A seventh letter, concerning the sacred Trinity occasioned by a second letter from W.J. / by John Wallis ...

A Seventh LETTER Concerning the Sacred Trinity.

IN a Postscript to my Sixth Letter (which should have been Printed with it; but came, it seems, too late, after all the Sheets were Printed off,) I gave notice, That I had received from London the Night before (March 27.) another Letter from W. I. of a like import with his former; but somewhat fuller.

That, what in it did directly concern me, was but Ex∣pressions of Thanks, Respect, and Approbation. For which I knew not how otherwise (than by such a way) to return him my acknowledgment: Because he did nei∣ther signifie who he is that writes; nor do I know any in London, to who's Name the Letters W. I. do be∣long.

That, there were Reflections in it, on some Expressi∣ons of a Learned Author: which Expressions I do not see that I am at all engaged to defend: And did there∣fore wave them.

That, to say, The three Divine Persons, are Three In∣telligent

Beings (three substantial Beings, three Spirits,) Re∣ally Distinct, (though mutually conscious,) is more, he thinks, than that Learned Author needed to have said; (And I think so too:) And that it is more Safe, to be less Posi∣tive and Particular, as to what the Scripture leaves in the dark. And his Answer (I think) would not have been less valid, (against those he undertakes to answer,) though such Expressions were omitted.

That, I did forbear to publish that Letter without his Order; because I was loth to engage the Learned Wri∣ter thereof in a Publick Dispute against that Learned Au∣thor, unless he please.

Since which time; considering, that the Postscript came too late to be Printed with that Letter of mine; and, that the Letter of this Reverend Divine (for such I take him to be by the contents of it,) seems to be penned with that care and caution, as if he were willing to have it publick; and without any intimation of Di∣slike for my having published his former Letter in like Circumstances: I have thought not amiss (nor unagree∣able to his mind) to publish this also. Which is as fol∣loweth: (supplying the Date from the Post-mark at London, denoting what day it was given-in to the Post-Office there.)

For the Reverend Dr. Wallis, Professor of Geometry, at Oxford.

London, March 24. 1690-91.

SIR,

YOur Repeated Letters, give me a just occasion of Repeat∣ing my hearty Thanks to you. And I hope you will give me leave to join both my good Wishes and Endeavours to promote that Moderation which you seem to Aim at, in stating the Mysterious Truths concerning the Trinity. Me∣thinks we might be easily perswaded to this; by the Difficulties which all men find in conceiving those Mysteries: Especi∣ally the Consequences which some make from them; and im∣pose upon us as Certain and Sacred Truths.

Sir, Because I would have you lose as little of your Time as may be in reading my Letters; I will enter immediately upon the Subject proposed; and consider, not some lesser Nice∣ties, but the Two Main Points in the Doctrine of the Tri∣nity; and the Difficulties which our Vnderstandings represent to us in the Conception of them.

The Two Main Points are these: The Unity of the God∣head, notwithstanding the Distinction of Three Persons: And the Equality of those Three Persons, notwithstanding their Derivation one from another.

Concerning the Divine Persons; The Hypothesis which we referred to formerly (and shall still follow) asserts these Three Things. First, That they are Three Beings (or Three In∣telligent Beings) Really Distinct. Secondly, That they are Three Substantial Beings, Really Distinct. Thirdly,

That they are Three Infinite Minds, or Three Holy Spi∣rits, Really Distinct. And to these, I think, we may of course add a Fourth Character, That they are Three Compleat Beings, really Distinct.

They are not Inadequate or Partial Beings. For a Spirit infinite in Perfection, as each of these is represented, can want nothing to compleat its Being or Perfection.

Let us now, if you please, run over these Characters; and observe the most obvious Difficulties, that occurr to our Minds in the Conception of them.

For the first, Three Beings really distinct. According to the plain Tract of humane Reason, Every real Being hath its Essence; (that is the Basis it stands upon, as distinguished from Non-Entity, or a Fictitious Being). And every Distinct Being hath its Distinct Essence: I mean, Numerically di∣stinct. And therefore, according to this Principle, there ought to be Three distinct Essences in the Godhead, seeing there are Three Beings, there, really distinct.

