The second part of the dissuasive from popery in vindication of the first part, and further reproof and conviction of the Roman errors / by Jer. Taylor ...

THE INTRODUCTION BEING An Answer to the fourth Appendix to J. S. his Sure Footing; intended against the General way of procedure in the Dissuasive from Popery.

WHen our Blessed Saviour was casting out the evil spirit from the poor Daemoniac in the Gospel, he asked his name; and he answered, My name is legion, for we are many. Le∣gion is a Roman word, and signifies an Army, as Ro∣man signifies Catholic; that is, a great body of men which though in true speaking they are but a part of an Imperial Army, yet when they march alone, they can do mischief enough, and call themselves an Army Royal. A Squadron of this legion hath attempted to break a little Fort or Outwork of mine, they came in the dark, their names concealed, their qualities unknown, whether Clergy or Laity not to me discovered, only there is one pert man amongst them, one that is discovered by his sure footing. The others I know not, but this man is a man famous in the new science of controversie (as he is pleased to call it) I mean in the most beauteous and amiable part of it, railing and calumny; The man I mean is the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Con∣fident, the man of principles, and the son of demonstra∣tion;* 1.1 and though he had so reviled a great Champion in the Armies of the living God, that it was reasonable to

think he had cast forth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, all the fiery darts of the wicked one; yet I find that an evil fountain is not soon drawn dry, and he hath indigna∣tion enough and reviling left for others, amongst whom I have the honour not to be the least sufferer and sharer in the persecution. He thought not fit to take any further notice of me but in an Appendix;* 1.2 the Viper is but little, but it is a Viper still, though it hath more tongue than teeth. I am the more willing to quit my self of it, by way of introducti∣on, because he intends it as an Organum Catholicum against the General way of the procedure which I have us'd in the Dissuasive; and therefore I suppose the removing this, might 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 make my way smoother in the following discourses.

I will take no other notice of his evil language, his scorn and reproach, his undervaluing and slighting the person and book of the Dissuader, (as he is pleased sometimes to call me) but I shall answer to these things as S. Bernard did to the tempation of the Devil endeavouring to hinder his preaching by tempting to vanity; I neither began for you, nor for you will I make an end: but I shall look on those Rhetorical flowers of his own but as a fermentum, his spirit was troubled, and he breathed forth the froth as of an enraged Sea; and when he hath done, it may be he will be quiet, if not, let him know God will observe that which is to come, and require that which is past.

But I will search and see what I can find of matter that is to be considered, and give such accounts of them as is necessary, and may be useful for the defence of my Book, and the justification of my self against all ruder charges. And after I have done so, I shall proceed to other things which I shall esteem more useful.

The first thing I shall take notice of, is his scornful and slight speaking of Scripture, affirming that he is soonest beaten at this weapon, that it is Sampsons hair; it is

the weakest part in the man: And yet if it be the weakest, it is that which S. Paul calls the weakness and foolish∣ness of preaching, more strong and more wise than all the wisdom of man: When the Devil tempted our Blessed Sa∣viour, he us'd Scripture; but Christ did not reprove his way of arguing, but in the same way discovered his fraud. Scrip∣tum est said the Tempter; yea, but scriptum est said Christ, to other purposes than you intend; and so would I. S. have proceeded if he had been at all in love with the way. But he thinks he hath a better; and the wonder is the less that the Gentleman does not love the Scriptures, or at least gives too much suspicion that he does not; for he hath not yet proved himself by his writings to be so good a Christian as to love his enemies, or his reprovers: But however he is pleased to put a scorn on Scripture expressi∣ons, it were much better if he and his Church too would use them more, and express their articles they contend for, and impose them on the Christian world in the words and expressions of Scripture, which we are sure express the minde of God with more truth and simplicity, than is done by their words of art and expressions of the Schools. If this had been observed, Christendom at this day had had fewer controversies, and more truth, and more chari∣ty, we should not have been puzzled to unriddle the words of transubstantiation, and hyperdulia, and infallibili∣ty, and doctrines ex Cathedra, and fere de fide, and next to heresie, and temerarious, and ordo ad spiritua∣lia, and S. Peters chair, and supremacy in spirituals, and implicit faith, and very many more prophane or un∣hallowed novelties of speech, which have made Christi∣anity quite another thing than it is in it self, or then it was represented by the Apostles and Apostolic men at first, as the plain way of salvation to all succeeding ages of the Church for ever.

But be it as it will; for he will neither approve of Scripture language, nor is he pleased that I use any hand∣some

expressions, for that is charged upon me as part of my fault; only to countenance all this, he is pleased to say that all these are but division upon no grounds; and therefore to grounds and first principles I must be brought, and by this way he is sure to blow up my errors from the foundation; that's his expression, being a Me∣taphor I suppose taken from the Gunpowder treason, in which indeed going upon Popish grounds they intended to blow up [something or other that was very considerable] from it's very foundations.

To perform this effect I. S. hath eight several mines, all which I hope to discover without Guido Faux his Lan∣thorn.

The First Way.

HIS first Way is, That I have not one first or self evi∣dent principle to begin with, on which I build the Dissuasive; but he hath, that is, he says he hath; for he hath reproved that oral tradition, on which he and his Church relies, is such a principle; He thought (it may be) he had reason then to say so; but the Scene is altered, and until he hath sufficiently confuted his adversaries who have proved his self evident principle to be an evident and pitiful piece of Sophistry, his boasting is very vain. How∣ever, though he hath failed in his undertaking, yet I must acquit my self as well as I can. I shall therefore tell him that the truth, fulness, and sufficiency of Scripture in all matters of faith and manners, is the principle that I and all Protestants rely upon. And although this be not a first and self-evident principle, yet it is resolved into these that are. 1. Whatsoever God hath said is true. 2. What∣soever God hath done is good. 3. Whatsoever God intends to bring to pass, he hath appointed means suffi∣cient to that end. Now since God hath appointed the Scrip∣tures to instruct us, and make us wise unto salvation,

and to make the man of God perfect, certain it is, that this means must needs be sufficient to effect that end. Now that God did do this, to this end, to them that believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God, is as evident as any first principle. And let these Scriptures be weighed toge∣ther, and see what they do amount to.* 1.3 Search the Scrip∣tures for therein ye think to have eternal life. The Jews thought so, that is, they confessed and acknowledged it to be so; and if they had been deceived in their thought, besides that it is very probable Christ would have reprov'd it, so it is very certain he would not have bidden them to have used that means to that end. And if Christ him∣self and the Apostles did convince the Jews out of the Scriptures of the old Testament, proving that Jesus was the Christ: if Christ himself and the Apostles proved the resurrection, and the passion, and the supreme Kingdom of Christ out of the Scriptures, if the Apostle proved him to be the Messias, and that be ought to suffer and to rise again the third day by no other precedent topic, and that upon these things Christian religion relied as upon it's in∣tire foundation, and on the other side the Jewish Doctors had brought in many things by tradition, to which our Blessed Saviour gave no countenance, but reproved many of them, and made it plain that tradition was not the first and self evident principle to rely upon in religion, but a way by which they had corrupted the Commandment of God: It will follow from hence, that the Scriptures are the way that Christ and his Apostles walked in, and that oral tradition was not. But then to this add what more concerns the N. T. when S. Luke wrote his Gospel, in the preface he tells us, That many had taken in hand to set forth in order a declaration of those things, which are most surely be∣lieved amongst us [Christians,] and that he having per∣fect understanding of all things (viz. which Christ did and taught) from the very first did write [this Gospel] that Theophilus might know the certainty of those

things in which he had been instructed: Now here (if we believe S. Luke) was no want of any thing; he was ful∣ly instructed in all things; and he chose to write that book, that by that book Theophilus might know the truth, yea, the certainty of all things. Now if we be Christians and be∣lieve. S. Luke to be divinely inspired, this is not indeed a first but an evident principle; that a book of Scripture can make a man certain and instructed in the whole Gospel of Jesus Christ. To the same purpose is that of S. John These things are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ the Son of God,* 1.4 and that believing ye might have life through his name. The end is salva∣tion by Jesus Christ; the means of effecting this, was this writing the Gospel by S. John; and therefore it is a sure principle for Christians to rely upon, the word of God writ∣ten by men divinely inspired, such as Christians believe and confess S. Luke and S. John to be. Hear S. Luke again,* 1.5 The former treatise have I made O Theophilus of all that Jesus began both to do and teach untill the day he was taken up. No man then can deny but all Christs doctrine and life was fully set down by these Evan∣gelists and Apostles; whether it were to any purpose or no, let I. S. consider, and I shall consider with him in the se∣quel. But first let us hear what S. Paul saith in an Epi∣stle written as it is probable not long before his death; but certainly after three of the Gospels, and divers of the Epistles were written, and consequently related to the Scriptures of the old and new Testament. [Continue thou in the things which thou hast learned and hast been as∣sured of,* 1.6 knowing of whom thou hast learned them: And that from a child thou hast known the holy Scrip∣tures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation, through faith which is in Christ Jesus. All Scrip∣ture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instru∣ction in righteousness, that the man of God may be

perfect, throughly furnished unto all good works.] Now I demand; Does I. S. believe these words to be true? Are the Scriptures able to make us wise unto salvation? Are they profitable to all intents and purposes of the spirit, that is, to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct? Is the end of all this Oeconomy, to make a Christian man, yea a Christian Bishop perfect? Can he by this dispensation be throughly furnished unto all good works, and that by faith in Jesus Christ? If so, then this is the true principle, the Apo∣stolical way, the way of God, the way of salvation: And if Scriptures, [the books written by the finger of God, and the pen of Apostles] can do all this, then they are some∣thing more than Inke varied into divers figures, unsen∣sed characters, and I know not what other reviling Epi∣thets I. S. is pleased to cast upon them.

