An exclusion of scepticks from all title to dispute being an answer to The vanity of dogmatizing / by Thomas White.

Fifth Plea Refells our Ignorance of the Soul and Sensation. (Book 5)

1. IN the third Chapter, therefore, of his most elo∣quent Discourse, he objects our ignorance of that thing we ought to be best acquainted with, viz. Our own souls. Concerning which, what a kind of thing 'tis in this our earthly habitation, he neither teaches nor enquires at all, as far as I can discern; only that it is, he asserts, may be most clearly gathered from its effects; but, to ask what it is, he saies is like the mis∣take of Infants, that look behind the Glass for the Body whose superficies they saw painted on its fore∣side. And, in my judgment, he had said rarely, had he stopt here: but in his following Questions, he shews his deficiency even in this. For, he asks farther, whence the Soul comes? and how tis united to the Body? He is therefore most manifestly detected, to think that the Soul, lying hid in the Body, is of it self a certain sub∣stance, which may directly be made, come, and be joined to another thing: whence he terms it sub∣sistence, which doubtless denotes a Thing and Sub∣stance. Now, that this is a most important error in Philosophy none can doubt, that's able to discern the opposition of One and Many. For, tis plain, that either

a Man is not a Thing; or else that his Soul and Body are not two Things; if one thing cannot at once be many, nor many one. Nor am I scar'd with the distin∣ction (which the Boys that gabble Philosophy have al∣ways ready in their Budget) of a perfect and imperfect thing: which saies just nothing, unless imperfect signifie to which somewhat is wanting to make it a thing; which suppos'd, an imperfect thing is not a thing, and the di∣stinction vanishes. Otherwise, the same cannot be one thing and more things: Wherefore either a Man is not a Thing, but a Pair of Things consisting of an Intelligence and a Beast; or his Soul and Body are not two things.

2. When, therefore, he asks, Whence comes the Soul? it must be answered with a question, Whether he doubts whence the man comes? For, if whilst the man lives, there be but one only thing which is call'd the Man, 'tis he alone can have come; and he beats the wind that enquires whence the Soul comes? Nor am I shaken with the Authority of our Fore-fathers, though never so Reverend: I mean not of those who profess themselvs unable to grapple with the Question; for these deliver the Candle into the hands of Posteri∣ty, advising them to pursue on the same Race, that it may be seen whether any thing purer occur to them than to themselves, ready to Patronize whoever shall clear the Truth. But their opposition I resist, who cla∣mor 'tis the Faith of all Churches that Rational Souls are fram'd by God. For, now I'm accustom'd to it, to di∣stinguish

between what's due to the sincerity of Faith, and what to Scholastical subtilty. If I attribute the Making of Man, as he's Intellectual, to the singular power and operation of God, I have submitted my self to the keys of the Churches Doctrine, and sub∣scrib'd to the Tradition of the Saints. But, whether that action, which is the Generation of Man, con∣sists of two actual parts, or be but one alone, by more notions equivalent to more really-distinct actions, is a purely speculative Question belonging to the Schools. And so it must be said that one Thing, a Man, equivalent to a Beast and an Intelligence, is brought into existence, by one action, equivalent to two, the Generation of an Animal and the Creation of an Intelligence.

3. By this truth we are led to the evident solution of the two following knots; the econd being how the Body and Soul are united? Which, 'tis plain, is herein faulty, that it supposes two things to be united existing either before the Compound, or not destroyd but ty'd together in it: which is clearly false, not only out of the 'fore-declared Truth, but also out the definition of a Part. For, Parts are call'd such, whereof, by a Motion, call'd Composition, one thing is made; or into which, what was one is resolv'd by Division, or destruction of the Unity. Now, Unity, not Union, is the form of what is One: And, in that which is One, to seek for the colligation or

