Another collection of philosophical conferences of the French virtuosi upon questions of all sorts for the improving of natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent. & J. Davies ..., Gent.

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Another collection of philosophical conferences of the French virtuosi upon questions of all sorts for the improving of natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent. & J. Davies ..., Gent.
Author
Bureau d'adresse et de rencontre (Paris, France)
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London :: Printed for Thomas Dring and John Starkey and are to be sold at their shops ...,
1665.
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Philosophy, French -- 17th century.
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http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A69471.0001.001
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"Another collection of philosophical conferences of the French virtuosi upon questions of all sorts for the improving of natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent. & J. Davies ..., Gent." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A69471.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 17, 2024.

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CONFERENCE CLXI. Why the French are so much incensed with the Lye. (Book 161)

TRue and Good being reciprocal; hence to call a man Lyar, is as much as to say, that he is of no Value; and because the paltery Fellow is unworthy of Honour, whereof the French is more covetous then any other Nation (as appears by the cou∣rage wherewith he runs upon hazard to the danger of his Life, testifying thereby that he prises Life less then Honour, to which most other Nations need to be incited by infinite Artifices)

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hence it comes to pass that the French are more sensible of the Lye than they.

The second said, That all Mankind make esteem of Piety to∣wards God, and Courage towards men: the former having been a means us'd by the greatest Princes and Legislators to gain the minds of their people; so powerful, that some even with the apparence of it alone have produced strange effects, (wit∣ness the dotages of Mahomet in the East, and many others else∣where.) The other, namely Courage, being the vertue most re∣ver'd amongst men, and esteem'd by women, who commonly favour the most valiant. Now Lying is a Vice opposite to both these Vertues, implying Impiety towards God, and Cowardize towards men. For he that lyes cannot be ignorant, that God the Father of Truth knows, and will sooner or later punish his Crime, if he have power to do it, (as cannot be denied without manifest irreligion.) And since Truth comes of it self to the Tongues end, unless it be detained Captive by Fear, or some other servile consideration; hence a Lye presupposes Cowar∣dize and Fear of him before whom it is spoken. So that it is no wonder if the reproach of these two crimes trouble us so much, the French Nation being the most glorious of the World.

The third said, That the Lye cannot but have something in it more hainous then the reproach of Coward and Impious, since these are repayed only with the Lye, but the Lye it self with blows; probably because Lying is a servile Vice, and the French are very jealous of preserving their Liberty. But we must di∣stinguish between lying and telling a Lye; for in this latter case people are not readily offended, as in the former. Thus an Advo∣cate pleading upon a Breviate, the matter whereof is fictitious, takes it not for an injury if the Adversaries Advocate is false; but replies only, that he will justifie it. The Philosopher main∣taining an erronious opinion, which he believes good, will not be angry at its being impugned of falshood. But when one is surprised in a Lye, which seems invented purposely to impose up∣on the Company, the discoverer of the falshood seems to re∣proach him not only of knavery but also of sottishness, in that he could not utter it dexterously enough to make it believ'd. As therefore Theft was not punished, but esteemed among the Lacedemonians, when it was well concealed, and received not chastisement except the Thief were taken in the fact; so a Lye seems to offend only when it is discovered; but if handsomly told, instead of being blamed, is authorized by Rhetorick and Poetry, (which are arts of handsomly feigning things that are not) by Complements, which are fair Disguisements; by dissimu∣lations, common enough everywhere; by stratagems of War. Hence when we give the Lye to any one, we add, saving the re∣spect of the Company; intimating thereby, that we intend not to reproach them of little judgment in letting pass so gross a

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falshood for a truth. For I see not that the French are greater Lyars then other Nations, unless you will bring under Lying their reservedness and modesty in not telling their designs to all the world.

The Fourth said, That the French being the most civilized of the world, have reason to take for the greatest affront the Vice which most destroyes civil Life and Conversation; which being founded upon Communication, whereof Speech is the In∣terpreter: if there be no assurance in this, then Humane Society is destroyed. All other things are known for what they are by the species which they send to our senses (as the species of a Dog and a Horse never fail to represent them to us such as they are) our intentions and thoughts alone are committed to speech; which, if it ill represent them, is no more to be esteem'd then a false Looking-glass which represents objects quite other then what they are; or then a copy not at all resembling its original; or lastly, then a thing which is nothing less then what it is taken to be. Hence a Lyar seeing himself dis-believed, and every one upon their guard when he speaks or negotiates; he hath reason to be sharply offended with him that gives him such a repute: and because being accounted a Lyar, he that accuses him would not believe his bare affirming the contrary; therefore he gives him a box on the ear, as the most suitable reply that can be made to the Lye; which being the highest affront, the blow is the first re∣venge of it, which the uncover'd parts of the body (namely the hand and face) present to the offended person; which blow is esteem'd the greater out-rage, in that it testifies the highest con∣tempt of the receiver, and is onely meant to provoke him to re∣sentment: Therefore a thrust with a Sword at an enemy pur∣posely to deliver ones self from the fear of him by killing him, is accounted much less injurious then an affront done purposely for the affronts sake. But, besides the foregoing reasons, cu∣stome (which oftentimes hath none) in France authorizes the greatness of the injury of the Lye.

The Fifth said, That the refiners of Honor are like those that sharpen the points of Needles so much till they break. The French, instead of interessing their Honour (as most other Na∣tions do) onely in things of importance, and of fairly maintain∣ing that they speak true when they are told that they Lye, are as much incens'd upon the sole pronunciation of these words, as if they were so many magical terms forcing the hand to give a blow, or draw the sword; and, which is strange, 'tis not enquir'd whether the thing be true or false, the Lye being judg'd alike offensive in both: yea, ordinarily they are the greatest Lyars that are most offended with the Lye: the reason whereof may be, That the reproach of true Vices offends us more then that of false and suppositious, and those of the minde more then those of the body, as being more reprehensible in us, in that 'tis our own fault that they are not amended: for a reproach made to one

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for a Vice he cannot remedy, serves more to shew the malice of the Reproacher than the fault of him that is blam'd But 'tis not so with a Lye, which presupposes either ignorance or malice. Whence the terms of Sot and Ignorant are also most cutting even to those that are not so. Besides, a Lyar (unless he repel the injury; a vowing himself the Disciple of the Father of Lyes, this Reproach is very odious to good men, especially to the French, who so affect that Title from all Antiquity, that our Ancestors have transferr'd it to Valour, (which they esteem'd the chief of the Vertues) saying, that such as have defended themselves well, have done en gens de bien, like good men.

The Sixth said, That the Lye is offensive only upon account of the intention; since most of our Discourses, Answers, and Re∣plies (wherein consists one of the greatest pleasures of life, & with∣out which our Converse would have no agreeableness, as appears by those that speak not to one another, or agree in every thing) are no other but fair givings of the Lye; yet are so far from be∣ing offensive, that they cause us to desire the company of such as know how to make handsom Reparties. Thus many of our Generals, whose venturousness upon the greatest hazards suf∣ficiently testifies their desire of Praise, yet shew displeasure at the hearing of their own Commendations; a Dissimulation, which carries them sometimes so far, that when any History of these times publishes some brave Action perform'd by them, they scruple not to blame the Historian, who by concealing the like another time, may secure himself from such Complements, if he take them not in the right sense.

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