The grounds of obedience and government by Thomas White ...

THE GROUNDS OF OBEDIENCE And GOVERNMENT.

The first GROUND.

Wherein consists the Perfection of Government.

XEnophon, in his excellent Booke of the instruction of Cyrus, moves this Question, Why, of all other living Creatures, which are of different Natures from Man, wee easily attaine to the mastery and rule; but few men are so intelligent

as to be fit to governe Men; and those few are the highest and wor∣thiest part of Mankind? But, to me, the very Question seems to beare the solution in its owne bow∣ells. For, when one asks, why Man is hard to be govern'd since he governes other Creatures; hee asks, why one, who hath the pow∣er to rule others, is himselfe so dif∣ficult to be master'd: and the answer is, because the powers, by which he reduceth others to his obe∣dience, makes him apter to resist them who seeke the conquest of himself; and so renders it a higher taske to weild and manage him, then those Creatures which he hath power over.

For, we need not looke into Philosophy, nor study learned Bookes, to know that the nature of Man is inclin'd to have its owne will, and casteth all things which

are under his consideration to com∣passe and effect it: as also, that every ordinary mans knowledge and consideration is farre beyond any we find in other living Crea∣tures; and, by consequence, is farre lesse easily masterable then any of them.

Whence we may plainly collect, that were it possible for a Gover∣nour to make every single person in his Dominion particularly under∣stand, that what was ordered by the Governement was his owne truest interest; such an one would be the most absolute and perfect Governour; and infallibly would find the charge of governing most easie and sweet, as well to himselfe as to his Subjects.

This Case is cleare both in Rea∣son and in Experience. Reason shew∣eth us, that to draw any thing to Action, according to its owne fit∣nesse

and inclination, is both easier to the attempter, and makes the action it selfe more efficaciously and throughly performed. He that will drive a wedge into a hard piece of wood, strives, as far as the scitua∣tion gives him leave, to make his hammer fall downewards, because a weight hath, of it selfe, an inclina∣tion that way, and so both the im∣pression is stronger and the arme lesse strain'd, knocking and the very fall of a weight encreasing by motion downewards: Therefore Black-smithes, whose continuall la∣bour is to use the hammer, lay their iron upon their anvile, that is, in such a scituation below their heads, as is most fitting to gaine the best advantage of the descent of their hammers, which they first raise to give them scope of a descent.

Upon this principle it is, That they who tutour Dogges, Horses,

Elephants and Hawks, knowing the ordinary attractive of Beasts to be meat and some kind of Flattery, make them understand, to the pro∣portion of their capacity, that to do the action they breed them for, gaines them food; to which they joine also certaine motions of stro∣king and gentle words, that make an impression in the Beast of its owne excellency, and that it pleaseth its master. In like manner, to deterre them from certain actions, cudgels, whips, and harsh words are used; which have a notabler efficacy then one would easily imagine, if he saw it not by experience.

This, now, being apply'd to Mankind, drives the effect home. For Man, being a rationall crea∣ture, (whose inclination it is to worke according to knowledge) desires to know that the worke prescribed him is good, that is, good

for him, or his good. And because if two actions be proposed, where∣of the one is better for him then the other, the lesse good action deprives him of some good which the more good had brought him; his in∣clination leads him to do the better, and by consequence to know and dispute which is the better; which is as much as to chuse betwixt them; and this we call being free, or ha∣ving naturall Liberty to do one and not the other. So that, the Nature of Man is to be free; and to act what ever he does, because it seems to him the best.

Whence it is evidently conclu∣ded, that the perfectest way and most connaturall for governing men is, by making them determine them∣selves to their actions, and to pro∣ceed freely, and act, as it were, by their owne inclinations. This if the

Governour can effect, hee shall finde both his intent generally perfor∣med, because the Subject proceedeth with much affection and courage; and seldome or never will his Com∣mands be resisted, or their obedience repented: For, men are not wont to repine often at what themselves chuse and judge best for themselves; espe∣cially if, even after the action per∣formed and peradventure the attempt failed, yet the Subject remaines sa∣tisfied, that it was best for him, in those circumstances, to do what he did: Now, if the reasons were solid when the Governour proposed them, such must of necessity be, for the most part, the sequell.

Experience maketh this same as manifest as Reason concludeth it. What Mother or Nurse doth not seeke to perswade and win the yet sucking childe with gay things, with Flattery and such demonstrations of

Love (that is, of the childs good) as the child is capable of? What Ma∣ster or Father draweth not his Boyes to schoole and sitting exercises, by promises and proposalls of good, as play, goodcheere, fine cloathes, and any other toyes suitable to their tempers? The stronger ages have stronger Motives; as, of Honour, Lands, Offices, and the like: by which we see the most part of men led, not onely to Labour, but even to hazard their lives and those very goods which are proposed them for motives of their actions.

On the contrary side, how ill do those enterprises thrive, where the Actors conceive themselvs either not concern'd or wrong'd? How dili∣gently are excuses sought out and easily found, and every cause of delay judged sufficient? How rea∣dily (if the Actours be in great multitudes (as Soldiers or Schol∣lars)

do seditions and mutinies spring up, and all disorders grow bold and spread themselves, the Commander of the action hated and esteemed an oppressour and a Tyrant, his Officers scorned and disobeyed?

This then is, of all hands, con∣cluded, that the proper and naturall way of Governement is, by making the obeyer understand that it is his owne profit which the action aimes at; so to make him work out of the inclination of his owne will, and the dictamen of his owne un∣derstanding.

The Second GROUND.

That the Nature of Man reacheth not to the perfection of Governement.

NOtwithstanding this inclina∣tion be so naturall to us, yet

Nature is not able to make it perfect in most both persons and actions. Children are not come to the ability of judgeing; some others are so grosse of capacity, they cannot bee brought to understand their owne good, at least in that time and cir∣cumstances which Nature hath pro∣vided them; Most spend so much of their day in some one Businesse, which they have chosen either for their Livelyhood or pastime, that they have not sufficient Leasure to attaine the Knowledge necessary for other occurrences of their life: Even the greatest Wits are not capable to understand the nature of all things necessary to their owne pri∣vate conditions. The Prince him∣self must trust the Physician, the Lawyer, the Mariner, the Soldier, the Merchant, the Cook, the Brewer, the Baker, and divers other Trades and Knowledges, which he hath no

possibility to understand so perfect∣ly as to be a Master in them.

Neverthelesse, Nature doth not recede wholly from her Principle, in thus subjecting one mans under∣standing to anothers, and the grea∣ter most times to the lesser. For it doth not this, otherwise then by making the party subjected see, it is his owne good to trust another's skill. Wherefore, it is true, that he followes his owne inclina∣tion, and is ruled by his owne un∣derstanding; and so governes him∣selfe; onely, hee is a degree higher, not busying his thoughts about the particular worke, but onely about chusing the master of the worke, or about his own submission, that is, his owne action, as he is a man, and his action as that of a man, and not of a Physician or Pilot, or such o∣ther particular discipline or Quali∣ty. It remaines therefore still that

hee is free, and Master of his owne action and the commanding part of it.

The Third GROUND.

That a Rationall beliefe is necessary to Humane Action.

OF those things to whose knowledge wee cannot our selves arrive, but must rely on the credit of others, there are two kinds; some purely to be believed, others to be also acted. As, when we in∣forme our selves of what passed in some forreigne Country, or of the nature of Trees or Beasts wee never have use of; wee are barely to assent to what is delivered: But, when a Physician telleth us wee must take a Purge or keepe such a Dyet; wee doe not onely believe

him but act according to our be∣liefe. Now, though in truth this second sort belongeth properly to our discourse apart, because the na∣ture of pure beliefe is intrinsecally included in it, as a part in the whole; yet wee must first note the Errours to bee avoided in a meere speculative assent: And these are two; one of defect, and one of ex∣cesse.

The vice by defect, warnes you to believe no thing but what your selfe understand, that is, indeed to believe nothing at all. But, were these men bound to their own Law, that they should take no Physick till they knew it would doe them good, at least as well as the Physi∣cian doth; nor trust their cause to a Lawyer till they understood the subtleties as perfectly as hee; and so in other vocations; I doubt they would have neither health nor

wealth for Physician or Lawyer to worke upon.

But, because those who advance this proposition are persons of wit, I must not think they stumble at so notorious a block: Therefore, their meaning is onely, that wee ought not to beleeve, but what we are able to understand if wee had will and leisure to study. But, even so ex∣plicated, it is a most wilfull propo∣sition, reason being quite on the opposite side: For, let the Autho∣rity which denounceth me a Truth, be sufficient to make it credible, and overvalue the mysteriousnesse of the object; and the higher it is above my knowledge, the more necessity there is of believing it. What is but a little above me, I may easily come to know; and so need not be∣lieve but take paines and see it: Be∣liefe is ordained for Truths whose direct and immediate evidence wee

cannot compasse; and therefore is more proper, more due, more requi∣site for such as are above our know∣ledge.

But, peradventure these smart persons do suppose that all things which have a possibility to be knowne, are the subject of mans wit; and so take these two to signi∣fie the same sence, that the object is such as we are able to understand, and that it is understandable, or doth not couch a contradiction in its termes: and peradventure con∣ceive themselves able to shew con∣tradiction in whatever they re∣fuse to believe. If this be their meaning, the maxime they goe upon is safe; but they must be very care∣full not to subsume or apply it to particular instances without much consideration: For, ordinarily, the authority is very great which by un∣derstanding men, is alledged for re∣mote

and high truths; and so is dangerously neglected, without an exact perusal and anatomy of the truths maintained by it.

There are others soe prodi∣gall of our naturall endowments, that they will teach us a kinde of contempt of reason and understand∣ing. In a word, their position is, That, though you be certaine the proposition made (for ought you know) is false, neverthelesse, you may and ought to think it true: which how to excuse, from being an irrationall act and a pure folly, is beyond my skill; at the same time to be assured it is uncertaine, and to hold it for certaine is, to mee, an im∣possibility. Doe I not hold that which I am certaine of? that is, that this truth is uncertaine? How then can I hold it is certaine? Put this in the mouth of a witnesse in any Court of Justice, and teach him

that, though hee know certainly hee doth not perfectly remember whe∣ther hee saw the man killed, yet hee may sweare hee saw it; what Justice will remain uncorrupted?

Passion and Precipitation may pre∣vail with us, to judge that cleare and evident which is not so, and carry us to believe and affirm it; but that rea∣son should make us believe what it telleth us it seeth no ground for, or not sufficient, is to me, an assertion the most unworthy, the most contra∣ry to reason, and the most biassed by interest that can be imagined. If our nature be rationall, if all our acti∣ons should be conformable to our nature, and governed by reason; there cannot bee a more pernicious proposition, then to tell us we must assent, when there is no proportioned motive think wee ought to assent.

Thus much I thought fit to say concerning the errours of belief in

speculation; because beliefe in practicall things, and which con∣cernes our actions, depends of it, and includes it, and is, in part, regu∣lated by the same rules. The belie∣ving of practical things begins to trench upon the subject of our main discourse: for it is the first and most simple or uncomposed degree of go∣vernment and obedience, and so the very roots of both are dependent from and to be discovered out of it.

For, wee experience by our ordi∣nary apprehensions, that wee esteeme a Physician, a Lawyer, a Schoole-master ought to bee obeyed, though wee doe not acknowledge in them the power of a Lord or Magistrate. And so wee say, the Scholler will never profit, because he will not doe what his Master would have him: The client loseth his cause, because he would not obey his Counsell: The Patient recovers not, because he fol∣loweth

not the advice of his Physi∣cian. And though we doe not say the Doctour or Counsellour com∣mands his Patient or Client, yet, if we look into it, he both rewardeth and punisheth, which are the con∣comitants of commanding. For who obeyeth is rewarded with learning, health, and prosperity, and who disobeyeth is punished with Ignorance, sicknesse, and losses.

The Fourth GROUND.

Of the vertue of obedience, and wherein it consists.

OUt of this we may easily un∣derstand what nature intends by the vertue of obedience, and what are the limits and Lawes of it. For it is plaine, the immediate end is that our workes and all that

concernes us may be well done, even as to those things wherein our selves have no skill, or not enough, and the more remote end to bee atchie∣ved by this is, that our life may bee good and happy, and the end of Na∣ture arrived to by us. The condi∣tions likewise are cleere: First, that the matter of our action bee such as our selves are not sufficiently skilfull in; the second, that our Commander bee a master in that art; the third, that hee bee a good and honourable person, in whom wee may rest confidently he will deale with us conformably to his skill, and not wilfully or for his own pleasure, or interest, doe any thing against our good and profit.

If the first bee wanting, wee al∣so our selves are wanting to our selves; for Nature hath endowed us with reason to provide for our owne good by this power: againe, it is

non-sence and folly to expect ano∣ther man should be more carefull of our good, then our selves: And sup∣pose it were so, it were either our fault or his, and for ought to bee mended on one side; our fault if wee bee not so sollicitous as wee ought to bee, that is, as much as the weight of the affaire requires; His if he be more sollicitous of our good then the same demandeth, and soe hee who professeth such a care may bee feared to bee a busie fellow, and one who aimes at his owne pro∣fit under colour of love, unlesse it bee in an evident neglect of ours, which cannot well be imagined of one who is ready to obey another.

If the second condition bee wanting, there can be no vertue in obedience, since it will nothing mend but rather impaire our life, and to the import of that action, de∣stroy our pretence to happinesse, to

submit our selves to one who hath no more skill then wee, nor can bee rationally supposed to bear us more love and care, or that hee will or ought to imploy himselfe in our particular businesse more attentively then we our selves.

As for the last condition, with∣out it obedience is a plaine precipi∣tation of our selves into misgui∣dance and absolute ruine, and there∣fore a pernicious & wicked practice.

By this discourse wee may under∣stand, it is a fallacious principle, though maintained by many, that obedience is one of the most emi∣nent vertues, and that it is the great∣est sacrifice we can offer to God, to renounce our owne wills, because our will is the chiefest good wee have. For, not denying that obe∣dience is a great vertue; it being, truly in it selfe, the affection to mo∣derate the pride of our understand∣ing,

which is subject to make us think too well of our owne opini∣ons without having evidence of the truth of them, and so hinder us from candidly seeing and acknow∣ledging the truth (an inclination of all others most deeply rooted in our nature, and both most hard to bee conquered, and most pernicious to be followed) and therefore, the ver∣tue which tempers and moderates this passion must needs be very ex∣cellent: yet I cannot give it so high a rank, as to preferre it before all.

For, I see it is only a vertue in case of imperfection, as Penance and some others are; it being grounded on this, that a man is ig∣norant in those matters wherein hee ought to bee obedient. But, the reason displeases mee more then the conclusion: For what signifieth this, that it is the greatest good we have and can renounce for Gods sake? If

it bee a great good, it is no vice, no excesse, but a naturall power or exer∣cise of a power given us by Almigh∣ty God; and then would I know, why to renounce such a thing is pleasing to him. Can we think it were pleasing to God for any one to binde up his armes or legges, or cut off his hands, pretending to doe it for his sake? Hee that made them gave them us to use; and there by commanded us to use them accord∣ing to the manner intended by na∣ture; and, if wee doe not so, wee offend him.

