Miscellanea ... by a person of honour.

A SVRVEY of the Constitutions and Interests of the Empire, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, Holland, France, and Flan∣ders; with their Relation to England in the Year 1671. And then given to One of His Majesties Principal Secretaries of State, upon the ending of my Embassy at the Hague.

THE Decay and Dis∣solution of Civil, as well as Natural Bo∣dies, proceeding usu∣ally from outward Blows and Accidents, as well as inward Di∣stempers or Infirmities; it seems equally necessary for any Government to know and reflect upon the Constitutions, Forces, and Conjunctures among their

Neighbouring States, as well as the Fa∣ctions, Humours, and Interests of their own Subjects; For all Power is but comparative, nor can any Kingdom take a just measure of its safety by its own riches or strength at home, with∣out casting up at the same time what Invasions may be feared, and what Defences expected from Enemies or Allyes abroad.

'Tis certain, That so advantageous a Scituation as that of His Majesties Dominions in these Islands of Great Britain and Ireland, makes any for∣reign consideration less important to us, than to any other Nation: Because the Numbers and Native courage of our men, with the strength of our Shipping, have for many ages past (and still for ought we yet know) made us a match for the greatest of our Neighbours at Land; and an over∣match for the strongest of them at Sea: Whereas whoever hurts us without our own Arms, must be able to master us in both those Elements. Yet in regard there are the names of several Conquests remaining still upon Re∣cord

(though all of them the meer effects of our own divisions or invita∣tions); when Trade is grown the de∣sign of all Nations in Europe, that are possest of any Maritime Provinces, as being the only unexhausted Mine, and out of whose Treasures all greatness at Sea naturally arises: When instead of a King of France surrounded and bearded by Dukes of Brittany, and Burgundy, as well as our own possessi∣ons in Normandy and Guienne; Instead of a Count of Flanders or Holland, who served for no more, than like the smaller weights to make the balance sometimes a little even in the greater scales of the English, French, and Ger∣man Powers; We now behold in France the greatest Land-Forces that perhaps have ever been known under the Command of any Christian Prince; And in the United Provinces, the greatest numbers both of Ships and Mariners that were ever yet heard of under any State in the World; And which have hitherto been only awed by the strength of our Oak, the Art of our Shipwrights, and chiefly by the

invincible hearts of our Seamen: When the prospect of these two Powers brings us to consider, that any firm conjun∣ction of them, either by Confederacy or the Submission of Holland, will prove the nearest approach that was ever made to our ruine and servitude: It may perhaps import us in this calm we enjoy, to hearken a little more than we have done of late, to the storms that are now raising abroad; and by the best Perspectives we can find, to discover from what Coast they break, what course they are like to hold, how much we can lye in their danger, and whether the shelter expected from us by our Neighbours, will be only a strain of Generosity and Humanity, or the best provision we can make here∣after for our own safety.

Those Countreys in whose Actions or Interests we have at any time con∣cerned our selves, have been the Em∣pire, France, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, and the Low-Countries, in the two se∣veral bodies usually distinguished by the names of Flanders and Holland. For with Poland we have never gone

further, than our good wishes towards their defence against the Turk. Nor with Italy, than the Offices of Cere∣mony, or Interests of Traffique, unless sometimes some short Negotiation that served the present turn to stop the a∣spiring growth of either the French or Spanish greatness in those as well as nearer parts.

THE Forreign Interests of the Empire are the defence of the Eastern parts against the Turk, and the preservation of the Western Circles against the growth of France. The Domestique are the limited constitu∣tion of the Imperial Power, and the balance of the several free Princes and States of the Empire among themselves. The two last have raised no dust since the Peace of Munster, which seems chiefly occasioned by the Swedes com∣ing in to be a Member of the Empire, upon the share then yielded to him in Pomerania and Bremen. These give him an immediate entrance into the heart of Germany, where the Native poverty of his own Countrey makes him considered, as still upon the wing,

and ready to stoop at the first Quarry he can meet with upon any divisions in the Empire, so as there seems a ge∣neral resolution not to furnish him with such occasions. Their defence against the Turk will be provided and pursued by Common Inclinations and Forces, unless those Princes of the Western Circles should at the same time be busied in some nearer danger from France. But if the Grand Vi∣zier be so great a man as he is reputed in Politicks as well as Arms, he will never consent by an Invasion of Hun∣gary, to make way for the advance of the French Progress into the Empire, which a Conquest of the Low-Coun∣tries would make easie and obvious: And so great accessions (with others that would lye fair and open in the Spanish Provinces upon the Mediterra∣nian) would make France a formi∣dable Power to the Turk himself, and greater than I suppose he desires to see any in Christendom; So that it seems not improbable, that the present Peace between the Emperor and the Turk, may last longer than is generally calculated by the fears or desires

of those who are most concerned in it.