Yea, but all this is nothing, unless we know that Scriptures are the word of God, that they were writ∣ten by the Apostles; and of this, the Scriptures can∣not be a witness in their own behalf: And therefore oral tradition must supply that, and consequently is the only first and self-evident principle. To this I an∣swer; that it matters not by what means it be conveyed to us that the Scriptures are the Word of God. Oral tradition is an excellent means; but it is not that alone by which it is conveyed. For if by oral tradition he means the testimony of the Catholick Church; it is the best exter∣nal ministery of conveyance of this, being a matter of fact, and of so great concernment. To which the testimo∣ny of our adversaries Jews and Heathens adds no small moment; and the tradition is also conveyed to us by very many writings. But when it is thus conveyed, and that the Church does believe them to be the Word of God, then it is that I inquire, whether the Scriptures cannot be a witness to us of it's own design, fulness, and perfection. Certainly no principle is more evident than this, none more sure and none before it; Whatever God hath said is

true, and in Scripture God did speak, and speak this; and therefore this to us is a first, at least an evident prin∣ciple.

Yea, but if this proposition, that the Scriptures are the Word of God, is conveyed to us by oral tradition, this must needs be the best and only principle; for if it be trusted for the whole, why not for every particular. This Argument concludes thus. This is the gate of the House, therefore this is all the house. Every man enters this way; and therefore this is the Hall and the Cellar, the Pantry and Dining room, the Bedchambers and the Cocklofts. But besides the ridiculousness of the argument, there is a particular reason why the argument cannot con∣clude: The reason in brief is this, because it is much easier for any man to carry a letter, than to tell the particular er∣rand; It is easier to tell one thing, than to tell ten thou∣sand; to deliver one thing out of our hand, than a multi∣tude out of our mouths; one matter of fact, than very many propositions; as it is easier to convey in writing all Tullies works, than to say by heart with truth and exact∣ness any one of his Orations. That the Bible was written by inspired men, God setting his seal to their doctrine, confirming by miracles what they first preached, and then wrote in a book, this is a matter of fact, and is no other∣wise to be prov'd (unless God should proceed extraordinari∣ly and by miracle) but by the testimony of wise men, who saw it with their eyes, and heard it with their ears, and felt it with their hands. This was done at first, then only consign'd, then witnessed, and thence delivered. And with how great success, and with the blessing of how migh∣ty a providence, appears it in this; because although as S. Luke tells us, many did undertake to write Gospels, or the declaration of the things so surely believ'd amongst Christi∣ans; and we find in S. Clement of Alex. Origen, S. Ire∣naeus, Athanasius, Chrysostom and S. Hierom mention made of many Gospels, as that of the Hebrews, the Egyp∣tians,

Nazarenes, Ebionites, the Gospel of James, Phi∣lip, Bartholomew, Thomas and divers more, yet but four only were transmitted and consigned to the Church; because these four only were written by these whose names they bear; and these men had the testimony of God, and a spirit of truth, and the promise of Christ, that the spi∣rit should bring all things to their minds, and he did so: Now of this we could have no other testimony but of those who were present, who stop'd the first issue of the false Go∣spels, and the sound of the other four went forth into all the world, according to that of Origen, Ecclesia cum quatuor tantum Evangelii libros habet, per universum mundum Evangeliis redundat; heresies cum multa habeant, unum non habent. Those which heretics made are all lost, or slighted, those which the spirit of God did write by the hands of men divinely inspired, these abide, and shall abide for ever. Now then this matter of fact how should we know, but by being told it by credible persons who could know, and never gave cause of suspicion that they should deceive us. Now if I. S. will be pleas'd to call this Oral tradition, he may; but that which was deliver'd by this Oral tradition was not only preach'd at first, but transmitted to us by many writings, besides the Scrip∣tures, both of friends and enemies. But suppose it were not; yet this book of Scriptures might be consigned by Oral tradition from the Apostles and Apostolic men, and yet tradition become of little or no use after this consigna∣tion and delivery. For this was all the work which of ne∣cessity was to be done by it; and indeed this was all that it could do well.

1. This was all which was necessary to be done by Oral tradition; because the wisdom of the divine spirit having resolved to write all the doctrine of salvation in a book, and having done it well and sufficiently in order to his own gracious purposes, (for who dares so much as suspect the contrary) there was now no need that Oral tradition should

be kept up with the joynture of infallibility, since the first infallibility of the Apostles was so sufficiently witnessed, that it convinced the whole world of Christians; and there∣fore was enough to consign the Divinity and perfection of this book for ever. For it was in this as in the doctrine it self contain'd in the Scriptures, God confirmed it by signs following; that is by signs proving that the Apostles spake the minde of God, the things which they speak were prov'd and believ'd for ever; but then the signs went away, and left a permanent and eternal event. So it is in the infallible tradition delivered by the Apostles and Apostolic age, concerning the Scriptures being the word of God; what they said was confirm'd by all that testimony, by which they obtained belief in the Church, to their persons and doctrines; but when they had once deliver'd this, there needed no remaining miracle, and intail of infallibility in the Church, to go on in the delivery of this; for by that time that all the Apostles were dead, and the infallible spirit was departed, the Scriptures of the Gospels were believed in all the world, and then it was not ordinarily possible ever any more to detract faith from that book; and then for the transmitting this book to after ages, the Divine providence needed no other course, but the ordina∣ary ways of man, that is, right reason, common faithful∣ness, the interest of souls, believing a good thing, which there was and could be no cause to disbelieve; and an Uniuersal consent of all men, that were any ways concern'd for it, or against it, and this not only preach'd upon the house tops, but set down also in very many writings. This actually was the way of transmitting this book, and the authority of it, to after ages respectively.

These things are of themselves evident, yet because I. S. still demands we should set down some first and self evident principle, on which to found the whole procedure, I shall once more satisfie him; And this is a first and self evident principle, whatsoever can be spoken can be

written; and if it he plain spoken, it may be as plain written. I hope I need not go about to demonstrate this; for it is of it self evident, that God can write all that he is pleased to speak; and all good scribes can set down in writing whatsoever another tells them; and in his very words too if he please, he can as well transcribe a word spoken, as a word written. And upon this principle it is, that the Protestants believe that the words of Scripture can be as easily understood after they are written in a book, as when they were spoken in the Churches of the first Christians; and the Apostles and Evangelists did write the life of Christ, his doctrines, the doctrines of faith, as plain as they did speak them, at least as plain as was necessary to the end for which they were written, which is the salvati∣on of our souls. And what necessity now can there be, that there should be a perpetual miracle still current in the Church, and a spirit of infallibility descendant to remem∣ber the Church of all those things, which are at once set down in a book, the truth and authority of which was at first prov'd by infallible testimony, the memory and cer∣tainty of which is preserved amongst Christians by ma∣ny unquestionable records, and testimonies of several natures.

2. As there was no necessity that an infallible Oral tra∣dition should do any more but consign the books of Scripture; so it could not do any more, without a continual miracle. That there was no continued miracle is sufficiently prov'd, by proving it was not necessary it should; for that also is another first and self-evident principle, that the All wise God does not do any thing, much less such things as miracles, to no purpose, and for no need. But now if there be not a continued miracle, then Oral tradition was not fit to be trusted, in relating the particulars of the Chri∣stian Religion. For if in a succession of Bishops and Priests from S. Peter down to P. Alexander the seventh, it is im∣possible for any man to be assured that there was no nullity

in the ordinations, but insensibly there might intervene something to make a breach in the long line, which must in that case be made up as well as they can, by tying a knot on it: It will be infinitely more hard to suppose, but that in the series and successive talkings of the Christian religion, there must needs be infinite variety, and many things told other∣wise, and somethings spoken with evil purposes, by such as preach'd Christ out of envy; and many odd things said, and doctrines strangely represented by such as creep into houses, and lead captive silly women: It may be the Bi∣shops of the Apostolical Churches did preach right doctrines for divers ages; but yet in Jerusalem, where fifteen Bishops in succession were circumcis'd, who can tell how many things might be spoken in justification of that practice, which might secretly undervalue the Apostolical doctrine. And where was the Oral tradition then of this proposition; If ye be circumcis'd Christ shall profit you nothing. But however, though the Bishops did preach all the doctrine of Christ; yet these Sermons were told to them that were absent, by others who it may be might mistake something, and understand them to other senses than was intended. And though infallibility of testifying might be given to the Church, that is, to the chief Rulers of it, (for I hope I. S. does not suppose it subjected in every single Christi∣an man or woman) yet when this testimony of theirs is car∣ried abroad, the reporters are not always infallible: And let it be considered, that even now since Christianity hath been transmitted so many ages, and there are so many thousands that teach it, yet how many hundreds of these thousands understand but very little of it, and therefore tell it to others but pitifully and imperfectly; so that if God in his Goodness had not preserv'd to us the surer word of the prophetical and Evangelical Scriptures, Chri∣stianity would by this time have been a most strange thing, litera scripta manet. As to the Apostles while they lived it was so easie to have recourse, that error

durst not appear with an open face, but the cure was at hand: so have the Apostles when they took care to leave something left to the Churches to put them in minde of the precious doctrine; they put a sure standard, and fixt a rule in the Church, to which all doubts might be brought to trial, and against which all heresies might be dashed in pieces. But we have liv'd to see the Apostolical Churches rent from one another, and teaching contrary things, and pretending contrary traditions, and abounding in several senses, and excommunicating one another; and it is im∣possible (for example) that we should see the Greeks go∣ing any whither, but to their own superiour and their own Churches to be taught Christian Religion; and the Latins did always go to their own Patriarch, and to their own Bishops and Churches, and it is not likely it should be other∣wise now, than it hath been hitherto, that is, that they follow the religion that is taught them there, and the tra∣dition that is delivered by their immediate superiours. Now there being so vast a difference, not only in the Great Churches, but in several ages, and in several Dioceses, and in single Priests, every one understanding as he can, and speaking as he please, and remembring as he may, and ex∣pressing it accordingly, and the people also understanding it by halves, and telling it to their Children, sometimes ill, sometimes not at all, and seldom as they should; and they who are taught, neglecting it too grosely, and attending to it very carelesly, and forgeting it too quickly; and which is worse yet, men expounding it according to their inte∣rests, or their lusts, out of faction, or as they are mislead, and then report it accordingly: These and a thousand things more, convince us of the easiness of being deceived by Oral tradition of doctrines, which can insensibly and un∣avoidably be chang'd in great differences and mistakes; but can never suffer any considering Person to believe, that mouth delivery is a better way of keeping records than writing in a book.