There is a story of Origen, that he exsected his virility, thinking to Please God; but the same story saith, hee was reproved by the whole Church, and excommunicated for the fact: Simeon Styletes is report∣ed to have chained himself upon a hill, that he might not goe thence; but he was taught that such impoten∣cy

was fit for beasts, not men. So that, to renounce any natural facul∣ty or the legitimate and fitting use of it, under pretence of pleasing God, is a folly, not a vertue.

But, let us see what power it is that wee must renounce; our Will: and this word doth not, in this place, signifie any interessed affection or malicious resolution; but that will which followeth and is guided by our understanding, and that truth which God hath made us capable of: Therefore the renouncing of this will, is, withall, the renouncing of our understanding; that is, of our wits and manhood; so that it is in ef∣fect to renounce our rationality, and that by which we are the image of God. If any man should take a fancy to goe upon all foure like a beast, or subject himself to bee led in a string like a Beare about the Countrey; would not all wise men cry out on

him for bestiality, and thinke him unworthy the conversation of men? How much greater is the indignity of him who permitteth himselfe to bee carried in his whole course of life, and those actions that most con∣cerne him without using that wit or understanding which hee hath, and by the sole direction of another?

Hee can bee accounted so farre no better then a clock or watch, which tells the houre by the wit and indu∣stry of the maker, not by any sence or worth of its owne. If there∣fore, to renounce our wills for Gods sake bee to bee accounted a sacrifice; as farre as my understanding reach∣eth, it is no other then that the Scri∣pture expresseth upon another occa∣sion, to wit, one by which the sons are sacrificed to the father, the image of God defaced to the glory of him whose image he is.

The Fifth GROUND.

That Fidelity is different from Obe∣dience; and in what it consisteth.

BUt leaving this mistake of sim∣ple devotion; of which wee needed not have spoken so much, had there not depended on it some matter of greater consequence (as the following discourse will manifest in its due place:) wee are to take notice of an equivocation which may draw on some errour if not pre∣vented. Wee use to say serving∣men and waiting-maids ought to bee obedient to their Masters and Mistresses, whereas indeed, the ver∣tue by which they serve is not that of obedience, but of fidelity and truth, which is manifest to him that looks into the nature of hirelings.

For, none thinke a husbandman, who is hired to till or fence a piece of ground, obeyeth the hirer more then hee that selleth a piece of cloth or other merchandize obeyeth the buyer, because he taketh his moneys; but they are said to contract and per∣forme their part of the bargaine faithfully and truly. So servants pay their duties, performe their bar∣gains: and Fidelity is their proper vertue; to doe it carefully, and up∣rightly; not Obedience.

For, Obedience is in such actions as are the proper actions of the obeyer, which concerne his life, and by which hee may derive good if well done, and harme if amisse. Now in servants the good successe pertaineth to the Master, the servant hath his livelyhood and wages, whether the event goe right or wrong, so hee doe what his Ma∣ster commandeth. And hence it

followeth, that neither ought hee bee ignorant in the action hee doeth, nor sollicitous whether his Master bee either skilfull or honest: For, since what is done concerneth not him but his Master, his duty is to seek to doe what hee is commanded in the best way he can, without in∣teressing himself about the successe. This I say, as farre as he is a serving-man; but as hee is also an honest man, it may belong to him to suggest to his Master what hee thinks best; and, sometimes, when it lieth happi∣ly in his way, to help such errours of his Master as he can: without trenching on his Masters credit; still providing for his own indemp∣nity: that hee bee not involved in his Masters either imprudence or ini∣quity; for by his bargaine with his Master, he did not renounce the care of his own preservation.

The reason of this equivocation

is because wee ordinarily call obey∣ing the doeing another mans will: and distinguish not how, sometimes, this is done with renouncing our own wills, which is in those actions whereof wee are Masters, that is, our owne actions; and, sometimes, without such renunciation, as in the actions which belong to others, in which wee have no will to re∣nounce. Now Obedience as it is a vertue especially attending on the renouncing of our wills, is properly confined to the former sence, not to the other; with which it onely hath an alliance in the name, and which truly is Fidelity, as we have already declared.

But, although Fidelity bee a di∣stinct vertue from Obedience, yet is it not such a stranger as not to de∣mand a place in this Treatise: espe∣cially because the kinde of Obedi∣ence wee desire to look into, which

is that by which Common-wealths and Communities subsist, is founded generally on Fidelity or the matter thereof which wee call promise, and in that vertue it bindes to obser∣vance. After which discourse wee shall bee prepared to venture on the matter it self of Governement, and to our power, declare the force of it amongst men.

Man therefore being by his nature and definition a reasonable, that is, an understanding Creature, or one whose primary and principall incli∣nation is to truth or true knowledge; and the outward carriage and acti∣on of man being naturally propor∣tionable to his inward substance; it is cleere his chief property, by which he behaves himself outwardly like a man, is to speak truth, and to doe as hee sayeth, when his words have action following them. Hence it is, that though honesty (which in a

Courtlyer terme is called Honour, when applyed to a rationall carri∣age, and in a more spirituall lan∣guage, Conscience) bee extended to many other qualities, yet it is most frequently and principally expected in his keeping his word; in so much that though hee have other faults, either spirituall or carnall, yet if he be true of his word, he, often and in ordinary conversation, passeth for an honest man.

Againe, this vertue of Truth is the principall and first engine of humane conversation, and he that hath it not is unfit to be admitted to treate amongst men, but is to be rejected and banished from all Negotiation. Thus you see what engagement every one hath, both by nature and necessity of conversation, to stand up∣on his word or fidelity: For so we call the vertue by which we speake our mind in reference to action, and

are constant to performe what wee say.

Yet, since malice is growne to such a height, all nations, who pre∣tend to the fear of any Deity, have used to make men confirme their faith and promise by the invocati∣on of the Deity they worship; hoping Religion may worke in them what Nature is not strong enough to effect. This confirmation is performed in two sorts: One, when we onely call God to witnesse; as when we say, God, who sees my heart, knowes this to be truth, or that I meane as I speake: The other, when we pledge our trust in God for a security; as when wee wish God may punish us, or never doe us good, if we break our promise. And this is properly an execration, as the other an oath; yet both cal∣led oaths, and agree in this, that we pledge our beliefe and feare of

God, to another, for his security.

By which it is evident, that men generally esteem Religion the thing which should pierce deepest into a mans heart and affection; and the strongest Bond and tye of Faith and honesty; and that he, who setteth little by his Religion, hath neither honour nor honesty in him; or at least wanteth the greatest and strongest part of them, and that which ought to rivet in and fixe the naturall inclination which we have to truth and fidelity.

The Sixth GROUND.

In what consists Right or Due.

THE next consideration may appear too Metaphysicall a subtlety for a Morall treatise: yet such it is, that the ignorance of it

is mother of many mistakes and quarrells. We ought therefore, to know that a man, considered in pure Nature, lookes on all other things, Men and Beasts, and in∣sensible creatures, as his subjects to worke on; his onely rule being Reason, which takes nothing to bee good but what is good to him∣self; and makes the rule of his actions, to do what is fitting for him or conformable to his, that is, to a rationall nature. By this rule he treats another Man, otherwise then a horse or a dog, and them other∣wise then a tree or stone: For Rea∣son is a faculty to use every thing suitably to their natures; as, to take a knife to cut, a horse to ride on, a man to read or write or be his Counsellour. And this runs through all his actions.

But as, though a Taylor or Ma∣riner governe himselfe by this rule,

even when he playeth the Taylor or Pilot, yet none can doubt but the rules of Taylorship or Steerage are different from this seeking his owne good and applying all things to that end: So, neither can any just∣ly doubt but the art of a Lawyer or Counsellour is different from this principle which belongeth to all men.

And to find out the difference, wee are to reflect, that he who maketh a promise to another, so it be a perfect one (which we adde to decline the question of what pro∣mises oblige, what not) puts him∣selfe and his Promissary into a rank of agency and patiency, on a new score, to wit, that of fidelity and negotiating: So that now, not the nature of the two men, but their words, and what followeth out of them, ground their being active and passive. This power of activity is,

in Latine, called Jus or Justum, in English, Right or Due.

The difference of these two Arts is, One considers onely what is noble, and manly, and Conscience; the other, what is according to promise and consent of parties. Whence we finde, by the vertue of a promise, a new order growne a∣mongst men following out of pro∣mise: Wherein three things are to be considered; The engagement of nature and honesty; The confir∣mation by oath; and lastly, This right and duty which ariseth from the promise: For, whoever pro∣miseth, submits himselfe to his promissary, and becomes his Sub∣ject, as far as the contract reaches.

The first mistake that springs from the ignorance of this diffe∣rence is, the great noise we heare of the Law of Nature and the Law of Nations. For, we are made ima∣gine

that Nature hath bound us to certaine Lawes, and not left us to the Liberty of Reason, where no pacts or agreements intervene: As, that men ought to give free Trade to leave the Seas open, to give immunities to Ambassadours, and the like: For these either depend on Custome and Consent, or are free for every man to dispose of, ac∣cording to his owne profit, necessi∣ty, or convenience of his affaires.

It is true, there is an inclination in man, from reason, to do another any good I can without my owne prejudice, and to have a desire to keepe peace with all men: But if I do not, it followes not that I wrong him, even though I do him harme or seeke his ruine; But I wrong my selfe, nature binding me to make my carriage to every one rationall and becoming a man: For he is no otherwise to me then

a piece of cloath or wood, which I cut and shape after my owne will, fittingly for my use. And, on the contrary side, the par∣ty prejudiced or refused a Courtesy, gets no right over me to revenge himselfe: But Nature and Reason teaches him, peradventure, that it is good and prudent for him to hurt me, to prevent a greater mischiefe to himselfe; and he doth right to himselfe in harming me, because he doth an action rationall and suitable to manhood.

The different consequents of the two positions, will appeare in this: That, if there be, in nature, radica∣ted such an order of right and natu∣rally just or due (as many hold) it is a thing that reason can never infringe nor can any thing justifie what God hath shewed us by example, and we see wise Politicians practise sometimes, when, without crime

or offence offered, they make them∣selves Masters of convenient pla∣ces: But, if there bee no such right by Nature, then Reason is left Mi∣stresse to judge whether it be con∣formable to the nobility of man to do such an action or no.

The Seventh GROUND.

Why men desire to live in Commu∣nity; and of the necessity of Governement.

NOt to make the foundations or under-ground workes bigger then our building; It is time to en∣ter upon our pretended subject of Governement and Obedience, and examine what it is maketh Governe∣ment necessary to Mankind. And, because the Governement we looke upon is that of a multitude; first

it is fit to understand why men de∣sire to live in flocks or multitudes. Neither can any who hath never so little skill in nature doubt, but, as pleasure masters and heads all our actions, so likewise doth it this of living in society.

The first community is of Man and Wife. Who seeth not the power of pleasure in their mutuall society? Aristotle, out of experience, teacheth us that we take pleasure in conver∣sing with handsome persons. And if wee consider pleasure to be nothing but the knowledge or sence of our being well or receiving some good; and, that the immediate cause of pleasure is the impression which some naturall or apprehended good maketh of its owne presence; and that good signifieth connaturall or fitting for us; wee shall perceive that Handsomenesse in our owne kinde must of necessity cause plea∣sure

in us; the impression it makes by our eyes being of the features and colour due to the perfection of our Nature; a gracefulnesse, not onely of gesture and voice, but even of wit and discourse being regularly the ground of the outward beauty. So that (if Nature hath not miscarried) all the parts and actions of a beau∣tifull body are gracefull to nature, and breed pleasure in others who in∣joy them by conversation and, as it were, communication.

This then is the first origine of meeting and living together; as, whosoever lookes into experience will easily discover: For, he will finde most men burthensome to them∣selves when they are alone, and to seeke company to divert themselves, so to elude the length of time. I remember to have heard a Country fellow complaine of the losse of a Dog which was stollen

from him; and gave for his reason, that he was to travell a whole night alone, and the Dog would have beene an excellent companion to him. Bees also, wee know, love company. Horses not onely labour, but even eate better amongst their fellowes: and we often heare sickly stomachs thank those that visit them for the good meale they have made, as if the company helped downe their meat. Pleasure therefore and Love is the first combiner of men into Society.

The next is, that God and Na∣ture have so managed mankind, that no one hath of himself, as much as he desireth; but regularly aboun∣deth in one kinde of goods and wants some other which his neigh∣bour hath: Hence, they mutually affect Society; to bee accommoda∣ted with such necessaries, as they cannot have but by communication one with another.

In the third place comes Feare: for hee that findeth himselfe stored with those things which hee and others love, is subject to feare those whom hee suspecteth able to bereave him of them; and so seeketh compa∣ny of friends for protection. Nor doth any one feare to lose but what he affecteth to have; so that first love marcheth in the van, and feare fol∣loweth in the reare. Besides, it is against all generosity, and embases Nature it selfe, to set the Throne of Feare above that of Love; and agreeth neither with Philosophy nor Morality.

To make a step farther: Granting once men to be desirous to live toge∣ther, and taking notice of the passi∣ons they are subject to, and how self-love corrupteth the judgement of al∣most all in their own case; it is evi∣dent they can never live in quiet and content, unlesse there bee some way

contrived of agreement, when passi∣on stirreth contention. They must therefore, necessarily, give consent, to end their controversies by some means. And since reason is our na∣ture; and every ones reason freer to see the truth in anothers case then in his owne; and a wise and good man fitter then a fool or knave, the most naturall way for a multi∣tude to live in peace is to have some man or men, accounted wise and good, chosen, to whose arbitrement all the rest ought to stand; the stronger part combining to force the weaker, in case of resistance; that is, the disinteressed part, which is the multitude, to force the interessed, which generally are but particulars if compared to the body of the peo∣ple.

Here you see the nature of Go∣vernement begin to appeare. But, to make it perfect, wee must farther con∣sider,

That many commodities are necessary to a multitude, which are to be furnished by common consent: That likewise there are many for∣raigne enviers to a multitude which liveth handsomely and happily: And in conclusion, that to provide for goods and prevent evils in common, is a matter of so great weight and dif∣ficulty, that it takethup the whole life of one or more men; and by conse∣quence, these businesses cannot be carried on by the whole body of the community, whose worke and aime is to enjoy themselves to their pro∣portion, in getting by their labour, those accommodations of humane life, which they esteem necessary or conducing to their happinesse. It solloweth therefore, they must en∣trust some more or fewer to take care of the common concernements.

Such Trustees are called Gover∣nours, and the commnnity is said to

obey them; and according to the principles forelaid, you see the peo∣ple are supposed ignorant of what ought to bee done for the publike, this being a businesse requiring a mans whole time; which they nei∣ther can spare, nor doe desire to em∣ploy in this: way: You see they en∣trust others in whose prudence and goodnesse they confide; and them∣selves execute what their Trustees think fitting, either by practising when they are commanded, or gi∣ving a sufficient force to their Go∣vernours to master such restif par∣ties as will not obey: In conclusion, you see Governement is, naturally, a power or right of directing the common affaires of a multitude, by a voluntary submission of the communities wills to the will of the Governours; whom they trust, up∣on opinion that they are understand∣ing and honest, and will administer

the Commonalty by the rules of wisedome and goodnesse, as is most convenient and advantageous for the people.

