Dr. Willis's practice of physick being the whole works of that renowned and famous physician wherein most of the diseases belonging to the body of man are treated of, with excellent methods and receipts for the cure of the same : fitted to the meanest capacity by an index for the explaining of all the hard and unusual words and terms of art derived from the Greek, Latine, or other languages for the benefit of the English reader : with forty copper plates.

CHAP. I. The Opinions of Authors both Ancient and Modern are recounted.

WIth what Pleasures, and with what Delight, beyond other things, the Contemplation of the Soul hath drawn to it self the Wits of Men, and * 1.1 most profoundly Exercised them, appears even from hence, that al∣most none of the Philosophers, of whatsoever Sect they were, and of every Age, who have not laboured in the search of it: But in∣deed, how hard and abstruse it is, and with what dark Blackness, not l•…•…ss than the shades of Hell it self, this Knowledge of the Soul is over-shadowed, may be gathered from this; because they are opposite and uncertain, concerning it; yea, almost as many Men as there are, so many several Opinions have they Published; that truly 'tis no unjust Complaint of the Soul, that she understands all things but her Self. Nevertheless, in this Age, most fruitful of Inventions, when that so many Admirable things not before thought on, as it were another Ancient World unknown, are discovered, about the building of the Animal Body, when new Creeks are daily found out, new humours spring up, and altogether another Doctrine than what hath been delivered by the Ancients, concerning the use of many of the Parts, hath been instituted; why may we not also hope, that there may be yet shewn a new disquisition concerning the Soul, and with bet∣ter luck than hitherto? Therefore, however the thing may be performed, I shall attempt to Philosophise concerning that Soul at least, which is Common to Brute Animals with Man, and which seems to depend altogether on the Body, to be born and dye with it, to actuate all its Parts, to be extended thorow them, and to be plainly Corporeal; and that chiefly, because, by the Nature, Subsistence, Parts, and Affections of this Corporeal * 1.2 Soul rightly unfolded, the Ingenuity, Temperament, and Manners of every Man may be thence the better known; as also the Causes, and formal Reasons of many Diseases, as of the Phrensie, Lethargy, Vertigo, Madness, Melancholy, and others, belonging rather to the Soul than to the Body, as yet hidden, may in some part be discovered: Then Secondly, because the ends and bounds of the aforesaid Corporeal Soul being de∣fined, the Rational Soul, Superior and Immaterial, may be sufficiently differenced from it; nor is that Argument admitted so easily, confounding them together, whereby some deserving very ill of themselves, have affirmed the Souls of Man and the Beasts only to differ in degrees of Perfection; and so that either alike must be either Mortal or Immor∣tal, and alike propagated ex traduce or from the Parent. Wherefore that the Dignity, * 1.3 Order, and Immortality of the Rational Soul, discriminated from the Corporeal, may be vindicated, and likewise that we may make a way to the remaining Pathology, or Method of Curing of the Brain and Nervous Stock, in which not only Parts of the Body, but often the animal Spirits, yea, sometimes the whole sensitive Soul, seems to be affe∣cted, (altho we have formerly unfolded according to our slender Ability, not after this manner, the Descriptions and Uses of the Brain and Nerves,) Therefore at present, we

shall endeavour to deliver a certain Doctrine of the Soul, previous to the shewing the Doctrine of the Diseases of those Parts. But here it will be first expedient to rehearse the Opinions of others, or at least the chiefest and most noted among them: From which, being put together, if not what the Soul truly is, may be made known; yet what many considering it have thought of it; and from thence a little more certain search of it, we may enterprize.

