The darknes of atheism dispelled by the light of nature a physico-theologicall treatise / written by Walter Charleton ...

THE CONTENTS, SERIES, AND ORDER OF THE WHOLE BOOK.

• CHAP. I. The Existence of God demonstra∣ted. page 1.
  • ...SECT. I.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. ARistotle, the most Knowing and cu∣rious Ethnick, did yet, by his silence in the cardinal point of Theology, proclaim the impossibility of mans full understanding the simple and perfect Essence of God. p. 1.
    • 2. The Hebrews intimated so much, in the im∣moderate Veneration enjoyned towards his Name Jehovah. p. 3.
    • 3. The clearer sighted Christian also can per∣ceive no more of the Divine Nature, then what is shadowed in its Attributes. ibid.
    • 4. And therefore the Author restrains the Rea∣ders expectation only to a Demonstration of the Existence of God, in this chap. sub∣necting a short scheme of his praesent De∣sign and Method. p. 4.
  • ...SECT. II.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. THe Mind of man can have no cogni∣tion of the Nature of its Objects, but by the mediation of their proper Ideas. p. 5.
    • 2. Those Ideas are (1) Innate (2) Adventiti∣ous (3) Imaginary. p. 6.
    • 3. A strict enquiry, whether the Ideas of ob∣jects existent without our selves, hold an exact simlitude to their Natures. ibid.
    • 4. A second Disquisition, whether any of those things, whose Ideas are found in the mind of man, have any existence without it? p. 8.
    • 5. A firm induction, that its impossible for any Idea to import or comprehend more of per∣fection, then its prototype, or Cause. p. 10.
    • 6. And therefore, if any Idea contain more of perfection, then can be sound in our minds •• certainly our minds cannot be the Efficient of that Idea. ibid.
    • 7. The diversity of Ideas, respective to the di∣versity of Entities. ibid.
    • 8. The possible originals of each sort severely examined, and all sound desumable from our selves; the Idea of God only excepted. p. 11.
    • 9. The Idea of God, here described, cannot be either formally, or materially false, but the most clear, distinct and true of all others. p. 13.
    • 10. A declarement of the impossibility of the divine Ideas desumption either from our selves. p. 15.
    • 11. Or from some other cause less perfect then God. p. 18.
    • 12. Or from our Parents. p. 19.
    • 13. The concernment of all; or a conclusion that the Idea of the divine nature is innate and congenial to the mind of man. p. 20.
    • 14. An abstract, or Anacephalaeosis of the whole demonstration. p. 21.
  • ...

• ...
  • SECT. III.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. THe importance of the term, Cogitation. p. 21.
    • 2. Of an Idea. ibid.
    • 3. Of the objective reality of an Idea. p. 22.
    • 4. Of the ••o••mal, and eminent being of Attri∣butes in the objects of Ideas. ibid.
    • ••. Of a substance. ibid.
    • 6. Of the word, Mind. ibid.
    • 7. Of a Body. p. 23.
    • 8. Of the real distinction of two substances. ibid.
    • 9. Of the substance supremely perfect. ibid.
  • SECT. IV.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. OBject. 1. That the mind of man, being sinite, cannot extend to the clear and distinct intellection of an Infinite, quatenus an Insinite: and the Solution thereof by three distinctions. p. 23.
    • 2. Object. 2. That the Idea of the divine na∣ture, resident in the mind os man is a meer Ens rationis: and the Solut: p. 27.
    • 3. Object. 3. That an effect may have more os reality, or pers••ction th••n its Cause: and the Solut: p. 27.
    • 4. Object. 4. That the existence of such an ex∣cellent Idea, as hath been described of the Divine Nature doth not necessitate the exi∣stence of an Entity, in all points respondent, or superior thereto: because of the possible composing such an Idea, out of our colle∣ctions from sensible objects: p. 29. And the ample Solut: p. 31.
    • 5. Object. 5. That the Idea conceived of God, is capable of Augmentation and diminu∣tion: and the clear Solut: p. 32.
    • 6. Many scruples, concerning the finality, man∣ner, and form of the Idea imprcst; as also concernining the seeming Heterogeneity, or Alterily between the essence of the mind and that of the Idea: particularly satisfied. p. 33.
• CHAP. II. That God created the world ex nihilo, proved by Arguments Apodictical. page 39.
  • ...SECT. I.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. THe ins••parability, or (rather) identity of God, and Creator. b. 39.
    • 2. The two respects, which inclined the Author to amore a m••le comprob••tion of the first Article of our Christian creed; together with a dielenchical explosion of that antiqua∣tated delusion, that the Ʋniverse was au∣tocthenous in its original, or constructed meerly by Chance. ibid.
    • 3. The summary of Empedocles, Leucippus, Epicurns, Democritus, & c. doctrine•• of the worlds spontaneous result from a Chaos of Atoms. p. 40.
    • 4. A Digression, winnowing the Chaffe from the Wheat concealed in the former theory of Epicurns, and by the Corollary of some ca∣stigations, restrictions and additions, decla∣ring the great advantages, that this Hypo∣thesis of Atoms hath beyond any other con∣cerning the Material Principle of all Bo∣dies, as yet excogitated. p. 43.
  • ...SECT II.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. THe conceit of the Worlds fortuitous pro∣duction, disparaged by a praepollency even of Pagan Auctority, that profoundly asserted the contrary, viz. of
    • 2. Thales Milesius. p. 47, 48.
    • 3. Anaxagoras. ibid.
    • 4. Pythagoras and Plato. ibid.
    • 5. The Stoicks. p. 49.
    • 6. Aristotle. ibid.
  • ...SECT. III.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. THe pretext of Fortune destroyed, by the constancy of Nature in her act

