Another collection of philosophical conferences of the French virtuosi upon questions of all sorts for the improving of natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent. & J. Davies ..., Gent.

CONFERENCE CXXIII. Which of the Humane Passions is most excusable. (Book 133)

MAn being compos'd of two Pieces, Body and Soul, and upon that account styl'd by Trismegistus, The Horizon of the Universe, because he unites in himself the spiritual nature with the Corporeal, the Inclinations whereof are different; he hath also need of two guides to conduct those two Parts (the Rational and the Animal) and make them know the Good to∣wards which they are carried of their own Nature. The In∣tellect makes him see the Honest and Spiritual Good; the Ima∣gination enables him to conceive a sensible and corporeal Good. And as the Rational Appetite (which is the Will) follows the light afforded to it by the Intellect in pursuit of Honest Good, whence Vertue ariseth; so the sensitive Appetite is carri'd to the enjoyment of sensible Good which the Imagination makes it conceive as profitable and pleasant, and that by motions com∣monly so disorderly and violent that they make impression not only upon the Mind, but upon the Body, whose Oeconomy they discompose; and for this reason they are call'd Passions or Perturbations, and Affections of the Mind. These Passions either are carri'd towards Good and Evil simply, as Love and Hatred; the first inclining us to Good which is the Parent of Beauty, the latter averting us from Evil: or else they consider both Good and Evil Absent, as Desire and Flight: or Lastly, they consider them being present, and cause Pleasure and Grief; which, if of longer duration, produce Joy and Sadness. Now because difficulties frequently occurr in the pursuit of Cood and flight of Evil, therefore Nature not contented to have indu'd Animals with a Concupiscible Appetite, which by means of the six above-mention'd Passions might be carri'd towards Good, and avoid Evil; hath also given them another Appetite call'd Irascible, to surmount the Obstacles occurring in the pursuit of Good or flight of Evil; whence arise five other Passions, Hope, Despair, Boldness, Fear, and Anger. Hope excites the soul to the prosecution of a difficult but obtainable good. Despair checks the motions of the soul towards the pursuit of a Good no longer obtainable. Boldness regards an absent Evil, which assures it self able to surmount. Fear considers the same absent Evil without any means of being able to avoid it. Lastly, the violence of Anger is bent against a present Evil, whereof it be∣lieves a possibility to be reveng'd. And because a present and enjoyed Good cannot be accompani'd with difficulty; hence there is no Passion in the Irascible Appetite answering to Anger, as there is in the other Passions: which again are divided ac∣cording to the several objects about which they are exercis'd.

The desire of Honours is call'd Ambition; that of Riches, Co∣vetousness; that of fleshly Pleasures, Concupiscence; that of Meats, Gourmandise or Gluttony. The Hatred of Vice causes Zeal; that of a Rival, Jealousie. The sorrow arising upon the sight of Evil suffer'd by an undeserving person, causes Com∣passion; Indignation proceeds from the happening of Good to one that merits it not. Now, among all these Passions, Ambiti∣on, which aims at a general superiority, seems to me the first; and since it hath serv'd to excuse Parricides and Violators of the publick faith, whom it hath caus'd to say, that for the sake of command nothing is unjust, it may very well be excus'd every where else; besides that, it hath been the instigator to the most glorious Actions, the source whereof is that laudable Ambition which every one hath to out-vie his companion.

The second said, If the Passions are Diseases of the Soul, as the Stoicks held, and the Question seems to presuppose; I con∣ceive none more agreeable and excusable than Love; whose sweet violence insinuating into the severest brests, finds nothing capable to resist it. Hence those that are taken with it, wish nothing less than a cure, which cannot proceed but from obli∣vion of the thing belov'd, wherein they live more than in them∣selves: the soul being more where it loves than in the body wherein it lives. Moreover, this Passion is the most natural and common of all, and consequently, the most excusable; being found not only in all men, but also in all Animals, who feel the assaults of Love, which makes them naturally tend towards Good. And as Love is the most common, so it is likewise the source and principle of all the Passions: for we neither hate nor fear any thing, we have neither joy, sadness, desire, fear, nor anger, but because we love something: the true course to become exempt from these Passions, being, To love No∣thing.