In the preservation of the Western Circles (especially that of Burgundy and the Rhine) against the Progress of the French Greatness; the Dispo∣sitions, if not Interests of the several Members of the Empire, seem much more divided. The Emperor himself is firm in resolving it, because he has nothing to fear so much as the Power and Ambition of France, in regard of their Common Pretensions to Spain after the young Kings death, and a jealousie of the Empire it self after a further course of success: But he will be faint in any execution of such a Counsel, unless spirited by the una∣nimous Decrees of a general Dyet, from his own dispositions, which are thought rather generous and just than ambitious and enterprizing, from the influence of the Jesuits in that Court, who are observed to grow generally French as they were Spanish in the last age; from the fear of the Turks, who are still like a Cloud that hangs over his head; And from a jealousie of Swedens joyning absolutely with France,

which might share a great part of the Empire between them.

The Elector of Saxony would fall intirely into the Interests of the Em∣peror in this point, as a Prince that is a true German, loves the liberty of the Empire; Forefees, that if it should fall into the French hands, all the Princes would grow little Companions to what they are, or return to be the several Officers of his Court; as they were in the unlimited greatness of some Anci∣ent Emperors. Besides, his distance from France, though it does not in∣struct him to think wiser than other Princes, Yet it helps him to speak bold∣lier what he thinks upon these Con∣junctures.

The Elector of Brandenburgh and Langrave of Hesse, and at least two of the Dukes of Lunenburgh, are in their Dispositions and Judgments upon the same Interests; But will be influenced and awed by Sweden, whose ill Ta∣lent will be still suspected to Bran∣denburgh, upon the differences in Prus∣sia; and to Lunenburgh upon the late disappointment at Bremen.

The Electors of Mentz and Triers have the same Inclinations, but lying at the mercy of France, in so near and so imperious a Neighbourhood, They will take no measures wherein they may not see their own safety provided for, as well as that of the Empire; Wherein no Prince has greater repu∣tation of Prudence and Caution, than the Bishop of Mentz.

The Elector Palatine, either upon remainders of the ancient Leagues with France, or quarrels with the House of Austria, has been thought inclined to the French; But as a wife Prince will be found generally in the true Interests of the Empire as far as the seat of his Countrey will give him leave, which in a War will be so much exposed.

The Elector of Bavaria has been esteemed wholly in the French Inter∣ests since the Treaty of Munster; But by what tyes or motives, has not fallen under my observation, in regard of the distance of his Countrey, and small Commerce out of the limits of the Empire.

The Elector of Colen is a person of much natural goodness and candor, but of age and infirmities, and whom Devotion and Chymistry have shared between them, and in a manner remo∣ved from the affairs of his State; which have been long and intirely devolved upon the Bishop of Stras∣burgh; A man busie, and always in motion or intrigue: But for the rest, whether upon future ambition, or present advantages, Esteemed to be perfectly in the French Interests; So as whatever use can be made by France of that Electors Name or Countrey, may be reckoned upon as wholly at the devotion of that Crown.

The Duke of Nieuburgh is in his person and meen, rather like an Italian than a German; and should be so in his disposition, by playing the Game of an Italian Prince; In declaring no partialities, provoking no enemies, and living more retired than the other Princes of his Countrey; Having ne∣ver shewed any ambition, but for the Crown of Poland, which design helpt to inspire him with great compliance

towards all his Neighbours, and other Princes, who were able to do him good or ill offices in that point. But the failing of it, was thought to have some∣thing disobliged him from France (up∣on whose assistance he reckoned) and has sunk him in a debt which he will hardly recover.

The Bishop of Munster is made on∣ly considerable by his scituation, which lyes the fittest of all others to invade Holland; And by the dispositions of this man, which are unquiet, and Am∣bitious to raise a name in the World. An old implacable hatred to the Dutch upon their intelligence with his chief Town of Munster; Their Usurpation (as he pretends) of Borkloe, and some other small places in his Countrey; Their protection of the Countess of Benthem, and the hopes of sharing Overyssel or Friesland, if ever their spoyls come to be divided; make him a certain friend to what Prince soe∣ver is Enemy to them, and will fur∣nish him with men, or money enough to appear in the head of an Army a∣gainst them.

The general Interest that the several Princes of the Empire have with us, is grounded wholly upon the Esteem of His Majesties Power, and the vene∣ration of his Name, which is so great amongst them, That most of them are resolved in the present Conjuncture of Affairs in Christendom, to under∣stand perfectly His language, before they speake their own.

