catastrophe of every mans life be prescribed in the book of Fate.

In what sense we are to understand the Term of Mans Life to be Fixt or Moveable.

As for the Second Preconsiderable; the Term of life may be * 1.181 sayd to be Fixt in a twofold sense: (1) in respect to some posi∣tive Divine Decree, antegredient or precedent not only to all conspiracies, but also the Prescience of all Secondary or Instru∣mental Causes; whereby God hath so precisely fixt and limi∣ted a certain space, or time of life to every single man, together with all relative Circumstances, as place, manner, or kind, and cause of Death: that it is absolutely impossible to man, what means soever he shall use to the contrary, in order to his preser∣vation, or what dangers soever he shall have formerly exposed himself unto, notwithstanding, either to prolong his life beyond, or to fall before that Fatal Term. (2) In respect not to some Absolute, but Hypothetical, or Conditionate Decree of God: i. e. such whose mutation or accomplishment is suspended on the liberty, or Free Election of mans Will, according as that, either being conducted by the manuduction of Light Supernatural, or Divine Grace, shall pursue the real and true Good; or being seduced by the delusion of its own sensual judgements, shall wander in the devious tracts of Error, and so hunt after only apparent and false Good. Now whether we understand this Conditionate Decree to be made and grounded upon a certain and infallible prenotion of all concomitant things, circumstances, manners, causes, and finally of mans election of and adherence unto Good, or Evil objects, and his consequent Virtuous or vici∣ous course of life: or whether we understand it to be made with∣out any such certain Prenotion, or Volition of Prenotion at all; but yet with a deliberate and positive Sentence certainly to be pronounced and executed in the fulness of time, or opportunity, when the right use, or abuse of this Prerogative or Freedome of the Will, shall be in actual determination, i. e. shall ripen the Suppositionality of the decree into Absoluteness, and reduce the Possibility thereof into actual Necessity: the distinction is not Material. For it can be of no considerable advantage to our

present attempt, whether of these two Notions we prefer; and that the reason is, why we here omit to enquire, whether holds the neerest Cognation to truth.

From these premises hath the judgement of man extracted three * 1.182 different opinions.

The First, of those, who hold it as point of faith, that the Term of every mans life, together with all means or Causes, immediate, mediate, remote, circumstantial and corollary, or in any rela∣tion whatever pertinent thereto, is absolutely immoveable and Fatal; being precisely decreed by the immutable and irresistible law of the Divine Will.

The Second, of those, who averre the absolute Fatality, or Fixation of every individual mans Term of life, à Posteriori: but decline it à Priori, i. e. they concede, that in truth the term of every mans life is appointed by the irrevocable decree of Fate, in this respect, that it can never be extended or spun out to the duration of one moment beyond that, to which the natural condition of his particular Temperament promises him to attain: but not in this respect, that it admits no possibility of Contracti∣on or Abbreviation.

The Third, of those, who allow the Term of life to be Fatal indeed; yet upon no higher a Necessity, then that of Gods meer Prenotion, or hypothetical determination, respective to mans right use▪ or abuse of the Liberty of his Will: and therefore not so fixt, but that it may be not only abbreviated but also pro∣longed; non praesupposita ista aut praenotione, aut hypothesi citra praenotionem.

And this is the most passant Division of mens dissenting opi∣nions * 1.183 concerning this intricate Subject; but if we come with na∣ked minds to examine the state of the difference between the last and the second, we shall find them concentral in the point of Mutability or Mobility: and therefore both perspicuity and brevity perswade, that we gratefully adhere to that more con∣venient reduction of all opinions concerning this Theorem, to two only, offered by Joh. Beverovicius (Epist. ad Simon. Epi∣scopium)

in words of this importance: Some maintain the Term of mans life to be fixt by the eternal and immutable law of De∣stiny; and on the contrary, others contend that it is not so fixt, but that it remains moveable as well forwards as backwards, not only obnoxious to Decurtation or Anticipation, by depravities and exorbitances of the Six Non-naturals, by Epidemical Dis∣eases, or by a thousand unexpected Knocks of unconstant For∣tune; but also capable of Production or Postposition by a tem∣perate, anticachectical and cautious course of life.

Now as for the First of these Opinions; 'tis generally known * 1.184 to have bin Canonical among the Stoicks, who bound up the efficiency of all things in the Universe, in the iron chaines of Fate; beleiving all events subject to so uncontrollable a necessity, that their prevention, suspension, or alteration is not only above the hopes of man (whose virtuous endeavours, piety, and prayers must therefore prove as fruitless and ineffectual towards the Aversion; as vitiosities, impiety and profaneness towards the Attraction or Acceleration of any misfortune predecreed) but even of God himself: whom though they allow to have bin the Author of that sempiternal and irrepealable law of Destiny, yet they deny him to have reserved to himself the prerogative of exemption from the obligation thereof. This was the Creed of Philetas, when he sayd▪

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—Mortales superat quodcunque necesse est, Vi solida; quia nec superos reveretur, in almis Qui Coeli spatiis degunt sine luctibus aevum.

Of that old Poet, quoted by Cicero (de Fato) who sayd, quod fore paratum est, id summum exuperat Jovem: and of that renowned Captain, Hector, when being importuned by his wife not to hazard himself in a salley upon the Graecian trenches, he

conjured her fond fears into a resolved confidenco, that no sword could reach his heart, but that of Fate, by this spell;

Parce, precor, nimio misera indulgere dolori; Nam quis me, Fat is invitis, mittet ad Orcum? Nullum equidem vitasse hominum dico ultima Fata.

Prithee, forbeare thy needless grief; and know, No hand can send me to the shades below, Without the Fates assent. I hold it true, What Fate hath destin'd, no man can eschew.

As also of those Military men, mentioned by P. Gregorius Tholosanus (lib. 21. de republ. cap. 8.) whose minds being sea∣soned with the same perswasion, that the manner and moment of every mans Death is appointed by the immutable law of Fate, and his lot inscribed in invisible Characters on his forehead; be∣came of so hard a temper, as to be wholly insensible of the threats of that terrible Giant, Danger: nor did they account it other then a vanity, resulting from the cowardize of Ignorance, to pro∣vide against the blows of War either by caution, or defensive armes; urging the examples of many valiant Soldiers, who have bin observed to have confronted whole showers of levelled bullets, shot from the neer engines of the advancing Foe, with∣out a wound; and yet at last have fallen by some petite and unexpected peble thrown from the sure sling of Destiny, even then, when they seemed immured in the secure Cittadel of Peace, and thought their triumphant Lawrels armour of proof even against thunder.

Occidis, Argivae quem non potuere phalanges Sternere, nec Priami regnorum eversor Achilles. Hic tibi mortis erant metae, &c. Virg. 12. Aeneid.

But, alas! 'tis not the Academy of the Stoicks alone, that af∣fords patronage to this Error of Absolute Fatality; nor the Camp that only contends for the propagation thereof; nor the

politick institutions of that Secretary of Hell, Mahomet, in his absurd Alcoran (cap. 6.) that only countenance the diffusion thereof in these our days: for even the Schools of Christianity, in some parts, have advanced the reputation thereof to so un∣reasonable and dangerous a height, as to make it an Article of Faith, if not absolutely necessary, yet at least collaterally con∣ductive to Salvation; and this by Auctority of the Councel of Dort, which ratified the doctrine of their Apostle, Calvir, con∣cerning Absolute Predestination, and enjoyned the publick As∣sertion thereof to most of their Divines of the last reformation.

I sayd, the Doctrine of Calvin concerning Absolute Prede∣stination; * 1.185 thereby, though tacitly, intimating my knowledge of the no small Disparity between the Fate of the Stoicks, and that propugned by many Christian Divines. The one being, as Chrysippus hath defined it, Sempiterna & indeclinabilis series rerum, & catena, quae seipsam velvit, & perpetuò implicat, per aeternos consequentiae ordines, ex quibus connexa est; A sempi∣ternal and indeclinable series, syntax, or chaine of Causes, whose turnings, convolutions and perpetual implications are dependent on it self, by those eternal orders of consequence, of which it is made up and connected: the other, as the best of School men hath defined it, Pendens à Divino Consilio series, ordoque caus∣sarum; a series, or successive complexion and order of Causes, dependent on the Will of God. From the just Collation of which two Definitions, our first thoughts may collect, that the Diffe∣rence between the Stoical and Theological Fate, may be thus stated.

The Former, in some things, excludes Divinity from that * 1.186 round or Circle of Causes, reserring all events, as well general, as particular, to the meer subsequence of Naturall Actives ope∣rating upon capable Passives, subordinately connected unto, and so by successive influx necessarily disposing each other to the production of those particular Effects, to the Causation whereof their Natural Faculties were at first determinately accommoda∣ted: and, in others, includes Divinity within it, i. e. confines his

Power and Will to that rigid and infringible Law of Necessity, excogitated by his Wisdom from all eternity, and established by his Decrce, at the inauguration of Nature to Existence. The Later makes the Will of God to be the first link in the cha••n of Causes, and so superior to the restriction of natural necessity dependent thereon. The Stoick, being a declared Enemy to the Arbitrary Prerogative of God, adligeth the Ener∣gie of the First and Infinite Cause to the capacity of Secondary and Finite; and, upon consequence, doth acknowledge neither the Liberty of his Will, nor the Absoluteness of his Power, or Omnipotency. But, on the Contrary, the Christian look's up to heaven, as the Councel-house, where the Instruments, opportuni∣ty, place and success of every Action receive their Specification to this or that determinate purpose; to the Arbitrary Resolve of God, as the Definite Sentence or Injunction; and on all Se∣cond Causes, but as subordinate, and subalternally instrumen∣tal to the punctual execution and accomplishment of the same: and, upon legal consequence, concludes, that the Divine Will is absolutely Free, knowing no circumscription, but that of the Divine Wisdome; that the meer Fiat of that Councel, is the Director, and Spring in the Engin•• of the World; and that the Author of Nature hath reserved to himself the Privilege of adding unto, detracting from, intending, remitting, inverting, transcending, or adnulling the fundamental Constitutions of Nature, and so breaking that Concatenation of Causalities, or the Chain of Fate, at pleasure. The Heathen absurdly dream't that all effects are inevitably produced by the conspiracy and coefficiency of natural Causes, respectively qualified; or that all Accidents spring up from the proper tendency of their parti∣cular Efficients, without the influence, direction, or moderation of any other Virtue, besides their own native and Congenial Fa∣culties. The more intelligent Christian proves, that all natu∣ral Causes doe not produce their respective Effects 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ex inevitabili necessitate, by the absolute and never∣failing power of their Essential Qualities, or inherent endowments; but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quatenus fieri licuit, or according to the possibility of their Concingency: and therefore, though he con∣fesseth

that all Events are foreknown and preordained in the eternal Councel of God; yet he stands assured, as well upon the ground of Reason, as Faith, that the precise and opportune contingency of every individual Event proceeds from the inslu∣ence of this Providence, which disposeth and conjoyneth some certain convenient Causes to the production of this or that determinate Effect, in some sort respecting the last of Ends, his own Glory. To conclude, the Stoick hath clip't the immense and towering wings of mans Will, and allows it no wider range, then what the line of Fate affords: while the sublimer Christi∣an scornes to stoop to the Lure of any Necessity, besides the special Decrees of the Divine Councel; not conceiving his will subject to the inclination, much less the compulsion, of any force below that of him, who conferred that infinite liberty upon it. For he, indeed, holds the rains of our Wills, and can bend them: yet non coactione violenta, sed leni suavique influxu, not by violent Coaction, but gentle and sweet Invitation, as the School-men distinguish.

Now if we consider Fate in the notion of the Stoicks; 'twill * 1.187 be no easy wonder, if any man, though his reason be never so much hoodwinckt with the veile of Prejudice, shall not at first glance discover it to be an opinion Blasphemous in respect to God; insomuch as it strikes at no less then the cardinal and inseparable Attribute of his Nature, Omnipotence, by coercing his infinite and arbitrary Activity with the definite laws of se∣cond Causes, and denying him the prerogative of absolute su∣periority to his mechanique Vicegerent, or (rather) Instrument, Nature: and, inrespect of man, intolerably Absurd; since it subverts the Liberty of all humane actions, and leaves nothing in the power of mans Will either to elect, or avoide. For who∣ever conced's that the mind of man is subject to the compulsive regiment of Fatal Necessity, and so that all the actions of our lives are but the accomplishments of so many ineluctable, im∣moveable, and inevitable Decrees, from the birth of time enrol∣led in the Ephimerides of Destiny; must also concede, upon clear inference, that our Creator endowed us with the Semi-divine

Faculty of Rationality, either to no purpose at all, or at best to facilitate our betraying our selves into the snares of ruine and misery beyond possibility of reparation or redemption; Must induce, that the Will being deposed from her arbitrary throne, the judgement seate of Reason must fall to the ground; nor can there be any room left for Consultation to sit and determine the debates of the Soul concerning the good or Evil of her objects: since notwithstanding all our most profound, serious, and prudent Deliberation, the success of our actions, as well as the results of our councels, would then be no other, but what hath bin resolved on and predecreed by Fate; and then, to conceive our selves obnoxious to punishment, for incurring those sins, which are imposed upon our wills by a necessity beyond our con∣troll, is an open derogation to the equity and Justice of the Divine Nature, and to ascribe our Evil to that, which is by essence superlatively Good. That Prudence, is miserable Folly; the study of Wisdome, laborious Vanity; and all our ancient Lawmakers, either ridiculous Fools, or detestable Tyrants: since they prescribe and enjoyne those things, which either we must have done, had not they injoyned them, or are restrained from do∣ing, in spite of our own conformable inclinations, by the contrary impulsion or seduction of Destiny. And, finally, that all Divine and Human Exhortation to Good, and Dehortation from evil, are unnecessary and supersluous. Thus shall Virtue and Vice va∣nish into meer and empty notions; and Religion become, what Libertines would have it, a mysterious and well contrived in∣vention to support temporall Greatness, and fright vulgar minds into a tame submission to the arbitrary dictates of their imperious Lords: nor shall there be a Heaven to compensate suffering Piety, or a Hell for the punition of Villainy; because as the Good man could not but live honestly and religiously, whether he would or no; so must it not be in the power of the Wicked man, to abstain from doing Evil. Thus shall Love and Hatred, the two most usefull Affections of our Souls, be robbed of their proper Objects, Amiable and Detestable: nor shall Justice find convenient subjects, whereon to place Laudation and Vituperation; since Praise only belongs to those, who have cho∣sen

to do Good, when 'twas in their power to have done Evil and Dispraise is the due guerdon of those, who choose to do Evil, when twas in their power to have done Good. And thus shall all our Prayers be fruitless, our vowes hopeless, our Sacrifices unprofitable, and all other acts of Devotion desperate Vanity. The least of which and of a myriade of other equivalent Ab∣surdities, Incongruities, and oblique, or appendent and infer∣rible Blasphemies, shooting up from this one poysonous root of Absolute Fatality; is more then enough inconsistent to the fundamentals both of Reason and Religion, to deterr even Heathens from approaching, much more embracing and defen∣ding it.

But as for Theological Fate, or Predestination; if accepted in the legitimate sense of the Primitive Church, and not in that rigorous and inflexible notion of the German Calvinist: I con∣ceive it fully concordant not only to many Texts of Sacred writ, but even conciliable to mans Free will, notwithstanding the ap∣parent repugnancy betwixt them; as I shall endevour to prove singularly in an ensuing chapter.

SECT. III.

AS for the Second Opinion, viz. that the Term of mans Life * 1.188 is not fixt beyond possibility of either Anticipation, or Postposition; this, I profess, my judgement inclines me to prefer, as that which seem's to be drawn in the directest line from the point of Truth; and that for two mighty Reasons.

First, because there are very few places, or testimonies of Scripture, which may be thought to advantage the doctrine * 1.189 of Absolute Fatality; but, on the contrary, very many alle∣gable in defence of this.

Secondly, because those Texts, which make for this, have * 1.190 their importance so perpendicular, that nothing but a violent

perversion can wrest, so perspicuous, that nothing but obscure interpretations can darken, so soft and easy, that nothing but over nice and unnatural Exceptions can harden it. And Justice will frown on that stupid partiality, that shall prefer paucity to multitude, obscurity to clarity, and difficult to genuine and familiar solutions.

To explain and justify this by Instance; the Hercules, or * 1.191 most▪ champion Text usually brought into the field to assert the opinion of Absolute Fatality, in the precise manner and time of every mans Dissolution into his first matter, is that of Job; Definiti sunt dies ejus, & numerus mensium ejus tecum est; statuta ejus fecisti, & non praeteribit:

His days are determined, the number of his moneths are with thee; thou hast appoin∣ted his bounds, that he cannot pass. (chap. 14. vers. 5.)

Now this place hath much of obscurity, and little of strength for the supportation of their opinion, more then ours. (1) Much of obscurity; since, though racked to the highest extension of its importance, no Logique can extort any other Conclusion from it, but this, that the Term of mans Life is fixt by God, so that impossible it is for man to remove it forwards to a greater longitude; the concession whereof no way infringeth our asser∣tion. For hence it follows not, that tis impossible for man, by intempetance, by the temerarious obtrusion of himself upon the jaws of danger, or other means whatever, to Anticipate that Term, or remove it backwards to a greater Brevity. Again, I have yet met with no substantial reason, that may countermand our construction of these words, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or in the latitude of Generality; and therefore may safely understand them, as an expression of the brevity of mans life, in specie, not in individuo; their whole Mass weighing no more then this: that the life of man, being included within a certain Circle, or round of days and moneths, and circumscribed by a short succession of minutes flowing into a stream of Time, cannot possibly be extended to a longer duration then what our Creator hath prefixt to all man∣kind: i. e. then that moment to which he hath determined and adapted the durability of mans specisical Temperament, or

Principles of Vitality. And thus interpreted, this place runs pa∣rallel to that of Moses (Psalm. 90. vers. 10.) Dies nostrae vitae septuaginta anni, & si in fortudinibus sit, octoginta anni, & fortitudo eorum molestia ac labor, quoniam recedit citò & avo∣lamus: as also that of David (Psalm. 39. vers. 5.) Ecce, ut palmos posuisti dies meos, & aevum meum tanquam nihil coram te; profectò universae Vanitas est omnis homo stans; Behold, thou hast made my days as a hands breadth, and mine age is nothing before thee: every man, verily, at his best state is altogether Vanity.

True it is (nor have I heard many, besides Helmont, and a * 1.192 Fanatique Brother or two of the mystical Order of the Rosy Cross, impugne it) that the Life of Man doth consist in a Peacefull Discord maintained between the 4 First Qualities (I understand them, according to the Physiology of Epicurus, and Cartesius, as certain Modifications of Matter, or Quantity) a rising from the commixture of them in a proportionate Dose, or commensurate symmetry, respective to the Activity of some and Patability of others; and proximly, in a requisite harmo∣ny, of the Primigenious Heat and Radical Moysture: which harmony being more or less durable according to the more or less exquisite temperament of body assigned to each single per∣son, by the free dispensation of the Divine Will; it follows, unavoidably, that the Longitude or Brevity of every mans life must naturally depend upon the perfection, or imperfection of his Idiosyncrasy, or individual Constitution.

Nor doth it carry less semblance of truth, that by the decrees of that Councel, which is all Wisdome, and can therefore will nothing but what is superlatively Good, it was enacted, that the ordinary Duration of this Humane Temperament should be cir∣cumscribed and limited to some certain general, though not pre∣cisely adstrict, term or space of years, conceive of 70. 80. 90. or 100. over or under: and that our ingenerated Protogenitors, even before the depravation of their Vital Principles by their 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or precipitous Fall, held their lives by the same common lease; for manifest it is, that the Tree of Life was

planted in Paradise to this purpose, that the fruit thereof being frequently eaten might instaurate the vital Balsam of man as fast as it suffered exhaustion from the depredatory operation of his Implantate Spirit, and by a continual refocillation of im∣paired nature keep her up fresh and vigorous to longevity. To which I ask leave, with due submission to the correction of maturer judgements, to tender my private conception; that the like extraordinary means of making the sands of life run slowly and long in the glass of Time, was by the special indulgence of the great Preserver of men, permitted to Methusalem and other 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of the worlds youth; whose registers amounted to more Centuries of years, then ours usually to Decads, and who outlived all the titles of Consanguinity.

(2) Little of strength for the supportation of their opinion, * 1.193 more then of ours; for though we should concede, what these ea∣ger Patrons of Fatality principally insist upon, viz. that the sense of these words of Job is restrained only to that precise Term, or prestitute Date appointed by God to the life of every individu∣al man: yet notwithstanding can they not from this concession extort more advantage to their plea, then what doth naturally result from thence towards the justification of ours. For Job doth not so much as tacitly insinuate, by what kind of Decree, manner of institution, or computation that Definition or Cir∣cumscription of daies and moneths was made by God: nor is there ought to hinder us from affirming, that the tenor of his words remains sincere and inviolate, when we understand that kind of statute, concerning the circumscription of mans life to belong to that Classis of Decrees, which God, either upon his own infallible Previdence of the future demeanour of every man, or upon the Hypothesis of mans good or evil use of the li∣berty of his will, hath made, or may occasionally make. Besides all this our equitable conference of many other Texts of Scripture, which we shall have occasion, in the remaining dilucidation of this Theorem to alleadge, with this of Job; will plainly, and almost unavoydably ascertain us, that his words are to be interpreted in our sense, de specie, and not de individuo.

But, in the present, it is sufficient for us to have declared, that from that place of such reputed validity amongst the Defendants of Destiny, no firme Argument can be extracted to protect them, or impugne us.

And therefore I find my self at liberty to discharge my proper * 1.194 duty, viz. the Confession of those Reasons, which charmed my judgement to an adherence to their perswasion, who contend for the Mobility of the Term of mans Life.

The First of those is desumed from the Testimonies of the Oracle of Truth, the Book of God; and in our list of those Testimonies, those deserve to stand in the front, which in am∣ple, elegant, and express terms warrant our Assertion, that the life of man hath bin, and may be, both Abbreviated and Pro∣longed.

The Coryphaeus, or leading Text is that of the Wise King (Proverb. 10. vers. 27.) Timor Domini apponit (aut prolongat) dies; anni verò impiorum abbreviantur: the Fear of the Lord prolongeth daies; but the years of the wicked shall be shortned. Then which nothing can be more express, perspicuous, and po∣sitive; and so nothing less subject to detorsion or altercation.

The Lievtenant, or second to that, is the gracious encouragement to filial reverence and obedience annexed to the 5^th. Precept in the Decalogue; Honora Patrem tuum, & matrem tuam, ut pro∣longentur dies tui super terram quam Jehov ah Deus tuus dat tibi: which the Apostle of the Gentiles (in Epist. ad Ephes. 6. ver. 2.) call's the first (understand it of the second table) Commande∣ment with promise, viz. of a singular reward; or the first with a peculiar promise, and such as hath ever bin held distinct from the promise made in the second Precept of the Decalogue, in∣somuch as that is common and universal, comprehending all kinds of Blessings, but this only peculiar and determined to that of diuturnous subsistence, or Longevity. In Exhod. 24. ver. 25. and many other places, the Pen-man of God earnestly inculcates the benefit of the Fear of God, by this forcible impulsive; that he would crown them with length, health, and serenity of days, who should revere his most sacred name and conscientiously

observe his laws. Si colatis Deum vestrum, benedicet pani ve∣stro, & aquis vestris, auferetque infirmitatem è medio vestri, non crit abortiens aut sterilis in terra vestra: numerum dierum in terra vestra complebo. Which importune incitement to pie∣ty, those Commentators have no way enlarged, who have ex∣tended it to this just height of intention; that to those happy Sonnes of Israel, who subjugated their Wills to the written Will of God, and cherished no desires so much, as those of cordial obedience to the rules of his Law, demeaning themselves reve∣rently towards their Maker, and righteously toward their Neighbour; to these God would vouchsafe, not only that they should accomplish that lease of life, which they held by the grant of Nature, or the condition of each mans Idiosyncrasy; but even that their Temperament should be meliorated, made more symmetrical, compact, tenacious and consequently more durable, as well by the soveraign, balsamical, and restorative Faculties of their Aliment, impregnated or inriched by the tin∣cture of his continual Benediction, as by the benigne and salu∣tiferous disposition of the Aer, and propitious influences of the Host of Heaven, which otherwise are wont to induce sensible Exorbitances and Anomalies upon the blood, spirits, and solid parts of mans body, and from those seeds of morbosities produce various both Acute and Chronique Diseases, which either con∣sume, or corrupt the Vital Nectar, and accelerate the exe∣cution of that Sentence, Pulvis es, & Pulvis eris. So that of infirme, languid, and valetudinarious persons, they should be made robust, athletical, and longevous; no less then the Barren should be made Fertil: the one by the Conservatory, the other by the Prolifical virtue of Gods special Grace. The same pro∣mise we read frequently repeated by God, in most of his Em∣bassies delivered by his Secretary, Moses, to his People; and more particularly in Deuteron. 4. vers. 40. and chap. 30. vers. 20. And as he proposeth length of days for the desiderable reward of obedience: so, on the contrary, he makes Immaturity of Death, the affrighting penalty of Disobedience. For (Deuteron. 30. vers. 19. and 28. vers. 20.) contain a large Catalogue of insirmities, diseases, and corporal calamities feircely comminated

to the immorigerous and disobedient: and in vers. 62. tis em∣phatically sayd of Transgressors, ye shall be left few in number, whereas you were as the starrs of heaven for multitude; because thou wouldst not obey the voyce of the Lord, thy God.

A Third egregious text, is that where God, gratefully resen∣ting Salomons Election of Wisdome before all other Accom∣plishments temporal set before him, supererogates to his vote, by the additional concession of long life (2 Kings 3. 14.) And if thou wilt walk in my wayes, to keep my Statutes and com∣mandements, as thy Father David did; then will I lengthen thy days.

A fourth, is that definitive sentence of David (Psalm. 55. vers. ult.) Bloody and deceitfull men shall not live out half their days.

A Fifth, that of the same Author (Psalm. 102. vers. 25.) O my God take me not away in the midst of my days: and in like manner, (Psalm. 6. and 30. and 88. and 111.) he with fer∣vent importunity supplicates, that God would be pleased not to cut off the thread of his life, while he was then in the spring and vigour of his age, but restore him from that languor and marcid Consumption, introduced by his grievous disease, to his pristine sanity, that he might thereby be enabled to chant his praises in the Sanctuary, and do good to the children of Sion.

A Sixth, that remarkable Precedent of the prolongation of life beyond the term presixt, King Ezechias (Esai. 38. vers. 10.) who being infested with the most mortiferous of diseases, the Plague, and convulst with the horror of death, denounced by the thundering Prophet; in the intervalls betwixt the showers of heavy tears, he sighes out this lamentation: in the cutting off my days I shall go to the gates of death; I am deprived of the residue of my years. Mine age is departed, and is removed from me as a shepards tent: I have cut off like a weaver my life (vitam meam veluti textoris telam praecidi, as some read it) he will cut me off with pining sickness. Which signifies as much as this, that he was adjudged to dye before his time. But this night of sorrow was dispelled by a comfortable morn, caused by the light of that Sun, which riseth with healing in his wings;

for immediately after, his contrition, sincere resipiscence, and earnest supplications obtaining a repreive from the mercifull hands of him, who desireth not the death of a sinner, the exe∣cution of that fatal sentence was suspended, and a paroll lease of 15. years supernumerary annexed to that old one of his life, fully, to some few anxious minutes, expired. And can any Pre∣judice be so inslexible, as not to stoop to the conversion of this pregnant Example, which on one side, testifies the possibility of the Decurtation of the Term of mans Life, by any mortal dis∣ease; and, on the other, manifesteth the possibility of the Prolongation of the same, by the seasonable and right use of the means conductive thereunto, viz. remorse of Conscience, repen∣tance, supplication, and medical remedies. For, prescribed it was by Isaiah, thus: Let them take a Bunch of Figgs, and lay it for a plaister upon the boyle (or Carbuncle) and he shall re∣cover.

And, to bring up the reare of these Sacred Arguments, mi∣litant on our side, let us instance in the semblably pertinent story of the Ninivites; who, by the counter-violence of those holy spells, Penitence, severe Humiliation as well of the outward, as of the inward man, and Prayer distracted with nought but tears and groans, seem to have abrogated the Decree of Destiny. For the Bowels of Divinity yearning with paternal compassion towards so populous a City; wherein though all were guilty, yet many millions must have bin blended in the chaos of com∣mon ruine, who were yet too young to share in the actual Depravities; smoothed the brow of his Justice, and prevailed with him to interpret their universal mortification of Impiety, as an Allegorical accompletion of his resolve concerning the ge∣neral devastation and mortality denounced against their Persons and Habitations; to accept the slames of their thick sacrifi∣ces as Expiatory and preventive to the impendent Combustion of their City; and heighten the wholsome virtue of their Ab∣stinence, observed in the strict Fast, to a generous Prophyla∣ctique or Preservative against the Pestilence now ready to be kindled by the breath of his Indignation.

Nor are we destitute of Instances, in holy Chronicles, to

teftify the Reverse part of our assertion, viz. That the Term of mans life hath bin Abbreviated. For who can read the story of the General Deluge, and not observe, that the whole stock of Humanity (except 8. beleivers, who committed themselves pri∣soners to the Ark of Preservation) was immaturely extinguished, and by the most proper and expedite way of corruption, resol∣ved into its Hyle, or Watery Principle? Who can rehearse Moses his relation of those many thousands of incredulous and murmuring Israelites, buried in the wilderness, to whom God had promised, nay sworn to give them possession of the land of Canaan; and not be satisfied, that their Rebellion and Infi∣delity anticipated their funerals? and who examine the fate of those Cowards, who being sent to explore the fertility of the pro∣mised Land, and the forces of the Amalekites, returned a dis∣couraging answer to their brethren, and were therefore cut down by the revenging sword of the Lord of Hosts, in the noon of their lives; and not be convicted, that the Wages of Sin is Death, and may be paied as justly, though not so naturally, in the morn, or noon, as evening of life?

Now so fiduciary are these Testimonies, that whoever shall justly compute their Number, perpend their Gravity, and clearly discern their Perspicuity; must confess it no less then open injustice to all the Inducements of beleife, to debase them so much as to a Competition for the priority of perswasion, with those Few, Light, and Obscure Allegations, upon whose Cre∣dit the Factors of Immoveable Destiny have adventured to take up their opinion. However, that we may add a brighter po∣lish to this our Gold, by scouring off the rust of all Exceptions made against it: it deserves our time, and sweat to dispossess our * 1.195 Adversaries of all their pretended interest in the importance of Three the chiefest of our Testimonies.

First they attempt to infirme our title to that definitive and emphatical sentence of the Psalmist, The bloody and deceitfull men shall not live out half their days; and this under the pre∣text of several perverse Interpretations: as (1) by understan∣ding the place thus; Impii & sanguinarii non dimidiabunt

negotia sua, they shall not accomplish half their Designes, or, contrary to their expectation they shall fall before they have brought their evil Purposes to pass.

To this unlawfull Construction we reply, that this subterfuge was contrived by that profest Libertine of Christianity, Luther, to the end he might support his doctrine of Absolute Fate, which with so much Ardor and Pertinacy he had once maintained a∣gainst that ornament not only of Germany, but of Europe also, Erasmus. But the Connexion of these with the former words, manifestly prohibite any such Comment. Thou, O God (sayth David) shalt bring them down into the pit of destruction, i. e. thou shalt irretiate or insnare them, and suddainly preci∣pitate them into the same pit, which they have digged for me, thy servant; or thou shalt, according to the concernment of the Hebrew phrase, destroy them subita praematura morte, by a suddain premature death; that from the experiment of their unexpected ruine, the world may learn thy justice, and be sa∣tisfied of thy favour and indulgence to the pious, and thy ha∣tred and indignation to the impious. For if we accommodate this text meerly to the Natural expiration of the term of life, which is appointed as well to the Righteous as to the Reprobate, and generally to all men: pray, what Energy or Emphasis can remain to that saying of David, Tu facies eos descendere in pu∣teum foveae; for then we shall reduce all the meaning only to this, illi morientur statuto suo tempore, sicut mortales alii om∣nes, they shall dye in their appointed time, as all other mortal men: and if so, who might not have justly made this retort up∣on David; & te etiam tuo tempore, sive cum finis vitae tuae praestitutus aderit, Deus faciet descendere in puteum foveae, and thee also, when thy appointed time shall come, or when the temperamental lease of thy life shall be worn out, shall God bring inro the pit of destruction.

Again, if we exchange Negotia for Dies; then must we re∣nounce the appropriation of the sense to the Wicked, and make it common also to the Godly. For, who ever lived to accom∣plish all his purposes? But the expression sufficiently illustrates the intention; for it exactly responds to many other phrases used

by the Holy Spirit to the same scope, as, They shall not fulfill the number of their days, their days shall be abbreviated &c.

(2) By Translating the Text thus; Non dimidiabunt dies suos, (i. e.) peribunt antequàm sperent: they shall perish in the immaturity of their Hopes, not of their Lives. For the sensuall Affections of their earthly minds having determined their judgements only to the expectation of enjoying blessings inservient to the satisfaction of their domineering Concupiscence, make them promise to themselves long subsistence in this their paradise; nay extend their vain projects as far as the impossi∣ble period of Eternity: so though they survive even life it self, by dwindling out their bedrid days, till the marasmus of ex∣tream old age hath embalmed them before-hand, pined them into perfect Skeletons, and so defrauded their hungry Credi∣tors, the Wormes; yet since they drop away full of youthfull and green hopes, their departure is premature and inopine; and so they may be sayd, not to dimidiate their days.

We return that this illegitimate Desoant ought to be reject∣ed for 4, considerable Causes. (1) Because it cannot be justly charged upon the words, no not in the greatest latitude of Con∣struction. For tis not there sayd, the Wicked shall dye sooner then they expect; but positively and expresly, they shall not dimidiate their days: now every Ideot can tell, that it is one thing, not to live out half their days, and another, not to beleive they shall live out half their days. (2) because it argues the sacred Psalmist of a manifest Falsity. For when the ungodly expire, they do not only Dimidiate their days, but Accomplish them, Death being at any time the December of life. (3) Be∣cause it imports a double repugnancy to Truth. For first, now there are, and in all ages, since the first experiment of death, have bin millions of Vicious men, who even in the wildest paroxysme of their Vanity, and highest orgasme of their Pride and Am∣bition, have still cooled themselves with E〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and felt a dejecting horror from within, at the remembrance of that Motto, Statutum est omnibus semel mori; so far is our Nature from entertaining any hopes of Immortality, though but in a dreame, or melancholy depravation of Phansy.

And, again, no Chronicle is barren in the stories of prosperous Libertines, who have wanted nothing but some Cross to in∣deare the Felicity of their lives, have unravelled their vital web in the highest blandishments of Sense, attained to miraculous Longevity, and being sated with the profuse treatments of Fortune, have outlived their own large stock of Hopes; so that a Poet might take the Liberty to say of them, they dyed for grief, that they had nothing left to wish for, which they had not already surfetted in the fruition of. (4) Because the admis∣sion there of loseth the Singularity or Determination of Davids speech to Sanguinary and Nefarious Persons. For, if to Dimidiate their days, import no more then to dye by the same common kind of Death, and at the same period of their Temperamental Lease, when, by the ineluctable laws of Destiny, it is enacted that all men shall revert to Dust: certainly, there can remain no reason why Impious men, so dying, should be thought more unhappy, because they were Cruent and Unjust, then others. To con∣clude; of all those just Persons mentioned in the old Testament, who were translated from this Vale of tears to the Celestial Hils of permanent delight, by early and premature deaths (amongst whom the Apostle (Heb. 11. vers. 38.) hath accounted some so excellent above the common rate of humanity, that the world was not worthy of them) of such, I say, 'twas true, according to this erroneous paraphrase, that they did not Dimidiate their days, because they dyed sooner then they expected. For they did not only hope, but upon the faithfull promise of God even assure themselves of a longer continuation heer below to do him further service. And confidently to expect, nay by a lively hope to anticipate the fruition of a promised blessing; is a privilege peculiar only to those, to whom the promise doth properly and solely belong: but the blessing of Longevity was only then promised to the pious observers of the Divine laws; as is ma∣nifest from the places formerly cited.

(3) By fixing the scope of the Text only upon that mature Term of life, to which many ordinarily attain, viz. to 60. 70. 80. 90. years, more or less, according to the respective Durati∣on of every individual Constitution; and so concluding the verity

of Davids speech only in this respect. For (say they) the An∣nales of Impious men seldome arise to so large an account; be∣cause either the sword of war, or justice, or some Accident oc∣casioned by their Villanies takes them off, before the completion of their natural Term of years.

But this sinister Detorsion of the Text ought also to be repu∣diated for two Reasons.