And indeed if we would grow wise concerning the Soul only out of the Pleas of Au∣thors, and the Writings of Philosophers of every Age, we should be intangled in a Laby∣rinth of Opinions, following for truth mere Phantasms, and for the genuine Idea of the Soul, as it were the Apparitions of divers Specters. But that we may reduce the various Opinions, whatever have been declared, both of the Ancients and Moderns, to some certain Heads; it will be fit that we observe, some did affirm it to be Corporeal, others Incorporeal. In either Kind we meet with great diversity of Opinions. For first of all, among those who thought it Incorporeal, some affirmed it to be a Substance existing of it self and immortal, others without Substance having only an accidental form. Those * 1.4 who believed the Soul an Incorporeal and Immortal Substance, differed also among them∣selves. The Platonists and Pythagoreans said, the Souls of all living Creatures, to be a certain Part of the Universal Soul of the World, and that they were depressed or immer∣ged in this lower Body, as in a Sepulcher; and therefore, the Soul, when the Animal received Life, was not born but dyed; for as much as by this inferior Birth, it was divi∣ded from the simple and undivided fountain of Nature. Further they thought, that the same Soul so demersed, did wander from one Body being dead, to another, and so by a various Metampseuchosis, did inhabit or was a guest sometimes in the Bodies of Men, and sometimes of Beasts. The Manichees asserted, That all Souls being taken out of the Substance it self of God, did actuate Terrestrial Bodies, and going from hence again, returned into God himself. The Origenists different from either, taught that Souls were Created from the beginning of the World, and at first to subsist of themselves, then as occasion serv'd, that Bodies being formed, they enter'd into them being begun, and actuated them during Life, and that at length they returned to their private or sin∣gular Substances. The state of which Souls, tho some attributed it only to Humane Souls; yet there were others, who granted the like Immortality to the Souls of the Brutes, yea and of Plants.

On the contrary, Nemesius (but untruly) saith, That Aristotle affirmed the Soul to be Incorporeal, but without Perfection and Mortal, when he had designed the Entelechia * 1.5 or Perfection of every living thing; as to wit, She as it were arising up of her own ac∣cord, from Power only of matter rightly disposed, understands nothing else, but its own * 1.6 Crasis or Temperament, resulting from the mixture; which as it adds nothing substan∣tial to the praeexisting Matter, the Soul it self seems to be from thence a mere Ens of Reason, and only an extrinsical denomination. Further, when the Peripateticks, from the Soul raised up out of the Grave of Matter (which they affirmed to be a simple form, without Extension and divisibility) do contend that the Members of the same Body, do perceive many things at once and together, they have introduced into the Schools that Plea or rather Riddle, to wit, That it is whole in the whole, and whole in every part. To this Opinion thus unfolded, that of Dicaearchus was a-Kin, who said the Soul was Harmo∣ny, and also that of Galen, who call'd it a Temperament.

Nor do we meet with a less diversity of Opinions, among the Philosophers of every Age, delivering that all Souls, or all others, the rational excepted, are Corporeal. To * 1.7 pass by those who have affirmed the Soul to be either Fire, or Air, or Water, or some∣thing made out of many of these Elements; some, as Critias and Empedocles have said, that it was Blood. Which Opinion the Sacred Scriptures in some places plainly favour, where the eating of Blood is forbidden, because it is the Life or the Soul: Moreover, there are not Reasons and Arguments wanting, which conclude this to be very near, or very like to Truth; as shall be shewn anon.

To these may be added, the Opinion of Epicurus delivered of old, and of late revived in our Age, which introduces the Soul plainly Corporeal, and made out of 2 knitting to∣gether * 1.8 of subtil Atoms, and asserts, citing Laertius, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. which according to the mind of Gassendus, is as much as to say, That the Animal is as it were the Loom, in which the Yarn is the Body, and the Woof the Soul. From thence Laertius describing more fully its Corporeity, saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. which is, that the Soul is Composed of most light Atoms, and round, not much different from those out of which fire is. Other Epicureans de∣scribing the Nature of the Soul, otherways, depaint it as from something hot, flatuo•…•…s, and airy, we need not to unfold any further this Opinion, nor shew out of Laertius and Lucretius, by what Rite the Assertors of the Epicurean Philosophy, do accommodate such an Atomical Composition of the Soul, to all the Actions and Affections of the Function, or Animal Government, which are to be performed.

Upon this Hypothesis of the Epicureans, as it were its basis, the Philosophers of this * 1.9 latter Age have built all their doctrines of the Soul, tho very divers, and I may almost say opposite. For as the soul of the Brutes, is affirmed by most of them, to be Corpo∣real and divisible, yet she is by some of them deprived of all Knowledge, Sense, and Appe∣tite; in the mean time, not only Sense, Memory, and Phantasie is granted to her by others, but the use of a certain inferior Reason. And what is more to be wonder'd at, the same end of their Assertion is proposed by either Sect; to wit, That the Soul of the Brutes, both as it may be deprived of its gifts, and also as it is most notably adorned by them, may be very much distinguish'd, or (that I may use the Idiom of the Schools) di∣versified from the humane Soul.