Furthermore; If you give one single Essence to Three Be∣ings really distinct, you must either Divide it, or Multiply it. Either each of these Beings must have a Piece of this Essence; and then you Divide it: or each must have the Whole; and then, being but one Whole, you cannot give it to Three without Multiplying of it.

This is still made more difficult to conceive, when the Au∣thor allows these Three to be as Distinct as Peter, James, and John. For if they be as Distinct as Peter, James and John; they are One but as Peter, James and John. For every degree of Distinction takes away a degree of Vnity: As every degree of Heat, takes away a degree of Cold.

We proceed to the second Character. The Three Divine Persons, are Three Substantial Beings, Really distinct. That is, in plain English, are Three Substances Really di∣stinct. As a Spiritual Being is a Spirit; a Corporeal Be∣ing, a Body: so a Substantial Being is a Substance; (put∣ting

onely Two Words for One.) And the Author must un∣derstand it so; because he makes them Three Spirits afterwards: and therefore they must be Three Substances.

Besides, what are they, 'pray, if not Substances? they can∣not be Modes, or bare Relations. I know some Platonists call them Super-Substances. Or, if you will think them lower, and call them Semi-Substances, (as some Philosophers do their Substantial Forms:) All this is but playing with Words. For there is nothing represented to our Faculties, but as Sub∣stances, Modes, or Relations; excepting what is meerly No∣tional.

And the Learned Author must not debar us the use of the Word Substance, under pretence that it sounds Corporeally. For two Creeds make use of it: and the Scripture it self, upon a fair interpretation, Heb. 1. 3.

To proceed therefore. Here are Three Substances Really Distinct, whereof each is a God (pag. 47. l. 13. p. 98. l. 23.) and yet there is but One God. This is very hard to conceive, as contrary to all our Idea's of Number and Nu∣meration.

'Tis true, we may conceive these Three Substances, in strict Vnion one with another, notwithstanding their real Distin∣ction. But Union is one thing, and Unity is another. For Vnity excludes all Plurality and Multiplicity; which Vnion doth not, but rather supposes it. Vnity also, in simple Na∣tures, excludes all Compositions: which Vnion, on the con∣trary, always Implies, in one kind or other.

Accordingly; Substances, upon Vnion, are not Confounded or Identified, or brought to Vnity of Substance: But, conti∣nuing numerically distinct Substances, acquire some Commu∣nity or Communication of Operations: namely, of such Acti∣ons and Passions as they are respectively capable of.

Let us consider Instances of these things, in the chief uni∣ons that are known to us. Our Soul and Body are two Sub∣stances really distinct, and in close Vnion with one another:

But, notwithstanding this, they continue distinct Substances under that Vnion. In like manner, the Humane Soul of Christ is in Vnion with the Logos, or second Person of the Trinity, which we call an Hypostatical Union: But neither doth this Vnion make any Vnity of Substance; for the two substances of the Divine and Humane Natures, continue Distinct under that Vnion. Which must not be allowed in the Vnity of the Godhead, where there can be no Plurality or Multiplicity of Substances.

The Learned Author does acknowledge (p. 87, 97.) that these three Substances, if they were separate, would be three Gods: but being Inseparate and Inseparable, they make but One. This is again uneasy to conceive, that Substances Re∣ally Distinct, should not be separable. For the notion of a Substance, is, of that which may subsist by it self: And what mark have we of separability but Real Distinction? Things that are only Modally or Notionally distinct, we allow cannot subsist separate: But if they be Really distinct, as Substances, why may they not be separated Really? When we have proved, the Real Distinction of the Soul and the Body, as two Sub∣stances; we think we have sufficient ground to assert the Sepa∣rability of the Soul from the Body. And from the same Rea∣son, we assert the Parts of Matter to be Separable, as being Really distinct Substances, let their Vnion be otherwise what it will. For, if our Faculties be true, what things we clearly conceive Really distinct (ut res & res) may (possibly) be se∣parated. Clear and Distinct Conception being to us the rule of Partibility.