(1) In regard tis manifestly heterodox, and dissimilar to the express sense of the words; since they say not, Wicked men shall not live out half the days of Others, but their own. Now the days of their lives amount not to so many years, as are requi∣red to the commensuration of the natural space betwixt the Animation and Disanimation of the posterity of Adam, pre∣fixt by the decree of him, who is the Breath of our nostrils: and therefore, when they fully and wholly accomplish that common compute, with what semblance of truth can they be sayd to Di∣midiate their days? Moreover, if those Sanguinary Miscreants, against whom David directly denounceth this judgement of Premature Mortality, be sayd not to dimidiate their days, only in this respect, that they seldome arrive at that provect and silver-headed Age, wherein the Tapor of life, by the ordinary deflux of Nature, burns dim and languid, and at last, for want of oyle, winks out into pepetual night: then with equal right may it be affirmed also of many Holy and Just persons, that they do not dimidiate theirs; nay tis a question not easily answered, whether the same may not be asserted of these, with more justice then of those. For, how rarely doe we observe the pulse of Pious men to beate, till their Arteries grow hard from the Hectick distemper of old age? How small a manual would the Legends of all those Saints, whose names and stories yet sur∣vive, make, who have lived till the Almond tree hath budded and flourished: and how vast a volume would theirs make, who have bin gathered green into the Granary of God, and never lived to see one revolution of Saturn about the solary Orbe? and how frequently have we occasion to comfort our selves, after the transplantation of Junior Virtue, with that adage, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉? Nor hath Piety always proved a Coat of maile

against the danger of Malice; or the Panoplie of a Christian▪ defence against the sword of war; or perfect Charity, an Anti∣dote to Poyson; or Temperance, an Alexipharmacon against the Pestilence; or religious Abstinence, a Preservative against Fa∣mine; or Innocence awarded the stroke of the Executioner: in short, as to the time of Death, in this concernement, there is one event to the Righteous, and to the Wicked, to the clean, and to the unclean, to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not; as dies the Good, so dies the Sinner, and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath.

(2) In respect it disarmes the Text of all its Force and Purpose. For to what end could David say, they should not dimidiate their days, if thereby he intended no more then this, that they should not run over half their stage of life, or subsist untill grey haires; unless the ground or reason thereof be also subjoyned, viz. because of their impious and bloody Inclinations and Pra∣ctises: and so consequently our present opinion be admitted? For if he beleived it constituted by the immutable law of Fate, that such should then, and at no other time be taken off; with∣out any relation at all to the contracting and anticipating merit of their Impiety: what makes it to the principal scope, that he sayd, they shall not dimidiate their days? since, according to this inconvenient interpretation, they do not only not Dimi∣diate theirdays, but fully Accomplish them, as any the most mortified and conscientious observers of Gods sacred laws: and so neither Piety shall retain its attribute of having the power to prolong, nor its Contrary longer weare the just imputation of having the power to abbreviate the Term of Life. To which we may add, that David could not, without special Revelation from that omniscient Light, that penetrates the darkness of Futurity, deliver this certain Prognostick concerning the non-dimidiation of their days. For since he could not but have ob∣served that many the most accursed Vassals of Satan, (the Pro∣vidence of God so permitting, for considerations privy onely to his Wisdome) attained to extreme old age: whence could he acquire that prophetique knowledge, that those particular Vil∣laines, whom he levelled at, should be taken in their own snares,

and perish immaturely in the nonage of their lives? Undoub∣tedly, he could desume that prediction from no oracle less pre∣scient, then that Spirit, whose Essence is Truth, and to whose cognition all things are actually present: but who can, though but with a specious or verisimilous argument, prove that David received any such special Revelation? Wherefore Reason ad∣viseth that we acquiesce in the judgement of most of the Fa∣thers, who unanimously resolve, that David reslected his thoughts upon that positive sentence in the Levitical Law, which (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) for the major part, comminates a short and calam∣tous life, and a repentine and miserable death to the Ungodly; but, on the contrary, promiseth longevous and peaceable days, to those, who should revere the sacred Majesty, and observe the wholsome ordinances of Jehovab: and upon the general infallibility of that Sentence, erected his particular prediction; that those Sanguinary traytors who had with so much detesta∣ble policy prepared stratagems to ensnare his feet walking in the ways of innocence and charity, should be entangled in their own mischievous wiles, and stumble into their graves in the midle of their race. To which we may accommodate that of Juvenal,

Ad Generum Cereris, sine caede ac sanguine pauci Descendunt Reges, & sicca morte Tyranni.

Few Tyrants goe late to th' infernal slood; But sink betimes in Cataracts of blood.

The second place they endeavour to betray out of our possession, is that promission of Longevity, whereby the Father of all things * 1.196 was pleased to invite Children to a due Veneration of their Pa∣rents: which they corrupt with this dangerous gloss. This (say they) was spoken Anthropopathically, or ad captum hominis, by the Holy Spirit, who frequently hath descended to discourse in the stammering and imperfect dialect of mortality; so that the days of obsequious children are said to be prolonged, then when they are blessed with diuturnity, tranquillity and sanity of life, which as it immediately depends on the immutable decree

of God, so cannot one moment be superadded thereunto beyond the term prefixt, unless we infer a manifest Inoonstancy upon that immutable Essence, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, with whom is no variableness nor shadow of turning. But that the Ancient of days had determined, that such should live to wear the honourable badge of Antiquity, who should con∣stantly beare a venerable regard toward those, from whom, un∣der God, they had derived their being: yet so, that if any obedient Child should chance to be snatched away by the tal∣lons of that sarcophagous Vultur, Death, before time had re∣duced his haires to the same colour with his skull; which is no rarity; yet notwithstanding doth God in no respect deflect from the point of his general determination, but persevere in the accomplishment of his promise, no less then a Prince, who bestows a million of crowns upon that servant, to whom he had promised only a hundred. For this life is no Mansion, but a narrow and incommodious Inne, standing in the way to a better, whose Term is Eternity: and therfore, ter felix ille, cui ante lassitudinem peractum est iter, thrice happy he, who arrives at his journies end, before he is weary of travell. And our Grand∣fathers tell us, that old Age is but the magazine of sorrows, the sowre Dreggs of life, the Portal to the Nosocomie or Hospital of Diseases, and indeed a kind of living-Death, wherein men only Breath and Doate; which though all men wish for, yet no man delights in when it comes: optima cum expectatur, cum advenit, onerosa sibi, aliis molesta; good only when expected, evil when enjoyed, because burdensome to it self, and trouble∣some to others. So that those Saturnine minds, which were most ambitious to wear the silver Crown of old Age; when they had obtained it, found it to gall their feeble temples, and enervate all their limbs: nor did they appear other then wea∣therbeaten and mouldring statues of their former selves, Human-Grashoppers, or Ghosts walking in Skeletons. In fine, that the whole concernment of this encouragement to Filial Duty, doth consist only in this; that Vivacity in this transitory World is promised unto morigerous Children, only in this capacity, that it is a Benediction of God: and a Benediction only in this re∣spect,

that it is a Document of Divine Grace, or an Evidence of Gods singular love toward them; which he doth infinitely more testify unto them by a timous and early delivery of them from this calamitous prison of Mortality into the glorious Li∣berty of the Sonnes of God.

We reply, that this plea of Exception against our lawfull right to the place, is not only frivolous and dilute; but even derogatory as well to the Sanction, as Excellence of the Promise. For, to transmute the serious and faithfull promise of him, whose words are yea and amen, into an Anthropopathical Sophisme, or affe∣cted expression in the stammering Dialect of Humanity; is fri∣volous, and not only to stagger, but subvert the Fidelity there∣of, and so demolish the comfortable hopes of Filial Piety, nay, what's a degree of Blasphemy, to insimulate Truth it self of Im∣posture. For, to promise Longevity to morigerous Children, when formerly and without any respect to their prevised obe∣dience, God hath prefixt unto them an Intransible Term of life: what els can it be, but to make him promise that, which cannot be promised Hypothetically, or upon condition; unless that which was Absolutely decreed long before the promise was made, be violently cancelled and altered. And so much the more intolerable indignity to the sacred majesty of God, doth this absurd Exception infer; by how much the more both of Im∣prudence and Inconstancy it must import, to play the uncircum∣spect Sophister with those, who (as our Adversaries themselves affirme) stood possessed with a full perswasion, that the Term of every mans life was absolutely, and without any respect to his future piety, or Impiety, predetermined. I profess sincerely, I am yet to be perswaded, that any Credulity can be so pedan∣tique and slavish, as to entertain a beleif; that even Man (I forbear to say, God) can thus openly and detectibly dissimulate with any the most stupid and indiscreet person alive; unless he be first resolved to expose himself to the just scorn and derision of all men, and by this loose and childish jugling forfeit that reputation, which he had acquired by his former grave and ora∣culous treaties, and the just performance of all Articles, to which he had subscribed. 'Tis one thing to admit, that the Holy

Ghost doth sometimes descend to discourse in the stammering and amphibological Phrase of man, when he is pleased to hint unto us those 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or ineffable Mysteries, which are too fine to be spun into words by the gross fingers of flesh, and are notions re∣served to entertain the Soul, when enfranchized from the bonds of Corporeity; such are those glances, whereby he affords us a dark landskip of the New Jerusalem, and allegorical descri∣ption of the joyes and glories of the Eternal Life, an idea of the majesty of his incomprehensible Essence, and three distinct Subsistences in one indivisible Existence, &c. and a far different, nay contrary, to say, that he doth speak Anthropopathically and conform to our unequall capacities, when he promiseth those things, which do not only not transcend our faculties of compre∣hension; but are familiar to our knowledg, nay such as the nee∣rest concernment of our nature requires us fully and perspicuously to know. And such is the quality of those Blessings, which the Bounty of Providence hath by promise assured unto the Vir∣tuous, in order to the demulsion and dulcification of the sharp condition of this life; and particularly that of longevous subsi∣stence upon earth. To conclude; the Spirit or Form of a Pro∣mise doth consist in this, that they, to whom the promise is made, do understand the good therein specified, to be really, bona fide, & in specie, intended to be performed by him, who made the promise. Now, if there arise any doubt, whether or no that promise be repugnant to a verity formerly declared; then doth the force and sanction, together with the Dignity thereof, totally vanish and become voyd.

Our Adversaries have rejoyned, that God doth therefore pro∣mise Longevity to obsequious Children, because he hath formerly decreed to qualifie their particular Constitutions with respective Durability.

But, alas! this subterfuge neither dissolves the Difficulty, nor prevents the Doubt. For if his Decree, concerning their Longevity, be Absolute, devoyd of all Suppositionality, and suspended upon no respect to his Prevision of their obedience: no reason can dis∣cover what Force or Energy the promise can pretend unto from the performance of the Condition required. Again, how can

that Promise 〈◊〉〈◊〉 way of invitation or allurement, affect those, who are already confirmed, that what the promise imports, is formerly, by the positive and non-conditionate Will of God, made inevitable, and hath the Possibility of its Futurition de∣termined to precise Necessity? In fine, the Postulation of that Condition can neither consist with the Eternal Identity of God that promises; nor effectually move those, to whom he makes the promise, to endeavour the Consequution of that ample re∣ward of filial obedience: for his Decree, concerning the Term of their life, doth and shall forever stand firm and immote, whe∣ther the Condition be performed, or not.

The last Testimony they have essayed to extort from us, is the * 1.197 Instance of Ezekiah; and this by a Fourfold Cavillation.

(1) By this Excuse, Singulare aliquod Exemplum non ever∣tere regulam, that one single denormous Example is not sufficient to evert the general obligation of a law; or one swallow makes no summer.

This Exception, I confess, might have had some colour, or slender pretext of Validity; had not our Opponents themselves totally excluded it, by asserting that the immutable law of Destiny was equally extended to all and every individual per∣son from Adam down to us. For most certain it is, that God never limited his free Omnipotence, by any fixt law, or bound up his own hands with the same setled Constitutions, whereby he circumscribed the definite activity and duration of his Crea∣tures: it being the Prerogative of his Nature, to know no Im∣possibility, but to be able to act either above, or against the statutes of his Deputy, whensoever, and upon what subject, and to what end soever he pleases. But I have no warrant to beleive, that among the Propugnators of Fate, any one hath deviated inro so remote an Alogie, as to opinion, that the Lots of all men are not delivered out of one and the same common urne; but that the Decrees concerning the Destinies of some particular persons, are not so definitive, precise, and immoveable, as those of all others in generall.

(2) By this Response, that under the seeming Absoluteness of the Prophets Sentence, Morieris, Thou shalt dye; there lay concealed a tacite Hypothesis, which was this: Nisi seria poe∣nitudine te ad Deum convertas, unless by serious and profound re∣pentance thou shalt mortify the old man of sin, and apply thy self wholly to the Mercies of God.

Against this mistaken plea our defence shall be, that it wants the principal inducement to beleif, and so can afford no satisfacti∣on at all. For, (besides this, that it quadrates neither to their First Exception, nor their Thesis concerning the Immobility of Destiny) what Logick can tolerate the induction of an Hy∣pothetical upon a Categorical Proposition? or, more expresly, how can any Condition be comprehended under that message, which by a definitive and peremptory decree, and such as carried no respect to the performance, or non-performance of any con∣dition whatever, tels the K. in down right terms, that the date of his life was now expired, and that the severe Publican, Death, stood ready at the door of his chamber, within some few hours to exact from him the common tribute of Nature? Subordinata non pugnant, is an Axiome I well know, and am ready to receive a challenge from any singularity, that dares question the univer∣sality of its truth; but, that a condiiional Decree can be subor∣dinate to an Absolute, I am bold to deny, nor need I goe far for an Argument to prove the impossibility thereof; the very Anti∣thesis of those notions, Absolute and Conditional sufficiently declaring as much. To take the just dimensions of this Cloud; every Condition is moveable upon the hinge of Indefinity or Un∣certainty, as being suspended upon an uncertain and mutable Cause, viz. the Arbitrary Election of mans Free will: insomuch, that the Event thereof cannot be known, nay not unto the Om∣niscience of God, who is the only Cardiognostes, and sees beyond our very Essences, so long as it hangs in suspence or indecision, by reason of the Indifferency, or non-determination of its Cause, i. e. while it is not determined to either part by the Actual Vo∣lition of mans will. But as for an Absolute decree; that cannot but be Certain and Immutable; as being constitute without, and antecedent to any Prevision of a Condition, that is to be,

or hath bin performed, or is not to be, or hath not bin perfor∣med.

(3) By insinuating, that God made use of this sharp Com∣mination, in order to the more Expedite and effectual reduction of the K. to Penitence.

But, alas! this also is a broken reed, and he shall fall into the ditch of Error, who relies thereon. For who can be perswaded, that this Commination could be serious and in earnest, that must not at the same time dissolve the rigour and immutability of Gods decree concerning the fatal Term of the K^s. life? or how could it be serious, if it were fully constituted from all Eternity that the K. should not die, till full 15. years after the Sentence? This is a pure 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and something that no man can com∣prehend. For, to comminate suddain death to him, whom our Adversaries acknowledge reserved by the law of Destiny till the complete expiration of his prefixt Term of life: is not to comminate in earnest, but in jest, and argue the God of Truth, of Dissimulation. Again, what Efficacy or inforcing Virtue could that Commination have over the Affections of Ezekiah, if he firmly beleived, that he should not, could not dye before the precise term of his life constituted and made intransible from Eternity? Assuredly, if so; he had no just cause either to com∣plain of, or fear the abscission of his days.

(4) By recurring to this their last refuge, Deum hac ratione palam facere voluisse, quam Regi ab aeterno designarat 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that God was pleased to take this course for the promul∣gation of that Longevity, which he had from eternity designed to Ezekiah.

This is more impertinent, and less satisfactory then any of the precedént Exceptions. For extremely ridiculous it is, to opinion, that God would by a Commination suspended on a con∣dition, or by a hypothetical decree, make that known; which long before he had, by an Absolute Decree, without any con∣dition, or prevision of any condition, constituted firme and immoveable. Unworthy and disparaging thoughts both of the Wisdome and Justice of the Supreme Being doth that unhappy man entertain, who ascribes unto it the making of Decrees

subordinate, disparate, and irreconcileable. That Sacred, omniscient, omnipotent Agent, as himself makes nothing in vaine; so would he have us make him our Exemplar, and doe no action, but what points at some certain end, and conduces both to our benefit, and the last of ends, his Glory. But in vain had he promised, in vain threatned, had he either promised or threatned those things, which his own irrevocable Decree had formerly made immutable, which must of necessity, had they never bin promised or threatned, have come to pass in their predetermined opportunity: or such, to whose Existence it was wholly and absolutely necessary, that that very thing, under which the promise or commination was made, should be effected by such a power, to which no other power can resist.

And this (we hope at least) is sufficient to the ample justifi∣cation of our opinions right to those Three appropriate and Con∣vincing Testimonies, of the Mobility of the Term of mans life, desumed from holy Writ. ¶.

SECT. IV.

IT remains only that we endeavour to wind our reason out of * 1.198 that profound abyss of Predestination (of which the Apostle, though he had the advantage of all other men in this; that he had the eye of his Soul illuminated by beams deradiated imme∣diately from the Soul of Light: did yet excuse himself for his non-comprehension, with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.) into which the solution of this grand difficulty hath unavoidably precipitated it: for the stron∣gest hold, which the Defendants of Absolute Fatality have left them to retreat unto, is erected upon this Foundation.

It makes no materiall difference (say they) whether the Pre∣science of God be conceived precedent to his Preordination of any future Event, and so Predestination be founded upon Prevision; or,

on the contrary, this Praeordination precedent to his Praescience, and so Praedestination be the basis of Paervision: for, from the concession of either, it follows of absolute necessity that the Term of mans life (in individuo) must be fixt and intransible.

We answer, * 1.199

That the Consequence, indeed, ought to be admitted as firme and impregnable. For this Praescience, whether it praeced, or succed Divine Praedestination, is and must be ever certain, prae∣cise, and infallible; or so supposed to be, at least: and therefore must the Term of mans life be constituted certain, precise, and immutable, ex necessitate si non consequentis, saltem consequen∣tiae, by necessity if not of the Consequent, yet of the consequence; i. e. if not from the Virtue or Efficiency, yet from the Hypothesis, or Conditionality of that Praescience. For no Sceptick can disal∣low of this Consequence; if God doth infallibly foreknow, that this and no other shall be the Term of my life: ergo this and no other shall be the Term of my life.

But this is not the point, at which our inquiry is levelled. Manifest it is, aswell from our precedent discourse, as from the Condition of the subject, that these two Propositions are not repugnant each to other; viz. The Term of mans life is fixt and immutable in respect to the infallibility of Gods Praescience: and the Term of mans life is moveable in respect to our right use, or abuse of the Liberty of our Will. Though, I confess, with the great Mersennus, that the apparent discord betwixt the infalli∣bility of Gods Prenotion, and the indetermination of mans Free Will to the actual election of good or evil; hath bin the rock, against which many the greatest wits of all Ages and Religions have bin shipwrackt, in their perswasions of the irresistible en∣forcement of Destiny.

To extricate our judgements out of this maze, let us remember and adhaere unto that excellent Axiome of the most and most learned of the School-men; Praevisionem Dei nihil influere i•• nostras actiones, that the Praevision of God hath no influence upon the actions of man, nor upon the operation of the remedies applyed by the Physician to the cure of diseases: but presup∣poseth

both the one and the other. For, in truth, God cannot foreknow the future actions of man, or the effects of remedies administred, otherwise then because of their necessary Futurity. Since, if we take a way the Futurition of events, we necessarily destroy the Prenotion of God.

Which Abstrusity that we may the better comprehend, let us begg the liberty, to suppose some Momenta rationis, or suc∣cessive minutes in Eternity (which, though in reality impos∣sible, Eternity being one permanent 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or instance, as un∣capable of division, as cessation; may yet serve, as an excellent Perspective to our weak-sighted reason in its inspection of many sublime Phaenomena in Theology,) and humbly conceive; that in the First Moment of Eternity, God saw, and only saw, with∣out any relation at all to his future decrees, all things to come, as well '〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or such whose futurity is necessary from the condition of their Nature, or impuls of their proper Causes; as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Futura Contingentia, which hang suspended in aequilibrio upon the Free Will of their Efficients; so that they may, or may not succeed, whether they be Absolute, or Condi∣tionate: in which First moment had God acquiesced, and pro∣ceeded no farther, then only to foresee the Necessity and Possi∣bility of their Futurition; then nothing should have bin to come▪ That in the Second Moment, God saw, and only saw, that this or that event was in Possibility of Futurition, in the life of this or that particular man, if such or such things were done, in this or that time, with this or that Temperament of body, and other respective Circumstances: but yet did neither determine any thing to absolute Necessity of Futurition, and therefore no∣thing could be said to depend upon the Praeordination of God, though all things should come to pass in the same manner, as he foresaw them, whensoever the Fiat of his Will should bring them into actual existence, or educe them extra suas cau∣sas; nor did he see, that they would so and no otherwise come to pass, from hence that he would they should so and no other∣wise come to pass; since this Praevision anteceds all Volition. That, therefore, in the Third Moment of Eternity, God decreed, that he would make Future not all those Possible Effects,

whether Absolute or Conditionate, but only some particulars, as, for example, that he would make Alexander, or Plato, of this or that individual temperament of body, in this or that climate and country, of this or that particular cours of life, with all conspiring Circumstances; to whom all things should happen according to the possibility of their Futurition, wherein God beheld them before the conception or pronunciation of his Decree; so that by this influence of God's definitive Will, those Events are no more then deduced into actual existence, which formerly were only in 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or in the womb of their Causes.

Now, upon this Hypothesis our understanding is advanced to this manifest Conclusion, That the Prescience of God doth nothing conduce adrem existentem, nor to the Actions or Pas∣sions thereof; since it is not the cause of their Inference: nor doe his Decrees, that are subsequent unto, and in a manner grounded upon his Prevision, work any the least mutation at all in the natures of his Creatures, or by violence pervert their Virtues to the production of any Effects, to which, by their primitive Constitution and individuation, they were not pre∣cisely adapted and accommodated. Since, in so doing, he must take away from his Creatures those peculiar Faculties, which he at their creation freely conferred upon their severall natures; and innovate the fundamental laws of Nature.

Now this dark shadow of that darker mystery of Predestina∣tion, * 1.200 how obscurely soever presented, doth yet sufficiently com∣monstrate how vast and diametral a disparity is between that Divine Prenotion, which is Antecedent; and that which is subsequent to Divine Praeordination. For that Praescience, which hath for its object a thing to come, without any praevious and praedeterminant Decree; supposeth that particular thing to come, together with the whole series or concatenation of its proper Causes, and method or manner of its Futurition: the Modus Futuritionis being, as the Schoolemen well define, Id quod fu∣turum est, sive quod ad rei, quae futura praescitur, futuritionem quolibet modo pertinet. This that Rabbin Isac bar Sesat, quoted by Menasseth Ben Israel (de termino vitae. pag. 226.) seems

well to have understood, when he said; Deus ab aterno disposuit totius mundi negotia, & divina sua sapientia, ac perspicacia, vi∣dit omnes effectus, qui in tempore futuri essent: qui licet pen∣deant (loquor enim de actionibus humanis) a libero hominis arbi∣trio, ut fiant aut non siant; nihilominus tamen Deus certò & in∣fallibiliter eos praevidit, ac praescivit. Neque tamen ideoquicquam in tempore facit homo, quia Deus ca facturum praescivit: sed è contrà, quia homo in tempore hoc vel illud facit, aut operatur, ideo Deus ab aeterno illud scivit.

But on the Contrary, that Praescience, which follows upon the Praedetermination of the Divine Will, hath, indeed, for its object a thing to come, and also presupposeth it as fully as the former; but so that it comprehends the order and manner of its futurition as sixt and immutable, being so constituted by vir∣tue of the antecedent Praedestination.

For the further inculcation of this Distinction, let us make use of an Example most familiar, and pertinent to the difficulty in hand.

That Divine Praescience, which hath no dependence on a prae∣determinant * 1.201 decree, let us suppose it to be a Praescience of the life and death, of the health and sickness, of the good or evil use of the Free will, of Peter, John, and every individual man in the world: and is twofold.

First Conditionate; if Peter, or John, being born of a sound and durable constitution, shall choose such a course of life, as that he shall observe the wholsome Aphorismes of Temperance in his use of the Six nonnaturals, shall opportunely, in all di∣stempers introduced by the inclemency of the aer, the malignant impressions of the Stars, epidemick contagions, or other unde∣clinable Accidents, recur to the use of such convenient remedies, as both reason and experience prescribe for the preservation or restauration of health; then I foreknow that he shall live healthy and long: but if, on the contrary; then I foreknow, that he shall be infested with frequent diseases, and die immaturely.

Second Absolute; I foreknow that Peter or John shall choose a prudent course of life, convenient both to his Genius, and

temperament; shall sedulously endevour the preservation of his health, by moderation in diet and other nonnaturals, and the re∣stauration of the same, when impaired by any distemper, by rational and approved medicaments; and shall therefore enjoy health, and attain to longaevity. On the Contrary, I foreknow, that he shall lead a disorderly and luxurious course of life, ac∣celerate the dissolution of his temperament, by the immoderate, praemature, or unseasonable use of Wine, Woemen, Passions &c. and when assaulted by any disease, chronique or acute, shall ei∣ther omit to consult learned, judicious and experienced Physitians, or disobey their pharmaceutical or diaetetical praescripts, drinke wine in a Fever, cold water in a Critical sweat, salt, sharp, acid or corroding liquors in a Dysentery, eate Astringents in obstru∣ctions, frigid, crude and dyspeptical fruits in an imbecillity of the stomach, &c. and shall therefore ruine his health and drop into the grave before hee's ripe.

Now take which Praescience you please, and either hath for its object, the praecise Term of Peter or Johns life, as a thing to come; and fully and punctually presupposeth the same: but so, that together with that fixt Term it comprehends also all the order and manner of its Futurition, or all the antecedent and conspiring causes; amongst which the principal and most energetical is the right use or abuse of his own Free will, in whose power it was to move that Term either forwards or back∣wards, (i. e.) either to adduce, or produce it.

So far, therefore, is this Praevision of God from excluding the necessity of Medical Remedies, as the Defendants of Fate would impose, according to that of Solon in Stobaeus

—Fato quaecunque manet sors; Non hanc avertet victima, sed nec aves, Nec qui Paeonias aegris mortalibus herbas Saepe erraturam ferre laborat opem.

That it totally includes, nay presupposeth it so necessarily, that if we take away from man the Liberty of his Will, and the op∣portunity of using either prophylactical, or therapeutical means, in order to the prolongation of his life; we must also submove

the Certainty of Gods Praescience: since that determineth no∣thing, but only praesupposeth all things; nor doth God, by a decree subsequent to that Prescience, praeordain that this or that individual man shall recover of such or such a disease, unless by virtue of such or such appropriate remedies, which the Phy∣sician shall in the opportunity praescribe.

Nor is it a more justifiable plea at the bar of reason, to argue thus; if the Term of mans life be certainly and precisely fore∣known to God, then must it, together with the order and man∣ner of its Futurition, be sixt and immutable: then to argue thus; if God hath a certain and precise cognition of any thing already past, as of the Creation of the world; therefore could that thing have come to pass no otherwise, nor at any other time, then it did; therefore was the world created by God, non libe∣ré sed necessariò, not by an Arbitrary, but Necessary and restrained activity. For, as Science, having for its object a thing Praeterite, doth infer no necessity upon that thing praeterite, that it should have bin so and no otherwise effected: so doth Praescience, having for its object a thing Future, infer no ne∣cessity upon its futurition; each being an Immanent Action in God, & extra rem, or having no compulsive influence at all upon that particular thing, or its Causes: and Futurum esse imports no other thing, but an object of Praescience; nor Prae∣teritum esse, any thing but an object of Science, or Memorie. Science is the perfection of the Subject, or thing knowing; not of the obiect, or thing known: much less the destruction of the thing known. For necessary it is to perfect Science, that it a∣gree in all points with the nature of its object.

But wholly Antarctical to this, is that Praescience which is grounded upon Divine Praedestination, whereby not only the Term of every individuals life, together with the whole order and manner of its Futurition, is praefixt; but also all those Causes, whose refractary or counter-activity might in any respect hinder the precise accompletion of that prefixt Term, are prae∣vented or praedetermined to invalidity, lest the Praescience become uncertain or dubious: whether that Praedetermination dispose per modum Causae Efficientis, by a certain Physical and really

effective action, or impression upon the will of man, enforcing it to the election of such a course of life, as may conduce to his punctual pervention to that praestitute Term; or per modum Causae Desicientis by nonconcurrent, but only permissive influence (by some called Permissio simplex, Simple Permission: by others, Permissio essicax, efficacious permission,) since that rule amongst Philosophers Causa Desiciens in necessariis reduci∣tur ad Efficientem, doth warrant the Indifferency. For this Decretory Praescience, though it agree with the precedent sim∣ple Praescience in this, that it hath for its object rem futuram, includeth in its circle the whole order and manner of its Futuri∣tion, and presupposeth both the end, and respective means fully and absolutely; yet it clearly and irreconcilably differs from it in this, that the precedent Prescience presupposeth the liberty of mans Will, and the use thereof not only incoacted, and without irrefragable impuls, but absolutely free and arbitrary: but this wholly destroys the arbitrary monarchy of the Will, by importing that the influence of the Decree not only inclineth by soft and gentle flexure or perswasion, but by an irresistible violence forceth it upon the election and pursuit of those means, which in a direct and natural line lead to the accomplishment thereof; and this lest the Certitude or Infallibility of the Di∣vine Praescience be infirmed and staggered.

To discriminate this Later from that Former Praescience yet * 1.202 morefully: and so insinuate the result of the Distinction, by the most intelligible and concise way of argumentation: it will be necessaty for us to conceive the Decrees of God in the same me∣thod of subordination, wherein they, who found the infallibility of his Praevision upon the necessity of his Praedestination and Prae∣determination, have bin, by the obscurity of the Subject, com∣pelled to range their thoughts, in the declarement of their opi∣nion.

The first Decree of God runs thus; I will, that Peter live till the expiration of the natural or temperamental lease of his life; conceive it to be till his glass hath run 50. 60. 70. or 80. year: but that John wither before hee's ripe, and fall in the

June of his age; conceive it to be in the 20. 30. or 40. year from his birth.

The Second thus; I will praeserve Peter from this or that sickness, defend him from this or that knock of misfortune, con∣serve him in, or restore him from this or that dangerous disease; lest he expire before the praestitute Term of his life: but for John, he shall be invaded by such or such a mortal disease, re∣ceive such or such a wound incurable, or perish by this or that fatal Accident; so that he may verify my prognostick in dying at the hour appointed.

The Third thus; lest Peter laps into such or such a mortal disease, I will that he be provided of an industrious and pru∣dent Physician to prescribe unto him rational, generous, and effectual prophylactical means; or, if surprised therewith, that he use convenient and victorious therapeutical medicaments▪ in order to the expulsion of the same; that so the number of his days be not shortned: but, on the contrary, that John shall fall into such or such a dangerous sickness, and want Physicians, medicaments, and all other Conservatives whatever; lest he survive beyond the moment praefixt.

The Fourth thus; that Peter may not, by the abuse of his Arbitrary prerogative, become insensible, incurious, or negli∣gent of the means ordained to conserve health, and run into the perpetration of such sins, as may be injurious to the tempera∣ment of his body, as well as the peace of his mind; I will, by the powerfull influence of my Special Grace, so prepare and dispose his Will, that he shall lead a temperate, circumspect and virtuous life, and so subsist till the period of his days praefixt. On the contrary, that John may not, by the right use of that Elective Liberty conferred upon his Will, and by a desire of attaining to longaevity, endevour the conservation of his health, by diaetetical or pharmaceutical observations; I will, that he want that ingenuity, that prudence, that advice, and those pre∣scripts, conducible to the prolongation of his life, and finally that assistance of Divine Grace, without which it is not only probable, but necessary, that he should resign up the rains of his Will to Sensuality, and so either by the prodigal effusion of his

Vital oyle in the immodest and destructive rites of Venus, or the extinction of his implantate heat by the frantique sacrifices of Bacchus, or other exorbitances, decurtate the temperamental lease of his life; and so confess Corruption in the moment prefixt.

Or, in a higher key of Fatality, thus; though Peter, by the abuse of his Will, rashly expose himself to the fury of the most dangerous Enemies to life, and by gluttony, ebriosity, vindictive anger, salacity, &c. render himself both unfit, and unworthy longer to inspire the common aer; I will notwithstanding all this again repaire the breaches of his constitution, protect him from the malice of danger, and conserve him till the moment predestined, nor shall he be taken off by any other means, but what my Will hath predetermined. Contrary; though John, by the right use of the liberty of his will, shall constantly and severely practise all the hard lessons of Virtue, subdue the im∣petuous and forcible Temptations of Sensuality, lead a life more impassionate then the most rigid of the Stoicks ever professed, more chast then aged Hermits, more abstinent then Lessius, more peaceable then Charity her self, and so deserve to become the greatest Example of Longevity: I will notwithstanding, that the appointed Term of his life remain fixt and intransible beyond that point, which my will hath from all Eternity decreed to be the Ne Ʋltra of his subsistence.

On these, or the like Decrees, must the Certitude and infalli∣bility of the Divine Prescience be erected by any; who subor∣dinate Gods Prescience to his Predestination of the end, and predetermination of the means.

Now, to use all this; so many, so great, and so intolerable are the Incongruities, and Inconveniences, which necessarily de∣pend on this Decretory Prescience; that we need no other ar∣gument to evince the weakness of their judgements, who have laboured in its defence▪ but only to select and consider the chiefest * 1.203 and most obvious of them.

First, this opinion, that, all the actions of man, and their Events, are Fatally predetermined by the Decretory Prescience of God; doth not only enervate and scandal, nay destroy the sincerity

of those many Divine Precepts, enjoyning man to endevour, to the utmost of his knowledg and power, the conservation of his health, and the prolongation of his life, by temperance and all other law∣full means; of those many Promises made to encourage him to a strict observance; of those many Comminations annexed, to deter him from the neglect of those Precepts; but also, upon inference, dissolves the obligation to all serious study and sollicitude to explore, procure, prepare, and use all convenient remedies, in order to the expulsion of diseases, and the revoca∣tion of health, on the part of the Sickman; and on the part of the Physician, to be industrious, carefull, vigilant, and conscien∣tious, in the exercise of his Profession.

That the Patient is hereby disobliged from the duty of Self-conservation, may be thus manifested. If it be, ex Decreto Di∣vino, fixt and immutable, that such a man shall lead a peaceable, healthfull, and blisfull life, and do all things that are either necessary or conductive to the procurement and continuation of that happy estate; or on the Contrary, that such a man shall eate the bread of sorrow, drink the bitter waters of Affliction, and unravell his tedious days in poverty, contention, valentude, or craziness of body, anxiety of mind, &c. and therefore take no care at all to do those actions, which might be necessary or conductive to the amendment of his miserable condition, by reason he wants the assistance, counsel, and manuduction of Divine Grace▪ then doth it unavoidably follow, that the labour and sollicitude of the one is superfluous, and of the other unsucces∣full, nay impossible. For whatever the one, or the other shall do, and however live; yet still the success shall be no other, but what God hath predestined, and though the intention of either be levelled at an end quite contrary to what is designed by the Volition of the Predestinant; yet shall the Force of the Decree ei∣ther pervert, or render it ineffectual: and if we grant, that the Happy man did take care to conserve his health and life; we must also grant, that he could not but take that care; and that the Miserable man did take none to preserve either, because it was not in the power of his Wil to determine on that care. And thus, what either shall do, can be neither Care, nor Negligence,

strictly and properly so called: but a meer Necessity of Caring, or not Caring.

On the part of the Physician, the Reason is the same; for, if this doctrine of Fatality be true, well may he be excused, nay thought the wiser man, if he shut up his books, forget his Aphorismes, deliver out his Prescripts per Sortilegium (a course, as I have bin ascertained by the testimony of a judicious and faithfull observer thereof, not long since taken up and constantly practised by a Devout Impostor, whose counterfeit zeal to the Cause had advanced him to the trust of a Physician in that Army, which gathered the first flowers of its triumphant wreath in Nase by Field) and supinely give Coloquyntida, or Scammo∣ny in a Dysentery, Antimony in the Iliaca Passio, Opium in a Crisis, Aqua Fortis for a Julep &c. since no Art can supersede, nor Poyson accelerate his departure, whose time of transition to the invisible world Destiny hath limited to a moment; Et cum Fata volunt, bina Venena juvant. Nor can it be rightly esteemed a Virtue in the Physician, to be studious and solici∣tous; or a Vice to be debaucht, ignorant, and negligent of the safety of his Client: if it be only the irresistible Impulse of Fate, which forceth his Will to the election of either, in order to the precise accomplishment of its Decree: or, more plainly, if the Care or Negligence of the Physician be but the Medium, where∣by Fate brings about its end concerning the dissolution of the Patient. And if so, what Moral obligation remains upon the conscience of the Physician? Assuredly none at all. Which every moderate judgement will soon detect to import so mani∣fest, dangerous, and detestable an Absurdity; that of it self tis able not only to discredit the opinion of Fatality, but also to ac∣cuse and convict the Abettors thereof of unpardonable Inconsi∣deration, Stupidity, and Irreligion.