• ...
  • ...
    • of specification, (i. e.) the restraint and determination of the semnalties of Animals to the procreation of their like in specie: and the Atheists objection, of fiequent A∣nomalous and Heteroplasmical, or monstrous Productions, dissolved. p. 53.
    • 2. The necessity of the Worlds Creation by an Agent infinite in Science and Power, proclai∣med by the constant Ʋniformity of Nature, in her perpectuation of Vegetables. p. 56.
    • 3. The Sun convincively demonstrates the infi∣nite wisdome of its Creator, by 3. Argu∣ments: viz. 1. The universal convenience of its situation in its proper orb. p. 57. 2. The appointment of its continual Circ um∣gyration. p. 58. 3. The contrivement of its oblique motion along the line Ecliptick. p. 59.
    • 4. The impresses of an infinite Intelligence, plainly legible in the fronts even of Subterra∣neous Inanimates. p. 60.
    • 5. The impossibility of the worlds Creation by any Agent but God, illustrated both by the Magnitude, and Pulchritude thereof: and the Epicureans dream, of a motive faculty eternally inherent in Atoms, derided. p. 61.
    • 6. The Epicureans grand Argument, of the possibility of the consiguration of the Ʋni∣verse by a casual and spontaneous disposition of Atoms, from the frequent actuall produ∣ction of an Iusect by the same means or prin∣ciples; countermined by an inversion or Ar∣gument à majori ad minus. p. 65.
    • 7. An exception against the seeming disparity betwixt their inserence and ours, prevented: and the invalidity of theirs, though their own hypothesis were conceded in terminis, decla∣red by an adaequate similitude. p. 67.
    • 8. The conclusion of this section; or, the aequi∣pondium of the praecedent reasons, if perpen∣ded in the mass and conjunctively, to the most perfect demonstration. p. 68.
  • ...SECT. IV.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. THat Antique absurd expostulation, who•• Instruments Auxiliants, materials predisposed, God made use of, in his act of Fabrication of the Ʋniverse, copiously satis∣fied: and the energie of the Divine Will commonstrated superior to the indigence of either. p. 69.
    • 2. A second immodest interrogation, wherefore God so long deferred the creation, resolved: with a detection of the unreasonableness of undecent curiosity. p. 73.
• CHAP. III. Why God Created the World. Page 77.
  • ...SECT. I.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. THe improbability of the worlds creation by God, insinuated, by the Atheists, from his defect of any possible Motive, scope, or final cause. p. 71.
    • 2. Their first Argument, that the divine Nature is above the capacity of either emolument or delectation, from the Ʋniverse. p 78.
    • 3. The satisfactory resutation thereof; and Gods glory manifested to have been his prime and principal end. p. 79.
  • ...SECT. II.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. THeir second Argument; that God had no especial regard to the benefit of Man: and the Fortification thereof by 8 reasons. p. 82.
    • 2. The total redargution thereof by a common∣strance that the benefit and felicity of man, was Gods secondary end: and the impos∣sibility of satisfaction to the first end, by any creature but man, concluded, from his

      1. Rationality.	p. 86.
      2. Sermocination.	p. 88.

    • ...