It seems to mee no moderate and discreet person can doubt but a Go∣vernement so ordered is both neces∣sary and connaturall to a rationall multitude, and, in a word, such as humane nature requires; and is the best, if not the onely, that sutes to the disposition of free men and pru∣dent.

The eighth GROUND.

Of the Authority given to an abso∣lute Governour; and of under∣sorts of Governement.

BY this resignation of the Peo∣ples will, it is also evident, the Magistracy receives such an activity

and power as, wee have explicated before, did arise out of a mans pro∣mise to his neighbour: and by con∣sequence, that the people as farre as they have renounced their owne will, so farre they have no power left in them to contradict or resist the orders of the Magistracy.

I say, as farre as the People have submitted their wills: for since this power is in the Magistrate in vertue of their wills, it cannot extend far∣ther then the peoples promise: So that if the people binde their Magi∣strates to certaine Lawes and Limits; hee hath no right to transgresse such Lawes, or extend himselfe beyond the prefixed limits by his install∣ment, and the original power given him: but above all, he cannot dis∣pose of one chip or dispense in one the least law; farther then he apprehends it as fit and necessary to the good of the Common-wealth: and, if hee

doth, hee exceedeth his Patent and power. True it is, there is a great discretion to bee used in such limits, and the prudent Governour will see that the good of the Community re∣quireth many of those dispensations, which carelesse Governours use out of an overweening of their owne height and power.

Having thus declared the nature and conditions of naturall Governe∣ment; it is not amisse to see whether there bee any other Governement; and wherein distinguished from this. And casting our eyes round about us wee quickly perceive certaine com∣munities which pretend to a defe∣ctive Governement: as Companies of Merchants or Trades-men; Uni∣versities and Colledges of Schollers; and Cloysters of men and women, who pretend to employ themselves wholly to perfect their soules to∣wards eternall beatitude. All these

have a participation of Governe∣ment; but have not the universall administration of humane goods and evills: For, power of life and death, generally, they have none; and are subject, for the most part, to appeals from their judgements, in matters of great consequence: nei∣ther have they any power of peace and warre: And if sometimes any of these royalties belong to them; it is not as they are heads of such Communities, but as they partici∣pate of Soveraignty by priviledge, or accident.

These therefore are distinguished from the Governement wee pretend to declare; as being slight imitati∣ons of it, and certaine likenesses, not the power it self; or as some Art or Trade is different from Morall Philosophy, which is Mistresse of the will, and all her actions; the others being but Ushers to the parti∣cular,

as it were formes or rankes in which petty things are taught. In fine, these others are to our Governe∣ment, as particulars to the univer∣sall. The Governement therefore which wee explicate is that which hath power, either of all things be∣longing to the people it governeth; or at least, of all comprehensible by Nature and falling under Sence and Experience. The first of these wee see in the Pope and such Bishops as are withall Secular Princes; the second, in other Christian Governe∣ments either of Princes or Com∣mon-wealths, where the Spiritual jurisdiction is acknowledged to be higher and greater, though not com∣mander of the Temporall.

But wee seeke farther, whether there bee any supreme Governement different from this wee explicate, or no: And the occasion is from what wee see in certaine instances,

that there is a kinde of command or rather subjection, which wee call Slavery, exercised, not onely amongst Heathens, but even Christians, who have more conformity to nature.

The Ninth GROUND.

Of Slavery and the lawfulnesse of it.

ANd first, wee must looke into the notion of Slavery; which signifies a subjection to command in all things; and that meerely for the Masters profit. This all things may either reach to the hindring him from those actions which are necessary to obtaine Beatitude; or onely to corporall services, with that moderation, that the Master hinders him not from such exercises

as concerne the procurement of fu∣ture happinesse.

And clearly, it is against nature for any to submit his will so farre as to renounce eternall blisse. There can∣not, then, bee any Obedience due to such an extremity; and, by conse∣quence, there cannot be any power of commanding such enormities in the compasse of nature. The like I conceive of a subjection to be killed or maimed causlessely and without desert, or even tormented; nay, or so penuriously abused as to have no content in life; but perpetually to suffer sicknesse, hunger, cold, or any other notably afflictive condi∣tion, so that his life is rather a pu∣nishment then a content to him. For since life is our beeing, and since bee∣ing is the thing most deeply recom∣mended to us by nature; it is evi∣dently against the inclination of na∣ture, to consent to the losse either of

life or of the profit of life, which is, either to be well in this world or in the next: therefore it cannot be conformable to nature to renounce either; especially, the Quiet in this world being the meanes to gaine blisse in the other.

Neither doth it scare me to cast my eyes upon so many holy men and women, as have put themselves, voluntarily, upon penurious and painfull lives. For, I can easily an∣swer, that they had not displea∣sing lives; enjoying the fruit of contemplation, and the sweetnesse of Conscience in expecting a great reward for what they did: So that, they onely refused the pleasures of this world, to gaine those of the next; which is very rationall. But, for a man to renounce the content of this world, who either thinke not of a∣nother, or, at least, hopeth nothing out of his renunciation: this must

of necessity be extremely irrationall and against Nature; whose univer∣sall aimes are, to be well, either in the next or this present life. But if there be no su••h subjection naturall, there can as little be any power of command gotten either by promise and submission of the subject, or violence of the Commander; who may perforce do what he list, but can never make it conformable to nature, to use an other with such in∣humane severity.

There followes yet another kinde of Slavery; which consisteth in be∣ing bound to do what his Master commandeth, while his Master af∣fordeth him a convenient lively∣hood; and being subject to due pu∣nishment, without farther appeal, when he deserveth it. And this hath no apparent opposition to Nature; why, in circumstances, a man may not binde himselfe to it, and be ob∣liged

to maintaine and make good his word to his dying day. And, of such a kind of Slavery, we may question, Whether nature alloweth a whole people to be involved in it, or it be a thing that onely can hap∣pen accidentally in nature.

And Aristotle is the first man whom wee are engaged to offend in this matter; who sayes or seemes to say, That some Nations are naturally Masters and Commanders, others, Slaves and Subjects: To which conceit Virgil seemes also to incline;

Tu regere imperio populos Romane memento &c. Hae tibi erunt artes—

As if it were proper to that Countrey to command. Neither doe I thinke Aristotle's meaning was any more, then that there was a greater fitnesse

in some Nations to command, then in others: for, himselfe teacheth, the Barbarous prisoners, whose edu∣cation had been noble, should not be put to servile offices. So that, it was but a little selfe-pleasing in these two great Authours, and affection to∣wards their Countries, which made them fall into this extremity, of thin∣king it fit that other nations should submit to theirs: Whereas, had they lived in our dayes, long experience would have taught them that, in every nation, there are men fit to Governe, if Education and Disci∣pline be not wanting; And againe, any nation may prove a Slave, even through too much wit, if they have not goodnesse to temper it. But we must not be angry, even with great ones, if they flatter a little their Countrey: but take warning it be not our owne case, either for our Countrey, or, which is more absurd, for our selves.

Leaving then this question, Whe∣ther any nation be, by nature, borne and designed to slavery? let us see whether, within the Latitude of Nature, it consists that any nation can enslave it selfe in the sence pro∣pounded. I do not here intend to engage in that question; Whether one nation may oppresse another, and, by force of Garrisons and Ar∣mies, keepe them quiet in a Legiti∣mate course of Governement and Subjection? a question much diffe∣rent from ours, which is onely, Whether a whole Nation may vo∣luntarily submit it selfe to a Govern∣ment, by which it shall have no∣thing of its owne, nor be able to deserve or get any thing; but bee entirely at the disposition of the Magistrate it chuseth, without right or property?

That we may not walk too much in the dark, the holy Scripture

holdeth us out a Lanthorne, in the example of Joseph; who bought up the whole nation of AEgypt for Pharaoh their King, so that he ren∣dred him not onely the Governour as before, but also absolute Lord and Master, and them his slaves; and this by their consent. Neverthelesse, I am not able to understand reason in it. To put therefore the case clearly, the meaning is; Whether a whole nation can ty it selfe so by any promise to one Magistrate, as afterward to be bound, they and their Children, in force of their words, not to have or dispose of their Labours and goods of fortune but at the pleasure of the Magistrate; and that he hath power, arbitrari∣ly and without any farther reason then his owne will, to give what one man possesseth to another, and make any one worke and obey ano∣ther, meerly because such is his plea∣sure.

That which induceth me to de∣clare for the Negative is the Nature of man; whose first and maine ope∣ration, is judgement and choice; and the matter of this is his out∣ward action: So that, who univer∣••ally renounceth his judgement in externe action, truely renounceth nature it selfe, in renouncing the end and action for which it was made. Now, that a single man may be forced to this, I make no difficulty: For, if force can take a∣way a single mans life, much more may it take away his outward acti∣on. But, when I speake of a Nation, me thinks I speake of Nature it selfe: For, I understand a Nation to signi∣fie a thing in nothing different from humane Nature, except in greatnesse; as a bit of bread from a loafe or a paile of water from the pond out of which it was taken; and so, Reason cannot teach us to do that to

a nation, which ought not bee done to all humane kinde. Now, who abhorres not to thinke that the use of judgement and will should bee banished out of Mankinde? Were not that quite to unman us and be-beast our whole nature? On the other side, it being the property of reason to use every thing it know∣eth, according as it is fitting to the respective nature of the thing; and nothing being more fitting for man in common and every one in particular, then to judge and go∣verne in his little spheare of activi∣ty; reason can never demand or approve of the contrary to be pra∣ctised universally; as is implyed in this Position, that it may be done to a whole nation.

I looke not into the inconveni∣ence of such proceeding: How base and unworthy it renders the sub∣jects; how unfit for the service of

the Magistrate; how ready to ac∣cept of any occasion to better them∣selves; and the like; which are suf∣ficient to dehort any wise Gover∣nour from attempting or desiring it: Because my Theame is onely upon the contracting an obligation of obedience, out of the force of their promise; and extends no fur∣ther. And, I suppose, the shewing that such a promise invalidateth the principle upon which a promise grounds its constancy, is enough, to shew that no promise so made can be constant and firme; since a man stands to his word, because he is a man and hath a principle of judge∣ment or choice upon judgement, by which and according to which he is and ought to be governed: Now then, such a promise being a re∣nouncing and bereaving him of this his manlinesse; it cannot assuredly bee maintained by manlinesse which

is the onely or chiefe strength of a promise.

But, what must we reply to Jo∣seph? what to many thousands of eminent Christians, who seeme to professe and observe, in vertue of a vow, this very kinde of subjection? As for Joseph, he justifies himselfe, in renouncing the Vassalage of his People for one fifth part of their lands and fruits. 1. And, not to make an estimate, how proportio∣nable the fifth of a Kingdome is to the furnishing of necessaries for governing; so much at least is plain that, by his remission of foure parts absolutely, that is, for ever, he did not execute what he pretended by the bargaine; but, by the formality of acquiring all, he obtained what he aimed at, That the People should willingly contribute the fifth part of their Labour and goods ge∣nerally, and, in case of necessity,

willingly obey their Governour.

As for the speciall obedience vowed by some Christians of ex∣emplary life, it is professedly only, concerning spirituall instruction or exercise, even then when it is applyed to the Knights champions of Christendome: And this is ex∣pressed by the greatest Divine the Schoole ever had, in his 22^•. Qu. 104. Art. 5. ad tertium. So that, neither of these objections prejudice the conclusion we have setled; How∣ever the outward undiscerned shew may make an appearance to the contrary.

Out of this conclusion it is easi∣ly seene, that the Turkish, Mosco∣viticall, Tartarian and other what∣soever Governements, setled upon this principle, that the Goods and Lives of the Subjects are the Princes, not to defend (as our Lawes go) but to dispose of at will, without

contradiction or limitation, more then of his pleasure; neither do nor can ever breed any obligation of Obedience in the Subject, farther then out of feare or present utility.

It is not amisse to adde this con∣sideration, that those Tyrannicall Governours exact of their Subjects no lesse then to forgoe all that is deare in this world, at their plea∣sures, life and meanes, wife and children, and whatsoever hath made impression upon them: So that, truely, there is no protection or se∣curity from them; and if they rob you not, it is because they have no occasion, not because they con∣ceive any unworthinesse in it. Whence, no good nor profit doth, regularly and according to the in∣tention of the pact and agree∣ment, result to the particular; but all is the high Masters, and the Subjects portion is onely to

share those scraps he shall cast down to him, as to a Dog, to make him fit to hunt for his master.

The tenth GROUND.

Why a man is to hazard himselfe for the common good.

IT is true, this debt in the subject, of hazarding life and limbs and all that is estimable in this world, is exacted, as well in just and legiti∣mate Governements as in those hi∣deous Tyrannies; But, there is a recompence for it, and the good of the whole reflecteth on the part; and if one lose his life, his children and relations at last feele the sweet∣nesse of it; and this makes men hazard with courage, and die with comfort. And cleerly, were there not this obligation, no Com∣mon-wealth could stand. What City could be defended, if the Ci∣tizens would not venture their lives

upon the walls? What Army could bee managed, if the Souldier would never be brought into the danger of death, or would fly as soon as the bullets began to play about his ears? all wrongs must be suffered at their hands who would expose their own lives to hurt others; and no justice maintained, or innocency defended. Nature therefore makes it most cleer that such an obligation is unavoid∣able, and the daily necessity of it beateth it out so flat and plaine, that wee can no way escape so manifest an evidence.

But if it bee by the direction of nature, certainly it is also rationall, and hath some principles of its truth and reasonablenesse. Now, in Mo∣rality the reason of all action is the good obtaineable by it; which if lesse or not greater then what wee hazard and, peradventure, lose in the attempt, it is no good nor can

bee a rationall motive of such an action. We ought therefore to seeke out this great good.

Aristotle proceeds as cunningly in this businesse as became so wise a Master; and, according to his fashi∣on, where his skill reached not to explicate the particulars, remained in common termes: telling us, that Bonum commune divinius est quàm particulare: But, in what this Di∣vinity consists, hee no where expres∣ses. Truly, if there were a Plato∣nick Idea of the particular's goods, which might bee termed the com∣mon good, I could understand that there were a Divinity in it; but himselfe hath extinguished that flash of Plato's, beyond reviving. I understand also, that the notion of common, compared to the notion of individuall, hath a kinde of excel∣lency by its universality, which rendreth it very august and lustrous,

and of a higher degree then the par∣ticular. I know again the perpetui∣ty a Common-wealth pretendeth to, compared to the mortality of a sin∣gle person, vesteth it selfe with a kinde of infinity, which giveth it a glorious appearance. Nay, when I see the same man work for a Com∣mon-wealth, in a free way of doing it good; and againe, for a private friend: I see a vast distance between his pretended ends; and an eminent generosity in one over the other: Whence, I believe, it cometh that Heroës and heroicall vertues are chiefly taken in respect of doing good to whole Countreys or Cities.

