Another collection of philosophical conferences of the French virtuosi upon questions of all sorts for the improving of natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent. & J. Davies ..., Gent.

CONFERENCE CXXXV. Of Happiness and Ʋnhappiness; and whether men are Happy or Ʋnhappy, because they really are so, or be∣cause they think themselves so. (Book 135)

THree sorts of effects are observ'd in Nature. Some arise always necessarily, as the vicissitudes of Days, Nights and Seasons, which depend upon the motion of the Stars, no more alterable without a miracle then the other effects of Uni∣versal Nature. Others come to pass often but not always; the particular nature which produces them being sometimes hindred by some accident, which makes it bring forth Monsters. The last happen neither always nor often but seldom; as all those which depend upon contingent causes, which are of two sorts. The first act by a necessity of nature, without any election: The second by a principle of liberty without choice or delibera∣tion. Both, when they produce an effect contrary to their in∣tention and primary design, are called fortuitous causes. And as those which act by natural necessity produce a casualty, as when a Stone falls upon the head of any one; so when those which operate by election and design, produce another thing then what they had propounded to themselves, they make for∣tune, or good and ill-luck, according to the good or evil ari∣sing thence by ways and springs, by us unforeseen: for in case the cause or motives be known, the effects are no longer fortui∣tous and contingent, because they have their manifest and cer∣tain cause. So when industry, labour, favour or friendship pro∣cure

Riches, the effect is not to be ascrib'd to Fortune, no more then the losses which follow upon the luxury and profusions of a disorderly life: but Riches and Honours are fortuitous when they happen to persons altogether incapable thereof; as also poverty, infamy, and contempt also to brave men, whose con∣stancy and resolution in undergoing all those disgraces hath made it be commonly said, That a wise man is above fortune, because he slights her stroaks by the strength of his reason; which being alone capable to render us happy, since Beasts de∣stitute thereof have neither any share in good-luck or bad-luck, I conceive that both the one and the other depends intirely up∣on our fansie, and the reflection we make upon the condition of the thing possessed; which appearing sometimes good and some∣times bad, makes us accordingly judge our selves happy or unhappy.

The Second said, Diversity is no where more apparent than in humane Actions, the incertainty and inconstancy whereof is such, that men rarely arrive at their proposed end, but of∣tentimes behold themselves either exalted to an unhoped degree of Felicity, or overwhelmed with the Misery which there was no ground to apprehend. Which diversity of accidents, induced Superstitious Antiquity, to set up a blind and flitting Deity, con∣stant onely in her inconstancy, whom they held the cause of all such effects; thus betaking themselves to an imaginary canse, in regard they could not, or would not acknowledg the true; which I attribute to every ones temperament, by means of which is produced in the Soul a certain natural motion and impetuosi∣ty for obtaining some particular thing, without Reasons contri∣buting thereunto; and according as a Man follows or resists these instincts and inclinations, so he proves either happy or un∣happy. Thus he who finds himself disposed to Arms, if he em∣brace them, thrives better than in a soft and sedentary life, whereunto the Melaneholly person is more addicted, and pro∣spers better herein. Now because dull spirits, fools, and thick-skull'd fellows, easily suffer themselves to be guided by those motions; therefore they commonly prove more fortunate than the wise, whose Prudence and Discretion causing them to make abundance of reflections upon what they undertake, causes them also to lose opportunities which never return. For I am not of their Opinion, who hold, That as there are Spirits which make the Celestial Orbes move, and, according to Averroes, an Intel∣ligence presiding over natural Generations; so there is a parti∣cular one for the various events of life, which it makes to hap∣pen according to the different intentions of the First Mover: Since without recurring to such obscure and remote causes, we carry in our selves those of our Felicity and Infelicity, whereof we are the true Artificers; which to place in the Phansie alone, and not in reality, is to say, good is not Good; since goodness being an essential affection of real entity, is inseparable from it, and consequently true, not barely imaginary.

