Another collection of philosophical conferences of the French virtuosi upon questions of all sorts for the improving of natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent. & J. Davies ..., Gent.

CONFERENCE CXX. How the Ʋnderstanding moves the Will. (Book 120)

'TIs proper to the Understanding not only to conjoyn things wholly different, but oftentimes to abstract and separate such as are perfectly united in one and the same substance, and differ only in accidents, which it severs from their subjects. Hence reflecting upon it self, it distinguishes in its operation two Faculties, to wit, its Cognition and the Reasonable Appetite or Will, although they are one and the same thing, not only in the Soul, whose essence is simple, but also in the Intellect; nor are their objects different, Truth, the object of the Understand∣ing, being convertible and all one with Good, the object of the Will. Hence Civilians acknowledg no Will in those that want Understanding, as Ideots and Children. And as the same Sun-beam that produces light, causes heat too by the continuation of its action, or by its re-union in a Burning-glass: so an object long consider'd or strongly apprehended by the Understanding as good, immediately incites and inflames the same to seek and desire it. So that the cognition of a thing in the Understanding is only Theory, which the Will, applying it self thereunto by desire, reduces into Practice. As the Theorical habit of an Art differs not from the Practical, and the conclusion of a Syllo∣gism is only a dependance upon its two Premisses. Wherefore the Will, which is the practice of the Understandings speculati∣on, and a result of its ratiocination, is not distinguish'd from the Understanding; and to know good, to desire and seek means to possess it, are operations continu'd by one sole moti∣on. Besides, to separate the actions of the Souls faculties, and make them independent one of another, would infer a kind of divisibility in the Soul: but the Will being only a desire, every desire a species of motion, and motion an accident; it is sepa∣rable from its subject, the Understanding, whereof 'tis only an affection and propiety. So that the Intellect and the Will being the same thing, when the former is carried towards an appre∣hended good, we say it moves the Will, as it doth the other powers which it employs in quest of that good, when the same is external and it cannot attain to it by it self.

The Second said, That to know, to will, and to be able, although of the same extent in things purely natural (as in a Stone, whose knowledge, desire, and power to tend to its centre are the same thing) yet are different actions in rational agents. For oftentimes we know without willing, and will what we can∣not do; and sometimes we know not that which we would: Oftentimes we will things not only without, but even against Reason; witness the irregular Appetite of breeding Women

and Green-sickness Maids. Wherefore these actions being dif∣ferent, the Faculties from which they proceed, the Intellect, Will and Motive Faculty, must be wholly distinct; seeing their two adequate Objects, which specifie Faculties, are consider'd under divers formal Reasons, which are the sole Causes of the distinction of Faculties. For Entity immaterial and spiritual, is, as true and intelligible, the object of the Understanding; but, as good and desirable, 'tis the object of the Will: which are two wholly different formal Reasons. Now though the In∣tellect and the Will are two different Faculties, yet there is such a dependance between them that the one can do nothing with∣out the other, and they communicate mutual assistance: the Understanding supplies Reasons and Counsels, which the Will causes the Powers under its dominion to execute: for 'tis a blind Queen, having no knowledg of her own but only what light she receives from the Intellect. But how can it see the same, if blind, as 'tis fancied? We answer, that as all things have a bent and natural inclination to their proper good, though they know it not (as even the Intellect assents to a truth known by ratiocination, but knows not why it assents to a first Principle, as, That the whole is greater then its part, and that 2 and 1 make 3; these being connate Notions) so the Will is carried to the Good propos'd to it by the Understanding, because the goodness and sutableness thereof engage it to endeavours of en∣joying it, wherein its supream Felicity lyes.

The Third said, Since the Will is a desire, every desire a mo∣tion, and every motion from some other (nothing moving it self); the Will cannot desire unless mov'd by some superior power and knowledg: For as there is no desire without know∣ledg, so, to the end this may not be idle and unprofitable, Na∣ture hath joyn'd an Appetite to it; to wit, a Sensitive Appetite to the knowledg of a Sensible Good apprehended such by the Imagination, which is common to Men and Brutes; and a Rati∣onal Appetite (the Will) to the knowledg of an honest Good apprehended such by the Understanding. And whereas imma∣terial things cannot be known by themselves but by such as are sensible and corporeal, we cannot better judge of the manner whereby the Intellect moves the Will, then by that whereby the Imagination moves the Sensitive Appetite; which is the sweetness of the Object, whose Species being receiv'd by some one of the outward Senses, and carried from the Common sense to the Phansie which relishes the same to the full, is then pro∣pos'd to the Sensitive Appetite, which presently flyes to it, of∣tentimes so impetuously as that it hurries the Reason and the Will along with it self, and constrains them to yield to the vio∣lence of those Passions which it excites to joyn with it in pursuit of that good, and which itre doubles upon the occurrence of any obstacle to its designs. In like sort the Will is carried of it self to a vertuous action, when the Understanding represents the honesty