The third said, That the most violent Passions being the most excusable because the hardest to subdue, those of the Irascible Appetite (particularly Anger) being more vehement than those of the Concupiscible Appetite, are also the most worthy of excuse. The former possess the noblest part of Man, the Heart, which is the source of Anger; the latter, the Liver which is the seat of Love; whose weakness the Poets have sufficiently demonstrated by representing it to us under the form of a Child, which hath no power over us but what we suffer it to take. But Anger which is proper to the Generous, as Love is to the weak and effeminate, makes it self master of the Soul; and by its sudden and impetuous motions obscuring the light of rea∣son, makes us the more excusable in that we are no longer masters of our own actions. And as Madness excuses the Fran∣tick from blame and punishment, so Anger which is a short Madness, as the Poet saith, deserves the same excuse; its vi∣olence being so much above that of all other Passions, that it is

the most quick and passes like Lightning: for when it takes root in the soul, it loses its name, and degenerates into Ha∣tred.

The Fourth said, That he was for Joy, because all the other Passions acknowledg its power such, that they are contented to be its servants; Love and Desire are only in order to some hoped Joy; Hatred and Flight, only to remove all objects that may trouble it. Despair then only seizes us, when we can no longer hope for Joy; Hope is for it alone; Fear is only of what is contrary to it; Boldness, to break through all Obstacles op∣posing our contentment; and Anger serves to express the dis∣pleasure we resent for its delay or interruption. If a man in∣jure us in his anger, or in his sadness, yea, or in his despair; we will not excuse him: but be we never so displeas'd, we not on∣ly excuse the joy of others, but take pleasure in it. And where∣as Contraries are known by their Contraries, since nothing dis∣pleases us so much as Sadness, nothing pleases us so much as Joy; whose violence is manifested by some that have dy'd of it, as none ever did of Anger. In fine, we cannot better prove and approve the power and empire of any one than by becom∣ing his subjects, as we all are of Joy; to which the greatest part not only give part of their time, but also quit the most impor∣tant affairs to seek it in places destinated to the god of Laughter; whose Festivals are now more frequen then in in the days of A∣puleius. And what makes us in youth bear and endure all the pains of study; Apprentices of each Trade, the hardships which they undergo; Soldiers, the danger of Death, but a pre-con∣ceived hope of Joy? which he that possesses, becomes so master'd by it, that he forgets all his past evils: The Mariner no longer remembers the perils of the sea, nor the sick person his pains; In short, every one suffers himself to be possess'd and govern'd by this Passion, which is therefore the most ex∣cusable.

The fifth said, That Grief brings greater Evil than Joy doth Good; because Evil wholly destroys the Nature of a thing, which Good only renders more complete; whence it follows that the former is much more just and excusable than the latter which gives only Well-being, but Evil destroys Being it self; to the preservation whereof all Creatures being naturally enclin'd, more carefully eschew such things as may hurt them, then they pursue those that may procure joy and contentment. More∣over the accents of the Voice which testifie Grief or Sadness are much more violent than those of Joy; which being nothing else but a bare complacency receiv'd in the enjoyment of Good, consists rather in rest then in motion, whereof Grief partakes more largely by the endeavours which it causeth the soul to put forth for removing of what torments it.

The sixth said, That the Passions being Appurtenances of our Nature, and part of our Selves, are all excusable in themselves, be∣cause

natural and inevitable; but especially those whereto we are particularly most inclin'd by Temper: so Love and Joy are most excusable in the sanguine; Choler and Despair in the Bili∣ous; Hatred and Sadness in the Melancholick; Hope and Bold∣ness in Youth; and Bashfulness is excusable in a Child, but cul∣pable in an old man. Yet Hope, which accompanies Man not only while breath lasts, but extends even beyond death, seems by that duration to plead, that as it is the least separable, so it is the most excusable.