The Third said, That Good being such onely upon account of its conveniency or sutableness to the Possessor, there is not in this world any Absolute Good or Happiness, but onely Relative and by Comparison, seeing what sutes well with one, doth not so with another. Riches, wherein most Men place their Felicity, were cast into the Sea by a Philosopher, that he might the better attend Contemplation. Honors and Pleasures, (charms, which most powerfully inveigle most of Man-kind) are crosses and tor∣ments to some others. Imprisonment, one of the hardest trials of Patience, is nevertheless sought by some, who prefer Solitude and perpetual Restraint, before the vanities of the world. To have no Friends is the greatest of infelicities; yet Timon made it his prime Pleasure. Life, the foundation of all goods, hath been so tedious to some, that to be deliver'd from it they have kill'd themselves; and the pains, afflictions, and diseases leading to death, are, in the Stoicks account, but imaginary Evils, ma∣king no impression upon the wise.

The Fourth said, Since Happiness and Unhappiness seem to be the Elements, composing the Political Life of Men, and the two Poles of that Globe upon which the Antients plac'd Fortune, their Consideration may be taken two ways, either in their Cause, or in their Effect. As for the first, the Stoicks, who establisht a Fate governing All by a Series of necessary and determinate Events, were as impious as Democritus and Leucippus, who, on the contrary, maintain'd that all things were done by Chance in the Universe, which, they said, it self was made by the casual occourse of their Atoms; these denying the Providence of God, those his Power, by subjecting and tying him to the immutable Laws of Fatality. But without considering things in reference to God, to whom every thing is present and certain, we may distinguish them into two sorts. Some acting necessarily, have alwayes their necessary effects: others, which depend absolute∣ly upon Man's Will, which is free and indifferent, have accord∣ingly Effects incertain and contingent. Thus the accidents of the Sea, (where the vulgar believes is the chief Empire of For∣tune), natural deaths, the births of poor and rich, have regular and necessary Causes. On the contrary, Goods freely given, or acquir'd with little industry, or found, have contingent Cau∣ses; which being almost infinite, (for there is no Cause by it self, but may be a Cause by accident, by producing another thing than what was intended) they cannot fall within the know∣ledge of Humane Wit, which knows onely what is finite and terminate. Other Events have Causes mixt of Chance and Necessity, as the death of the Poet Aeschylus, hapning by a Tor∣toise which an Eagle let fall upon his bald Head. As for the se∣cond manner wherein Happiness may be consider'd, namely, Whether it render us happy in Reality or in Imagination; 'tis an accusing all Men of folly, to say that Felicity is imaginary and phantastical; since Nature, which hath given no Desire in vain,

(as she should have done, if she had caus'd us to desire a thing that exists not) makes all Men aspire to the one, and fear the other. There must be an Absolute Happiness as well as an Ab∣solute Good, namely, the possession of this Good, as that of Ex∣istence is, which being the foundation of all Goods, must be a Real and Absolute Good. Virtue and, the Honor attending it, being likewise true and solid Goods, their possession must adferr a semblable Felicity; the verity and reality is no more chang'd by not being equally gusted by all, than the savour of Meat, or the Beauty of Light, would be by not being perceiv'd by a sick or a blind person: Yea, as he that ha's a rough Diamond is not less the possessor, or less rich for not knowing the value of it; so he that possesses some Good ought not to be accounted less happy, though he think not himself so. Moreover, 'twould be as absurd to call a Man happy or unhappy because he thinks himself so; as to believe a fool is a King, or Rich, because he phan∣sies himself to have Empires and Riches.

The Fifth said, That Happiness, which is rather an Effect of our Genius, (as the examples of Socrates and Simonides prove) than of our Temperament, much less of the Stars and their influ∣ences, depends not onely upon the possession of some Good, or the belief a Man hath that he possesses it, but upon both together; namely, upon the reflexion he makes upon the Good which he really possesses; for want of which, Children, Fools, Drunkards, and even the Wise themselves, whilst they are a sleep cannot be call'd Happy.