But when, on the other side, I see the same great Master teach us, that Good is the same with Desireable; and every ones good, what is desire∣able to him; I finde it is an intri∣cate labyrinth of equivocation wherein wee endlessely erre, while

wee thtnk that Good taken in com∣mon, should bee accounted Good, truly and properly. As, who would bee so wilde as to bend any strong labour here in England to profit the King of Persia or Siam, if hee ex∣pected no good to reflect on him∣selfe by it? Much lesse would any account it good to bee robbed or maimed, because it was good to ano∣ther who possessed his money or was afraid of him: and yet if wee stick upon the common Notion of good, without determining to whom it is good, ••oth these must bee esteem∣ed not onely goods but great ones; for, so they are to some body, though nothing or harme to the esteemer. Then, to cry, The Common good, is a meere deceit and flattery of words; unlesse wee can shew that the com∣mon good is as great to us as wee make it sound.

Neither can the authority of

learned Nations and the many ende∣vours of worthy men perswade us the contrary. For these Nations generally were of Popular governe∣ments, where plainly the common good was the good of them who were to reward the causes of it: so that, it was no wonder the Common good should be so highly exalted and cryed up; where it was the par∣ticular good, both to them to whom it was commended, as also the com∣menders themselves were to arrive to their own private pretences through that notion of the common good. The like is of all Princes and Go∣vernours; who if they bee wise, conceive the common good in most circumstances, to bee compared to them as their own proper good.

It remaines therefore, to see what may bee the ground on which an understanding man ought to value so highly the common good; and ex∣pose

his life and all that is deare to him, upon the score of the Publicke. Cleare it is, that hee who ventures his life, ventures all this world: For if hee dies, what reward remaines there in this world? Fame is a slen∣der recompence, when the fruit of it (which chiefly consists in being re∣spected in company, and having a power amongst his associates) is once passed. The good of his wife and children; that may rejoyce a dying man; but if there rest no∣thing after death, it is a comfort which soon expires; being indeed nothing but a flash. It is then past dispute, that for him, who expects nothing in the next world, there can bee no rationall motive of volunta∣rily endangering his life for the common cause; if himselfe bee not particularly interessed in it.

I know Philosophers reply, that there is no harme in death, nor pain

after it, and wee are but as if wee never had been; so they dispute to take away the feare of death. But first, I would ask them, why, even in such a case, the fear of death should be taken away? What signifieth this to a sound Philosopher, to take away the love of his Summum Bonum? of the end for which hee is to doe all his actions? Againe if hee must embrace death, upon what motive must he make his onset? shall hee propose to himselfe none? or a lesse good then hee loses? or entertaine frantick apprehensions of glory after hee is nothing? These are not an∣swers for Philosophers and conside∣rate persons; but for some hare∣brained fool-hardy flashes or doat∣ing Oratours, who, with a multi∣tude of fine words, can plausibly dresse up contradictions and non∣sence.

This therefore remaines certain,

that there is no good to bee expected here equivalent to the hazard of death; and consequently, none can bee rationally valiant, who sets not his hopes upon the next world: And as, before, wee made it apparent, that hee who was not constant to his Religion, could have no rooted Ho∣nour or Honesty in him; so, now it is likewise evident, hee cannot ratio∣nally bee either valiant himselfe or trusted by others in danger, farther then hee is a foole. Since then, on the contrary side, the nature of Com∣mon-wealths makes it beyond dis∣pute that hazarding is necessary; it is both evident there is another life to bee expected, and that it imports good Government to plant deeply in the breast of the subjects a ratio∣nall apprehension of it. The cause therefore, and solid reason why men ought to bee valiant, is the hope of reward hereafter for doeing good to

our neighbour here: and the Com∣mon-wealth beeing our neerest and greatest Neighbour, as including our Friends, Parents, Acquaintance, and all of Mankinde that our know∣ledge reacheth to; to performe ser∣vice to It is, certainly, the greatest act of charity towards our Neigh∣bour; that is the highest externe act which God hath granted to us, and, consequently, to bee preferred before all others; and, as such, to ex∣pect a profit and recompence in the next life.

I know, it may bee objected, that in beasts also is to bee found a kinde of valour, even to the hazard of their lives for their Mates and little ones, and yet no reward of the next world can be pretended for them. But, wee are to reflect, that beasts are not governed by any reason gi∣ven them to governe themselves by; but like Clocks and other Engines,

by the wit of their Makers: and therefore it ought not to bee expect∣ed they should bee addressed to that which is their individuall greatest good, as Man is by his Reason; but onely to what is fittest for their Creators intention; which being onely to continue them for the use of Man; and this passion of audacity which wee see in them, being fit for that, wee are not to seeke a further reason for them to hazard their lives, nor to draw any conse∣quence from them to Mankinde, whose propriety is to governe him∣selfe by the knowledge of his owne good, and not to bee forced out of that for the good of any other, so the notion of good bee rightly taken.

By this wee, in part, understand wherein consists the worth and excel∣lency of a Magistrate and his Office: to wit, that all others ends being pure∣ly for the good of their private per∣sons

or family; the Magistrates aime is at the universall good of the whole eternall body of the Common-wealth, the extent of the persons, the long and farre-sighted care, and the abstraction from his private good, manifestly exalt this function, beyond comparison, above that of private men and their intentions; and placeth it, as it were, in an orb of honour proper to its dig∣nity.

The eleventh GROUND.

The Quality and Rationall power of a supreme Governour.

THus is our supreme Magistrate or Governour mounted on his Throne of Justice and Soveraignty. Hee hath for his strength, that right the People have bestowed on him;

devesting themselves, by this sub∣mission, from interposing in Com∣mon affaires. He hath besides, the strength of the People; both their Wealth and Swords being delivered up to him; so that, if he bee wise, he can make himselfe and his Lawes obeyed. But chiefely he hath his owne Prudence and Goodnesse, which is supposed to be the choicest that could bee found in that people; and the Credit of it to be his strength and support.

For, if we looke into it; As we see that, in the naturall generation of Governement, the people truely intend to be governed by one whom they esteeme the Wisest and Best amongst them: so afterward, when they apprehend their Magi∣strate no Solomon, yet they still con∣ceive he is the best they can obtaine or prudently aime at; That is, if they should attempt to change, it

would bring greater inconveniences then their continuance under this weaker Magistrate. So that, as it were, the Essence and Forme of his power to governe, is Wisdome and Goodnesse; at least, such a degree of both as is sup∣posed and apprehended the greatest possible, according to the circum∣stances wherein they are. His End wee finde to bee The common good: and to that is he wholly and adequately bound, by his owne Goodnesse, by the peoples Inten∣tion, by his owne Acceptance, by the nature of the Charge it selfe, and by the very forme of his life and Profession: In so much that, he faileth from his Duty, from the expectation of his Subjects, and his owne Goodnesse, if he doth the least action for his private in∣terest, or otherwise then out of his esteeme that it is for the greatest good

of the Common-wealth.

And truely, if it bee duely consi∣dered, we may plainely see that his private interest is not distinguished from the publick. For, how can it be? First for Honour, 'tis plaine, the welfare of his Subjects is his highest honour; Their knowing they are well by him, and so their love to him, his strongest security; Their ex∣pressing still on all occasions con∣tent with his actions, and esteeme of his person, his greatest pleasure; and in fine, the more wealth they have, the greater Commander is he: so that really, this private interest (if he be indeed a good Governour) is the true felicity of his People. I doe not, by this, intend to cut off from Supreame Magistrates that promise and magnificence wee see usually in persons of that quality: But, whereas it may be practised either for pride and vanity, that

is, to procure an esteem of the pri∣vate merit of the Magistrate, or else, to facilitate the governement by the awe and reverence it printeth in the Subject; I expect the supreame Magistrate to be so discreet, as to understand the former is meerly a shadow or faint and fading co∣lour, the other a reall profit and necessary instrument, and so to be embraced for the good of the people.

Neither must wee leave our Ma∣gistrate here, but transplant our discourse into a new consideration. For, if he hath gotten a Commissi∣on, he hath not, by that, lost the quality of a rationall, wise, and good man; but joined to that a new obligation of being new fixt upon the Common good, as the effect and scope of the actions of his whole life: Insomuch that, to determine the quality of his action, we must

make one complexe of the whole person; and aske, What a wise and noble minde, haveing such li∣mitations upon him, by word or oath engaged in his installment, may or ought to do concerning the limitations?

And first, it is undoubted on both sides, that neither may he, without great cause, make a breach in those hedges his way is fenced with; nor, if he make some small and incon∣siderable breaches, that hee violates therefore his oath. For, the nature of humane action is such, as not to consist in an indivisible; but, of it selfe, to have a morall Latitude▪ our understandings not being able to reach to such small and petty dif∣ferences as nature maketh and our operations containe, as far as they depend from nature.

But, the Question cometh, When some great fault discovers it selfe in

the limitations, and the end of Go∣vernement is prejudiced by such a defect; and neverthelesse it is no doubt but 'tis the intention of the people or the Trustees of the people to binde their Magistrate to such conditions; Whether, in such a case, he be bound to his orders and oath, or whether the duty of a wise and good man doth enfranchise him to doe what is truely best for the people, though it be against their wills?

The question seemeth hard: and therefore it is not amisse to note, that truely best signifieth that it be not onely best, if it had been fore-ordered or if it were in practise; but that it be best to be brought into practise; and that, notwithstanding all dammages and dangers which are to be incurred in the setling of it; Otherwise, it is clear, he ought to stand to his oath. Another caution

is, that the Magistrate doe not onely think it so best, but know it by cer∣tainty and science; otherwise, hee proceedeth not wisely, to hazard a disturbance of the Common-wealth upon slight and weak appearances.

These two suppositions premised, wee are to consider what it is that engageth the Magistrate on both sides. And, for his promise, it is above declared, that hee is engaged to it by the connaturality and beauty of Truth in Mans nature: Now not Truth onely is conformable to mans nature, but also that Noblenesse and Goodnesse that bindeth man to man; which in its highest pitch, that is, as it looketh upon a Common-wealth or a little Mankinde, is the beauty and vertue of a Governour.

Againe, I see a Governour hath in himselfe, as it were, two Truths, or degrees of truth belonging to his person: One, which is the publicke

Honesty, either considered betwixt him and his subject or some aliens; and this forfeited maketh his publick credit weak and unfit for the use of Governement: the other is but a splendour reflecting on his own person, by which hee appeareth in the face of honour and a man of his word. For this latter it is very evident, the affection to the publicke ought to oversway it; because being but a private good it should doe homage to those vertues which carry a man to the common interest. For the former, the dammage ensueing is to bee esteemed and poised against the profit or necessity of the Com∣mon-wealth: For, if it bee evident, that the good of the change openly and vastly exceeds the dammage proceeding from the discredit; cleerly hee is bound to admit of the discredit, to purchase the advantage accrewing by the change: But, where

there is none or little difference, there the ballance hangs upon quiet∣nesse side, and change is not to bee ventured on.

This seemeth so plainly and evidently concluded, that a ra∣tionall man cannot resist it. But, to those who are used to main∣taine their credit by custome more then by reason, it is a bolus of hard digestion, to tell them they must break their word for the com∣mon good: and seemeth to bee of the same nature, with that famous defini∣tion of an Ambassadour, witty in England, harsh in other Nations, that Hee is sent ad peregrè mentiendum pro patriâ, which where the equivo∣cation of lying abroad is not under∣stood, is, in verity, a scandall to Statesmen, whose negotiation hangs so tenderly on their credit, that, it once being broken, they have lost a principall instrument to penetrate

the hearts on which they are to work.

Therefore, let us see whether the high Magistrate (in proceeding as wee have declared) does truly force the rampart of veracity so necessary for a Governement. Let us first begin with his promise, and consider what it is. Hee is entrusted to doe for the common good: and the rea∣son why hee is entrusted is, because the entrusters conceive themselves either through their incapacity or at∣tendance to other imployments, ig∣norant of what is truly the common good. They entrust him, therefore, with more then they understand; and so his power is to proceed, ac∣cording to his understanding, though it crosse theirs: Hee then of necessi∣ty, must bee false to his Oath, if hee doe not, according to his trust, act for the common good what hee evi∣dently sees in a high degree to im∣port

it. Further, because wee know, in morall businesses, the end aimed at, is more principall then the means ordered to it, and hath such a com∣mand over them that they are to bee or not to bee, according as is fitting for the end: And in the Oath or Promise of our high Magistrate, if hee observe his limitations, he de∣stroyeth the end for which they were put: Hee offends against both his Oath and Fidelity to his people, if hee maintain such limitations, when hee is obliged, for the publick good, that is, when hee ought to break them.

Yes but (replieth the man who thinketh himselfe wedded to an out∣ward and seeming honesty in this cause) howsoever, at least hee breaketh that part of his Oath, in which hee swore directly, to those limitations. Let us therefore see even that point, and ask, what was the peoples will in 〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

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exacting his Oath or Promise? Doeth any one will what hee under∣standeth and knoweth not? If one should say to another, I give thee what is in that trunk; in which himselfe had put a suit of apparell, and, without his knowledge, his ser∣vant had taken that out and put in bags of gold to the same bulk; would any Divine, or Chancery Judge, or prudent person assert he were bound to bestow on that promissary all his gold, which was in the trunke? I thinke not; and the reason is, be∣cause it is the will and understand∣ing which hath the power to give strength to a promise or contract; and here the will is wanting; for hee knew not what he said, nor in∣tended to give any thing but a suit of clothes.

How many promises doe Divines and Lawyers pronounce null, though they were good and valid

when they were made, by reason of the change of accidents follow∣ing, which could not be foreseene? If one promise his Daughter in marriage to his neighbour, and shee dyeth; is he bound to fulfill his engagement, or seeke his neighbour another wife? Nay, if the neigh∣bour be discovered not to be the man he was taken for; not to have a competent estate and such like con∣ditions; he may justifie the disper∣formance of his promise; nor shall he forfeit his credit if he doeth not keepe his word, but rather, if he do, be accounted a weak man.

Now, to come to our purpose, let it bee supposed the people were made understand, when they exact the promise from their Magistrate, that such limitations would destroy their peace, and contentment: doth any one think they would binde their Governour to maintaine them?

If they would not, tis evident, howsoever their mouthes pronounced the words, their hearts were igno∣rant and inculpable of such an ex∣action; for they knew not what they did, they understood not nor meant what they spake.

But suppose that truely they knew the incommodities that were to follow, and yet they would have them observed: For, this happeneth often in this our subject, that some (especially great men, and some∣times the populace) understand the inconvenience of a Law, and yet for private interest will have it maintained: What then is the duty of the supreame Magistrate, who is sworne to maintaine the said Lawes? The question is clearely answered by the condemnation of Jephthe; who, when he had rashly vowed to sacrifice the first thing that met him from home, did impiously murther

his daughter. All understanding men know, a wicked oath is not to be observed. He that should give a mad mana sword, because he had vowed or sworne it, deserved to be hanged for the murthers by him committed: Now, an ignorant and wilfull man, what is he but a mad man? Or what is madnesse but a wilfulnesse in doing evill? If the action be naught and such as the exactor cannot, with reason, desire, he cannot by any oath bind a swea∣rer to it: Now to observe conditions which shall ruine the Governement and destroy the end for which they were instituted, is an action con∣trary to all reason, and to which the promissary cannot binde the promiser, in any wisdome and goodnesse: He is therefore bound, rather to the destroying then ful∣filling such conditions; neither is he therefore perjured, but were ra∣ther

unjust and wicked, if he obser∣ved them. This so resolved, it ap∣peareth plainly, that no supreame Magistrate can bee bound to any Lawes contrary to good Governe∣ment; farther then either the danger of changing them, or the not cleerly seeing them to be such, may hold his hand.

