An exclusion of scepticks from all title to dispute being an answer to The vanity of dogmatizing / by Thomas White.

An exclusion of SCEPTICISM AND SCEPTICKS From all Title to Dispute. (Book 1)

First Plea. There is Demonstration and Science. (Book 1)

1. SCepticism, born of Old by an unlucky miscarriage of Nature, for her own Credit, carryed off the Tongues of the Eloquent where it had long been fostred, and buryed by the steddiness of Christian Faith; this Monster snatcht from the Teeth of Worms and Insects, Peter Gassendus, a Man of a most piercing Sagacity, of neat and copious Eloquence, a most pleasing Behaviour and wonderful Diligence, by a kind of Magick has endeavoured to restore again to life. He, a Person (which is the strangest of all) most tenacious of Catholick Faith, and never suspected guilty of mis∣chievous Tenets: whereas, yet, this Scepticism is the Mo∣ther

of infinite Errors, and all Heresies, and that very se∣ducing Philosophy and vain fallacy which the Saints, warn'd by the Apostles, have taught us to beware of. Heard, this man, otherwise eminent in his paradoxical Exer∣citation against the Aristotelians, has dar'd to expose, not vail'd, as before, and wandring like a Quean in the dark, but bold-fac'd and painted, to the Multitude and Market place.

By his Example, the Author of The Vanity of Dogma∣tizing has produc'd her amongst us beauteously trick'd-up in English: He, too, a great Master of Wit and Eloquence. Nor indeed are vast mischiefs to be dreaded from Vulgar heads. This is the occasion of my undertaking; and this my Design (if Heaven vouchsafe to enlighten and guide my pen) to force back into her Grave this Carcass that would be rivalling Science, and deliver her up a Feast to her former worthy Commoners. Come on then, let's untie the knot of the Question.

3. Since, then, 'tis of Science we are to speak, its genius would in some measure be look'd into. Nature her self, therefore, teaches us, that Man is an Animal endued with Reason, to fit him for governing his Action, and Reason is allowed to be That whereby what before was unknown is rendred known: dayly Experience also convinces that our Action consists for the most part in such things as are subject to an infinite and insuperable mutability and varia∣tion: whence it comes to pass, that that Vertue which is im∣mediate to action cannot properly be called Science (since

'tis not infallible, and the effect of demonstrative Dis∣course) but a power of conjecturing aptly; and uses commonly to be term'd Prudence, either properly or derivatively; properly, if it be concerning the thing to be done, as to its right proceeding from Reason; analogically, if of the action or thing to be done, as it regards some other inferior Faculty subservient to the dominion of Reason. Now Prudence depends on two previous Powers, Art and Inference or Experiment. Art, though it ows its birth to Experience, yet is sustai∣ned by universall and unfailing Rules: But, it self un∣derstands not the necessary and indefectible efficacy of its Rule; but is content with the testimony of ever-corresponding effects. Inference, or Experience for the most part is true, but necessitates not assent, because not universal.

4. Setting this therefore aside, 'tis clear the Decrees of Art, since she is veracious, have necessitating and ne∣cessarily connected Principles, which force the effect of Art to be not possibly otherwise than as Art teaches 'twill succeed. Whence follows, that the subject Matter of Science and Art is the same; and every Art has a proper Science due to it self, if the nature of Man would stretch to attain it. But, the same warning we gave before concerning Prudence, must be repeated concerning Science. For, as he who behaves himself prudently in any Artifice, is not therefore esteem'd and stil'd a prudent man; but only he who rightly tempers