The Second Inconvenience, or rather Absurdity, inseparably * 1.204 conjoyned to this opinion of a Decretory Prescience in God; is this: Whoever shall grant, that all the means or remedies, and so the sedulity or negligence as well of the Sick, as the Physician, are subordinately predetermined by the Decree of

Fate; must also, by the necessity of natural consequence, be compelled to grant, that to allow the merit of Praise or Dispraise, Commendation or Reprehension unto either, is open Injustice. For by what pretext of Equity can a Sick man challenge to himself the honor of having done a praise-worthy action, in endevouring to preserve himself both by observing a course of Diet contrary to his disease, and seasonable consulting with and strictly conforming unto the advice of a learned and judicious Physician; or the Physician for the full discharge of his duty in regulating the sick according to the most profound and salutiferous maximes of his Art: if the obedience of the one, and the care of the other be not Arbitrary, but coacted or necessitated by the Force of the complex Decree of Fate, as instrumental to the subsistence of the sick man till the predestined term of his life? Ʋbi mera necessitas locum habet, ibi laudem exulare necesse est: where meer Necessity is admitted, thence all Laudation is excluded. And with what justice can we re∣prehend the sick man, for being incurious in the disquisition, or irregular in, and averse from the use of the means prescribed for his restauration: if that his supinity▪ irregularity, and aver∣sion be imposed upon his Will by the impuls of Destiny, and predetermined as a necessary Medium to accomplish the De∣cree of his immature death? or the Physician either for his neg∣lect, or ignorant and inartificial tractation of his Client; if twere decreed he should be so, to the end the client might ex∣pire according to the decree? Persuasum est omnibus (saith Menasseh Ben Israel, de Termino Vitae. pag. 205.) nec lau∣dandum, nec arguendum quemquam, nisi qui libero arbitrio & consulto benè agit, aut delinquit; adeo ut nullus suasioni, consiliis, redargutioni, praemio aut poenae locus sit, si homo non est liber in actionibus suis.

* 1.205 From this distress our Opponents have promised themselves an easy evasion, by replying; that both Patient and Physician are wholly ignorant of the Decree, the Opticks of Mortality be∣ing too weak and remote to read the lines in the Book of Fate, without the perspicill of Divine Revelation.

But this way of Subterfuge may be blockt up, by rejoyning; that though the Decree be known to neither, yet tis sufficiently manifest to both, from the Hypothesis of this opinion, that not only their Actions, but also the Successes thereof are the pre∣scripts and consignations of Fate; and so can be no other then what is included in, and necessitated by the Decree: and con∣sequently that there can remain no just Cause of reprehension on either side.

Should they insist yet further upon the same plea, and urge; that tis part of the Decree, that either the Physician, or Patient, or both should be negligent, and so become Culpable: we may soon exped this obstruction only by demanding, what reason or equity can be found to justify such an accusation and respective punition, where the Will of the delinquent is controlled, infle∣cted, nay impelled upon the commission of a crime, or omis∣sion of a duty, by a power infinitely superior to his reluctancy; and not only the act, but time, place, instruments, means, &c. conspiring circumstances, precisely preordained by a decree of that Will, which is Omnipotence? Reprehension imports not only an Act of the Reprehendent, but also the Guilt or Culpa∣bility of the Reprehended: otherwise it cannot be just. To the legality, therefore, of a reprehension it is undeniably necessary, that the ground or cause thereof be a real and proper Guilt in the person reprehended. Now Guilt can have no place, where that which is impeached cannot be a Voluntary Agent, but a Medium, or Instrument ordained, and actuated by an irresistible Power to the execution of an infallible Decree.

The Third and last Absurdity imports no less then the sub∣version * 1.206 of the very fundamental Principle, or basis of all Moral Virtues, and Christian Graces; by inferring a deniall of Ju∣stice in the reward of Good, and punishment of Evil, either be∣fore, or after death. For, tis the Liberty of the Will only that supports the Equity of Compensation: and therefore he, who doth a good action, when twas not in the election of his Will to have omitted that good action, or to have done it otherwise then he did; hath but a weak claim to a reward; nor hath he, who

commits a sin, which is not in his power to leave uncommitted, more reason to feare a punishment from the even hand of Divine Justice.

To conclude, therefore; since these are the Absurdities, which every mans Logick may perceive necessarily and immediately to slow from the doctrine of Decretory Prescience, or such as is subsequent to Divine Predetermination; and since the same, nor any others of equal danger to the Principles of our Know∣ledge, and Articles of the Christian Faith, can ever be dedu∣ced from the hypothesis of that Simple Prevision or unactive Prescience, which we have allowed of as consistent to the justice of God, because consistent to the Arbitrary freedome of mans Will: tis no hard task to determine, in which opinion our judgements may with more safety and permanent satisfaction aquiesce.

Now, that we may relieve the Memory of our patient Rea∣der, * 1.207 from the oppression of our (not well to be avoyded) prece∣dent prolixity; we conceive our selves in gratitude obliged, to tender him a Recapitulation, or reducement of all this tedious discourse, concerning the Mobility of mans term of life, in Fower Conclusions, naturally resulting from the Premises.

The First Conclusion.

That God hath circumscribed the duration of mans life, with a certain Circle or round of time, conceive it to be of 70. 80. 90. or 100. years, more or less: but yet hath reserved to him∣self, as jus supremoe Majestatis, the prerogative power of exten∣ding the term of any individual mans life beyond the limits of that sphear, so far as it shall seem convenient to the Wisdome of his Will.¶.

The Second Conclusion.

That God, who loves justice more then man, and man only for Justice sake; and hates Injustice more then man, and man

only for Injustice sake (for Sin, unravelled to the botome, will be found to be nothing but Injustice) is willing, in respect of the object of his Love, or in consideration of mans justice, to prolong; or, on the contrary, in respect of the object of his Hate, or in consideration of mans Injustice, to abbreviate the term of mans life, included within that determinate Circle of time: reserving still to himself an arbitrary power of acting the quite contrary; (i. e.) of abbreviating the life of the just, and prolonging the life of the unjust, upon the perswasion of reasons either manifest to us, or private to himself. ¶

The Third Conclusion.

That God, when he is pleased to condescend to the prolongation of the life of a Just person, doth procure the same, either by means conforme to the ordinary and setled Constitutions, o, Canons of Nature; or by means Supernatural. The Former•• when bearing a respect to the native Durability of his individua Temperament, he assists to the duration thereof untill the na∣tural Period, or last moment of this sphear of time; wherewith the life of man (in specie) is circumscribed: and this either by conserving his Temperament in its decent tenor, and requisite Vigor; or by prohibiting and preventing the invasion of those known Enemies to longevity, which might any way conduce to the denormation, and consequently the premature dissolution of its harmony. The Later, when bearing no respect to the native durability of his individual Temperament, he meliorateth, exalteth, and by the secret immission of some special Athanasia, or Antidote against early death, corroborateth the same, so that it doth last longer, then otherwise, pro vi sua nativa, it could possibly have lasted, had it never bin impaired by any distemper. And this when God doth, then is he properly sayd, to prolong the life, or fulfill the number of the years of the Just. But the Contrary effect he procures by contrary Causes; (i. e.) he ab∣breviates the life of an unjust Person, either by an immature turbation and dissolution of his temperament, by its native dispo∣sition sufficiently tenacious and durable to extreme old age: or by not prohibiting, (i. e.) permitting and so procuring the vio∣lent

and preternatural dissolution thereof by the destructive sur∣prisall of any Accident whatever. And in this case properly are the Unjust sayd, not to Dimidiate their days. ¶.

The Fourth Conclusion.

That a just Person, who, so much as in him lies, sixeth all the Affections of his Soul upon the Fear of God, and the avoy∣dance of Evil; if he chance, through the frailty of his nature, or the force of temptation, to fall into some Capital Sin, which ac∣cording to the penalty annexed to its prohibition, deserves to be punished by the Abbreviation of his life: may notwithstan∣ding sometimes, his remorse of Conscience, profound sorrow, fer∣vent prayer, religious fasting, and other duties requisite to true and perfect repentance, effectually exciting the Mercies of God, obtain from him a full and absolute remission not only of the sin, but also of the temporal punishment due thereunto; and more∣over a restauration of his Temperament to its native vigor, from which it was alienated by former infirmities, or corrupted by the dyscratical or distempering contagion of sin. And sometimes not; and this chiefly, when it hath seemed convenient to the most wise and just God to pronounce the fatal and irrepealable sentence of Death upon him: for in such a case, I beleive the sin committed, to belong to that black order of Sins unto Death; by contradistinction thereof from that Sin, which is not unto Death, or upon which the irrevocable Sentence of Death is not yet pronounced; which no man can certainly know without special revelation. ¶.

CHAP. VII. Of the Liberty Elective of Mans Will.

SECT. I.

IN our enumeration of the Venenate Absurdities, * 1.208 which naturaly grow upon that inflexible stock of Absolute Fatality, or, more expresly, upon that execrable Hypothesis of the Stoicks (that we may be charitable in forgetting there are any Christians of that irreligious perswasion) that all the Actions of every individual man are praedestined, and the whole order and manner of their Fu∣turition praecisely praeordained by the invariable decrees of that Supreme Power, against which the coacted and limited Will of man can make no effectual resistance; we well remember, we specified the total sublation of all Virtue and Vice; the abnegation of Justice either Divine or Human, in the com∣pensation of Piety and Impiety; the adnihilation of the use and efficacy of Lawes to coerce from Evil, of Precepts and Ad∣hortations to elect and prosecute good, in a word, the subver∣sion of all Religion and Morality, and consequently the ne∣cessary resignation and rendition of the minde of man to receive all the destructive Impressions of Hell. And no less, nor fewer Absurdities may the reason of every man discover emer∣gent from the Antithesis or contrary Assertion, that all the Actions of man, and their particular Events or Successes, are

neither the praedeterminations of Fate, nor the occasional desig∣nations of Providence Divine, nor fully the arbitrary elections of mans will, but the meer unpraemeditate, and temerarious Hits of Chance: since, in pure Justice, those actions onely are Lau∣dable, or Vituperable, which are done D••libera••ò & liberè ratione Agentis, upon a deliberation of the Intellect, and an arbitrary election of the Will subsequent to that deliberation; and not those which are meerly Fortuitous, and result from the indeliberate or blind activity of Fortune.

When first I tasted the odious bitterness of these two streams, whereof most of the ancient Greeks, many of the noblest Ro∣mans, * 1.209 and (I fear at least) not a few of the professors of Chri∣stianity have drank too liberally, even to the infatuation of their reason; I must confess, I conceived them to have bin derived from two different fountains, or interests as irreconcileable as Light to Darkness: but when I had, by the continued travail of my thoughts, traced them up to their original, I found them to be effused from one and the same vein; viz. the propensity of Hu∣man nature depraved, to attempt by all means imaginable the Excusation or Extenuation of the Guilt of its defections from its proper object real good, by charging it wholly, or in part, up∣on some external influence praevalent over mans Will. For man, having from the Light of Nature learned this as an Axiome; that the Justice of Reprehension and Punition is radically con∣sistent in the intire Freedome of the Delinquents Will; or, more plainly, in this, that the Delinquent chose to do ill, when 'twas absolutely in his power to have done well; not in this, that either his Will was enforced by a Necessity that admits of no repugnancy, first to the Volition and after to the actual pro∣secution of that ill; or that he was onely a meer illiberal, in∣cogitant, & fortuitous Agent: 'twas obvious for him to con∣clude, that if he could incriminate either upon an ineluctable Necessity, o•• simple and meer Chance, then he might with aequal facility, discharge himself of the Culpability, or Guilt, and consequently of the punishment due thereunto.

Now, though our pen hath drop't, on the praecedent leaves, * 1.210 frequent and cursary Detections of the gross and ruinous Absur∣dities of both these subterfuges, so that a rational consideration may, from those transient glances or hints, collect Arguments more then enough for the total Demolition of them: yet, since those notions of Fate, Fortune and Free-will are subject to Aequivocation, some men understanding them as positive Cau∣ses, others as Modi agendi Causarum, certain manners of Causes operating, and others as Vana Nomina, meer Terms, which in Logical verity respond by way of adaequation to no real Entities; and since the difficulty of the subject encouraged us to promise a full Reconciliation of all their apparent Antipa∣thies, or Inconsistencies, and also a perfect Accommodation of them all to the Special Providence of God (the onely cause of their continuity and connexion to the present clue of our thoughts) we esteemed it not onely a pardonable, but a lau∣dable design to attempt by a singular discourse the manifestation of their particular Natures, or, more plainly, what we are to understand by Fate, what by Fortune, and what by Free Will. Which that we may atchieve with the more familiarity to com∣mon Apprehension, both method and perspicuity command us to consider the last in the first place.

By the Liberty or Freedome of mans Will (that we may maturely praevent all Logomachy or Sophistical contention * 1.211 impendent from the ambiguous sense of that term) we intend not that Freedome, which being called by the Graecian 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, defined by Cicero, Potestas vivendi ut velit quilibet, and by the Civil Law 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Power of leading the life of a Freeman, is the contrary to Servitude; since that con∣cernes onely the Civil or Political state of Man; but that which by a proper elegancy the Graecian defines 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Latines Id quod in nobis seu penes nos, nostróve in arbitrio, potestatéque situm est, and the Divines commonly name Liberum Arbitrium an Absolute power of electing what objects we please, Good or Evil, whereon to fix our Affections;

since that concernes only the natural state of man, and is that alone which can justify the Equity of the reward of Piety or Virtue, and the punishment of Impiety or Vice, by God, or Man.

For morethen one respect did the Ancients select and fix on * 1.212 this word Arbitrium; For, whether we would intimate that Action of the Rational Faculty, whereby man gives judgement in any matter that seemed dubious; as we use to say, that for the Decision of any case, whose obscure aequity either our own imprudence, or interest makes us unfit to determine, we ought to referre our selves to the Arbitration of some judicious and im∣partial person, who is thence most accommodately called an Arbiter: or the Rational Faculty it self existent within us, from which the action of Judication or Arbitration it selfe doth proceed, the word signifying the Action being transferred upon the Agent; we can hardly be furnished with a more ad∣aequate and significant Appellation. But, to trace the thoughts of the first Imponents up to the original, in respect the rational faculty, being the same with the Mind or Intellect, is conver∣sant and exercised about not onely things that belong meerly to speculation, but also such as are reducible into Action or Pra∣ctise; therefore doth the term Arbitrium seem to be appro∣priated to the Faculty, chiefly in respect of things to be done, inasmuch as it is occupied in the expension or dijudication of the consequent good of those actions, and sits as it were an abso∣lute Arbiter to determine, whether they shall be done, or no.

And hence is it that when the rational faculty having perpen∣ded the convenience and inconvenience, or good and evil of its objects, and ended its act of Deliberation, adhaeres unto, or fixes upon one as more convenient then the others; this second act or Adhaesion may be in the general (i. e. in respect of things both speculable and practical) called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an Assent or Approbation; but in particular (i. e. in respect only to those things that fall under action) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an Election or Choice: since it supposeth the praelation of that particular thing to be put in execution, to all others objected. And in this

distinct relation was it that Aristotle (Ethicor. 3. cap. 3. in fine) styles the object elected, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, id quod caeteris propositis, & postpositis, amplectendum nobis proponimus, or, id quod sub de∣lectum cadit. This the Latines most frequently render. Consi∣lium, as in those phrases, capere consilium, sequi rationis consi∣lium, nescire quid sit alicujus consilium, &c. and Propositum, as in those, adhaerere, stare, manere in proposito, à proposito revo∣care, propositi esse tenacem, &c. and we translate into Resoluti∣on, or Determination.

Again, so soon as the Mind, its act of Consultation or Delibe∣ration being finished, hath praeferred one thing to all others, in the praesent, and determined it for the greater good, or more convenient; then immediately supervenoth the function of the Appetite, whereby the mind is carried on towards the Am∣plectence, or fruition of the Good apparent therein: and this third action the Greeks call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Latines Voluntas and Volitio indifferently, and the English the Will or Act of Volition. Which we glance at per transennam, because vulgar∣ly, by the word Voluntas, men understand rather the Appetite (rational and proper only to Man) it self, then the Function or operation thereof: for which consideration, we shall in all our subsequent discourse conforme to custome, in using the terms Will and Appetit indiscriminatim, as Synonymas implying one and the same thing.

Moreover, in regard, that upon the Appetition of the Will, which is properly the actual prosecution of the good apparent in the object, there immediately succeeds the action of the Motive Faculty, therefore is the action consequent to that ap∣petition justly called Voluntary, as having bin deliberated and undertaken ex consilio, upon consultation and election, and respondent to that which the Graecian calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. For that is it, whose beginning Aristotle hath decreed to be Election, in his Aphorisme, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which was the ground of Ciceros Parados, non esse actionem in rebus ina∣nimis, that there could be no action in Inanimate things, since they are devoid of the power of Election, Assent, or Approbation: and of Aristotles also, when he contended that this kind of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

or action, could not rightly, and in distinct truth, be attributed to Brute Animals, nay higher yet, not to children, for the same reason, though he willingly conceded to both 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, sponta∣neous motion. Not but that by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he sometimes signifies motionem appetitus spontaneam, the spontaneous motion of the Appetite Rational, or the Will it self, as (in 3. Ethic. cap. 4.) where he constitutes this difference betwixt Volition and Election; that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Voluntas, is chiefly the end, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the Election of the means conducing to that end, as in this instance, We will health, and then elect the means which in probability may ossiciate either to the conservation or restitution thereof. But when he draws his thoughts into a sharper angle, and speaks more praecisely, he allowes not every appetition, to be the Will, but only that which follows a serious deliberation, approbation and election, and is grounded upon reason, which therefore he most judiciously defines to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, boni cum ratione appetitio, an Appetition of Good with Reason.

Nor doth he always restrain the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to that Action which proceeds from the Will, or election of the Rational Appetite: but many times lets it loose to the expression of those inconsiderate actions, which result from the impulse of the Sensual; as in these words (1. Rhetor. cap. 10.) Omnia quae homines agunt, aut per se agunt, aut non per se•• ac per se quidem, aut consuetudine, aut appetitione, & ipsa quidem aut rationali, quae sit Voluntas, aut irrationali, quae sit Cupiditas & Ira; non verò per se trifariam, quatenus aut natura, aut vi, aut ex necessitate agunt. And thus much by way of Introduction concerning the several Terms, by which both ancient and mo∣dern Philosophers have most properly denoted the several succes∣sive or subordinate actions of the Mind exercised about its ob∣jects. We now convert our thoughts to explore the Quiddity or Essence of that we call Liberum Arbitrium, and wherein it doth r••dically and principally consist.

SECT. II.

FAmiliar it is to the Apprehension of every one, that Man * 1.213 is affirmed to possess a Free-Will, for this reason; that a∣mongst many divers objects occurring to, and falling under the deliberation of the Cognoscent Faculty, or Intellect, he is not obliged to make his election of any one more then the others, nor doth he so elect any one, as that it doth not still remain in his power to refuse that again and elect the contrary. This Liberty of election some men have founded only in the Will, and others in the Rational Faculty; to whose opinion reason adviseth us to adhaere. For doubtless the Will, considered per se is a blind and undiscerning Faculty, or Power, which can make no progress, nor find the way towards convenient objects without the manuduction of the Intellect, which as it were lights the torch unto, and as a knowing guide conducts the Will: so that since it is the proper office of the Intellect to informe and conduct the Will, and the proper office of the Will to follow the direction and guidance of the Intellect; it is not only mani∣fest, that the Will cannot deflect from the right way, towards the amplectence and fruition of Good, unless by the mistaking Intellect it be seduced into the devious paths of Evil; but al∣so, that the Liberty of election is consistent in the Intellect primarily, and in the Will onely at the second hand, or by way of dependence. To speak yet more expresly, the nature of this Liberty Elective seems radically to consist in that Indifferency, in respect whereof the Faculty called free, may or may not be carried on towards any particular object, which the School-men call the Liberty of Contradiction; or be so carried on towards one object, as that it may at pleasure renege that Ele∣ction, and make a new one of the quite contrary, which they call the Liberty of Contrariety. Assuredly, since no man can

understand how there can be a Liberty, without a Faculty of Election; it is evident that the Election can be only there, where is the Indifferency: in regard that either where one single object is proposed, or the faculty restrained and determi∣ned to the election and prosecution of any one single object: there can be no free election, since election praesupposeth a varie∣ty of objects, and is nothing but the praeferring one to all the rest, or, if there be but two, the choyce of one and the refusal of the other.

Some there have bin, and those no mean Clerks, who have * 1.214 affirmed the Will to be then most free, when it is so determined to, and fixt upon one object grant it to be the Summum bonum or chiefest Good, that it cannot be deflected to its contrary Evil; and the reason they give is this; that since the Dilection, prosecution and fruition of that Good is highly Voluntary, it ought therefore to be accounted highly free.

But we have just ground to doubt, that the Authors of this * 1.215 Paradox did not either clearly understand, or at least sufficiently consider tho real difference betwixt a Spontaneous and an Arbi∣trary action; while they contended that because either may be said to be Voluntary, therfore they are one and the same originally▪ For indeed a Spontaneous action, though when men discourse at randome and in the general, it may seem to com∣prehend an Arbitrary one, yet in praecise and distinct reasoning, it sounds no more then a certain blind impulse of nature groun∣ded upon no praecedent ratiocination; when an Arbitrary action properly so called, depends upon a praevious ratiocination, exa∣mination, dijudication, and election.

That a Spontaneous action is no more then an indiscreet im∣pulse * 1.216 of nature, devoid of all deliberation, is manifest from hence; that not onely Infants and Brutes (to neither of which a Philosopher will allow either use of Reason, or Liberty of Will) may do many things spontaneously, but even Inanimates have their Spontaneous motions, as Fire ascends spontaneously, and

all bodies endowed with gravity descend spontaneously: so that in truth, to act by the impulse of nature, and to act spontaneously appear to be one and the same thing diversly phrased. And this makes it the less wonder, if since every appetite be ex suâ naturâ by the tendency of its own nature, carried on towards Good, it may be said to be carried on towards Good of its own accord or spontaneously; and so indeed that as a stone because by naturall tendency it falls downward, cannot again change that tendency and ascend upward, so likewise the Appetite be∣cause it is determined only to Good, wants an Indifferency of tending towards Evil: and as a stone by reason of its want of Indifferency to upward and downward, is said to be moved downward Spontaneously, but not Arbitrarily, so the Appetite by reason of its defect of Indifferency to Good and Evil may be said to tend towards Good in general Spontaneously, but not Arbitrarily. And hence comes it, that if you please to sup∣pose the Will to be determined to any one particular Good, grant it to be the Summum Bonum, so that it cannot relinquish that, and with aequal appetition prosecute any other Good, real, or only apparent, then indeed you may justly enough affirm the Will to tend towards that Summum Bonum spontaneously, since 'tis most natural to the Will to prosecute that which is the chiefest of Goods (for it would not prosecute the same above all others, if it were dimoved to the prosecution of less Good) but not Arbitrarily, since it wants an Indifferency of tending to another Good as well as that, or to speak more plainly, since it is not in its power at pleasure to desert that chiefest Good, and address it self to the pursuit of a less Good.

Nor can this truth be staggered by that objection, that this * 1.217 tendency of the Will is Volent, since that Volency (I ask leave to use that word untill I can find another more adaequate to my notion) imports not a Liberty but a meer Libency, that is a Complacency, or Collubescence, and so an exclusion of all co∣action, violence, renitence, or imposition: and from hence that the Dilection, Prosecution, and Fruition of such a Good may be properly enough accounted Voluntary; no man can

rightly inferre that tis therefore highly Arbitrary, but only that tis highly Libent or Complacent; for there may be a Libency we confess, and yet no Liberty, because no Indiffe∣rency.

Again, whereas they have added, that the Perfection of the Liberty of the Will doth consist in this, so to adhaere to Good as not to be capable of dimotion or diversion from it; we may not * 1.218 unjustly suspect them of inadvertency in that they did not discover this Perfection which they so much magnify to be not of the Liberty it selfe, but of the Will or Appetite, which being Imperfect only in this respect, that at pleasure it may desert and abandon real and true Good, and convert to the Affectation and prosecution of specious and coun∣terfeit; must acquire its perfection from hence, that quitting that native Indifferency or Liberty, it so firmely and inseparably adhaere to real and true Good, that nothing can divorce it from thence and alienate it to the prosecution of counterfeit. Besides, we conceive such a perfection of the Will to be above the sober hopes of mortality, as being reserved to make no small part of the Souls Beatitude in her state of Glorification, when she shall have no other object but the real Summum Bonum, and no other Appetite but a fixt dilection thereof. For, had flesh and blood bin capable of so great and divine an Excellency, as the devesting the Will of that Indifferency to Good and Evil, and the constant determination of it only to real Good; doubtless S^t Paul, a man of the most mortified affections to the specious Goods of this life, and of the most fervent desires towards the substantial and eternal of the next, had never with so many tears lamented his being subject to that inevitable and implacable Psychomachy and civil war betwixt his Rational and Sensual Appetites, nor in the height of despaire to conquer those re∣bellious inclinations to evil, cried out, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; Miserable man that I am! who shall deliver me out of this body of death?

But this mistake hath proved of no small advantage to the * 1.219 investigation of the truth, for from this which they concede, viz. it is impossible for the Will, which is once fixt upon the dilection and fruition of the Chiefest Good, really and clearly so understood (which is the prerogative only of those Sainted Minds, which the kindness of Death hath made superior to the seducements of Sense) ever to revolt from it, and deslect to the quest of a less Good: we may receive some assistance to our meditations, and the more easily understand what kind of Indifferency that is, wherein the nature of this Liberty Elective doth consist, during our souls obligations to corporeity. In our praecedent lines we affirmed, that the Intellect is guide, and doth hold the torch, or give light to the Will; and manifest it is that this Light which the Intellect holds forth to the Will, is no other but that Judgement, which the Intellect delivers concerning the Good and evil of objects, i. e. that this object is good, and that evil; or among several different goods, that this is more, and that less good: so that when the Will is said to be averted from one object and converted to another, that mutation proceeds from hence, that the Judgement of the Intellect is now for one thing and anon for another, and the in∣slexion of the Will is dependent on the inflexion of the Intellect. Since, therefore, the Flexility of the Will is subsequent and conform to the Flexility of the Intellect, which consists in the mutability of its Judgements: we are upon that consideration to observe, that the Intellect makes use of certain Notions, or as common Physiology calls them, Simple Apprehensions of things, in order to its own information, and succeeding pronunciation of Judgement concerning their natures. For necessary it is, that the Mind have a Praenotion what the Sun is and what Light is, that so it may judge afterwards that Light is in the Sun, or that the Sun is a Lucid Body; as also what Hony and what Sweet∣ness is, that it may afterwards pronounce Hony to be Sweet. But in respect that in objects which fall under Speculation, the Intellect doth acquiesce in such a simple Judgement, nor can in∣ferre anything further by necessity of consequence: therefore in objects reducible to action, it hath a certain compound Notion

called a Proposition or Enunciation, which by reason of ano∣ther common Notion congenial and implantate in the mind of every Man from its first existence, is immediately annexed to the former simple notion, and superadded thereunto as a Con∣clusion, which is really that which we call Judicium Practi∣cum, Practical Judgement. For instance, the Intellect having judged that the Sun is a Lucid Body, may therein acquiesce and proceed to no further inference; but so soon as it judgeth hony to be sweet, because it holds as implantate a second complex no∣tion, that what is sweet is to be tasted, therefore it instantly pronounceth this conclusion, that Hony is to be tasted. And because practicable objects are not Vniversals, but Singulars; and for instance, the Intellect doth not give judgement concerning Hony in general, but of this objected Hony that it is sweet; therefore to this judgement, this Hony is sweet, instantly coheres and is superadded that second judgement, this Hony is to be tasted. Nor that only, but such is the nature of this judgement, that without any delay, if nothing countermand, succeeds the Execution thereof, as in this case the actual Degustation of Hony. And upon the consideration of the immediate super∣vention of the Execution upon a practical judgement, was it that Aristotle (de Animalium motu cap. 7.) would allow no distin∣ction between an Action and a Conclusion, for saith he, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that Con∣clusion which follows upon two propositions, is the very action it self: which he most conveniently illustrateth by several Ex∣amples, the praesent omission whereof we hope either the memo∣ry or lecture of our competent Reader will supply. And this * 1.220 justifies their knowledge, who first denominated such a conclu∣sion which is the Action it self (or to which at least the Execution doth individually cohaere) a Practical Judgement.

We are moreover to observe, that since the action or Executi∣on of a Judgement cannot succeed, unless the function of the Appetite or Will intervene between the Judgement and Exe∣cution; therefore must every Judgement or Notion of Good have adjoyned unto it an Appetition of that Good, as every Judge∣ment

of Evil hath adjoyned unto it an Aversion from that Evil: so that the Intellect cannot pronounce this judgement, that what is sweet is to be tasted, but instantly riseth up the Appetite and wills the tasting of the Sweet; nor (to descend to singulars) enunciate this sweet is to be tasted, but immedi∣ately the Will is on edge to tast this Sweet. And hence it comes, that no conclusion can be extracted, nor Execution there∣of succeed; but onely because together with the Judgement the function of the Appetite hath praeceded. For the reason why the Conclusion of a Practical Syllogisme hath always the Execution or action coherent to it, but the Conclusion of a Spe∣culative hath not; is no other then this, that the function of the Will or Appetite is always associated to the praemises or judgements of the Intellect in one, and not in the other. And therefore so often as the Intellect gives Judgement of Good; which is the proper object of the Will; as often is the Will excited so necessarily, that its function or desire of fruition fol∣lows upon the heeles of the Judgement▪ as closely as a shadow attends a body in Sunshine; so that if the Intellect judge any thing to be good, the Will immediately desires that good; as on the contrary, if the Intellect judge any thing to be evil, the Will immediately abhors that evil.

This is an excellent Axiome, that one truth can never be clearely understood, but it leads on to the discovery of another; * 1.221 and here we have experience of it: for from the praemises it re∣sults a perspicuous verity, that because the Intellect is for the most part fickle and inconstant in its judgements; therefore must the Will be as wavering and unstable in its Appetitions: and when the Intellect to day judges any object to be good, but to morrow judges it to be evil; then doth this Paedantique faculty the Will affect that object to day, and hate it again to morrow: and when the Intellect to day declares that such an object is to be affected and prosecuted because 'tis good, but to morrow faceth about to a second object, and apprehending it to be better then the first, judges that to be prosecuted rather of the two; then is the Will to day carried on to the first object, and to morrow

averted from it to the Second. In a word, the Prosecution and Aversion of the Will is dependent on, and conforme to those Notions and Judgements which the Intellect delivers concerning the more or less good, or good and evil of objects.

Further, in respect that amonst good objects, one is really and truly good, another only apparent and counterfeit; and likewise * 1.222 among evil objects (for too frequently good is disguised under the uncomely vizard of evil, and evil again guilded over with the specious and alluring hatchment of Good, and then what is realy good seems either to be absolute evil, or a less good compara∣tively, and what is really evil seems either to be absolute good, or a less evil comparatively) hence comes it we say, that as the Intellect is frequently deluded in its judgements, as being invited by the Apparence of Good, it judgeth a guilded evil to be a real good, or offended at the Apparence of evil, judgeth that disguised good to be a real evil; so must the Will of necessity be deluded in its dependent Appetitions, and prosecuting an apparent good, obtain a real evil, and avoyding a seeming evil, be frustrated of a real good; or certainly as the Intellect enun∣ciates a less good to be a greater, or a less evil to be a greater; so must the Will, prosecuting a greater good, obtain a less, and avoyding a less evil, fall upon a greater.

On the demonstration of this grand-father Truth, viz. that the Will is but the Needle, and the Intellect the Magnet, by * 1.223 whose verticity it is impregnated with an affectation of lying parallel to the point of good, real or apparent, (for evil as evil, i. e. presented naked and without disguise, is not the proper object of either) or, more consimilar, that the Will is the Mari∣ner, and the Intellect the Compass by which he steeres; depends also the discovery of another Abstrusity, viz. that the Indiffe∣rency found in the Will is but the Counterfeit or Representative of that Indifferency which is congenial to the Intellect, and con∣sequently, that the determination of that Indifferency in the Mistress causeth the determination of the like Indifferency in the Handmayd, to this or that particular object. Now the

Indifferency of the Intellect seems essentially to consist in this, that it is not so adliged to adhaerence, to its own judgement con∣cerning the good of any thing objected, as that it may not alter its judgement, and if the apparence of good seems greater in ano∣ther object, apostate from the first, and as vigorously, and con∣fidently convert to the second. For the Intellect is not of the Number of those faculties, which by these fundamental constituti∣ons of their Essence are determined only to one certain motion, as Gravity in bodies devoid of animation, the Generative virtue in Animals, &c. but is by nature so Flexile, that having truth or good for its object, it may one while judge this and another while that, and perhaps the quite contrary of one and the same, and now affect an object under the notion of true and good, and within an houre, nay possibly in a moment, revoke that judge∣ment, and again dislike it under the notion of false or evil, or at least, of less true, or less good.

This constant Inconstancy of the Intellect, the most happy Wit of Cicero descanting upon, most conveniently compares it * 1.224 to a Balance (4 Academic:) for, in troth, no simile in the world, at least, that ever passed our observation, can be more qua∣drant, or hold a neerer resemblance, in all points: since, as a Balance, if geometrically adjusted by dimidiation, is of it self indifferent to be depressed at either extreme, and is so forced from its aequipondium, or depressed at that end, on which the greater weight is suspended; as that the contrary end may be immedi∣ately depressed, if a greater weight then the former be sus∣pended thereon: exactly so is the Intellect of its self indifferent, as to inclinations, and is so inflected to that object, whereto the greater apparence of truth or good (which is the weight that sways it down to determination from Indifferency) is ad∣haerent, that it can upon the appension of a greater apparence of good be reflected to a second object.

For it is not much below Uncontrollable Necessity, that the * 1.225 Intellect should thither convert, and there fix, where is the grea∣test semblance of good: and therefore its native Indifferency is not such, as that abandoning an object, whose good is more perspicuous, it can affect another, whose good is less perspicu∣ous; or, rejecting a judgement which appeares more true, court and embrace another which appeares less true: because, as the beam of a balance, being depressed on one extreme by a greater weight imposed, is never elevated by the imposition of a less weight on the contrary extreme, but of a greater; so likewise can it not be, that that assent of the Intellect, which is caused by the perspicuity of Experience, or some praevalent reason, should be removed to another object, unless by the attraction of an Experience of greater moment, or a reason whose validity and importance is more perspicuous. And, for the eviction of this natural conformity of the Intellect to the attraction of the more ponderous Verisimility of its objects, we need no other argument but this; that many times we find our minds aequilibrated be∣twixt two judgements, or wavering in suspence between two ob∣jects equally attractive; which Fluctuation or Doubting ariseth of necessity from hence, that the moments of verity, or weights of reason are equal on either side, and so exactly counterpoise each other, that the mind can acquiesce in the election of nei∣ther; * 1.226 as a paire of scales charged with two equal weights can∣not be swayd from an aequilibrium.

Again, that it seems during this Fluctuation, one while to incline to the one part, and instantly to be counter-inclined to the other, and then again to revert to the former, and so to be agitated by the inquietude of suspence; hath no other reason but this, that one while it is more attentive to the perpension of reason in the first object, and anon more Attentive to that in the second; and so long doth it remain inclined to the invite∣ment of the one, as it apprehends the good thereof more appa∣rent then of the other, and no longer; after the same manner as if when a paire of scales are aequilibrated by two aequal weights,

you shall superadd to either end of the balance but a few grains more, that end must be depressed, and upon the shifting of those grains to the other end the former again elevated. So that when the Intellect doth at last deflect to one part, this Deter∣mination must proceed from hence; that either the Apparence of verity is somewhat more ponderous on that part, or at least that the more constant Attention to the Verisimility of that part, conjoyned to the minds impatience, (which too frequently helps to turn the Scales, and therefore ought to be allowed for) supplying the defect of weight, makes it seem so.

Most certain it is, we confess, that the Intellect frequently * 1.227 doth, retracting that judgement which of its self, i. e. in the sim∣plicity of its nature, is either more good, or absolutely good, adhaere to a second judgement, which of its self is either less good, or absolutely evil: but yet notwithstanding that in the ob∣ject, which affects and inclines the Intellect, is always ipsa veri species, the Apparence of Truth, which it observes and is atten∣tive to. And because that species of Truth may be either real or counterfeit; therefore may that which is in its own nature really true, be presented under the disguise of an absolute fals∣hood or less Truth, and that which is in its own nature really false, be presented likewise under the disguise of an absolute truth, or less falshood: and so the Intellect becoming subject to deception in the point of judicature, may be allected to the prosecution of an absolute falshood, or less truth, while the ob∣ject remains obvelated under the delusive vizard of an absolute truth or a less falshood, & è contra.

This seriously considered supports three excellent Consequences; (1) that as often as the Intellect, having adhaered to a true judge∣ment, * 1.228 quits and pursues a false one, so often of necessity doth something intervene which detracts the genuine or natural Apparence from the good object, and imposes a counterfeit Ap∣parence upon the evil one, and by that means causes a mutation of the Intellects assent, or judgement: and therefore (2) that the commutation of the species or Apparence of the object is the sole

immediate cause of the Commutation of the Intellects judgement and assent: and therefore (3) that since the Will is obliged, by that necessity formerly declared, to conforme to the conduct and directions of its Guide, the Intellect; it is in vain there∣fore to hope or attempt that the Will should change its Appeti∣tion, unless care be first taken, that the Intellect change its judgement, or, that the Will should be constant to its Appetiti∣on, unless we provide that the Intellect be constant to its judge∣ment. And, therefore, that Mind, which having discovered the incomparable beauties of virtue is become enamoured on her, and stands resolved to court no other Mistress but her, ought to be exceeding circumspect and cautious in this particular, that it submit to the allurement of no object, untill it hath pro∣foundly examined whether that species of Good therein presen∣ted, be really true, or only superficial and counterfeit, that so it may render its self superiour to the delusion of painted Vice.