• ...
  • ...
    • ... 3. Lucretius his 8. reasons subverted, particu∣larly. p. 90.
• CHAP. IV. The General Providence of God Demonstrated. page 94.
  • ...SECT. I.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. THe Authors reasons for his praesent ad∣herence to the common discrimination of Providence from Creation. p. 94.
    • 2. The Definition and received Division of di∣vine Providence. p. 95.
    • 3. A short list of the principal ethnick Physiolo∣gists, who, in order to their propagation of Atheism, have attempted the eradication of this magisterial verity of divine Providence: and a gentle cure of S. Hieroms wound, caused by his venial lapse from the same. ibid.
    • 4. The Atheists first Argument against univer∣sal Providence, with the absurd and mali∣cious comment of Lucretius thereupon. p. 97.
    • 5. Their second Argument: and its conve∣nient dissection into two parts, viz.

      1. The irregularity of contingencies:	p. 99.
      2. The unequal or unjust distribution of good and evil.	p. 101.

  • ...SECT. II.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. That the Notion of General Providence is Proleptical; inferred from the umversality of its recepeption. p. 102.
    • 2. From the misplaced devotion of Idolaters. ibid.
    • 3. From the confession of most Philosophers of the highest forme; as of

      1. Ecphantus.	p. 103
      2. Plato.	ibid.
      3. Aristotle.	ibid.
      4. The Stoicks.	p. 104.
      5. The Academicks and Scepticks.	ibid.

    • 4. A review of the induction: and the Argu∣ment found to be Apodictical on one side; and on the other only perswasive. p. 105.
  • ...SECT. III.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. GOds General Providence demonstrated by the Idea of his Nature reflected on our thoughts. p. 107.
    • 2. The same particularly supported by that tri∣nity of Attributes, viz. his

      1. Infinite Wisdome.	p. 109.
      2. Infinite Power.	ibid.
      3. Infinite Goodness.	p. 110.

    • 3. The necessity of the worlds gubernation, by the indefinent influence of Gods general Providence, demonstrated from the conside∣ration of the absolute and total dependence of all Second Causes upon the First. p. 111.
    • 4. The vastity of the world: the infinite varie∣ty of its parts: and the irreconcileable discord of many natures, demonstrate as much. p. 113.
    • 5. Ʋnder what restriction we are to understand that tropology of some Hermetical Philoso∣phers, Deum esse Animam Mundi. p. 114.
    • 6. The Atheists subterfuges of Nature and Fortune praecluded. p. 116.
  • ...SECT. IV.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. THe Atheists first Antiprovidential Ar∣gument refuted, by the Perfection of the Divine Nature: and their absurdity, in commensurating the excellencies of God, by the infinitely inferior Faculties of man, detected. ibid.
    • 2. Divinity demonstrated superior to the circum∣scription both of Time and Place. p. 118.
    • 3. That the procuration of all the infinitely vari∣ous actions of second causes, in the World, can∣not be any interturbation of Gods serene feli∣city, proved by an Argument à minori. p. 119.
    • 4. The same illustrated by a second comparison. p. 120.
    • 5. That the administration of petty occurrences can be no indignity or disparagement to the sacred Majesty of God; but, on the Contra∣ry, absolutely essential to him, firmly evicted, from the universality of his Cognition and Presence. p. 121.
  • ...

• ...
  • ... SECT. V.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. THe first division of the Atheists second objection; viz. that the apparent irregularity of events doth justisie their non-praedestination or meer Contingency; strongly convelled: and that to the praeordi∣nation of Divinity nothing can be casual; clearly commonstrated. p. 124.
    • 2. The Authors Antithesis, that all Natural Agents are under the strict laws of their distinct species. p. 129.
    • 3. A second Counterposition, that those laws were instituted and sancited by an infinite wisdome. ibid.
    • 4. A third, that the legislator hath reserved to himself a praerogative power to alter, tran∣scend, invert, or repeal the laws of Nature. ibid.
    • 5. The verity of the first and second Positions, amply demonstrated. p. 130.
    • 6. The verity of the third Position demonstra∣ted. p. 136.
    • 7. A farther confirmation of the same by an Argument, from the miraculous operations of God in praeterito. p. 137.
    • 8. That there was an universal Deluge. p. 138.
    • 9. The Cessation of Satans Oracles, after the advent of the Word of Truth, proved authen∣tiquely. ibid.
    • 10. That there was a prodigious Eclips of the Sun, at the passion of our Saviour. p. 140.
    • 11. A Demonstration of the impossibility of the Catholique Deluges proceeding from Causes Natural. p. 141.
    • 12. That the Cessation of Pagan Oracles, upon the incarnation of God, was an effect meer∣ly fupernatural; comprobated uncontrollably. p. 146.
    • 13. That the Eclips of the Sun, at the death of Christ, was purely Metaphysical, irrefu∣tably demonstrated. p. 149.
    • 14. The Adaequatien of all to the verification of the Authors third Position. p. 152.
  • SECT. VI.
    • ARTIC.
    • 1. LUcretius his blasphemy, that mans ig∣norance of the energy of Natural Causes, is the sole basis of the opinion of an Universal Providence. p. 152.
    • 2. The redargution thereof. p. 153.
    • 3. Magnanimity the proper effect of Religion. p. 154.
    • 4. The opinion, of a General Providence, consistent with Physiology. p. 155.
    • 5. Lucretius his scruples concerning the seem∣ingly temerarious effects of the Thunder∣bolt; singularly resolved. ibid.
• CHAP. V. The especial Providence of God Demonstrated. page 157.
  • SECT I.
    • ARTIC.
    • 1. THe introduction, intimating the neer cognation betwixt this present, and the precedent Theme: and the necessity of the Authors beginning at the Atheists Ob∣jections. p. 157.
    • 2. The first objection, desumed from the Apathie of the Divine Nature. p. 158.
    • 3. The same excogitated by Epicurus: and promoted by Lucretius. ibid.
    • 4. The second objection, extorted from mans being obnoxious to the hostility of many other Natures. p. 159.
    • 5. The last objection, of the Adversity of the Pious and Prosperity of the Impious, in this life. p. 160.
    • 6. The sporadical diffusion thereof upon Eth∣nicks, Hebrews and Christians: and the probability of their opinion, who hold the book of Job, to be a Treatise concerning the same subject, insinuated. p. 16••.
  • ...