So that now I wonder that I. S. is pleas'd to call tradi∣tions certainty, the first principle of controversie; the pretence of it is indeed the mother and nurse of controver∣sie; for in the world there is not any thing more uncertain than the report of mens words. How many men have been undone by mistaken words? And it is well remembred that in the last unhappy Parliament, a Gentleman was called to the Bar for speaking words of truth and honesty,* 1.7 but against the sense of the House: The words were spoken in a great assembly, before many witnesses; curious and mali∣cious observers spoken at that very time; and yet when the words were questioned, they could not agree what they were; and consequently the sense of them might be strange∣ly altered, since a word, the misplacing of a word, an accent, a point, any ambiguity, any mistake might change the sense; well upon this accident the Speaker call'd to a Gentleman whom he had observed to write the words; and to him they appealed, and he told them that which I supposed was said, but wholly differing from them that speak it, the traditionary part of the Parliament.

All the rest which I. S. says in his first Way, is nothing but a strange and arrogant bragging, which as it is incon∣sistent with the modesty of a Christian, so it is an ill sign of a sober and wise conviction; for if he had demon∣strated the certainty of Oral tradition, he needed no such noises; they that speak truest, make the least stir, and when they are at peace in the truth of the thing, they are pleas'd it is well, and so they leave it to prevail by it's na∣tive strengths.

But after all this noise made by I. S. why is he so fierce to call me to first and self evident principles? Does any school of Philosophy do so in their Systems and discourses? Are there not in every Science divers praecognita, things to be presupposed and believ'd before we can prove any thing? Is it reasonable when I reprove any vitious person for dishonouring God, and dissuade him from his wicked

courses, that he should tell me he will not be dissuaded by my fine words, but if I will go to principles and first grounds, he will hear me; and I must first prove what dis∣honouring is, and how God can be dishonoured, and whether it be only by fiction of law, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and by way of condescension it is so said; and yet after all this, I must prove that God does care at all whether the Man say such things or no, or lastly I must prove that there is a God, before he can suffer me to reprove him upon such ungrounded discourses. Theology, and the Science of the Scriptures supposes divers grounds laid down before and be∣liev'd; and therefore it were a wild demand, that in eve∣ry book we should make a Logical systeme, or a formal ana∣lysts of all our discourses, and make a map describing all the whole passage from the first truth, to the present affir∣mative.

But if I. S. will but consider what the Design of the Dissuasive was, and that the purpose of it was to prove, that the doctrine of Popery as such, is wholly an Innovati∣on, neither Catholic, nor Apostolic; there was no need of coming to any other first grounds, but to shew the time when the Roman propositions were not Catholic doctrines, and when they began to be esteemed so. These things are matters of fact, and need no reduction to any other first principles, but the credible testimony of men fit to be be∣lieved. But yet because I will humor. I. S. for this once; even here also the Dissuasive relies upon a first and self evi∣dent principle as any is in Christianity; and that is, Quod primum verum. And therefore if I prove that the Roman doctrines now controverted were not at first, but came in afterwards, then I have built the Dissuasive aright; and now I have pointed it out, and have already in part, and in the following book have more largely done it; therefore I hope I. S. will be as good as his word and yield himself absolutely confuted. But because there are some other reasons inclining me to think he will not perform his pro∣mise,

and particularly because of the ill naturedness of [his own] principles, (that I may use his own expression in in his postscript) yet if I have fail'd in my proofs, it is not for want of clear and evident principles, but of right deductions from them; and therefore he is mistaken in his first way of mining, and whether there be any defect in any thing else, will be put to trial in the sequel; In the mean time, the Lion is not so terrible as he is painted.

The second Way.

IN the next place I shall try his second mine; and believe I shall finde it big with a brutum fulmen, and that it can do no hurt but make a noise, and scare the boys in the neighbourhood.

For now though in the first way he blam'd me for relying upon no first and self evident principle; in the second he excludes me from all right of using any, unless I will take his. He says, I have no right to alledge Scriptures or Fathers, Councils, or reason, history or instances. But why, I pray? Tis done thus: All discourse supposes that certain upon which it builds. That is his first proposition; what he makes of it afterwards we shall see; In the mean time, he may consider that though all his dis∣courses suppose that certain on which they build, because his Geese are Swans, and his arguments are demonstra∣tions, yet there are many wiser discourses which rely upon probable arguments: And so does a moral demonstration; and such a great wit of France, Mr. Silhon supposed to be his best way of proving the immortality of the soul. Now this is nothing but a coacervation of many probabili∣ties, which according to the subject matter (as not being capable of any other way of probation) amounts to the effect of a demonstration. And however this Gentleman looks big upon it, the infallibility of the Church of Rome is by the wisest of his own party acknowledged to rely but upon

prudential motives; and he is a mad man says Artistotle, who in some cases (in which yet a man may discourse wisely enough) looks for any more than arguments of a high pro∣bability. But what does I. S. think of arguments ad ho∣minem? do they suppose that certain which they build up∣on? or if they do not, can there be no good discourses made upon them? what are the wise consultations of States and Councils? do they always discourse foolishly when they pro∣ceed and argue, but upon probabilities? Nay what does I. S. think of General Councils who are fallible in their premisses though right in their Conclusions? do their con∣clusions suppose their premisses, upon which they build their conclusions to be certain? If not, then I. S. hath af∣firm'd weakly, that all discourse supposes that certain upon which it builds.

Well! but how does he build upon this rotten foundati∣on, who hath already in this very procedure confuted his following discourse, as being such which does not, I am sure ought not (as appears by the reasons I have brought against it) suppose that certain on which it is built: Thus, if tradition or the way of conveying down matters of fact by the former ages testifying can fail, none of these (viz. Scripture, reason, history, Fathers, Coun∣cils, yea instances) are certain. This is his assumption; and this besides that it is false, is also to none of his pur∣poses. 1. It is false, For suppose tradition be not certain, how must all reason therefore fail? for first there must be some reason presupposed, before the certainty of tradition can be established; and if there be not, why does I. S. offer at a demonstrative reason to prove the certainty of tradi∣tion: (though if there be no better reasons for it, than he hath yet shown, his reason and tradition fail together) 2. Supposing tradition should fail, yet there may be rea∣sons given for the excellency of Christianity, which as they confirm Christians in their faith, and beget love to the ar∣ticles,

so they may be sufficient to invite even the wiser hea∣thens to consider it, and choose it.

But then suppose that these things should be uncertain upon the supposal of the uncertainty of tradition of mat∣ters of fact, yet it will avail I. S. nothing; for it will only follow that then those things which only rely upon that matter of fact are not demonstratively certain; but though it may fail in some things, it may be right in others, and we may have reason for one, and not for an∣other, and then either those things must be proved some other way, or else they can be believed but only so far as the first topic will extend; which yet though so uncertain as not to be infallible or demonstrative, may be certain enough to make men believe, and live and dye accordingly. For if we have no better, God requires no better, and by these things will bring his purposes to pass; and if this were not true what will become of the Laity, and many the ignorant Priests of his own Church, who do not rely upon the certainty of Universal tradition, but the single testi∣mony of their Parents or their Parish Priest? But of this afterwards.

But to come closer to the thing? suppose tradition of fact be certain (for so it is in many instances, and if it be Uni∣versal, it will be allowed to be so in all) yet it is but so certain, that yet there is a natural possibility that it should be false; and it is possible that what the Generality of one sort of men do joyntly testifie, may yet be found false, or at least uncertain; as the burial of Mahomet in Mecha, and his being attracted by a Loadstone, of which the Ma∣humetans have a long and general tradition, at least we in Christendom are made to believe so; and if it be not so, yet it is naturally possible that they should all believe and teach a lie, and they actually do so; yet I will allow Ec∣clesiastical Catholic tradition speaking morally to be cer∣tain and indubitable; and that if this should fail, much of our comfort and certainty of adherence to Christian Re∣ligion

would fail with it; but then it is to be considered, that the certainty of tradition which is allowed, is but in matters of fact, not in doctrines, because the fact may be one, the doctrines many; that soon remembred, these soon forgotten; that perceived by sense, these mi∣staken and misunderstood; And though it is very credibly reported and easily believed that Julius Caesar was kill'd in the Senate, yet all that he said that day, and all the unwritten orders he made, and all his orations will not, cannot so easily be trusted upon Oral tradition. So that Oral tradition is a good ministery of conveying a record, but is not the best record; and the principle office of Oral tradition is done when the record is verified by it, when the Scripture is consign'd; and though still it is useful, yet it is not still so necessary: For when by tradition or Oral testi∣mony we are assur'd that the Bible is the word of God, and the great record of salvation, then we are sure that God who gave it, will preserve it, or not require it, and he that design'd it to such an end, will make and keep it suffi∣cient to that end, and that he hath done so already is there∣fore notorious, because God hath been pleased to multiply the copies, and enwrap the contents of that book with the biggest interests of mankind; that it is made impossible to destroy that divine repository of necessary and holy doctrines; And when the Christians were by deaths and tortures assaul∣ted to cause them to deliver up their Bibles, that they might be destroyed, the persecutors prevailed not; they might with as much success have undertaken to drink up the sea. And that providence which keeps the whole from destructi∣on, will also keep all it's necessary parts from corruption, lest the work of God become insufficient to the end of it's desig∣nation; And he that will look for better security, than we can have from the certain knowledge and experi∣ence of the infallibility of the Divine providence and never failing goodness, must erect a new office of assu∣rance.