his Action in as much as 'tis Humane: so, neither is he, with propriety, to be called a knowing man, who skills the demonstration of Duelling, or Versifying; but he that has the demonstration of those things which are Principles for governing our life, in as much as 'tis Humane: The chief whereof is that which has merited the term of Theology, or Metaphysicks: the next is Ethicks: then Physicks, or Natural Science; whe∣ther, because all corporeal Natures, or the World, is proposed to the disputation of men; or because, next Metaphysical Contemplation, nothing so much ad∣vances our desired Beatitude as Physicks. Nor yet are Mathematicks to be excluded; both because Quan∣tity, their subject, is the Vesture of those bodies which Physicks speculate through; as also, because the Rules, and as it were, the demonstrableness of Natural things at every step depends on them. Out of all which 'tis clear, that in nothing Equivocation more lewdly cheats Man-kind, than in this term of Knowing, or Learned men. For, if Masters in Sciences, analogically so cal∣led, are not really worthy this name: how much fur∣ther off meriting so noble a Title are those, whose ambition streins no higher than, like Parrats, to repeat others sentiments? and how manifestly pernicious are they that have the confidence to apply such learning to the government of humane life; and vent poison, or at best, smoak, under the Reverend name of Sci∣ence?

5. It follows, that such Science 'tis we propose to our selves as is beneficial to Humane life. And concerning this, three things offer themselves to our enquiry. Whether there be at all any certainty attain∣able, at least of one Proposition or one Reasonment, which we call a Sylogism? At this hangs the next, Whether at least, any Habit, or Series of more Truths traced with certainty (such as generally are esteem'd those which Arithmeticians and Geometricians profess) may be acquired by humane industry? The last Que∣stion, by most (at least in practise) disputed (whate're in words they pretend) is limited to Physicks and Me∣taphysicks; whether about the objects of these any be∣neficial Multitude of Truths may be spun out conne∣ctedly; as the Masters in Mathematicks seem already to have done? And herein consists the usefulness of my discourse; and the desparation or difficulty of this Conclusion compels me to clear the former; which of themselves by their own evidence had stood unscru∣pled, had not the step, and almost necessary conse∣quence they afford to the third, terrified those who feel such difficulty to yield this last.

6. To work, then; let us fix the first step, and as∣sert, as invincibly known, and unshakable by any Art of the Scepticks, that What is is, or that what termi∣nates and specifies an Identical Proposition as its Ob∣ject is self-evident: as if we should say, that Peter is Peter, Wood is Wood, a stone is a stone; and what∣ever

others carry as open-fac'd an Evidence. The Scepticks I imagine, will laugh at this Axiom as foolish: because Identical Propositions use to be excluded from the rank of Scientifical ones, and the Sciences them∣selves; as nothing at all advancing the understanding. But, by this their very laugh they'l yield us the Victory; as confessing Evidence in these, however they be useless: And therefore that wherever the same necessity shall Intervene, there cannot want E∣vidence. One thing in this position occurs a little cloudy, obscuring it through a Mist caus'd by the shadow of that most acute Person, Renatus des Cartes; who, severely prying to descry the very first thing fal∣ling under knowlege, beat it up at length to this, that the first thing every one knows, is, that Himself thinks. But, the difference of our Opinions, I con∣ceive, has sprung from hence, that, whereas Science may be consider'd both in its Generation and in its Subsistence; He has taken the former Method, I the later. For, really, if we examine by what degrees Science is born in us, we see, the first thing that hap∣pens is to have a passion made in us by Bodies; and the first evident thing that strikes us is that we think. But, if, looking upon Science now existing▪ and as its twere at rest in us, we enquire what 'tis that fasten truth to our Minds, so that we cannot doubt or, as were, waver about it: Nothing will appear more simply or originally manifest then that what is is,

wherein, in a manner, is formally included that what is so is, that, whilst it is, it cannot not-be; which, in∣deed, is, that the understander is certain that the thing is, or has a fixedness concerning the truth which is in him.