cement, is to seek by what the same is made the same. The same Error runs through the following Difficulty, which laments that 'tis unknown how the soul moves the Body: Which is utterly knock'd on the head, by denying the soul moves the Body. For, true it is, that one animated Member moves another; but not, that any substance, which is a pure soul, moves immediate∣ly any Member in which the soul is not. I appeal to other Animals, in which there's frankly denied to be a Soul independent of the Body: and I desire to have shewn me what motion there is in man, which is not in them. I confess freely, that one Member, the Brain especially, moves the rest after another manner in Man, than in other Animals; and this by reason of the dif∣ference in their Souls: but first it ought to be made evident by experiments, that a Humane Soul, without the help of the Body, or some Member acting together with it, moves another Member; before we are to en∣quire into the manner how this either is or can be done.

4. The last darkness which he bemoans in this Chapter lyes in our ignorance of that Motion, where∣by the spirits are deriv'd out of the brain into the fit Nerves for the Animal's natural Action. And, if in∣deed the Objection brandish an Argument common to all Animals, I should soon quit the field: for I con∣fess my self not so skilful in Anatomy, that I can lay be∣fore the eyes, why, from the Motion of Anger boyling

in the heart, the spirits should start into those Muscles, by whose streining the Animal is carry'd towards its Adversaries; and, from the Motion of Fear, spirits flow into the opposite Muscles, by which the Ani∣mal flies fromwards them; whereas they, in a manner, add strength to and enforce both alike. Yet, I make no question at all but, by force of the Brain's Motion, caus'd by the motion of the heart, it comes to pass that the entrance into one sort of Channels are shut, others opn'd, and that thence comes this admirable and as-yet-not-sufficiently-seen-through direction of the spirits. But, the Authors seems to make Mans case proper to himself; alledging Will, and perhaps Electi∣on, to be, as it were, the first Author of this direction. Still, therefore, he slips into the same Error. For, first, he should demonstrate some act of the will, without some either precedent or concomitant Motion of the Heart, (which, when tis violent, we call Passion; when we endeavour at any thing, Desire or Flight, or some other such like we stile it): But, if there be no such, then the cause of this direction is purely Mechani∣cal, as he calls it, and not any certain inexplicable power. Now, that there cannot possibly be any such exempt act of the will, 'tis clear enough to them who allow ther's no knowledge without a beat of Phansies: For, Phansies cannot chuse but both be stird themselves and stir others, by the usual ways of Nature. By Motions, therefore, deriv'd from the heart, whether in

Man or in Animals, all Motions, whether Natural or Free, Universally are perform'd: and, by consequence, are subject to the contemplation and scrutiny of Philo∣sophy and acurate Mechanicks.

5. The fourth Chapter objects that the Natures of Sensation and Memory are inexplicable. As to the former, first he acknowledges the substance of sensa∣tion is seated in the Brain alone: Then he inclines to Des Cartes's fantastical conjecture, shall I call it, or deviation from the manifest footsteps of Nature; a∣bout Motion's being brought down from the Heav'ns to our Eyes, through the continuedness of a very thin Ether: But, because he esteems Aristotle's con∣ceits, too, not incredible, I may be excus'd from that speculation. At length, therefore, he falls again into the old Error, enquiring how corporeal things can have any force upon a naked Spirit? He supposes therefore, the Soul in the Body to be a kind of thing, not the form or affection of the thing, Man; and so, is upon the same false haunt again, nor needs repeating former discourses to beat him off it. But, left he should say nothing new, he objects that, by sense alone; there's no discerning the Quantities, Distances, Figures and Colours of things. I wonder, I must confess, at these Objections from a curious and ingenious Man; things so clearly explain'd & demonstrated in Opticks. Who is so ignorant, that he knows not that bigger things, at the same distance, strike the eye in a more

obtuse Angle and stronglier? Who knows not that Figure, if plain, as objected to the eye, is nothing else but Quantity more spacious or contracted this or that way? but, if it be a solid one and participate of the third dimension, it borrows its variety from Distance. Again, that Distance is nothing else, but a certain Magnitude spread between the Eye and the Object; which if it be past judging of, neither can the Eye at∣test the distance. Lastly, that Colour is nothing else, but the confused figuration of a Superficies, according to its parts undistinguisht to sense. Whence it remains clear, that the Eye needs no other Geometry for all these, than what is necessary to judge of a magnitude from the variety of an Angle.

