Another collection of philosophical conferences of the French virtuosi upon questions of all sorts for the improving of natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent. & J. Davies ..., Gent.

CONFEERNCE CXXIV. Whether we may better trust one whom we have oblig'd, or one that hath oblig'd us. (Book 124)

COnfidence being the fruit of Friendship, yea, the sweet bond wherewith this Virtue unites Hearts; it may seem we ought to have most in him that loves most perfectly, namely, he that hath oblig'd us. For as 'tis harder to give then to receive, because we cannot give without depriving our selves of what we enjoy, (which is contrary to our natural inclination) so it is a more virtuous action, and argues a greater kindness: the receiver of a benefit finding no difficulty in this action of receiving it. More∣over, we cannot doubt of his good will, who obliges us by his benefits; but we may of his, that receives. For it frequently happens to those that do good, as it did to the Sower in the Gospel, part of whose seed fell in stony places, part amongst thorns, part in the high-way, and was devoured by birds; and the least part upon good ground, and brings not forth fruit but in its own time. Yea, there are many that hate nothing so much as the remembrance of those that have done them good, as if their presence were an Universal Reproach, notwithstanding that a second benefit revives the first, and a third or fourth cannot but mind them of the preceeding. But when you have obtain'd of them to remember it, yet many regret nothing more then to pay a debt, because constrain'd thereto, either by Law or Duty; and Man being of his own Nature free, hates nothing so much as to do any thing by constraint. Hence, if he requites an Ob∣ligation, 'tis not with that freeness and cheerfulness which is re∣quisite to good Offices, and becomes a Benefactor; in whom therefore we have more reason to confide then in another.

The Second said, The little fidelity now in the world, even amongst nearest Relatives, makes it reasonable to enquire, Who may be trusted. And if the fear of Ingratitude, (the most vulgar crime, though in shew much detested by all the world) is the cause why he who hath done good to another, yet dares not trust him; the receiver thereof hath oftentimes no less doubt of his Benefactor's intention. For though he hath re∣ceiv'd a seeming testimony of his kindness, yet the motives of benefits proceeding sometimes from an other cause besides true Friendship, suspicion may as well arise in the Receivers, as in the givers Mind. Many give onely that they may receive with Usury; others, out of vanity, and to make Creatures and Clients: which they regarding no longer but as their inferiors and dependents, 'tis as dangerous for these to confide in their Benefactors, as for a slave to use confidence towards his Master, or a Vassal towards his Lord; not often allow'd by the respect

and timerousness of the less towards the great, as commonly those are that give: Whereas we ordinarily find in him whom we have oblig'd nothing but Subjection and Humility, Virtues much disposing the mind to Gratitude, which cannot but assure their Benefactors of their fidelity. Nor can they easily be un∣grateful if they would, your confidence in them obliging them continually to fidelity, and, withall, giving them occasion to requite your kindnesses by their assiduity and services. Which was the recompence wherewith the poor amongst the Jews pay'd their Creditors, by serving them for some years. So that he is scarce less blameable who distrusts him whom he hath oblig'd, and by this diffidence deprives him of the means of requital, then he who having receiv'd a benefit betrayes his Benefactor; the Injustice being almost alike in both. If the first complains of having been deceiv'd by him whom he finds ungrateful; the se∣cond, in whom his Benefactor puts not the confidence which he ought, will have no less cause of complaint that on the contra∣ry he hath distrusted him, and soil'd the lustre of the first Ob∣ligation by his diffidence and bad opinion of him; which is to tax himself of impudence for having done good to one unwor∣thy of it.

The Third said, That if Men were perfect, Communicative Justice would require of them that the receiver of a benefit should repay the like, or at least some acknowledgment by his endeavours: Which the Poets intimated by the Graces, holding Hand in Hand. But the perversity of Man is such, that the more he is oblig'd to this Duty, the worse he acquits himself thereof, not doing any thing handsomely but what he does freely; and because being a vain-glorious Creature, he hates nothing so much as to be subject, and to pay homage to him that hath done him good; whose presence seems to upbraid him with his own meaness. If he loves his Benefactor, 'tis with an interess'd and mercenary affection; whereas that of the former is free from all self-respect, and proceeds meerly from a principle of Virtue, and consequently, is with more reason to be rely'd upon. Moreover, a Work-man loves his Production more then he is lov'd by it: as also God doth his Creatures; and Fathers, their Children. Now a Benefactor, who is a kind of Work-man and Artificer of our good Fortune, cherishes and loves us as his work and creatures, because he seems concern'd for our preser∣vation; just as Causes are for that of their Effects, in which them∣selves revive, and seem to be re∣produc'd.

The Fourth said, That our Natural Sentiments incline us more to rely upon those whom we have oblig'd, then upon those who have oblig'd us; not so much by way of chal∣lenging a requital, (for Obligations are not to be done in hope of recompence; which would be exchange rather than kindness) as because we are apt to trust those most, whom we love most. But we love those most, to whom we

have given greatest Testimony of our Affections. A Man may be deceiv'd in reckoning his benefits as causes of Ami∣ty in the receiver; but, they are certain Effects and Signs of Affection in the bestower: So that in respect of us, 'tis mani∣festly better to trust him whom we have oblig'd, than him who hath oblig'd us. The same is prov'd also in respect of him that is oblig'd; even the wild beasts are tam'd, and, instead of hurt∣ing, obey those that feed them; and therefore 'twere injurious to humanity, not to judge It capable of acknowledging a benefit which it knows how to conferr without provocation. For upon examination, the Causes of Ingratitude will be found to arise from those who boast of the title of Benefactors; the impru∣dence whereof is so great in some, that they displease more than oblige, by Presents unseasonably given, of no value, and (con∣trary to Seneca's advice) of little duration, intermixt with ill Of∣fices, instead of being fenc'd with new to keep out the rain of the disgusts and coldnesses which destroy Friendship; with re∣gret, and not with a chearful Countenance; after denials and de∣layes, so that the thing seemes rather snatch'd then receiv'd; diminish'd by burthensome conditions; and lastly, nullifi'd by reproaches, if not requited as soon as was expected. Whence such pretended benefits deserve rather the name of Out-rages: And nevertheless, being there are many that are grateful, even for such benefits, we may justly conclude that Courtesies done with their due circumstances, are far more capable to oblige the receivers to Gratitude, which cannot consist with Unfaith∣fulness.

The Fifth said, That the Decision of this, as of all other Moral Questions, depends upon persons, times, places, and other circumstances whereupon Prudence is founded, which teaches when, how, and whom we are to trust. Yet, supposing circum∣stances alike, and two persons equally virtuous, one of which hath done me good, and the other receiv'd good from me; the contrary Reason of the Law, which presumes him alwayes bad who hath been once bad, makes me judge, That he who hath once done me good, will sooner do me good again then another; and therefore that I ought rather to trust him.