But however! Suppose, if you please, this Vnion Indissolu∣ble; this does not change it into Vnity. If the Soul of Man was made to be in Perpetual Conjunction with Matter, as some Platonists affirm: that doth not make Matter and the Soul, One and the same substance; nor Matter cease to be Matter, or the Soul a Spirit. So, if you suppose these three Divine Substances to be under an Indissoluble Vnion; that doth not

make them cease to be three Substances, but, it makes them, Three Substances in an Indissoluble Vnion.

What the learned Authour says concerning Matter and Ex∣tension, may be returned upon him in reference to the God∣head. (p. 80. l. 9, 10.) He supposes Extension to consist of Parts, if they be only Assignable parts, whether they can be divided or not: so, say we, (according to this opinion) The Godhead may consist of several Substances, if they be only As∣signable Substances, whether they can be Divided or not: And you may as Distinctly Assign, by your Vnderstanding, Three Substances in the Godhead, that of the Father, that of the Son, and that of the Holy Ghost; as you may Assign Three Parts in a Physical Atome, by A. B. C.

Lastly, There is no Substance lost or destroyed in this or any other Vnion, Dissoluble, or Indissoluble: Therefore, as to Substances, they are the same, whether in Conjunction or Separation.

We come unto the Third Character. (pag. 50. 166. 258. see also p. 93.) The Three Divine Persons are Three Infi∣nite Minds, or Three Holy Spirits: And yet but One God. This rises still higher than the former as to its Vnconceivable∣ness. It seems to say and unsay the same thing, with the same breath. An Infinite Spirit is compleatly a God, as to Essence and Attributes: Therefore three such are three Gods. Om∣nis mens infinitè perfecta est Deus; Tres sunt mentes infinitè perfectae; Ergo Tres sunt Dii. Where is the fourth of this Syllogism?

This Character seems to assert Three Infinites: Whereas the Athanasian Creed, which stands at the highest pitch of any, is yet very tender and cautious in giving the number Three to any thing but the Persons. It will not allow three Eternals, nor three Incomprehensibles, nor three Almighties: But, three Infinites include all these.

An Infinite Spirit (as I said before) is a God, (I mean, Infinite in Perfection, as our Authour doth,) And three Spi∣rits,

whereof each is Infinite in Perfection, are Three Gods: As, three Creatures, whereof each is a Rational Animal, are three Men. Both these Propositions go upon the same ground, namely, That the Definition, and the thing Defined, are re∣ciprocal and of the same extent. Now as we have no better De∣finition of a Man, than that he is a Rational Animal; so neither have we a better Definition of a God, than that he is a Spirit infinitely Perfect. And as so many Animals Ratio∣nal, so many Men; so likewise, so many Spirits infinitely per∣fect, so many Gods.

I speak this according to the use of our Faculties. For, what the true and precise state of things is, in themselves, when the question is concerning Infinite Natures, I do not presume to determine.

But thus much, I think, we may safely determine, That in such cases where our Faculties are at a loss, the safest way is to keep close to Revelation and the words of Scripture. And that's the Conclusion I drive at.

Lastly, To put a plain question, which will come into eve∣ry one's mind: Here are Three Spirits infinitely Perfect; ei∣ther they are Gods, or they are Creatures? They must be one of the Two. When we speak of a Spirit infinitely perfect, we describe an absolute, compleat, entire Being. Which must be of some Denomination, either a God, or a Creature; for we know nothing of a middle nature betwixt these.

Possibly they will Answer this by a Distinction; namely, that they are three Gods considered Separately; but considered col∣lectively and in Vnion, they are but One God: And seeing they cannot be really separate, it would be improper to call them Three Gods. But, pray, Why not as properly three Gods, as three Infinite Spirits? seeing these terms, A Spirit infinitely perfect, and A God, are terms equivalent or identical. What partiality is it then to allow the one, and not the other? And if these Infinite Spirits be Inseparable, why do you grant the number Three to that name, and not to the name of Gods?

seeing they are both the same Thing, and equally Insepa∣rable.

We observed before, that this Learned Authour is liberal in his Threes; three Intelligent Beings, three Infinite Minds, three Holy Spirits, three Divine Glories, three Majesties; but not three Kings. 'Tis the Name, it seems, is scrupled, ra∣ther than the Thing.