The effect of this discourse is this; that Oral tradition may be very certain, and in some case, is the best evidence we have in matters of fact, unless where we are taught by sense or revelation, and if it were not certain, we should be infinitely to seek for notices of things that are past; but this is but a moral certainty, though it be the best we have; and this is but in matters of fact, not in doctrines and ora∣tions, or notions delivered in many words; and after all this, when tradition hath consign'd an instrument or record, a writing or a book, it may then leave being necessary, and when the providence of God undertakes to supply the testi∣mony of man, the change is for our advantage.

Well! now having considered this second proposition, let us see what his Conclusion is; for that also hath something of particular consideration, as having in it something more than was in the premisses. The Conclusion is this. [There∣fore a Protestant or a renouncer of tradition cannot with reason pretend to discourse out of any of these] To which I shall reply these things. 1. This Gentleman wholly mistakes us Protestants, as he did the Protestant Religion when he weakly forsook it. Protestants are not re∣nouncers of tradition; for we allow all Catholic traditions that can prove themselves to be such; but we finding little or nothing (excepting this, that the Bible is the word of God, and that the Bible contains all the will of God for our salvation, all doctrines of faith and life) little or nothing else, I say, descending to us by an Universal tradi∣tion, therefore we have reason to adhere to Scripture, and renounce (as I. S. is pleased to call it) all pretence of tra∣dition of any matters of faith not plainly set down in the Bible.

But now since we renounce no tradition but such as is not and cannot be prov'd to be competent and Catholic, I hope with the leave of I. S. we may discourse out of Scrip∣tures and Councils, Fathers and reason, history and in∣stances. For we believe tradition when it is credible,

and we believe what two or three honest men say upon their knowledge, and we make no scruple to believe that there is an English Plantation in the Barbadoes, because many tell us so, who have no reason to deceive us; so that we are in a very good capacity of making use of Scriptures and Councils, &c. But I must deal freely with Mr. S. though we do believe these things upon credible testimony, yet we do not think the testimony infallible, and we do believe many men who yet pretend not to infallibility: And if nothing were Credible but what is infallible, then no man had reason to believe his Priest or his Father: We are taught by Aristotle that that is credible, Quod pluri∣bus, quod sapientibus, quod omnibus videtur; and yet these are but degrees of probability, and yet are sufficient to warrant the transaction of all humane affairs, which (unless where God is pleased to interpose) are not cap∣able of greater assurance. Even the miracles wrought by our Blessed Saviour though they were the best arguments in the world to prove the Divinity of his person and his mission, yet they were but the best argument we needed and under∣stood; but although they were infinitely sufficient to con∣vince all but the malicious, yet there were some so malici∣ous who did not allow them to be demonstrations, but said, that he did cast out Devils by Beelzebub. Here we live by faith and not by knowledge, and therefore it is an infinite goodness of God to give proofs sufficient for us, and fitted to our natures, and proportion'd to our understanding; but yet such as may neither extinguish faith, nor destroy the nature of hope, which although it may be so certain and sure as to be a stedfast anchor of the soul, yet it may have in it something of Natural uncertainty; and yet fill us with all comfort and hope in believing: So that we allow tradition to be certain if it be universal, and to be credible according to the degrees of its Universali∣ty and disinterested simplicity; and therefore we have as much right to use the Scriptures and Fathers as I. S. and

all his party: and all his following talk in the sequel of this second way, relying upon a ground which I have discovered to be false, must needs fall of it self, and signifie nothing. But although this point be soon washt off, yet I suppose the charge which will recoyle upon himself will not so easily be put by. For though it appears that Protestants have right to use Fathers and Councils, Scriptures and reason, yet I. S. and his little convention of four or five Brothers of the tradi∣tion have clearly disintitled themselves to any use of these. For if the oral tradition of the present Church be the infal∣lible and only rule of faith, then there is no Oracle but this one; and the decrees of Councils did bind only in that age they were made, as being part of the tradition of that age; but the next age needed it not, as giving testimony to it self, and being it's own rule. And therefore when a question is to be disputed, you can go no whither to be tried but to the tradition of the present Church, and this is not to be proved by a series and order of records and succession; but if you will know what was formerly believed, you must only ask, what is believed now; for now rivers run back to their springs, and the Lamb was to blame for troubling the Wolf by drinking in the descending river, for the lower is now higher, and you are not to prove by what is past, that the present is right, but by the present you prove what was past, and Harry the seventh is before Harry the sixth, and Chil∣dren must teach their Parents, and therefore it is to be hop'd in time may be their Elders. But by this means, Fathers and Councils are made of no use to these Gentle∣men who have greatly obliged the world by telling us a short way to Science; and though our life be short, yet art is shorter, especially in our way, in Theology; Concerning which there needs no labour, no study, no reading, but to know of the present Church what was always believed, and taught, and what ought to be so; Nay what was done, or what was said, or what was written is to be told by the present Church, which without further trouble can infal∣libly

assure us. And upon this account the Jesuits have got the better of the Jansenists; for though these men weak∣ly and fondly deny such words to be in Jansenius, yet the virtual Church can tell better, whether they be or no in Jansenius, or rather it matters not whether they be or no; for it being the present sense of the Pope, he may proceed to condemnation.

But I. S. offers at some reason for this: For (saith he) Fathers being eminent witnesses to immediate posteri∣ty or children of the Churches doctrine received, and Councils representatives of the Church; their strengths as proofs, nay their very existence is not known till the notion of the Church be known, which is part of their definition, and to which they relate. This is but part of his argument, which I yet must consider apart, because every proposition of his argument hath in it something very untrue; which when I have remark'd I shall consider the whole of it altogether.

And here first I consider that it is a strange proposition to say that the existence of the Fathers is not known till the notion or definition of the Church be known. For who is there of any knowledge in any thing of this na∣ture that hath not heard of S. Austin, S. Jerom, S. Am∣brose, or S. Gregory. The Spaniards have a proverb, There was never good Oglio without Bacon, nor good Sermon without S. Austin; and yet I suppose all the peo∣ple of Spain that hear the name of S. Austin it may be five hundred times every Lent, make no question of the Exi∣stence of S. Austin, or that there was such a man as he; and yet I believe, not very many of them can tell the definiti∣on of the Church. Thousands of the people and the very boys see the pictures of S. Austin sold in Fairs and Mar∣kets, and yet are not so wise as to know the notion or nature of the Church; and indeed many wiser people both among them and us will be very much to seek in the definition, when your learned men amongst your selves dispute what that nature or definition is.

But it may be though I. S. put Fathers and Councils in∣to the same proposition, yet he means it of Councils only, and that it is the existence of Councils which is not to be had without the notion or definition of Church, and this is as false as the other; for what tradesman in Germany, Italy, France or Spain is not well enough assur'd that there was such a thing as the Council of Trent; and yet to the knowing of this, it was not necessary that they should be told how Church is to be defin'd. Indeed they can not know what it is to be Church-Councils, unless they know as much of Church as they do of Councils. But what think we? Could not men know there was a Council at Ariminum more numerous than that at Nice, unless they had the noti∣on of Church? Certainly the Church was no part of the de∣finition of that Council, nor did it relate, save only as ene∣mies are relatives to each other; and if they be, yet it is hard to say they are parts of each others definition. But it may be I. S. means this saying of good and Catholic Coun∣cils; yet they also may be known to have been, without skill in definitions. Definitions do not tell An sit, but quid sit; the first is to be supposed before any definition is to be inquir'd after.

Well! but how shall the being or nature of Church be known? that's his second proposition, and tells us a pretty thing, [Nor is the being or nature of Church known till it be certainly known who are faithful or have true faith, who not; which must be manifested by their ha∣ving or not having the true Rule of faith.] Why, but does the having the true rule of faith make a man faithful? Cannot a man have the true rule of faith, and yet forsake it, or not make use of it, or hide the truth in unrighte∣ousness? Does the having the best antidote in the world make a man healthful, though he live disorderly, and make no use of it? But to let that pass among the other 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. That which is more remarkable, is, That the being or Nature of Church is not known, till it be certainly

known who are faithful or have true faith. I had thought that the way in the Church of Rome of pronouncing men faithful, or to have true faith, had been their being in the Church, and that adhering to the Church (whose being and truth they must therefore be presupposed to believe) had been the only way of pronouncing them faithful; which I suppos'd so certain amongst them, that though they have no faith at all, but to believe as the Church believes, had been a sufficient declaration of the faith of ignorant men. But it seems the Tables are turned. It is not enough to go to the Church; but first they must be assured that they are faithful and have true faith, before they know any thing of the Church.

But if the testimony of the present Church be the only rule of faith (as I. S. would fain make us believe) then it had been truer said; a man can not know the being or na∣ture of faith, till he be well acquainted with the Church. And must the Rule of faith be tried by the Church, and must the Church be tried by the rule of faith? Is the testi∣mony of the Church the measure and touchstone of faith, and yet must we have the faith before we have any know∣ledge whether there be a Church or no? Are they both first, and both prove one another, and is there here no circle? But however I am glad that the evidence of truth hath brought this Gentleman to acknowledge that our way is the better way; and that we must first chuse our religion and then our Church; and not first chuse our Church, and then blindly follow the religion of it whatsoever it be. But then also it will follow that I. S. hath destroyed his main hypothesis, and the oral tradition of the present Church is not the Rule of faith; for that must first be known be∣fore we can know whether there be such a thing as the Church or no; whose rule that is pretended to be.

