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CONFERENCE CXCVII. What Sect of Philosophers is most to be follow'd. (Book 197)
ALl the Sciences confess Obligations to Philosophy. Divinity draws Ratiocinations from it; Eloquence is diffuse Lo∣gick; and Rhetorick is not to be learnt but after Philosophy. Civil Law, being wholly founded upon Morality, is nothing but an effect of it, whilst it teaches us to do voluntarily what the Laws makes us practise by force. Physick supposes excellent skill in Philosophy, since the Physician begins where the Natu∣ralist ends. Now there are so many Sects of Philosophers, that to follow them all, is to fall into manifest contradictions; and to adhere to one alone, is to be in great danger of mistaking the worst. That which keeps us from being able to make a good choice, is the little knowledge we have of these Sects, and the Probability each seems to have; and therefore 'tis requisite to examine them in general, in order to drawing a general conclu∣sion. And because Saint Augustine cites almost three hundred Opinions touching the Supream Good, and as many may be brought touching other points of the Sciences; I shall only take notice of the famousest Sects, as seeming the most rational, and most follow'd. And let us compare the always contentious Pe∣ripatericks, and the Stoicks together: The end of the former was to contemplate and understand things; the latter, aim'd more to do good than to know it; their design was Speculation, the scope of these Practici. I side with the former, because that Science which embellisheth Man's noblest part, his Understand∣ing, is the most sublime, and consequently, the most consider∣able. And as the Understanding is more excellent than the Will, so is Theory in matter Science than Exercise, Acts of Virtue depending on the Acts of Reason, and those of Reason not de∣pending on those of Liberty. Besides, that is most to be esteem'd, which must render us blessed; and that is the know∣ledge of God, and of the Creatures in God and in themselves, which is to constitute the Beatifick Vision.
The Second said, That Men ought not to get knowledge only to know, but to operate comformably to their knowledge. Truth would be either useless or dangerous, if it lead us not to practise. And though the Will is one Sense subordinate to the Understanding, yet it commands the same in another. To know how to do well, and yet to do ill, is a double crime. And if knowledge alone could make happy, the Devils would be soon in Heaven; since Divines tell us, the least of them, hath more na∣tural knowledge than all Mankind together. Now the Opinion of the Stoicks regulating the Acts of our Wills, and composing our Manners suitable to Reason, seems to place the steps which