The admirable Des Cartes (in 3. part. passion. artic. 22.) praesenting a general praeservative against all the excesses and * 1.229 exorbitancies of our passions, gives us this excellent advice, that having learned first to distinguish betwixt those motions or Af∣fections which are terminated in the Soul, and those which are terminated only in the Body, we should, when we feel our blood and spirits agitated by any affection which concernes only the body, reflect upon this as a general Maxime; that all things which offer themselves to the imagination, do tend to no other purpose but to the deception of the Soul, and to perswade the rational and judicative Faculty, that those reasons inservient to the Commendation of the object of that passion, are far more solid, sirme and worthy our assent then really they are, and, on the contrary, that those reasons inservient to the Improbation or disal∣lowance of the object, are far more trivial, infirme and less worthy our assent, then really they are. That when the passion perswades to those things, whose execution may admit suspension or delay; we abstain from passing our verdict too hastily upon them, and divert our cogitations to the serious examen of the inconveniences impendent on their pursuit and execution: or, at

least, to some other object, till time and sleep shall have calmed the impetuous commotions of the blood and spirits, which the seeming good of the object hath excited. And that when the Pas∣sion incites to those actions, whose fleet occasion gives the soul little or no time to consult and deliberate; we always ende∣vour to convert our Understanding to the perpension, and our Will to the prosecution of those reasons, which are conttary to those inferred and urged by that passion; notwithstanding they shall, at the first view, appearless valid and ponderous; for thereby we shall mainly refract and abate the violence of the passion.

Now, this may be our Exemplar in ordering our advice, how * 1.230 to prevent the Delusion of our Understanding, and the seduction of our Will by Evil disguised under the similitude of Good. First, we ought to learn the discrimination of the goods of the Mind, from those pertinent only to the Body: and then, when we meet with any object apparently good, abstractly to examine, whether that good concerns either the body alone, or the mind alone, or both body and mind equally, or more the body then the mind, or more the mind then the body. If only the body, we are to convert our cogitations upon the reasons which disswade, more intently then upon the reasons which perswade the election of and adhae∣rence to it, that so we may, if there be any, detect the Evil couched under that vernish of good, and also conquer the Minds impa∣tience, which too often beares a large share in our deceptions. If only the Mind, in that case we are to bring it to the touch∣stone of the Divine Will: i. e. examine whether those reasons whereby it perswades our Intellect to an Approbation, and con∣sequently our Will to an affectation and prosecution of it, are correspondent to that inseparable or proper sign, or mark of true Good, Conformity to the Will of God, or not; for the very Soul, or quintessence of virtue doth radically consist▪ ••n this; that man without all haesitancy, murmur, diffidence, and re∣luctancy, conforme his Will to the indeceptible Divine Will, as being ascertained, that he can will nothing more excellent in its self, nor convenient to him, then what God hath willed before.

If both body, and mind equally, then to abstract those reasons which insinuate the interest of Sense, and insist only upon those which praefer it to the mind: for, if they shall be found wor∣thy of assent, we need the Authority of no other to justify our e∣lection of that object. If more the body then the mind, then we ought to aestimate the convenience of it by that lesser relation it holds to the mind, and not by that greater it holds to the body. And finally, if more the mind then the body, since the interest of the mind is infinitely to be praeferred to that of the body, where the reasons are equall on each part: tis manifest, we may safely acquiesce in that judgement, and embrace the object. But, in case the object seem dubious, and such whose Verity or Falsity is not easily discoverable, then the only way of avoyding Errour in our judgements, is cohibere assensum, to suspend our approbation of, and assent to the Apparences, or species on each part offered. And by this power of with∣holding our assent does Des Cartes endevour to establish the Liberty of the Will. (Princip. Philosoph. part. 1. Sect. 6.) This in generall, we conceive to be the Art of rectifying the Will by the praevious information of the Intellect; and that thrice happy Soul that hath learned it, hath anticipated one degree of that Perfection, which is one moity of that State of immor∣tal Beatitude, which we are confident that knowing Soul of Des Cartes once aimed at, and now enjoyes, without that nothing of measure.

But alas! while we dwell in the Courts of Vanity, walk amongst the snares of Satan, and carry in our very nature whole legions of frailties, the least of which too strongly inclines us to the delusions of Vice, if presented in the colours of Virtue; tis a Province above the power of meer Humanity to acquire such anhabitual Constancy of our Intellect to its judgement, and of our Will to its Appetition of real Good, as that neither can be divorced from it, and alienated to the embracements of spe∣cious or splendid Evils, and therefore we must indefatigably en∣devour to conquer part of this inhaerent Indifferency upon our knees, humbly and fervently imploring the assistance and conti∣nual manuduction of divine Grace, that supernatural Light;

whereby the Intellect may be illuminated to a clarity, that shall trans fix and dispel all the thickest clouds of Error and fals∣hood, wherein the opticks of Sense are usually terminated; and modestly suspend our hopes of a totall and indissoluble union with Verity, untill our Souls shall have abandoned this body of sin to corruption, and entered the new Hierusalem, where there is no Indifferency, but an eternal determination of the Mind and all its Faculties to the Supreme Good, where nothing shall occur to either Intellect, or Will, but that Supreme Good, and (in a word) where that Libency of the Will, which some Divines calls the Perfection of its Liberty, shall become a pure and ineluctable Necessity.

SECT. III.

HAving made it sufficiently manifest, that the Liberty of * 1.231 mans Will doth radically consist in the Indifferency of the Intellect to its judicature; and amply explained the nature of that Indifferency: it remains only that we expede that prover∣bial objection, whereby the best of us are too prone to palliate our delinquency and excuse our offences; viz. Omnis peccans est ignorans, Ignorance is the mother of all Sin. This Aristotle doubtless alluded to when he sayd, Quî fieri possit, ut qui de rebus rectè aestimat, incontinens sit? and Socrates also when he said, Fieri non posse, ut in quo sit Scientia, in eo aliud quid do∣minetur, atque adeo ut qui de rebus rectè aestimat, non id quod est optimum agat; cum si id agat, necesse sit (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) ob ignorantiam id fieri.

Out of this Labyrinth we may soon extricate our thoughts by * 1.232 making use of that Clue of a Distinction between Science in Habit, and Science in Act; For, a man may have a knowledge, and yet neglect to make use of it, as when he diverts his mind

more intently to some thing, then to that which he doth know; or hath the clarity of his Understanding benighted with sleep, mad∣ness, wine, &c. and a man may have a knowledge and reduce it to practise, as when he converts his mind unto, and fixes it upon that only which he doth know. Now if a man Actu∣ally know, or hath not the acies of his mind levelled at any other thing but what he doth know; in this case, we confess it impossible, that he should do an action contrary to his know∣ledge: and consequently, that holding a clear and perfect knowledge of the decorum or pulchritude of Virtue, and con∣trariwise of the turpitude or deformity of Vice, he should for∣sake the former to court the later. But if he know only Habi∣tually, or hath his cogitations more attent to another thing, then that of which he hath a clear and indubitate knowledge; since his neglect to use it is aequivalent to the total want of that knowledge; we have no reason to deny, that he may do what is point-blanck repugnant to his knowledge; and consequent∣ly, though he possess a clear theory of the loveliness of Virtue, and contrariwise of the ugliness of Vice, that he may notwith∣standing abandon the former and embrace the later.

To this some have inconsiderately replyed; that a man may do a thing repugnant to his Actual knowledge; why? because * 1.233 for the most part every Delinquent so soon as he hath acted amiss, and most commonly at the same instant, feels himself surprised with a certain horror, secret regret, reluctancy and conturbation of mind, called by Divines remorse of Conscience: which must of necessity proceed from his cognition of the amia∣bleness of Virtue which he hath repudiated, and of the odious∣ness of Vice which he hath embraced; since if he wanted this, he must also have wanted that.

Here Aristotle hath praevented our Rejoynder by retorting; that every such Delinquent acts the same part with vinolent * 1.234 Rhapsodists, who, by the habitual exercise of their memory, use ex tempore to rehearse a whole sheet of Empedocles moral ver∣ses, of which they understand little, and practise less; or School-boys, who distinctly read what their understanding doth not comprehend; or Stage-players, who can gracefully personate the most magnanimous Heroes; but themselves still continue most abject and superlative Cowards. For in him who com∣mits a vicious Act, there always is excited some Passion, either of Pleasure, or Anger, or Ambition, or Avarice, which raiseth a tempest in his mind, and so perturbeth, perverteth, and drowneth that habitual Science; insomuch, that what ever of good is in virtue, and what ever of evil is in vice, becomes thereby obnubilated, and darkened; and on the con∣trary, whatever of difficulty seems to be in virtue, and what ever of pleasantness in vice, becomes thereby more conspicuous and illustrated: i. e. Passion is a Perspective, which representeth as well the difficulty of virtue, as the complacence of vice, in magnified dimensions; and on the contrary diminisheth the good of the one, and the evil of the other. And hence comes it, that the real good of virtue attracteth the mind more weakly, and the seeming Good of vice more strongly; and on the con∣trary, the real evil of vice averteth or disgusteth the mind more weakly, and the seeming evil of good more strongly. So he that offends, may, we confess, with Ovid, say, Video meliora, probóque, deteriora sequor, that he knows those things which he rejecteth to be the better, and those things which he ele∣cteth to be the worse; but yet, this must be referred unto some other time, when he recognizes his habitual Science, and calls to mind, that once he had other judgements of those things: for he cannot justly say so of that time wherein he offended, since then he judged those things he pursued to be the better, and those he deserted to be the worse.

Now as for that internal regret, contristation, and poenitence, which invades the mind of every Delinquent immediately after,

and most frequently in the same moment of the perpetration of his offence; this proceeds from his animadversion that he suffers some loss of good. But since this his apprehension of the loss of good, and that reluctancy of mind attendant thereupon is but dull and weak, in comparison of that complacency he is affected withall by the seeming good or pleasure of evil, which subdues his judgement to an approbation of it: hence it is manifest, that he considers and perpends the impendent omission of Good, and the incursion of evil, not seriously and profoundly as he ought, but only perfunctorily and slightly. For, were the punishment, sorrow, ignominy, and other evils, which he only lightly and confusedly apprehends, and fears, profoundly exa∣mined and lookt into by him, not as absent, not as future, not as uncertain, and avoidable, but as impendent, present, certain, and inevitable; without all doubt the smallest glimpse of reason would be sufficient to let him see those forcible determents, nor could he be so mad as from the rock of knowledge to precipitate himself into the most horrid gulph of vice. And therefore al∣beit an offender may say that he saw and approved the Good, but embraced the Evil, yet is that Inconsideration or Non-adver∣tency, by reason whereof he doth not sufficiently discover all the qualities and circumstances of the evil object, and what and how great mischiefs must necessarily ensue upon his actual prosecuti∣on thereof, a kind of Ignorance. And in this sense only can we allow Ignorance to be the mother of Sin; for had man suffi∣ciently understood the evil thereof, he had never bin vicious.

To conclude therefore, this Ignorance must prove but an * 1.235 invalid and ridiculous plea at the judicious Tribunal of Justice, nor ought a Delinquent to slatter himself with the vain hopes of impunity by such an excuse; that he sinned for want of know∣ledge, that he prosecuted the apparent Good he saw in the object, that it was above his power to prevent the delusion of his under∣standing by Evil praesented under the species of Good (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, we cannot countermand Apparences) that no man is vicious with his own consent, nor happy against his will, according to that Proverb, Nemo malus ultrò est, neque beatus non

volens, and that he wanted an ability of J••udgement to do otherwise: this we say cannot extenuate his guilt, and conse∣quently not avert the punishment due thereunto. For, that Ignorance which excuseth, is of another nature; such as we may more properly call Inscientia mera, meer Nescience, Ignorantia pura ac invincibilis, pure and invincible Ignorance; such as that of Cephalus, when mistaking her to have bin a wild beast couchant in a brake he discharged his dart at his beloved wife Procris, and unfortunately slew her; and that of the constant Deianira when she poysoned Hercules with a shirt dipt in Nessus the Centaures gore, which she intended for a Philtre to revoke his affections from Iole; and that also of the fatal handed Gentleman, who shooting at a Deer in New-Forest, killed William Rufus: but that Ignorance, of which we here discourse, is in proper truth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Incuria, vel Negligen∣tia mera, meer Negligence, Inadvertency, or Heedlesness, and is therefore for distinctions sake denominated Ignorantia crassa, affectata, supina, gross, affected, supine ignorance.

To understand the nature of this Non-excusing Ignorance the more distinctly, let us observe, that every Delinquent must in justice charge the Ignorance he praetends, upon one of these two Causes; either that himself was to himself the cause of his ignorance: or that he neglected the means and advantages of acquiring knowledge, i. e. that he did not imploy his Cognoscent Faculty on the examination and consideration of the real good or evil of his action, with that care, seriousness, and sedulity, which was requisite.

To the First of these Causes belongs the ignorance of a Drun∣kard; for in being the Cause of his Ebriety, he is also the Cause of his Ignorance; and 'twas in his power to have praevented this, by the praecaution of that: and therefore his Ignorance is so far short of extenuating, that it naturally aggravates his culpability; and he, if Aristotle may be judge, deserves a double punishment, one for making himself drunk, another for the crime committed in his Drunkenness. Hither also we are to refer his Ignorance, who resisteth not the force of a Passion or perturbation of his mind in the first motion or beginning thereof,

while 'tis yet but weak, and to be supprest by a small opposi∣tion of reason; but permits it to acquire more violence, and gain upon him by degrees, till its impulse grow impetuous, and more inoppugnable: as also his, who suffers a vicious Inclina∣tion, which he might without any considerable difficulty have at first refracted and totally extinguished, to grow into a setled Habit, which pleading praescription and possession, is hardly ejected, but plays the obsolute Tyrant ore the mind, and holds the Scepter of both Understanding and Will by the ineluctable title of Conquest. Thus if a man, who having a rare Bird in his hand, willingly lets it sly, should complain that he cannot recover it again; tis not to be expected that any rational per∣son should pity him for his loss, but rather deride his folly, in that he manumitted it when twas in his power to have kept it: and if a man contract some dangerous disease by intemperance, who can afford him half so much compassion, since twas in his power not to have bin intemperate, as if he had bin invaded by some impartial Epidemick Contagion, against which none the greatest temperance is an infallible praeservative? To this pur∣pose were these words of Aristotle intended; Nemo enim caeci∣tatem, quam natura, morbus, ictus fecerit, exprobret, sed caeci potius misereatur; at si illam aut ebriositas, aut intemperantia alia fecerit, non id opprobrio ducat? (in 3. Ethic. cap. 7.)

To the other belongs his ignorance, who being hurried on to * 1.236 the prosecution of Evil, by the impetuous rapt or swindge of Passion, can yet say Video meliora probóque: for in this case also was it in his power to have more seriously and sedu∣lously examined, sifted, and praeconsidered the evils impendent on that action, and so to have avoided it; We say, absolutely in his power, for four weighty respects. (1) Because we fre∣quently observe, that if in the same moment, when we are pre∣pared to commit a sin, and already entered upon the execution, there chance to come in some grave and virtuous Person, whom we revere, or some Magistrate, whose revenging sword we sear, intervene: we instantly become conscious of our wicked in∣tentions, and desist from the perpetration of it. (2) Because

there are many Virtuous Persons, who having learned and pra∣ctised that noblest militia of conquering themselves, can com∣mand themselves even in the highest orgasmus and fervour of their passions; holding it most base and unworthy the dignity of a generous mind, to be surprized with the subtlest Ambushes of Vice, and led captive by the Pygmie armies of sensual Temptations. (3) Because tis not in vain that God, compassionating the frailties and deceptibility of humane nature, hath vouchsafed to accommodate our understanding with those faithful and powerful auxiliaries, Laws, Praecepts, Exhortations and pious Praecedents, to which we may, in the hottest charges of vicious temptations, with safety and assured Conquest recurre; and upon which if with sufficient attention we reflect the eye of our mind, we shall become 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ejus domini, quod res esse apparet, Lords Comptrollers of Apparences, i. e. detect the frauds and impostures of Evil, though drest in all the glorious ornaments of Good. (4) Because no man endevo∣ring to excuse his offence, can truly say Video meliora probóque; but he doth manifestly grant the action he doth to be Deliberate, and Praecogitate; which is as much as this, twas absolutely in my power to have omitted the doing of it, and to have done the contrary good. For none can say so of an indeliberate acti∣on, as when he feels a commotion of his blood and spirits at the first touch of Anger; which is the reason of Seneca his affir∣mation (2 de Ira 3) quod primus motus non sit voluntarius, that the first motion which an object excites in the mind is involun∣tary, and the ground of that Maxime Primi motus non sunt in nostra potestate.

What these First Motions, which objects, their species being * 1.237 by the mediation of the nerves and spirits transmitted to the mind, excite therein, are in the general; though Epictetus hath furnished us with a convenient brief description of them, in these words, Primus motus est quem creant visa animi (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 appellant Philosophi) quibus mens hominis prima statim specie accidentis ad animum rei, pellitur, non voluntatis sunt, neque arbitrariae, sed vi quadam suâ sese inferunt

hominibus nos••itandae: yet the most apposite and most familiar way of explaining their nature and extent, which our meditati∣ons could find out, is to exemplify them in some one particular beginning Passion, and chiefly in that of Anger, where these Impulses or motions are most sensible, because most forcible. Which that we may the more worthily performe, let us, with Des Cartes, concede two distinct species of Anger, (1) one caused in a moment, which invading with some violence, can∣not be concealed; but discovers it self for the most part by co∣louring the face with a Vermilion, or Aurora tincture on a sud∣dain; but performes little, and is easily and soon calmed. (2) Another, which invading with less violence, is not to be discovered, unless rarely by inducing paleness upon the Counte∣nance, by any signes in the beginning; but being of a less diffu∣sive condition, doth more corrode and gall the heart, and conse∣quently produce more dangerous effects. To the first of these, they are most obnoxious, who have the most of Love, Noble∣ness or sweetness of disposition habited in them. For it ariseth not from any profound hatred, but from a suddain Aversation, repentinely surprising the Mind: and because loving, good, and Heroick minds are always propense to imagine, that all things ought to proceed in that manner or course which they judge to be the best, therefore so soon as they discover any thing to be carried on in a contrary course to Good, they instantly make a stand in their thoughts, become offended at it, and grow angry; yea many times when the matter concerns not them in special; for since they love much, they take to heart, (as the vulgar phrase it) resent, and appropriate the Cause of them they love, as neerly as if it were their own, insomuch as what would have bin no more then matter of Indignation to others, proves matter of Anger to them. And because that Inclination, whereby they become possest with a constant propensity to love, doth effect, that they have always much of heat, because much of blood in and about their Heart; therefore that repentine Aversion, which suddainly surpriseth them, cannot but propell some small quantity of Choler (the Tinder whereon the sparks of this Passion fix and foment) to the Heart; nor that little of

Choler but be accended, and excite, in an instant, a great com∣motion, and effervescence of the blood thither propelled. But this Commotion lasteth but a small space of time, because the impulse or force of the unexpected Aversation is of no continu∣ance; and so soon as they deprehend the matter for which they were angry, to be of no moment, and such as ought not to have commoved them to that height; they becalme themselves, con∣jure down their spirits, and become affected with a reluctancy against and a poenitence for that Passion, and so destroy it in the Embryo or shell. With the other, weak, abject, and inge∣nerous minds are most transported. For though it seldome dis∣cover it self in the beginning, unless by some paleness in the face; yet is its force by degrees increased by reason of that agitation which the fervent desire of Revenge exciteth in the blood, which being permixed with that Choler propelled to the heart from the inferior part of the Liver and Spleen, kindles therein a sharp, pungent, and corroding Heat. And as those minds are most generous, and noble, which are most inclined to Gratitude; so are those the most proud, abject and base, which suffer themselves the most to be transported with this kind of ignoble Anger. For by so much the greater do Injuries appear to be, by how much the greater value Pride makes a man put upon himself, and by how much the greater aestimation is set upon those Goods which are taken away by that Injury: and by so much a higher rate are those goods prized at, by how much the more weak, abject, and ignoble the mind of him is that aestimates them, be∣cause in truth they are dependent upon others pleasure; nor doth a well ordered mind lose any part of its happiness by being de∣prived of them. Now, having duly praeconsidered all things occurrent in this pregnant example, we may not only without difficulty understand what those first motions or incitements are, which objects exciting in the mind thereby obtrude themselves upon the Intellect, or rather compell the Intellect to apprehend them under that species in which they praesent themselves; but also that, though those motions are not in our power, yet the Consequents or Actions to which they provoke us, are subject to our Deliberation, Examination, and Arbitrary Election, or

Rejection; since every Action, is the Conclusion of a Practical Syllogisme, and every Conclusion praesupposeth two praecedent Propositions, and these again praesuppose Deliberation, and consequently that who ever committing an Evil Action, doth yet say Videóque meliora probóque, doth in that confess his Action to be Deliberate and Arbitrary, which is as much as to confess that twas absolutely in his own power not to have done it.

And as for that proverbiall subterfuge 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Nemo m••lus ultro est, neque beatus non volens; Aristotle hath long since subverted it by answering, That though it be true in the later part, insomuch as no man can be happy, because not virtuous, against his will, yet tis false in the former, insomuch as vice, whereby man becomes Evil, is volun∣tary (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) whereupon M. Anton. said 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: qui verò sui ipsius animi motus certa ratione consi∣lióque non gubernat, necessariò miser est. (lib. 2. num. 5.) And therefore though many have thought to palliate their vitiosities, by affirming that no man doth commit a sin voluntarily, but being compelled thereunto by the impulse of some perturbation: yet tis manifest, since every Delinquent gives either occasion or way to that perturbation, and suffers himself to be transported by the impulse thereof, beyond the sphaere of reason, that no co∣action can intevene.

To conclude, we are ready to confess, that among those many excuses, which the Sophistry of the Advocates of vice hath * 1.238 alledged for the extenuation of its Culpability, the most weighty and considerable is the violence of Necessity and Fear. But, all violence must proceed from an external Principle, and is not admitted without some Renitency in the thing that suffers it; and that Necessity, whereby any man is coacted, must proceed from an external and present Cause; and fear is an internal Passion, though excited by an external Cause, viz. a fu∣ture Evill; and differeth from Cupidity in this, that this, though it be excited by an external cause also, viz. a future Good, yet

it is joyned always with a Libency or Willingness, but Fear with a Renitency or Ʋnwillingness. Upon which considerati∣on was it, that Aristotle concluded him exceeding stupid and ridiculous, who, having vitiated his friends wife, should for ex∣cuse pretend, that he was constrained to that perfidious and immodest action by the violent temptation of pleasure; bur holds him excusable who is compelled to omit an office of friendship by the praevention of some more considerable incommodity impendent upon himself, since the Necessity of the one is more violent and urgent, then the obligation of the other. For the more easy decision of all disputes concerning the more or less pressure of these kinds of Necessity, Cicero puts this Case. Si constitueris te cuipiam advocatum in rem prae∣sentem esse venturum; atque interim graviter aegrotare filius coe∣perit, non sit contra officium non facere quod dixeris; magisque ille cui promissum sit, ab officio discedat si se destitutum queratur.

This praemised, we may safely conclude, that a small and light fear is not to be accounted sufficient to excuse a male∣faction; because it cannot usurp upon and countermand the Liberty of the Mind; nay nor a great and strong fear (which is therefore allowed by some great Clerks for an excuse, because it may sometimes invade and stagger a mind in other things con∣stant and generous) since it cannot so oppose the Liberty Ele∣ctive, as not to leave the mind possest with some Libency. And this is to be understood, not in respect to that Evil, which is sustained or undergone in the praesent, but to that far greater one, which is avoided, and in comparison of which the less Evil hath indeed the reason of Good; because it is as it were the means whereby the greater Evil is averted or prevented, as when Mer∣chants throw their treasure overboard, for fear of drowning, and a Traveller delivers his purse to Robbers for fear of having his throate cut. Now, how far this kind of fear, which seems to necessitate the commission of a small Evil for the probable prae∣vention of a greater, may be extended by way of Excusation; as also of what sorts those evils must be which justify this fear; the exactest and profoundest of Moralists have found it no easy matter praecisely to determine; chiefly because according to the

variety of mens Temperaments, ages, sexes, Educations, Ha∣bits &c. what is but a weak and light fear to one, may be great and potent to another; but all consent that we are to understand it to be a fear of no less then Death, Mutilation, torment, servitude, long exile, taedious imprisonment, aeternal dishonour or ignominy, privation of all, or the greatest part of ones estate, or livelyhood (and in this particular, not in respect of a mans self only, but also for those who depend upon him for temporal subsistence, as wife, children, parents &c.) as also that kind of fear which is a species of Reverence, and such as may be in a subject, in respect of his Prince, in a child in respect of his Father, in a wife in respect of her husband &c. We said that fear which seems to necessitate the commission of a small evil &c. thereby insinuating, that it only seems so to do. For, Truth its self hath taught us, that we ought not to do evil, though never so small, for prevention of another evil, though ne'r so great; and every man knows that Fear (unless of doing Evil) is wholly excluded the society of virtue. Which our late Salomon (whom we can hardly think upon, without a devout Adoration of his deified part) reflected upon, when he affirmed for a Maxime of general truth, That a Coward can hardly be an honest man. And this we desire our Reader can∣didly to accept, as a sufficient enquiry into the nature of mans Free-Will.

CHAP. VIII. Of Fortune.

THat this Phantsme, though of no great antiquity (comparatively) hath under the disguise of a * 1.239 Reality, so long and so universally possessed the heads not only of the Vulgar (whose rank and muddy brains are ever more fertile in the pro∣duction, and more favourable to the conservation of Monsters, then Nilus and all Affrica) but even of some of those more cul∣tivated Explorators of truth, who well knew the absurdity of Multiplying Entities, and pretended to examine every Idea oc∣curring to the mind, whether it had an exemplar, or prototype in real Existence; that so, though they could not attain to a full cognition of the distinct Essences, or simple Forms of Objects, they might at list acquire an assurance of their Reality, or Being in rerum natura: this, we say, seems to us no contemptible Ar∣gument, that the Venome of the Forbidden Fruit hath a stronger and more infatuating operation upon the posterity of Adam, in the old age of the world, then it had in its youth and midle age; and that the sun in the Microcosme hath sufferd a greater and more demonstrable decay of Splendor, Clarity, and Influence, then Bodin (method. Histor. cap. 8.) out of Copernicus, Reinaldus, and Stadius, hath affirmed that in the Macrocosme to have sustained, and confessed by its neerer approach to the Earth, and more Southerly inclination, since the daies of Ptolomie. For (first) though Simplicius (2. physic. comment. 39.) hath a certain obscure tradition, that Orpheus ingaged in the expedition of the Argonauts, composed a votive Hymne to this Fairy Queen, which was afterward inserted into the idolatrous Liturgie of the

Delphian Apollo, together with whom she was solemnly invoca∣ted: yet hath, Macrobius, much the better Antiquary of the two, faithfully observed (5. Saturn. ib.) that she was, if not unborn, yet unnamed in Homers time; subjoyning as a reason thereof, quod priscis illis temporibus omnia, quae sierent, referri ad Deos Authores solerent; that more simple and intelligent Antiquity used to referre all events to the wise procuration of the Gods. Which is evidence sufficient, that Fortune could not mount up to an Apotheosis, till the world grew into its Dotage, and man sunk a whole sphear below that of his Ancestors simpli∣city and knowledge. And (2) that, whenever she was borne, and whoever was her Father, yet Ignorance was her Mother; besides the convincing Authority of our own Reason, we have that of the impartial Cicero, in these words: Stultitia, Error, Caecitas & Ignoratio rerum atque causarum, Fortunae nomen primò induxisse, certum est. And so much the more of weight may this Argument bear, by how much the more manifest a Con∣tradiction they incurr, who have either defended, or advanced her reputation; for though no one among those many Writers, who have professedly treated of her Nature and Power, hath denyed her extraction from, and necessary dependence upon that accursed Beldam, Ignorance: yet have most agreed, that she is somthing more then Nomen inane, a meer and empty Name, or Chimaera; and some allowed her the dignity of a considerable Influence upon the actions of Man; nay, others have gon so farr as to exalt her virtue to a competition with Providence Di∣vine, and consigned her a throne among the Coelestial Deities, as is intimated in that verse of Juvenal (Satyr. 14.)

—sed te

Nos facimus Fortuna Deam, coeloque locamus. And this briefly concerning the Antiquity and Genealogie of this Nothing.

As for the full description of her Nature, or more properly, what Kind of Activity the chiefest Philosophers have allowed * 1.240 her, and to what order of Causes referred her; this we cannot so satisfactorily present by any other way, as by a short Com∣memoration, and aequitable Collation of their several Desinitions of her.

Plutarch (1. placit. 29.) makes Plato to have defined her thus; Fortuna est causa ex accidenti, & consequens inopinatò in iis, quae consilio fiunt, Fortune is a Cause by Accident, and un∣expectedly supervenient in those actions, which are deliberately and upon consultation performed: and Aristotle thus; Fortuna est caussa per accidens in iis, quae rei alicujus gratiâ, appetitu movente, fiunt, eáque incerta & instabilis; Fortune is an Acci∣dental (yea and an uncertain and instable) cause, interesting it self in those actions, which are done by an Agent, upon the incitement of its Appetite, in order to its consequution of an object. Which words, indeed, seem to comprehend, in Epitomy, all that the Philosopher (in 2. physic. cap. 5.) intended in his more prolix de∣scription of Fortune; abating only this, that he there confines her concernment only 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, rebus Contingentibus, to Effects purely Contingent, i. e. such as may, or may not come to pass, and are therefore of dubious or uncertain event. To explain this, they exemplify in him, who digging in the earth, with no other designe, but to plant a tree, found a great Treasure, of which he never thought: for (say they) the Invention of the Treasure is an effect by Accident, i. e. evenient above the hopes and besides the intention of him that digged; and so the Digger in∣somuch as he is Causa per se of the digging, is also Causa per accidens of the invention of the Treasure. Such an Accidental Cause, therefore, doe our Philosophers call Fortune: and the Event it self, viz. the invention of the treasure, they call Rem fortuitam, a Fortuitous Effect. But whereas Arist. hath fre∣quently advertised, that Fortune (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) and Chance (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) are different each from other in this, that Fortune is pro∣per only to things done by Causes, whose activity is Arbitrary; and Chance common both to such, and also Inanimate or meer

Spontaneous Causes (as when a stool falls, and breaks a Glass.) & consequently that all Fortune is Chance, but not every Chance Fortune: hence may we observe, that he would have aswell For∣tune, as Chance to belong to the classis of Contingents, and that all Contingents belong to the classis of Possibles. More expressly, that since among Possibles some are such, as that their Event can∣not be interdicted, impeded, or countermanded, as this, the sun cannot be hindred from rising again to morrow morn; and others such, whose event is not necessary, as this, tis not necessary, though possible, that it should raine to morrow a•• sun rising; therfore is it manifest, that a Possible of the first sort, is the same with that which is called Necessarium, absolutely Necessary, or such whose Contrary is purely Impossible; and of the second sort, the same with that which is called Contingens, meerly Contingent, or of an uncertain event, such whose Contrary is aequally possible. Further, in respect that the meer Contingency, or Ambiguity of any Event must be founded on this, that either some Liberty in∣terveneth, by reason whereof that which otherwise would come to pass, doth not; or that which otherwise would not have come to pass, doth; or some other Cause interposeth, which besides its proper destination and the unpraemeditated concurse of cer∣tain other things, effecteth that some even••, which, otherwise would, doth not come to pass, or that some event, which o∣therwise would not, doth come to pass: hence is it manifest, that this Posterior kind of Contingency, is in the general that, w^ch men call Chance; and if it be especially in Man, besides or beyond whose intention any Effect eveneth, then is it what they call Fortune: unless that somtimes they confound both these, and then 'tis indifferent whether the event be referred either to For∣tune, or Chance.

However, we perceive (reflecting upon the former Example) since the Double Effect, viz. the digging of the earth, and the in∣vention of the treasure, had but one single Cause, viz. the man that digged: that, for this reason, the Digger may justly enough be sayd to be Causa per se, in respect of the one, and per accidens in respect of the other. To which we may add this, that since in Effects meerly Natural, one and the same thing may be both

Fortune and Nature, or a Natural Cause: therefore Gassendus had very good reason to justifie Epicurus in this particular that he made Fortune and Nature no more then synonoma's, signi∣fying one and the same thing in Reality.

Now though common Enquirie may goe away satisfied with * 1.241 this pausible Adumbration of Fortune; yet cannot a profound and more ocular Scrutiny be terminated therein: for the Example introduced to explain it, comes largely short of a requisite Adae∣quation; insomuch as no rational man can appositely enough accept either him that digged, or his Action of digging, for all that's comprehended under that obscure notion of Fortune. Wherefore, omitting the consideration of Res Fortuita, or the Event, which is most frequently apprehended for Fortune it self, or the cause of that insperate event; let us understand Fortune to be, such a concurse of various Causes, made without all mu∣tual consultation, or praecogitate conspiracy betwixt them, as that from thence doth follow an Event, or fortuitous Effect, which neither all the Causes concurrent, nor some of them, nor especialy he to whom the Event happens, ever in the least measure inten∣ded, or could expect. Now, according to the tenor of this Defi∣finition, in regard to the fortuitous Invention of a treasure, is re∣quired not only the Person, who digg's and finds it; but also he, who first digg'd and hid it: it is no obscure nor controvertible truth, that Fortune, or the Cause by Accident of the invention of the treasure, is the Concurse both of the Occultation and Effos∣sion thereof, in that particular place. We sayd, without mutual Consultation, and besides the intention of any or all the Causes concurrent; thereby intimating, that though one or more of the Causes may have haply intended that event: yet nevertheless tis properly and absolutely Fortune, in relation to that Cause, which intended it not. Thus if any man, who foreknowes, or at least conjectures, that such a Person will come and digg in such a place, doth there hide treasure, to the end that the other may find it: in this case, in respect to him that hid it, the Invention of the treasure is not a Fortuitous Effect; but in respect to him, who unexpectedly finds it, it is. Thus was it not altogether For∣tuitous

in respect of Nitocris, what hapned at the Violation of his Tomb; in regard he praesumed that, in process of time, there would be some King or other, who invited by this promising In∣scription [If any of my Successors, the Kings of Babylon, shall want mony, let him break open this Sepulchre, and thence take what may supply his wants; but on no condition, unless his wants be real, let him attempt it: for it shall redound to his no swale detriment.] would open it: but yet, in respect to Darius, that instead of mony he therein found this deriding Engravement [Had'st not thou bin insatiable with riches, and covetous of sor∣did lucre; thou wouldst not have thus prophaned the Ashes of thy Praedecessors, and ransack't the sacred Dormitory of the Dead,] this was meerly Fortuitous. And thus also, though Democritus hath pleaded hard to free Fortune from having any hand in the incomparable Death of good old Aeschylus; why because his bald pate, being mistaken by a volant Eagle for a white stone in the field, was the cause why the Eagle drop't a Tortois perpendicular thereupon: yet, had we bin of the Jury, we should have found her guilty of the Murder; (1) in respect of the Poet, since that sad event was besides his intention, he at the same time having withdrawn himself from the Town, for fear of being destroyed (according to the tenor of the Astrologers praediction) by the fall of an house, nor could he possibly foresee that prodigious mischance impendent: (2) in respect of the Eagle, who drop't not the Tortois with purpose to brain the Poet, but to break its shell, that so he might come at his prey, the flesh thereof. However, we are willing, because, in truth, we ought to acknowledge, that if we regard the height or punctilio of her Propriety, Fortune is chiefly, when among all those several Causes, which concurr, no one either principally, or collaterally intends or aimes at that Event, which unexpectedly succeeds upon that their concurse: of which we have a most illustrious and competent Example in the Dilatation of the death of So∣crates, a day beyond the time praefixt by his Judges, for the Exe∣cution of their Sentence upon him; as Plutarch (de Fato) hath praecisely observed.

We have it from the pen of that oraculous Secretary of Nature, * 1.242 D^r Harvey, that he never dissected any Animal, but he always discoverd somthing or other more then he expected, nay then ever he thought on before; so useful & infinite in variety is the Magna Charta of Nature: and perhaps some of our Readers may here have occasion to say as much of this our Dissection of Fortune; for while we have exercised our thoughts in the exploration of her Nature, we have unexpectedly found that, if considered per se & reverà, she hath no nature at all, i. e. that in Reality she is nothing. For, when we have abstracted all those Causes in the Concurse, which act per se, or by natural virtue; there remains no more but a meer Privation or Negation of all Praenotion in the concurrent Causes of that particular Concurse, and also of the intention and expectation of the subsequent Event: nor can that unpraemeditate Concurse of Causes be rightly accounted the Cause of the Fortuitous Event, by any neerer relation then that which Philosophers have termed Conditio sine qua non. Since, as the Admotion of any combustible body to Fire, may be sayd to be the Cause of its combustion, in this respect only, that it was Con∣ditio sine qua non, or, if that Admotion had not praeceded, the combustion had not succeded: so also cannot that Concurse of Causes, from which any Fortuitous Event doth result unexpe∣ctedly, be sayd to be the Cause thereof, in any other respect but this, that it was Conditio sine qua non, i. e. if that Concurse of Causes had not praeceded, that Event had not succeded, though not one of those Causes in the single energy of its nature, nor all in confederacy ever any way intended it; the Analogy betwixt these two cases standing faire and full in all points.