And now follows his conclusion, which is nought upon other accounts; [Wherefore (saith he) since the pro∣perties of the Rule of Faith do all agree to Tradition

our Rule, and none of them to theirs, it follows the Protestant or Renouncer of Tradition knows not what is either right Scripture, Father or Council, and so ought not to meddle with either of them.] To this I have already answered, and what I. S. may do hereafter when he happens to fall into another fit of demonstration I know not, but as yet he hath been very far from doing what he says he hath done, that is, evidently prov'd what he undertook in this question. And I suppose I have in a fol∣lowing Section of this book evidently prov'd that Traditi∣on, such I mean as the Church of Rome uses in this in∣quiry, leads into error or may do, as often as into truth; and therefore though we may and do use tradition as a pro∣bable argument in many things, and some as certain in one or two things to which in the nature of the thing it is apt to minister, yet it is infinitely far from being the rule of faith, the whole Christian faith.

But I wonder why I. S. saith that for want of Tradition, we cannot know either right Scripture, Fathers or Coun∣cils. I do not think that by tradition they do know all the books of Scriptures. Do they know by Universal or Aposto∣lical Tradition that the Epistle to the Hebrews is Canoni∣cal Scripture? The Church of Rome had no tradition for it for above four hundred years, and they receiv'd it at last from the tradition of the Greek Church; and then they, not the Roman Church are the great conservers of tradition, and they will get nothing by that. And what universal tradition can they pretend for those books which are rejected by some Councils; as particularly that of La∣odicea (which is in the Code of the Universal Church, and some of the Fathers,) which yet they now receive; certainly in that age which rejected them, there was no Ca∣tholic tradition for them and those Fathers, which as (I. S. expresses it) were eminent witnesses to their immediate posterity or children of the Churches doctrine re∣ceived, in all likelyhood did teach their posterity what

themselves professed; and therefore it is possible the Fa∣thers in that Council and some others of the same sentiment might joyn in saying something which might deceive their posterity, and consequently the very ground of I. S. his de∣monstration is digg'd up, for it was very possible the Fa∣thers might teach something that contradicts the present oral tradition of the Church; because when they were alive they believed the contradictory.

But further yet, can I S. affirm that by the oral tradi∣tion of the present Church we can be infallibly taught which books were written by the Fathers, and which not? If he can, how haps it that the Doctors of his Church are not a∣greed about very many of them, some rejecting that as spu∣rious, which others quote as Genuine. If he cannot, then we may have a title to make use of the Fathers though we did renounce tradition; because by tradition certain and infallible they do not know it; and then if either they do not know it at all, or know it any others ways than by tra∣dition, we may know it that way as well as they, and there∣fore have as good a title to make use of them as them∣selves.

But the good man proceeds, Since pretended instances of traditions failing depend on history, and histori∣cal certainty cannot be built upon dead characters, but on living sense in Mens hearts deliver'd from age to age that those passages are true, that is, on Tradition, it follows that if the way of tradition can fail, all histo∣ry is uncertain, and consequently, all instances as being matters of fact depending on history. To this I answer; that it is true that there are many instances in which it is certain that tradition hath fail'd, as will ap∣pear in the following Section; and it is as true, that the record of these instances is kept in books, which are very Ancient and written by Authors so credible, that no man questions the truth of these instances: Now I grant that we are told by the words deliver'd by our Forefathers▪

that these books were written by such men; but then it may be our Forefathers though they kept the books safe, yet knew not what was written in them; and if all the con∣tents of the book had been left only to rely upon the living sense in their hearts, and the hearts of their posterity, we should have had but few books, and few instances of the failing of tradition, only one great one would have been left, that is, the losing of almost all, that that is now recorded would have been a fatal sign that Traditions fail was the cause of so sad a loss. It is well, tradition hath help'd us to the dead characters; they bear their living sense so within themselves, that it is quickly understood when living men come to read them. But now I demand of I. S. whether or no historical certainty relies only on cer∣tain and indefectible tradition? If it does not, then a man may be certain enough of the sacred history, though there be no certain oral tradition built on living sense in mens hearts delivered from age to age. If he does, then I must ask whether I. S. does believe Tacitus, or that there was such a man as Agricola, or that the Senate decreed that Nero should be punish'd more majorum. If he does believe these stories, and these persons, then he must al∣so conclude that there is an Oral indefectible tradition that Tacitus wrote this book, and that every thing in that book was written by him, and it remains at this day as it was at first, and that all this was not convey'd by dead and unfens'd characters, but by living sense in our hearts. But now it will be very hard for any man to say that there is such an infallible Tradition delivering all that Roman story which we believe to be true. No man pretends that there is; and therefore, 1. History may be relied on without a certain indefectible oral tradi∣tion. And 2. The tradition that consigns history to after ages may be, and is so most commonly, nothing but of a fame that such a book was written by such a famous person who liv'd in that age, and might know the truth of what he

wrote, and had no reason to lie, but was in all regards a very worthy and a credible person. Now here is as much certainty as need to be; the thing it self will bear no more; and almost all humane affairs are transacted by such an Oeconomy as this; and therefore it is certain enough, and is so esteemed, because it does all it's intentions, and loses no advantage, and perswades effectually, and re∣gularly engages to all those actions and events, which hi∣story could do, if the certainty were much greater. For the certainty of persuasion, and prevailing upon the greatest parts of mankind, may be as great by history, wisely and with great probability transmitted, as it can be by any imaginary certainty of a tradition that any dreamer can dream of. Nay, it may be equal to a demonstration, I mean, as to the certainty of prevail∣ing: For a little reason to a little understanding as cer∣tainly prevailes, as a greater to a deep and inquisitive understanding; and mankind does not need demonstra∣tions in any case, but where reason is puzled with an aequilibrium, and that there be great probabilities hinc inde. And therefore in these cases where is a probabi∣lity on one side and no appearance of reason to the con∣trary; that probability does the work of a demonstrati∣on. For a reason to believe a thing, and no reason to disbelieve it, is as proper a way to persuade and to lead to action as that which is demonstrated. And this is the case of history, and of instances; which though they cannot (no not by an Oral tradition) be so certain, as that the thing could not possibly have been otherwise; yet when there is no sufficient cause of suspici∣on of fraud and imposture, and great reason from any topic to believe that it is true, he is a very fool that will forbear to act upon that account, only because it is possible that that instance might have been not true, though he have no reason to think it false. And yet this foolish sophisme runs mightily along in I. S. his demonstrations,

he cannot for his life distinguish between credible and infal∣lible; Nothing by him can make faith unless it demon∣strate; that is, nothing can make faith but that which de∣stroys it, by turning it into Science.

His last argument for his second way of mining is so like the other that it is the worse for it: [Since reasons are fetch'd from the Natures of things, and the best na∣ture in what it is (abstracting from disease and mad∣ness) unalterable, is the ground of the humane part of Christian tradition, and most incomparable strength is supperadded to it as it is Christian, by the superna∣tural assistances of the Holy Ghost. It is a wild conceit to think any peice of nature or discourse built on it can be held certain, if Tradition (especially Christian tradition) may be held uncertain.]

In this Jargon, for I know not what else to call it, there are a pretty company of nothings put together; that indeed they are inke varied in divers figures, and unsensed characters, they are nothing else. For 1. It is false that all reason (for so he must mean, if he would speak to any purpose) is fetch'd from the natures of things; some rely upon Concessions and presuppositions only; some upon the state of exterior affairs, and introduced Oeconomies, or accidental mesnage of things; some upon presumptions, and some even upon the weaknesses of men, upon contingen∣cies; and some which pretend to be reasons rely upon false grounds, and such are I. S. his demonstrations.

But suppose they did, as indeed the best reasons do, what then? Why then, the best nature, that is, I suppose he means (the humane) unalterable (abstracting from dis∣ease and madness) is the ground of the humane part of Christian tradition. This proposition hath in it some∣thing that is false, and something that is to no purpose. That which is false is, that the nature of man unless he be mad, or diseas'd in his brain, is Unalterable. As if men could not be chang'd by interest or ambition, pride or

prejudice, by weakness and false Apostles, mistake or neg∣ligence. And by any of these a man, that naturally hath faculties to understand, and capacity of learning, and speaking truth may be so changed, that he is very alter∣able from good to bad, from wise to foolish, from the knowledge of the truth to believe a lie, and be transported by illusions of the Devil: Every man naturally loves know∣ledge, that's his nature; and it is the best nature; but yet it is so alterable, that some men who from the prin∣ciples of this best nature are willing to learn, and they are ever learning, yet they are so altered, that they never come to the knowledge of truth.

But supposing that this best nature is the ground of the humane part of tradition, yet it is not the ground of the humane part of tradition as it is unalterable; but as it hath a defectible understanding, and a free and a change∣able will, and innumerable weaknesses, for these are so in this best nature, that it can never be without them. And therefore because this ground may be slippery, there will be no sure footing here: Especially since it is but the ground of the humane part of tradition, for which cause it can be no more ground of truth in religion, than the Roman sto∣ry, than Plutarch or Livy is of infallible indefectible truth in history; and therefore I. S. does very wisely add to this, the incomparable strengths of the supernatural assistances of the Holy Ghost. But these alone can be sufficient, if they could be proved to be given infallibly, absolutely, and without the altering condition of our mak∣ing right use of them, without grieving the Holy Spirit; of which because there is no promise, and no experience, it is no wild Conceit to think tradition may be uncertain, and yet our discourses in Religion by other principles be certain enough. But now I perceive that I. S. is no such impla∣cable man, for all the seeming fierceness of his persuasion in his new mode of Oral tradition, but that in time he may be reduc'd to the old way of this Church; and ground

(as he does mainly here) her infallibility not upon new de∣monstrations taken from the nature of things, but upon the continual assistances and helpes of the only infalli∣ble spirit of God. That indeed is a way possible, if it were to be had; but this new way hath neither sense nor reason: And therefore in this place he wisely puts the grea∣test stress upon the other. I should have proceeded a little further, if I could have understood what I. S. means, by [any piece of nature built on Tradition;] and if he had not here put in the phrase of a wild Conceit, I should have wanted a name for it; but because it is no other, I shall now let it alone, and dig into the other mines, and see if they be more dangerous than these Bugbears.

The third Way.