Sir, I will add no more upon these Heads. But will consi∣der now the grand Principle which is designed to take off all these Difficulties; And that is, mutual Consciousness; whereby all these Threes are made One; and reduced to a per∣fect Numerical Unity.

I need not spend time in telling you what the Author means by mutual Consciousness, nor how he applies it to the present case: You know them both sufficiently. But methinks this Vnitive Principle is defectively expressed, by the word Con∣sciousness. For bare Consciousness, without Consent, is no more than bare Omnisciency. As God is Conscious of all our Thoughts, good or bad; and of all the Devils thoughts; with∣out Vnion, as without Consent. If a good and bad Angel were made mutually Conscious of one anothers mind, they would not thereupon become One, being still of different Wills and Inclinations.

It may be the Author will say, Consciousness involves Consent, as he says, Knowledge involves Power, or is the same with it. But, besides, that I cannot well reconcile the Author to himself in this point, (See P. 9. l. 3, 4. compared with p. 72.) I have given you Instances in a former Letter to the contrary. To which you may add, if you please, this further consideration: If Knowledge be the same thing with Power, then actual Conception is the same thing with actual Execution. And if so, then You and I may sit quietly in our studies, and, with our Thought and Pen, build Palaces, and take Towns and Cities. For we know the Methods of both, and can distinctly conceive them and delineate them. And as these

are not the same thing in us, so neither can we conceive them, in all respects, the same in God. For, from all Eternity, God had a clear Idea of the frame of the World, and of the manner of producing it: therefore, if Gods Conception or Knowledge had been the same with his Power, the World had been produ∣ced from Eternity.

But to proceed, Let us give this Principle its full strength, Consciousness and Consent: they would not together make a perfect Vnity of Operations in the Deity, much less of Substance. We noted before, that Vnity and Vnion are dif∣ferent things. And this is more apparent now, when Three Spirits are to be united into One. For how that can be done without some sort of Composition, is an unconceivable Mystery. You may indeed conceive these Three Spirits, singly and sepa∣rately, as simple Beings: But if you conceive these three sim∣ple Beings united into One (without Annihilation of any one) that One must be a Compound Being, according to our Con∣ceptions.

Then, as to Vnity of Operations: Besides the Energies peculiar to the Father and the Son, this Author allows (p. 67.) that every one of these three Minds, notwithstanding their Vnion, hath some Distinct Consciousness, not common to the other Two: therefore the Godhead, which consists of these Three Minds, cannot be One as a single Mind is One; where there is an intire Community and Sameness of Consciousness, in all Operations.

In my opinion, if this Hypothesis were prest to speak out, the plain language of it would be this; There are Three Di∣vine Substances, three Holy Spirits, infinitely Perfect, and, in truth and reality, three Gods: But, for some Reasons, not fit to be called so. These three Beings, by Similitude of Nature, mutual Consciousness, Consent, Cooperation, are un∣der the greatest Vnion possible; and, in that state of Vnion, do constitute the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Intire All, comprehensive God∣head. This, I confess, books something like a conceivable

thing: But the Christian Trinity does not use to be repre∣sented thus. For this amounts to no more than a kind of Hy∣postatical Vnion of Three Divine Spirits.

Sir, I will trouble you no further upon the first general Head, The Distinction of the Persons. I proceed now to consider the Equality of the Persons. Which I will dispatch in a few Words.

The first Argument against their Equality may be this (pag. 99. l. 29. &c.) The Father is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, self-existen••, self-originated: whereas the other Two are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, exi∣stent and originated from another. Now this cannot but make, according to our Faculties, not only some Difference, but also some Inequality. For 'tis a fundamental Perfection to be self-originated: and what is not so, is not Equal to that which is so.

You will say possibly, Though the Son and Holy-Ghost are produced of the Father, yet 'tis not in such a way as Creatures are produced. That is, by a voluntary External Act; but This, by an Internal, Necessary, and Emanative Act.