THE Government of Sweden is esteemed steady and wise, as their people warlike and numerous. The digestion of their Counsels is made in a Senate consisting of forty Coun∣sellors, who are generally the greatest men of the Kingdom in Office, Estates, or Abilities; and who have most of them been Commanders in the German Wars, or are so in the present Militia, which makes their Counsels generally Warlike and Ambitious, though some∣thing tempered by the Minority of their King. This has turned them for some years since their last Kings death, rather to make advantages by the name and reputation of their Alliances, than by the appearance of their Arms. But

if their King grow a Man, and of Mar∣tial thoughts, as may be presaged from so great a Father, We may see great actions and revolutions grow again out of this Northern Climate. For the names of Goth, and Vandal, and their famons successes both in Poland and Germany this last age, inspire them with great thoughts; And the bodies and courages of their common men, as well as the Prudence and Conduct of their great Officers, seem to have framed them for great undertakings. Besides their Application of late years to trade, has much increast their Ship∣ping and Seamen (which they found to be their weak-side in their last at∣tempts). All these may in time make way for their great design, which is the Dominion of the Baltick Sea by the Conquest of Denmark. This was about the year 59, wrested out of their hands by the Dutch Assistances, and can hardly escape them, if ever that Commonwealth should be bro∣ken. And if they arrive once at this point, there will grow a Power in that rough Climate, which both at Land and Sea may equal most others that

are now in Christendom; by being Masters of such numbers of strong and valiant men, as well as of all the Naval Stores that furnish the World.

They have a nearer prospect upon the City of Bremen, by the Addition whereof to the Bishoprick already in their possession, They design to lay a great foundation both of Trade and Strength in the nearer parts of Ger∣many.

Their next Interest seems to be a long knocking War in the Empire or the Low-Countries, which will make them Courted by all, till they think fit to declare; And then will bring them to a share in the Game; And those often go away with the great∣est, who bring in least when the Stake begins. The neglects of France since the peace of Munster, and the late courtship of Spain, seem to have left them open for the fairest offer from either of those Crowns: But rather inclined to Spain, which has still the surest fonds of treasure (if they could fall into good method or direction)

and to whom they are more necessary than to France, which has out-grown almost all measures with their Neigh∣bours. They have a peek to Holland something in shew, but more at heart; As lying cross to their three designs, the Dominion of the Baltick, their Acquisition of Bremen, and a War in the upper or lower Germany. And they are so wise a State as to be found commonly in their Interest; which for these reasons, is either an absolute breaking, or a great weakening of that Commonwealth. Besides, they esteemed themselves at least neglected by them in the late Negotiation of the Tripple Alliance, wherein they expected constant Subsidies in the time of peace, from Spain and Holland, to engage them in the defence of all those Provinces against the threatning power of France.

An old friendship to our Nation, and Alliance, proceeding from a long conjunction of Interests, besides the necessity of keeping well with one of the greatest Maritime Powers, will (as may be conjectured) perswade

them to follow His Majesties measures the closest and furthest of any State in Europe. This gave them the first de∣sign of entring into the Tripple Al∣liance; And into the commerce with Spain in the year 68; And their re∣solution of keeping pace with His Majesty in both those points, as well as the consequences of them; Which they will do, unless the present Scene should wholly change, and open new Councels and Interests not yet thought of in the world.

THE Kingdom of Denmark seems less considerable than their Neighbour-Crown, From a fainter Spirit which appears of late in their people, and in their Government it self; as well as a great inequality of number in their Forces both at Sea and Land; For the last change of their Government, from Elective to Hereditary, has made it seem hitherto of less Force, and unfitter for Action abroad. As all great Changes brought about by Force or Address in an old Constitution of Government (rooted in the Hearts and Customs of the peo∣ple),

though they may in time prove an encrease of Strength and Great∣ness (when fallen into Method, and grown easie by Use); Yet for many years they must needs weaken it, by the divisions and distractions of mens minds, and discontents of their hu∣mours; And so turn the Counsels up∣on Designs within, desisting from any without; And advantages upon Ene∣mies, must give way to those upon Subjects: So as the breaking down an old frame of Government, and erect∣ing a new, seems like the cutting down an old Oak (because the fruit decays, and the branches grow thin), and planting a young one in the room. 'Tis true, the Son or Grandson (if it prospers) may enjoy the shade and the maste; But the Planter, besides the pleasure of Imagination, has no other benefit to recompence the pains of Setting and Digging, the care of Wa∣tering and Pruning, the fears of every Storm and every Drougth. And 'tis well, If he escapes a blow from the fall of the old Tree, or its Boughs, as they are lopt off.