THe third Way I must needs say is a fine one, He of∣fers to prove my Dissuasive to be no Dissuasive, no nor can it be a Dissuasive. And why? because to Dissuade, is to unfix the understanding from what it held before; which includes to make it hold or assent, that what it held before certain, is false or at least uncertain. And here before I proceed further, it is fit we acknowledge, that we owe to I. S. the notice of these two mysteries. 1. What is meant by Dissuading, and that it is making a man to change his opinion, an unfixing of his mind: And the second, That this unfixing the minde makes the minde to shake, or to be chang'd, to be uncertain or to think the proposition fit to be held: we being thus instructed in these grounds of some new design'd demonstration, may the surer proceed: For wisely he adds a conjecture, that surely by my Dissuasive from Popery, I intend to oblige men to assent to the contrary. I do believe indeed I did; but my first aim was to dissuade, that is to unfixe them, and afterwards to establish them in the contrary. Well! thus far we are agreed; but for all this, The thing

I intend cannot be done by me; I cannot dissuade; be∣cause I have no peculiar method of my own; but I use those means which others use to prove errors by, and if the way I take be common to truth and error, It is good for no∣thing, error shall pretend to it as well as truth: I must have a particularity of method above what is in others. Now this is strange, that I should be so severely dealt with; why is more requir'd of me than of others? I take the same way that the writers of books of controversie us'd to take; I quote Scriptures, and Fathers, and Histories, and in∣stances, and I use reason as well as I can: I finde that Bel∣larmine and Baronius, Card. Perron and Gregory de Valentia, Stapleton and Hart, Champian and Reynolds use the same Dull way as I do; and yet they hope to per∣suade and Dissuade according to the subject matter, and why my penny should not be as good silver as theirs I know not; but I hope I shall know by and by, why, the true reason why I cannot Dissuade, and that I miscall my book a Dissua∣sive is, because the method which I take is common to those discourses which have in them power to satisfie the understanding, and those who have no such power. But herein is a wonderful thing, my book cannot dissuade; because I take a way which is taken in discourses which can satisfie the understanding. For if some discourses pro∣ceeding my way can satisfie the Understanding, as I. S. here confesses, then it is to be hop'd, so may mine; at least there is nothing in my method to hinder it, but it may: yea, but this method is also us'd in Discourses which have no such power, well! and what then? Is not there∣fore my method as good a method as can be, when it is the method that all men use; they that can satisfie the Under∣standing and they that cannot. And is there any thing more ignorant than to think a method, or way of proof is nought, because some men use it to good purposes, and some to bad? And is not light a glorious covering, because the evil spirit sometimes puts it on? Was not our Saviours

way of confuting the Devil by Scripture very good, because the Devil us'd the same way, and so it was a way com∣mon to discourses, that have in them the power to sa∣tisfie the understanding, and those which have no such power. Titius is sued by Sempronius for a farm which he had long possess'd and to which Titius proves his title by indubitable records and laws and patents. Semproni∣us pretends to do so too; and tells the Judge that he ought not to regard any proof of Titius's offering, because he goes upon grounds which himself also goes upon; and so they are not apt to be a ground of determining any thing, because they are Common to both sides. The Judge smiles, and in∣quires who hath most right to the pretended grounds, but approves the method of proceeding, because it is common to the contrary pretender: And this is so far from being an argument against my method, that in the world nothing can be said greater in allowance of it; even because I prov'd upon principles allowed by both sides, that is, I dispute up∣on principles, upon which we are agreed to put the cause to trial. Did the primitive Fathers refuse to be judg∣ed by, or to argue from Scriptures, because the heretics did argue from thence too? Did not the Fathers take from them their armour in which they trusted? And did not David strike with the sword of Goliath, because that was the sword which his Enemy had us'd? David prov'd that way apt to prevail by cutting off the Giants head. But what particularity of method would I. S. have me to use? shall I use reason? To that all the world pretends, and it is the sword that cuts on both sides, and it is us'd in discourses that can, and that cannot satisfie. Shall I use the Scriptures? in that I. S. is pleas'd to say, the Quakers out-do me? Shall I use the Fathers? The Smectymnu∣ans bring Fathers against Episcopacy. What shall I bring? I know not what yet, but it ought to be something very particular; that's certain. Shall I then bring Tra∣dition? will Oral tradition do it? I hope I. S. will for his

own and his three or four friends sake like that way. But if I should take it, I. S: might very justly say, that I take a method that is common to those discourses, which have in them power to satisfie the understanding, and those which have no such power: Whether this method is us'd or no in discourses satisfactory, let I. S. Speak; but I am sure it is us'd of late in some discourses, which are not satisfactory, and the name of one of them is Sure footing. And do not the Greeks pretend tradition against the Roman doctrine of Purgatory, the procession of the Holy Ghost, the supremacy of the Bishop of Rome? whether right or wrong I inquire not here, but that they do so is evident; and therefore neither is it lawful for me to proceed this way, or even then to call my book a Dissuasive. For it is plain to common sense, that it can have in it no power of moving the understanding one way or other, unles there be some particularity in the method above what is in others; which it is certain can never be, because there is no me∣thod, but some or other have already taken it. And there∣fore I perceive plainly, my book is▪ not any more to be called a Dissuasive, till I can find out some new way and method which as yet was never us'd in Christendom. And indeed I am to account my self the more unsuccessful in my well meant endeavours, because I. S. tells us that he sees plain∣ly that in the pursuit of truth, Method is in a manner All; I. S. hath a method new enough, not so old as Mr. White, and he desires me to get such another; but nobis non licet esse tam beatis; and I am the less trou∣bled for it, because I. S. his Method is new, but not right, and I prove it from an argument of his own; For (saith he) it is impossible any controversie should hover long in debate, if a right method of concluding evidently were carefully taken, and faithfully held to. Now because I see that I. S. his method or new way hath made a new controversie, but hath ended none, but what was before and what is now is as likely as ever, still to hover

in debate; I. S. must needs conclude, that either he hath not faithfully held to it, or his way is good for no∣thing.

Other things he says here, which though they be rude and uncivil, yet because he repeats them in his Sixth way, I shall there consider them altogether, if I find cause.

The fourth Way.

THis fourth mine hath (as good luck would have it) no∣thing of demonstration, nor is his reason founded up∣on the nature of the thing (as before he boasted) but only ad hominem. But such as it is, it must be considered. The argument is this, That though I produce testimony from Fathers, yet I do not allow them to be infallible, nor yet my self in interpreting Scripture; nor yet do I with any infalliable certainty see any proposition, I go about to deduce by reason, to be necessarily consequent to any first or self evident principle, and therefore I am certain of nothing I alledge in my whole book. The sum is this, No man is certain of any thing, unless he be infallible. I confess I am not infallible, and yet I am certain this must be his meaning, or else his words have no sense; and if I say true in this, then fallibility and cer∣tainty are not such incompossible and inconsistent things. But what does I. S. think of himself? is he infallible? I do not well know what he will answer, for he seems to be very neer it, if we may guess by the glorious opinion he hath of himself; but I will suppose him more modest than to think he is, and yet he talkes at that rate, as if his arguments were demonstrations, and his opinions certain∣ties. Suppose his grounds he goes upon are as true, as I know they are false; yet is he infallible in his reasoning, and deducing from those principles such feat conclusions, as he offers to obtrude upon the world? If his reason be in∣fallible,

so it may be, mine is for ought. I know, but I ne∣ver thought it so yet; and yet I know no reason to the con∣trary, but it is as infallible as his: but if his be not, it may be all that he says is false, at least he is not sure any thing of it is true; and then he may make use of his own ridiculous speech he made for me [I know not certainly that any thing I say against your religion is true,* 1.8 &c.] All the men that tell us that Cardinal Chigi is now Pope, are fal∣lible, they may be deceiv'd and they may deceive; and yet I suppose Mr. White, though he also be fallible, is suf∣ficiently certain he is so; and if he did make any doubt, if he would sail to Italy, he would be infallibly assur'd of it by the Executioners of the Popes Censures, who yet are as fallible as any the officers of Montfalcon.

But I. S. however says, I ought to confess that I ought not to dissuade from any thing, in case neither the Fathers nor my self be infallible in any saying or proof of theirs. For the infallibility of the Fathers, I shall have a more convenient time to consider it under his eighth way. But now I am to consider his reason for this pretty saying, which he says he evinces thus. Since to be infallible in none, hic & nunc (taking in the whole complexion of assisting circumstances) is the same as to be hic & nunc fallible in all or each; and if they be fallible, or may be de∣ceiv'd in each, they can be sure of none, it follows that who professes the Fathers and himself (though using all the means he can to secure him from error) fallible in each, must, if he will speak out like an honest man, confess he is sure of none.] This is the evi∣dent demonstration, and indeed there are in it some things evidently demonstrative. The first is, That to be infallible in none, is the same as to be fallible in all. Indeed I must needs say, that he says true and learnedly, and it being a self evident Principle he might according to his custome have afforded demon∣strations enough for this, but I shall take it upon his own

word at this time, and allow him the honour of first com∣municating this secret to the ignorant world; that he that is not infallible is fallible. Another deep note we have here; his words laid plain without their Parentheses, can best declare the mystery [If they be infallible, or may be deceiv'd in each, they can be sure of none; it follows that they that profess they are fallible in each, must confess they are sure of none. If I. S. always write thus subtilly, no man will ever be able to resist him: For indeed this is a demonstration, and therefore we hope it may be aeternae veritatis, for it relies upon this first and self evident principle, idem per idem semper facit idem. Now having well learned these two deep notes out of the school, and deep discourses of I. S. let us see what the man would be at for himself: and though we find it in his Pa∣rentheses only, yet they could not be left out, and sense be intire without them.

