A philosophicall essay towards an eviction of the being and attributes of God. Immortality of the souls of men. Truth and authority of Scripture. together with an index of the heads of every particular part.

SECT. IV.

The same further demon∣strated from the seve∣rall acts of the Soule, from simple Apprehen∣sions.

HAving demonstrated the souls of men to be incorporeall substan∣ces, from the comparison of their pro∣perties with the affections of bodies, and therein finding no agreement or correspondency, and moreover from the generall way of our operations, which could not possibly proceed from variety, or subtilest applications of bodily substances. It remains that at this time we consider the severall kindes of the cogitations of men, and

from the

• Simple apprehension,
• Judgement,
• Discourse,

conclude the immortality thereof.

First of all from simple apprehensi∣on, which is the first operation of the understanding of man both in nature and time, and is the taking in of sim∣ple objects into the minde, and so fur∣nishing it with materials for judgement and discourse; we shall finde then the souls incorporeity if we shall but re∣flect upon such simple Ideas in it self which represent things in themselves incorporeall, for a corporeall thing can neither be the Idea of an incorpo∣reall being, neither can an incorpore∣all, immateriall be subjected in a ma∣teriall or corporeall: we found be∣fore that the application of bodies could not perform that which we call the sense of bodies, much lesse then can that produce in us Ideas incorpo∣reall, yet such and very many such we finde to be within our souls.

We finde in our selves Ideas of spi∣rituall substances, as of God and Angels and of their simple and incorporeall properties and attributes, it is but re∣turning back and recalling into our re∣membrances those demonstrations of

the severall Attributes of the God∣head, to which we did arise, even from the visible things of this world, and they will satisfie us in this particular: our endeavour there was to demon∣strate the truth of them in themselves, here to consider the way and manner of their objective existence in our ap∣prehensions, and the truth of demon∣stration which satisfies the souls of men: it is that clear agreement be∣twixt the understanding and the ob∣ject, that is, that things be in the un∣derstanding as they are in themselves. We clearly then demonstrated God to be an immateriall substance, where∣fore we gained an apprehension of a substance immateriall and incorporeall, and of immateriall properties, and consequently the notions of the God∣head, and his attributes were in our un∣derstandings incorporeally, and so they are incorporeall.

It cannot here be denied but that in our ordinary and transient thoughts and discourses, we are very apt toge∣ther with spirituall beings to draw in∣to our fancies the images of things cor∣poreall;

for example, when we speak of God we are very apt to have in our fancies the visible heavens, and a re∣presentation of something sitting or acting in them: when we think or speak of Angels we are apt to call to our remembrances the shapes of beau∣tifull winged, aery bodies, and so when we meditate upon Eternity, we are apt to reflect upon the image of time, of the revolution of the Sun and Starres, which are the usuall measures of it, at leastwise of a successive dura∣tion of things, and there are diverse of us which terminate our thoughts in these images, and never obtain a flight beyond them, nor ever come to ob∣serve in our souls the difference be∣twixt imagination and intellectuall ap∣prehension; but yet notwithstanding when we have the patience to stay up∣on the consideration of these objects, and warily attend to that inward light which we bear about us, we presently reject these images from the essence of God, and Angels, and Eternity, and by discourse we strip off these materi∣all and grosse representations, and

finde that the causes why upon such occasions as these they come into our mindes, is, because we commonly hear of them together, and because of those symbolicall expressions of these beings which have delivered to us the know∣ledge of these. God Almighty cals himself the ancient of daies, and it is not our custome to imagine any thing but cloathed with circumstances, in some place, and the place that is usu∣ally mentioned with God, it is the hea∣vens, and those heavens which are the object of our senses and imagination, it is the place of the Sunne, and Moon, and Starres; and so we are apt to form to our selves an image of God, or at least through incogitancy to let slip in∣to our thoughts a fancy of some reve∣rend image sitting above the Firma∣ment.

Thus likewise the descriptions of the Angels, they are usually made to us in Scriptures by such representations: we see nothing fairer then our own kinde, and so we conceive of them in the fairest shapes we can imagine, (and contrariwise of the devils in the most

ugly) assigning to them wings, be∣cause under such forms the notion of of them is veiled to us.

And yet at the same time we know, and can perhaps demonstrate evident∣ly, that if God were a body, he could not be a God, that is, that the proper∣ties of a bodily substance can no way agree with that notion of the God-head, which is immoveably fastened in the very essence of our souls.

We know habitually that the nature and essense of the Angels that stood, it is the same with those that fell a∣way; however we have fair and plea∣sant imaginations usually when we speak of those of light; and foul, and ugly, when we think of those that are in chains of utter darknesse: however the name of Michael and his Arch-An∣gels recall into our mindes the images of the fairest of the children of men, and that of Beelzebub the Image of a Dragon.

So likewise the common measure of the duration of things, wherewith we usually converse, they are hours and daies, and moneths, and years, and these are made by the revolution of the

sun, and of the starres, and those are attended with severall positions of them in respect of themselves, and us with light and darkness, cold and heat, Winter and Summer, and those other vicissitudes, and speaking of Eternity we presently think of a long continu∣ance, and so call into our imaginati∣on a long continued series of these re∣volutions and vicissitudes; whereas yet we know that where there is a vicissi∣tude there is a priority, and where there is a priority there must be a beginning, and where there was a beginning that was not eternall: 'tis plain that if in eternity there were such parts as daies and years, there must be as many millions of years, as minutes, and so that a minute were equall really to a thou∣sand years, and so it follows clearly that Eternity even in our notion is an infinite and undivided unsuccessive du∣ration.

These examples are sufficient to shew the difference betwixt the intelle∣ctuall apprehension of things, and the imagination which accompanies

our superficiall thoughts, our slight and cursory taking them to our mindes and to illustrate that, however in our fancies we may have corporeall repre∣sentations, attending upon these spiri∣tuall beings, yet the Idea's whereby the understanding apprehends those simple essences, are incorporeall, and conse∣quently the understanding part of man is incorporeall.