The Change in Denmark▪ was the safer by having to deal with a soft easie people, and with Nobles grown to have small power or interest amongst them, and of whom many were gained by the Crown. Besides, that nothing seemed to concern Property in the change of Successive, for Elective. And the example of all Christian Crowns (besides that of Poland) made way for it; And yet it is certain, that Denmark has continued ever since weak and unspirited, bent only upon safety, and enjoying the Revenues of the Sound (which are the chief be∣longing to that Crown); So as their great Interest is their defence against Sweden, And for the rest a general Peace, by which Traffique encreasing they may come in for a share, and see their Customs grow in the Sound and Norway. They reckon'd chiefly upon their support from Holland, till seeing them fall into closer measures with Us and Sweden, upon the Tripple Alli∣ance; They have tacked some points nearer France, and the rather, because of the unkindness grown in the last Dutch War, between us and them;

Yet they have it at heart, that Hol∣land has ever used them insolently, if not scornfully, in the whole course of their Treaties and Alliances, as well as the differences between them about the payments of the Sound, And will be ever ready and resolute in the de∣fence of Hamborough, whenever the Danes shall have strength and heart enough to attaque it, which seems the chief Ambition they have left them abroad.

THE Crown of Spain was in all Philip the Second's time lookt upon as both the terror and de∣fence of Christendom; No Monarchy having ever grasped at so great an Empire there, and at the same time pursued an open War against so great a power as the Turks. This great∣ness was grown up by the Union of the House of Castile and Arragon, of that of Burgundy and the Netherlands, with that of Naples and Sicily; By the accession or conquest of Portugal, By that of the Indies (when their Mines bled fresh, as they did many years af∣ter their first opening), By the num∣ber

of brave Troops and Leaders; which were raised and made by the various and continual Wars of Charles the Fifth; But chiefly by the uninter∣rupted succession of three great Prin∣ces, Ferdinand, Charles, and Philip; Which can never fail of raising a small Kingdom to a great, no more than the contrary of bringing down a great one to a small. But whoever measures the Crown of Spain now, by the Scale of that Age, may fancy a man of Four∣score, by a Picture drawn of him at Thirty; 'Tis like a great old Tree which has lost its Branches and Leaves, Et trunco non frondibus efficit umbram. Though no man knows, whether out of this old Root a Sucker may not spring, that with a little shelter at first, and good seasons, may in time prove a mighty Tree; For there seems still to remain strength and sap in the Root to furnish a fair growth, though not in proportion to the first. These decays have been occasioned by so long a War with Holland (supported by all the Neighbours who envied or feared the greatness of Spain), By the exhausting in a great degree of their

Indian Mines; By that of their Na∣tives to furnish the Indian Conquests, and secure all their Provinces both in Italy and Flanders; But most of all by two Successions (which we may at least call) of unactive Princes, And the want of any great Ministry to re∣pair either them, or the Minority of this King, in which they ended. Un∣less this Crown out-grow its present weakness, by some great Spirit rising up at the head of the Monarchy, who shall digest their Councels, reform the vast and impertinent profusions of their Treasures, by suppressing all unnecessa∣ry Pensions and Expences, And re∣store the vigor of their Nation by Martial designs and examples; We may reckon the Interest of Spain to lye wholly in the preservation and de∣fence of Flanders from France, of Sicily from the Turks, and of their Indies from Us. That of Sicily seems more remote, because both Hungary and Poland is a nearer Game for the Turk, And will not so generally alarm or unite the Christian Princes, as the Invasion of Sicily, wherein France as well as Italy is so near con∣cerned.

The jealousie of their Indies has been much nearer them since our possession of Jamaica; And akes at heart upon every fit which the de∣sperate Sallies of our Privateers there bring upon them. But they hope to make fair weather in those Seas, by opening to us some advantages of Trade there, And by a Conjunction of Interests in Europe, which they think the greatness of France makes as necessary to us as to them.

Their quarrel to France by a course of almost continual Wars ever since Charles the Fifth's time, by the late pretensions to Flanders, set on foot by France since the death of their last King, and pursued by the late Invasion (which the Spaniards pretend to have been against all Faith, as well as Right) seems to be grown wholly incurable, Though dissembled by the sense of their own weakness, which makes them rather willing to deceive themselves with a Peace, that they know must fail them, than break out into a War they fear must ruin them, without the assistance of their Neighbours. And this they hope some breach of the