We will allow your Distinction; and admit that the Son and Holy-Ghost have a different Origin from that of common Creatures. But this does not remove the Difficulty. It shews indeed a great Difference and Inequality betwixt any of the Di∣vine Persons, and bare Creatures: But it does not shew any Equality amongst the Divine Persons themselves. 'Tis true, the Dependance which a Creature hath upon the Creator for its Being, is of another kind and degree from that of the Son or Holy-Ghost. But however, they are Derivative Beings, in some way or other, and dependent upon the Father. And we cannot but conceive some Inequality betwixt an Original and a Derivative, a Dependent and Independent Being.

Secondly, That Act whereby the Son is Generated by the Fa∣ther, is some Energy and Perfection: Nay, 'tis an Energy of the Highest Perfection; Because the Result of it is the most Perfect Being that can any way be produced; or the Noblest and

Greatest Product in Things. Creation, or that Energy that produceth a Creature, hath not a Term or Effect so Noble or so Great, as that Energy whereby the Son is generated: And consequently it is not so great a Perfection to Create a World, as to Generate the Divine Logos. This being so; there is, you see, not only Self-Origination in the Father, which is not in the Son: but also an Active Perfection of the highest De∣gree possible, in the One, which is not in the other. And therefore we cannot in either respect, conceive these two Be∣ings equal.

Besides, if you make them all three Equal, and all Infinite; they will be Co-ordinate, (I mean internally, & as to perfecti∣on of Nature: For, External Subordination, as to Oecono∣my, signifies nothing in this case.) And are no more One, than three Individuals of the same Species are One; that is, than Peter, James and John are or may be One. And this, I think, was the Doctrine of the Tritheites, or very near it.

Lastly, You may please to reflect upon the various Senti∣ments and Expressions of the Ancients, concerning the Digni∣ty and Preheminence of the Fathers, (which you know are no∣ted by Petavius (de Trin. lib. 2. c. 2. & l. 8. c. 9. §. 15.) and consider their Consistency or Inconsistency with perfect E∣quality.

Sir, As I do not write this with any Disrespect to that Treatise, (which contains many Excellent things:) so neither to represent absolute Truth or Vntruth: But the Difficulty of our conceiving things of an Infinite Nature. From which Consideration I would willingly infer Two Conclusions.

First, That we ought to keep close to Scripture in these Mysterious Doctrines.

Secondly, That we should not impose Consequences hu∣manely made, with the same Rigour as divinely revealed Truths.

The Anti-trinitarian System is not at all suited to my Ge∣nius. Yet I would not stretch our Trinitarian Doctrine so

far, as to set it at a distance from Scripture as well as from Reason. Secret things belong unto the Lord: but those things that are Revealed, belong to us and our Children. Deut. 29. 29. And the Angels, it may be, think us as foolish and ridiculous, for pursuing these Notions, as we think our selves wise and learned in such pursuits.

I am, Sir, with all Sincerity, Your most humble Servant, W. I.

To this Letter, I reply as followeth.

To the Reverend W. J.

SIR,

I Am obliged to you for the Kind and Respectful Cha∣racter, which you are pleased to afford me in Both your Letters. I am not at all displeased (but thank you for it) with a like Moderation in Yours (to what you commend in my Letters) as to the Mysterious Truths concerning the Sacred Trinity: And do fully close with what you say in the Conclusion, That the Angels may think us as Foolish and Ridiculous, for pursuing these Noti∣ons further than they are Revealed, as we think our selves Wise and Learned in such pursuits: Like as You or I should Laugh at a Blind man (who had never seen) that should undertake to Conceive in his Mind, and Express to us in word,) a Distinct and Perfect Notion or Idea of Sight, Light, and Colours.

He may Hear the Noise or Sound of those three Words (supposing him, though Blind, not to be Deaf also,) and may Believe that they signifie Somewhat. But, what that Somewhat is, he cannot Tell; having never had an Idea thereof in his Mind, nor a Perception thereof by his Senses.

And if You or I (from that Notion which our selves have of it) would Explain it to him: We could do it no otherwise than by the Use of such Words (in a sense Analogical) as do properly belong to somewhat of which he hath (from Experience) some Idea.