• ...
  • ... SECT. II.
    • ARTIC.
    • 1. THat man is the sole object of Gods spe∣cial Providence, argued from hence; that he is the principal object of his (extrin∣secal) love: and that inferred from hence, (1) that God hath impressed upon the mind of man a greater knowledge of his Divinity, then upon any other Creature, Angels only excluded: (2) that man is only qualified to speculate, admire, and laud the pulchritude of Nature. p. 166.
    • 2. That the soul of man contains a proleptical notion of Gods special Providence. p. 170.
    • 3. That this proleptical notion is the basis of Religion. ibid.
    • 4. That Man brings into the world with him, an irresistible propension to Religion. p. 172.
    • 5. An objection, that the Calaici were absolute Atheists, refuted. p. 173.
    • 6. A second objection, that the Massagetae and Scythians were devoyd of all Religion, prevented. ibid.
    • 7. That it is not in the power of man, totally to cradicate this plant of Religion, or notion of special Providence Divine, out of his mind; evinced from hence, that the most contuma∣tious Atheists have, at some time or other, acknowledged it: as, p. 174.
    • 8. Pharaoh. ibid.
    • 9. Herod Agrippa. p. 175.
    • 10. Antiochus Epiphanes. ibid.
    • 11. Maximinus. p. 176.
    • 12. Julian Apostata. p. 177.
    • 13. Tullus Hostilius. ibid.
    • 14. Bion Borysthenites. p. 178.
    • 15. The possibility of the obscuration of the im∣press of special Providence Divine, pro tem∣pore, conceded: and the impossibility of the total Deletion thereof, briefly proved. p. 179.
    • 16. The reduction of all, to a concise and me∣morable demonstration; that the occurrences of every mans life are the consignations of special Providence. p. 180.
  • SECT. III.
    • ARTIC.
    • 1. THe Atheists first objection, confuted: and the Divine Nature demonstrated both irascible and placable, (anthropopathically.) p. 180.
    • 2. The Atheists scruple, of Gods inaudition of the prayers of good men, or not concession of their petitions; satisfied. p. 183.
    • 3. The Atheists second Argument against Spe∣ciall Providence divine, dissolved: and the necessity of Objects hostile, and deleteri∣ous to the life of man, demonstrated. p. 184.
    • 4. The same illustrated, by a correspondent simile. p. 185.
    • 5. The Atheists last and grand objection, of the prosperity of the Vitious, and adversity of the Virtuous, redargued: and the nature of the Goods of Fortune profounded. p. 186.
    • 6. The Reason, wherefore Divine Providence confers Good things on Evil men. p. 189.
    • 7. Those apparent Evils, which Providence Divine consignes to Virtuous men, anatomi∣zed; and found to be real Goods intrin∣secally. p. 190
    • 8. The Authors Sanctuary wherein he secured his mind from discontent, in all those stormes of Calamities, which our late Civil war showred upon him. p. 191.
    • 9. Virtue, a meer Chimera, without the oc∣cursion of those things, which Sensuality calls Evil. p. 192.
    • 10. The Sense, no competent Criterion of the Good or Evil of the mind. ibid.
    • 11. The Atheists objection, that God ought, in justice, always to preserve Good men from suffering Evil; expunged. p. 195.
    • 12. The Summum bonum of this life, con∣sistent in a full conformity of our wills to the Divine will. p. 196.
    • 13. An excellent meditation of Marcus Antoni∣nus concerning the Good and Evil occurrent to man in this life. ibid.
• ...