The Twelfth GROUND.

Who is such a Governour, and the Subjects duty towards him.

WEE have long talked of a Supreame Governour; it is time we should point him out, that he may bee knowne. And, since all agree that there are three sorts of Governement, Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy; when

they are simple, there can bee no doubt who is the supreame magi∣strate. Now, mingled they may bee, all together, or some two of them: And againe, their mixing may bee either continually, as when all parts mixed are so often engaged that their Authorities run jointly, or else some are continuall, others but at cer∣taine termes.

If Monarchy bee mixed, either with Aristocracy or Democracy, so that they be continually joint actors; the Monarch is but a Servant, and the other part the Master: as is to be seen i•• the Italian Doges, and the Lacedaemonian Kings; for his force is nothing, compared to his con∣sort.

If Democracy and Aristocracy be so mixed, the quarrell is more ballanced; and because it is a Go∣vernement divided in it selfe, and therefore dangerous; no doubt but,

if the Aristocracy get power enough, she is in the posture of supreame Au∣thority. The example of this wee have in the Roman Common-wealth, in the time, specially, of Sylla's conquest; when, if he had setled the State in the Senate, there had been no feare of Caesar and Pompeyes mangling that Common-wealth, as afterwards fell out.

Monarchy and Democracy can hardly be so mixed, that Democra∣cy be perpetuall, and Monarchy by spurts: For that is not Monarchy; the said Monarch being not long enough in power to be accounted a setled Magistrate; as wee see in the Decemvirs, Tribunes and Dicta∣tors amongst the Romans: So that, the Monarch hath not the power in his hand to change any thing, which is the case we aime at. And the like is of Aristocracy; when its em∣ployment is the ordinary and con∣tinuall,

and Monarchy onely by turnes and seasons.

There remaineth onely Monar∣chy in continuance, compared to Aristocracy and Democracy at certaine turnes. And in both, it is cleare, the Monarch is the supreame Governour in ordinary; and so the Magistrate of whom we speake, who may alter the inconveniences, if oc∣casion serve. As for the People, they are but a weake part, if the Governour be wise: So that he is, by this posture, in the state of doing that good to the Commonwealth which his judgement and conscience dictate to him to be necessary. The comparison to Aristocracy is much harder; every one of the Aristo∣cracy being, generally and regu∣larly speaking, a petty Monarch; and the whole of them easily assem∣bled; and, when so, having the power in their hands: So that the

Monarch is not (by vertue of his ordinary condition) in a posture to bee able to rectifie what he seeth necessary to be altered; therefore he is not the man wee call the supreame Magistrate, but the assembly of the Nobility, whereof he is but an eminent and considerable one.

The Subject, being correlative to the Magistrate, requireth upon that title, to be reflected on; but much more because the nature of the Ma∣gistrate cannot be well understood, unlesse the duty of the Subject bee joyntly declared. We must there∣fore declare, or seeke out at least, what Honour and Conscience ob∣ligeth the Subject to: and, to per∣forme this, wee must reflect upon his motive of Obedience; which, as is before insinuated, was groun∣ded on the love and necessity of living in Community, that, from it, he may receive good, and, by

its protection, secure himselfe a∣gainst evill. To this end he entrust∣eth the charge of the common ad∣ministration to the Magistrate; taking himselfe as one unskilfull or unable for such employment. Wee see therefore, the end of the Subject in his obedience, immediately, is the publick good or the good of the Commonwealth: a farther though more cordiall and deep in the sub∣ject, is the good he is to receive out of the Commonwealth being well; which is nothing else but that the particulars of the Commonwealth be so. Evident then it is, that the im∣mediate motive which the Subject is to propose before his eyes, in his obedience, is the good of the Com∣monwealth; that is, the very same motive the Magistrate ought to have in administring, and which hee had when first, in his owne person or in his forefathers, he submitted

himselfe to this rule.

Wee know, by consequence, how excellent a virtue this act of Obedience is; having a motive of so great a price and high elevation a∣bove other ordinary employments, which reach no farther then to his private good. But, herein the same vertue is lesse in the Subject then in the Commander; that, because the common good is the very private good of the Commander, therefore it is not related to any private good of the same nature; and so not com∣manded or limited by any other, as in the subject it is by the end of his idioticall good.

The next thing that occurreth is the Subjects fact by making this trust; and that is, that he hath made away all power of judgeing and caring for the common good, farther then by the eyes and hands of the Magistrate, his Trustee, other∣wise

they have not made him Su∣preame Governour: So that, if he thinketh or judgeth any thing to goe amisse, or interpose his opinion, in any reall and effective way, even so farre as to disgust himselfe or any other against the Governement; he breaketh his promise and engage∣ment to his Governour: Much lesse is it in his power to recall the trust and seeke any way to take it out of the hands of his Soveraigne. As for his oath of Allegiance, I believe every man sees, it takes its strength from these two; and, by consequence, is to be understood to reach whither they carry it, and strengthen the ob∣ligation that they ground: but, not to extend it selfe to what they doe not; onely what they begin and, as it were, make, the oath doth, by Religion and reverence to God, enholy and consecrate, and so give it the greatest strength that

falleth upon humane Liberty.

By this discourse, we learn, that the Magistrates security, from hone∣sty and conscience, is the greatest that humane nature can frame; be∣ing grounded upon the noblest ver∣tue, fortified by the vertue of ve∣racity so naturall and principall as is above signified; the subject ha∣ving made as great an alienation of his propriety to Governement as will can ratifie; and lastly, eleva∣ted it above his cwne soule by the invocation of him who is master both of soule and body, of time and eternity. Whence, nothing but the frailty of humane condition can pre∣judice a Governour once estated le∣gitimately in his seat of Justice; nothing can make a Subject more delinquent, then to work against this duty of obedience; no wonder, therefore, if Rebellion be connume∣rated with Soothsaying and Idolatry.

and Obedience preferred before sa∣crifice, even in the sight of God.

The thirteenth GROUND.

Of the Qualities of Lawes and Commands, in respect to Obedience.

OUt of what hath been said concerning the Subject's Obli∣gation to Obedience, wee may un∣derstand a distinction made by many, of the validity and lawful∣nesse of commands. For, the law∣fulnesse to a Soveraigne Comman∣der, is no other then that hee truly thinketh it to bee for the good of the common; that is, for the great∣est good, all things considered: which if hee doth, it is, by the for∣mer discourse, lawfull for him to command, what he pleases, without

reproach of conscience or honour to him; and on the other side, if hee swerve never so little, hee so farre breaketh his trust: and the greater the abuse is, the greater also his fault and shame. But, the subject is to remember that hee hath put his confi∣dence in his Governour; as beeing himselfe ignorant and not having leasure to look into the depth of the policy: and therefore hee is to think and judge well of his Magistrates counsells, and make account hee doeth not understand the bottome of them; and so bee prompt and for∣ward to obey.

The validity of the command consists in the obligation the subject hath to performe it: And this may faile in two degrees; One to the not fulfilling the command, by avoid∣ing it; the other, by resisting it. This latter is no waies in the Subjects hands, unless it be in such a case as

his oath of Allegiance and Obligati∣on to the good of the Community, cease or bind not: The former can ne∣ver happen as long as it can be pre∣sumed to be the Commanders will this Subject, in these circumstances, should perform this command; For, so long, his trust obligeth him not to faile. But, because a Governour many times is not rightly informed, nor can a Law reach home to all particu∣lar accidents; it is very incident that; in some speciall cases, the Subject may presume it is not the Magi∣strates will he should be bound to this particular service. And this is so ordinary that, among us, there is a particular and highest Court, to de∣clare when wee are not bound to the written lawes.

Yet is it necessary to believe that even that Court is able to satisfie all cases, or that private men are bound not to avoid a law without having

recourse to that Court, or to obey all decrees of that Court if they can prudently avoid it: because no Court (especially amongst refined pleaders) can bee without many for∣malities; which are not the sub∣stance of Justice, and therefore may prudently bee declined, neither honour nor conscience obliging to such proceedings. But they must ever have for their rule, that the Lawmaker intended not to include them, in these circumstances, with∣in the compasse of his Law.

Some make us a threefold division of Lawes; the first absolute or commanding; the second permissive; the third they call penall Lawes: The first they averre to bee obliga∣tory, because directly intended by the Law-giver; and of this sort is verified what wee have newly dis∣coursed.

The second (were it expressely

the sense of the Law to permit a thing) is also of the former kinde and onely distinguished in the mat∣ter: For it would make the thing permitted truly lawfull. But this is not the Writers meaning: For they doe not conceive it was the Law-ma∣kers intention to allow of the pra∣ctice; but onely not to punish it, or to ordaine somewhat in supposi∣tion of the case. As when usury is limited to such a rate, that greater is forbidden; but to such a rate is so permitted, that he that hath borrow∣ed is bound and compellable to pay so many in the hundred; but no man is bound to borrow; nor as they say, allowed to take Interest, though the Law constraine the borrower to pay. But, how the Law can forc•• the one to give, and yet not allow the other to take, is to mee, a hard proposition and like a rid∣dle; and therefore, I believe,

the law it selfe is to bee condemned or the practice to bee justified; and that truly there neither is nor can bee such a kinde of Law, as shall compell a thing to bee done and not approve of the doeing.

The third sort also seemeth to mee no lesse contradictory: for though I confesse there are penall Lawes un∣questionably, that is, such as con∣stitute punishments for offences; yet these Masters meane not such, but under the cloake of the name, teach disobedience to certaine Lawes, per∣swading us the Law-givers intention is indefinite, that either a man should doe such a thing, or suffer such a punishment if hee bee disco∣vered to have committed the fault: which is directly against all good∣nesse. For first wee are to consider whether the thing commanded bee usefull to the Common-wealth; if so, it cleerly argues it is the direct

will of the Lawmaker. Againe, it is to be looked into, if it be universally neglected, what dam∣mage accreweth to the Common; and this also will assure us, by the necessity of it, that it is intended for the common good, and therefore to be executed to the possibility of the Subject. Againe, how unworthy a thing is it of a Governour, who is sapposed to be all equity and good∣nesse, to ly at the catch with his Subjects, to entrap them for a thing he doth not aime to have done? Besides, the name of punishment supposeth a fault; so that, the law must be supposed to speake im∣properly; which, in its dogma∣ticall way of proceeding, is ab∣surd.

Yet doe I not deny but Lawes may bee made indefinitely; as, to command every Townesman to march or pay so much monies, lea∣ving

it to his Liberty to do which hee listeth: But this is no penall Law, nor hath it any likely hood of one; but is meerly a disjunctive Command. Neither likewise do I entrench upon such orders in Com∣munities, which being almost im∣possible to bee rigorously observed, have some other obligation an∣nexed to the failing; to be perfor∣med by the conscience of the De∣linquent, whether discovered or no. For, this clearely remaineth volun∣tary, and is ordered to make the failing rare, and to acknowledge a defect and fault in the not observing; and so hath not that crossing of the will, and that force which one feeleth when he is discovered and, by authority, chastised. So that, in conclusion, there is but one sort of Law in all these; and that binding the Subject, in force of his pro∣mise and oath, to the proportion of

his concurrence to the Common good, by his act of Obedience.

The Fourteenth GROUND.

In what conditions the Subject may resist Governement.

NOw, to returne to the former part; it is evident, if it be ra∣tionall to resist the Governement, it will be lawfull also to break and remove it: For, these two actions are of the same nature; and, in truth, pure resistance and disobedi∣ence is the annulling it. For, Go∣vernement, consisting in the pow∣er of commanding, that is, of having no resistance; to resist is not to ac∣knowledge it, but maintaine there is no such power, at least, in this

case; that is, to take it away in this case; that is, to set another Judge or knower when obedience is due and when not; that is, not to keepe the Subject in the nature of igno∣rance, in which is grounded his being a Subject. This being the nature of this disobedience or resist∣ing, the Magistrate is bound with all his strength to crush and breake it; and, by consequence, it draw∣eth along the concussion of the whole state, if the Subject bee able to make good his resistance. Out of this it is cleare, that a Subject may not use this resistance; but in case when it is fitting to attempt the dissolving of the Governement.

It followes first, that it cannot be done, but when the occass••on is greater then the value of the publick peace and good of the Common-wealth. No man therefore can just∣ly attempt such a disobedience, to

save his owne life and goods, or the life and goods of his owne family, how great soever, if contained with∣in the bounds of a private family, or but a part of the Common-wealth. Now, how farre this extendeth, I dare not subtilize; it being a kinde of morall consideration and a pru∣dentiall esteeme to weigh it in par∣ticular; the common notion reach∣ing no farther, then that it be not so notorious a part of the Com∣mon-wealth, that it bee a homoge∣neall part of it, such as is fit to make a Common-wealth of it selfe, to determine whose nature, is not the intent of our present embarque∣ment.

The next consideration is, that neither an universall harme, if moderate and such as may bee sup∣ported with lesse dammage then fol∣lowes out of the State, is a sufficient cause of resistance to the Soveraigne

Magistrates command. As for ex∣ample, an enormous Taxe (such as was thought to be that which revol∣ted Guienne from Edward the third of England, or the Low Countries from Philip the second of Spain:) as both their wars may well testifie; in which the taking of any one Towne was of more consequence then all such a Taxe would have been. How farre this also reaches is not for mee to esteeme; Who should aske me, if the Governour exacted for one time all the Subject had, so there remai∣ned a ground to worke upon of new, and within a little time to live contentedly; I should be troubled to confesse it were a sufficient injury to take up armes against him, be∣cause I cannot judge which were the greater mischief to the Subject.

Thirdly, if the wrong be of that nature as to ruine the whole Com∣mon-wealth, yet not suddenly but

after many yeers, if often repeat∣ed; I cannot allow it a sufficient cause of open resistance. The reason is cleere; for, on the one side there is no inconvenience so small but (in processe of time) may grow to bee the ruine of the Common-wealth, if it bee often repeated and so excessive∣ly multiplied; and on the other side, long time breeds so great changes or, at least, is subject to them, that the pure nature of the of∣fence is not able to justifie a rebel∣lion and breach of unity in a Common-wealth, and so, not the resistance to the Governour. How much the time in which the ruine would follow should bee, to make it a sufficient cause, who can judge? Onely this wee see, that what will not ruine in a set time, wil never doe it; and I have seen people live happily, where it was said, they paid the value of their whole subsi∣stance

to their Magistrate once in seven yeers. Nor doe I pretend, by these instances, to set any rule for enfranchising the subject; more then this, When evidently the tyran∣ny of the Governour is greater then the mischiefe hazarded. When ever this happeneth, bee the materi∣all conditions what they will, the subject is free: And if this bee not, whatsoever the circumstances bee, the subject ought not to stirre. For, this and this onely is the finall cause measuring all attempts, What is best for the People; and knowne it is that, if it bee not evident to bee bet∣ter to stirre, it is evidently better to remaine quiet: for, not-a-cause is sufficient for not changing; but, for a change and such a change, it ought to bee a cleer and evident abbetterment.