Again, forasmuch as this indeliberate Syndrome or Combina∣tion of Causes, is always uncertain and various, the Causes be∣ing * 1.243 neither elected, nor connected, nor managed by any Provi∣dence of their own: we cannot in justice but applaud the wary judgment of Epicurus in this, that he called Fortune, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a Cause instable in Persons, Times, and Manners; which is aequivalent to this, that since she

is a Cause of uncertain and indeterminate insluence, none but Fools can hope that this Chamaeleon should constantly appear in the same colours, or wear the same Countenance.

Nor is he less to be commended for his, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, * 1.244 Cave ne habeas Fortunam Deam (apud Diogen. Laert. Epist. 3. Epicuro conscripta.) endeavours to degrade Fortune from her imaginary Divinity, and deride the egregious folly of her so∣lemne Worship; for so great is the imbecillity of vulgar minds, that what they doe not well comprehend, they not only immo∣derately admire, but superstitiously revere, as somthing wholly Divine, and as farr above Nature, as it seems above their Capaci∣ty: and undoubtedly mans Ignorance of the praevious Conspi∣racy of Accidentaly concurrent Causes, from which any Event extraordinary and superintentional doth emerge; first praevailed upon him to invest Fortune in such a specious disguise, under which he might, with less dishonour to his own•• Intellectuals, advance her to the reputation of a Deity, and adore her. Tis more then probable, that men did not, at her first Canonization, either much care for, or enquire into the condition and extent of her Power; and evident, that when she began to be cryed up for producing strange Effects in the transactions of the world, and by a kind of impervestigable superintendency to dispose the acti∣vity of Natural Causes to the induction of Events above or be∣side their proper and Customary Destinations: then began the Vulgar to think themselves concerned in the conciliation of her favour, and early atonement of her displeasure; and so by those, to whom she seemed friendly and prosperous, was she accounted a Good and Propitious Numen, and to those, to whom she appea∣red Inclement and Adverse, an Evil and Malevolent one. And hence (the Error, like Rivers, still enlarging) were stately and magnificent Temples erected for her popular and solemne Ado∣ration, and several Inscriptions respective to that particular At∣tribute, which her fond Votaries conceived most eminent in her, or most advantagious to themselves, ingraven in capital letters on their Porches; such as' 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (one of which I have seen at the house of that ingenious Benefactor to Antiquaries, Mr Vernon,

in Essex, with no small cost and difficulty digged up in a field neer Smyrna, and together with many other very antique Mo∣numents brought by him into England) Malae Fortunae, Aver∣runcae, Blandae, Calvae, Vitreae, Equestri, Fallaci, Aureae, &c. a large catalogue of which Appellations we may read in Pliny (lib. 2 cap. 7.) Plutarch (lib. de Fortuna Romanorum.) and Na∣talis Comes (lib. 4. Mytholog. cap. 9.) This Pliny, with some indignation at the ridiculous delirium of the world in the Deifi∣cation of this Non-entity, takes ample notice of in these words: Toto mundo, & locis omnibus, omnibusque horis, omnium voci∣bus Fortuna sola invocatur, una nominatur, una accusatur, una cogitatur, sola laudatur, sola arguitur, & cum convitiis coli∣tur; volubilis, à plerisque verò & caeca etiam existimata; va∣ga, inconstans, incerta, varia, indignorum fautrix: huic om∣nia expensa, huic omnia feruntur accepta; & in tota ratione mortalium, sola utramque paginam facit; adeoque obnoxiae sumus sortis, ut Sors ipsa pro Deo sit, qua Deus probatur incertus.

We are not ignorant (nor, in duety to the praeservation of their memories from ingratefull Detraction, ought we to con∣ceal) * 1.245 how difficult it is for any man to impeach any one Philo∣sopher, among those many, whose Names or Writings have hitherto escaped the jawes of Oblivion, of this absurd Delusion of ascribing Divinity to Fortune. For though Plato (de legibus. lib. 4.) hath this saying; Deum omnia, ac secundum Deum Fortunam & Tempus omnia gubernare; & Aristotle (2 Phys. 4. affirmes that some there were, who held, Fortunam esse causam quidem, sed humanae menti obscuram; & Stobaeus (Ecles. Phy∣sic.) tells us of others, Qui partem aliquam Fortunae, ex eo esse Divinam censerent, quo quidam temere agentes optatum finem consequerentur, caeteros verò prudentia utentes optata d••∣stituerent; who opinioned, that Fortune was in some part Di∣vine, for this reason, that some men, who enterprized their de∣signes rashly and inconsiderately, did not withstanding accom∣plish them successfully, and happily attain their ends, while others who grounded theirs upon the most apparent probability, and managed the means conducing to their procuration, with

great prudence and circumspection, were however fooled in their attempts, crost in their hopes, and frustrated of their purposes, by the suddain intervention of some occult impediment, which as no Forecast could discover, so no Caution praevent: yet can∣not all this be justly interpreted any other then their wary and tacite Confession of their Ignorance of the cryptick ways, and imperceptible Ends of Providence Divine; nor did these great Book-men speak other then the Dialect of the Illiterate, and conforme their Expressions to the customary notion of the Mul∣titude, when they referred to Fortune those Contingents, which to the jndgement of Reason seemed to want a Natural Series of Causes proper for their induction, being as it were ob∣truded upon man by a power Supernatural, i. e. so far above the praecaution of his Prudence, as the investigation of his Sapi∣ence. And though some few perhaps, whose Curiosity was weak, but Superstition strong, may be found to have contributed toward the propagation of this Error; yet cannot that in reason be ex∣tended to the attainder of the major and more judicious number of Philosophers: who upon the strictest examination of their Reliques, must be found guilty of no more then the continuation of that laudable custome of their Praedecessors, in transmitting the most abstruse and difficult mysteries of Science, in the more comprehensible Allay of Symbolical and Emblematical tradi∣tions; and in this particular, what the Multitude could not well understand under the Metaphysical notion of Providence Divine, disposing the confederations of Natural Causes to the production of Events either above or besides their native and proper virtues, or, at least, above the investigation of Reason; this they accommodated to weaker Capacities, in the easie Repraesentation of Fortune.

We sayd the more comprehensible disguise of Symbolical & Em∣blematical * 1.246 Traditions; because, though it be commonly conceived, that primaevous Antiquity used to invent Parables and Emblems rather to invellope the Arcana of Philosophy and so conceal them from the prophaning eyes of Ignorance, then to render them more intelligible: yet Parabolical and Poetical Fictions con∣duce

tam ad lumen & illustrationem, quàm ad involucrum & velum, as well to the illustration of darker, as the involution of more evident peices of Truth; as the Oedipus of this last Cen∣tury, the Lo. S^t. Alban (in praefat. ad lib. de Sapient. Veterum) hath acutely observed.

Nor ought we to be so vainly credulous as to admit, that the Ancients, being better acquainted with Simplicity and Bene∣volence, then Fraud and Envy, would expose their names to infamy, and the just execration of succeeding Ages, by drawing a curtain of Allegories, Symbolisms, and Similitudes, betwixt the eyes of Posterity, and the naked glories of Verity; there∣by to detain them in the most horrid darkness of Ignorance: especially while tis manifest, that such was the rudeness of the Illiterate in those blinder times, when Contemplation was ac∣counted inglorious Idleness, and Action the only end of life, that most were either incapable of, or impatient of the study requisite to learn any thing, which was not reduced down to a familiarity with Sense; and consequently, that the professors of Science had no other way left to insinuate the Maximes, and secret Conclusions in physiology, into the narrow minds of their Scholars, but by the mediation of their Senses affected with Corporeal Representations. Which is also the reason, why Hieroglyphicks were much more ancient then Letters; and Parables then Arguments.

Now, that the Philosophers Description of Fortune was only * 1.247 Emblematical; needs no other remonstrance, but this of Pacu∣vius (apud Auth. lib. 3. ad Herennium)

Fortunam insanam esse, & coecam, & brutam perhibent Philosophi; Saxoque illam instare globoso praedicant volubilem; Ideo, quò saxum impulerit Fors, cadere ev Fortunam autumant. Coecam, ob eamrem esse iterant, quod nihil cernat, quò sese applicet: Insanam autem aiunt, quia atrox; incerta, instabilis{que} sit: Brutam, quia dignum atque indignum negat internosc••re.

Philosophers paint Fortune, mad and blind, Fix't on a Globe revolv'd by every wind

Of Casualty: importing her to fall, Where Chance converts her whirling pedestall. Her eyes valid over with the skarf of Night; 'Cause she doth ne're distinguish wrong from right. Frantique, because Unconstant, Giddy, Cruel To him, at night, who was, at morn, her Jewel. Irrational, 'cause she doth ne're elect, By merit, whom to grace, whom disrespect.

Nor had those ingenious Painters and Statuarics, whose happy Fancies invented an Alphabet of Things, and composed * 1.248 a silent language of Figures, intelligible by the eye, to express the several attributes of Fortune; any other design, then by a pleasant affectation of the Sense (the only Criterion of illiterate Heads) to offer a gentle violence to the mind, and by a most familiar way of information, conduct the captived thoughts through the labyrinth of the mystery, to an easy and durable perception of the Deuteroscope, or Mythological intention. Thus the Scythians, as Piccolomineus (in 8. gradu Philosoph. Moral.) relateth, had an Image of Fortune without feet; sensibly intimating, that the Goods of Fortune must be be∣holding to the leggs of Virtue, to support them in the con∣stant benignity of their nature; i. e. they fall to the ground, and perish in a depraved use, unless they be managed by Pru∣dence. Thus the Smyrnoeans, as Pausanias (lib. 4. Messenico∣rum. pag. 178.) hath recorded, had a statue of Fortune, like Atlas, supporting the Pole with one hand, and holding in the other the Amalthaean Horn, or Copia Cornu: intuitively m∣porting the Universality of her Empire, and that Riches are rather showred down on the heads of Mortals, by the free bounty of Providence Divine, then collected by the hands of Human Industry; which had I beheld, I should instantly have reslected upon that observation of Salomon (Eccles. 9. vers. 11.) That the race is not to the swift, nor the battell to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of Ʋnderstanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but Time, and Chance happeneth alike to all. Thus others, pourtraying

her bestriding a Serpent; would have the Spectator intuitively understand from the theory of that Express; that Fortune holds the bridle to Human Prudence, and can at pleasure counter∣mand the profoundest Policy. And others, by representing her riding on a running Horse, lash't on by Fate, which treads up∣on his heelcs; tacitely instruct the beholder, that Fortune must at last be overtaken, and vanquisht by Destiny. To conclude, a copious list of many the like Emblematical and Symbolical Idols of Fortune, together with their several Significations and Mythologies; the ranging pen of Bernhardus Coesius (de Mi∣neral. lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 12.) hath collected, and exhibited together in one sheet: and theresore we should defraud the Curiosity of our Reader, not to remit him thither for more ample Satisfaction.

Now, from a review of this disquisition into the nature of For∣tune, * 1.249 tis obvious to the meanest capacity that if we respect only the Proenotion and Expectation of human Reason; then none the most praecise in Christianity can justly quarrel at the custo∣mary use of the Notion: but if we respect the inslucnce and dispo∣sition of Providence Divine extended to all occurences in the world; then none but the most barbarous, or Atheistical Igno∣rance dare defend it. Which distinction the learned Spondanus (in Comment, in Homeri Iliados libr. 7. pag. 123.) hath more fully and elegantly delivered thus; Minime audiendi sunt, qui sortium dispensationem fortuitam esse dicunt. Quod Ego tamen admitto, si Homines tantum spectaveris: sed illoe etiam ex Pro∣videntia Dei omninò pendent. Eo sensu etiam accipiendum est nomen Fortunoe; quoe enim consilio humano non fiunt, causam quoad nos non habent: sed illa omnino Deus regit & moderatur.

CHAP. IX. Of Fate.

SECT. I.

TIS not unknown to the meanest in the Com∣monweale * 1.250 of Learning, that no less then an Age can suffice to the observant lecture of that Vatican of Books composed by Philoso∣phers of all times, concerning this perplexing Theorem; there being more Discourses (a∣bating those, which the kindness of Time hath substracted) now extant thereupon, then any other subject, that ever exer∣cised the cogitations and pens of Scholars: as must be ac∣knowledged by any, who hath surveyd the singular Iatrophi∣lological Treatise of that judicious Parisian, Gabriel Naudae••••, de Fato & Vitae Termino. But yet, such hath bin the singular fortune of Fate, that it hath obtained an exemption from that general Experiment, Tot sententiae, quot Authores: there being found, upon a just audit of them all, fewer Opinions then Books concerning it; nay, what is one degree of wonder higher, a diligent scrutiny may soon explore, that they all fall under the comprehension of only Two Catholique Heads; some understanding Fate to be Aliquid Divinum; a certain power Divine, and the rest, Aliquid merè Naturale, a certain Con∣stitution merely Natural.

In the Classis of those, who have conceived Fate to be a Divine Power, the highest seat belongs to the Platonist and Stoick; according to whose doctrine, methodized and sum∣maried

by Plutarch (lib. de Fato) we may consider it in a twofold Notion.

First, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ut Substantia, as a Substance. In which sense * 1.251 it is accepted for God Himself, or that sempiternal Reason, or establish't method, according to whose tenor He hath praeordai∣ned and disposed All things in the World, and so connected Causes to Causes, that all Events whatever, Arbitrary and Fortuitous, individually depend upon, and indeclinably result from that subalternate Series, or Complication of Essicients. For thus Plato (in Timaeo) one while affirmes that Fate is ipsa Anima Mundi, the very Soul of the Universe; and another while, Naturae Ʋniversi aeterna ratio ac lex, the eternal reason and law of Nature: and thus also both Zeno and Chrysippus are cited by Plutarch (in 1. placit. 28.) as defining Fate to be, Vis spiritualis, ac Ratio ordinis universa gubernans, a Spiritual Power, and constitution governing All things according to an order eternally praecogitate and praedecreed. And all the rest of the Stoical Family, as well generally quoted by Diogenes Laertius, as Panaetius and Possidonius (at least, if He be the true Father of that Book, de Mundo, vulgarly conscribed to Aristotle, out of which the text is extracted) quoted by Stobae∣us (Ecl. Physic.) have unanimously held, that Fate was the same with God, Jupiter, and the Ʋniversal Mens. To whom we may justly associate Seneca also, who, (in 4. de Bene∣fic. & 2. Natural. Quaest. 45.) sayth, in downright terms; si Fatum, Jovem dixeris, non mentieris: if you please to assert that Jupiter and Fate are one and the same thing, you shall speak the truth. Hence comes it, that though Poets sometimes refer all events to the procuration of Jupiter; and sometimes again to Fate: yet may not the nicest Critick impeach them of Inconstancy or Contradiction; since those Terms differ only in the sound, not in the notion; as signifying one and the same Eternal Principle, disposing the virtues and conspirations of all second Causes to the opportune effecting of Events, de∣signed by it self, and so made indeclinable. Thus Homer, introducing Agamemnon as pleading his excuse fot being

instrumental to a misfortune, makes him incriminate upon Fate and Jupiter at once, in these words:

—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,—

Non Ego Causa, Verum Jupiter & Fatum.

Secondly, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ut Actus, as an Act; according to * 1.252 which Acceptation, we may understand Fate, partly to be ipsum D••i decretum, the very Decree or absolute Command of God, whereby He hath determined all Events to Necessity of Futu∣rition; from whence the Latin word, Fatum, importing a Decree pronounced, is by Grammarians derived: and partly, ipsum ordinem, seriem, vel concatenationem Causarum, in natu∣ra statutam; the order, series, or subalternate concatenation of Causes, according to whose praesctipt tenor all Events prae∣destined come to pass, in respect to the Decree pronounced. For thus much may be collected from that Definition of Fate ascribed to Plato by Plutarch (de Fato) viz. est lex Adrastaeae, the law of Divine Justice, consigning to every thing, what is convenient to its nature, and which no man can clude, or in∣fringe: but more perspicuously from that notorious one of Chry∣sippus, Fatum est sempiterna quaedam ac indeclinabilis series rerum, & catena volvens semetipsam, & implicans per aeternos consequentiae ordines, ex quibus adapta, connexaque est; which we have formerly introduced, and interpreted, in our Chap. concerning the Mobility of the term of mans life. To which, for more assurance, we may annex the respective signifi∣cation and importance of each of those various Appellatives, which the Stoicks have accommodated to Fate. For they have named it (1) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because 'tis a connected series, or subalternately-dependent syntax of Causes and Effects: (2) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it involves and contains All things in that definite and invariable concatenation: (3) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because all Events are the Necessary designations thereof; or, because it self is also under the same restraint of an immutable definition:

(4) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because no attempt can praevail to an alteration infringement of its tenor: (5) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it is a Constirution Eternal: (6) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it is a distribution made to every Individual: (7) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it comprehends whatever is, by Consignation, due to every man: (8) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because as the ori∣ginal, so also the Dissolution of all things is subject to its ap∣pointment: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Parca, because it is the peculiar Lot or Portion destined to every man. But as for this aequivocal De∣nominative, Parca; insomuch as it not onely determineth the state of all other things in general, but also the Life of man in special, quasi Nendo, as it were by spinning out a thread of commensurate longitude: thereupon did Hesiod (in Theogn.) dichotomize it into three distinct species; viz. (1) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in respect to the Irrevocability of time past, which exactly re∣sembleth a thread already spun, and wound upon the reel or fuze; (2) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in respect to the Decurrent, or Praesent time, which responds to a thread now in twisting, in the hand of the Spinster; (3) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in respect to the Future, or Lot yet remaining behind to every man, which holds an analogie to Flax not yet spun off the distaff. Which is the Summarie of Possidonius (de mundo) and Apuleius (10. de repub.) their Mythologie of the ingenious Figment of the Three Fatal Sisters. * 1.253

SICT. II.

IN the other Classis of Philosophers, who have apprehended Fate to be Res purè Naturalis, a Constitution meerly Natural, devoyd of all Divinity, nor dependent upon any eter∣nal Decree; we find a subdivision of two different Sects. For,

(1) Some have proposed to themselves a Series of Natural Causes, so harmoniously adapted and linked together by mutual revinction, that the posterior being continually suspended on and moved by the praecedent, performe their operations com∣pulsively, i. e. they cannot but do, what they do: so that thereby is inferred a Necessity so absolute, that it admits of nei∣ther

Evasion, nor opposition; such a necessity, as would be no whit inferior to the Stoicks Lex Adamantina, or Adrastaea, formerly mentioned; if this only difference be allowed, that ac∣cording to that, Fate would be a Chain of Causes constituted by God; but according to this, a subalternate series of Causes, whose Constitution, reciprocal concatenation, and eternal du∣ration are made by, and dependent upon it self, and is therefore no less Necessary and Invariable then the other. And

(2) Others have, indeed, likewise allowed a Series of natu∣ral Causes mutually complicated; but yet have they reputed, that the Inferior Causes in this chain are not so dependent upon, nor commoved by the Superior, but that they may be impeded from doing those things, which by the impulse of their inhaerent Essiciency, and without the intervention of any impediment, otherwise they would have done. Impeded, we say, by things purely Contingent, or Counter Agents endowed with, and using the Arbitrary Liberty of their Will.

The Coryphaei, or Leaders of this Sect of Philosophers, were Heraclitus, Empedocles, Leucippus, Parmenides, and (who * 1.254 took the right hand of all the others) Democritus; as we have found upon the list of Cicero (de Fato.) For, albeit the Founda∣tion of his Physiologie was the same with that of Epicurus, Fortuito factum esse mundum, that the Universe was made by Chance; which Hypothesis we have formerly explained, exa∣mined, and exploded: yet did He strenuously endevour to im∣pose thereupon this disagreeing superstructure, Fato omnia fieri, that all things are effected by Fate; confounding two most con∣trary Notions, meer Contingency, and incluctable Necessity.

If any demand, how we can justify this our Accusation of Democritus; we answer, that it may be genuinely collected * 1.255 from hence: that it was his opinion, that Fortune is nothing else in reality but Nature, and that Nature is bound, by her own adamantine laws, to do what she doth, in all particulars. For the First of these positions, that Nature and Fortune are Identical; we cannot much dispute: since all the Attributes of For∣tune

are bur surreptitious▪ and usurped from Nature; nor doth Fortune, in a meer philosophical Sense, import more then Mans Ignorance in the Di hoti of many Effects, which Nature produceth, or are at least produced by natural means. For the Second, that Nature is its own Fate, or, more expresly, that Nature being only a constitution of Causalities resulting from Chance, or from a fortuitous disposition and setlement of the Universal Matter, in that Figure the adspectable World now bea∣reth; doth necessitate her self to the causation of all things: this He hath conceived inferrible from this process of reason. Atoms (saith He, apud Magnenum) being the Catholique Principle, of which all things consist, have an ingenite or con∣natural Motive Faculty essentially inhaerent; by the uncessant activity whereof they are perpetually agitated or commoved: and all things, by coalescence composed of Atoms, cannot but conforme to the same motions, by which their principles are commoved. And sithence some Atoms tending one way, are by the occurse and justling of others diverted to another course; both the Diverting and Diverted from the direct line of their native tendency, cannot but observe, continue and pursue those necessary motions. By the same reason, some bodies, composed of concreted Atoms, as they are praecipitated one way, by the impulse of their own coessential Faculty, may, by the occursation and arietation of others steering a different course, be deflected from the perpendicular of their motion congenial, to some other transverse, oblique, rectilinear, &c. so that both the Deflecting and Deflected cannot but observe, continue, and pursue those compulsive motions. And this, in General, is that Fate, or Necessity, whereby Democritus would have all things effected, and by which the World was at first composed, in the same Figure, we speculate at this day; for, as the Universal Principle, Atoms, concurring, crowding, rebounding reciprocally, in an infinite space, by the agitation of their own inexistent Faculty, could not but convene, coalesce, and cohaere into any other Forme, but what they did: so now having acquired that forme by Chance, can they not either change it, or not observe and execute those motions begun, and by the mediation or intercession

whereof all Events are brought to pass. For, in Plutarch, (1. placit. 26.) He sayth plainly, Necessitatem nihil esse aliud, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quam latio∣nem, percussionem, repercussionem Materiae; that Necessity is nothing else but the Lation, Percussion, Repercussion of the ma∣terial Principle of all things, i. e. of Atoms. From hence we have an opportunity to interpret that passage in Simplicius (2. physic. comment. 59.) that some of the Ancients held an opinion, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Material Necessity was the sole Causatrix of all Effects; in respect that the Matter of Bodies is not idle and unactive, as most have dreamt, but uncessantly operative; and that, not by impression, but Inhaerency, as be∣ing to it self the Principium à quo of all its motions. And this we here touch upon, opportunely to discriminate this Doctrin from that of others, who constituted a meer Formal, or Agent Necessity, distinct from the material principle of the world; whether that Agent be simply Natural, according to the Physiology of Aristotle; or Primus Opifex, the First Ope∣rator, according to the hypothesis of Plato, and the Stoicks, who also sometimes radicated that Necessity, whereby Evils are continually existent in the world, in the Matter thereof, as Seneca (de Provid. 5.) excusing the non ablation of Evil by the Creator, sayth positively, Non potest Artifex mutare materiam, it was not in his power to Abstract it, because not to alter the Matter. But, not to leave our Explanation of Democritus Fatum Materiale imperfect; we may, from what hath prae∣ceded, perceive at what mark these words of his were directed; Necessitatem, quâ omnia fiunt, esse & Fatum, & Iustitiam, & Providentiam, & opisicem mundi (apud Plutarch. 1. placit. 45.) that the Necessity, whereby all things are effected, is both Fate, Justice, Providence, and Maker of the World: viz. this, that the Series of things, in which the reason or essence of Fate doth consist, could not have bin otherwise constituted; that upon this Series it depends, why one thing is accounted Just, and another Unjust; why the world is governed thus, and all things proceed according to the praesent method, and no other; and why the adspectable form of the Universe was made in all points

responsible to what it now holds, &c. For, He referred the Causation of all things to those newly explicated congenial mo∣tions of Atoms; and so conceived that even the Soul, or Mind of man (which He also fancied to be a certain Contexture of sphaerical or orbicular Atoms) is variously agitated, not only by those internal motions of its own insensible particles, which vary according to its individval Complexion (i. e. the Atoms composing the Soul of a Melancholy man, are of one sort, at least of one contexture; those of a Cholerick, of another; those of a Phlegmatick▪ of a third, &c.) but also by those Extradvenient motions caused by Objects; by whose Species, or Images incurrent (which Atoms also constitute) the Mind cannot but be Attracted, if they be consentaneous and allective, or gratefull; nor not be Averted, if they be dissentaneous and repulsive, or ingratefull. That, if the Mind be not alwaies allected by At∣tractive Species; the reason is, because at the same instant there occur unto it the more potent sollicitations of their Contrary, Averting Species: and if it be not alwaies Averted by Repellent; the reason is equal, viz. because at the same in∣stant it is more strongly sollicited by their Contrary, Attractive Species. That therefore, the Mind cannot but be carried on toward Good, or that which is gratefull and allective, so long as it discovers no Evil admixt thereto: nor not be averted from Evil, or what is ingratefull and aversant, so long as it perceives no Good to be commixt therewith. That therefore, the Mind cannot, when two Goods are objected, but pursue the greater Good; as that which attracteth more potently: nor, when two Evils are objected, but avoyd the greater; as that where∣by it is averted more potently. That, when two objects, the one Good, the other Evil, at the same time praesent their Species; it cannot but neglect the Good, so long as the Evil averts more potently then the Good attracts: nor not be carried towards the Good, while the Evil averts more weakly, and the Good attracts more strongly. Finally, that since, by reason of the Ignorance, or Dimness of the Mind, it doth frequently not per∣ceive the Evil consequent upon its prosecution of some Good; therefore is it subject to Deception in some cases, and is often

carried on to that, from which it ought to have bin aver∣ted: nor perceive the Good that is consequent upon its prosecu∣tion of some Evil, and is therefore, as often averted from that object, to which it ought to have bin converted. But notwith∣standing, insomuch as all objects, by this and no other way, occur unto, and affect the Mind; still it cannot but Necessarily be carried whither it is carried; nor but be averted from that, from which it is averted: and consequently, that there remains to it only a Desire of Truth, i. e. that no Counterfeit Species may occur, but that all objects may appear such as in reality they are, nor Good be concealed under the disgusting vizard of Evil, nor Evil gilded o're with the splendid semblance of Good. For this is the summe of what Empiricus (2. advers. Physic.) makes Democritus to have desiderated, when He sayd; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Exoptat rerum imagines consentaneas posse nancisci. Now, by this complex Argumen∣tation, Democritus may be understood to have inferred; that though some Actions seem situate within the praecincts of our own jurisdiction, or that it is absolutely in our power to Elect, or Reject this or that object; insomuch as every mans ex∣perience doth demonstrate to him, that he doth and can con∣sult and deliberate about the Good and Evil of Objects, and actually electing the one, refuseth the other; and that, not by Compulsion, but Freely: yet notwithstanding is nothing really in our power, because not only the occasion of our Consultation, but also the Consultation it self is imposed upon us by inevita∣ble Necessity. First, that the Occasion of Consultation (or the Exhibition of many objects, which almost equally affecting the Mind, and by reason of the aequipondium of their Verisi∣mility, or moments of Good, holding it suspended in aequilibrio, of necessity ingage it to a Deliberation) cannot but be imposed upon us; we conceive it not obscure to him, who shall deduce the conducing Series of things ftom a due Epoche, or height, and analytically undoe the chain of Causes: and Secondly, that also the act of Consultation is a Necessary Effect, is mani∣fest from hence; that when two objects occur to the mind, so equally Attractive, that their Apparencies of Vtility, or

Praesentations of Good, are aequilibrated, and reciprocally coun∣terpoise each other; the mind must of necessity be agitated by a kind of Fluctuation, and detained in the suspence of Indiffe∣rency, or Indetermination, or Consultation, untill it acquiesce in its Election of that Object, whose praesentation of Vtility seems to praeponderate the others. Which, aequitably audited, amounts to no more then this; that Election is nothing but the prosecution of an Object which either really is, or at lest seems more Good; and that a spontaneous one, without all coaction or renitency: in respect that man doth both spontaneously affect, and willingly prosecute Good. And that you may not admire this bold assertion, viz. that both the Occasion and Consultation, and free, or rather libent Election of Objects, are all links in the Chain of Fate, and so comprehended under this Natural Neces∣sity, propugned by Democritus: the Stoicks intercept your wonder, by obtruding another as strange, viz. that it depends on the same Concatenation of things, that you now read this our discourse of Fate; as Manilius (lib. 2.) Hoc quoque fatale est, sic ipsum expendere Fatum. And this, because whatever Action of any man you shall suppose; it can be no difficulty, according to this Hypothesis, to find out the proxime Cause exciting him thereunto, and to refer that Cause to the permotion of another remote one, and that third to the permotion of a fourth, that fourth, to the induction of a fifth, &c. unravelling the series of Causes, so that it must at length be inferred, that that supposed action could not but follow upon those other actions subalter∣nately praecedent, and consequently, that it must be, as Demo∣critus would have it, Fatal, or Necessary. Which opinion Aristotle ardently impugneth (in lib. de Interpre. cap. 8.) when discussing the verity and necessity of Propositions, He contends to evince; that though of two opposite singular propositions, which concern a thing either Praeterite, or Praesent, one must be true, the other false: yet the Canon holds not in two Contrary sin∣gular propositions, which concern a thing Future; the Verity of the one not necessitating the Falsity of the other. For, as He there argues, if every Affirmation, or Negation concerning a thing to come, were true or false, ex Necessitate: then would

the Futurity of any thing include a Necessity of its Futurition, i. e. whatever is Future would be Necessary, and on the contrary, whatever is not Future, would be Not-necessary: and upon just inference, nothing could remain either Fortuitous, or Arbi∣trary; which to admit, is an Incongruity so manifest, that the repugnancy of every mans Experience detects it; an Incom∣modity so intolerable, that it not only disparageth, but con∣futeth it self. And this, if there be any Fidelity in the records of our Memory, is the Summary of their Theory, who have apprehended and asserted Fate to be a meer Natural Constitu∣tion of Causes, subalternately connected; as not dependent on any thing Divine, nor any Eternal Decree; so not capable of any mutation or interruption, by the intervention of any Im∣pediment, purely Fortuitous, or Counter-activity of any Arbi∣trary Agent.

SECT. III.

* 1.256 IN the other Division of Philosophers, who also conceded Fate to be a meer Natural Constitution of Causes subalter∣nately dependent, &c. but yet denied the inevitable or ne∣cessary insequution of all Effects upon that concatenation; allowing the possibility of its mutation, or interruption by either Chance, or mans Free will: the Principal are Aristotle and * 1.257 Epicurus.

First, as for Aristotle; that He held Fate, or fatal Necessity to be nothing but very Nature, or (if you like it better) every particular Cause acting secundum suam naturam, naturalémve ductum, according to its proper or natural Virtue; is manifest from his own words, in sundry places of his Writings. To particular; (1) He sayth (in 2. phys. cap. 6.) Eas generationes, acoretiones, & alterationes, quae violentae sunt (ut dum ex arte, & ob delicias, cogimus plantas aliquas praematurè

pubescere, adolesceréque) esse 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, non Fatales, hoc est non Naturales; making Fatal Effects to be mee••ly Natural. And (2) He sayth (1 Meteorol. cap. ultim.) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Fatalibus temporibus magnas quasdam hyemes, imbriúmque excessus, quibus creentur diluvia, contingere; eo modo, quo & contingit hyems statis anni temporibus: which rightly paraphra∣sed, imports thus much; that as Winter, the Sun receding from our climate, at some certain period of the yeer, according to the Ecliptick progress consigned unto it by Nature, is the regular effect of the Suns remove to larger distance; even so are hard Winters, and immoderate rains, the regular effects of some pe∣riodal Conjunctions of the Planets, proceeding in their motions according to the setled Constitutions of Nature. From whence we have an advantage to observe, that though Stobaeus (Ecl. Phys.) tells us; Aristotelem non tam existimasse Fatum esse Causam, quàm modum Causae advenientem rebus ex necessitate statutis; that Arist. conceived not Fate to be so much a Cause, as the manner of a Cause, advenient to things determined by Necessity: yet nevertheless are we so to comment upon this his nice descant, as that we understand, Fate not to be any new kind of Cause, but Nature her self, which, in respect to her Agency, is called a Cause, and in respect to the certain, proper, and ne∣cessary manner or way of her acting, is called Fate. And, that He impugned the former Error, viz. that all Agents, included in this Universal Subalternation, act ex inevitabili necessitate, or cannot but doe, what they doe; is not obscurely intimated in this, that He defined Fate to be pure Nature. Since the Works of Nature are not effected of inoppugnable necessity; as may be boldly concluded from the frequent Experiments not only in Generation, which is commonly impeded, by the intervention of any indisposition or impatibility of Matter, and other resisting Accidents; but also in Generous and virtuous Minds, which easily subdue and countermand those strong inclinations, or pro∣pensities to Avarice, Luxury, Audacity, Incontinency &c. which may not unjustly be esteemed the genuine Effects of their very constitutive Principles, and branches that shoot up from the root of their Corporeal Temperament. Upon which reason,

we may conjecture, that Arist. reflected, when He sayd of So∣crates, praeter naturam, ac fatum suum, continens evasit: He acquired an Habit of Continency, even in spite of the contrary sollicitation of his individual Nature, and particular Fate.

Secondly, as for Epicurus; that his thoughts made an Unison * 1.258 with those of Aristotle, in the key of a Non-ineluctable Fate, is sufficiently constant from hence; that having admitted a certain Necessity Natural in this sentence, Naturam à rebus, ipsarúm∣ve serie, (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) doceri, cogique, sive necessitate agi (in Epist. ad Herodotum:) He yet denied the Inevitability, or Absoluteness thereof, in another Fragment of his revived by Stobaetis (in Ecl. Phys.) where He delivers as a general Canon, Omnia sieri trium modorum aliquo, (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) Necessitate, Consilio, Fortuna. For, in that he makes Fortune, and Consultation, or mans Free will equal competitors in the empire of the world with Necessi∣ty Natural, He manifestly excludes it from being 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, sole Despot or Monarch, and reserves to the two others an equal dominion. Which assurance may duely be augmented by the superaddition of this also; that Cicero (de Fato) intro∣ducing Epicurus disputing about the verity of Future Events, makes him deny, with Aristotle, that of two contrary singular Enunciations about a thing to come, the one must be true, and the other false: subnecting this reason; Nulla est in natura talis Necessitas.

And, certainly, as He stood equal with Aristotle, in the deni∣al; so hath He outdone him, by many degrees, in his ende∣vours * 1.259 for the Refutation of this unsound opinion of an Absolute Necessity: insomuch as he excogitated his Hypothesis of the Declination of Atoms (illustrated in the incomparable Com∣mentary of Gassendus) as a motion, which once conceded, doth totally infringe the indispensable rigor of Fate, and conserve an Evasory or Declining Liberty for the Mind of man. This Plutarch taught us, in two perspicuous texts: (1) when He sayth (de Anim. Solert.) that the motion of the Declination

of Atoms in the Human Soul, was subtilly invented by Epicurus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that Fortune might be brought on the theatre of the world, there to act her part, and the Arbitrary power of man might not be abrogated: (2) when He declares (de Stoic. repub.) that the same Epicurus (sese in omnem partem versare, ingeni∣úmque contendere, in id incumbendo, ut quomodocunque à motione sempiterna liberum tueatur Arbitrium, ac pravitatem esse in∣culpabilem non patiatur;) rack't all the nerves of his wit, to find out a way for the protection of mans Free will; and so that evil might not praetend to inculpability.

Now, though we may not train along the thoughts of our Reader, out of the direct tract of our praesent Theme, into a wide Digression concerning Epicurus his whole Romance of the De∣clination of Atoms in the Soul; especially having lately remitted him to Gassendus his accomplisht Comment thereupon: yet can we not impede his progress along the streight line of method, here to arrest him, while we informe him briefly, How he ac∣commodated that fiction to the vindication of mans Liberty from the inexorable Coaction of Fate. We conceive, that Epi∣curus, having observed 3 kinds of Motion in Animals, but prin∣cipally in Man, viz. Natural, Violent, and Voluntary; took it for granted, that the primary Cause of each was to be deduced from Atoms, the Principium à quo of all motion: and here∣upon concluded, that the spring of all Natural motion, was the primary motion congenial or inhaerent to Atoms, viz. that whi••h physiology calls the motion of Gravity, whereby an Atom is praecipitated ad lineam rectam, to a perpendicular; that the spring of all Violent motion, was the motion of Reflexion, or that which ariseth from occursation, arietation, or repercussion of one Atom by another, whereby the Atom reflected, is carried ad lineam obliquam; and lastly, that the spring of all Voluntary motion was the motion of Declination, to which no region is determined, nor time praefixt.