When he talkes of being infallible, if the notion be ap∣plied to his Church, then he means an infallibility, ante∣cedent, absolute, unconditionate, such as will not per∣mit the Church ever to err. And because he thinks such an infallibility to be necessary, for the setling the doubting mindes of men; he affirms roundly, if infallibility be denied, then no man can be sure of any thing. But then when he comes to consider the particulars, and cannot but see, a man may be certain of some things, though he have not that antecedent infallibility, that quality and permanent grace; yet because he will not have his Dear notion lost, that infallibility and certainty live and dye together, he hath now secretly put in a changeling in the place of the first, and hath excogitated an infallibility consequent, conditionate, circumstantiate, which he calls hic & nunc, taking in the whole complexion of assisting circumstances; Now because the first is denied by us to be in any man or company of men, and he perceives that to be uncertain in every thing, will not be consequent

to the want of this first sort, he secretly slides into the se∣cond, and makes his consequent to rely upon this deceit∣fully. And if the argument be put into intelligible terms, it runs thus: If when a whole complexion of assisting cir∣cumstances are present; that is, a proposition truly repre∣sented, apt to be understood, necessary to be learned, and attended to by a person desirous to learn, when it is taught by sufficient authority, or prov'd by evidence, or con∣firm'd by reason; when a man hath his eyes and his wits about him, and is sincerely desirous of truth, and to that purpose, himself considers, and he confers with others and prays to God; and the thing it self is also plain and easie; then if a man can be deceiv'd, he is sure of nothing: And this is infallibility hic & nunc. But this is not that which he and his parties contend to be seated in his Church; for such a one as this we allow to her, if she does her du∣ty, if she prays to God, if she consider as well as she can, and be no way transported with interest or partiality; then in such propositions which God hath adopted into the Chri∣stian faith, and which are plain and intended to be known and believ'd by all, there is no question but she is infallible, that is, she is secur'd from error in such things. But then every man also hath a part of this infallibility. Some things are of their own nature so plain, that a man is in∣fallible in them, as a man may infallibly know, that two and two make four. And a Christian may be infallibly sure that the Scriptures say, that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, and that there shall be a resurrection from the dead, and that they who do the works of the flesh shall not inherit the kingdom of God; And as fallible as I, or any Protestant is, yet we cannot be deceived in this; if it be made a question whether fornication be a thing forbidden in the New Testament we are certain and infal∣libly so, that in that book it is written, flee fornication. An infallibility hic & nunc, if that will serve I. S. his turn, we have it for him; and he cannot say, that we

Protestants affirm that we are fallible when we do our duty, and when all the assisting circumstances, which God hath made sufficient and necessary, are present: we are as cer∣tain as infallibility it self, that among the ten Commande∣ments, one is, Thou shalt not worship any graven Im∣ages: and another, Thou shalt not commit adultery: and so concerning all the plain sayings in Scripture, we are certain that they carry their meaning on their forehead, and we cannot be deceiv'd, unless we please not to make use of all the complexion of assisting circumstances. And this certainty or circumstantiate infallibility we derive from self evident principles; such as this, God is never wanting to them that do the best they can, and this, In matters which God requires of us,* 1.9 if we fail not in what is on our part, God will not fail on his. And this infallibility is just like to what is signified by what God pro∣mised to Joshua, I will never leave thee nor forsake thee,* 1.10 only be thou strong and very couragious, that thou mayest observe to do according to all the law. Nothing was more certain than that Joshua should be infal∣libly conducted into the land of promise, and yet it was re∣quired of him to be couragious, and to keep all the Law of Moses; and because Joshua did so, the promise had an infallibility, hic & nunc: And so it is in the finding out the truths of God, so said our Blessed Saviour, If ye love me keep my Commandements, and I will pray to the Father,* 1.11 and he shall give you another Comforter that he may abide with you for ever, the Spirit of truth whom the world cannot receive. If we open our eyes, if we suffer not a Vail to be over them, if we inquire with diligence and simplicity, and if we live well, we shall be infallibly directed, and upon the same termes it is in∣fallibly certain that every man shall be saved. And the Gospel is not hid, but to them that are lost (saith the Apostle) in whom the God of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of

the glorious Gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them. So that it is cer∣tain that in things necessary, a man need not be de∣ceiv'd unless he be wanting to himself; and therefore hic & nunc he is infallible: But if a man will lay aside his rea∣son and will not make use of it, if he resolves to believe a proposition in defiance of all that can be said against it; if when he sees reason against his proposition, he will call it a temptation, which is like being hardned by miracles, and slighting a truth, because it is too well prov'd to him; if he will not trust the instruments of knowledge that God gives him, if he sets his face against his reason, and think it meritorious to distrust his sense, and seeing will not see, and hearing he will not understand, (And all this is every day done in the Church of Rome) then there is no∣thing so certain, but it becomes to him uncertain; and it is no wonder if he be given over to believe a lie. It is not confi∣dence that makes a man infallibly certain, for then I. S. were the most infallible person in the world; but the way to make our calling and election sure, is to work out our salvati∣on with fear and trembling. Modesty is the way to know∣ledge, and by how much more a man fears to be deceiv'd, by so much the more will he walk circumspectly and determine warily, and take care he be not deceiv'd; but he that thinks he cannot be deceived, but that he is infallible, as he is the more liable to error, because by this suppos'd infallibility he is tem∣pted to a greater inconsideration, so if he be deceived, his re∣covery is the more desperate. And I desire that it be here observ'd, that it is one thing to say, I cannot be deceiv'd, and another to say, I am sure I am not deceiv'd. For the first no man can say; but the latter every wise and good man may say if he please; That every man is certain of very many things is evident by all the experience of man∣kind; and in many things this certainty is equivalent to an infallibility, that is, hic & nunc: And that relys upon this ground (for I must be careful to go upon grounds for

fear of I. S. his displeasure) Quicquid est, quamdiu est, necesse est esse; while a truth prevailes, and is invested with the whole complexion of assisting circumstances, it is an actual infallibility, that is, such a certainty, cui falsum subesse non potest; for else no man could tell certainly and infallibly, when he is hungry or thirsty, a∣wake or weary; when he hath committed a sin against God, or when he hath told a lie: and he that says a fallible Chri∣stian is not infallibly certain, that it is a good thing to say his prayers, and to put his trust in God, and to do good works, knows not what he says.

But besides this, it were well if I. S. would consider what kind of certainty God requires of us in our faith; for I hope I. S. will then require no more. Our faith is not Science, and yet it is certainty; and if the assent be accor∣ing to the whole design of it, and effects all it's purposes and the intention of God, it cannot be accepted though the wayes of begetting that faith be not demonstrative argu∣ments. There had but five or six persons seen Christ after his resurrection, and yet he was pleas'd to reprove their unbelief, because the Disciples did not believe those few who said they had seen him alive. Faith is the foundation of good life; and if a man believes so certainly that he is willing to live in it, and die for it, God requires no more, and there is no need of more; and if a little thing did not do that, what shall become of those innumerable multitudes of Christians, who believe upon grounds which a learned man knows are very weak, but yet are to those people as good as the best, because they are not only the best they have, but they are sufficient to do their work for them. Nay God is so good, and it is so necessary in some affairs to proceed so, that a man may be certain he does well, though in the proposition or subject matter he be de∣ceiv'd. Is not a Judge infallibly certain, that he does his duty, and proceeds wisely, if he gives sentence Secun∣dum allegata & probata, though he be not infallibly cer∣tain

that the witnesses depose truth. Was not S. Paul in the right, and certainly so, when he said it was better for the present necessity, if a Virgin did not marry; and yet he had no revelation, and no oral infallible tradi∣tion for it; this speak I (saith he) not the Lord; and he did not talk confidently of his grounds, but said modest∣ly, I think I have the Spirit of God; and yet all Chri∣stians believe that what he then said was infallibly enough true. We see here through a glass darkly, saith the Apostle, and yet we see; and what we see we may be cer∣tain of, I mean, we Protestants may, indeed the Papists may not, for they denying what they see, call bread a God: so that they do not so much as see darkly, they see not at all, or what is as bad, they will not believe the thing to be that which their eyes, and three senses more tell them that it is. But is a wonder that they who dare not trust their senses, should talk of being infallible in their argu∣ment.

And now to apply this to the charge I. S. lays on me, Be∣cause I do not profess to be infallible, I am certain in nothing, and without an infallible oral tradition, it is impossible I should be certain of any thing. In answer to this, I demand why I may not be as certain of what I know or believe, as Mr. White or I. S.? Is the doctrine of Purgatory fire between death and the day of judgement, and of the validity of the prayers and Masses said in the Church of Rome to the freeing of souls from Purgatory long before the day of judgment, is this doctrine (I say) de∣livered by an infallible oral tradition, or no? If no, then the Church of Rome either is not certain it is true, or else she is certain of it by some other way than such a tradition. If yea, then how is Mr. White certain that he speaks true in his book de statu animarum, where he teaches that pray∣ers of the Church do no good, and free no souls before the day of judgement, for he hath no oral tradition for his opinion; for two oral traditions cannot be certain and

infallible, when they contradict one another; and if the traditions be not infallible, as good for these men that they be none at all. So that either Mr. White cannot be certain of any thing he says, by not relying on oral tradition, or the Church of Rome cannot be certain; and therefore he or she may forbear to persuade their friends to any thing. And for my present adversary I. S. who also affirms, that oral tradition of the present Church is the whole rule of faith, how can he trust himself or be certain of any thing, or teach any thing, when his Church says otherwise than he says, and makes tradition to be but a part of the rule of faith, as is to be seen in the Council of Trent it self in the first decree of the fourth Session.* 1.12 So that in effect here are two rules of faith, and therefore two Churches; Mr. I. S.'s is the traditionary Church, so called from relying solely on tra∣dition, the other (what shall we call it for distinction sake) the Purgatorian Church from Purgatory, or if you will, the imaginary Church from worshiping images: And since they do not both follow the same rule of faith, the one mak∣ing tradition alone to be the ground, the other not so; it will follow by Mr. I. S. his argument, that either the one or the other missing the true ground of faith, cannot be certain of any thing that they say. And now when he hath considered these things, let him reckon the advantage which his Ca∣tholic faith gains by the opposition from her adversa∣ries if they be rightly handled, (as Mr. S. hath handled them, and brought to his grounds) But however the op∣position which I have now made, hath it's advantages upon the weakness of Mr. Whites grounds, and I. S.'s demon∣strations, yet I shall without relation to them, but upon the account of other grounds which his wiser and more learned brethren of the other Church do lay, make it appear that there is indeed in the Church of Rome no sure footing, no foundation of faith upon which a man can with certainty rely, and say, Now I am infallibly sure that I am in the right.