There is further to be looked into what part of the Common-wealth it

ought to bee that is sufficient to ju∣stifie such a quarrell. For, as there is no doubt, but the whole Com∣mon-wealth, that is, such a portion of it as makes the Governours party inconsiderable, is sufficient: so, there will bee lesse doubt on the other ex∣treme, if the number resisting bee a pure single part, it is not sufficient to proceed to this extremity. The question then is, whether the party rising ought to bee the major or equall or, at least, inconsiderably lesse then those who side with the Magistrate. But here wee must ob∣serve the greatnesse of the Common-wealth divided. For if such parts bee of themselves, fit to make Com∣mon-wealths, nothing considered but the quantity or the number; it cannot bee doubted but that will sus∣fice: now what that quantity is, be∣longeth to another science.

Besides all these considerations,

there remaineth another; that it can bee effected: For who is to at∣tempt an action, ought as well to weigh the cost of compassing, as the worth and recompence when it is compassed: so that, unlesse the ha∣zard of missing and the labour of obtaining, beeing both added into the ballance with the present quiet, bee all overswayed; it cannot bee prudently done to engage for a change.

Some will tell mee, never did people expect with so much patience as I require: And your Gallants, who pretend to generosity, will ex∣claime, it is better to dye in the field then suffer such indignities: Nay, some will think or, at least, vaunt it fitter to lye in prison or rot in a dungeon, or seeke his fortune in Barbary, then to be under such a slavery. My answer to these last Gallants is, that they should first

try what it is to rot in a Dungeon, or to wander amongst Barbarians; before they engage themselves and other ignorant persons in such ad∣ventures. To the second, that I understand not those spurgalls of honour, which disquiet their fiery humours: I onely discourse of what is fitting to make a sweet and con∣tented life, to them who thinke it consists in enjoying naturall goods of Science and Vertue for our mindes, and the accommodation of our sences for our bodies: Those high and aereall goods of honour, and vapouring words I esteeme as Ajax (when his eyes were open) at his death; Vertue (said hee, meaning honour) I followed thee as a thing, but I finde thou art but words. To the formost, I answer, I doe not averre men either have been wise or will bee so wise; onely endevour to lay before them what it is to bee

so; let them look to the exercise. Neither on the other side doe I ju∣stifie the Prince who putteth his subject to such extremities, or think it prudence in him to doe it, or that he doeth not deserve all the mischiefe which may light upon him for it: I leave both to the force of nature, to their wit or folly, and to the force of reason or passion which governes in persons and present circum∣stances; keeping my self in the common notions which belong to Science.

Still there remaines one difficul∣ty, which may breed great variety in the resolution; and it is, who is to bee Judge, Whether the neglect of the Magistrate bee so great, as to de∣serve resistance? For, if the Magi∣strate himselfe bee endowed with that power, it is a folly to thinke that circumstance will ever come; and, if it belong to the people,

such hot-spurres, as wee spake of, will make it come long be∣fore the season bee ripe for it. But, the truth is, this question seemeth in a manner superfluous: For it sup∣poses, there is a question and ambi∣quity to bee decided; and by the conditions put, it is cleer there can bee no question of the necessity of the resistance; for they are such as to put the question beyond all ambi∣guity in the very conscience of the Magistrate, the objects beating on the subject in every ones particular beyond denyall and dispute. And besides, as long as truly there is any disputablenesse, the trust reposed in the Magistrate makes him Judge; For, beeing entrusted as a man both knowing and good, and the people taking themselves as ignorant in what they trust him; cleerly hee re∣mains sole Judge, as long as there remains a case to be judged. And

therefore his either ignorance, or carelessenesse, or Tyranny ought to bee so evident, that it bee beyond all question; or else the subject must have patience for his owne good, which is his aime in putting himselfe under governement.

The Fifteenth GROUND.

Wherein consists the power and liber∣ty of the Subject.

YEt may some think, on the other side, that the doctrine delivered contradicts it selfe. For, it beeing before determined, that the people hath alienated all right of judging or medling in governement; how can it ever happen that they should have a right to interpose againe, or that such circumstances can possibly

fall out in which they may resist the Magistrate? And this objection is so much the stronger, by acknow∣ledging so great a power in the Ma∣gistrate of breaking all Lawes and limitations of Governement, by the force of reason placed in the circum∣stances of power and authority, as hath been declared: whence it seemes, since that authority in the Magistrate cannot consist with an opposite authority in the subject, to bridle and curb him; they can ne∣ver have this power to resist.

And the truth is, the people act∣eth not what it doeth in such a case, by any authority acquired, but by the force of nature; that same force by which the Magistrate overswayes the Lawes, but in other circumstan∣ces. And first that the people hath no authority to oppose their superi∣our is manifest: For, authority is a thing instituted by consent and de∣pending

on promise; but here is no need of consent nor any thought of it; here is no publicke meetings or Ligues; and if there were, they would bee of no value against a former tradition of their wills to their Magistrate: It cannot bee there∣fore, that the people proceed by any such contract.

Whence is it then that the people come to any such power? The an∣swer is, As, when they first insti∣tuted Government, they did it in the force of Nature; without having any other Power then the pure force of Rationality: so, if, by any cir∣cumstance they be devolved into the same state of Anarchy that their pro∣mise made bindes no more; then Ra∣tionality teacheth them and giveth them, by force of nature, to institute another Governement. Now, the excessive disorders, expressed in the forementioned conditions, make it

evident they are not in a Governe∣ment, that is, in a conspiracy to the common good, which is the offence of Governement; but in an Anar∣chy, and therefore remitted, by the evill managing or insufficiency of their Governour, to the force of na∣ture to provide for themselves, and not bound by any promise made to their Governour: the whole end and intention of their promise be∣ing, purely, to submit to Governe∣ment, that is, conduce to the common good & safety; which having failed, there is no more obligation in their oath or promise, then if they had never made them. This is, therefore, the ground of the peoples opposition, and onely circumstance to justifie their breaking their oath and pro∣mise: so that, in truth, the Magistrate, first, by his miscarriages, abdicateth himself from being a Magistrate, and proveth a Brigand and robber in

stead of a Defender; and the people, in the way of naturall preservation of themselves, make resistance against him.

I should passe farther to the change of Governement, did not the loud and universall cry of all com∣mon people, especially of our Nor∣therne Countries, diverting my pen, force me to attend their impor∣tunity. They say, this Doctrine deliver'd ruineth their Liberty; and people are but a knot of slaves and Galley-birds, if this be the course of Governement. They must be sa∣tisfied, or, at least, their courage al∣lay'd, by reason, if it be possible. For this word Liberty prints it selfe in such a letter, that it leaves unstu∣died no man, as one speaketh. The Pelagian thinkes he hath lost his na∣turall liberty, if it may be comman∣ded by Gods omnipotency. The worldly man accounts himselfe a

slave, if rationall governement be conserved: he must have license to commit wickednesse and ruine Go∣vernement, or else he is in chaines. Let us then repeat the nature of Governement, and see wherein con∣sisteth the Liberty of the Subject, that we may know when he hath it, and what belongeth to it.

The people (we said) to fall to their owne businesse, and the impro∣ving of nature, choose one or more to manage the common interests; holding them wise and capable, and themselves unskilfull; and this with a great deale of reason: for nothing but experience, and much debating is able to beget a sufficient art or knowledge, in such subtle points and turnings. Besides, they esteemed a few fitter for resolution, and easier to agree then their owne multitude; where so many private aimes are hard to be avoided, and if not pre∣judiciall

to the common. Upon these grounds, it is plaine, out of the very nature of Governement, that they reserve no power in themselves to consult of common businesses. For, how absurd is it that he who hath no skill shall give counsell, or sway the resolutions of those whose art and profession it is? Or, what wise man could undertake a Governement with truth and honour, if, in his greatest difficulties, he must depend on the advice, or rather wilfulnesse of an ignorant rabble?

Let us look now what is left for the obeying party; and we shall finde, it is to governe their private affaires, as farre forth as they fall not within the verge of the common good or harme. But, once put that the private mans business either hinders, or is necessary to help the common designes: and, as evident as it is that the common is to be pre∣ferred

before the particular; so evi∣dent it is, that even his proper bu∣sinesse is not to be managed, so far, by his private understanding and liberty. If the Souldier, when he is commanded to stand Perdue, should have his private considerati∣ons allow'd him, what could the Army doe? If the Citizen, being commanded to watch his turne upon the walls, might bring an excuse that he had no body to look to his shop, the City would soone fall to the enemies prey. Private interest, then, must yeeld, when the publick is con∣cerned, or else no Governement can be hoped for: and, he that will leave matters of great consequence to the resolution of the govern'd party, must make them the Governours.

Wherein then consists the Liber∣ty of every Subject? In not being controll'd in his private affaires. If there be not justice administred both

against Robbers and Riotous op∣pressors, the Citizen is not free: if he be molested in his domestick ma∣nage, otherwise Men when the com∣mon demandeth his assistance, he is not free. But, for serving the com∣mon, it is the freest act he hath: It was his choice to elect it, it is his good to conserve it, and will be his destruction to infringe it. As it is no liberty to have an immunity to hang or maime himselfe, or his wife and children, or to commit any other unnaturall act; no more is it to be esteem'd Liberty, to have the privi∣ledge to substract himselfe from the service of the Common-wealth. They are therefore seditious spirits, who, using the name of Liberty, pro∣voke the Subject against the Magi∣strate; and in themselves, ordinari∣ly, it is either ignorance or faction, which is the true Mistresse of such attempts. Nor can it be feared, that

Governement, carried connaturally and as it ought to be, doth any way prejudice the Liberty of the Subject, what seisures soever it makes either upon goods or persons.

Yes, but Governours will exceed the moderation of the true Lawes of Governement. First, the Com∣monwealth hath a presumption of their goodness to the contrary. Se∣condly, admit they doe, must we seek to remedy it by a greater wound which is, by taking away the life and soule of Governement? Againe, the oppression is either in common upon all, or in particular upon some few: If in common, it is almost impossible to be heavy upon every one; for, many little summes easily rise to a great one, and many hands make light worke: If the wrong be done to particulars, wee ought to consider that accidentall harmes cannot be prevented neither

in nature nor in humane affaires; and so are objects of pity rather then of hope to be amended, and to be tolerated rather, in respect of the great good which is in the common peace, then expose all to such confu∣sion as must be, and ever hath beene where the Governement is, in part, placed in unexperient hands.

This, therefore, is resolved, that the plenitude of power in the Gover∣nour hinders not the liberty of the Subject: which is to bee contained within an inferiour sphere, and the sphere it selfe within the sphere of Governement; and to be carried by it, as the private good by the com∣mon, when the necessity of the pub∣lick requires. Likewise, the propri∣ety of right of the Subject is to bee taken, not against the Governour or common right, but against the encroaching of another party: as, whoever understands what common

and particular signifie, easily under∣stands that the common and parti∣cular are not two; as the part and the whole make not two, because the part is included in the whole; but part and part make two, because one hath no community with the other. Therefore, it stands not with reason, that any private person should claim a right against the Common-wealth, or the Governour, which is all one; for, so he makes the Common-wealth a part distinguished from himselfe.

The Sixteenth GROUND.

Of the dispossession of a supreme for∣mer Governour, and of his right.

THis rubb being taken away, our march is free to consider the action of the change of Governe∣ment;

by what it is effected that the former Governour remaineth no lon∣ger in his authority, and the new one beginneth to have the power. For, we speake of a supreme Governour whose power is sworne to; and so fortified, by an allegiance due from the people, and a right obtained by himselfe. And, we may presently re∣flect, that our former discourse, Of the Peoples resistance to a Soveraign Magistrate, reached not to the reso∣lution of this. For, there we suppo∣sed the Magistrate to have behav'd himself so unworthily, that he was truely no Governour but a Tyrant and Robber; and so had really de∣pos'd himselfe, and disannull'd the Subjects oath and obligation by re∣nouncing, in deeds and practice, the nature of a Governour. Now, our Question supposeth the Governour not to have come to that extremity: but, either to have been good or in∣nocent:

or that it is doubtfull whe∣ther his excesses deserved expulsion: or, at least, if they did deserve it of themselves, yet the circumstances were not fitting for it; but the ex∣pulsion happened either by the inva∣sion of a stranger, or the ambition of a Subject, or some popular head∣lesse tumult; for, these three wayes a Magistrate comes, forcibly and unjustly, to be outed of his power.

And first, if the Magistrate have truely deserved to be dispossessed; or it be rationally doubted that he hath deserved it, and hee bee actually out of possession: In the former case, it is certaine, the subject hath no ob∣ligation to hazard for his restitution, but rather to hinder it: For, since it is the common good that both the Magistrate and the Subject are to aime at; and clearly, out of what is expressed, it is the common harme, to admit againe of such a Magistrate;

every one, to his power, is bound to resist him. If you say, he may or will repent and amend, that importeth not our Question, or Whether he be to be restor'd? but, Whether he be to be chosen of new? For, since it was meerely his possession and the interest of not changing or troubling the Common-wealth which oblig'd the Subject to maintaine him; it be∣ing supposed his owne desert did condemne him, this change and trouble of the Common-wealth be∣ing now turned on the other side and another in possession, clearly neither he hath any right left, nor the Sub∣ject any obligation to maintaine but rather oppose him. Now, if his desert be doubtfull, then is it also doubtfull whether he hath right or no: and certaine, that the common good is not to be disturbed for it; Nature teaching that wee need no reason to be quiet and remaine where

we are, but that to make a change we must see a strong cause and mo∣tive.

The next case is, if he be inno∣cent and wrongfully depos'd, nay, let us adde, One who had governed well and deserved much of the Com∣mon-wealth: yet he is totally dis∣possess'd; and so, that, it is plaine, in these circumstances, it were better for the common good to stay as they are, then to venture the restoring him, because of the publicke hazard. It is cleare, in this case, there is a comparison betweene the generall good of the Common-wealth, on the one side, and the particular of this man or family on the other. Let us, then, put the case on his part; and see, If he be generous, if he hath setled in his heart that eve∣ry single man ought to preferre the common Interest before his parti∣cular safety, profit, or honour; if

hee bee fit for a Governour, that is, one that is to espouse the com∣mon good as his owne individu∣all; what he will, in honour and conscience, resolve: whether hee bee not obliged absolutely to renounce all right and claime to Governe∣ment; and, if he does not, hee bee not worse then an Infidell: For, if he that hath no care of his Dome∣sticks, be reputed so; with how much more reason, he that is ready to plunge a whole Nation in blood, for his owne Interest?