But might not Democritus, and other Defendants of Absolute Necessity natural, have excepted against this, as insufficient to * 1.260 the protection of mans Evasory Freedome, by returning; that because this motion of Declination is no less Natural (for it is derived from no other principle, but Atoms themselves) then that of Gravity; therefore doth it still remain, that All things are effected by Fate, as well when Epicurus his Hypothesis is conceded, as before. Insomuch as all things, which were to come to pass, by reason of those various motions of Arietation, Repuls, Declination &c. by an eternal series, and kind of subalternate Concatenation, are consequent one upon the heels of another; and particularly that event of Cognition and Appetition, to which mans Liberty appertains; and so are brought to pass by an equal Necessity. For, that the Mind of man may display, or execute that Liberty Elective, whereby it affects and prosecutes any object, conceive it to be an Apple; necessary it is, that the Image or Species of that Apple be first emitted from it, and being transmitted through the mediatory organs of sight, invade, percell, and commove the Mind to know, or apprehend it. Necessary to the Apple, before it can transfuse its visible Species to the eye, that it be put in some place convenient for adspect, by him, who gathered it from the tree or received it elsewhere. Necessa∣ry, that the Tree, which bore that apple, be first generated by a seed, and nourished by the moisture of the earth, concocted by the heat of the Sun. Necessary, that that Seed be derived from a former apple, and that from a former tree, planted in this or that determinate place, at this or that determinate time: and so by retrogression to the beginning of the world, when both the Earth, and all its Vegetable seeds had their origination from the Con∣cursions and Complexions of Atoms; which could not (being agitated by the impulse of their own inhaerent Faculty Motive) but convene and coalesce, and acquiesce in those Figures, those situations, at that time. Again, if the Soul, or Mind be also a Contexture of orbicular Atoms; those Atoms must have bin contained in the Sperm of the Parents; must have consluxed thither from certain meats and drinks, as also from the Aer and

beams of the Sun; those me ats must have bin such and no other: and so subalternately successive from eternity, the Event will be found to come to pass by the same Adamantine Necessity, what∣ever of the Causes, lateral or concurrent (which must run up to an account beyond all Logarithms) you shall please to begin at. Because from Eternity Causes have so cohaered to Causes, that the last causes could not but concurr; which being deduced in∣to act, the Mind could not but know, and knowing affect, or desire that particular object, viz. the Apple. And what is here said of Causes, the same in all points is to be understood also of Atoms, which constitute those causes, and from whose congenial motions the Causes derive those their Motions, by which they attain to be Causes.

To this Exception, that we may compose some Response, such * 1.261 as may seem Consentaneous to the Doctrine of Epicurus, and to contain somewhat of Probability, at least; we must usurp the liberty to assume: that such is the Contexture of Atoms in the Soul, or Mind, its Declinant Atoms can break that Rigidity arising from other Atoms, and so make its nature Flexile to any part; in which Flexility, the root of Liberty doth consist. And therefore, the mind, being allected by the Species of any object, is indeed carried towards that object; but so, that if another object shall instantly occurr, whose Attraction is aequi∣valent, it may again be invited by, and carried towards that ob∣ject also: so that, deflecting from the first, it may become aequi∣librated or indifferent to either part; which, doubtless, is to be Free, or Arbitrary. And that the Mind, being thus constituted Flexile and Indifferent, doth at length determine it self rather to one then the other part; this ariseth from hence: that the impression of one Species is more violent then of the other; and consequently that the Election succeeds, upon the Apprehension of that object, whose species appears either positively good, or comparatively more good. Finally, that the Mind, when it e∣lecteth or willeth any object, is as it were the principal Machine, or main Spring, by whose motions all the Faculties, and the members destinate to execution are excited, and carried thither,

whither the Mind tendeth: and this by mediation of the Spirits discurrent, or rather transmitted through all parts of the body. All which Lucretius fully expresseth in these Verses:

Declinamus item motus, nec tempore certo, Necregione loci certa; sed ubi ipsa tulit Mens: Nam dubio-procul his rebus sua quoique voluntas Principium dat; & hinc motus per membra vagantur. * 1.262

Again, perhaps Epicurus will not gainsay, but that the motion of Declination is as much Natural as the motion of Gravity; But yet will He by no perswasions yeeld, that the Mind, being contemperate of Declinatory Atoms, is so affected and attracted by Necessity toward one object, that it cannot instantly be de∣flected to another. For, as a mixt Nature is made, so is the Mobility of its insensible parts varied: and from various Natu∣ral motions retused or refracted, ariseth a Third Nature, accor∣ding to which its motions may be sayd to be Voluntary and Na∣tural both; insomuch as they proceed à Natura libera, from Nature free and uncoacted. Nor will He deny, supposing the Occursation and Arietation of Atoms, that it is pure Necessity, that Percussions, Repulses, and either Reflexions or Cohaesions should succeed among them: but yet may He refuse to allow a Necessity of such Occursations, as if they could not be impeded, nor their Consequents be diverted. Hence, concerning that eternal series of the Causes of the Apple, and the Mind; Epi∣curus will grant, that when things are already effected, a kind of Necessity may be attributed thereunto, such in respect whereof those things cannot be uneffected; since, non datur jus in praeteri∣ta, there is no countermanding things Praeterite: but before those things were peracted, there was no such Necessity; since both Fortune, or Contingency, and the opposing Liberty of mans Will might have interrupted, inverted, and changed it. For few are ignorant of the wide disparity between these two Assirma∣tions, viz. What is once done, cannot be not done: and what is done, might not have bin done. Since, in the Former, a thing is considered as already past; and in the Later, as yet to

come: and as according to the Former it is Necessary; so ac∣cording to the Later, it, may be or Contingent, or Voluntary. By which reason, was it possible, that the Apple might not have bin praesented to the eye; possible, that the Tree which bare it might first have withered; that the Seed, of which that tree was generated, might either have proved abortive and steril, or else have bin sowed in some other place; that other of its Causes might have bin divers ways praepeded: which also may be affirmed of the Mind, and its Causes; and consequently none of the many Causes, which did antecede the Appetition of the Apple, can be conceived to have bin Necessary, as they might if the Causes were of themselves uncapable of Impediment, or if there were one Cause Paramont to all others in the Concate∣nation, which by an absolute soveraignty, or despotique power, had directed and coacted them. Allbeit we concede, that the Appetition of the Apple by the mind, is the Conse∣quent of the Minds Cognition thereof, and that Cognition the consequent of its Occursation to the eye, and that the Conse∣quent of its Position in a place convenient for sight, and that the consequent of its Existence, and so from link to link retro∣grade up to eternity: yet notwithstanding can no man justify this Inference, that therefore the Mind is Necessitated to that Appetition; because still there remains a Posse to the Mind of being Averted from the Affectation and Prosecution thereof, in case either the Species of a better object, or a suspicion of poyson therein concealed, shall intervene, or a refrigeration of the Stomach by the dyspeptical and slatulent juice thereof be fea∣red, or any other Cause of moment sufficient to perswade the mind to abstain from the use thereof, shall be interposed,

Nor is this Rejoynder disswasive; that, when the Mind is aver∣ted * 1.263 from the Appetition of the Apple, the Causes Antecedent were not such as might induce the mind to an Appetition, but such as induced it to an Aversation; and that these Averting, not those Attracting Causes were so connected to the series of Fate, that the mind could not but be averted from it.

well as of those, which Attract it to an object, to the eternal Series of Fate to overbalance Epicurus his defence of mans Liberty.

For, though the Mind be contemperate of such a Contexture of Atoms, as that it may be Commoved by the irruent Species of external Objects; yet is the nature of its contexture such also, as that it can derive from it self some motions distinct from, nay contrary to those motions excited by Extradvenient Images; which motions being instituted by no other Principle but it self, are ma∣nifestly Spontaneous and Voluntary, and by which it is em∣power'd to resist External motions, and therefore may not so be carried to one Object, as not to be, upon advantage, deflected to another. And hence we may Conclude, that the Mind is not obliged to a necessity of any one Object; but stands Free to refuse that, and elect another: and that the Reason of a thing to come, is not a little different from that of a thing already past; since, in respect to a thing Future, there remains an Indifferency to the Mind of electing either of two Objects, but in respect to a thing Praeterite, there is a Necessity of its election of one. If this Solution be thought too light, we can superadd another of weight sufficient to counterpoyse the Doubt; viz. that which Carneades in Cicero insinuated, when he taught, that the Epicureans might have defended the Liberty of mans Mind, without their commentitious Declination of Atoms. For having once declared, that the Mind hath Voluntary motions of its own institution, they needed no other Argument to confute Chrysippus: to whom when they had conceded, that no motion can be without a Cause Movent; there remained no reason why they should have granted, that all Effects have their Antecedent Causes; since to the will of man no Causes are Antecedent, it being to it self the Principium à quo of all its motions Voluntary.

And this is the faithfull Abridgement of Epicurus his Doctrin concerning Fate, as a Constitution meerly Natural, and capable of interruption, alteration, opposition, by either of the Two other in his Triumvirate, viz. Fortune or pure Contingency, and the Liberty of mans mind, which He conceived Copartners in the Empire of the World. ¶.

SECT. IV.

THere is yet another Species of Fate, retaining to our Second * 1.264 Genus (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) whose exceeding vanity and inconsi∣derableness had well-nigh occasioned our total Inconsideration thereof, in this place; and that is Fatum Mathematicum sive Astrologicum, the Mathematicians and Astrologers Fate; being a certain imaginary Necessity Natural, imposed upon all Sublunary Agents, and more especially upon Man, as the most analogous Recipient, by the inoppugnable Influence of Cele∣stial Bodies, respective to their Motions, Positions, Con∣nexions, Aspects.

Tis no wonder, we confess, that the Chaldaeans, a Mercurial * 1.265 and volatile Nation generally infatuated with Astral Idolatry, were the Inventors of this Planetary Destiny; since they Dei∣fied all they understood not, and advanced their observations of the circumvolutions of the Sphears, together with their Orbs of light, to such a height of insolence, that they fancied the Hebrew Alphabet represented in the Figures of the Asterisms, and praetending to the skill of reading the Celestial Ephime∣rides, by spelling those Characters, which the Planets in their Conjunctions, Oppositions, and other Apparitions seemed to make, into words and sentences perfectly signifying, to the exact and intelligent observer, the intent of God concerning not only the subversion of Monarchies, mutation of States, religi∣ons, &c. general Events, but also the prosperity or adversity, the health or sickness, life or death of particular persons: as Rabbiben Ezra, and out of him Gassarel (without the conceal∣ment of his strong inclination to the same superstitious Arro∣gance) hath observed, and by several experiments alleaged endevour'd to patronize, in the 13. Chap. of his Ʋnheard of

Curiosities. Nor is it a wonder, that the Hebrew, and after them the Graecian Astrologers, with great ostentation of tran∣scendent knowledge, and no less then privacy with the three Fatal Sisters, sedulously promoted the same splendid Error, of ascribing the Empire of the world to a Heptarchy of Erratique Starrs: since, upon the testimony of the greatest Antiquaries, * 1.266 we may justly assirme, that the Hebrews added to the vani∣ties and absurdities of the Chaldaean, and the Graecians to the wild Romances of the Hebrew Astrology; the stream thereof, by long running in the channel of time, contracting more and greater Impurities. Which is a chief reason, why we inhaerite so dark and imperfect a knowledge of the great Astronomical Sagacity of the more simple and upright times of Abraham and Moses. Though this be no wonder, we say, yet tis a considera∣ble one, that even many Physiologists, who praetended the inda∣gation and tradition of nothing but Verity, of verisimility at least, have liberally contributed towards the diffusion and propagation of the same Delusion. Witness that peremptory speech of Pliny (1 nat. Histor.) singulis sydera tributa sunt, clara divitibus, minora pauperibus, obscura defunctis, & procujusque sorte lu∣centia ad munera mortalibus. Nor can we conjecture, what should occasion the Deception of so many and so great judge∣ments, in this easy particular; unless that grand Cause of Po∣pular mistakes, viz. Transcriptive Adhaerence to all, that seems praesented in the reverend habit of Antiquity, especially if guilded over with the Estimation of Rare and Sublime: the Wit of man being naturally prone to Affect and Admire, rather then Indubitate and Examine those Transmissions, which con∣cern the remotest Difficulties in Nature, and above all, the Ener∣gy and Configurations of Celestial Bodies. Prodigia cum nar∣rantur, excipi solent favore mirantium, & quanquam non ad verum exacti sint, postquam semel Scriptorem invenerunt, plu∣ribus placent, veneratione crescunt, vetustate commendantur; was Nicopompus his saying, in Joh. Barclaii Argenis, lib. 2. For, had they devested their minds of all traditional Praejudice, and but reflected their thoughts, either upon the Hypothetical Necessity of the Matter, or Subject, whereon the Starrs are

supposed to discharge and six their uncontrollable influence; or upon the extremely different Fortunes of Twins, conceived and borne under the same Constellation; or upon the double Impiety of ascribing to remote, weak, and perhaps unconcerned Causes, those Effects, which proclaim their designment by an Infinite Wisedome, and their Praeordination to Ends above the sagacity of Human Providence; and of charging all the most nefarious Villanies of sinfull man upon the innocuous and exceeding both usefull and comfortable Creatures of God: had they, we say, but pondered any one of these Reasons, that sufficiently demon∣strate the Absurdity of Planetary Necessity; doubtless, they had soon reclaimed their belief from this dishonorable seduction, and would no longer have abused themselves with an opinion, that all the Occurrences of every Individuall mans life, together with the time and manner of his death, are the inevitable Effects of those Starrs, which were Lords of the Horoscope, either at his Conception, or Nativity, or both.

The First Reason, whereby this Chaldaean Fate may be de∣monstratively * 1.267 redargued of extreme vanity, we desumed from the Hypothetical Necessity of the Matter, whereon the Planets exercise their power. For, according to their own Concession, Omnis receptio est ad modum recipientis, All bodies ought to be Analogous, i. e. praedisposed to admit either the benigne, or maligne influences of the Heavens; for Alteration is of necessity praevious to Production, and before a body be configurate, ne∣cessary it is that the Matter, whereof it is composed, be altered and variously praepared; and praepared it is by Second Causes, but perfected by First. Thus the Geniture of the Male, though perfect and prolisical in its self, must yet be frustrated of its end, unless it meet with convenient and patible Materials whereon to actuate its Plastick virtue, viz. the Blood and se∣minal infusion of the Femal, proportioned both in quantity and quality to its Efficiency. Thus the Aer of Aegypt, because Nilus (being 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) doth yeeld no Evaporations sufficient to the generation of Clouds, continues still serene and unobnu∣bilated; notwithstanding the potent Attraction of the Sun,

Moon, and other Sydereal Magnets: and though all the Planets should convene in the watery signe of Pisces, as before the catholique Deluge * 1.268, and threaten an Apertio portarum to that Climate; yet, because the material Cause of rain, Evapo∣rations, is there wanting, must their conspiracies be defeated, and their Influences become languid and ineffectual. And there∣sore, by equal reason, unless the Planet, which is Lord of the Geniture, shall find a Subject qualified in all points for the ad∣mission and promotion of this Celestial Fate, which our effron∣ted Genethliacks have conceived it to immit into Embryons and Births, all its magnified Influx must miscarry, and be lost in an invalidity as absolute, as the labour of that Statuary, who should attempt to melt Marble with Fire, or mould sand into an Image, without a convenient Cement. If this be, as it must be true; that the Praeparation of the Matter, on which the Im∣pressions of Superlunary Bodies are to operate, doth depend upon Sublunary and determinate Causes: then may we, with more honour, recurr to that excellent sentence of the Poet;

Libera stat nobis mens, nulli subdita coelo.

The Second praegnant Argument, wherewith the more sober * 1.269 sort of Book-men usually deride the Arrogance of our Ge∣nethliacks? (who blush not to promise to the world exact Copies of the Rolls of Destiny, and divine as considently as if they had bin of the Cabal with all the Asterisms) we derived from the common Experiment of Twinns: who, though procreated of the same Seminalities, faecundate in the same Ovarie or bed of na∣ture, and (for ought even our most perspicacious Harvey knows to the contrary) conceived in the same moment, and so under the same Ascendent; are notwithstanding many times observed to differ in Sex, physiognomy, genius, condition of life, and most∣ly in the manner and time of their death. Thus Esan and Jacob, who may, without the dispensation of a Figure, be sayd to have bin but one and the same Birth, the younger Midwising himself into the world by holding fast his brothers heel, and so if not indubitating the right of Primogeniture, yet at least portending his future purchase and usurpation thereof; were yet so disparate

n their Complexions, Dispositions, Fortunes, course of life, Age, and dissolution; that our Secretaries of Heaven must either demonstrate that the face of the Heavens was varied in that short moment that intervened betwixt neer Nativities; or confess it to be the hand of Providence Divine, which di∣stributed to each his peculiar Lot, not the irrational Starrs that caused that vast disproportion. And thus Proclus and Euristhenes, Gemini not only in their production, but in the Crown of Lacedaemonia, and so aequally disposed by their For∣tunes also to the promotion of that Influence, which the then paramont Conjunction of the Pianets had impressed upon them: did neither live in equal glory, nor perish by equal and syn∣chronical Fates. On the Reverse; how many Myriads have proved Twinns, in their Decease, who were utter Aliens in their blood, nativity, constitutions, professions, inclinations, fortunes? Dare our Judicial Astrologers assirme, that All, who fall in battle at once, had one and the same sydereal Fate, which necessitated that their Copartnership in the grave? un∣sainedly, nothing acquainted with letters can be so contradicto∣rily impudent. What excuse have they then left them, for stop∣ping their ears against that grave Admonition of the oraculous Zoroaster; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Ne tu augeas fatum, Beware thou dost not aggravate thy Fate. which signifies no less then this; in thy power it is, either to promote, or frustrate the virtues of Celestial Influxes: to promote them by Coope∣ration, to infirme and defeat them by Counter-inclination or repugnancy. To which we may accommodate also that me∣morable Aphorisme of the Prince of Astrologers, Ptolemy; Potest is, qui sciens est, multos stellarum effectus avertere, quando naturam earum noverit, ac seipsum ante illorum even∣tum praeparaveril.

Our last Argument to confound Chaldaean Fate, is the Double Impiety inferrible thereupon. (1) If the Infelicity of * 1.270 every man be the indeclinable Effect of that malicious Tincture, which the unfriendly Complexion of the Heavens at his Nativi∣ty infused into his nature; as our aethereal Mercuries assirme:

then must it follow, that those glorious orbs were created by God more for the harme and ruine, then benefit and comfort of mankind; for whose sake only, subordinate to his own Glo∣ry, the whole Creation was intended. And (2) if all the re∣gicides, parricides, homicides, incests, rapes, rapines, blasphe∣mies, sacrilegies, rebellions, proditions, &c. nefarious acts of Miscreants (the very naming whereof will blister the most in∣nocent lips) be the executions of those designes, which the ma∣levolent starrs in their Confoederations have determined to ac∣complish by such and such unhappy Instruments: then must it be conceded, that no Malefactor ought to be accountable to justice, because he can plead, Non equidem vellem, sed me mea Fata trahebant; as also, that God is the Author of Evil, by giving to the starrs such noxious power, and such unlimited Commissions, as doe autorize them to operate to the Destructi∣on of his Masterpiece.

To these 3 Redargutions of Astrological Necessity, we might have annexed as many score, borrowed from Picus Mi∣randulanus, Bradwardine B. of Canterbury, Sixtus Senensis, Mersennus, Gassendus, All which heroical Champions of truth and Providence Divine, have drawn their victorious swords, in this quarrel, against the Host of Heaven: but, re∣membring that proverbial axiome, Frustra fit per plura, quod fieri possit per pauciora, we found our selves obliged to decline supererogation, and referr the unsatisfied to these incomparable Authors. However, we ask leave to insert the memorable and not commonly quoted Confession of Hillarius Altobellus Senior (in praefatione ad Tabulas Regias Divisionum 12. partium Coeli) in these words. Cum igitur per tot secula fluctuarit Astrono∣mia & mendax tanto tempore peragrarit totum orbem, quot modis, quot locis, quot viribus, quot cum temerariis vel ignavis aucto∣ribus, inverecunda, fronte perfricta, fornicata est? nunquam, nullibi, nullis (ante Tychonem, & à Ptolemaeo post aliqua saecula) annuam veracem revolutionem dedit, neque eventuum verum tempus consignavit, non ipsa, non dilectissima silia Astrologia. Ʋtraque enim pavit curiosos mendaciis & adulationibus. Si autem interdummendaces non fuere, sors favit, vel casus, vel

per accidens congruentia syderum ad illa puncta, & non docta ac naturalis conjectatio. By which ingenuous Confession of a Person, whose assiduous inquest into the most recondite myste∣ries of Astronomy, non only by indefatigate lecture of the choy∣cest of Urania's Secretaries, but also by the most exact use of Instruments and Tables, and frequent tempestive Experiments, had enabled him to detect all those pernicious Frauds, which either the Ignorance, or ostentation of succeeding Ages had foisted in upon the simple and demonstrable Ʋranometrical observations and Axioms of Antiquity; not only to the Corruption, but eternal Defamation and contempt of that noble Science: how much of just Disparagement is inferred upon Judicial Astrology, which the Avarice of Divining Impostors, on one hand, and the superstitious Curiosity of abject minds, on the other, have exalted to the height of Destiny; we should rudely derogate from our Readers Capacity, not wholly to entrust to his own immediate judgement. To ratifie and terminate this our repro∣bation of our Genethliacal Schematists, we have the like censure of them from S••. Ambrose (in Hexaemero) Nonnulli tentave∣runt exprimere Nativitatum qualitates, qualis futurus u∣nusquisque, qui natus sit, esset; cum hoc non solum vanum sit▪ & inutile quaerentibus, sed impossibile pollicentibus.

CHAP. X. The Liberty of Mans Will, Fortune, and Fate conciliated to Providence Divine.

SECT. I.

THus long have we exercised the Candor and Pa∣tience of our Reader, with the prolix Recitation, * 1.271 and necessary Explanation of the Ancients opi∣nions concerning Fate: and the residue of our pro∣vince is to gratify him with the concise Declare∣ment of our own, both concerning the legitimate Admission of this notion of Fate, and the Conciliation thereof to mans Free-will, Fortune, and Providence Divine; which we have formerly invited him to expect, as the grand scope at which all our prae∣vious Meditations were directed, and the point in which all these lines of this small matter of Book are concentred.

First, we are to abominate the execrable Opinion of Demo∣critus; * 1.272 not only because it is uncapable of due Consistence with the sacred and indubitable Principles of Religious Faith, which ascertain that the Creation, Molition, Conservation, and con∣stant Administration of all things, are impossible rightly to be ascribed to any Cause but the Supreme Being alone: but also because it is è diametro repugnant to the evidence of that in∣fallible Criterion, the Light of Nature; which demonstrateth the Soul of man to be an Arbitrary and uncoacted Agent. For, that man hath in himself a power of inhibiting, or sus∣pending his Assent unto, and Approbation of any object, the

Verity of whose Species is not sufficiently clear and distinct, but Dubious; is a perfect Demonstration of the Indifferency, or Liberty of his Intellect, and so also of its charge, the Will, or Faculty Elective: as Cartesius excellently observes, in Princip. Philosoph. part. 1. sect. 6.

Secondly, that opinion of Aristotle and Epicurus, may, in∣deed, * 1.273 be defended so far forth as it makes Fate and Nature, or the Concatenation of natural Causes, to be one and the same thing in reality, though expressed by different Terms: but ought to be exploded, insomuch as it not only denies the Verity of Future Events, and so substracts from God the proper Attri∣bute of his most perfect Essence, Omniscience, by not conce∣ding to him an infallible Science of all things to come; but al∣so supposeth no Creation of natural Causes, no disposition, no moderation of their Efficiencies by Providence Divine.

And thirdly, as for that more specious opinion of the Plato∣nist * 1.274 and Stoick; we can discover no danger in our adhaesion to it, so far as it affirmes the primitive Constitution, and continual Gubernation of all things in the Universe by God; by defi∣ning Fate to be that Method, series, or systeme of Causes, which the Divine Nature at first constituted, and established, in order to the praecise, and opportune effecting all things praede∣creed by his infinite Wisdome: But yet we must cautiously abandon it in this, that it not only blasphemously invades the cardinal Praerogative of Divinity, Omnipotence, by denying him a reserved power, of infringing, or altering any one of those Laws, which Himself ordained, and enacted, and chaining up his armes in the adamantine fetters of Destiny; but also, in great part, excludes the mind of man from acting any volun∣tary part on the theatre of the world, and leaves no room for the intervention of Contingents. * 1.275

Nor is there any substantial reason to deterr the most scrupu∣lous Christian from admitting the use of this term, Fate, in a rectified sense; i. e. provided that He thereby understand, not

any blind and unpraemeditate Necessity; but a provident and well ordered Concatenation of Causes, which (like the Mag∣netick Chain, where all the inferior links are dependent on the impraegnating or invigorating Emanations of the First,) was constituted by the Fiat of the Eternal Wisdome, and may be varied, or inverted by the occasional Determinations of the same; and this without incurring the Imperfection either of Inconstan∣cy or Improvision. For our warrant in this we have no less a Praecedent, then S^t. Austin; whose words are these: Qui omnium connexionem seriemque Causarum, quâ fit omne, quod fit, Fati nomine appellant; non multum cum iis de verbi con∣troversia certandum est: quandoquidem ipsum causarum ordi∣nem, & quandam connexionem summi Dei tribuunt Voluntati; ac proinde Fati voce qui voluerit uti, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat. (in 5. de Civit. Dei. cap. 8.) ¶.

SECT. II.

NOw, as for the Abolition of the seeming Enmitie between * 1.276 Fate and Fortune; tis not obscure, that the Concession of the one is very far from adnihilating the other. For, if we ad∣mit Fate to be a Law, by the Divine Will imposed upon Natu∣ral Causes, according to the tenor whereof all things are done, that are done; and Fortune to be an Event resulting from a concurse of Natural Causes, besides, above, or contrary to the expectation, conjecture, and forecast of man, though praecisely praeordained by the Providence of God▪ and connexed to the series of Causes, or Chain of Fate: we cannot but soon perceive their Convention, Concentration, and Identity in the point of Providence Divine; nor is there any veil of Discrepancy be∣twixt them, in their naked and simple Realities, but that light and thin one, which either the Ignorance or Sophistry of man hath rudely, and perhaps profanely drawn. When a Prince dispatcheth two Posts to the same place, by several waies, neither knowing of the others mission; and they meet each other in

one moment at their journeys end: though we may rightly call it Fortune, in respect to them, who nevet thought of that Convention; yet still is it providence, in respect to the Prince, who sent them; and limited their time of travell to such an houre. And undoubtedly, by the authority of no less reason are we bound to acknowledge, that though many Events hour∣ly occurring to us, which the highest Human Prudence could never so much as suspect, may without derogation to the sacred Monarchy of God, be styled meerly Fortuitous, in relation to our Improvision: yet still are they the wise and convenient Praedeterminations of his Special Providence. Our Memory may rehearse, that the Terme, Fortune, hath a double impor∣tance; (1) a Concurse of Causes; (2) mans praevious Ignora∣tion of the Event resulting from that Concurse: and our Rea∣son cannot bur hence inferr, that according to the First, For∣tune may be admitted in respect to man, though not of God; and according to the Last, nothing can interdict our assertion, that Fortune is a part, not only of Fate, but also of Providence Divine, which, as hath bin profusely demonstrated, compre∣hends all occurrences, as well those which are, as those which are not praevised by Man. And in this sense only are we to in∣terpret that sentence of Plato (Epist. 6.) Deum apparare For∣tunam; as also that other, (in 4. de Legibus) Deum, & cum Deo Fortunam humana omnia gubernare. This duely conside∣red, we cannot but conclude; that Fortune is consistent with Fate, by the same interest, that a Species doth consist with its Genus: for that the Analogie is consimilar, is manifest from what immediately praecedes.

Plutarch, when descanting upon Plato his Distinction of * 1.277 Providence into Supreme, Planetary, and Sublunary; judici∣ously interpreteth the supreme, to be Intelligentia & benefica Dei voluntas, the Intelligence and benefical Will of God: and this for two respects; (1) that He might with greater reason enunciate, that Fate is to be reputed subordinate to the Divine Will; (2) that He might with greater auctority contra∣dict that proverbial error, Omnia Fato fieri; though he con∣ceded,

Omnia Fato complecti, that all things are comprehended in Fate. We say All things, not only meerly Fortuitous, and more General Contingents; but also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, such whose Event is ambiguous, and suspended on the Election or Aver∣sation of Mans Free-will. And the scope at which He aimed this Distinction; was to insinuate and commend the Analogie betwixt Fate and the Civil Law. For (sayth He) as all acti∣ons are not Legitimate, i. e. are not done according ••o the rule of the Law, which are under the comprehension of the Law (for the Law comprehends Prodition, Desertion, and many offences of the same kind, which yet no man can justify to be Legitimate: since that only is Legitimate, which is praescribed by the Law; and therefore He, who kills a Tyrant, doth not a Lawfull, (though a Commendable, at least not a punishable Act) but only those, which are enjoyned and expresly prae∣scribed by the Law: even so, though Fate doth comprehend all Events, yet are not▪ all Events therein comprehended, Fatal, or the Designations and Effects of Fate; but only those, which follow upon Causes (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) in the Divine Dispo∣sition Antecedent, or Necessary; such as are the motions of the Planets, upon which their Rising and Setting follow of Ne∣cessity.

SECT. III.

ANd finally, concerning the Enodation of that more then * 1.278 Gordian Knot, (about which many Ancient Philosophers have broken the teeth of their Reason, and as many Christian Theologists bin driven to make use of the sword of Faith, to cut it asunder) viz. the Conciliation of Fate to its apparent Con∣trary, Mans Free-will; we conceive the most hopefull way of dissolving the mighty Difficulty to be, with the most penetrating Thom. Aquinas, to understand Fate, in respect to man, to be

no more but that part of Providence Divine, which Theologists intend by the Term, Praedestination. For the vulgarly con∣ceived Antipraxis between Providence Divine and Liberty Hu∣man, being once removed: the Repugnancy between Fate and Liberty will also vanish of consequence. This that we have, in the 4. Sect. of our Chapter concerning the Mobility of the Term of mans life, to more then a small part performed; the Memory of our Reader is a sufficient record. However, that we may leave no stone unturned, under which any the most minute particle of Truth, to whose Explanation the concern∣ment of our praesent Theme doth adlige us, may be thought to lye neglected: we shall, with permission from, and due sub∣mission unto the Censure of the Church (from whose Fundamen∣tals we humbly beseech the God of Truth we may never recede in the least) make a second attempt to expound the mysterious Riddle of Praedestination; that so we may with more perspi∣cuity evidence the Conciliability thereof to mans Arbitrary Agency.

In order hereunto, we are to observe, that as Theology holds it for * 1.279 a maxime, that God created two distinct orders of Causes, in the General, viz. Necessary, and Free; and that both of these con∣stantly and faithfully execute the commission of their Natures, re∣spectively, i. e. the Necessary operate by Necessity, and the Free by Liberty: so also doth Philosophy admit it for Canonical, that both the Necessary and Free aequally acknowledge God for their Author, and are so comprehended in the episcopacy of Fate; that the Necessary operate Necessarily, or Fatally, and the Free not Fatally, but Freely. And from this Consent comes it to pass, that as the Difficulties, which perplex both Divines and Philosophers, are of great Affinity, if not Identical, in the main: so also are the Responses thereto of aequal moment: Wherefore it must commend our studies, to select only those Two Cardinal Doubts, to which all others may, in some relati∣on, either direct, or collateral, be referred: and, to the perspicu∣ous solution of each, accommodate such praegnant Reasons, as may be of correspondent extent in their importance.

The Former, being desumed from Divine Praenotion, is by the Theologist proposed thus. Either God knew definitely and * 1.280 certainly, that Peter would deny Christ: or He did not know it. That he did not know it, cannot be affirmed; first, because He praecisely praedicted his Abnegation; secondly, because Truth it self cannot lye: and if He had not known it, He not bin Om∣niscient, and consequently not God. Therefore He knew it defi∣nitely and certainly: and upon inference; it was impossible to Peter, not to deny. For had it bin left to his Election, and he using that Liberty had not denyed: then might the Praenotion of God have bin argued of Fallacity, and his Praediction of Falsity. But if it was not in Peters power, not to have denyed; 'tis manifest, that he wanted the Liberty of Election.

And by the Philosophers thus. Either the Gods have a de∣finite * 1.281 and infallible praescience of the future events of Contin∣gents (i. e. whether of 2. contrary Events, in possibility, shall be deduced extra Causas, or actually succeed) or they have no knowledge at all of future things; or they have an indefinite, and only conjectural cognition, such as even Man may justly praetend to: but neither the 2. nor 3. proposition can be endured, without the joynt toleration of most horrid Absurdities, and ine∣vitable praecipitation upon that dangerous rock, the Commen∣suration of the Infinite Science of the Gods, by the Finite ex∣tent of mans capacity; and therefore the First remains only to be asserted. If therefore the Gods have a certain Praenotion, which of 2. Contraries, whose Event is equally possible, as to the virtues of their Causes, shall come to be effected: manifest it is, that that particular Event, whose Ambiguity is determi∣ned to Certainty of Futurition, and is actually brought to pass, is Fatal or Necessary, i. e. could not but come to pass. For, otherwise, the Gods must be confest subject to Mendacity. One of the two therefore, must be granted, viz. that all things come to pass, Necessarily, as they are foreknown and Praedicted by the Gods; and so that the word, Contingens, is excluded, as impor∣ting no Reality, but a meer Chimaera; or, that the Affairs or

Occurrences of man, are neither praecognite, nor procured by the Gods; the Impossibility of which assertion, doth also fully exclude all Contingency.

To the Solution of this Difficulty, tis well known, the Di∣vines * 1.282 have most judiciously accommodated their Distinction of Necessity into Absolute and Suppositional. For instance; that 2. and 3. make 5. or that yesterday is praeterlapsed, is Abso∣lutely Necessary: but, that I should to morrow take a journey into the Country, or write a Consult for such or such a Patient, is not absolutely Necessary; yet if I suppose, that I shall travel; or write; then there ariseth a Necessity of my travelling, or w••iting, ex Suppositione, from that my Supposition. Now, in respect tis manifest from this Distinction, that the Necessity Absolute of any Action doth destroy the Liberty of the Agent; but the Suppositional doth not (for though I journy, or write, according to my Supposition, yet was it possible to me to have done neither) thereupon doe they most excellently reason thus: that Peters Abnegation was foreseen and praedicted by God, as an Event to come of Necessity, not Absolute, but Suppositio∣nal, by which nothing was detracted from Peters Liberty of not denying. For, as now in the praesent, if He be interroga∣ted concerning his Master, he is intirely Free or to avouch, or disavow his knowledge of him; so also will He be in the Future, when He shall be interrogated. Wherefore, as, if He now determine himself rather to deny, then affirme, and according to that determination actually deny; He doth that Freely, notwithstanding from the moment he denied, his denial is Necessary, insomuch as it is supposed that he hath actually denied: so also in the Future; when He shall determine himself rather to deny, then affirme, and according to that de∣termination shall actually deny, shall his denial be Free, or Arbitrary; however it cannot but be granted Necessary that He hath denyed; because he hath already actually denied. Nor is it paradoxical, or difficult to affirme, that this Supposi∣tional Necessity, and Peters Liberty are not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Discor∣dant, or Inconsistent, in any respect; because the Necessity is

subsequent, not antecedent to the Determination of his Liberty; and because it doth not consist so much in Re, vel Actione, in the Thing or Action it self, as in Temporis Circumstantia, the Circumstance of Time when 'ti•• done. Since, when we say, tis Necessary that Peter hath denyed; that Necessity is not un∣derstood to have bin any thing Antecedently in him, which com∣pelled him to deny: but that it is radicated now in Time it self, which as it is really past, and cannot be not past; so the Action done in that past time, however it was done, cannot be not done. And hence it is evident, though no man can justly assert, that twas Necessary to Peter to deny, because according to that assertion, there must be understood some Antecedent Cause, by which he was coated to deny: yet justified it may be that Now tis Necessary that he hath denyed; because the Action being once done, and so impossible to be not done, all the Necessity falls upon the Praeterition of the Time. Now, in respect that God is Omniscient, He cannot but Foresee that Peter will deny; yet that Divine Praenotion of Peters Abnega∣tion, is subsequent to the Divine Praevision of Peters Free De∣termination: and therefore God Foresees that Peter will deny, only because He Foresees, that Peter, abusing his Liberty, will freely determine himself to a denial. And hence comes it to be embraced amongst the most judicious School-men, as a truth indisputable; That Peter will deny, not because God hath prae∣vised and praedicted that he will deny: but that, because Peter will deny, when he shall be examined, therefore and for no other reason doth God Foresee and Foretell that he will deny. For, uti Scientia, praeteritam rem pro objecto habens, nullam rei praeteritae, ut ita & non alitèr fieret, necessitatem infert: ita Praescientia, rem suturam pro suo objecto habens, rei futurae, sive Futuritioni nullam potest inferre necessitatem: utraque enim est extra rem, & in Deo actio Immanens; that as Science having for its object a thing Praeterite, doth induce no necessity there∣upon; that it should have bin so, and no otherwise, so also doth Praescience, having for its object a thing Future, inferr no ne∣cessity upon its Futerition, that it shall so and no otherwise come to pass; for both Science and Praecience are distinct from,

and alien to their Objects, and Actions Immanent in God, i. e. not at all effluxed to the object, to the destruction, or alterati∣on of its Nature: this, we say, is a Verity which demonstra∣teth it self, and which we have more praecisely insisted upon, in the 4. Articl. 4. Sect. of our discourse of the Mobility of the term of mans lifè. And that all Cognition is a thing really distinct from, and extraneous to its Object; and that a thing comes to be actually, what it is not from the Cognition there∣of by an Idea in all points consimilar, but from it self, or its Efficient Cause: needs no other probation, but the conviction of this instance; that Snow is white, not because tis known to be white, but contrary, that it is known to be white, because really it is so. To speak a profound truth plainly, in few words; herein consists the Disparity between Divine and Human Cognition, viz. that Human can be extended only to Praesent and Praeterite: but Divine doth extend it self, with equal Certitude, to Future Contingents also. Now, insomuch as Praeterite Contingents were sometimes Future, and in the same condition with those, which are yet Future; and again, those which are yet Future may be understood to be praeterite in time to come, and in the same condition with those, which are al∣ready Praeterite: manifest it is, that as neither Divine, nor Human Cognition is the Cause, why Contingents already Praeterite, are praeterite; but, è contrà, they are known as Praeterite, because really they are so: in like manner, that those which are Future, are not therefore Future, because God holds an exact praenotion of them, as Future; but, è contrà, because they really are Future, therefore doth God hold an exact prae∣notion of their Futurition. And upon this Basis was it, that many Schooolmen erected that Axiom, Praevisionem Dei nihil influere in humanas actiones; that the Praevision of God hath no influence (coactive) upon the actions of man. Now, what hath bin argued for the Praevision and Praenotion of God, is also to be extended to his Praediction; especially because tis un∣controvertible, that Praediction is posterior or subsequent to the Praenotion of any Contingent, yet in the womb of Futurity: since what is not exactly foreknown, can never be certainly

foretold. For which respect, shall any urge upon us, that the Divine Praenotion and Praediction cannot be Fallacious; we shall most willingly concede their position, as most indubitate, because nothing can be prognosticate by God, as Future, which is not really Future: but, when it shall be thence inferred, that if Peter had once the absolute power in his own hands to have not denyed, and rightly using that arbitrary power, had actu∣ally not denyed; in that case, the praenotion and praediction of his denyal by God had proved Fallacious; we must reject the Illation, as illegal and absurd, because had not Peters de∣nyall bin realy Future, God had neither praevised, nor praedicted the same. For, it is the Reality of its Futurition, that supports the Certitude of the Praediction of any future Contingent. And therefore, in case Peter had bin not to deny; God had as cer∣tainly praedicted, that He would not deny: since so the Sup∣position had bin quite contrary, viz. that Peter, rightly using his Liberty of Election, would determine it, not to a Nega∣tion, but Affirmation. Whereupon we may safely conclude (1) that Peters Abnegation was Future, and (2) that God both praevised and praedicted the same, upon no other Necessity but only this: that Peter, when it should be in his own power to determine himself to either part, would then actually determine himself rather to Disclaim and Abjure, then own and avow, his Master. Thus the Divines.