Peace at Aix on the French side, or other accidents, may at one time or other engage for them. And though as they stand single, their present In∣terest is but bare defence, and wear∣ing out their Kings Minority without further losses; Yet a greater Interest, and far more at heart, Is a War with France in Conjunction with the Trip∣ple-Alliance, or at least with Us and Holland. For though the Peace holds, Yet while France continues so great Forces and Designs on foot, the pre∣servation of Flanders will cost Spain 200 m. pounds a year, besides the Re∣venues of the Countrey. And what is left them in those Provinces remains so lockt and interwoven with the last French Conquests, that upon the first breach of a War, It is all endangered; and indeed cannot be any ways secu∣red, but by a strong diversion, which may imploy the greatest part of the French Forces in some other places. These regards, and that of being hard∣ly used (as they conceive) by Us and Holland, in the Peace of Aix, which forced them to quit so much of their Countrey to France, and of

their money to Sweden, Have raised up a party in their Council, that would make and secure the best Peace they can with France, by a Cession of Flan∣ders to that Crown, in exchange for other Provinces towards Spain, and of some other pretensions. But this will not be carried in a Minority of their King; at least without greater fears of a sudden Invasion from France, and greater despairs of help from us. Because whenever they quit Flanders, they must be content to shut them∣selves up within their Mountains, and signifie nothing more in the Affairs of Europe; Nor could they perhaps long be safe either in Spain or Italy, if they were there to sustain all the Forces of France, without the great diversion they have always made by Flanders; out of which whenever they are Masters of the field, they march in four or five days up into the very Isle of France.

To compass these two Interests ei∣ther of defence or a war in Confe∣deracy, they would fain engage Swe∣den, but will endanger this Aim, by the fear of venturing their money be∣fore

the Game begins. They reckon themselves sure of Holland as far as their defence, but know, they will never be brought to begin a War with France. And the old rancours be∣tween Spaniard and Dutch, are not yet enough worn out of the disposi∣tions of the People or the Govern∣ments, to make room for such an ab∣solute turn. Their great hope is in England, where their inclination carries them as well as their interest. Besides, they think our old as well as fresh quarrels with France, and the jealousie of their present growth, will temper us for their turn at one time or o∣ther, so that their measures will ever be fair with us; But no more towards preserving their Peace, because they think our Interest as well as our Trea∣ties will be enough to engage us so far without other motives. Though to head a War against France, where∣in both Sweden and Holland, would (as they think) follow our paces; There is no advantage which the Crown of Spain could make us in Trade, nor money they could spare from their own necessities (in the

share of the quarrel) which they would not willingly furnish us, and trust to the events of a War how un∣certain soever.

THE State of Holland in point both of riches, and strength, is the most prodigious growth that has been seen in the world; if we reckon it from their Peace with Spain; be∣fore which time, though their Forces were great both at Land and Sea, yet they were kept down by too violent exercise; And that Government could not be said to stand upon its own legs, Leaning always on their Neigh∣bours, who were willing to support them against Spain, and feared nothing from a State so narrow in compass of Land, and so weak in Native Subjects, That the strength of their Armies has ever been made up of forreign Troops. But since that time, What with the benefit of their Scituation and Orders of their Government, The Conduct of their Ministers (driving on steddy and publick Interests), The Art, In∣dustry, and Parsimony of their peo∣ple; All conspiring to derive almost

the Trade of the whole World into their Circle, (while their Neighbours were taken up either in Civil or For∣reign Wars) They have grown so considerable in the World, that for many years they have treated upon an equal Foot with all the great Princes of Europe, and concluded no Nego∣tiation without advantage. And in the last War with Us and Munster, were able at the same time to bring above a hundred men of War to Sea, and maintain threescore and ten thou∣sand men at Land. Besides, the Esta∣blishment or Conquests of their Com∣panies in the East-Indies, have in a manner erected another subordinate Commonwealth in those parts; Where upon occasion they have armed five and forty men of War, and thirty thousand Land-men by the modestest computations. Yet the frame of this State (as of most great Machines made for rest and not for motion) is abso∣lutely incapable of making any consi∣derable enlargements or conquests up∣on their neighbours; Which is evident to all that know their Constitutions: But needs no other argument besides

their want of Native Subjects to ma∣nage any such attempts; What men they can spare being drawn so wholly into their trade, and their East-Indies; That they cannot so much as furnish a Colony for Surinam, proportioned to the safety and plantation of that place; And no Nation ever made and held a Conquest by Mercenary Arms. So that the wounds and fears they can give their neighbours consists in point of Trade; In injuries or insolencies at Sea; In falling with great weight in∣to a ballance with other Princes; In protecting their Rebels or Fugitives, And in an arrogant way of treating with other Princes and States, a qua∣lity natural to men bred in popular Governments, and derived of late years from the great successes of theirs, under the present Ministry.