Let us cast the accompts on the other side; and see, that the Subjects aime ought to be the publicke peace, and quiet enjoyment of their lives and interests: It will appeare that, if hee bee bound to renounce his claime, they cannot be oblig'd to maintaine it: and besides, that they are wilfully blinde, if, where the whole concernements of them∣selves,

their wives and children lie at the stake, they will venture all for an aereall fancy, without regard to the end of Governement, publicke peace; meerely for the meanes, this mans Governement, without whom the end may be obtain'd. It cannot, therefore, be rationall on either side, for a dispossess'd Governour to be restor'd with hazard: unlesse it be certaine the succeeding Governe∣ment be a pure Tyranny, and so the dispossess'd person necessary for the quiet and peace of the Common-wealth; and therefore, that both sides pretend the good of the Com∣mon-wealth, as well hee that is to be restor'd, as those who seek to restore him.

But some cry, he had right; he hath not deserv'd to lose it; Justice must be done whatever follows on it; happy they that are unfortunate

in so good a Cause, they shall not lose their reward, however it fares with them now. Well for them, if this plea will serve them in the next world; nor will I dispute whe∣ther the evidence of what I deliver be so great as that ignorance may not excuse them: That question be∣longs to the Tribunall of God one∣ly: I must say that, before men, who are clad with flesh, and whole hearts cannot be pierced by other mens guesses, the Law is, that not onely the intention bee good, but also the action be intelligent and prudent; otherwise, we are subject to believe, that some vanity or secret hopes doe byass the actor and make his proceeding irrationall. I must also tell them, that this principle, Fiat Justitia & ruat coelum, is seldome practised amongst the wise; who all agree that Charity and

Prudence ought still to moderate the rigour of Justice. It is also too metaphysicall for a morall way, to thinke that Justice is a Platonick Idea in the concave of the Moone; no waies to be chan∣ged by circumstantiall occurrences: Whereas, the truth is, Justice is but a partiall and commanded ver∣tue; and that which governes in man, is reason or his owne nature and inclination to make all his actions connaturall and fit for a rationall Creature; and so may consult whether Justice be in some to bee administred, and pronounce that Summum jus est summa in∣juria.

But, the capitall in this matter is, that truely there is no justice on either the Magistrates or Peoples side, to binde to the restoring him: both these depending on the promise made, and the force of the

promise being none, since the ground of it is changed. For, the sub∣stance of the promise made to a Magistrate, is, To obey him as a Magistrate, that is, as farre as is fit∣ting for the Common-wealth and peace; he being nothing but the instrument of the common good: Now, take away that fitnesse for the Common-wealth, and that which gave strength to the promise is gone, and the promise it selfe is no more a promise, nor can any obligation arise from it. Who knows not, that the promise of any man de∣pends on his intention, his intention on his knowledge, his knowledge reacheth no farther then his conside∣ration and present memory when he maketh the promise? So that, in na∣ture, a promise reacheth onely to presupposed and thought on circum∣stances: and who, when he sweareth to a Magistrate, expecteth to see

him dispossessed and turned off?

Nature annulleth promises: as, when we promise to come such a day, and either die or are imprisoned before. Morality annulleth them: as if we promise to run such a horse against another a month hence, and the horse in the meane time falleth lame; who will condemne the ma∣ster for not venturing on such a race? Is not the man better then his word? If then the man himselfe bee lesse then the common good, which he must violate by keeping his word; can his word be greater? But a promise must many times bee kept even with losse of life? I de∣ny it not: But, first, I must bee as∣sured it is a promise; which before I have declared to bee none: For, our case is case of Nature not of Law, we admit no presumptions; nothing what he meant to doe or should have done, wee onely regard

what was done. Secondly, if it were intended to be so promised, it was wicked and irrationall; for, to promise to regard a private mans good against the common, is unna∣turall and wicked; therefore, it ne∣ver was a promise, can never binde as such, nor be professed with ho∣nour, either to be made, or, if made, to bee kept. I need not insist upon the confirmation by oath: for, every one understands, if the Oath be but a confirmation of a precedent pro∣mise, and there were no promise, there can be no oath, to have the na∣ture and force of an oath.

So that, this is manifest, a Magi∣strate actually dispossessed hath no right to be restored, nor the Sub∣ject any obligation to seek to re∣store, but oppose him. For, what is man, or rather mankinde (for, so we have styled a nation) better then a herd of sheepe or oxen, if it bee

to bee owned, like them, by ma∣sters? What difference is there be∣tweene their Masters selling them to the Butcher, and obliging them to venture their lives and livelihoods for his private Interest? Wee know it is naturall, that the part should venture for the whole; but that the whole should venture the losse of it selfe to save the part, I cannot un∣derstand. The Governour is the highest and noblest part, yet but a part; the People is the whole, the End, (though not by office, yet by worth and dignity) the Master and Lord, for whom those who are Lords by office are to be vested and devested in Lordship, when it is ne∣cessary for the common good: who thinks otherwise, deserves not the name of a man.

The Seventeenth GROUND.

Of a supreme Governour dispossessed.

BUt one will object, if hee were wrongfully dispossessed, hee suf∣fered wrong; it cannot then but bee reason hee should have reparation. And this cannot bee denied. But be∣side the Governement taken from him, hee was peradventure injured in his reputation and spoiled of such aliments as are fit to maintaine him according to the quality of his birth and education: And, for these, hee may, as a private man, demand reparation; but so, as still to remember he is a Denizen of that Countrey, a member of that people, and compared to it as a particular to its universall; and may demand his share, yet so that if it cannot bee

obtained without the concussion of the publicke, hee is to renounce it and sacrifice that interest to the good of his Countrey.

Likewise, on the opposite side, the Common-wealth may demand reparations against the dispossessed Magistrate, who abused it or his subjects during his governement: Not touching any thing hee did upon intention of the publick good, though it were breaking of known Laws or any injurious violence offered, with pretence of serving the Common-wealth; For, the trust put in his hands vindicates him from all such actions, as long as they beare the face of any intention of the Com∣mon good. But, if, for private mens satisfaction, or his owne lust, or covetousnesse hee did any wrong, of that hee may bee asked an ac∣count: not while hee is in Go∣vernement but after the dispossession,

when now the common distemper followeth not the prosecution of such riots, and so, his publicke pro∣tection beeing gone, hee is but a private man, and consequently, by the force of nature, subject to a stronger; obligations of common good and former promises beeing now faded away, and hee left in the condition of a stranger, saving that his demerits follow and pur∣sue him, if other merits doe not counterballance them and exempt him.

Againe, when hee is to bee judged, he cannot bee proceeded against by Law; which can judge none but the offenders against it. Now wee have had often occasion to declare that the chiefe Magistrate is not under the Law; the common good for which the Lawes themselves were made, beeing committed to his trust, and the end hee is to look af∣ter

beeing higher then the Lawes, which are but a part of the meanes to arrive at that end, and therefore inferiour aud subordinate to it. But those who could put their owne agreements, that is, the Lawes un∣der his feet, could not put Nature under them, nor authorise him to doe any irrationall or unhandsome acti∣on: Therefore, when the structure of the Common-wealth is dissolved, that is, disjointed from him, then any who hath suffered wrong in the fore-declared manner may bee party against him and proceed as if there were no Common-weath; by the Law which, in a Wildernesse, warranteth us to kill a Tyger or Robber that seeketh to kill us, not pretending Law for our action, but that it is manlike & rational. Neither ought it bee called punishment that is done against a dispossessed Ma∣gistrate, but rather revenge, or some

other name that includeth no order to Law.

By this wee understand the truth of that famous question; Whether a Soveraigne bee under the Lawes? to which is ordinarily answered, that hee is, as farre as his example and direction is necessary to his subjects; but not so, that the Law, as such, hath any superiority or force upon him. To declare this more plainly, wee must remember, the Rule of his actions is, To doe what reason teaches a man in his posture ought to doe, that is, what is fitting for the publicke: Now ge∣nerally speaking, the common good requireth that the Lawes bee obser∣ved betwixt fellowes of the same Common-wealth; wherefore Na∣ture teacheth him to give example of that observance, as farre as his pub∣lick office permits.

Besides, in the very person of the

Soveraigne are to bee distinguished, his beeing one of the Common-wealth, and beeing the head or Ma∣gistrate: So that, though his beeing a Magistrate exempts his publicke actions and also his person and pri∣vate actions from the inquisition of the Law; yet it doth not exempt his private actions from the pro∣portion to those of the subjects, that is, from being good or bad, be∣cause like or dislike to the actions which the Law commandeth or for∣biddeth. So that, he is not, even in his private actions, subject to the Lawes at his rule; for that is onely reason; but, as they are a kinde of way chalked out to him for the ma∣teriall part of his action; as the Architect frames his house for him; or the Gardiner his walkes: That is, the Lawes are to him as an art under him, an art to shew him what is to bee done, not to command or

punish him for not doing; nay, not so much as necessitating him to doe, at least, universally, whether the businesse be purely betwixt sub∣jects, or betwixt himselfe as a pri∣vate person, and his subjects.

For, the principle of common good beeing higher then the art of making Lawes, may, nay ought in some cases, differ from the prescri∣ptions of the Law. Yet this must not authorize him to dispense fre∣quently with the Law; the Go∣vernement beeing not possible to bee good in which there is no constancy: But, if the circumstances require any Law to bee often forced; the Law it selfe ought to bee limited, that the practice of the subject may bee firme and customary, which is that maketh the Lawe-please. Thus in conclusion, though the Magistrate bee not commanded by the Lawes, nor personally subject to them, yet

reason (which is his rule) bindeth him to observe them as the good of his people; and (ordinarily speak∣ing) essentiall to his end, which is the common good. The Lawes therefore are his matter to work on, or instruments necessary to work by, not his rule or Master∣ing directions.

There remaines yet untouched the question that seemeth most trouble∣some to many, When the change of the Governement is valid, and such as the subjects obedience is due to the new Magistrate and to bee substracted from the old, how unjustly soever hee were bereaved of it. And, others have sought by terme of yeers to decide the diffi∣culty: among whom, one was Pope Vrban the eight, an intelligent and generous Prince and well versed in politick Governement. Hee pub∣lished a decision that after five yeers

quiet possession of an estate, the Church was not bound to take no∣tice whether the title were lawfull or no; but acknowledge the pos∣sessour, in Ecclesiasticall businesses. So much hee said for aimes sake. But, wee must proceed upon other principles, that is, the forelaid and main basis of our discourse, that the common good ought to bee the rule of the Magistrates title, and the subjects obedience.

Out of which this followeth, that when ever (considering all things) the common good is cleerly on the possessors side, then the dis∣possessed hath no claime. Neither ought wee expect till wee have as∣surance, that it will not bee better for the subject if the late owner (af∣ter great dangers, gaineth his for∣mer power: For, first, this it selfe is uncertaine; secondly, the suc∣cesse of endevours to restore him

must bee hazardous; thirdly, many and great mischiefs, during the time of the attempt, are altogether un∣avoidable; and all this to bee bal∣lanced against those uncertaine hopes. Nor, againe, must wee ex∣pect that the wills of all the subjects concurre, actually, to the acceptance of the new Governour: For that is either impossible or of so long ex∣pectation, as to ruine all dissensions and jealousies in the meane time: Nay, the vulgar sort are so easily led by fancy, that they understand not the common good, nor what they should wish.

But you may demand, How shall it bee knowne when the com∣mon good holdeth it selfe on the possessour's hand? I answer, wee must first see who are the common, whose welfare is to bee preferred be∣fore private interests. And pre∣sently it appeareth that, dividing

the whole people into Governours and governed; the governed part is the Publicke to whose good the Governours are to direct their paines: And that these are they that spend their lives in seeking their owne profits, either by im∣proving the Land, or in Arts and Handicrafts: Whence, it followes, when their good stands on the pos∣sessours side, then cleerly hee be∣gins to gaine right and power; and this is plaine to bee, when the Mer∣chant, the Husbandman, and Tradesman, with their appendices, are in an undisturbed practice of their functions, and begin to bee afraid of change upon the noise of an invasion.

This resolution could not bee doubted, were it not that one might object, that what is said seemes true, abstracting from circumstances; but it ought to bee considered, that

such men see nothing but the out∣ward appearances of what passes in humane negotiations, and so there may many circumstances lie hidden from them, which would make them thinke or wish otherwise if they knew them: As, for example, home-dis∣contents, and forraigne conspiracies; which if understood, would make these honest men preferre a warre, after which there is to follow a peace farre exceeding the present quiet and such a one as deserves the intervening disturbance and dam∣mages.

And indeed, I allow these men understand not such mysteries of State, nor penetrate the value of the hazard: But, if they doe not, why are they not also exempted from en∣gaging on those motives? and then the rest of the Common-wealth will bee but so many private men, who must follow the common▪ Againe,

if they think themselves well, they manifestly consent to the present Governement, and therefore cut off the title of the dispossessed Govern∣our. Besides, who can answer they shall be better by the returne of the dispossessed party? surely, by common presumption, the gainer is like to defend them better then he who lost it.

But, let us overslip this opportu∣nity and end of the common Good: how long must we expect, till it shall be suppos'd the right of the former Magistrate is extinct? Some Ages? as wee kept our title to France, and France did to Sicily and Naples: Or at least some generations? as the du∣rance of the Spaniards warres upon Holland: Or, till the former Magi∣strate declares the relinquishment of his right? Or, till his followers are weary of inventing new devices, to blind, & ruine their unwary friends?

All these are soone discern'd to bee meere uncertainties; and rather nets to catch fools and bring them to the ambitious desires of some few men, then any grounded reason. But, what if an open Enemy should come, could or ought the Subjects joine against him with their new Magistrate? If not, the whole publick must pe∣rish: If they may, then the case is the same against their old Ma∣gistrate; since his right stood upon the common peace, and that is trans∣ferr'd from him to his rivall by the title of quiet possession.

The Eighteenth GROUND:

The Objection of Divines answered.

REason hath plaid its part; but Authority cannot be silenc'd unheard. Let us therefore hearken to what it saith. And, first steps up the Divine to preach us, out of Scripture, the duty wee owe to Priests and Kings; no lesse then death and damnation beeing the guerdons of rebellion and disobe∣dience. The Lawyers come yoaked from the Popes and Emperours Court, taking for maxime, Tempus non occurrit Ecclesiae & Regi. The practice seems to confirme the same; wee seeing both some Noble men and divers Cities make protestations against the possession of others for many years and ages. But, which is

more, they will speak reason too at least, by the Divines mouth; who telleth us, that God, by nature, is high Lord and Master of all; That whoever is in power receiveth his right from him; That Obedience consists in doing the will of him who commandeth; and concludeth that this will ought to bee obeyed till God taketh away the obligation, that is, till hee who is to be obey∣ed himselfe releaseth his right.