Sight, we might say, is a certain kind of Sense or Feel∣ing in our Eyes (which we have not in our Hand, Feet, or other parts of our Body,) whereby we can (as it were) Feel with our Eyes, the Shape, Figure, Bigness and Pro∣portion of a Body at a Distance; as we might, with our Hands if within our Reach. Whereby he might Ap∣prehend, that there is some kind of Resemblance be∣tween Seeing and Feeling; but, what indeed it is to See, he cannot comprehend.

Light, we might tell him, is a Necessary Requisite to such a Feeling with our Eyes, as that for want of it (which Want we call Darkness) we can no more so Feel, or Dis∣cover, by our Eyes, such Shape, Figure, or Bigness; than we could, with our Hands, that (suppose) of a Piece of Money locked up in a Box which we could not open; but, by the Admission of such Requisite, we are inabled so to Feel it with our Eyes, as we might with our Hands, if the Box were opened whereby we might come to Handle it.

Colour, we might tell him, is somewhat of such a Na∣ture, as that, on a Plain Board (or the like) on which by our Hand we can Feel nothing but Smooth and Uniform; by it may be Represented (to be so Felt with our Eyes) as great variety of Shapes and Figures, (suppose, of a

Horse, a Bird, a Ship, a House, or any Shape whatever) as by our Hand we might, if we had such Shapes formed in Wood or Stone; and the different Motions of such.

But, after all this, it is not possible for this Blind man, to have that Idea or Notion in his Fancy, of Sight, Light, and Colour, which we have who See.

And it is much more Impossible for Us (who have no Notions in our Mind, other than what we derive, Mediately or Immediately, from Sensible Impressions of Finite Corporeal Beings) to have a Clear and Perfect Notion, of the Nature, Unity, Distinctions or Attri∣butes of an Infinite Spiritual Being; or otherwise to ex∣press them than by some Imperfect Analogies or Resem∣blances with things we are conversant with; and by words in a borrowed sense from such.

I do therefore fully agree with you in your Two Con∣clusions; namely, That it is Safe and Prudent to keep close to Scripture in these Mysterious Doctrines; (since we know nothing of them otherwise than as there Revealed:) And, not to impose Consequences of Humane Deduction, with the like Rigour as Divinely-revealed Truths. For, even in common affairs, when things are represented onely by the Analogy or Resemblance which they bear to some other things; it is seldom that the Similitude is so Abso∣lute between them, but that there is some Dissimilitude likewise. Much more when the Distance is so great as between Finite Corporeal Beings, and what is Infinite and Incorporeal. So that we cannot always argue co∣gently from one to the other.

And therefore the words Nature, Essence, Vnity, Di∣stinction, Father, Son, Person, Beget, Proceed, (and the like,) when applied to God in a borrowed sense from what they properly signifie as applied to Creatures, must not be supposed to signifie just the same, but somewhat Analogous to that of their Primary signification; nor

Consequences thence to be deduced with the same Ri∣gour.

It would be mere Cavilling for any to argue, that, Because Knowledge and Strength are separable in Man; Therefore, what in God we call by those names, are so in God; and that, consequently, it may be Possible for the All-wise God, not to be Almighty; or the Almighty God, not to be All-wise.

So, if we should argue from the manner of our Loca∣lity or Duration, to God's Vbiquity without Extension, and his Eternity without Succession; the Inferences must needs be Lame and Inconsequent. With other Inferences of like nature.

And, (even without proceeding to Infinites) if we sup∣pose a Spirit, or the Soul of Man, to be void of Parts and Local Extension, and therefore (as the Phrase is) tota in toto & tota in qualibet parte of that Space or Matter to which it is compresent: And should yet argue (as you do in a like case) If one single Spirit be compresent with three or more really-distinct Parts of Space or Matter; we must Divide or Multiply it: Either each of these extensive Parts must have a Piece of that Spirit; and then you Divide it: Or, each must have the Whole, and (there being but one Whole) you cannot give it to each, without Multiplying it: Such Inference upon such a Supposition (which Supposition I am loth to think Impossible,) must needs be Lame.