It may be laid (I believe) for a Maxim, That no wise State will ever begin a War unless it be upon de∣signs of Conquests, or necessity of Defence; For all other Wars serve only to exhaust Forces and Treasure, and end in untoward Peaces, patcht up out of weakness or weariness of

the parties: Therefore the Hollan∣ders, unless invaded either at home or in Flanders (which they esteem now the same case, if it comes from France), can have no interest to offer at a War; But find their greatest in continuing their course of Traffique uninterrup∣ted, and enjoying the advantages which in that point their industry and address will gain them from all their Neigh∣bours. And for these ends they will endeavour to preserve the Peace now in being, And bandy by Leagues and Negotiations against any from whom they shall fear a breach of it.

They will ever seek to preserve themselves by an Alliance with Eng∣land against France, and by that of France against England, as they did formerly by both against Spain. And they will fall into all Conjuctures which may serve to ballance in some measure the two lesser Crowns of Swe∣den and Denmark, as well as the great∣er of France and Spain. But because they believe, that good Arms are as necessary to keep Peace, as to make War; They will always be Great in

their preparations of that kind, espe∣cially at Sea; By which they may in all cases, advance or secure their Trade, And upon a War with France, make up that way the weakness of their Land-Forces, Which a long rust of Peace, and a swarm of Officers pre∣ferred by the Magistrates in favour of their relations, has brought to be very disproportioned in Force to what they are in Number. They esteem themselves secure from Spain and their German Neighbours (upon what has been said of the present condition of those Princes). And from Us, not so much upon our late Treaties with them, as upon what they take to be the common Interest, which they think a Nation can never run over, and be∣lieve is the opposing any further pro∣gress of the French greatness. Their only danger they apprehend, is from France, and that not immediately to themselves, but to Flanders; where any Flame would soon scorch them, and consume them, if not quenched in time. But in regard of the weak∣ness of Spain, The slow motions of the Empire, The different paces among

the Princes of it, And the distance of Sweden; They esteem the Peace of Christendom to depend wholly upon His Majesty, as well as the safety of Flanders, in case of a War. For they think France will be dared, and never take wing while they see such a Na∣val Power as Ours and the Dutch ho∣vering about all their Coasts; And so many other Princes ready to fall in, whenever His Majesty declares, united by the same jealousies or dangers. And if they should open a War, they fore∣see the consumption which France must fall into by the stop of their Wine, Salts, and other Commodities (now in a manner wholly taken off by our two Nations). And the head that may be made against their Forces in the Field it self, by a Body of English Infantry (so much renowned abroad). So as though their first Interest be to continue the Peace, while it may be done with any safety; yet when that fails, their next is, to open a War in favour of Spain, and conjunction with us. And the greatest they have in the world, is to preserve and encrease their Alliance with us; Which will

make them follow our measures ab∣solutely in all the present Conjun∣ctures.

THE Crown of France consider∣ed in the extent of Countrey, in the number of People, in the riches of Commodities, in the Revenues of the King, the greatness of the Land-Forces now on foot, and the growth of those at Sea (within these two years past), the number and bravery of their Officers, the conduct of their Ministers, and chiefly in the Genius of their present King; A Prince of great aspiring thoughts, unwearied application to whatever is in pursuit, severe in the institution and preservati∣on of Order and Discipline; In the main, a Manager of his Treasure, and yet bountiful from his own motions, wherever he intends the marks of Fa∣vour, and discerns particular Merit. To this, in the flower of his Age, at the head of all his Armies, and hitherto unfoiled in any of his attempts, either at home or abroad: I say, considered in all these circumstances, France may appear to be designed for greater At∣chievements

and Empires, than have been seen in Christendom since that of Charlemaigne.

The present Greatness of this Crown, may be chiefly derived from the for∣tune it has had of two great Ministers (Richelieu and Mazarine) succeeding one another, between two great Kings, Henry the Fourth and this present Prince; so as during the course of one unactive life, and of a long Minority, That Crown gained a great deal of ground both at home and abroad, in∣stead of losing it; Which is the com∣mon fate of Kingdoms upon those oc∣casions.

The latter greatness of this Crown began in the time of Lewis the 11th, by the Spoils of the House of Bur∣gundy, and the Divisions of the Prin∣ces, which gave that King the heart of attempting to bring the Government (as he called it) Hors de Page; Being before controul'd by their Princes, and restrained by their States; And in point of Revenue, kept within the bounds of the Kings Demesnes, and the Subjects voluntary Contributi∣ons.

