Treatises of 1. The liberty of prophesying, 2. Prayer ex tempore, 3. Episcopacie : together with a sermon preached at Oxon. on the anniversary of the 5 of November / by Ier. Taylor.

SECT. X.

Of the authority of Reason, and that it proceeding upon best grounds is the best judge,

HEre then I consider, that although no man may be trusted to judge for all others, unless this person were infallible and * 1.1 authorized so to doe, which no man nor no company of men is, yet every man may be trusted to judge for himself, I say every man that can judge at all, (as for others they are to be saved as it pleaseth God) but others that can judge at all must either choose their guides who shall judge for them, (and then they of∣tentimes doe the wisest, and alwayes save themselves a labour, but then they choose too) or if they be persons of greater under∣standing, then they are to choose for themselves in particular, what the others doe in generall, and by choosing their guide; and for this any man may be better trusted for himselfe then any man can be for another: For in this case his own interest is most con∣cerned; and ability is not so necessary as honesty, which certain∣ly every man will best preserve in his owne case, and to himselfe, (and if he does not, it is he that must smart for't) and it is not required of us not to be in errour, but that we endeavour to a∣void it.

2. He that followes his guide so far as his reason goes along with him, or which is all one, he that followes his owne reason * 1.2 (not guided onely by naturall arguments, but by divine revelation, and all other good meanes) hath great advantages over him that gives himselfe wholly to follow any humane guide whatsoever, because he followes all their reasons and his own too; he follows them till reason leaves them, or till it seemes so to him, which is all one to his particular, for by the confession of all sides, an erro∣neous Conscience binds him, when a right guide does not bind him. But he that gives himselfe up wholly to a guide is often∣times (I meane, if he be a discerning person) forc'd to doe vio∣lence to his own understanding, and to lose all the benefit of his owne discretion, that he may reconcile his reason to his guide. And of this we see infinite inconveniences in the Church of Rome,

for we finde persons of great understanding, oftentimes so amused with the authority of their Church, that it is pity to see them sweat in answering some objections, which they know not how to doe, but yet beleeve they must, because the Church hath said it. So that if they reade, study, pray, search records, and use all the means of art and industry in the pursuite of truth, it is not with a resolution to follow that which shall seem truth to them, but to confirm what before they did beleeve: and if any argument shall seeme unanswerable against any Article of their Church, they are to take it for a temptation, not for an illumination, and they are to use it accordingly: which makes them make the De∣vill to be the Author of that which Gods Spirit hath assisted them to find in the use of lawfull means and the search of truth. And when the Devill of falshood is like to be cast out by Gods Spirit, they say that it is through Beelzebub; which was one of the worst things that ever the Pharisees said or did: And was it not a plain stifling of the just and reasonable demands made by the Emperour, by the Kings of France and Spaine, and by the a∣blest Divines among them which was used in the Councell of Trent, when they demanded the restitution of Priests to their li∣berty of marriage, the use of the Chalice, the Service in the vul∣gar Tongue, and these things not onely in pursuance of Truth, but for other great and good ends, even to take away an infinite scandall and a great schisme? And yet when they themselves did profess it, and all the world knew these reasonable demands were denyed meerly upon a politick consideration, yet that these things should be fram'd into articles, and decrees of faith, and they for ever after bound not onely not to desire the same things, but to think the contrary to be divine truths: never was Reason made more a slave or more useless. Must not all the world say, either they must be great hypocrites, or doe great violence to their understanding, when they not onely cease from their claim, but must also beleeve it to be unjust? If the use of their reason had not been restrained by the tyrannie & imperiousness of their guide, what the Emperour, and the Kings, and their Theologues would have done, they can best judge who consider the reasona∣bleness of the demand, and the unreasonableness of the denyall. But we see many wise men who with their Optandum esset ut Ec∣clesia

licentiam daret, &c. proclaime to all the world, that in some things they consent and doe not consent, and doe not heartily be∣leeve what they are bound publickly to profess and they them∣selves would cleerly see a difference, if a contrary decree should be fram'd by the Church, they would with an infinite greater con∣fidence rest themselves in other propositions then what they must beleeve as the case now stands, and they would find that the au∣thority of a Church is a prejudice as often as a free and modest use of reason is a temptation.