Yet such are commonly the Cavils of those who study to pick Quarrels with the Doctrine of the Trinity as de∣livered in Scripture. And (in particular) though, amongst Men, Three Persons are sometimes (not always) so used as to import three Men; we may not thence conclude, that the three Divine Persons, must needs imply three Gods. Or, if the word Persons do not please, (though I think it a fit word in the case; we can spare the word, without prejudice to the Cause, (for 'tis the Notion, ra∣ther

than the Name, that we contend for,) and content our selves to say, They be three Somewhats which are but One God. Or, we may so explain our selves, That, by three Persons we mean three such Somewhats as are not in∣consistent with being One God.

And hitherto, I suppose, that You and I do well e∣nough agree.

Now, as to what you observe concerning the Learned Author (Dr. Sherlock;) I shall begin where you end: And agree with you, that the Treatise (to which you refer) contains many Excellent things. The Strength and Weight of his Arguments, as to those to whom he undertakes Answer, doth not depend upon those Expressions against which you object: But his Arguments against those, are of equal Force, though these Expressions were spa∣red.

As to those Expressions of his, by you noted, That the three Divine Persons are Three Beings (three Intelligent Be∣ings, three Substantial Beings, three Holy Spirits,) Really Distinct, even as distinct as Peter, Iames, and Iohn; and One God onely as they are mutually Conscious: I was (I confess) Unsatisfied therein (as You are) from the first; Looking upon them as Expressions too Hardy for one to venture upon, (and so I find are most others with whom I have discoursed about them:) and wish he had decli∣ned them.

Yet I did not think it necessary for me to write against them (though I did not like them) but chose rather to wave them, and express my self otherwise. (For it would be Endless if I should make it my business to write Books against every one who hath some Expressions which I cannot approve, amongst many others wherein I think he doth well.) Nor shall I Aggravate the Obje∣ctions which you have Urged against them; But leave them as they are.

I might perhaps mollifie some of his Expressions, by putting a softer sense upon them than at first view they seem to bear; (for I find some Men, in such matters, do use words at a very different rate from what others do:) But I have not (where now I am) the Book at hand; and have read it but once (a good while since) when it first came out: and therefore am not willing to say much without Book, least I should miss his sense, or not per∣form it to his mind.

That learned Author may, if he think fit, so Vindi∣cate or Explain those Expressions as he shall judge con∣venient: Or he may (which I had rather he should) Decline them, without prejudice to his main Cause; (which, in my opinion, he may as well defend without them:) and thereby less expose himself to the Cavils of the Anti-trinitarians; who are catching at every colour∣able pretence of Objecting, though not against the main Cause concerning the Trinity, if but against some Ex∣pressions of those who maintain it.

Thus far, I think, He and both of Us do agree; namely, That there is a Distinction between the Three, more than meerly Notional, and even more than that, be∣tween (what we commonly call) the Divine Attributes; yet not so as to be Three Gods, or more Gods than One: (which is as much as we need maintain against the Anti-Trinitarians:) And, that the word Person is no unfit Name to denote that Distinction. And thus far we may close with him, notwithstanding some other Inconveni∣ent Expressions.

And if it be agreed that these Three (thus distinguish∣ed) are but One God (each Communicating in one and the same Numerical Essence,) then they are all Equal (as to that common Internal Essence, and the common Attri∣butes thereof:) and then an External Subordination, as to Oeconomy (you grant) signifies nothing in this case.

Now, Sir, if you look back upon your own Discourse: You will find, that the whole Edge of your Arguments is directed against those Expressions, Three Beings, Three Substances, Three Spirits; (and I do acknowledge, that, as to these, the Arguments seem to me sharp enough, and to do their work.) But if, instead of these, he say (as I think he should) that The Three Persons are One Being, One Substance, One Spirit, (like as he says they are One God) that Edge will be taken off* 3.1.