• ... CHAP. VI. The Mobility of the Term of mans Life asserted. page 199.
  • SECT. I.
    • ARTIC.
    • 1. THe Assinity of this Theorem to the precedent, intimated: and the necessary division thereof into a specifical and individual consideration. p. 199.
    • 2. The reasons of the Authors concise tractation of the first part. p. 200.
    • 3. The moderation of Death by Special Pro∣vidence Divine, argued from the impossibi∣lity of the moderation thereof by any other power. ibid.
    • 4. The same demonstrated, from the necessary dependence of all natural motion in its be∣ginning, continuation, and period, on the will of the First Mover. p. 202.
  • SECT. II.
    • ARTIC.
    • 1. A Transient discovery of the almost insu∣perable Difficulties to be encountred in the worthy and satisfactory solution of this problem, whether the Term of mans life be Moveable, or Fatal; premised by way of Apology for the Authors unequal judgement: and his purpose of taking a middle way be∣tween the absolute Fatality of the Soick, and the meer Fortune of the Epicurean. p. 204.
    • 2. Two praevious considerables, necessary to the right understanding and consequent discussion of the question. p. 207.
    • 3. The necessary relation of all Causes both of life and death, to three General heads, viz. Necessary, Fortuitous, Supernatural; sup∣ports the discrimination of the Term of life into Supernatural, Natural and Acciden∣tary: and the impertinency of the considera∣tion of the Supernatural Term, to the pre∣sent scope. p. 207.
    • 4. The proper import of the Natural Term o•• mans life, and also of the Accidental. p. 209.
    • 5. The result of our acceptation of the Term of life, in the first signification. ibid.
    • 6. The consequence of our understanding the Term of life, in the second signification. p. 210.
    • 7. The Fixation of the Term of life, acceptable in a double interest; viz. (1) in respect to some Absolute Divine Decree, precedent even to Gods Prescience of all Secondary or instrumental Causes: (2) to some Hypo∣thetical Divine Decree, whose mutability is suspended on the liberty of mans Will. And the indifferency of either branch of the di∣stinction to our instant design. p. 211.
    • 8. Three different opinions vulgarly extracted from the precedent Distinction. p. 212.
    • 9. The convenient reduction of them to two only. ibid.
    • 10. The First opinion declared: and the prin∣cipal Abettors thereof mentioned. p. 213
    • 11. The Stoical Fate; and the Calvinists Predestination, fully defined. p. 215.
    • 12. A full and clear discrimination of the Stoical, from the Theological Fate. ibid.
    • 13. A list of the execrable Absurdities impen∣dent on the opinion of Absolute Fatality; so accepted as the Stoick proposeth it. p. 217.
  • SECT. III.
    • ARTIC.
    • 1. THe Authors adhaesion to the Second opinion, justified by two important reasons. p. 219.
    • 2. The great obscurity, and small validity of some Texts of holy writ, alledged by the Defendants of Fatality to warrant their opinion, detected. p. 220.
    • 3. The Natural Causes (proxime) of the Lon∣gitude and Brevity of mans life: and the Authors private conjecture of the cause of Longevity in the first age of the world. p. 221.
    • ...