7. It being determin'd that an Identical Proposition is evident, 'tis equally determin'd that Propositions term'd self-known are evident: for, if they be look'd into, twill be clearly seen, that a self-known Proposition is in some sort composed of an Identical Proposition and another otherwise evident, or taken for evident. For, there are two sorts of self-known Propositions; one wherein the Generical Notion is predicated of a Species; another wherein the Species are predicated divisively of the Genus. Take these for Examples: A Man is an Animal: the sense is, A Rational Animal is a sort, or one of the Animals: The evidence of the Proposition consists in this, that the word Animal sig∣nifies, as it were formally in predication, to be one of the Animals; and the word Rational denotes that whereby a Man is one of the Animals. Wherefore in this Proposition, a Man is an Animal; these two Pro∣positions shrowd themselves, one of the Animals is one of the Animals; and that other, that Rational is a de∣terminer of Animality: Now this later is not affirmed, but taken for granted, either from Sense as it were, or some other way supposed to be known and past doubt; and in force of the former Identification, tis concluded

that a Man is an Animal. In like manner when 'tis said, Number is either even or odd, Bulk is either finite or infinite; and whatever Predicates, contradictorily oppos'd, are predicated divisively of a Subject; two propositions lye in them; one an Identical one, for example, that even and not-even are all, or comprise all the kinds of Number; and another otherwise known, viz. That such a Number, for example, Ten, is a cer∣tain Number. This later is known as it were by sense; or suppos'd, not affirm'd: The former is equivalent to this all Number is all Number; and one of all the Numbers, for example; Ten, is affirm'd to be one of the even or odd, because, by force of the contradiction between even and not-even, even and odd must of ne∣cessity comprise all Numbers, or even and odd and all Number be the same.

8. The same force of Identity is also clear in a Sy∣logism: For example, when in the first Mood, or Bar∣bara, two self-known propositions are taken and ano∣ther truth, unknown before, is concluded out of them. As, when tis argu'd that Every Man is a living Crea∣ture, because every Man is an Animal, and Every Ani∣mal is a living Creature: there's made an Identifica∣tion of Man and living Creature; or rather it is disco∣vered by the double Identification of Animal with the Superior and Inferior. The force therefore of the Sy∣logism whereby it fixes the mind in this Identity, tha•• Man is a living Creature, lies in nothing but this, tha••

through the former two Identifications it rests fixed as to the Premisses. Plain therefore tis, that the light of an Identical Proposition shews it self both in self-known Propositions, and in those which are concluded by Sylogisms: and, which follows, either that the truth of an Identical Proposition is not evident, or else that self-known propositions, and such as are concluded by a legitimate Sylogism are Evident and most cer∣tain: and, that it cannot be doubted, so many truths are palpably certain as can be reacht by a legitimate deduction of Sylogisms. Since, therefore, he cannot be esteem'd other than a Mad Sot that should deny the Evidence of an Identical proposition; he cannot be reputed Rational who should at all reject proposi∣tions self-known, or collected by legitimate Dis∣course.

9. Be this, therefore, a Demonstration a priori, as they term it, of this truth, that there is some cer∣tainty or Science; that, since tis undenyable that what is is, or, an Identical Proposition is true, and every Proposition, whether self-known or Sylogistically-concluded, has no other necessity than what shews it self in an Identical one; there can be no doubt of these, unless Identical ones, too, be called in question. For, since, in a self-known Proposition, tis Evident, that the thing signified by one Term is that which is signified by the other: And in a Sylo∣gistically-concluded Proposition, it likewise appears,

that because A is B, and B is C, A too is C; or that, unless A be C, A will not be A; for 'tis not A unless it be B, nor B unless it be C: 'Tis Evident that whatever is evinced by a legitimate Sylogism, has the same necessity as an Identical Proposition. Since therefore 'twere meer perversness, and such as cannot fall into humane Nature, to doubt whether an Identical Proposi∣tion be true; tis absolutely manifest that whatever is concluded by ligitimate discourse out of self-known Propositions is engrafted, beyond any danger of ambi∣guity; or, that there is Science of all such like: And therefore that there is some Science, and that, indeed, of many truths. Now, that which either in a self-known or in a Demonstrated Proposition, is assum'd beyond Identical ones is not capable either of truth or falshood; but, in a manner, is taken by way of snppo∣sition; as if 'twere said, if he be a Man; if it be an A∣nimal: I say, for as much as Man or Animal are the sub∣jects of the Propositions or Premisses.