3. God will have no man pressed with anothers inconvenien∣ces in matters spirituall and intellectuall, no mans salvation to de∣pend * 1.3 upon another, and every tooth that eats sowre grapes shall be set on edge for it selfe, and for none else: and this is remarka∣ble in that saying of God by the Prophet, If the Prophet ceases to * 1.4 tell my people of their sins, and leads them into error, the people shall die in their sins, and the blood of them I will require at the hands of that Prophet: Meaning, that God hath so set the Prophets to guide us, that we also are to follow them by a voluntary assent by an act of choice and election. For although accidentally and occasionally the sheep may perish by the shepherds fault, yet that which hath the chiefest influence upon their finall condition, is their owne act and election, and therefore God hath so appoin∣ted guides to us, that if we perish, it may be accounted upon both our scores, upon our own and the guides too, which sayes plain∣ly, that although we are intrusted to our guides, yet we are in∣trusted to our selves too. Our guides must direct us, and yet if they faile, God hath not so left us to them, but he hath given us enough to our selves to discover their failings, and our own duties in all things necessary. And for other things we must doe as well as we can. But it is best to follow our guides, if we know nothing better; but if we doe, it is better to follow the pillar of fire, than a pillar of cloud, though both possibly may lead to Ca∣naan: But then also it is possible that it may be otherwise. But I am sure if I doe my own best, then if it be best to follow a Guide, and if it be also necessary, I shall be sure by Gods grace and my own endeavour, to get to it; But if I without the particular in∣gagement of my own understanding, follow a guide, possibly I may be guilty of extream negligence, or I may extinguish Gods

Spirit, or doe violence to my own reason. And whether intrust∣ing my self wholly with another, be not a laying up my talent in a napkin, I am not so well assured. I am certain the other is not. And since another mans answering for me will not hinder, but that I also shall answer for my self; as it concerns him to see he does not wilfully misguide me, so it concerns me to see that he shall not if I can help it, if I cannot it will not be required at my hands: whether it be his fault, or his invincible error, I shall be charg'd with neither.

4. This is no other then what is enjoyned as a duty. For since * 1.5 God will be justified with a free obedience, and there is an obe∣dience of understanding as well as of will and affection, it is of great concernment, as to be willing to beleeve what ever God sayes, so also to enquire diligently whether the will of God be so as is pretended. Even our acts of understanding are acts of choice, * 1.6 and therefore it is commanded as a duty, to search the Scriptures, to try the spirits whether they be of God or no, of our selves to be able to judge what is right, to try all things, and to retaine that which is best. For he that resolves not to consider, resolves not to be care∣full whether he have truth or no, and therefore hath an affection indifferent to truth or falshood, which is all one as if he did choose amiss; and since when things are truly propounded and made reasonable and intelligible we cannot but assent, and then it is no thanks to us; we have no way to give our wills to God in matters of beliefe, but by our industry in searching it and exa∣mining the grounds upon which the propounders build their di∣ctates. And the not doing it is oftentimes a cause that God gives a man over 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, into a reprobate and undiscerning mind and understanding.

5. And this very thing (though men will not understand it) is * 1.7 the perpetuall practice of all men in the world that can give a reasonable account of their faith. The very Catholike Church it selfe is rationabilis & ubi{que} diffusa, saith Optatus, reasonable, as * 1.8 well as diffused, every where. For take the Proselites of the Church of Rome, even in their greatest submission of understan∣ding, they seem to themselves to follow their reason most of all. For if you tell them, Scripture and Tradition are their rules to follow, they will beleeve you when they know a reason for it,