The first Assertor of the former Opinion was Gometius Pereira, who affirmed that Beasts wanted all Knowledg or Perception; whom in our latter Age, the Famous Men * 1.10 Cartesius and Digby, with others Exactly followed; who endeavouring as much as they could, to discriminate the Souls of Beasts from the humane, affirmed them, to be not only Corporeal and Divisible, but also meerly passive; that is, that they were not all moved, unless that they were moved by other Bodies, striking some part of the Soul; from whence it followed, that every action of the Brute Consisted in it, as it were an artificial Motion of a Mechanical Engine, to wit, that first some sensible thing affecting the animal spirits, and Converting them inwards, stirs up sense; from which by and by, the same spirits being moved, as it were by a reflected undulation or wavering, return back again, and being determinated for the fitted order of the organs and parts of the Fabrick it self, in certain Nerves and Muscles, they perform the respective motions of the Mem∣bers: For otherwise, if Cognition be granted to the Brutes, you must yield to them also Conscience, yea and deliberation and Election, and a Knowledge of universal things, and lastly an incorporeal and rational soul.

Whilst these famous Philosophers suppose Brute Animals to be only certain Machines wonderful made by a Divine Workmanship; to wit, which without any Knowledg, Sense, or Appetite, perform only Corporeal Motions, and the Acts of their Faculties, ac∣cording to the fitted structure of parts, and the precise direction of the spirits, within Certain measures or bounds of the Animals; yet some of them differ in their Opinions, about the structure and model of the Machine or moving Engine; to wit, for as much as the figure and properties of the Atoms, out of which the same is supposed to be made, are assigned one way by these, and after a divers way by those. The most illustrious Cartesius, unfolding all things by matter and motion, asserting the Souls of Brutes to con∣sist * 1.11 altogether of round and highly moveable Atoms, which he Calls the Elements of the first Kind; affirms, That nothing else is requisite for all its acts to be performed, than that the fibres and nervous parts being struck by a stroke of a sensible thing, they receive a motion after this or that kind of manner, and transfer it by a Continued affection of the sensitive parts, as it were by a Certain undulation or wavering, into the respective parts: But our Digby supposing mobility of the particulars of this kind, out of which * 1.12 the Soul is made, adds further, That certain most thin Effluvia's, falling away from the sensible Body, do not only affect the Exterior sensories, but entring into the more in∣terior recesses, mix themselves with the spirits, and moving them into Various fluctua∣tions, do produce sense, and divers sorts of local motions: Moreover, that out of these Extrinsical Atoms, so entring into the nervous parts, and the Brain it self, do proceed not only Extempory Actions; but out of those left in the feeling body, and retaining the former Configurations, are Constituted the remaining Idea's, in the memory of things formerly done. It would be too prolix a business to recount particularly what appertains to the aforesaid Hypothesis, concerning the souls of Brutes, or animal Acti∣ons; or to Examine the Reasons of each; also to shew by what manner of Solutions of that Kind, those operations of the Brutes, which seem to be made by a Certain Judg∣ment and Ratiocination, are wont to be unfoulded.

But indeed these Solutions of difficult Phaenomena's, and the Reasons for the mechani∣cal provision of living Creatures, and their Souls, tho artificially formed by these Au∣thors, seem not to satisfie a Mind desirous of Truth: And whilst every one expounds so * 1.13 the Works of the Creation, according to the model of his Wit, they seem to say, That God is not able to make any thing beyond what Man is able to Conceive or Imagine. Wherefore others, also renowned Philosophers, both Ancient and Modern, professing themselves no less adverse to Atheism than the former, Challenge in the behalf of the Beasts, not only the operations of an external and internal Sense, with Perception. Ap∣petite, and spontaneous motions; but besides, grant to them a certain use of Judgment, Deliberation, and Ratiocination.