That (I conceive) which did impose upon him in this Point, is the forced sense, which, in our Language, we sometimes put upon the word Person, for want of ano∣ther English Word (answering to Homo) which might indifferently respect Man, Woman, and Child: and a like forced sense put by the School-men upon the word Perso∣na, for want of a Latin word which might equally re∣late to Men and Angels; as signifying an Intelligent Being. Whence he was induced to think, that Three Persons must needs be Three Intelligent Beings. Whereas Persona, in its true and ancient sense (before the School-men put this forced sense upon it) did not signify a Man simply; but, one under such, and such, and such Circumstances, or Qualifications. So that the same Man (if capable of being qualified thus, and thus, and thus,) might sustain three Persons, and these three Persons, be the same Man.

Now if (as he says of himself elsewhere in a like case) he have not been taken to be a Fool: Yet a wise Man may sometimes, upon second thoughts, see Reason to change his Opinion (as in that case he did) or rectify his Expressions. And if then he consider, how much easier it will be (and less obnoxious to Exceptions) to main∣tain

his Hypothesis thus Rectified: He may think I have done him no ill Offices thus to suggest.

Having thus given you my thoughts of this Hypothe∣sis: If you press me further (as between our selves) to tell you, What Degree of Distinction (as in our Metaphy∣sicks they are wont to be Reckoned up) I take this to be, between the Three Divine Persons: I think we need not much trouble our selves with such niceties. And if I do tell you; it is only ex abundanti, as what doth not much concern the main question in hand; (which is safe enough without it:) Nor that I so prescribe therein, as to require others to express their Sentiments just as I do.

The Degrees of Distinction commonly mentioned in our Metaphysicks, are such as these: Distinctio rationis ra∣tiocinantis, (which is purely Notional, and depends meer∣ly on our Imagination:) Destinatio rationis ratiocinatae (which is otherwise said to be secundum inadaequatos con∣ceptus ejusdem rei:) Distinctio Modalis, (either ut res & modus, or ut modus & modus,) which is otherwise said to be ex parte rei sed non ut res & res: And Distinctio rea∣lis, or ut res & res. Though, in the Names of these se∣veral Degrees, all Writers do not always speak alike. One perhaps by a distinction ex parte rei, may mean the same which another means by Distinctio Realis: And so of the rest. And these thus marshalled are but a contri∣vance of our own. They might, for ought I know, have been made more or fewer if the Contriver had so thought fit.

But these Degrees of Distinction, I take to be prima∣rily fitted to our Notions of Created Beings. And are not intended as applicable to God, otherwise than by Ana∣logy; as other Words properly fitted to created Beings are wont to be so applied. And therefore I should choose to say, that (in strictness of speech) our Metaphysicks

have not yet given a Name to these Distinctions: Nor do I know any need of it.

The Divine Attributes, we use to say, are distinguish∣ed ratione ratiocinata, or as inadaequati conceptus ejusdem rei. And it is well enough so to say, to those that have not a mind to be captious; but are willing to understand Figurative Words in a Figurative sense. But, to those that have a mind to Cavil, I would speak more cauti∣ously, and say, It is, in God, somewhat Analogous to what we so call in Created Beings. And, That of the Divine Persons, somewhat Analogous, in the Deity, to what, in Created Beings, is called Distinctio Modalis, or Distinctio à parte rei, sed non ut res & res.

If it be asked, What that Distinction is which is thus Analogous: I say, that I cannot tell. You must first tell me (and enable me to comprehend) what is the full and adaequate import of the words Father, Son, Beget, Proceed, &c. when applied to God, in a sense Analogous to what they signify as to Created Beings. If you cannot tell me, precisely, what they are: How should I tell you, How they Differ?

But what need we trouble our selves with these Nice∣ties, or Names of these Degrees of Distinction? (Which, when we have all done, will by divers Men be diversly expressed.) I think it is enough to say, The Distinction is Greater than that of (what we call) the Divine Attri∣butes; but not so as to make them Three Gods. Or, That they be so Three, as yet to be but One God. And I am content to rest there.

I am, Sir, Yours to serve you,I. Wallis.

Apr. 11. 1691.

Notes

• * 3.1

  Augustin. Epist. 174. Spiritus est Deus; & Pater Spiritus est, & Filius, & ipse Spiritus Sanctus; nec tamen Tres Spiritus, sed Vnus Spiritus; sicut non Tres Dii, sed Vnus Deus.