'Tis not here necessary to observe, by what difficulties and dangers to the Crown, this design of Lewis was pur∣sued by many succeeding Kings, like a great Stone forced up a Hill, and up∣on every slacking of either strength or care, rolling a great way back, often to the very bottom of the Hill, and some∣times with the destruction of those that forced it on, till the time of Car∣dinal Richelieu. It was in this great Mi∣nister most to be admired, that finding the Regency shaken by the Factions of so many great ones within, and awed by the terror of the Spanish greatness without; He durst resolve to look them both in the face, and begin a War, by the course of which for so many years (being pursued by Maza∣rine till the year 60), The Crown of France grew to be powerfully armed, The Peasants were accustomed to Pay∣ments (which could have seemed ne∣cessary only by a War, and which none but a successful one could have helpt to digest), and grew heartless as they grew poor. The Princes were sometimes sa∣tisfied with Commands of the Army, sometimes mortified and supprest by

the absoluteness or addresses of the Mi∣nistry; The most boiling blood of the Nobility and Gentry was let out in so long a War, or wasted with Age and Exercise; At last it ended at the Pi∣reenes in a Peace, and a Match so ad∣vantageous to France; As the reputa∣tion of them contributed much to the Authority of the young King, who bred up in the Councils, and served by the tried Instruments of the former Ministry, But most of all advantaged by his own personal Qualities, fit to make him obeyed; Grew absolute Ma∣ster of the Factions of the great men, as well as the purses of his people. In the beginning of his Minority, the two disputes, with the Pope about the out∣rage of the Corsi, and with the King of Spain about the encounter at London, between the Count D'Estrades and the Baron De Batteville (Ambassadors from those Crowns), both carried so high, and both ended so honourably, and to the very will of France, Were enough to give a young Prince the humour and appetite of trying yet further what there was could oppose him. The Inva∣sion and easie success in Flanders, fed

his Glory, and encreast the reputation of his Power; Till this career was inter∣rupted by the Peace at first, then the Alliances between Us and Holland, and afterwards the Peace at Aix, and the Tripple Alliance (contracted purposely to secure it), since which time the Counsels of that Court have turned wholly from Action to Negotiation; Of which no man can yet see the success, nor judg whether it may not be more prosperous to them than that of their Arms.

If there were any certain heighth where the flights of Power and Ambi∣tion use to end, one might imagine, that the Interest of France were but to conserve its present Greatness, so feared by its Neighbours, and so glori∣ous in the world: But besides, that the motions and desires of human minds are endless, It may perhaps be necessary for France (from respects within) to have some War or other in pursuit abroad, which may amuse the Nation, and keep them from reflecting upon their condi∣tion at home, Hard and uneasie to all but such as are in charge, or in pay from the Court. I do not say misera∣ble

(the term usually given it), because no condition is so, but to him that e∣steems it so; And if a Paisan of France thinks of no more, than his coarse Bread and his Onions, his Can∣vass Clothes and Wooden Shooes, la∣bours contentedly on Working-days, and dances or plays merrily on Holy∣days; He may, for ought I know, live as well as a Boor of Holland, who is ei∣ther weary of his very ease, or whose cares of growing still richer and richer, waste his life in toils at Land, or dan∣gers at Sea; and perhaps fool him so far, as to make him enjoy less of all kind in his riches, than t'other in his poverty.

But to leave strains of Philosophy, which are ill mingled with discourses of Interest: The common people of France are as little considerable in the Government, as the Children; so that the Nobles and the Soldiers may in a manner be esteemed the Nation; Whose Interest and Hopes carry them all to War; And whatever is the general humour and bent of a Nation, ought ever to be much considered by a State, which can hardly miscarry in the pursuit

of it. Besides, the Personal Dispositi∣ons of the King, Active and Aspiring, And many circumstances in the Govern∣ment (fitter for persons of that Court, than Strangers to pretend the knowledg of), The continual encrease of their Forces in time of peace, and their fresh Invasion of Lorrain, are enough to perswade most men, that the design of this Crown is a War, whenever they can open it with a prospect of suc∣ceeding to purpose; For their Coun∣sels are too wise, To venture much up∣on the hopes of little gains. What the aims of France are in this kind, I will not pretend to judg by common fears, or the Schemes of men too ingeniously politique; Nor perhaps can any one tell any more than a man that leaps in∣to the water in strength and vigor, and with pleasure, can say how far he will swim; Which will be, till he is stopt by currents, or accidents, or grows weary, or has a mind to do something else. One may judg, that if France will begin a War, it would be naturally up∣on Flanders; unless discouraged by the same Alliances which prevailed with them to end the last; so as the

plain present Interest of France, is one way or other to break the confidence or the force of that Tripple Alliance, which alone seems to bound their prospect, which way soever they look; And if once laid open, they have the World and their Fortunes before them; which is enough for a Crown that has so much Force, and so much Con∣duct to manage them. Having little hopes of breaking this on the Dutch side, and knowing the Swede will fol∣low our measures in it, We may be sure of all address, and all the Court∣ship that can any way be infused; and in short, all sorts of endeavours and applications that can be used, to break it on ours, Which seems to be the present Game of that Crown, and that they will begin no other till they see an end of this.

