The Fifth GROUND.
That Fidelity is different from Obe∣dience; and in what it consisteth.
BUt leaving this mistake of sim∣ple devotion; of which wee needed not have spoken so much, had there not depended on it some matter of greater consequence (as the following discourse will manifest in its due place:) wee are to take notice of an equivocation which may draw on some errour if not pre∣vented. Wee use to say serving∣men and waiting-maids ought to bee obedient to their Masters and Mistresses, whereas indeed, the ver∣tue by which they serve is not that of obedience, but of fidelity and truth, which is manifest to him that looks into the nature of hirelings. Page 28 For, none thinke a husbandman, who is hired to till or fence a piece of ground, obeyeth the hirer more then hee that selleth a piece of cloth or other merchandize obeyeth the buyer, because he taketh his moneys; but they are said to contract and per∣forme their part of the bargaine faithfully and truly. So servants pay their duties, performe their bar∣gains: and Fidelity is their proper vertue; to doe it carefully, and up∣rightly; not Obedience.
For, Obedience is in such actions as are the proper actions of the obeyer, which concerne his life, and by which hee may derive good if well done, and harme if amisse. Now in servants the good successe pertaineth to the Master, the servant hath his livelyhood and wages, whether the event goe right or wrong, so hee doe what his Ma∣ster commandeth. And hence it Page 29 followeth, that neither ought hee bee ignorant in the action hee doeth, nor sollicitous whether his Master bee either skilfull or honest: For, since what is done concerneth not him but his Master, his duty is to seek to doe what hee is commanded in the best way he can, without in∣teressing himself about the successe. This I say, as farre as he is a serving-man; but as hee is also an honest man, it may belong to him to suggest to his Master what hee thinks best; and, sometimes, when it lieth happi∣ly in his way, to help such errours of his Master as he can: without trenching on his Masters credit; still providing for his own indemp∣nity: that hee bee not involved in his Masters either imprudence or ini∣quity; for by his bargaine with his Master, he did not renounce the care of his own preservation.
The reason of this equivocation Page 30 is because wee ordinarily call obey∣ing the doeing another mans will: and distinguish not how, sometimes, this is done with renouncing our own wills, which is in those actions whereof wee are Masters, that is, our owne actions; and, sometimes, without such renunciation, as in the actions which belong to others, in which wee have no will to re∣nounce. Now Obedience as it is a vertue especially attending on the renouncing of our wills, is properly confined to the former sence, not to the other; with which it onely hath an alliance in the name, and which truly is Fidelity, as we have already declared.
But, although Fidelity bee a di∣stinct vertue from Obedience, yet is it not such a stranger as not to de∣mand a place in this Treatise: espe∣cially because the kinde of Obedi∣ence wee desire to look into, which Page 31 is that by which Common-wealths and Communities subsist, is founded generally on Fidelity or the matter thereof which wee call promise, and in that vertue it bindes to obser∣vance. After which discourse wee shall bee prepared to venture on the matter it self of Governement, and to our power, declare the force of it amongst men.
Man therefore being by his nature and definition a reasonable, that is, an understanding Creature, or one whose primary and principall incli∣nation is to truth or true knowledge; and the outward carriage and acti∣on of man being naturally propor∣tionable to his inward substance; it is cleere his chief property, by which he behaves himself outwardly like a man, is to speak truth, and to doe as hee sayeth, when his words have action following them. Hence it is, that though honesty (which in a Page 32 Courtlyer terme is called Honour, when applyed to a rationall carri∣age, and in a more spirituall lan∣guage, Conscience) bee extended to many other qualities, yet it is most frequently and principally expected in his keeping his word; in so much that though hee have other faults, either spirituall or carnall, yet if he be true of his word, he, often and in ordinary conversation, passeth for an honest man.
Againe, this vertue of Truth is the principall and first engine of humane conversation, and he that hath it not is unfit to be admitted to treate amongst men, but is to be rejected and banished from all Negotiation. Thus you see what engagement every one hath, both by nature and necessity of conversation, to stand up∣on his word or fidelity: For so we call the vertue by which we speake our mind in reference to action, and Page 33 are constant to performe what wee say.
Yet, since malice is growne to such a height, all nations, who pre∣tend to the fear of any Deity, have used to make men confirme their faith and promise by the invocati∣on of the Deity they worship; hoping Religion may worke in them what Nature is not strong enough to effect. This confirmation is performed in two sorts: One, when we onely call God to witnesse; as when we say, God, who sees my heart, knowes this to be truth, or that I meane as I speake: The other, when we pledge our trust in God for a security; as when wee wish God may punish us, or never doe us good, if we break our promise. And this is properly an execration, as the other an oath; yet both cal∣led oaths, and agree in this, that we pledge our beliefe and feare of Page 34 God, to another, for his security.
By which it is evident, that men generally esteem Religion the thing which should pierce deepest into a mans heart and affection; and the strongest Bond and tye of Faith and honesty; and that he, who setteth little by his Religion, hath neither honour nor honesty in him; or at least wanteth the greatest and strongest part of them, and that which ought to rivet in and fixe the naturall inclination which we have to truth and fidelity.