And thus the Philosophers. Non quia Dii definitò norunt * 1.283 Contingentia, ideo illa eventura sunt. Neque enim, quia Dii norunt, ideo necessariò eveniunt; sed quia, cum naturae sint an••ipitis, aut talem, aut talem exhibebunt exitum; norunt Dii necessariò qualem, seu utrum obtinebunt: adeo ut Contingens, ex sua quidem natura indefinitum sit, sed respectu tamen notitiae Deorum definitum. Quinetiam constat, nostra quoque notitia Contingens definitò cognosci; cum, viz. propriè Contingens deinceps non sit: sed necessariò consequitur antegressas, cur fiat, Causas: Saith Ammonius (in lib. de interpret.) The whole importance whereof is this. That the definite praenotion of Con∣tingents by God, is in no relation the cause of their definite

Contingency; but, their being of themselves definitely Future, or their Ambiguity being to be determined to Definity of Fu∣turition, is the Cause of their praenotion by God. For, though a Contingent be Indefinite, in respect to its own nature, i. e. it is equally determinable, by the Liberty of its Causes, to either of two contrary Events: yet, in respect to the Praenotion of God, it is Definite; because God hath an infallible praenotion, to which of two contrary Events its Causes will determine it. All which may be confirmed à Minori, from the Praenotion of Man; experience assuring, that Physicians frequently prog∣nosticate and praedict the death of their deplored Patients, even to an hour. Not that their Prognosticks have any influ∣ence upon the Disease, to determine it to Mortal, when yet tis Dubious: but that the determination of the disease from Dubious to definitely Mortal, by its causes, is the ground of their Prognostick.

Here, lest we be misconceived to confound Divine and Human * 1.284 Praecognition, we advertise; that the Praenotion of God is In∣fallible, because à Priori, i. e. He foreknows Contingents, while they are yet only in Possibility, and in the womb of their Causes; nor to him, who demands, Why, or How God fore∣knows Events, while they are yet in the Dark, or Nothing of Futurity? can any other response be given, but this, that He is Omniscient, i. e. God: but the Praenotion, or (rather) Praesagiti∣tion of man, is Fallacious, because desumed à Posteriori, from Effects educed extra Causas, into actual Existence.

Which vast Disparity may be most adaequately Exemplified * 1.285 thus. God certainly Foreknows that Peter shall fall sick, and die of such or such a disease, viz. a Pestilent Fever. How? because He foreknows, that those Causes, which in respect to the Ambiguity or Indifferency of their event may, or may not generate an intense putrefaction and malignity in the humors of Peters body, shall lose that their Possibility, and determine themselves to the actual production of that particular malignant or pestilential inquinament in his blood, which constituteth the

essence of that disease: and that the disease so generated will be so violent and inoppugnable by the force of Nature, that the Temperament of Peters body, being too weak to sustain such a disproportionate Encounter, will thereby be dissolved, and so Death shall inevitably succeed.

But the Physician can only conjecture, that Peter may fall sick of such a malignant Fever; why, because He discovers that Peters praevious Intemperance hath prepared the continent Cause, or Fewell for a putrid Fever; and that the access of Malignity, either by Contagion communicated, or from an in∣tense Corruption of humors internally kindled, may, according to the Aptitude of its nature, seise upon that praepared fewell, and Ferment it into a pestilential Fever: but Definitely He doth not know, that Peter shall fall sick of such a pestilential disease; in regard, it transcends the maximes of his Art, and the Capacity of his limited Reason, to foreknow, whether the Possibility of such an Effect from such Causes, shall be deter∣mined to Necessity. Nor can He praedict, that Peter being in∣vaded with that disease, shall certainly perish thereby; untill the Dubiosity of the Fever be actually determined to Lethality: for then, from Symptoms, that signify the total Succumbency or yeelding of Nature to the victorious fury of the disease, he may, with good warrant and honour, praesage the imminent death of Peter. ¶.

SECT. IV.

THe other Capital Difficulty, being erected upon a certain circumventing Socraticisme, or Interrogatory Sophisme * 1.286 (most adaequately denominated by Cicero (de Fato) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Ignava Ratio, an unactive Argumentation; because, praevai∣ling upon the mind, it stupefies the same to a perpetual Restive∣ness, or Supinity, by charging even the Thoughts of every man upon the absolute and inoppugnable praeordination of Destiny; and consequently adnihilating the use of Piety, Prudence, and

Circumspection in all the actions of our lives) on that side which respecteth Theology, beareth this forme.

Either I am, from Eternity, praedestined and Elected to immar∣cescible Glory; or Reprobated to interminable misery. If the Former; then notwithstanding all my Impieties, I cannot be Damned: if the Later; then notwithstanding all my pious en∣deavours, I cannot be saved. But one of the two must be true: and therefore, since all my Good or Evil actions are of no avail, to what end shall I afflict my self with unnecessary, because fruit∣less care in any action of my life? Better is it for me, to grant a general Indulgence to my Genius, and provide for nought, but the satisfaction of all my Sensual desires; since that, nor ought else, can neither countermand my Election, nor promove or confirme my Reprobation.

And on the otherside, which respecteth Philosophy, it is prae∣sented thus. If the Decree of Fate be, that I shall recover of such a sickness; then, whether I consult the Physician, or not, I shall however recover: but if the decree of Fate be, that I shall not recover; notwithstanding my use, or neglect of the Physician, I shall not recover. And one of the two is necessarily Future: therefore is it vain and needless for me to use the Physician.

In order to our hoped Solution of this prodigious Problem, we begg leave to be our Readers Remembrancer, that among * 1.287 Divines there are two eminent Opinions, concerning this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or almost incomprehensible mysterie; in both which they have expressed so opportune and becoming a Modesty, as must extort from every ingenuous person not only a worthy Acknow∣ledgement, but superlative Commendation. For, being redu∣ced to an admission of some kind of Necessity, and considering how inconsistent any the weakest Necessity is with Liberty, wherein the Good and Evil, and so the Laudability and Cul∣pability of all the Actions of man, must be confessed to be essen∣tially radicated: they thought it the highest point of Wisdome to secure their routed judgements by a mature retreat to the Sanctuary of Ignorance; conceiving it a pitch sublime enough for the most aspiring thoughts of man to mount up to the

Apostles ô Altitudo! and soberly becalming the distractions of their Reason, by the Laudanum of Faith. If so, tis no shame for us to confess this Wonder of Praedestination to be Arcanum Divini Imperii, not only impervestiga••••le by the acutest and profoundest Speculation of Man, but also too abstruse for the clearer intelligence of Angels.

The Former opinion states the Abstrusity thus. That God, from all eternity, did Praedestinate, or Elect, out of the whole stock, or mass of mankind a definite number of persons, to whom, sine ullis eorum menitis, operibusve bonis praevisis, & ex pura sui Bonitate, without any respect at all to his Praevision of their Good works, but meerly of his own Favour and Benignity, He had decreed eternal Felicity: and the rest He decreed to Repro∣bate, or Damne to eternal Infelicity; yet, ex praevisis eorum malis operibus, in respect to his praevision of their Future Evilworks.

The other thus. That God did as well praedestinate some men to Glory, from his praevision of their Good; as others to misery, from his praevision of their Evil actions. Or thus. God, from Eternity, decreed to create the World, and therein a certain number of men, who should be capable of deserving well, or ill at the hands of his Mercy, or Justice, according to the right use, or abuse of that Liberty of their Understanding and Will, which He was pleased to endow them withall. And, compas∣sionating the Deceptibility of their Nature, He also decreed to diffuse upon the souls of all men, that Supernatural Assistance, which Divines call Sufficient Grace; that so they, who should, by the right use of their Elective Liberty, husband their stock or portion of sufficient Grace, to empower them to the perfor∣mance of Good Actions, should be Elected to Glory: but they, who should abuse both their Liberty, and his Auxiliant Grace, to the doing of Evil Actions, should be Reprobated to misery. And finally, because He foresaw, that some would rightly use his Auxiliatory Grace, and constantly persevere in that state of Piety untill death; and that others would neglect, condemn, and abuse it, and never repent perfectly, but die in that horrid state of Impiety: therefore did He decree everlasting Glory to those, and as lasting misery to these. And this we con∣ceive

to be the most intelligible Adumbration of this more then Aenigmatical Subject.

Now, of these two Opinions, the First seems as wholly in∣capable * 1.288 of Expedition from the intricate Entanglings of the prae∣cedent Interrogatory Sophisme; as the Absolute Decree of Re∣probation is of a full Conciliation to the Liberty of mans Will. For what Liberty can remain to those men, who are, by a decree Antecedent to all praevision of their future Good actions, prae∣destinate to Glory? And were there any Contrapractical Liber∣ty remaining to them, and should their Will, according to that liberty, elect evil, and they do such actions, whose guilt might deserve Damnation Eternal, at the tribunal of Justice Divine: in that case, would the Decree of their Election be eluded and countermanded. Nor is it less Contradictory, to reserve a Liberty to those, who are Reprobate; since, for this reason alone, that they are not Elected, it is impossible to them, notwithstan∣ding all their Good inclinations, endevours, and performances, to bring themselves into the number of the Elect. And yet damned they shall be, and justly too, for their Evil works: but how is it possible for them to doe Good, and not Evil of Necessity, when the decree of their Reprobation is supposed An∣tecedent to Gods Praevision of the future concurse, or conspiracy of their Will to the tenor of that Decree; and when they are left such deplorable wretches, to whom Damnation, and so the Patration of evil Actions only remain possible? To evade this Difficulty of Difficulties, many eminent Doctors of the Chaire as well in Universities, as Synods, have fabricated for themselves as many Sanctuaries of Distinctions. Some adscribing to God a certain Science Conditionate, or Hypothetical (they unani∣mously phrase it, Scientia Media, and are so immoderately de∣lighted with the Acuteness thereof, that, as the more then gene∣rally learned, Dr. Prideaux hath satyrically observed (in praelect. de Scient. Media.) de genuino ejus parente, haud segnius ac de Puero vivo inter meretrices, 1. Reg. 3. est decertatum, there hath bin as passionate and sharp a conslict between Fonseca, Molina, Leonhardus Lessius Lovaniensis, &c. Jesuits, for

the honor of its Invention, as was betwixt the two Ha••lots about the right to the Living Child) others requiring, if not to the justification of the Decree it self, yet at least to justify the Execution thereof, the concurse of Good Works, so necessarily, that no man can ever attain to Glory, but by the scale of Merits, at least those of our Saviour: and others mincing, or extenua∣ting the Elective Liberty of man into a meer and simple Libency (which we have more then once specified, and as often described) and accordingly attempting to salve the Repugnancy thus; that the Elect are therefore Free, because they do their Good works Libently, or Willingly; and likewise, that the Reprobate are also Free, because they doe their Evil works Libently. Hereup∣on, to him, who shall charge upon them with this Ʋnactive Argumentation, they instantly oppose; that there is very great reason, why every man, endowed with this Libency, should most strenuously endevour the constant practise of Good, rather then Evil: because, though He be uncertain of the Decree con∣cerning his Election or Reprobation; yet is He certain of this, that no man shall ever be assumed into Glory, unless he shall have done Good, nor any be excluded the Celestial Eden, unless He shall have done Evil. To which they add, that it is the main Duty of every man, to the utmost of his power, to ascertain himself rather of Election, by his perseverance in good; then of Reprobation, by a debaucht and desperate resignation of the sceptre of his Will to all the temptations of Evil: that so he may praevent, or mitigate that Fear and Anxiety, which must otherwise uncessantly excruciate his mind, during his whole life, by acquiring a setled confidence, that from God, who is infi∣nitely Good and Just, he hath no cause to expect evil, while the scope of all his endevours is, to deserve well, at least to obtain Mercy at his hand. To conclude, lest man should in the interim either Glory in himself, as if He ought, according to justice, to be Elected, for his good works sake; or Complain of the rigour of the Decree of his Reprobation, murmuring that it was not his fault, why his name was not inscribed in the Book of life: they check his Glorying with this cooling card of the Apostle, O Ho∣mo! quis te discernit? and hush his Complaint with, Tu qui es,

qui respondeas Deo? Nunquid dicet vas Figulo, quare me fecisti sic? Nunquid sacere illi licet aliud vas in honorem, aliud verò in contumeliam? (Roman. chap. 9. ver. 21.) And if this satisfy not; they here set bounds to Curiosity, and lime the wings of those Eagle Wits, who would soare higher then the lower region of the mysterie, with that grave advice of the Canonized Doctor: Quare hunc trahat Deus, illum verò non trahat, noli judicare, si non vis errare; or that modest rule of Cornelius Tacitus, San∣ctius & reverentius visum, de actis Deorum credere, quàm scire.

But as for the Second Opinion; to our first inquisition, that * 1.289 seemes capable of extrication from the forementioned Labyrinth, without much difficulty thus. I am (says Adrastus, or the Fatist) either Elect to glory, or Reprobate to misery, by an eter∣nal Decree of God. This we grant to be most true; but with this additional qualification: that Himself is Now the Cause, why He was from eternity Elect, or Reprobate. For, He is now in that very state, in which God foresaw that he would be, when educed into existence, endowed with reason, and assisted with sufficient Grace, for the clear discernment of Good from Evil; and it now depends upon the Liberty of his Will, that God hath praevised him operating good or evil: so that the Decree of his Election, or Reprobation, is subsequent or posteri∣or to the Divine Praevision of his future good, or evil Demerits. To speak yet louder; God therfore Elected him to Glory, because He Foresaw that he would use both the Liberty of his Under∣standing and Will, and that Supernaturall Light, or Divine Grace, which the Compassion of God vouchsafed for his Assi∣stance, as he ought, to enable him to lead an honest and pious life: and therefore Reprobated him to misery, because He Fore∣saw that he would Abuse the Lights of Nature and Grace, in constantly and impenitently doing actions point-blank repugnant to their frequent and importune Advisoes. This being inferred, the Fatist cannot but perceive, that it lyes on his part, now to doe well, and with all the nerves of his Mind to Cooperate to Divine Grace: that so God, from eternity foreseeing that his Conformity to the dictates of his Grace, may have Elected him.

For if he shall counterinflect his Will to the Inclinations of Di∣vine Grace, and pursue Evil: those Evil works shall be very they, which God from eternity having respect unto, hath Dam∣ned him for the Guilt of them, and impoenitence for them.

Nor can He elude this truth, by pleading; that God doth * 1.290 from eternity Foreknow, whether He shall be Elect, or Reprobate: and that therefore of Necessity he shall be, what he Will be; since the Divine Science is uncapable of Elusion, or Mutability. Because, though God, indeed, had an infallible Praecognition, from Eternity, whether he would be Praedestinate, or Reprobate; yet is that Praecognition grounded upon his own eternal Decree, and that eternal Decree grounded upon his eternal Praevision of the Fatists Good or Evil life. So that the actual Determination of the Will of man to the constant prosecution of Good, is the Basis, or first Degree in this mysterious Climax of Praedestination; the Praevision thereof by God, the second; the respective Decree of God, the third; and his indeceptible Praescience the fourth and last. Not that these Antecessions and Consecutions are Temporany, i. e. not that the Praescience of God is posterior to his Decree; and his Decree posterior to his Praevision (for those 3. make but one simple and intire Act in the Divine Intellect and Will: and Eternity is but one permanent Now, incapable of Division, because of Cessation) really, but Anthropopathically: i. e. that narrow and remote Man, when he speculates the nature of his own Free-Will, and that of Divine Justice, as integrally Con∣sistent; is necessitated, for comprehension sake, to suppose some Momenta Rationis, or Priority and Posteriority in Eternity, as we have singularly enunciated in the 2. Articl. 4. Sect. 6. chap. praecedent. * 1.291

Again, the Fatist can justly promise to himself no greater pro∣tection by this farther objection; that, if the Divine Decree be sub∣quent to Divine Praevision: therefore is it in his power to stagger the Certitude of the Decree, and dissolve its rigour into an arbi∣trary Mutability. Why? because the Decree is not made, nisi supponendo, quide esset facturus, but upon a Supposition what

the future Actions of his life would be: and the Immutability thereof is established upon the Necessity Suppositional, which * 1.292 can diminish nothing of the Liberty of man, as we have more then once professedly evinced.

And as little solid reason hath He to argue thus. If God did therefore Elect me, only because He eternally praevised those Good works, which I now do: then (ipse ero, qui me discernam) shall I my self be to my self the Author of my Discretion. For, tis not man, who by his own single power can make this Discre∣tion, but the very Grace of God alone; without which no man can ever attain so high as the foot of Goodness.

Conclude we, therefore; though it be not difficult to mans Rea∣son, * 1.293 to investigate the Cause, Why God was pleased to or∣dain this vessel for Honour, and that for Dishonour; why He, by the vigorous Magnet of his special Indulgence, doth Attract this, and not that man; still dispensing a sufficient portion of his illuminating Grace to all men: since it is not obscure, that the Concurse, Conspiracy, and Cooperation of this mans Will to that sufficient Grace, may inoffensively be conceived to be the Cause, at least a Cause, and so è contra. Yet is it (and the Acu∣test Wits have, from the Flaws made in them by the more then Adamantine Hardness of this Rock, had great reason to con∣jecture it will always continue) the most Desperate Difficulty, that ere perplexed the Cogitations of inquisitive Mortality, to explore the reason, why God made men of such a condition, as that some would be destinate to Honour, and others to Disho∣nour; and not All men such, as that they should willingly suffer themselves to be Allected by the Loadstone of his Love, or be willing to cooperate to his Grace diffused upon them: when, had it seemed convenient to his Wisdome, He might have made All men such, as that they would, with all ardency of Affection, and force of their Wills, have Cooperated to his Grace, and so have bin Elected to Honor. And certainly, from hence alone, that our Delection of Virtue, or Vice (conforme to which our Minds are carried on with a kind of infraenable Tendency; and

to which the Praevision of God being extended, He hath either Elected, or Reprobated) is necessarily dependent upon the Notions, or Species of things objected to our Senses, and tra∣ductively to our Cognoscent Faculty: there remains to us more then a great occasion of applauding and admiring the Modesty and judgement of the Apostles Exclamation, ô Altitudo! espe∣cially when the Exhibition, or Praesentation of those Notions, and Species doth depend upon that Concatenate Series, or sub∣alternate syntax and Disposition of Causes and Effects, which God, when He Created the World, according to the Model of his own imperscrutable Wisdome, thought good to institute. And this we have judged to be a faithfull Summarie of what the Divines Respons to this Circaean Charm, or Sophisme of Adrastus containeth.

The Remnant of our Assumption, is only to contract those voluminous Discourses of Philosophers, which perpendicularly point at the Solution of the same most bloody and impious So∣phisme, into a sew medullary or essential lines.

Plutarch (de Fato) as Platos Interpreter, insisting upon the praerecited Adaequation of Fate to the Civil Law; hopes to * 1.294 decide the mighty Controversy by distinguishing thus: Tametsi omnia, quae fiunt, Fato contineantur; non tamen Fato omnia fieri: ac ejusmodi esse ea, quae Contingenter, sive Liberè,

ac Fortuito fiunt. That though all things, which come to pass, are contained in Fate; yet are not all things effected By Fate: and particularly those Events, which are meerly Fortuitous, and those which are effected by Arbitrary Agents.

Now, ac∣cording to this eminent Distinction, we may concede; that it is, indeed, comprehended in Fate, not only that Thou, being cast upon the thorny bed of Sickness, shalt or recover, or perish, but also that thou shalt or Consult, or Neglect the Physician: But positively deny, that therefore either thy Convalescence, or Death is Fatal, since tis Contingent; as also, that thy use, or neglect of the Physician, is Fatal, since tis Arbitrary.

Notwithstanding this nice and specious Distinction, we * 1.295 confess, there remains a Difficulty, and such a one as the grea∣test Oedipuses of the World may, without dishonour to their Perspicacity, despair of its satisfactory Dissolution; viz. How it can be, since there is some Cause, which condueeth rather to thy Convalescence, then Destruction; or, è contrà, rather to thy Destruction, then Convalescence; and some Cause, which induceth, or inclineth thee rather to Consult, then Neglect the Physician, or, è contrà, rather to Neglect, then Consult him: and since those Causes had others Antecedent to them, and those were connected to others, and those to others, &c. retro∣grade along the chain of Fate: How it can be, we say, that these Effects, being admitted to be Contained in Fate, may not be also admitted to be Caused by Fate. Especially, when we cannot, without passion, quarrel at his Construction, who shall tell us; that to be Contained in Fate, is as much as to be connected to the Series of Causes, and that little less, then to be Effected by Fate. To palliate, not cure the Itch of Curiosity in this par∣ticular; we ask leave, with the sublimest and most daring Contemplators of the World, to recurr to that General Asylum; Non debet Humana Sapientia supra Divinam illam gloriari, juxta quam vetamur scrupulosiùs inquirere, quamobrem Deus sic ordinarit. And this the reason was of our saying, that the second opinion of Divines, to our first inspection, seemed capa∣ble of Extrication from the Labyrinth of the Fatists Ʋnactive Argumentation: for our second and more profounding medita∣tions have found it far otherwise. However, we judge it wor∣thy our Readers Patience, here to acquaint himself with the subtle Evasions of some Philosophers; especially when He shall survey them in epitome. * 1.296

Plato (in 10. de Repub.) sagely discoursing about the fu∣ture Infusion of Souls into Bodies, imagineth some certain Sortes, or Lots; which Lachesis distibuting to souls, as she pleases, thus inaugurates them: Non vos Daemon excipiet, sed vos Dae∣monem eligetis; your Genius shall not obtrude it self upon you, * 1.297

but every one shall elect his own particular Genius. And soon after, as a Comment upon his former Parable, He superaddeth thus much; Virtus sola extra omnem servitutis noxam est; libera planè & servire nescia: quam prout quis vel honorabit, vel negliget; ita plus vel minus ex ea possidebit. Culpa omnis est penes eligentem; Deus est extra omnem culpam.

Virtue is alone superior to all servitude and compulsion, being abso∣lutely Free, and nescious of subjection: of which every man shall possess more or less, according to his estimation, or neg∣lect thereof. All blame is lodged on the Electors side: and none can be on Gods.

In both which parabolical praesenta∣tions collated, we need not the opticks of Sphinx to discover a lively adumbration of the Later opinion of Divines, which is yet warme in our memory; for therein appears a shadow or pale description of Divine Praedestination, joyned hand in hand with the future use of mans Liberty: and this becomes the more visible by Virtue, which is but the repraesentative, or suc∣cedaneum of Divine Grace.

And as for the mythology of his imaginary Sortes, or Lots; Plotinus (Enn. 2. lib. 3. cap. 15.) unriddleth them to be, not only the Disposition of the Univers, at what time the Soul is immerfed into the body; nor only the individual Temperament of the Body, derived by traduction from the Parents; nor only the condition of the Climate, region and place; but also All other Extraneous Insluences, by which the Mind may be either Adjuvated, or Impeded, in its right Ratiocination, Judicature, Election, and Prosecution of Good, or Evil.

Seneca (in 2. Nat. Quest. 35.) vindicating their Devotion, who fled to the Sanctuary of Prayers, Vowes, and Expiations, * 1.298 as a more certain Praeservative from the Combustion of Light∣ning, then a Chaplet of Laurel (whose case holds no remote Analogy to theirs, who in sickness address to the Physician) hath this observable and pertinent passage. Hoc habent commune nobiscum, quòd nos quoque existimamus vota proficere, salva vi, ac potestate Fatorum. Quaedam enim à Diis immortalibus ita suspensa relicta snnt, ut in bonum vertant, si admotae Diis pre∣ces fuerint, si vota suscepta. Ita non est hoc contra Fatum, sed

ipsum quoque in Fato est. Aut futurum, inquit, est, aut non. Si futurum; etiam si non susceperis vota, fiet. Falsa est interro∣gatio; quia illam mediam inter ista exceptionem praeteris. Fu∣turum, inquam, hoc est, si vota suscepta fuerint. Hoc quoque necesse est, inquit, Fato comprehensum sit; aut suscipiat vota, aut non. Puta me tibi manus dare, & fateri hoc quoque Fato esse comprehensum, ut utique fiant vota; ideo fient. Fatum est, ut Hic disertus sit; sed si literas didicerit. Ab eodem fato contin••tur, ut literas discat; ideo discet. Hic Dives erit: sed si navigaverit. An in illo fati ordine, quo patrimonium illi grande promittitur; hoc quoque protinus fatum est, ut naviget, ideo navigabit. Idem dieo tibi de Expiationibus; effugiet pe∣ricula, si expiaverit praedictas Divinitus minas; at hoc quoquo fato est, ut expiet; ideo expiabit, &c.

And Chrysippus (apud Agellium, lib. 6. cap. 2.) being pressed hard by the same ponderous Argument of the necessary Exhi∣bition * 1.299 of the Species of objects of the Mind; is driven to assimi∣late the Mobility of the Mind to that of a Cylindre, or Bowle, which in respect to both its Gravity and Figure, is naturally indifferent either to acquiesce, or be agitated, according as it is either permitted to its own quiet, in plano, or deturbed from it, by an external impuls. And this upon Design, by that familiar Comparison to illustrate the Liberty of the Mind to be of such a constitution; that though it cannot but be commoved by the Species of Objects irruent through the gates of the Senses: yet nevertheless is it still in its own power to afford, or deny its assent unto them, i. e. or to Elect, or Reject them. Which was our only scope, in our praecedent Discourse concerning the First Motions of the Mind, and their Consequences. The words of Chrysippus are these. Sicut (inquit) lapidem Cylindrum, si per spatia terrae prona atque deruta jacias; causam quidem ei, & initium praecipitantiae facis; mox tamen ille praeceps v••lvitur; non quia tu id jam facis; sed quoniam ita se modus ejus & for∣mae volubilitas habet: sic ordo, & ratio Necessitatis Fati genera ipsa, & principia causarum movet; impetus verò consiliorum, mentiumque nostrarum, actionesque ipsas voluntas cujusque propria, & animorum ingenia moderantur.

To which we may consarciate the most plausible and pro∣mising Respons of a School-man. Voluit Deus homines deli∣berare, * 1.300 eligere? Deliberant sine ulla vi, & eligunt per volun∣tatem. Et tamen hoc ipsum, quod electuri fuerunt, vidit ipse ab aeterno: sed vidit, non coegit; scivit, non sanxit; praedixit, non praescripsit. Quid titubant hîc nostri Curiones? Miselli! non alius mihi locus videtur in clariori luce, nisi quod petulca mens ista identidem se scalpit, & exasperat, mala quidem scabie infecta litigandi, & disserendi. Quomodo enim (inquiunt) si Deus praevidit me peccaturum, & non potest falli ista praevisio; non peccem necessariò? Certè non necessariò, pro tua mente: liberâ voluntate hîc interveniente. Nempe hoc praevidit Deus, ut eo modo pecces, quo praevidit: providit autem ut liberè; igitur necessariò liberè peccas. Satin' hoc clarum? sed enim Deus ipse in nobis omnis motus Auctor. Communiter Auctor, fateor: sed non nisi boni Fautor. Ad virtutem accingeris? illo sciente & excitante sit. Ad vitium? Sciente, sinente, & sapienter moderante in bonum finem.

But alas! All this is Aer: and Curiosity is no Chamaeleon. * 1.301 For though we extend these ductile Distinctions to the ex∣treme of their capacity, and rack their importance with all the nerves of the strongest reason: yet will they at length be found so far short of attaining so much as to the outside of the re∣mote Mysterie, as Impossibility is beyond Difficulty, Infinite beyond Finite, Omniscience beyond Nescience; in a word, as the inscrutable Counsels of Divinity are above the comprehen∣sion of narrow, crass, and frail Humanity. Had they sayd no more then He, who being assaulted with the same consternating Scruple, returned in short; Fata volentem ducunt, Nolentem trahunt: they had contracted (but increased the weight of) their Speculations. For that rich and emphatick Sentence com∣prehends the substance of all their larger Evasions; and yet for all that the summe there of ariseth to no more then this: Though man hath a power of Non-resistance, yet he hath no power of Re∣sistance; i. e. though man hath such a Liberty, that he may be drawn Not-unwillingly, yet not such as that he may not be

drawn Ʋnwillingly; or, more plainly, that man hath a Free∣dome of Assent, but not of Dissent; for who hath resisted the Will of God?

Nor could it have proved any Disparagement, but contrary∣wise, * 1.302 the highest Honour, to which the circumscribed Intel∣lectuals of dark Mortality have any reason to aspire, here to have confessed a Ne ultra, and humbly acquiesced in a beco∣ming despair of other satisfaction then this: Deus, ab aeterno, Fati syntaxin, causarúmve naturalium seriem subalternatim sic ordinavit, & sanxit; quia sic ordinavit & sanxit, i. e. quia imperscrutabili ejus sapientiae sic visum est. When the Wit of man, wanting the Ballast of Piety, bears too much sail, it cannot escape oversetting: especially when it adventures upon the im∣mens, vertiginous, and bottomless ocean os Providence Divine; where All that is discoverable, is darkness and horror. What greater Prudence did the great Plato ever shew, which might consecrate his Memory to the venerable esteem of inferior Ages, then that in his introduction of Socrates, praeparing his Auditors, when He was to dispute about some things which concerned the Attributes of the Divine Nature, with this excellent Allay, or suppressive of immoderate scrutiny in such reserved mysteries: Aequum est, nos meminisse, & me qui disseram, & vos qui ju∣dicabitis, Homines esse; meet it is for us to remember, that both I who am to discourse, and you who are to judge, are but Men. The Arcana of Gods Decrees are like the meridian Sun; on which the more we gaze, the less we perceive: and all we can gain by our audacious inspection, will be only Blindness and too late Repentance. When the most Learned and Acute, whose monuments of Perspicacity are the most refulgent Gemms in the embroidered coate of Fame, have found their Disquisitions terminated in the sensible Mellifice of Bees, the contexture of Spiders, the spinstry of Silkworms (not to advance to those Giant Problems of the reciprocal Afflux and Reflux of the Sea; the sensible torrent of the Aer from West to East under the Tro∣picks; the Cause of Earthquaks; the motions and distances of Celestial or Quintessential bodies; the Circumference and

Diametre of the Globe Terraqueous, and its Libration or sus∣pension upon Nothing; the verticity and Alliciency of the Loadstone; the nature of the Soul, &c.) we say, when the most Eagle-eyed Indagators have found themselves discouraged, and at a loss in these minute Mechanicks of Nature: what a di∣stracted Insolency is it for us to Attach those infinitely more inexplorable Abstrusities of the Divine Praeordination, which are too intense for the stronger Opticks of Cherubins? What did grave and modest Antiquity design, by their erecting of the statue of that Monster, Sphinx, over the doores of their Tem∣ples? only this; by the commination of imminent Destruction, to deterr the Curious from prying into the recluse and abscondite Sanctum Sanctorum of the Deity. This the profound Euclid more then glanced at, when, being interrogated by some Phi∣lopragmonist (who hoped to confound the Mathematicks with the Metaphysicks) concerning the Nature and Politie of the Gods, He made this incomparable answer: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; as for other things concerning the Gods, I know nought, but this I know full well, that they detest and abominate the profane∣ly Curious. And this that reverend Father also reflected on, when He sayd; Ʋt multò faciliùs invenit syderum Conditorem humilis Pietas, quàm syderum ordinem superba Curiositas; ita firma stabilique fide sciamus omne Dei judi∣cium justum esse, & ubi investigare non poteris quare ita judicaret, sufficiet scire quis judicaret. Since therefore it is impossible for us to make our selves privy to the Concealed Will of our Creator; all that remains on our part, is to endevour, with all humility and serenity, to conforme and cooperate to his Revealed: assuring our selves, that He, who is All Wisdome and Goodness, can will nothing but what is Good, nay infinitely better for us, then what our imperfect and de∣ceptible understanding can instruct our Will to desire for our selves. This was the noblest resolve of the noble Epictetus. Semper magis volo, quod Deus vult, quàm quod Ego: adjungar illi, velut minister & assecla; cum illo appeto, cum illo desidero, & quod Deus vult, volo. And in truth, this is

the only true Halcyon, that can calme all the distracting tempests of our Cares; the imperturbed Haven, wherein the Weather-beaten vessels of our Minds may safely Anchor, and bid defiance to all the impetuous Gusts of Adversity, and Temptations; the Magisterial Elixir of all virtue, and so of all real Delight; nay, Heaven anticipated; and the Term wherein both my Cogitations and Pen shall acquiesce.

