Another collection of philosophical conferences of the French virtuosi upon questions of all sorts for the improving of natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent. & J. Davies ..., Gent.

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Title
Another collection of philosophical conferences of the French virtuosi upon questions of all sorts for the improving of natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent. & J. Davies ..., Gent.
Author
Bureau d'adresse et de rencontre (Paris, France)
Publication
London :: Printed for Thomas Dring and John Starkey and are to be sold at their shops ...,
1665.
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Philosophy, French -- 17th century.
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http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A69471.0001.001
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"Another collection of philosophical conferences of the French virtuosi upon questions of all sorts for the improving of natural knowledg made in the assembly of the Beaux Esprits at Paris by the most ingenious persons of that nation / render'd into English by G. Havers, Gent. & J. Davies ..., Gent." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A69471.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 17, 2024.

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Page 334

CONFERENCE CXCVII. What Sect of Philosophers is most to be follow'd. (Book 197)

ALl the Sciences confess Obligations to Philosophy. Divinity draws Ratiocinations from it; Eloquence is diffuse Lo∣gick; and Rhetorick is not to be learnt but after Philosophy. Civil Law, being wholly founded upon Morality, is nothing but an effect of it, whilst it teaches us to do voluntarily what the Laws makes us practise by force. Physick supposes excellent skill in Philosophy, since the Physician begins where the Natu∣ralist ends. Now there are so many Sects of Philosophers, that to follow them all, is to fall into manifest contradictions; and to adhere to one alone, is to be in great danger of mistaking the worst. That which keeps us from being able to make a good choice, is the little knowledge we have of these Sects, and the Probability each seems to have; and therefore 'tis requisite to examine them in general, in order to drawing a general conclu∣sion. And because Saint Augustine cites almost three hundred Opinions touching the Supream Good, and as many may be brought touching other points of the Sciences; I shall only take notice of the famousest Sects, as seeming the most rational, and most follow'd. And let us compare the always contentious Pe∣ripatericks, and the Stoicks together: The end of the former was to contemplate and understand things; the latter, aim'd more to do good than to know it; their design was Speculation, the scope of these Practici. I side with the former, because that Science which embellisheth Man's noblest part, his Understand∣ing, is the most sublime, and consequently, the most consider∣able. And as the Understanding is more excellent than the Will, so is Theory in matter Science than Exercise, Acts of Virtue depending on the Acts of Reason, and those of Reason not de∣pending on those of Liberty. Besides, that is most to be esteem'd, which must render us blessed; and that is the know∣ledge of God, and of the Creatures in God and in themselves, which is to constitute the Beatifick Vision.

The Second said, That Men ought not to get knowledge only to know, but to operate comformably to their knowledge. Truth would be either useless or dangerous, if it lead us not to practise. And though the Will is one Sense subordinate to the Understanding, yet it commands the same in another. To know how to do well, and yet to do ill, is a double crime. And if knowledge alone could make happy, the Devils would be soon in Heaven; since Divines tell us, the least of them, hath more na∣tural knowledge than all Mankind together. Now the Opinion of the Stoicks regulating the Acts of our Wills, and composing our Manners suitable to Reason, seems to place the steps which

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must raise us to the highest pitch of Felicity. Wherefore I con∣clude, that the Curious may follow the first Sect of these, name∣ly, the Peripateticks; but good men must necessarily adhere to that of the Stoicks.

The Third said, That there are three other Sects which seem to comprize all the rest, and therefore not to be omitted in this important choice: First, the Pyrrhonians, who doubt of all things, and say, There is no knowledge of any thing. Secondly, Those that doubt of nothing, but think they know every thing. Thirdly, Those who are neither in doubt, nor in perfect certain∣ty, but in search of Truth. The first do found their Opinion up∣on this receiv'd Maxim, That there is nothing in the Understand∣ing but what pass'd through the Senses; and these being fallaci∣ous, our Notions must be so too; That being we perceive not the essence of things, we cannot say that we know any thing. But these people may be answer'd, That since they have not so much as a knowledge of their doubts, they cannot make the same pass for a demonstrative maxim; if they think they have such a knowledge, they must grant that there is knowledge of some thing; and if of doubts, why not of certainties. Moreover, if the Senses be always fallacious, it will follow that there are Powers, which acting without impediment, never attain their end; and if our Understanding be always abus'd, 'tis in worse case than the faculties of Brutes, who acquiesce in embracing their Objects. In brief, these dreamers cannot be ignorant that themselves exist, because they act, and that existence is the foundation of all action. Nor are those that think they know every thing much more intelligent; the former offend against Truth, by deny∣ing it; these, by thinking it their sole Mistress. They argue, that since the Understanding is the Subject of the Intelligible Spe∣cies, which contain (they say) either actually or potentially the impressions of all Objects, it follows that as soon as we frame a Notion, we know all things. But I ask these Knowing Men, What Truths they know so easily, which other Wits hold so difficult to be known, Whether created or uncreated Verity? The former is knowable only to it self; we may demonstrate, That it is, but not What it is in its own Nature. And how many errors have there been concerning the Nature of that Sole, Necessary, and true Being? And as for the latter, we know not the Truth of Essences, but by their Accidents; and these by Species which are very often perverted, either in the Medium, or the Organ. But how can we know other things perfectly, whereas we know not our Selves? We know that we act, but we know not how; so that the Opinion of those that profess only to seek Truth, is the best and surest, though it ingageth us to continual labour; and be the punishment said by the Holy Scripture to be inflicted upon Men, both to satisfie and chastise their Curiosity. Now Action is the Life of the Soul, and that Science which keeps the Mind always awake, is justly preferrable before that which

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renders so good an Agent idle, and impoverishes it by perswading it that it hath riches enough already. Besides, all Men are of this Opinion, either directly or indirectly: And Dissenters themselves, seek Reasons every day to maintain it. Astrologers still endeavor to discover new Stars, Chymists new Secrets, Phy∣sicians new Remedies, and Philosophers new Opinions.

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