Nemesius an ancient Philosopher, discoursing of the Cognation or Propinquity of all Created things, after he had shewed from Minerals, that some things came near towards * 1.14

the natures of Vegitables, and some of Plants, and Animals, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (saith he) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, * 1.15 &c. which is, The Common Architect passing from irrational Creatures to that rational Animal Man, hath not effected this suddenly, but first has referred certain natural Know∣ledges, and Artifices, and Subtilties to other Animals, so that they appear near to ra∣tional Creatures.

Peter Gassendus, a most Skilful and Cause-Expressing Man, in his late Experimental * 1.16 Philosophy, when he had enumerated very many Instances, by which the Cunning and Wonderful Sagacity of brute Animals were declared; and also the Epithets, whereby these kind of Animals are noted by Philosophers, to wit, that some are called Excelling in Knowledg; others Artificial, these Dexterous and Compleat, or Crafty and Wise, at length the Author adds, that, These things could not deservedly be attributed to them, unless they granted them a certain kind of Reason. However it be, we may seem at least to be able to distinguish, by a ready way, that as Commonly a two-fold Memory, To wit, a Sensitive and In∣tellective, is distinguished, so nothing forbids to Call Reason Sensitive and Intellectual. And truly, as we understand by the Name of Reason, the faculty or beginning of Ratiocination, and that to Reason is nothing else, than to understand one thing by the Knowledg of another thing, there is nothing more Easily to be observed, than that Brutes do Collect one thing out of another, or what is the same thing, do reckon or recount, and therefore are indued with Reason. From these we may easily understand, what dignity, and beyond the powers of any Machine, causing its Efficacy, he affirms to be in the Souls of Beasts. But in the mean time, if it be marqu'd, what Hypostasis, or formal Idea, he hath assigned them; it doth not so Easily appear, how that such Choyce Priviledges, do agree with those Souls, so slenderly gifted, as to their Substances. For when from the Opinion of Epicurus he had shewn these to be * 1.17 Corporeal, and their Bodies to be made up of most light and round Atoms, out of which sort fire and heat is Created; at length he Concludes; The Soul therefore to be a Certain Flame, or a Species of most thin fire, which as long as it lives, or remains inkindled, so long the Animal lives; when it no longer lives or is Extinguished, the Animal dyes. But indeed, con∣cerning his Hypothesis, he ought to have unfolded, by what means this Fire Intelligent and Artificial (to speak like the Stoicks) could be; or how a flame within certain bounds and Organs of the Body, however framed with the most excellent artificie, being inkindled and dilated, can be able to produce the Acts of the animal Faculty; This I say, most dif∣ficult Problem, this most Learned Man came to, and pass'd over its Knot as it were pur∣posely in that place.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The Contempla∣tion of the Soul pleasant but dif∣ficult.
• * 1.2

  It Conduces to the knowing of the Manners of Men, and the Diseases of the Soul.
• * 1.3

  It distinguishes the Rational Soul of Man, from that other of the Brute.
• * 1.4

  Some have af∣firmed the Soul of the Beast to be an Incorpo∣real Substance; to wit, the Pla∣tonists, and the Pythagoreans.
• * 1.5

  Cap. 2. de Nat. Hom.
• * 1.6

  Others an In∣corporeal form as the Peripate∣•…•…icks.
• * 1.7

  Others affirm the Soul to be Corporeal, and either something out of the Ele∣ments or the Blood, &c.
• * 1.8

  The Opinion of Eplcurus, that the Soul is made out of Atoms.
• * 1.9

  The late fol∣lowers of the Philosopher Epicurus have affirmed the Soul to be made of Atoms.
• * 1.10

  Others of them deny it to have Sense and Per∣ception, as Gometius Pereira.
• * 1.11

  Cartesius.
• * 1.12

  Digby and Others.
• * 1.13

  Others attri∣bute to the Corporeal Souls sence and Perception; and further, the use of an inferior Rea∣son; as
• * 1.14

  Nemesius.
• * 1.15

  De Nat. Hom. Cap. 1.
• * 1.16

  Phys. Sect. 3. Membr. post Lib. 8. Cap. 4.
• * 1.17

  Who asserts the Soul, to be a little flame, or a Certain fire.