All Glory be to God on high, on earth Peace, and Good Will towards men.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Section 1. Article 1. Aristotle, the most knowing and curious Ethnick, did yet by his si∣lence in the cardinal point of Theology, proclaim the impossibility of mans full un∣derstanding the simple and perfect Essence of God.
• * 1.2

  Article 3. The Hebrews Intimated so much, in the immoderate veneration en∣joyned toward his Name, Jchovah.
• * 1.3

  Article 3. The clearer sighted Christi∣an also can perceive no more of the Divine nature then what is shadowed in its Attributes.
• * 1.4

  Article 4. And therefore the Author re∣strains the rea∣ders expectati∣on onely to a demonstration of the Existence of God, in this Chapter sub∣necting a short scheme of his present designe and Method.
• * 1.5

  Article 1. The mind of man can have no cognition of the nature of its objects, but by the mediati∣on of their proper Ideas.
• * 1.6

  Article 2. Those Ideas are 1 Innate. 2. Adventitious.
• * 1.7

  3 Imaginary.
• * 1.8

  Article 3. A strict enqui∣ry, whether the Ideas of ob∣jects existent without our selves, hold an exact similitude to their na∣tures.
• * 1.9

  Article 4. A second dis∣quisition, whe∣ther any of those things whose Ideas are sound in the mind of man, have any reall existence without it?
• * 1.10

  Article 5. A firme in∣duction, that its impossible for any Idea to import or com∣prehend more of perfection, then its proto∣type, or cause.
• * 1.11

  Article 6. And therefore, if any Idea con∣tain more of perfection then can be found in our minds: certainly our minds cannot ••e the efficient of that tran∣scendent Idea.
• * 1.12

  Article 7. The diversity of Ideas, respe∣ctive to the di∣versity of En∣tities.
• * 1.13

  Article 8. The possible originals of each sort se∣verely exami∣ned, and all found to be de∣sumable from our selves; the Idea of God only excepted.
• * 1.14

  Article 9. The Idea of God, here de∣scribed, cannot be either for∣mally, or ma∣terially false, but the most clear, distinct and true of all others.
• * 1.15

  Article 10. A declarement of the impossi∣bility of the divine Ideas desumption ei∣ther from our selves:
• * 1.16

  Article 11. O•• from some other cause le••s perfect then God.
• * 1.17

  Article 12▪ Or from our Pa••ents.
• * 1.18

  Article 13. The concern∣ment of all; or a conclusion that the Idea of the divine nature is innate and congenial to the mind of man.
• * 1.19

  Article 14. An abstract, or Anacephalaeo∣sis of the whole demonstration.
• * 1.20

  Article 1. The impor∣tance of the term, Cogita∣tion.
• * 1.21

  Article 2. Of an Idea.
• * 1.22

  Article 3. Of the ob∣jective reality of an Idea.
• * 1.23

  Article 4. Of the For∣mal, and emi∣nent being of Attributes in the objects of of Ideas.
• * 1.24

  Article 5. Of a substance.
• * 1.25

  Article 6. Of the word, Mind.
• * 1.26

  Article 7. Of a Body.
• * 1.27

  Article 8. Of the real di∣stinction of two substances.
• * 1.28

  Article 9. Of the sub∣stance suprem∣ly perfect.
• * 1.29

  Article 1. Object. 1. That the mind of man, being finite, cannot extend to the clear and di∣stinct intelle∣ction of an In∣finite, quatenus an Infinite: and the
• * 1.30

  Solution there∣of by three distinctions.
• * 1.31

  1.
• * 1.32

  ••.
• * 1.33

  3.
• * 1.34

  Article 2. Object. 2. That the Idea of the divine nature, resi∣dent in the mind of man, is a meer Ens rationis: and the Solut.
• * 1.35

  Article 3. Object. 3. That an effect may have more of reality, or perfection then its Cause: and the
• * 1.36

  Solut.
• * 1.37

  Article 4. Object. 4. That the ex∣istence of such an excellent Idea, as hath been d••scribed of the Divine Nature, doth not necessitate the existence of an Entity, in all points re∣spondent, or superior there∣to: because of the possible composing such an Idea, out of our col∣lections from s••nsible objects: and the ample
• * 1.38

  Solut.
• * 1.39

  Article 5. Object. 5. That the Idea conceived of God, is capable of Aug∣mentation and diminution: and the clear
• * 1.40

  Solut.
• * 1.41

  Article 6. Many scruples, concerning the finality, man∣ner, and form of the Idea im∣prest; as also concerning the seeming He••e∣rogencity, or Alterity be∣tween the es∣sence of the mind and that of the Idea: par∣ticularly satis∣fied.
• * 1.42

  Article 1. The insepara∣bility, or (ra∣ther) identity of God, and Creator.
• * 1.43

  Article 2. The two re∣spects, which inclined the Author to a more ample comprobation of the first Ar∣t••cle of our Chri∣stian breed; to∣gether with a d••elenchical explosion of that antiquated delusion, that the Universe was autoctbo∣nous in its ori∣ginal, or con∣structed meerly by Chance.
• * 1.44

  Article 3. The summary of Empedocles, Leucippus, Epi∣curus, Democri∣tus, &c. do∣ctrine of the worlds sponta∣neous result from a Chaos of Atoms.
• * 1.45

  Article 4. A Digression, winnowing the Chasse from the Wheat con∣cealed in the former theory of Epicurus, & by the corolla∣ry of some ca∣stigations, re∣strictions and additions, de∣claring the great advanta∣ges, that this Hypothesis of Atoms hath be∣yond any other concerning the Material Prin∣ciple of all Bo∣dies, as yet ex∣cogitated.
• * 1.46

  Article 1. The conceit of the Worlds fortuitous pro∣duction, dispa∣raged by a pre∣pollency even of Pagan Au∣ctority, that profoundly as∣serted the con∣trary, viz. of▪
• * 1.47

  Article 2. Thales Milesius.
• * 1.48

  Article 3. Anaxagoras.
• * 1.49

  Article 4. Pythagoras and Plato.
• * 1.50

  Article 5. The Stoicks.
• * 1.51

  Article 6. Aristotle.
• * 1.52

  Article 1. The pretext of Fortune de∣stroyed, by the constancy of Nature in her act of specifica∣tion, (i. c.) the restraint and determination of the seminal∣ties of Animals to the procrea∣tion of their like in specie: and the Athe∣ists objection, of frequent A∣nomalous and Heteroplasmi∣cil, or mon∣strous Produ∣ctions, dissol∣ved.
• * 1.53

  Article 2. The necessity of the Worlds Greation by an Agent infinite in Science and Power, proclai∣med by the constant Uni∣formity of Na∣ture, in her per∣petuation of Vegetables.
• * 1.54

  Article 3. The Sun con∣vincively de∣monstrates the infinite wis∣dom of its Cre∣ator, by 3 Ar∣guments: viz.
• * 1.55

  1. The universal convenience of its situation in its proper orb.
• * 1.56

  2. The appoint∣ment of its continual Cir∣cumgyration.
• * 1.57

  3. The contrive∣ment of its ob∣lique motion along the line Eclipitick.
• * 1.58

  Article 4. The impresses of an infinite Intelligence, plainly legible in the fronts even of Sub∣terraneous In∣anlmates.
• * 1.59

  Article 5. The impossi∣bility of the worlds Creati∣on by any A∣gent but God, illustrated both by the Magni∣tude, and Pul∣chrltude there∣of: and the Epicureans dream, of a motive faculty eternally inhe∣rent in Atoms, derided.
• * 1.60

  Article 6. The Epicureans grand Argu∣ment, of the possibility of the configura∣tion of the Uni∣verse by a casu∣al and sponta∣neous disposi∣tion of Atoms, from the fre∣quent actuall production of an Infect by the same means or principles; countermined by an inversion or Argument à majoriad minus.
• * 1.61

  Article 7. An exception against the see∣ming disparity betwixt their inference and ours, preven∣ted: and the in∣validity os theirs, though their own hy∣pothesis were conceded in terminis, decla∣red, by an ad∣equate simi∣litude.
• * 1.62

  Article 8. The conclusi∣on of this secti∣on; or, the aequipondium of the precedēt reasons, if per∣pended in the mass and con∣junctively, to the most per∣fect demon∣stration.
• * 1.63

  Article 1. That Antique absurd expostu∣lation, what Instruments Auxiliants, materials pre∣disposd, God made use of, in his act of Fabrication of the Universe, cop••ously satisfied: and the energie of the divine Will commonstrated superior to the indigence of either.
• * 1.64

  Article 2? A second im∣modest inter∣rogation, wherefore God so long defer∣red the creati∣on, resolved: with a detecti∣on of the un∣reasonableness of undecent cur••osity.
• * 1.65

  Article 1. The improba∣bility of the worlds creati∣on by God, in∣sinuated, by the Atheists, from his defect of any possible Motive, scope or final cause.
• * 1.66

  Article 2. Their first Ar∣gument, that the divine Na∣ture is above the capacity of either emolu∣ment, or de∣l••ctation, from the Universe.
• * 1.67

  Article 3. The satisfacto∣ry refutation thereof; and Gods glory ma∣nifested to have been his prime and principal end.
• * 1.68

  Article 1. Their second Argument; that God had no especial re∣gard to the be∣nefit of Man: and the
• * 1.69

  Fortification thereof by 8 reasons.
• * 1.70

  Article 2. The total re∣d••rgution thereof by a com nonst••āce that t••e benefit and felicity of man, was Gods secondary end: and the impossibility of satisfaction to the first end, by any cre••ture but man, con∣cluded, from his
• * 1.71

  1. Rationality.
• * 1.72

  2. Sermocina∣tion.
• * 1.73

  Article 3. Lucretius his 8 reasons subver∣ted, particu∣larly.
• * 1.74

  1.
• * 1.75

  2.
• * 1.76

  3.
• * 1.77

  4.
• * 1.78

  5.
• * 1.79

  6.
• * 1.80

  7.
• * 1.81

  8.
• * 1.82

  Article 1. The Authors reasons for his present adhe∣rence to the common dis∣crimination of Providence from Creation.
• * 1.83

  Article 2. The Definiti∣on and received Division of di∣vine Provl∣dence.
• * 1.84

  Article 3. A short list of the principal ethnick Physio∣logists, who, in order to thei•• propagation of Atheism, have attempted the eradication of this magisterial verity of divine Providence: & a gentle cure of S. Hieroms wound, caused by his venial lapse from the same.
• * 1.85

  Article 4. The Atheists first Argument against univer∣sal Providence, with the absurd and malicious comment of Lucretius there∣upon.
• * 1.86

  Article 5. Their second Argument: and its convenient dissection into two parts, viz.
• * 1.87

  1. The irregulari∣ty of contin∣gencies: and
• * 1.88

  2. The unequal or injust di∣stribution of good and evill.
• * 1.89

  Article 1. That the No∣tion of general Providence is Proleptical; in∣ferred from the universality of its reception.
• * 1.90

  Article 2. From the mis∣placed devoti∣on of Idolaters.
• * 1.91

  Article 3. From the con∣fession of most Philosophers of the bighest form; as of
• * 1.92

  1. Ecphantus.
• * 1.93

  2. Plato.
• * 1.94

  3. Aristotle.
• * 1.95

  4. The Stoicks.
• * 1.96

  5. The Acade∣micks and Scepticks.
• * 1.97

  Article 4. A review of the induction: and the Argu∣ment found to be Apodictical on one side; and on the other only per∣swasive.
• * 1.98

  Article 1. Gods General Providence de∣monstrated by the Idea of his Nature re∣flected on our thoughts.
• * 1.99

  Article 2. The same par∣ticularly sup∣ported by that trinity of Attri∣butes, viz. his
• * 1.100

  1. Infinite Wisdome.
• * 1.101

  2. Infinite Power.
• * 1.102

  3. Infinite Goodness.
• * 1.103

  Article 3. The necessity of the worlds gubernation, by the indesi∣nent influ∣ence of Gods general Provi∣dence, demon∣strated from the considera∣tion of the ab∣solute and total dependence of all Second Causes upon the First.
• * 1.104

  Article 4. The vastity of the world: the infinite variety of its parts: and the irre∣concileable discord of ma∣ny natures: do∣monstrate as much.
• * 1.105

  Article 5. U••d••r what re∣striction we are to understand that tropology of some Her∣metical Philo∣soph••rs, Deum esse Animam Mund••.
• * 1.106

  Article 6. The Atheists subterfuges of Nature and Fortune, prae∣cluded.
• * 1.107

  Article 1. The Atheists first Antiprovi∣dential Argu∣ment refuted, by the Perfection of the Divine Nature: and their absurdity, in commensurating the excellen∣ties of God, by the infinitely inferlor Faculties of man, detected.
• * 1.108

  Article 2. Divinity de∣monstrated su∣perior to the circumscripti∣on both of Time and Place.
• * 1.109

  Article 3. That the pro∣curation of all the infinitely various actions of second cau∣ses, in the World, cannot be any inter∣turbation of God•• serene fe∣licity, proved by an Argu∣ment à minori.
• * 1.110

  Article 4. The same il∣lustrated by a second com∣parison.
• * 1.111

  Article 5. Th••t the admi∣nistration of petty occur∣rences can be no indignity or d••s••aragement to the sacred Majesty of God; but, on the contrary absolutely essen∣tiall to him, firmly evicted, from the uni∣versality of his Cognition and Presence.
• * 1.112

  Article 1. The first di∣vision of the Atheists second objection; viz. that the appa∣rent irregulari∣ty of events doth justifie their non-praedestina∣tion or meer contingency; strongly con∣velled: and that to the prae∣ordination of divinity no∣thing can be casual; clearly common∣strated.
• * 1.113

  Article 2. The Authors Antithesis, that all Natural A∣gents are under the strict laws of their distinct species.
• * 1.114

  Article 3. A second Coun∣terposition, that those laws were instituted and sancited by an infinite wisdom.
• * 1.115

  Article 4. A third, that the legislator hath reserved to himself a praerogative power to alter, transcend, invert, or repeal the laws of Nature.
• * 1.116

  Article 5. The verity of the first and second Positi∣ons, amply de∣monstrated.
• * 1.117

  Article 6. The verity of the third Posi∣tion demon∣strated.
• * 1.118

  Article 7. A farther con∣firmation of the same by an Argument, from the mi∣raculous opera∣tions of God in praeterito.
• * 1.119

  Article 8. That there was an universal Deluge.
• * 1.120

  Article 9. The Cessation of Satans Ora∣cles, after the advent of the Word of Truth, proved anthentiquely.
• * 1.121

  Article 10. That there was a prodigious Eclips of the Sun, at the pas∣sion of our Sa∣viour.
• * 1.122

  Article 11. A Demonstrati∣on of the im∣possibility of the Catholique Deluges pro∣ceeding from Causes Natural.
• * 1.123

  Article 12. That the Cessa∣tion of Pagan Oracles, upon the incarnation of God, was an effect meerly supernatural; comprobated uncontrollably,
• * 1.124

  Article 13. That the Eclips of the Sun, at the death of Christ, was purely Meta∣physical, irrefu∣tably demon∣strated.
• * 1.125

  Article 14. The Adequa∣tion of all to the verification of the Authors third Position.
• * 1.126

  Article 1. Lucretius his blasphemy, that mans igno∣rance of the energy of Na∣tural Causes, is the sole basis of the opinion of an Universal Providence.
• * 1.127

  Article 2. The redargut••∣on thereof.
• * 1.128

  Article 3. Magnanimity the proper ef∣fect of Reli∣gion.
• * 1.129

  Article 4. The opinion of a General Providence, consistent with Physiology.
• * 1.130

  Article 5. Lucretius his scruples con∣cerning the seemingly te∣merarious ef∣fects of the Thunderbolt; singularly re∣solved.
• * 1.131

  Article 1. The intro∣duction, inti∣mating the neer cognation be∣twixt this pre∣sent, and the precedent Theme: and the necessity of the Authors beginning at the Atheists Objections.
• * 1.132

  Ab 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quod a∣grum laetum foe∣cundumque reddat.
• * 1.133

  Article 2. The first ob∣jection, desu∣med from the Apathie of the Divine Nature.
• * 1.134

  Article 3. The same ex∣cogitated by Epicurus: and promoted by Lucretius.
• * 1.135

  Article 4. The second objection, ex∣torted from mant being ob∣noxious to the hostility of ma∣ny other Na∣ture.
• * 1.136

  Article 5. The last ob∣jection, of the Adversity of the Pious and Prosperity of the Imptous, in this life.
• * 1.137

  Article 6. The sporadical diffusion there∣of upon Eth∣nicks, Hebrews and Christians: and the proba∣bility of their opinion, who hold the book of Job, to be a Treatise con∣cerning the same subject, insinuated,
• * 1.138

  Lib. 1. in Rufinum, subinit.
• * 1.139

  Article 1. That man is the sole object of Gods special Providence, a••∣gued from hence; that he is the principal object of his (••xtrins••cal) 〈◊〉〈◊〉: and that inferred ••••om hence, (1) that God hath impressed upon the mind of man a grea∣ter knowledg of his Divinity, then upon any other Crea∣ture, Angels only excluded: (2) that man is only qualisied to speculate, ad∣mire, and laud the pulchritude of Nature.
• * 1.140

  Article 2. That the soul of man con∣tains a prolep∣tical notion of Gods special Providence.
• * 1.141

  Article 3. That this pro∣leptical notion is the basis of Religion.
• * 1.142

  Article 4. That Man brings into the world with him, an irre∣sistible propen∣sion to Reli∣gion.
• * 1.143

  Article 5. An objection, that the Cala••ci were absolute Atheists, resu∣ted.
• * 1.144

  Article 6. A second ob∣jection, that the Massagetae and Scytbions were devoyd of all Religion, prevented▪
• * 1.145

  Article 7. That it is not in the power of man, totally to ••••dicate this plant of Religion, or notion of spe∣cial Provi∣dence Divine, ••ut of his minde; evinced from hence, that the most contumacious Atheists have, at some time or other, acknow∣ledged it: as
• * 1.146

  Article 8. Pharaoh.
• * 1.147

  Article 9. Herod Agrippa.
• * 1.148

  Article 10. Antiochus Epi∣phanes.
• * 1.149

  Article 11. Maximinus.
• * 1.150

  Article 12. Julian Apo∣stata.
• * 1.151

  Article 13. Tullus Hosti∣lius.
• * 1.152

  Iuvenal. Satyr. 13.
• * 1.153

  Article 14. Bion Borysthe∣nites.
• * 1.154

  Article 15. The possibility of the obscura∣tion of the im∣press of special Providence Di∣vine, pro tem∣pore, conceded: and the impos∣sibility of the total Deletion thereof, briefly proved.
• * 1.155

  Article 16. The reduction of all, to a con∣cise and me∣morable de∣monstration; that the occur∣rences of every mans life are the consigna∣tions of special Providence
• * 1.156

  Article 1. The Atheists first objection, confuted: and the Divine Nature de∣monstrated both Irascible and placable, (anthropo pa∣thically.)
• * 1.157

  Article 2. The Atheists scruple, of Gods inauditi∣on of the pray∣ers of good men, or not concession of their petitions; satisfied.
• * 1.158

  Iuven. Sat. 10.
• * 1.159

  Article 3. The Atheists second Argu∣ment against Special Provi∣dence divine, dissolved: and the necessitie of Objects ho∣stile, and dele∣terious to the life of man, de∣monstrated.
• * 1.160

  Article 4. The same illu∣strated, by a correspondent Simile.
• * 1.161

  Article 5. The Atheists last and grand objection, of the prosperity of the Vitious, and adversity of the Virtu∣ous, red argued: and the nature of the Goods of Fortune pro∣founded.
• * 1.162

  Article 6. The Reason, wherefore Di∣vine Provi∣dence consers Good things on Evil men.
• * 1.163

  Article 7. Those apparent Evils, which Providence Di∣vine consignes to Virtuous men, anatomi∣zed; and found to be real Goods intrinsecally.
• * 1.164

  Article 8. The Authors Sanctuary wherein he se∣cured his mind from discon∣tent, in all those stormes of Calamities, which our late Civil war showred upon him.
• * 1.165

  Article 9. V••••t••e, a meer c••••m••ra, with∣out the occu••ssi∣on of those things, which S••nsuality calls 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.166

  Article 10. The Sense, no competent Cri∣terion of the Good or Evil of the mind.
• * 1.167

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Bias.
• * 1.168

  Article 11. The A••heists objection, that God ought, in justice, always to preserve Good men from suffering Evil; expunged.
• * 1.169

  Article 12. The Summum bonum of this life, consistent in a full consor∣mity of our wills to the Divine will.
• * 1.170

  Article 13. An excellent meditation of Marcus Antoni∣nus, concerning the Good and Evil occurrent to man in this life.
• * 1.171

  Article 1. The Affinity of this Theo∣rem to the pre∣cedent, intima∣ted: and the necessary divi∣sion thereof into a specifical and individual consideration.
• * 1.172

  Article 2. The reasons of the Authors concise tracta∣tion of the first part.
• * 1.173

  Article 3. The moderatiō of Death by Special Provi∣dence Divine, a••gued from the impossibili∣ty of the mo∣deration there∣of by any other power.
• * 1.174

  Article 4. The same de∣monstrated, from the ne∣cessary depen∣dence of all natural motion in its begin∣ning, continua∣tion, and peri∣od, on the will of the First ••over.
• * 1.175

  Article 1. A transient dis∣covery of the almost insupe∣rable Difficul∣ties to be en∣countred in the worthy and sa∣tisfactory solu∣tion of this problem, whe∣ther the Term of mans life be Moveable, or Fatal; premised by way of Apo∣logy for the Authors une∣qual judgemēt: and his purpose of taking a mi∣dle way be∣tween the ab∣solute Fatality of the Stoick, and the meer Fortune of the ••picuream.
• * 1.176

  Article 2. Two praevious considerable, necessary to the ••ight under∣standing and cons••quent discussion of the question.
• * 1.177

  Article 3. The necessary relation of all Causes both of life and death, to three Gene∣rall heads, viz. Necessary, For∣tuitous, Super∣natural; sup∣ports the discri∣mination of the Term of life in∣to Supernatu∣ral, Natural, & Accidentary: & the imperti∣nency of the consideration of the Super∣natural Term, to the present scope.
• * 1.178

  Article 4. The proper import of the Natural Term of mans life: and also of the Accidental.
• * 1.179

  Article 5. The result of our acceptati∣on of the Term of life, in the first significa∣tion.
• * 1.180

  Article 6. The conse∣quence of our understanding the Term of life, in the se∣cond significa∣tion.
• * 1.181

  Article 7. The Fixation of the Term of life, acceptable in a double in∣terest; viz. (1) in respect to some Abso∣lute Divine De∣cree, precedent even to Gods Prescience of al Secondary or instrumental Causes: (2) to some Hypothe∣tical Divine Decree, whose mut••bility is suspended on the liberty of mans Will. And the indif∣ferency of either branch of the distinction to our instant de∣signe.
• * 1.182

  Article 8. Three diffe∣rent opinions vulgarly ex∣tracted from the precedent Distinction.
• * 1.183

  Article 9. The conveni∣ent reduction of them to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 only.
• * 1.184

  Article 10. The First opi∣nion declared; and the princi∣pal Abettors thereof men∣tioned.
• * 1.185

  Article 11. The Stoical Fate; and the Calvinists Pre∣destination, fully defined.
• * 1.186

  Article 12. A full and c••••ar discrimi∣nation of the Stoical, from the Theologi∣cal Fate.
• * 1.187

  Article 13. A list of the execrable Ab∣surdities im∣pendent on the opinion of Ab∣lute Fatality; so accepted, as the Stoick pro∣poseth it.
• * 1.188

  Article 1. The Authors adhesion to the Second opinion, justified by two important rea∣sons.
• * 1.189

  1.
• * 1.190

  2.
• * 1.191

  Article 2. The great ob∣scurity, & small validity of some Texts of holy writ, alleged by the Defen∣dants of Fata∣lity to warrant their opinion, detected.
• * 1.192

  Article 3. The Natural Causes (proxi∣me) of the Lon∣gitude and Bre∣vity of mans life: and the Authors pri∣vate conjectu••e of the cause of Longevity in the first age of the world.
• * 1.193

  Article 4. The Injustice of our Adversa∣rie, title of pa∣tronage from the foremen∣tioned text of Job, further manifested.
• * 1.194

  Article 5. Seven testimo∣nies, out of ho∣ly writ, suppor∣ting the mobi∣lity of the Term of mans life, in indivi∣duo.
• * 1.195

  Article 6. A full vindica∣tion of the Fourth Testimo∣ny, from the se∣veral Exceptions made against the appropria∣tion thereof to our scope, by the patrons of Fatality.
• * 1.196

  Article 7. The second Testimony vin∣dicated from several Excep∣tions.
• * 1.197

  Article 8. The sixth Testi∣mony cleared from 4. Excep∣tions.
• * 1.198

  Article 1. The necessity of our enquiry into the myste∣ry of Predesti∣nation, in or∣der to the solu∣tion of the pre∣sent difficulty: and the Fatists grand Argu∣ment.
• * 1.199

  Article 2. The refutation thereof, by the conciliation of the infallibility of Gods Prae∣notion, to the indeterminati∣on of mans free will to the actu∣al election of Good or Evil.
• * 1.200

  Article 3. The diamet••al Disparlty be∣tween that Di∣vine Praenotion which is an∣tecedent to Di∣vine Praeordina∣tion; and that which is subse∣quent; amply declared.
• * 1.201

  Article 4. A second illu∣stration of the same difference by a pertinent Instance, or ex∣••mplification.
• * 1.202

  Article 5. A third illu∣stration of the same Diffe∣rence, by con∣ceiving the Di∣vine Decrees, in the same subor∣dinate scries, which the Fa∣tists have ima∣gined.
• * 1.203

  Article 6. The first Ab∣surdity impen∣dent on the o∣pinion of a De∣cretory Presci∣ence of God, as to the Actions of man.
• * 1.204

  Article 7. A Second Ab∣surdity con∣nected to the same.
• * 1.205

  Article 8. Two Subterfu∣ges of the Fa∣tists; Precluded.
• * 1.206

  Article 9. A third Absui∣dity inseparable from the hy∣pothesis of a Decretory Pre∣science Divine.
• * 1.207

  Article 10. The reduction of the whole dissertation to 4 Conclusions, genuinely ex∣tracted from the Premises.
• * 1.208

  Article 1, The Parity of Absurdities re∣sulting from those two An∣tagonistical Hypotheses, of Absolute Fa∣tality, and meer Contingency; as to the Actions of man.
• * 1.209

  Article 2. Those 2 con∣trarie streams found to have bin derived from one and the same poyso∣nous Fountain; viz. a subter∣suge of man to evade Culpa∣bility.
• * 1.210

  Article 3. The Authors In••i••ments, here to enquire profoundly in∣to the Natures of Free-will, Fortune, and Fate
• * 1.211

  Article 4. What is inten∣ded properly by the Liberty of mans Will.
• * 1.212

  Article 5. The several subordinate Actions of the Mind, exercised about its ob∣jects: and the respective scholastick Terms, by which Philoso∣phers have ad∣aequately ex∣pressed them.
• * 1.213

  Article 1. The Essence of mans Liberty Elective, consi∣stent primarily in the Indiffe∣rency of the Intellect; and in the Will on∣ly dependently.
• * 1.214

  Article 2. An egregious Error of some Divines, that the Liberty of the Will doth consummate ly consist in its immoveable Fixation on re∣al Good.
• * 1.215

  Article 3. Their inadver∣tency of the real Difference between a Spontaneous, & Arbitrary acti∣on; the occasi∣on of that Error.
• * 1.216

  Article 4. That a Sponta∣neous action, and an indeli∣berate Impulse of Nature, are homologous or identical.
• * 1.217

  Article 5. The Divines objection, that the Tendency of the Will is Volent, and therefore Free; praevented, by a distinction of Libency and Liberty.
• * 1.218

  Article 6. Their S••per∣structure, that the Pe••fection of the Wills Liberty, is its constant Ad∣haesion to, and inseparability from real Good demolished by two reasons: (1) that this Perfection imagined is not of the Li∣berty, but the Will it self; (2) that it be∣longs only to separated Souls, in the state of Glorification.
• * 1.219

  Article 7. What kind of Indifferency that is, wherein the Liberty Ele∣ctive is e••••••n∣ced.
• * 1.220

  Article 8. That to every Judgement of the Intellect, is immediately and necessarily conjoyned an Appetition or Aversation of the Will; re∣spective to the Good, or Evil nunciated.
• * 1.221

  Article 9. The Instability of the Will, in its Appetitions; necessarily caused by the Instability of the Intellect, in its Judge∣ments.
• * 1.222

  Article 10. The Delusion of the Intellect, in its Judgements; necessitateth the Delusion of the Will in its dependent Ap∣petitions.
• * 1.223

  Article 11. That the In∣differency of the Will, is but the shadow, or re∣presentative of that Indiffe∣rency in the Intellect: and the Determina∣tion of this, ne∣cessitates the Determination of that.
• * 1.224

  Article 12. The Analogie betwixt the Intellect, and a Balance.
• * 1.225

  Article 13. That the Intel∣lect doth natu∣rally conform to the attracti∣on of the grea∣ter Verisimility: and the reason of its Fluctua∣tion.
• * 1.226

  Article 14. That the Deter∣mination of the Intellect to one or two objects, is caused either by the more ponderous Ap∣parence of Ve∣rity therein, or the minds greater Attenti∣on to the mo∣ments of rea∣son apparent on that side, then to those on the other.
• * 1.227

  Article 15. That the Ap∣parence of Truth is always the ca••se of the In∣tellects incli∣nation.
• * 1.228

  Article 16. Three conside∣rable Inferences from the prae∣mises.
• * 1.229

  Article 17. Cartesius his general Prae∣servative a∣gainst the ex∣cesses of Pas∣sions.
• * 1.230

  Article 18. General Rules praescribed by the Author, how to praevent the Delusion of the Ʋnderstan∣ding, and de∣pendent sedu∣ction of the will by Evil disgui∣fed under the similitude of Good.
• * 1.231

  Article 1. An objection, that Ignorance is the mother of sin.
• * 1.232

  Article 2. The same ex∣peded, by a Distinction of Science Into Habitual, and Actual.
• * 1.233

  Article 3. A reply, that the reluctancy of every Delin∣quents Consci∣ence, doth evi∣dence the pos∣sibility of mans doing an Act repugnant to his Actual Science.
• * 1.234

  Article 4. The Rejoynder, that the Habi∣tual Science of every Delin∣quent, is per∣tu••bed and ob∣nubilated by some Passion, excited in him: and that the Remors of Conscience proceeds from the sense of the Loss of Good.
• * 1.235

  Article 5. What kind of Ignorance that is, which may, in some degree excuse a Delin∣quent.
• * 1.236

  Article 6. ••••ur weighty Reasons, con∣vincing, that man hath an Absolute Power in himself to controll the temptations of Evil.
• * 1.237

  Article 7. What those First Motions are, which ob∣jects inevitably excite in the Mind: and that the Consequences of those moti∣ons are prae∣ventible.
• * 1.238

  Article 8. Necessity, and Fear conceded to be, in some measure, Excu∣ses: and what are the objects of Excusing Fear.
• * 1.239

  Article 1. The Antiquity and Genealogy of Fortune.
• * 1.240

  Article 2. Plato and Arist. their Descripti∣ons of fortune, examined, and illustrated: and 3 Conclusions inferred there∣upon.
• * 1.241

  Article 3. Their Anato∣my of her Na∣ture, desicient: & a more per∣fect one prae∣sented.
• * 1.242

  Article 4. Fortune, no∣thing but a meer Negation of all Praenoti∣on in a Con∣curse of natural Causes, respe∣ctive to a for∣tuitous Event.
• * 1.243

  Article 5. Epicurus com∣mended, for il∣lustrating the instability and uncertainty of Fortune.
• * 1.244

  Article 6. Her Indivinity manifested: & how she came by her Deifica∣tion.
• * 1.245

  Article 7. All sober Phi∣losophers vin∣dicated from the guilt of as∣c••ibing Divinity to Fortune.
• * 1.246

  Article 8. The Necessity and use of Al∣leg••••ical, Sym∣bolical, and Emblematical Traditions, in∣vented by the Ancients.
• * 1.247

  Article 9. Their Descrip∣tions of For∣tune, only Em∣blematical.
• * 1.248

  Article 10. As also the Images of Fortune fra∣med by Pain∣ters, and Sta∣tuaries.
• * 1.249

  Article 11. The review, tolerating the name of For∣tune, in respect to man: but detesting it, in respect to God.
• * 1.250

  Article 1. The conveni∣ent reduction of all opinions, concerning the essence of Fate, to 2. General Heads.
• * 1.251

  Article 2, What the Pla∣tonist and Stoick meant by Fate, considered (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) as a substance.
• * 1.252

  Article 3. And, what (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) as an Energy or Act: together with the e••y∣mological rea∣sons of those sundry Appel∣lations, the Stoicks have imposed upon it.
• * 1.253

  Article 1. The second Classis of Phi∣losophers, who understood Fate to be a Constitution meerly Natural subdivided into 2 distinct Sects: viz. (1) those who assert the Immutability & Inevitability of Fate; (2) those who de∣fend the possi∣bility of its Al∣teration & Eva∣sion.
• * 1.254

  Article 2. The Leaders of the First S••ct, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Leucippus, Par∣menides, and chiefly Demo∣••••itus.
• * 1.255

  Article 3. Democritus just∣ly charged with the patron••ge of Inevitable Fate: and his doctrine con∣cerning it▪ con∣cisely rehearsed.
• * 1.256

  Article 1. The Principal of the Second Sect, Aristotle and Epicurus.
• * 1.257

  Article 2. The Grounds of the Authors imputing the opinion both of Fates Iden∣tity with Na∣ture, and the possibility of its Mutation & Declination, by either Fortuitous or Arbitrary Antagonists, to Aristotle.
• * 1.258

  Article 3. Epicurus una∣nimous to Arist. in the point of Physical and Eluctable Ne∣cessity.
• * 1.259

  Article 4. The scope of Epicurus his Figment of the Declination of Atoms in the human Soul: and his Accom∣modation thereof to the tuition of mans Liberty, epito∣mized.
• * 1.260

  Article 5. An Exception, in the name of Democritus, a∣gainst Epicurus Inference.
• * 1.261

  Article 6. The justifica∣tion thereof, by a Respons con∣forme to the Physiology of Epicurus.
• * 1.262

  lib. 2.
• * 1.263

  Article 7. The most weighty Re∣joynder, (of the oonnexion of those Causes, which Avert the Mind from, so found too light.
• * 1.264

  Article 1. Mathematical Fate briefly described.
• * 1.265

  Article 2. The gross Va∣nity thereof concealed from many Philoso∣phers, only by the cloud of Transcriptive Adbaesion to Antique Tra∣ditions.
• * 1.266

  Rabbi ben Ezra, in ductore dubiorum.
• * 1.267

  Article 3. The Absurdity of Sydereal Ne∣cessity evicted (1) by an Ar∣gument desu∣med from the Hypothetical Necessity of the Matter on which Celestial Impressions are to operate.
• * 1.268

  Respice pag. 143.
• * 1.269

  Article 4. (2) By the common Ex∣periment of the unaequal For∣tunes of Twins.
• * 1.270

  Article 5. (3) By the dou••le Impiety, Inseparable from the belief thereof.
• * 1.271

  Article 1. The intent of the chapter.
• * 1.272

  Article 2. Democritus Fate, inconsi∣stent both to the Funda∣mentals of Re∣ligion, and the Liberty of mans Will: and therefore de∣tested.
• * 1.273

  Article 3. Aristotle and Epicurus their Fate admitted, in that it is Iden••ical to Nature: but abomina••ed, in that it clasheth with the Certi∣tude of Divine Praescience.
• * 1.274

  Article 4. The Platonick and Stoick Fate embraced, so far as it is con∣ceded to be a Constitution of the Divine wis∣dome▪ but aban∣doned, in that it detracts from Divine Omnipotence.
• * 1.275

  Article 5. In what quali∣fied sense Chri∣stianisme may tolerate the use of the term, Fate.
• * 1.276

  Article 1. Fate and For∣tune concilia∣ted, in the point of Pro∣vidence Divine.
• * 1.277

  Article 2. Flu••archs in∣genious Assi∣milation of Fate to the Civil Law: and his de∣sign therein.
• * 1.278

  Article 1. Fate concen∣••••ic••l to mans Elective Liber∣ty, in the point of Praedestina∣tion.
• * 1.279

  Article 2. The Concord betwixt Theolo∣gy and Philoso∣phy, in their ad∣mission of 2. orders of Cau∣ses natural, viz. Necessary, and Free; the ground of the Affinity both betwixt the Difficulties, and and Solutions, on either part: as to the Abo∣lition of the seeming Repug∣nancy between Fate and mans Free-will.
• * 1.280

  Article 3. The First c••∣p••tal Difficulty, desumed from Divine Praesci∣ence; as stated by Divines.
• * 1.281

  Article 4. The same, as stated by Phi∣losophers.
• * 1.282

  Article 5. The full soluti∣on of the same, by virtue of the Div••••s Dis∣crimination of Necessity into Absolute and Hypothetical.
• * 1.283

  Article 6. The Solution of the same by the Philosophers proving that the d••finite Praeno∣tion of future Contingents, is no Cause of their definite Contingency: but, è contrà, the definity of their Futurition, the c••use of their d••finite ••••anotion.
• * 1.284

  Article 7. The Disparity betwixt Divine and Human Praenotion.
• * 1.285

  Article 8. The same exemplified.
• * 1.286

  Article 1. The Second Capital Diffi∣culty, erected upon a sophism called Ignava Ratio; as it re∣specteth both Theology, and Philosophy.
• * 1.287

  Article 2. Two eminent Opinions of Divines touch∣ant the Soluti∣on of this Dif∣ficulty, recog∣nized: and their judicious Mo∣desty, in duely acknowledging the mystery of Praedestination, to be Arcanum Divini imperii, commend••d.
• * 1.288

  Article 3. The First opi∣nion found to∣tally uncapable of Expedi••ion from the So∣phisme, Ignava Ratio.
• * 1.289

  Article 4. The Second Opinion, to a great part, ex∣tricated from the same La∣byrinth.
• * 1.290

  Article 5. The Fatists Subterfuge, of the Infallibility of Divine Praenotion, praecluded.
• * 1.291

  Article 6. A second sub∣terfuge of the Fatist, viz. that the Subsequence of the Decree to Praenotion, doth implicate the possibility of its Elusion and Mutability; praevented.
• * 1.292

  Article 7. A third Con∣clusion, viz that the posteriority of the Decree of Election to Gods praevision of mans future Good actions, doth make man the Author of his own Discretion▪ detected and redargued.
• * 1.293

  Article 8. Two Extracts from the prae∣mises; (1) that the Coopera∣tion of mans Will to suffici∣ent Grace, may be conceived a Cause of his Election▪ (2) that to render a reason, why God did not constitute All men such, as that All should cooperate to sufficient Grace and so be Elect; is an impossi∣bility to mans understanding; other then this, that such was his eternal Will.
• * 1.294

  Article 9. The former Sophisme, (ig∣nava Ratio) in part dissolved, by Plutarchs Distinction; that though All effects are com∣pr••hended in, yet all are not caused by Fate.
• * 1.295

  Article 10. The insuffici∣ency of that D••stinction, to the total solu∣tion of the Dif∣ficulty, duely acknowledged.
• * 1.296

  Article 11. The most pro∣mising Respon∣ses of some Phi∣losophers, con∣cisely praesen∣ted: viz. of
• * 1.297

  1. Plato.
• * 1.298

  2. Seneca.
• * 1.299

  3. Chrysippus▪
• * 1.300

  4. Aquinas.
• * 1.301

  Article 12. These acute Re∣sponses aequita∣bly audited, & their import found to be no more then this; that man hath a Freedom of As∣sent, but not of Dissent to the Will of God.
• * 1.302

  Article 13. A Dehortation from immode∣rate Curiosity, in Divine My∣steries: and concise Adhor∣tation to con∣form unto, and calmly acqui∣esce in the Re∣vealed Will of God.