of the same to it; provided it be not otherwise prepossess'd, and the said action be not accompani'd with difficulties and thorns, as commonly happens; for then that Sensitive Appetite often∣times gets the better of Reason; the Flesh, of the Spirit. There is this difference between the motions of the Will and the Appe∣tite, that the latter necessarily follows the duct of the Imagina∣tion, by which 'tis inclin'd inspite of it self towards a Delectable Good; but the Will (common to us with Angels) is so mov'd by the Intellect, that nevertheless it always remains mistress of its own actions, and can do either good or evil by vertue of its liberty, which alone discriminates Man from Beast, and gives him right of empire and command, (which the Civilians define, a power of making use of any thing at one's pleasure;) and with∣out which not only Judgments, Vertues, Vices, Rewards and Punishments, Praises and Dispraises, Consultations and Delibe∣rations would be useless; but also all Laws would be to no pur∣pose, Man would be in worse condition then Brutes, over whom he hath no other advantage but that of Reason; which would serve for nothing if he acted things necessarily, as other Agents do, and not freely and voluntarily.

The Fourth said, He had always accounted it a vain enquiry, how the Understanding moves the Will; and the Senses, the Sensitive Appetite towards their Objects; because the Cognos∣citive Faculty, and these Appetites being really distinct and ha∣ving nothing common, there cannot intervene any commerce between them. They are Officers that have severed charges, without having any thing to share or dispatch together. Never∣theless it being true that we love nothing but what is first ap∣prehended and judg'd amiable, we must seek this dependance somwhat higher. Now all actions are of the whole Composi∣tum; and consequently Man, who is the whole, is he who by his knowledg either of Sense or of the Intellect, judges what both the one and the other Appetite ought to embrace or reject. Then after he hath pass'd his judgment by his Cognoscitive Fa∣culty, he determines himself to follow by his Appetite what he hath judg'd fit to be done; in consequence whereof he applies his Motive Faculty to the execution of his Resolution. So that 'tis Man that moves himself by his Will towards Good or Evil, to pursue or avoid, after he hath consider'd what he ought to will, how, and in what sort to comport himself. By this means we obviate a world of difficulties arising from this Question, and resolve many; as, amongst others, How the Understanding comes to illuminate corporeal phantasms, without establishing an Intellectus Agens for that purpose, whose office is pretended to sublime those phantasms by denudating them of their singu∣larity and materiality, that so they may become actually intel∣ligible and proportionate to the Intellect. For, besides that 'tis impossible to conceive how any spiritual light can fall from the Intellect upon a corporeal phantasm; (that which is corporeal

being incapable of receiving any thing spiritual, and the Intellect of producing any thing out of it self, since all its actions are imma∣nent:) we are deliver'd from all this trouble by saying, that in the state of this present life Man by his outward and inward Senses takes in as much knowledg of things as they can give him, and afterwards by his Understanding deduces and infers things which the phantasms alone could not acquaint him with. Thus when a phantasm represents to him a thing which his eye beholds afar off, he by his Understanding judges the same a Substance, be∣cause the phantasm shews him that it subsists of it self; if he see it walk, he judges it alive; So that 'tis sufficient to the drawing of all his Consequences that he infer from the phantasms what they are capable to represent to him, without need of spiritua∣lizing them, or of commerce between them and the Intellect. In like manner, 'tis not needful that the Intellect shew the Will its Object; but the man's seeing it, is sufficient to cause him to move himself by his Will towards the Good which he appre∣hends. For as a King hath his Scouts to discover the state of his Enemies, upon whose report he holds a Council of War, where∣in he resolves what is to be done. So Man by his Senses disco∣vers the nature of Objects, as by so many Spies, which make their report to the Imagination; after which the Understanding judges of the same; and lastly, the Man resolves and deter∣mines by his Will. Thus 'tis the Man that makes all this pro∣gress, employing all his Faculties diversly for that purpose. And as 'twere impertinent to ask how the Scouts and Council of War acted and mov'd the Troops which execute the General's resolution to make them fight; but it suffices to say, That 'tis his Order: So 'tis absurd to inquire how the Senses or Under∣standing move the Appetite or the Will; 'tis sufficient to say, That a Man resolves to will▪ after cognisance of the matter.