The Authorities they cite out of Holy Writ are, for the most part, meere commands to obey where obe∣dience is due, without specifying what or when it is due. This com∣mand is extended to wicked and evill Governours as well as good. One place there is, where Samuel denounceth to the people the evills that will come to them by the power of the King; and calleth them Jus Regis, or, as the Hebrew text, Judici∣um

Regis, or, Legem Regis, and af∣terward, Regni. And these words are, in two sences, true; one, that the King would do the wrongs there mentioned, by force; the other, that the people, since they would have a King, ought not to resist him when hee did such things. Yet doe I not deny but, if the particulars there mentioned, bee interpreted gently, all that is there recited might, with justice, bee practised by a King: As, when it is said hee should take away their Vineyards and Olive-gardens; it may bee un∣derstood, upon confiscation and by other lawfull wayes. Besides, they may peradventure alledge that God, by his speciall command, transferred the Kingdome from Saul to David, from Roboam to Jeroboam, and some others. But, they should also let us know, what they deduce from hence: For in such changes, God gave no

new Authority or Power to such Kings, but the same their predeces∣sors had: So that, in fine, all that is brought out of Scripture falleth short of proving that no time can make void the right of a King once given him from the hand of God.

The reason of this weak way of al∣leadging Scripture is, that when they read that God commandeth or doth this, they look not into nature to know what this commanding or do∣ing is; but presently imagine God commandeth it by expresse and di∣rect words, and doeth it by an im∣mediate position of the things said to bee done; whereas in nature the commands are nothing but the na∣turall light God hath bestowed on mankinde, and which is therefore frequently called the Law of nature. Likewise, Gods doing a thing is many times onely the course of na∣turall second causes, to which be∣cause

God gives the direction and motion, hee both doeth and is said to doe all that is done by them; as truly as the weight of a Jack turnes the meat upon the spit, and the spring of a Watch makes the clock of it strike: A notion not onely of a large extent and usefulnesse in it selfe, but, which gives mee just occa∣sion of complaining against these verball and winde-blowne Divines, as the bane of Christendome and Christian doctrine. For, whereas the Scripture is a book enriched with all Science and depth of learning; this sort of Grammar Divines, with∣out either Logick, Philosophy, or Morality, meerly by the vertue of their Dictionary, and such like lip-learning, undertake to bee interpre∣ters of the sacred Bible, and in stead of the sence of the letter, ob∣trude to the Readers their owne low and many times phreneticall fancies.

Let us instance in our present que∣stion. The first position they take is, That God is Lord and Master of all things. What seems, nay truly is more conformable to Scripture and Reason then this assertion, as it lies in words? And yet many not look∣ing into the nature of God and ra∣tionall and intelligent substances, make a shift to pervert it into a meer blasphemy: For, if the sence bee onely this, that God is omnipotent and no resistance possible in any creature to his absolute will; nothing is more certaine, nothing more holy. But, this is not the meaning of the Divines; but, that there is an Attribute or notion in God of being Lord and Master, to which they do not say we cannot, but, ought not re∣sist, and rather admit that wee can. And herein is the first faltring, that, in effect, they deny the Omni∣potency, and reduce that which is a

true physicall power to a Morall ob∣ligation. But this is not all.

The next point is, that, if even this Morality were founded in that great nature of Beeing, and beeing intelligent, which is in God almigh∣ty; and that they also held his com∣mands were to bee obeyed, because they proceed from an understand∣ing which cannot erre, and which is essentially the very order and well beeing of all creatures; the former would seeme pardonable: But, they will have it quite contrary, that therefore things amongst creatures goe well, because not reason, not the eminentiall beeing of themselves in God is their off-spring, but because a high and overpowering will or voice commandeth it so. A positi∣on in respect of God, absolutely blasphemous; as far as it makes him worke without the guidance of his understanding, that is, like

the lowest order of creatures, as stockes and stones &c. It is againe afflictive and vexatious to Man∣kinde; taking away that sweetnesse of obeying, which consists in the perswasion that because creatures are the participation of Gods owne na∣ture, every one in its degree and mankind in the first and highest place, therefore all Gods command and governement, are most conform∣able to their good, as it were salves to their sores, and allurements to the bringing them to their final end and perfection.

But, that which is more to our purpose is, that, upon this blasphemy against God, they build the greatest inconvenience that, peradventure, is to bee found in man's nature; to wit, That God gives to all in Power the likeness and participation of this irrationall Dominion which they conceive in

him; and that truly there is in Supe∣riours a kinde of dote or free gift of Mastery derived from God, in ver∣tue whereof hee is Master of the in∣feriours and what belongs to them, either wholly or in a certaine mea∣sure, according to the extent of the power given; that, lawfully and va∣lidly, he may dispose of all or a cer∣tain part of the things under his charge, meerly because such is his will and pleasure, & that the subject ought to be content to let him doe his will, upon this score, Because it is Gods will that this mans will should be fulfilled. Which doctrine, though it bee manifestly against Christs directions left to his disciples, and the practice of all good men; yet, because this Treatise doth not pre∣tend to Divinity, I will onely insist upon its naturall inconve∣niences.

As first, that it is not connatu∣rall

to Mankinde: which, consist∣ing, for its better part, in under∣standing, is not governed confor∣mably to its disposition, unlesse it be so guided that the understanding be principall and satisfied in it selfe and leader to the will and action; which course of proceeding when it is observed, then is a man truely a man and his action goes on with sweetnesse, as is before declared. Againe, it maketh the Governour proud, insolent, and carelesse. Proud, because hee taketh himselfe to bee of another orbe then his Subjects; that they are all slaves and beasts, himselfe onely Master, himselfe onely intelligent and a man. Info∣lent, because fully perswaded, by this doctrine, that he can doe them no wrong; that they are bound to suffer what he layes on them; that his pleasure is and must be their content and rule. Carelesse, because

he thinks he hath no account to make, either to God or Man: not to God, since he hath submitted the people to his will and disposition; and therefore he being incapable of doing them any wrong, cannot bee charged with any crime: Much lesse is he sollicitous to content his Subjects, in whom he taketh it for an insolency to repine at any thing, and esteemes it their duty to com∣mend all he does, and to have his authority for their rule to judge all things by.

On the other side, the Subject be∣comes base, restive, ambitious. For, the worth and dignity of man, which is his Liberty or guidance of himselfe, being taken away, it fol∣lowes, he must be servile and flatte∣ring, a slave, a body without soule and understanding. The more worldly and rustick part must, of necessity, grumble and feele it harsh

to see their labours disposed on to people, of whom they have opi∣nion that they are idle, vicious, and unworthy: and therefore, desire liberty from such a yoke, and to be∣come masters of their owne goods and labours; and are easily susce∣ptible of propositions tending to that purpose, when they come from faire tongues. Lastly, the higher Spirits have Governement in admi∣ration, and take it for the onely happinesse; and therefore have their hearts wholly bent, how, by flatte∣ry, by cunning, by force, to arrive to this power to depose him that is in possession, and sit downe them∣selves in his seat of glory. If their hopes mount not so high, for the impossibility of the fact and the remotenesse of their quality; then their aime is, by adulation and com∣pliances, to come neere the highest, to bee participant of his authority,

and have the like power to rob and oppresse, which they esteeme vertuous and glorious in him, and not unjust but fitting in themselves, as farre as they can doe it by the participation of that dote which God hath bestowed upon the highest Magistrate.

Lastly, we must looke into the lame proceeding of the common good and publicke actions of such a Governement; where the Subject, by the consequence of this doctrine, is set eagerly upon his owne inte∣rest, thinkes all lost that is done for his, not Governour or Prote∣ctor, but Lord and Master, and therefore alienated from him. Whence, it must come to passe that, what he can cousen, what hee can excuse, what hee can delay, hee is still forward to; and, by a secret instinct of nature which abhorreth such a Governement, thinketh it well

done, though he cannot give an ac∣count to justifie his action. In a word, who sees not this Common-wealth to be a Kingdome divided in it selfe alwayes in affection, and very neere in outward action; wanting thereunto nothing but an occasion, and some head to manage the sedition? who sees not that the whole Governement is violent; and so may indeed continue whilst actu∣all force hangeth over it, but hath not the possibility of a naturall du∣ration and length.

The nineteenth GROUND.

The Authority of Lawyers insuffici∣ent in this Question.

THE Divines errour being thus discovered, our plea against the Lawyers will be of lesse either de∣bate or consequence: for, this que∣stion belongeth not to their science or employment. The maximes, the rule, the highest Tribunall of their Judgements is the text of the Law, the agreements of men, and, at most, to declare the Law-makers intenti∣on: But, to judge whether the Law-makers intention be conformable to nature and such as it ought, whe∣ther he exceedeth his power, whe∣ther hee bee Master of the Lawes, and the like, is beyond the verge of their jurisdiction. Therefore, no∣thing

is more absurd, then to de∣mand that Lawyers should plead cases betweene the Soveraigne Ma∣gistrate and the Subject, where the common good and Governement is interessed: For, there, things are not to be carried by the Dictates of Ju∣stinian or Lancelotus, or the com∣mand of Caesar or Peter's Succes∣sours, but either by the Science of Politicks, or the certitude of Faith and Tradition; which are the onely two rules a high Governour hath. If the Divine findeth any thing contrary to the knowne Law of God, he may speake: If the Philo∣sopher finde any thing against the Nature of Man, his mouth is not to bee stopped: The Lawyer, what can he say? It is against the agree∣ment heretofore made by the Go∣vernement of the Countrey? The Governour may reply, Yes; but what you say is against the present

good of the Countrey, with which I am entrusted. Is the Countrey made for the Lawes, or the Lawes for the Countrey? The Lawes there∣fore must give place, where the good of the People is against the former Resolutions. If any Law be repea∣led by the Authority which made it, or by another equal; is it the Law∣yers part to plead what was Law before, or what is now? when a supreme Governour speaketh as such, as declaring what the present necessity requires; if any former Law bee against it, it is by his de∣claration annulled; it was Law be∣fore, but it is not now. But the Lawyer will reply, There is no Law in the Land which giveth such authority: It is easily answered; it is not a case for which a Law is to bee made. See the Romane Governement: when there came an exigence of desperation, all their

Magistrates, all their formes cea∣sed; a Dictatour was made, whose word was Law, nor could any man appeale to Law. Such is the Case when the high Governour pro∣nounceth against the Law: for hee ought not to doe it, but when the Law standeth not with the good and safety of the Subject; and when hee doth, Law is not to be pleaded against him.

Againe can any Law be enacted of what shall bee done in case of a conversion of the Governement? It is clearely a folly to pretend it. The ordering of the Common∣wealth is, then, in new hands: The former's power is expired: and to prescribe rules to them who will assuredly be their owne Judges, is a piece of great simplicity. The Lawyer may peradventure reply, There is no power in the Land to repeale the former Lawes or to op∣pose

them. I thinke hee will bee wiser; yet, if hee doth say it, I aske him, Who made the former Lawes? was it not the People, by themselves or their deputies? and which is the stronger, if they make them by their deputies, or by them∣selves? Certainely, it will be answe∣red, By themselves; for the depu∣ties have no power but what they impart to them. Is it then possible to put a Case, in which there is no power in a Countrey to repeale Lawes? Evidently, who sayes so must say there is no People in the Countrey? For, if there be People, there is in them a power to dispose of themselves, more strong then in Deputies.

But the Lawyer may say, the People cannot speake their mindes freely. I answer, certainely, they not onely can, but cannot choose but speake their mindes, in the case

we put. Who knoweth not that Liberty and speaking of ones minde belo••geth to all circumstances a man can be put in? The Merchant that, in a Tempest, throweth the precious fruits of his venture and labour into the Sea, doth not he doe it freely and willingly? The Hol∣landers of late made a peace with the Spaniard; wee, both with the Hollander and the Dane, and are pretending to others: In any of these, were all parts pleased? Did no party agree to somewhat which hee would not have done, but in consideration of his present circum∣stances? Or, was there ever peace made after a warre, but one part grudged at somewhat? must none of these be accounted freely done? must none of these promises binde, and be kept, upon Honour and Ve∣racity? This is to destroy all com∣merce of mankinde; nay, not to

allow man so much wit as to know what is fit for him to doe in time of necessity. If then the People speake, in one circumstance, something that they would not in another; it is not to be said they speake not their mindes, but that, according to cir∣cumstances, they alter their mindes, as all wife men doe. They agree and submit to the present conjun∣ctures, not because they are not free, now as before, but because cir∣cumstances are changed, and now render it fitting. But, I said that, in the case I put, they could not choose but speake. My case was, that Then a Governour is acknow∣ledged, when the People casting off the care and thoughts of innovati∣on, fall to their trades and manu∣factures: Can it be deny'd that by so doing they acquiesce to the pre∣sent Governement? which if they doe, can it be questioned whether

they consent or not to the repea∣ling of all such Lawes as cannot stand with the present Governe∣ment? Such Lawes therefore are repealed, not by deputies, but by the Deputants and Masters of the Deputies. The Lawyer, therefore, must either proclaime the present Governement none, or not plead Law against it: for it is pure folly to admit both, that is, faire and full contradiction. In a new Governe∣ment, all Lawes prejudiciall to it are annulled, by the pure admission of it: Other indifferent Lawes so goe on, as to bee subject to its judgement, whether and how farre to stand; but a wise Governour will continue them as farre as hee can with prudence, because innovation is contrary to the sweetnesse which is in custome, as in a kinde of nature.

The Conclusion.

BEE this then so resolved, That God himselfe hath no irratio∣nall and dead title of Lordship over his Creatures, but onely his all-right-setled Understanding, and irresistible Omnipotency. And, as hee hath none in himselfe, so likewise not given any to those hee hath put in Authority; but, that their power is either in the submis∣sion of the Subject by promise and agreement, or in the rationall dispo∣sition of the Magistrate, which maketh him work what is confor∣mable to humane nature; and the obedience or obligation to obey in the Subject is out of this, That hee hath entrusted the Magistrate with the Governement, and is, by that, to suppose he doth regularly what

is best (all things considered) for the common good.

That, by consequence, the title of the Magistrate begins and dies with the good of the Common-wealth; and holdeth purely so long as it is good for the people. That, no Lawes made by the power or agree∣ment of men, can judge betwixt Subject and Soveraigne, in dispute of the common good and Governe∣ment; but onely the Tribunalls of God and Nature, or Divinity and the science of Politicks: And therefore, the maximes of Law have no force in these questions; Now, if Princes lose their pretences by the force of Nature, it is ridiculous for private men to build hopes, upon rotten titles of ages long passed, upon weake maximes of Law, after Nature, by her revolutions, hath cast all Law and mortall acts and agreements.

And so is finished this small Treatise, to the profit of them who are able and willing to make use of it. Some, by the method I have used, something new in morall dis∣courses, may imagine the Doctrine I deliver, to bee more subtle in explication then solid in practice: But, let them either looke into the Causes of Governements, or the Ef∣fects; they will see nature and pra∣ctise both conspire to give testimo∣ny to the truth. The cause of all morall effects, if morally carried, are the end and intention for which they are sought and endeavoured after; This is manifest to bee the well-being of particulars under a Governement. The practises, which are the Effects, will shew, That Governements breake when it is not well with the Subjects, but they are oppressed by the Governour; That wise and good Governours are for∣ced

sometimes to breake disordered rules which hinder their free admi∣nistration; That people, as it were, forced by naturall changes, violate the promises made to their Gover∣nours, cast them off when they think them pernicious, and proceed against them, per viam facti, as they speake in the Schooles, not by Lawes, which cannot bee made for such matters. These are, in a manner, the whole subject of the precedent Discourse.

FINIS.