Another collection of philosophical conferences of the French virtuosi upon questions of all sorts for the improving of natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent. & J. Davies ..., Gent.

CONFERENCE CXXVII. Whether we profit best by Precepts or Examples. (Book 127)

AS there is nothing so hard as to judg of the worth of things, so it is the highest point of prudence to understand the goodness of the means that may conduce to some end. Precepts and Examples are the two Means to attain Vertue; 'tis demanded which is the best and most proper. At first view, Example seems to have the same advantage over Precept that the Whole hath over the Part; for a Good Example, besides being of its own nature a vertuous action holds the place of a Moral Rule; but a Precept is only a General Maxim, not necessarily follow'd by a particular Action: whence it follows, that Precept regards on∣ly the Understanding, whereto it affords some light; but Ex∣ample makes impression upon both Faculties together, the Un∣derstanding and the Will, by an order necessary in civil life, which is regulated by the example of others. Therefore Great Persons are oblig'd to good Example, which derives its dignity from that of the giver. Moreover, Moral Propositions are so reasonable and conformable to the instinct we have of good, that all the World assents to them as consider'd in the General. There is no body but acknowledges, that, what belongs to each man ought to be render'd to him; that, we ought not to do that to another which we would not have done to our selves: yet in the circumstances and particular cases we do not always apply those precepts, because then they appear clog'd with dif∣ficulties, to which our passion or interest give birth. Where∣fore Example, beng Particular, is more considerable in Morality, wherein people are govern'd more by opinion then reason; but Precept is Universal, and affects the mind only at a distance, our actions being oftentimes contrary to the secret dictates of the Un∣derstanding. In Example we feel the force and application of a precept in a particular subject, and know not only that which ought to be done but how it ought to be done by seeing it pra∣ctis'd. Experience it self shew us, that Doctrine alone is weak and little perswasive, unless it be animated by the examples of a good life, whose silence is more eloquent than all precepts. More∣over, we are like those with whom we live, and the maladies of the body are not so contagious as those of the mind: which not∣withstanding may as well profit by bad examples; as good, the

Understanding being able to turn bad food into good nourish∣ment: And as a brave Action excites good Motions in us by its beauty, resulting from its conformity to Reason; so a bad Action, by its deformity and contrariety to Reason, gives us aversion against it, and an inclination to its opposite. Socrates judg'd no Lesson so fit to moderate Anger, as for a Man to behold himself in a glass when he is agitated with that Passion. Which cannot be said of a bad Precept; for this being a bad seed, can never produce any fruit but of the same Nature. On the other side, Men are such Lovers of Pleasures, that Virtue separated from Delight, stumbles them, and seemes too severe: But Pre∣cept is a pure Rule of Duty, without any attractive; whereas Example, which appears to our Eyes, and is an Action cloth'd with circumstances, perswades us more sweetly, because we are naturally prone to Imitation; whence it comes to pass that Co∣medies are so charming: And Example is the subject: of Imita∣tion, but Precept cannot be so; for it is general of it self, and all Moral Actions are singular.

The Second said. That if it be true, as the Stoicks say, that Virtue is nothing else but a Science, then Precepts must be the foundations, as of Science, so also of Virtute; which indeed being a habit of a reasonable Faculty, must be more promoted by Precepts, (which are infallible verities, and supply light to that Power) than Examples which have no force to convince a strong Mind. They who follow Virtue by Example, and not by Reason, have more of the Ape than of the Man; and all the power Example hath, is onely to move the Will to admire and desire Virtue, but not to teach the way of attaining it, as Precept doth; which, besides being invariable, and always alike to its self, is more easie to be applyed than Example, which puts on a new face, according to the circumstances of times, places, and persons; there being no Actions, how, contrary soever, but have Examples to countenance their goodness. Moreover, they are either of the time past, and so move us not much; or of the present, in which there are few of Virtue; besides that, they are of less duration than Precepts, which are eternal. If vicious Examples attract more powerfully to Vice than vicious Precepts, the same cannot be said of the practice of Virtues; since these have not all the External Senses of their party, as Vices have.

The Third said, That sensible and palpable things, as ex∣amples are, have more power upon us than bare words, which cannot so well perswade a Truth, but that they alwayes leave some doubting in us; whereas Examples being sensible, give us a more entire and perfect Knowledge: yea, they have influence even upon brute beasts, who learn not by Precepts but by Ex∣amples, which is an evidence of their certainty; for a thing is the more certain, the more common it is to us with more. Hence Plato affirmes, That Examples are necessary to perswade high and lofty matters. Precepts, indeed, dispose, but Examples

animate the Soul to Virtue; those admonish, these stimulate and guide, as in the resolution of doing well: Instructions shew the way, but Examples drive us with the point of Honour, and the force of Emulation. Nor do Precepts include Examples, but the contrary; and every Example comprehends a Document. When we see a Good Man square his Life out to his Duty, we find I know not what satisfaction and contentment in the admi∣miration of his Virtue, and this pleasure makes us conceive, yea, strongly perswades us, that all Virtues are amiable. Even Vicious Examples sometimes make Vice appear to us so de∣form'd, that we detest instead of pursuing it. Hence the Lace∣demonians setting aside the Precepts of Temperature, were wont to make their Slaves drunk, that the ill-favour'd spectacle might make their Children abhor that Vice. Lastly, Our Sa∣viour, whose Life was a continued Example of Virtue, did more Works to teach us, then he gave Words and Precepts, most of which are comprehended under Examples and Parables: Yea, the Devil, well knowing that Adam's mind was too strong to be prevail'd upon by Reasons, first gain'd that of his Wife, which was more weak, that he might allure him to sin by her Example.

The Fourth said, The end is not onely more noble, but also more effectual than the means; for 'tis to that alone that they aim and terminate. Now the end of all Examples, is to de∣duce Precepts from them; which Precepts, are general Notions grounded upon many Experiences or Examples, either of others, or our own; but these being wholly particular, can have no power upon the Understanding, which frames its conclusions onely upon things universally true, as Maximes and Precepts are, and that more than Examples; for these are never perfect, but full of a thousand defects, those sure and infallible. Moreover, Precepts move the Understanding, which is the noblest of all the Faculties; whereas Examples make impression onely upon the outward senses and dull wits.

The Fifth said, That as the Sight and the Hearing know how to put a difference between Colours and Sounds, without Learning; and all the Faculties can naturally discern their own Objects: So the Understanding knows naturally the first Prin∣ciples, and clearly beholds those first Verities: The Will hath also in it self the Principles and Seeds of Virtues, (as the Syn∣teresis, and remorse of Conscience in the most wicked, sufficiently prove) and is of it self carryed to Virtuous Actions, without needing either Preecepts or Examples, equally unprofitable to the bad, who amend not thereby; and to the good, who want them not.

The Sixth said, That the Question is to be decided by distin∣guishing of the Minds of Men. Those that excel in Judgement attribute more to Reason than to Examples, which being more sensible, affect the Imagination of duller heads, who are not ca∣pable

of Reasons. So that though Precepts and Arguments be without comparison more perfect than Examples; yet because very few are capable of them, (because the generality of the World is stupid and dull) therefore they are not generally so proper to teach as Examples; which nevertheless being of no power, but serving onely to clear an obscure Truth, ought not to have any ascendant over a Mind that is reasonable and fur∣nish'd with Knowledge.