• ...
  • ...
    • ... 4. The injustice of our Adversaries title of pa∣tronage from the forementioned text of Job, further manifested. p. 222.
    • 5. Seven testimonies, out of holy writ, suppor∣ting the mobility of the Term of mans life, in individuo. p. 223.
    • 6. A full vindication of the Fourth Testimo∣ny, from the several Exceptions made against the appropriation thereof to our scope, by the patrons of Fatality. p. 227
    • 7. The second Testimony vindicated from several Exceptions. p. 233.
    • 8. The sixth Testimony cleared, from 4. Ex∣ceptions. p. 237.
  • SECT. IV.
    • ARTIC.
    • 1. THe necessity of our enquiry into the mystery of Praedestination, in or∣der to the solution of the present difficulty: and the Fatists grand Argument. p. 240.
    • 2. The refutation thereof, by the conciliation of the infallibility of Gods Praenotion, to the in∣determination of mans free will to the actu∣al election of Good or Evil. p. 241.
    • 3. The diametral Disparity between that Di∣vine Praenotion which is antecedent to Divine Praeordination; and that which is subsequent; amply declared. p. 243.
    • 4. A second illustration of the same difference by a pertinent Instance, or exemplification. p. 244.
    • 5. A third illustration of the same Difference, by conceiving the Divine Decrees, in the same subordinate series, which the Fatists have imagmed. p. 247.
    • 6. The first Absurdity impendent on the opinion of a Decretory Praescience of God, as to the Actions of man. p. 249.
    • 7. A Second Absurdity connected to the same. p. 251.
    • 8. Two Subterfuges of the Fatist, praecluded. p. 252.
    • 9. A third Absurdity inseparable from the hy∣pothesis of a Decretory Praescience Divine. p. 253.
    • 10. Tbe reduction of the whole dissertation to 4. Conclusions, genuinely extracted from the Premises. p. 254.
• CHA. VII. Of the Liberty Elective of Mans Will. page 257.
  • SECT. I.
    • ARTIC.
    • 1. THe Parity of Absurdities resulting from those two Antagonistical Hypotheses, of Absolute Fatality, and meer Contingen∣cy, as to the Actions of man. p. 257.
    • 2. Those 2 contrary streems found to have bin derived from one and the same poysonous Fountain; viz. a subterfuge of man to evade Culpability. p. 258.
    • 3. The Authors Incitements, here to enquire profoundly into the Natures of Free-will, Fortune, and Fate. p. 259.
    • 4. What is intended properly by the Liberty of mans Will. ibid.
    • 5. The several subordinate Actions of the Mind, exercised about its objects: and the respe∣ctive scholastick Terms, by which Philoso∣phers have adaequately expressed them. p. 260.
  • SECT. II.
    • ARTIC.
    • 1. THe Essence of mans Liberty Elective, consistent primarily in the Indiffe∣rency of the Intellect; and in the Will only dependently. p. 263.
    • 2. An egregious Error of some Divines, that the Liberty of the Will doth consummately consist in its immoveable Fixation on real Good. p. 264.
    • 3. Their inadvertency of the real Difference be∣tween a Spontaneous, and Arbitrary action; the occasion of that Error. ibid.
    • 4. That a Spontaneous action, and an indelibe∣rate Impulse of Nature, are homologous or identical. ibid.
    • ...

• ...
  • ...
    • ... 5. The Divines objection, that the Tendency of of the Will is Volent, and therefore Free; praevented, by a distinction of Libency and Liberty. p. 265.
    • 6. Their Superstructure, that the Perfection of the Wills Liberty is its constant Adhaesion to, and inseparability from real Good, de∣demolished by two reasons: (1) that this Perfection imagined is not of the Liberty, but the Will it self; (2) that it belongs only to separated Souls, in the state of Glorifica∣tion. p. 266.
    • 7. What kind of Indifferency that is, wherein the Liberty Elective is Essenced. p. 267.
    • 8. That to every Iudgement of the Intellect, is immediately and necessarily conjoyned an Appetition or Aversation of the Will; respective to the Good, or Evil nunciated. p. 268.
    • 9. The Instability of the Will, in its Appetiti∣ons, necessarily caused by the Instability of the Intellect in its Judgements. p. 269.
    • 10. The Delusion of the Intellect in its Judge∣ments, necessitateth the Delusion of the Will in its dependent Appetitions. p. 270.
    • 11. That the Indifferency of the Will is but the shadow, or representative of that Indifferency in the Intellect; and the Determination of this necessitates the Determination of that. ibid.
    • 12. The Analogie betwixt the Intellect, and a Balance. p. 271.
    • 13. That the Intellect doth naturally conform to the attraction of the greater Verisimility: and the reason of its Fluctuation. p. 272.
    • 14. That the Determination of the Intellect to one or two objects, is caused either by the more ponderous Apparence of Verity therein, or the minds greater Attention to the mo∣ments of reason apparent on that side, then to those on the other. ibid.
    • 15. That the Apparence of Truth is always the cause of the Intellects inclination. p. 273.
    • 16. Three considerable Inferences from the praemises. ibid.
    • 17. Cartesiu▪ his General Praeservative against the excesses of Passions. p. 274.
    • 18. General Rules praes••••ibed by the Author, how to praevent the Delusion of the Understan∣ding, and dependent seduction of the Will by Evil disguised under the similitude of Good. p. 275.
  • SECT. III.
    • ARTIC.
    • 1. AN objection, that Ignorance is the mother of sin. p. 277
    • 2. The same expeded, by a Distinction of Science into Habitual, and Actual. ibid.
    • 3. A reply, that the reluctancy of every Delin∣quents Conscience, doth evidence the possibility of mans doing an Act repugnant to his Actual Science. p. 278.
    • 4. The Rejoynder, that the Ha••itual Science of every Delinquent, is perturbed and obnub••∣lated by some Passion, excited in him: and that the Remors of Conscience proceeds from the sense of the Loss of Good. p. 279
    • 5. What kind of Ignorance that is, which may, in some degree, excuse a Delinquent. p. 280.
    • 6. Four weighty Reasons, convincing, that man hath an Absolute Power in himself to controll the temptations of Evil. p. 282.
    • 7. What those First Motions are, which objects inevitably excite in the Mind: and that the Consequences of those motions are praeven∣tible. p. 283.
    • 8. Necessity and Fear conceded to be, in some measure, Excuses: and what are the ob∣jects of Excusing Fear. p. 286.
• CHAP. VIII. Of Fortune. page 289.
  • ARTIC.
  • 1. THe Antiquity and Genealogy of For∣tune. p. 289.
  • 2. Plato and Arist. their Descriptions of For∣tune examined, and illustrated: and 3. Con∣clusions inferred thereupon. p. 291.
  • 3. Their Anatomy of her Nature, deficient: and a more perfect one praesented. p. 293.
  • ...