and if they take you upon your word, they have a reason for that too, either they beleeve you a learned man, or a good man, or that you can have no ends upon them, or something that is of an equall height to fit their understandings. If you tell them they must beleeve the Church, you must tell them why they are bound to it, and if you quote Scripture to prove it, you must give them leave to judge, whether the words alledged speak your sense or no, and therefore to dissent if they say no such thing. And al∣though all men are not wise, and proceed discreetly, yet all make their choice some way or other. He that chooses to please his fancie takes his choice as much as he that chooses prudently. And no man speaks more unreasonably, then he that denyes to men the use of their Reason in choice of their Religion. For that I may by the way remove the common prejudice, Reason and Authori∣ty are not things incompetent or repugnant, especially when the Authority is infallible and supreme: for there is no greater rea∣son in the world then to beleeve such an authority. But then we must consider, whether every authority that pretends to be such, is so indeed. And therefore Deus dixit, ergo hoc verum est, is the greatest demonstration in the world for things of this nature. But it is not so in humane dictates, and yet reason and humane authority are not enemies. For it is a good argument for us to fol∣low such an opinion, because it is made sacred by the authority of Councells and Ecclesiasticall Tradition, and sometimes it is the best reason we have in a question, and then it is to be strictly fol∣lowed; but there may also be at other times a reason greater than it that speaks against it, and then the authority must not carry it. But then the difference is not between reason and authority, but between this reason and that, which is greater: for authority is a very good reason, and is to prevaile, unless a stronger comes and disarms it, but then it must give place. So that in this question by [Reason] I doe not meane a distinct Topick, but a transcendent that runs through all Topicks; for Reason, like Logick, is instru∣ment of all things else, and when Revelation, and Philosophie, and publick Experience, and all other grounds of probability or demonstration have supplyed us with matter, then Reason does but make use of them; that is, in plain terms, there being so ma∣ny wayes of arguing, so many sects, such differing interests, such

variety of authority, so many pretences, and so many false be∣liefes, it concernes every wise man to consider which is the best argument, which proposition relies upon the truest grounds: & if this were not his only way, why doe men dispute and urge argu∣ments, why do they cite Councels & Fathers, why do they alledge Scripture and Tradition, and all this on all sides, and to contrary purposes? If we must judge, then we must use our reason; if we must not judge, why doe they produce evidence? Let them leave disputing and decree propositions magisterially, but then we may choose whether we will believe them or no; or if they say we must believe them, they must prove it, and tell us why. And all these disputes concerning Tradition, Councells, Fathers, &c. are not arguments against or besides reason, but contestations and pretences to the best arguments, and the most certain satisfaction of our reason. But then all these comming into question, submit themselves to reason, that is, to be judged by humane understan∣ding, upon the best grounds and information it can receive. So that Scripture, Tradition, Councells, and Fathers, are the evi∣dence in a question, but Reason is the Judge: That is, we being the persons that are to be perswaded, we must see that we be perswa∣ded reasonably, and it is unreasonable to assent to a lesser evi∣dence, when a greater and cleerer is propounded, but of that eve∣ry man for himselfe is to take cognisance if he be able to judge, if he be not, he is not bound under the tye of necessity to know any thing of it; that, that is necessary shall be certainly conveyed to him, God that best can, will certainly take care for that; for if he does not, it becomes to be not necessary; or if it should still remain necessary, and he damned for not knowing it, and yet to know it be not in his power, then who can help it? there can be no further care in this business. In other things, there being no ab∣solute and prime necessity, we are left to our liberty to judge that way that makes best demonstration of our piety and of our love to God and truth, not that way that is alwayes the best argu∣ment of an excellent understanding, for this may be a blessing, but the other onely is a duty.

And now that we are pitch'd upon that way which is most na∣turall * 1.9 and reasonable in determination of our selves rather then of questions, which are often indeterminable, since right reason

proceeding upon the best grounds it can, viz. of divine revelati∣on and humane authority, and probability is our guide, (Stando in humanis) and supposing the assistance of Gods Spirit (which he never denies them that faile not of their duty in all such things in which he requires truth and certainty) it remaines that we consider how it comes to pass that men are so much deceived in the use of their reason, and choice of their Religion, and that in this account we distinguish those accidents which make error in∣nocent from those which make it become a heresie.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Numb. 1.
• * 1.2

  Numb. 2.
• * 1.3

  Numb. 3.
• * 1.4

  Ezek. 33.
• * 1.5

  Numb. 4.
• * 1.6

  Mat. 15. 10. Joh. 5. 40. 1 Joh. 4. 1. Ephes. 5. 17. Luk. 24. 25. Rom. 3. 11. 1. 28. Apoc. 2. 2. Act. 17. 11.
• * 1.7

  Numb. 5.
• * 1.8

  Lib. 3.
• * 1.9

  Numb. 6.