6. His next pains is about Memory. To shew the explication of that impossible, he commemorates and rejects four waies of resolving it. I must take another path than any of those. First, I must weaken this con∣sequence, that If any thing about Memory has not hi∣therto been explicated, we must therefore make account it never will be, or that 'tis impossible to be explicated. We must be aware too, that alwaies some things will be unknown; either because their trivialness merits not the pains of learning them; or in that at length the bulk of things known will be grown so great, that more will be burthensome to the understanding. Now, to complain of such like is to have forgot human shortness. What, therefore, seems my task in this

Queston is, to bring into play those things which are already establisht and evident about memory; and, for those that are unknown to make an estimate whe∣ther, some time or other, they too will come or merit to be known. First, then 'tis evident, we must distin∣guish what is Memory and what Remembrance. For, Memory is only a Conserving of the impressions made by the objects, whereby the Animal is rendred able to use them when he lists or needs. But, Remem∣brance is a certain Motion whereby that power of using the impressions is reduc'd into Act and Use. Concerning Memory, therefore, a reason is to be given both of its station or rest, and of the causes or manner of its Motion: and of both, if I be not mista∣ken, Nature and Experience offer evident footsteps, for tracing them.

7. In the first place, that all things that move the sense have certain minute particles of their body shorn off; as to the Touch, Tast and Smell, is too notorious to abide contest. He that denyes the same force to the Light, returning from the things to our Eyes, must deny, too, that the Sun extracts exhalations from the Earth and Sea: there being no other diversity in the operations, but that the one is greater and stron∣ger, the other weaker and less. Now that these Atoms get up to the Brain, by the waftage of the Spirits, (that is, a certain liquid and most subtil substance) can scarce be denied by one never so pievish, that's but

put in minde how Waters and Oyles are impregnated. These Atoms, therefore, must of necessity strike, not without some violence, upon that part of the Brain, whose being-struck causes perception. Again, that a stream or any thing liquid dasht against a resister should not leap back again is most clearly repugnant, both to experience and reason. And, that a substance any thing viscuous, in a viscuous vessel besides (such as those are about the brain) being repuls'd, should not stick to any thing solid is equally impossible: as also, that a notable part of that stream should not cling together, is against the Nature of gluyness. The Walls therefore, of the empty and hollow places of the Brain must of necessity be all hang'd and furnisht with little threads. Conclude we, then, that through all the senses, except Hearing, the Animal is enabled, by Atoms constantly sticking in it, to make use a∣gain of the Impressions made by Objects. In fine, since sound is made by a collision of the Air; 'tis evi∣dent by Anatomy, that it drives the Hammer of the Ear to beat upon the Anvil, by which beat 'tis not to be believ'd but certain particles must fly off and strike the Fancy: the orderly storing up▪ therefore, of these is apt to constitute the Memory of sounds. The stru∣cture, then, of Memory (if I am not mistaken) is rati∣onally enough declared.