The Fifth said, That that which moves the Will, is something divine and more excellent then Reason, namely, that part of the Intellect, which is the knowledg of First Principles, and is to the Soul what she is to the Body which she informs. This appears in all the Will's actions; whereof those that tend to the End are, to Will, to Desire, to Enjoy, when the said End is a Good, and is either absent or present; not to Will, to Flee, to be Sad, when the said End is an Evil, and that consider'd too either as absent or present: those which respect the means lead∣ing to such End are, To Chuse, to Consent, and to Employ some rather then others. All which actions it cannot exert of it self, but being mov'd by that divine power of the Intellect which represents to it the goodness of the End, and the sutable∣ness of the Means for attaining the same: in like manner as the End moves the efficient Cause, attracting it to its prosecution by an improper and metaphorical Motion.

The Sixth said, As the Will is mov'd by the Intellect, so is the Intellect mov'd reciprocally by the Will, which commands

it to divide, define, abstract and perform its operations in such and such manner. Yea, there is no Faculty but is subject to its empire. It commands the Imagination to frame Idea's and Species; the Memory, to recall and represent them; the Mo∣tive Faculty, to speak, walk, and the like other actions; the Sensitive Appetite, to love, hate, be angry, to raise and ap∣pease its passions; though many times these are deaf to its dictats.

The Seventh said, Since the Rational Soul is a simple Form, and every Form a perfection of the subject wherein it resides; that of Man being to know Truth, to love Good, and to be united to both by Fruition: the same Soul when it knows, is call'd the Intellect; when it desires or loves the thing known, the Will. So that there is no need for the one to be mov'd by the other; for 'tis the Soul that moves it self, which therefore Aristotle calls Entelechia, and the Principle of motion; the Py∣thagoreans, a Self-moving number.

The Eighth said, That the Will depends not any way on the Intellect, and consequently is not mov'd by it. Which is prov'd, first, because the Will is mutable and oftimes contrary, upon the same ratiocination; as it would not be, if it were mov'd by the Understanding. For if the Will were, according to Aristotles definition, a desire of good with reason, the one ought always to follow the other. But it not doing so, 'tis an argument, that the Will hath another principle then the ratiocination. In the second place, as it was lately argu'd, there are amities of In∣clination, properly so call'd, because not grounded upon any Reason; and therefore the Will, which never exercises its do∣minion more freely then in Love, follows not the Intellect in that kind of amities, and consequently is not mov'd by it. Thirdly, whatever the Civilians say, Fools and Children have their Wills, as well as the Wiser and Elder; yea both the for∣mer Will, as resolvedly as the latter: and Women, who we say have less judgment then Men, are yet more self-will'd and ob∣stinate then they. On the contrary, the most judicious are commonly the least resolute, and find most difficulties in wil∣ling. An Emperick and ignorant Physician will be bolder and resolve things more pertinaciously then an old experienc'd Me∣thodist. A young and giddy Captain will sooner tell his opi∣nion, which is the issue of his Will, then an old beaten Soul∣dier who doubts of every thing, and labours much to bring himself to a resolution. But the contrary would happen, if the Will follow'd the Duct of the Judgment. Wherefore I con∣ceive rather that the Will moves the Understanding as well as all the other Faculties; since no body can reason inspite of him∣self, but he must will to set his Mind upon a thing before the In∣tellect can make its reviews.

The Ninth said, The best course was, rather to salve the Opinions of the School by some Expedient, then wholly to

depart from them, as a way too difficult to keep; and that he conceiv'd it better to untye the Gordian knot then to cut it; which belongs only to Alexander. 'Tis acknowledg'd that the Intellect and the Will are two Faculties of the Rational Soul; that we will nothing unless the judgment believe it good, whe∣ther it be really or only apparently such. But the difficulty is concerning the means that the Intellect employs to carry the Will to such good. Take it thus: The Will is carri'd of it self to good, as a Stone to the Centre; but as this Stone is some∣times hinder'd from arriving thereunto by obstacles which stay it; so Ignorance puts a bar to the Will. Hereupon the Under∣standing falls to work till it have remov'd that obstacle by its reasoning: Which done, as there is nothing between the end of a shadow, and the beginning of light; so there is nothing be∣tween the end of our ignorance, and the beginning of our voliti∣on: where the operation of the Understanding ends, there be∣gins that of the Will, no more induc'd, mov'd, and as little forc'd as the weight that tends downwards, which cannot be said carri'd towards the Centre, unless improperly, by him that takes away the piece of wood or other obstacle that stop'd it in the Air. Moreover, it were no longer a Will, if mov'd by any other principle but it self. As is seen in those who having a will to do somthing, when the same is once commanded them, change their resolution, or do only with regret what before they desir'd with passion: as the same motion which was natural to the Stone, becomes violent to it when it is impell'd, instead of being suffer'd to descend downwards.