• ...
  • ... 4. Fortune, nothing but a meer Negation of all Praenotion i•• a Concourse of Natural Causes, respective to a Fortuitous Event. p. 295.
  • 5. Epicurus commended, for illustrating the instability and uncertainty of Fortune. ibid.
  • 6. Her Indivinity manifested: and how she came by her Deification. p. 296.
  • 7. All sober Philosophers vindicated from the guilt of ascribing Divinity to Fortune. p. 297.
  • 8. The Necessity and use of Allegorical, Sym∣bolical, and Emblematical Traditions, in∣vented by the Ancients. p. 298.
  • 9. Their Descriptions of Fortune, only Emble∣matical. p. 299.
  • 10. As also the Images of Fortune framed by Painters, and Statuaries. p. 300.
  • 11. The review, tolerating the name of For∣tune, in respect to man: but detesting it, in respect to God. p. 301.
• CHAP. IX. Of Fate. page 302.
  • SECT I.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. THe conveni••nt redu••tion of all opini∣ons, concerning the Essence of Fate, to 2. General Heads. p. 302.
    • 2. What the Platonist and Stoick meant by Fate, considered (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) as a sub∣stance. p. 303.
    • 3. And, what (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) as an Energy or Act: together with the etymological reasons of those sundry Appellations, the Stoicks have imposed upon it. p. 304.
  • SECT II.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. THe second Classis of Philosophers, who understood Fate to be a Constitution meerly Natural subdivided into 2 distinct Sects: viz. (1) those who assert the Im∣mutability and Inevitability of Fate; (2) those who d••fend the possibility of its Al∣teration and Evasion. p. 305.
    • 2. The Leaders of the First Sect, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Leucippus, Pa••menides, and chiefly Democritus. p. 306.
    • 3. Democritus justly cha••ged with the patro∣nage of Inevitable Fate: and his doctrine conc••rning it concisely r••hearsed. ibid.
  • SECT. III.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. THe Principal of the Second Sect, Aristotle and Epicurus. p. 312.
    • 2. The Grounds of the Authors in puting the opinion both of Fates Identity with Nature, and the possibility of its Mutation and De∣clination, by either Fortuitous or Arbitra∣ry Antagonists, to Aristotle. ibid.
    • 3. Epicurus unanimo••s to Aristotle, in the point of Physical and Eluctable Necessity. p. 314.
    • 4. The scope of Epicurus his Figment of the Declination of Atoms in the human Soul: and his Accommodation thereof to the tui∣tion of mans Liberty epitomized. ibid.
    • 5. An Exception, in the name of Democritus, against Epicurus Inference. p. 316.
    • 6. The justification thereof, by a Respons conforme to the Physiology of Epicurus p. 317.
    • 7. The most weighty Rejoynder, (of the con∣nexion of those Causes, which Avert the Mind from, so well as of those, which Attract it to an object, to the eternal Se∣ries▪ of Fate) found too light to overba∣lance Epicurus his defence of mans Liberty. p. 319.
  • SECT. IV.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. MAthematical Fate briefly described p. 321.
    • 2. The gross Vanity thereof concealed from many Philosophers, only by the cloud of Transcriptive Adhaesion to Antique Tra∣ditions. ibid.
    • ...