FLanders cannot be considered di∣stinct from Spain in the Govern∣ment, but may in the inclinations of the people, which must ever have a great influence upon it. They are the best Subjects in the World, but may have some reason to be weary

of being the Theater of almost perpetual Wars; and where those two mighty Crowns have fought so many Battels, and seem to have still so many more to fight, If the Neighbour-assistances fall in to balance their powers, now so un∣equally matched. Therefore the In∣terest of the Inhabitants of those Spa∣nish Provinces seems to be, either that the present Peace should be kept invio∣late by the strength and reputation of the present Alliances; Or else, that a War when it opens should have a sud∣den issue; Which might be expected, either from the French Conquest, or a Proposition of Exchange. They are naturally averse from the French Go∣vernment, as they are inclined to the Spanish; but have so little kindness for the Hollanders, or esteem of their Land-Forces, that they hardly either hope or care to be saved by their assi∣stances. So as the reputation of His Majesties Protection and Alliance, is all that can inspire them with the hopes of a lasting Peace, or the courage to de∣fend themselves by a War.

FRom the Survey of all these seve∣ral Interests, and Forces, and Dis∣positions that compose the present state of all our Neighbours; It may be na∣turally, and unquestionably concluded, That a continuance of the present mea∣sures, The opening of new ones, Or an absolute revolution of all, depends wholly upon those His Majesty shall take or pursue in this great Conjuncture, wherein He seems to be generally al∣lowed for the sole Arbiter of the Af∣fairs of Christendom.

OUR Interest abroad must lye in one of these points.

Either to preserve our present Alli∣ances, and thereby the Peace of Chri∣stendom as it now stands.

Or to encourage France to an Inva∣sion of Holland, with assurance of our Neutrality.

Or else to join with France upon the advantages they can offer us, for the ruin of the Dutch.

Upon the first is to be considered, Whether with a longer Peace, the Pow∣er of France and Holland, with so great

Revenues, and such application as is seen in their Governments, will not encrease every year out of proportion to what ours will do; The Revenues of France arising originally from the vent of their Native Commodities; and those of Holland growing wholly out of Trade, and that out of Peace.

Upon the second, Whether France will ever resolve upon the Invasion of Holland; Or Holland upon its own re∣solute defence, without our share in the War, which would otherwise leave us to enjoy the Trade of the World, and thereby to grow vastly both in Strength and Treasures, whilest both these Powers were breaking one ano∣ther. Or whether the jealousie of such a design in us, would not induce France and Holland, either before a War, or soon after it begins, To close upon some measures between them to our disad∣vantage, as We and Holland did after the last War, to the disadvantage of France.

Upon the last, Whether by the ruin of Holland, we can reap as great ad∣vantages as France (though perhaps greater were necessary to make some

equality in our Powers). And to gain a fair prospect of this, it must be con∣sidered, Whether Holland upon its fall would grow an accession to the French, or to Us; Or live under the Prince of Orange as a Soveraign Prince, with our support or protection. Whether France would be content with either of these last; or to see us grow absolute Ma∣sters of the Sea, by the fall or subjecti∣on of Holland, any more than by their Conjunction and Alliance. Whether we could be able to defend the Maritime Provinces, either in our own subjecti∣on, or in that of the Prince, whilest France remained possest of all the Out∣works of that State (which are their Inland Provinces, their Towns in Bra∣bant and upon the Rhine); Whether we could on the other side hinder the accession of Holland to France, either as Subjects in a Maritime Province (with great Priviledges and Immuni∣ties for continuance and encourage∣ment of Trade), Or as an inferior and dependant Ally under their protection. Whether in either of these cases, our Government would have credit enough in Holland to invite their Shipping and

Traders to come over and settle in En∣gland, and so leave those Provinces de∣stitute of both. Whether it be possi∣ble to preserve Flanders after the loss of Holland, Or upon the Conquest of those Countries by France, For us to preserve our peace or good intelligence with that King, Or upon a War to de∣fend our selves, either by our own Forces, or the Alliances of our Neigh∣bours.

But though these Arguments may deserve the most serious deliberations of Ministers at home; Yet I know they lye out of the compass of my duty, and are improper for the representations of a man, the course of whose Imploy∣ments and thoughts for so long a time has lain wholly abroad.