Another collection of philosophical conferences of the French virtuosi upon questions of all sorts for the improving of natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent. & J. Davies ..., Gent.

CONFERENCE CLVIII. Whence diversity of Opinion proceeds. (Book 158)

TIs no wonder if every cause produces a different effect, and that there is diversity not only between things of dif∣ferent kind and species, but also between each individual, so that two eyes are not perfectly alike. Which variety, had we ways of distinguishing, would appear to us everywhere else, as it doth (for example) to the Dog, who, of two Hares which we judg alike, knows which he started first. But that one and the same thing appears divers according to the diversity of those that judg of it, this seems as strange in the inquisition of its cause as 'tis common in practice. For since that the Intellect judges of things according to the report of the outward senses, without whose ministry nothing is introduc'd into it; and that these senses and their mediums being well-dispos'd agree all in their reports, the whiteness of this paper, the blackness of this ink, and the truth of all other objects being faithfully represent∣ed to us; Why should not all men, that hear one and the same proposition, and the reasons whereby it is backt and oppos'd, make the same judgment for, or against it, without being divi∣ded, as they are, into several opinions. The cause hereof I ascribe to the several disposition and habitude of the Organs which render the soul's operations different. A sucking child being at a Sermon, understands nothing at all of it; one six or seven years old carries away a confus'd knowledg of it, and thinks it enough to say that the Preacher spoke of God; the young man and the old man judg thereof according to their inclinati∣on, the cholerick hastily, the melancholy with more circum∣spection, and almost all severally. Again, if the matter be scho∣lastical, the Peasant who understands it not, judges thereof with

admiration, the Scholar esteems it, the illiterate Tradesman blames it, and preferrs a point of morality▪ in brief every one judges of it after his own way. In the mean time 'tis one and the same Sermon, as one and the same liquor pour'd into different vessels, which give it the tast wherewith they are already imbru'd.

The second said, 'Tis true, Nothing is in the Intellect but what was before in the Senses, yet many times the Intellect is so prepos∣sess'd with prejudice that all supervening reasons signifie nothing; and when some Passion, as Love or Hatred, biasseth it, there is no room for equal consideration. Hence condemned persons com∣monly accuse their Judges unjustly; though indeed a friend's re∣commendation makes them look upon causes with other eyes then they should do.

The third said, This variety of judgments proceeds not only from the diversity of the species introduc'd by the common sense into the Intellect, but from the different conjunction which the Intellect makes of those species; just as the same alphabet is written and read variously by several Writers, and though ma∣ny speak the same language, yet both their pronunciation and phrase is different. Whence their expressions being so different, 'tis no wonder if the conclusions of their reasonings prove not the same.

The fourth said, He conceiv'd that there are some qualities in the soul which she derives not from the body. Otherwise we should not see some people extremely opinionative and obstinate, whose temper hath nothing of melancholy; nor others so light and mutable, though their constitution be not cholerick; and yet these two humors are commonly reputed the causes of stub∣bornness and inconstancy. But to what shall we ascribe it except to the soul alone that some men are naturally so given to devotion, that in an affair wherein religion is never so little concern'd they account nothing equitable against Ecclesiasts; and in the mean time there are others to whom what ever this sort of people propose is suspected. And who can think that the resolution of those that have been burnt for Heresie proceed∣ed from the temperament of the body.

The fifth said, That Opinions are to be distinguisht into Practical and Speculative. The first whereof, wherein we find our selves interessed, and which we promote upon that account, 'tis probable follow the temper and conformation of the Organs. Thus the melancholy man, who fears even imaginary dangers, cannot be perswaded to prefer trading at sea before that at land, but is alwavs fixt to hazard nothing. If he must choose a pro∣fession, he takes the Gown before the Sword, and then too he had rather be silent then advance any new proposition lyable to rejection. But if his birth or fortune command him to the war; he is rather for corrupting the enemies forces then fighting them, and in case of the latter he chooses an ambuscade before a pitcht battel. On the contrary, the hot cholerick person preferrs a

course, whereby he may soonest compass his design, though with the hazard of his Life, (which he will not believe, or at least not fear) before the tedious progresses of other Employ∣ments, which afford not their prosecutor meat till his teeth be out. And the Sanguine easily agrees to this Advice, provided it requires no pains, or be sweetned with some pastime; but the Phlegmatick cares neither for one nor the other. On the other side, in things consisting onely in Contemplation, I see not why I should be rather of the Opinion, that the flux and reflux of the Sea is caus'd by the Moon than by the Sun. And hence it is that persons of different Tempers, Sexes, Climats, and Ages, agree more readily in a point of Philosophy, than in their particular Inclinations and kind of Life. Indeed the main Source of this Diversity of Opinion, is, the Vanity and Ambition of the Hu∣mane Mind, which judging it self as well stock'd with Capacity and sufficiency as any other, and above all things, loving Liber∣ty, which seems disparag'd by consenting to an Opinion advanc'd by another; this Conceit, together with the dubiousness of all things not demonstrable, carries us to seek some new Light, which cannot be so small, but we love it more than that of ano∣ther; as people commonly do their own Children. Hence arise the so different Opinions of the Ancients, about all mat∣ters of Philosophy and other Sciences, not excepting Divinity it self even amongst Catholicks; amongst whom we see Sco∣tus, disagreeing with Saint Thomas, as Paracelsus doth in Physick with Galen, Copernicus with Ptolomy in Mathematicks, Ray∣mond Lully and Ramus in Scholastick Philosophy with Aristotle, and in Civil Law Cassius, with Labeo, and the Sabinians with the Proculeians.

The Sixth said, 'Twere a greater wonder if all Men were of one Opinion, than that they imitate in this diversity all other things of the world: At least 'tis harder to assign the cause why one and the same Man is to day of one judgement, and to morrow of another, then to see as many several Sentences as Heads. But to me this variety seems to arise from the various conception of things. As appears by the example of Julius Caesar, who being purpos'd to destroy King Deiotarus, no sooner heard Cicero speak in his defence but he pardon'd him; not to speak of many other Effects, both of his and Demosthenes's Eloquence. Whence it comes to pass, that though the same Fact be related with the same Reasons, yet the Diversities found in the manner, and in all the senses, imprint in us different species; upon the report whereof we also make a different judgement.

The Seventh said, This Variety proceeds from the Principles of Knowledge, as appears in those of Mathematicks., which be∣ing certain and known to all, cause every one to assent to their infallible Consequences. And so in a person seen at a di∣stance, of whom having a confus'd Knowledge, one saith, 'Tis a Tree, another, a Beast or a Man; but when his nearer

approach makes him better known, all agree that 'tis Peter or James.