Another collection of philosophical conferences of the French virtuosi upon questions of all sorts for the improving of natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent. & J. Davies ..., Gent.

CONFERENCE CXIX. Of Love by Inclination, or Sympathy. (Book 119)

'TIs not only amongst the Poets that Love is blind, the ob∣scurity of this causes evidencing him no less so amongst the Philosophers, who assign two sorts of it; one of Know∣ledge, which tends to a good known; the other of Inclinati∣on, whereby we love without knowing why. Indeed there is no love without ground, and some sort of knowledge; but yet, when the cause obliging us to love is manifest, it makes the former kind of love; when obscure, the latter: whereof we have many examples in nature, not only in the Symbolical qua∣lities of the Elements, Electrical and Magnetical attractions of Stones, particular alliances of Metals, and all the amities of Plants and Trees, as of the female Palm which is said to lean towards the male, and those which are found amongst Animals; but especially in the particular inclinations of some Persons to others unknown and void of all recommendations to qualifie them for the same, and the emotions some have felt both in Soul and Body at the first sight of their unknown Parents: as also of a contrary effect, when a dead body bleeds upon the presence of its Murderer; which is a testimony of an antipathetical ha∣tred contrary to the abovesaid Love, which we find in our selves almost upon all occurrences; as when two equally strangers play at Tennis, we wish that one may win and the other lose. For the first motions of Love, as well as of all other Passions, are not in our power, and afford not the Mind time to deliberate and make reflexion upon them. Hence oftentimes, Anger, Sad∣ness, Panick fright, and such other Passions seise upon us without cause; and Love doth the like frequently, without any appa∣rent reason. Yea, we may say, there is no Love of Knowledg but what took its first rise from that of Inclination, which presently makes us enamor'd of the proportions of a Face, which dis∣pleases another that understands the same as well as we, but without being any way affected therewith, because he finds not in it that correspondence and sympathetical resemblance that produces a Love of Inclination, which may also arise without any knowledge, as in that blind man who lov'd a Lass whom he had never seen; as also in Petrarch who made so many Verses upon his Lawra, whom he could never behold; The cause

whereof I should attribute to the power of the Imagination, which fancies somthing of loveliness where there is none; or else to the sole action of the Will, which not able to remain neuter between love and hatred (since its action is to will, and to will is to love) when it meets no cause of hatred in an object, loves it; and hates it, when it finds nothing amiable therein. For if you assign the reason of this love to the transpiration of Spirits issuing out of the lov'd person's body, their substance is too volatile to act so far off; and their issuing being never alike, (because the pores of the skin are more stopt at one time then at another) this love would be remarkably alter'd every moment. Besides, we many times love by an inclination an ab∣sent person for his merit; and many have been enamour'd of Beauties at the first sight of their Pictures; but love was never produc'd between two blind persons, notwithstanding any emis∣sion of sympathetical Spirits. Moreover, 'tis the Species and not the Spirits that are receiv'd by our Senses; and so none should ever love those they had not seen, but by a Prospective-glass.

The Second said, That it imports not much to the causing of love, whether the object be really or only imaginarily good; and indeed our minds seem to interess themselves more in the pursute and preservation of the latter then the former, which maintains it self by its proper worth. Wherefore if Love of Inclination presuppose goodness in the object, the same must be apprehended either by the Imagination or by some other Facul∣ty, to which it must therefore be approximated either imme∣diately by it self, or by it self. So the sweetness of Honey makes it self perceptible to the Tongue by it self: but the proportion of a fair countenance cannot make it self known but by its spe∣cies, which is the picture and representation of it. This way, is produc'd the Love of Inclination as well as that of Know∣ledge; only with this difference, that the Species which pro∣duce the former, act imperceptibly, and more suddenly then those that produce the latter, which is more deliberate and rational.

The Third said, There are but two sorts of Love; one, im∣proper and Metaphorical; the other, proper and formal. That precedes Knowledg, and is an Instinct inclining natural things to their proper good: This follows Knowledg as its guide, and is the first Expansion of the Heart, pleasing it self with the good it likes. And as that is diffus'd over all Creatures, so this is re∣strain'd only to the sensible and rational. The Appetite, whence the former proceeds, is immers'd and incorporated in the na∣ture of every thing, and not distinguish'd from the faculties and powers they have to act. But the latter, ariseth from the Ap∣petite properly so call'd, whose functions or motions are the ele∣ven Passions, to which as many acts correspond in the Rational Appetite. The Question cannot be concerning that improper

Appetite; for then Stones should have Love, as well as Instinct, towards their Centre; but of the true and proper Love subse∣quent to Knowledg, which gives Amability to good, as Light doth Visibility to colours. Wherefore they who talk of cer∣tain Spirits issuing out of the lov'd person's body into the eyes of the Lover, and seising upon the heart, without falling un∣der knowledge, seem ignorant of the nature of Love. For should such spirits arrive at the heart without being observ'd; yet they must come out thence again to be known before they can cause Love; as we cannot know any thing that is in the soul, unless it come first out thence and become sensible; since no∣thing is in the Understanding but what pass'd through the Sense. So a man cannot know his own face but by reflection from a Looking-glass without him. For the Soul at our Nativity is like a smooth table or white-sheet of Paper, and thence its pri∣mitive notions during this present state is by Phantasms sup∣plied to us by our Senses. Now the essential reason of this de∣pendance which keeps Love subject to Knowledg, is, that the Appetite, which is the Principle of Love, is only a Passion or Propriety of the thing wherein it is; but the Principle of Knowledge is an essential degree of Nature. Hence, Souls are distinguish'd by Cognition, not by Appetite: we call the Sensitive Soul, so, from the knowledg of Sense, which consti∣tutes its essential difference; and the Rational Soul so, because Reason, the principle of Knowledg is a degree of Nature: but Appetite is a propriety which follows it. And being there is the same reason of Actions and their Principles; as the Appetite supposes a principle of Knowledg, so Love, which is the action of the Appetite, supposes actual and clear Knowledg. Hence, there is no love without knowledg. For that we have more phansie to the one of two persons playing then to the other, 'tis because we discern somthing in his face, gestures, or motion that pleases us better. Sympathy (pretended the cause of this love) may indeed be the foundation of it; inasmuch as we naturally love those like our selves; but it can never make us love till we have found in the thing some Je-ne-scay-quoy of lovely. It can∣not be the sole cause of our love, since 'tis of it self impercepti∣ble to our knowledg, and consequently cannot produce love till the effects of such sympathy, to wit, such an Air, such a Motion, and such a Deportment have pleas'd us. And whereas 'tis said that from eyes which behold us attentively we perceive some∣thing come forth that animates us; I answer, that oftentimes quick fix'd and sweet intuitions are tokens of love, from which 'tis no wonder if ours take rise and growth, as from its proper cause; since Love begets Love.