• ...
  • ...
    • ... 3. The Absurdity of Sydereal Necessity evicted (1) by an Argument desumed from the Hy∣pothetical Necessity of the Matter on which Celestial Impressions are to operate. 323
    • 4. (2) By the common Experiment of the unae∣qual Fortunes of Twins. p. 324.
    • 5. (3) By the double Impiety, inseparable from the belief thereof. p. 325.
• CHAP. X. The Liberty of Mans Will, Fortune, and Fate conciliated to Provi∣dence Divine. page 328.
  • SECT. I.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. THE intent of the chapter. p. 328.
    • 2. Democritus Fate, inconsistent both to the Fundamentals of Religion, and the Liberty of mans Will: and therefore dete∣sted. ibid.
    • 3. Aristotle and Epicurus their Fate admitted, in that it is Identical to Nature: but abomi∣nated, in that it clasheth with the Certi∣tude of Divine Praescience. p. 329.
    • 4. The Platonick and Stoick Fate embraced, so far as it is conceded to be a Constitution of the Divine Wisdome: but abandoned, in that it detracts from Divine Omnipo∣tence. ibid.
    • 5. In what qualified sense Christianisme may tolerate the use of the term, Fate. ibid.
  • SECT. II.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. FAte and Fortune conciliated, in the point of Providence Divine. p. 330.
    • 2. Plutarchs ingenious Assimilation of Fate to the Civil Law: and his design therein. p. 331.
  • SCET. III.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. FAte concentrical to mans Elective Liber∣ty, in the point of Praedestination. p. 332.
    • 2. The Concord betwixt Theology and Phi∣losophy, in their admission of 2. orders of Causes natural, viz. Necessary, and Free; the ground of the Affinity both betwixt the Difficulties, and Solutions, on either part: as to the Abolition of the seeming Re∣pugnancy between Fate and mans Free-will. p. 333.
    • 3. The First capital Difficulty, desumed from Divine Praescience; as stated by Di∣vines. p. 334.
    • 4. The same, as stated by Philosophers. ibid.
    • 5. The full solution of the same by vertue of the Divines Discrimination of Necessity into Absolute and Hypothetical. p. 335.
    • 6. The Solution of the same by the Philoso∣phers proving that the definite Praenotion of future Contingents, is no Cause of their de∣finite Contingency: but, è contrà, the de∣finity of their Futurition, the cause of their definite Praenotion. p. 338.
    • 7. The Disparity betwixt Divine and Human Praenotion. p. 339.
    • 8. The same exemplified. ibid.
  • SECT. IV.
    • ...ARTIC.
    • 1. THe Second Capital Difficulty, erected upon a sophism called Ignava Ratio; as it respecteth both Theology, and Philo∣sophy. p. 340.
    • 2. Two eminent Opinions of Divines touch∣ant the Solution of this Difficulty, recogni∣zed: and their judicious Modelly, in duely acknowledging the mysterie of Praedestinati∣on, to be Arcanum Divini imperii com∣mended. p. 34••.
    • 3. The First opinion found totally uncapable of Expedition from the Sophisme, Ignava Ra∣tio. 343.
    • ...

• ...
  • ...
    • ... 4. The Second Opinion, to a great part, extri∣cated from the same Labyrinth. p. 345.
    • 5. The Fatists Subtersuge, of the Infallibility of Divine Praenotion, praecluded. p. 346.
    • 6. A second subtersuge of the Fatist, viz. that the Subsequence of the Decree to Praeno∣tion, doth implicate the possibility of its Elusion and Mutability; praevented. ibid.
    • 7. A third Conclusion, viz. that the posteriority of the Decree of Election to Gods prae∣vision of mans future good actions, doth make man the Author of his own Discre∣tion; detected and redargued. p. 347.
    • 8. Two Extracts from the praemises; (1) that the Cooperation of mans Will to sufficient Grace, may be conceived a Cause of his Ele∣ction: (2) that to render a reason, why God did not constitute All men such as that All should cooperate to sufficient Grace, and so be Elect; is an impossibility to mans un∣derstanding; other then this, that such was his eternal will. p. 347.
    • 9. The former Sophisme, (ignava Ratio) in part dissolved, by Plutarchs Distinction; that though All effects are comprehended in, yet all are not caused by Fate. p. 348.
    • 10. The insufficiency of that Distinction, to the total solution of the Difficulty, duely ac∣knowledged. p. 349.
    • 11. The most promising Responses of some Phi∣losophers, concisely praesented: viz. of

      1. Of Plato.	ibid.
      2. Seneca.	p. 350.
      3. Chrysippus.	p. 351.
      4. Aquinas.	p. 352.

    • 12. These acute Responses aequitably audited, and their import sound to be no more then this; that man hath a Freedome of Assent, but not of Dissent to the Will of God. p. 352.
    • 13. The Dehortation from immoderate Curio∣sity, in Divine Mysteries: and concise Ad∣hortation to conform unto, and calmly ac∣quiesce in the Revealed Will of God. 353.