8. I cannot see why the like track may not carry us to the explaining of the Symptoms of Remembrance

too; or why their Solution should be desparate. For, there's nothing clearer than that the fore-explicated motion of the Atoms is set on work by a wind, as it were. For, that Passion is a certain ebullition of Spirits reeking out of the heart, tis visible even to the eies, in Anger, and Love, and Bashfulness. If we make inqui∣sition what effect these motions have on the Fancy, we experience, that those Objects occur to the mind, tu∣multuously and all on a heap, as it were, which solicite these Passions; so hastily and in a huddle, that they prevent mature weighing. It appears, therefore, that the Atoms, rouz'd from their places by such like va∣pours, fly about the cognoscitive part, in a kind of con∣fused tumble. If then, there are certain winds and blasts, which we call Motions of the appetitive facul∣ty: is it not plain, that the cavities of the Brain will be brusht, as it were, and the Images sticking to the wals be moved to the place destin'd for attaining their effect? And that these Atoms are carried neither meerly by chance, nor yet in a certain order, is evident by this; that, upon inquisition, the things we seek for do not suddenly and perfectly occur; which were a sign of election; and yet manifestly, such abundance of them suit to our purpose, that tis clear, they could not run thus without any industry at all. As, there∣fore, when we treated of directing the Spirits into the Nerves, we allowed the several Passions each their waies into certain parts of the Brain: so, here, tis also

manifest, the same Passions have the places and series of some certain Atoms, in a manner more obvious to them, than others.

9. But our new admirer of Nature is perplext, how this multitude of Objects, swimming in the cavities of the Brain, should possibly be, without entangling and confounding one another: and by what Art they shift out of one anothers way, so as to be able to keep humane knowledge distinct. And here, I must con∣fess, I had need crave the help of a Machine: for, really, we have no Candle, nor Spectacles enabling us to look into the subtile paths by which the Atoms a∣void and slip by, to escape ruining one another by shocking. But, in exchange, I ask how many Sun∣beams (which Philosophy now questions not to be Bodies) pierce streight to our eies, through the vast continuity of Air, and so many little Bodies flying up and down in it? There's no body, if we credit Expe∣rience and Reason, without its steams, and a sphere of vapours derived from it: How do these steams find free paths to run in and attain such wonderful effects? The Magnetical, Sympathetical, and smell-producing streams, have not their courses broken, or ends inter∣cepted by one another. They that have not the con∣fidence to deny these, why are they loath to allow the same may happen in the wide passages of the Brain? But you'l reply, that to multiply a difficulty is not to salve it; but to profess the rest of Nature inscrutable,

when tis our task to clear this particular. Well then, thus I cut the very knot asunder: In currents of grea∣ter Atoms, where tis easier to make experiment, tis plain, that many are confounded, many lost; yet, out of the very nature of Multitude, that some are preser∣ved entire, and those enough to serve Nature's turn. So it passes even in the Brain: whatever Object enters requires time for affecting the Sense; which, if it be too short, the Object is lost almost before it be per∣ceiv'd; if long, it roots in the knowledge by the mul∣tiplicity of the images, and the frequent sight of the same Object does as much; nay, that knowledge often repeated, works the same effect, is evident beyond dis∣pute. This being so, we must conclude, that such is the art of Nature as, for things to be remembred, there shall not want that abundance of images, which is ne∣cessary and sufficient to force their way through the Crowd of all others they meet.

10. 'Tis plain that, in this Answer, I have prefer'd the Digbaean Method before the rest: Because that, as neer as is possible, traces Nature step by step. I concern not my self in the rest; as studying Philosophy, out of a design to build, not destroy. Only, I'd remember the ingeni∣ous Author that he mis-imposes the third opinion (which relishes nothing of Philosophy) upon Aristotle (who taught the Digbaean way); deceiv'd by the counterfeit stilers of themselves Aristotelians, whereas they are no∣thingless. In this same Chapter, the Author seems sollici∣tous

about the will's following the understanding: But, because, he disputes nothing on't, neither will I; only, hint that the will, as spiritual, signifies not any thing else, but the very understanding perfect, or ripe for action to follow out of it. That Mystery of whence comes ill, I deny not, has bin brought down, by the contests of the Ancients, even to our ears; nor question I but 'twill last as long as the bold and ignorant shall endure: But, as the Author mis-insinuates, I doubt not that St. Augustine himself has most clearly convinc'd it; nor can it any longer be troublesome to any, but those who either know not, or neglect his Doctrine.