The fifth Way.

THe fifth way I. S. says is built on the fourth, which being prov'd to be a ruinous foundation, I have the less need to trouble my self about that which will fall of it self, but because he had no reason to trust that foundation, for all his confidence he is glad to build his fifth way on the Protestants voluntary Concession, for they granting they have no demonstration for the ground of their faith, must say they have only probability. But I pray who told I. S. that we grant we have no demonstration for the ground of our faith? Did ever any Protestant say that there is no moral demonstration of his faith? or that it cannot be prov'd so certain, so infallible, that the gates of hell shall never prevail against it? If I. S. will descend so low as to look upon the book of a Protestant, besides many better,* 1.13 he may finde in my Cases of Conscience a demonstration of Christian Religion; and although it consists of probabilities, yet so many, so unquestion'd, so confess'd, so reasonable, so uncontradicted pass into an ar∣gument of as much certainty, as humane nature without a Miracle is capable of; as many sands heap'd together make a bank strong enough to resist the impetuosity of the raging sea. But I have already shown upon what certain∣ties our faith relies, and if we had nothing but high proba∣bilities, it must needs be as good as their prudential mo∣tives; and therefore I shall not repeat any thing, but pass on to consider what it is he says of our high probabilities, if they were no more: If there be probabilities on both sides, then the greatest must carry it, so he roundly professes, never con∣sidering that the latter Casuists of his Church, I mean those who wrote since Angelus, Silvester, Cordubensis and Ca∣jetan, do expresly teach the contrary, viz. that of two

probabilities the less may be chosen; and that this is the common and more receiv'd opinion. But since I. S. is in the right, let them and he agree it, as we do, if they please. I hope he relates this only to the Questions be∣tween us, and Rome, and not to the Christian Faith; well, but if the matter be only between us, I am well e∣nough content, and the greater probability, that is, the better argument shall carry it; and I will not be asking any more odd Questions, as why, I. S. having so clearly de∣monstrated his religion by grounds firm as the land of De∣los or O Brasile, he should now be content to argue his cause at the bar of probability? Well, but let us see what he says for his party: That there is no probability for our side (says I. S.) is very hard to be said, since the whole world sees plainly we still maintain the field against them, nay dare pretend without fearing an absolute baffle, which must needs follow (had we not at least probabi∣lities to befriend us) that our grounds are evidently and demonstrably certain.] Here I. S. seems to be a∣fraid again, of his probabilities, that he still runs to co∣vert under his broad shield of demonstration: but his po∣stulatum here is indeed very modest; he seems to desire us to allow that there are some probable things to be said for his side, and indeed he were very hard hearted that should say, there are none at all; some probabilities we shall al∣low, but no grounds evidently and demonstratively cer∣tain: good Sir, And yet let me tell you this, There are some of your propositions for which there is probable reason or fair pretence in the world: Nothing that can handsome∣ly or ingeniously deceive a man: Such as is your half Com∣munion, worship of images, prayers not understood and some others: And therefore you may be ashamed to say, you still maintain the field against us, for if you do not, why do you say you do? but if you still maintain the field, you may be more asham'd, for why will you stand in a falshood, and then call your selves equal combatants, if not Con∣querors.

But you may if you please look after victory, I am only in the pursuit of truth.

But to return, It seems he knows my mind for this, and in my liberty of prophecying, my own words will beyond all confute evince it, that they have probabilities, and those strong ones too. But now (in my Conscience) this was unkindly done, that when I had spoken for them what I could, and more than I knew that they had ever said for themselves, and yet to save them harmless from the iron hands of a tyrant and unreasonable power, to keep them from being persecuted for their errors and opinions, that they should take the arms I had lent them for their de∣fence, and throw them at my head. But the best of it is, though I. S. be unthankful, yet the weapons themselves are but wooden daggers, intended only to represent how the poor men are cosen'd by themselves, and that under fair and fraudulent pretences even pious well meaning men, and men wise enough in other things may be abus'd: And though what I said was but tinsel and pretence, imagery and whipt Cream, yet I could not be blam'd to use no better than the best their cause would bear; yet if that be the best they have to say for themselves, their probabilities will be soon out-ballanc'd by one Scripture testimony urg'd by Protestants; and Thou shalt not worship any graven images will out weigh all the best and fairest imaginati∣ons of their Church. But since from me they borrow their light armour which is not Pistol proof, from me if they please they may borrow a remedy to undeceive them, and that in the same kind and way of arguing: If I. S. please to read a letter or two of mine to a Gentlewoman not long before abus'd in her religion by some Roman Emissaries, there he shall see so very much said against the Roman way, and that in instances evident and notorious, that I. S. may if he please (he hath my leave) put them in ballance against one another,* 1.14 and try which will preponderate. They are printed now in one Volume, and they are the easier

compar'd. But then I. S. might if he had pleas'd have considered, that I did not intend to make that harangue, to represent, that the Roman Religion had probabilities of being true, but probabilities that the religion might be tol∣lerated, or might be endured, that is, as I there ex∣press'd it, whether the Doctrines be commenc'd upon de∣sign, and manag'd with impiety, and have effects not to be endur'd; and concerning these things I amass'd a heap of considerations, by which it might appear probable, that they were not so bad as to be intollerable; and if I was de∣ceiv'd, it was but a well meant error, hereafter they shall speak for themselves, only for their comfort this they might have also observ'd in that book, that there is not half so much excuse for the Papists, as there is for the Ana∣baptists; and yet it was but an excuse at the best, as ap∣pears in those full answers I have given to all their argu∣ments, in the last edition of that book, amongst the Po∣lemical discourses in folio.

I shall need to say no more for the spoiling this Mine, for I. S. hath not so much as pretended that the probabilities urg'd for them can out-weigh or come to equal what is said against them; and I humbly suppose that the difficulties will be increased by the following book.

The sixth and seventh Ways.

THE sixth mine is most likely at the worst to prove but a squib. I. S. says I should have made a pre∣face, and before hand have prov'd that all the arguments I us'd were unanswerable, and convictive, which indeed were a pretty way of making books; to make a preface to make good my book, and then my book cannot but in thank∣fulness make good the preface; which indeed is something like the way of proving the Scriptures by the Church, and then back again proving the Church by the Scriptures. But

he adds that I was bound to say, That they were never pretended to be answer'd, or could not, or that the Protestants had the last word. But on the contrary I ac∣knowledge, that the evidences on both sides have been so often produc'd, that it will seem almost impossible to bring in new matter, or to prevail with the old. This is the great charge, the sum of which is truly this. I have spoken modestly of my own undertaking, and yet I had so great reason to deplore the obstinacy of the Roman Priests, their pertinacy and incorrigible resolution of seeming to say something, when they can say nothing to the purpose, that I had cause to fear, the event would not be so successful as the merit of our cause, and the energy of the arguments might promise. I confess I did not rant as I. S. does, and talk high of demonstrations, and unmistakable grounds, and scientifical principles, and Metaphysical nothings; but according as my undertaking requir'd, I proceeded upon principles agreed on both sides. If Scripture and Fathers, Councils and reasons, the analogy of faith, and the Do∣ctrines of the Primitive Church (from which I proved, and shall yet more clearly prove the Church of Rome hath greatly revolted) will not prevail, I have done; I shall on∣ly commit the cause to God and the judgement of wise and good men, and so sit down in the peace of my own persua∣sions, and in a good Conscience, that I have done my endea∣vor to secure our own people from the temptation, and to snatch others as brands from the fire.

Only I wish here I had found a little more worthiness in I. S. than to make me speaking that I have brought nothing but common objections, or nothing new: I suppose they that are learned know this to be a Calumny; and by experience they and I find, that whether the objections be new or old, it is easier to rail at them all, than answer any. To this as it is not needful to say any more, so there cannot any thing else well be said, unless I should be vain, like the man whom I now reprove, and go about to commend my self,

which is a practice I have neither reason nor custome for.

But the seventh Way is yet worse. For it is no thing but a direct declamation against my book, and the quotations of it, and having made a ridiculous Engine of Corollaries in his Sure-footing against the quotations in Dr. P. his Sermon, without meaning my book, for that came out a pretty while after; he does like the two penny Almanack∣makers, though he calculated it for the meridian of the Court Sermon (as he calls it) yet without any sensible error it may serve for Ireland: It may be I. S. had an oral tra∣dition, for this way of proceeding, especially having fol∣lowed so authentic a president for it as the Author of the two Sermons called the Primitive rule before the refor∣mation, who goes upon the same infallible and thrifty way, saying [These two tracts as they are named Sermons are an answer to Dr. Pierce, but as they may better be styled two common places, so they are a direct answer to Dr. Taylon. So that here are two things which are Ser∣mons and no Sermons, as you please not Sermons, but com∣mon places; and yet they are not altogether common places, but they in some sense, are Sermons; unless Sermon and common place happen to be all one; but how the same thing should be an answer to Dr. P. as he gives them one name, and by giving them another name, to the same pur∣pose should be a direct answer to me, who speak of other matters, and by other arguments, and to other purposes, and in another manner, I do not yet understand. But I suppose it be meant as in I. S. his way, and that it relies upon this first and a self evident principle, That the same thing when called by another name is apt to do new and wonderful things. It is a piece of Mr. White's and I. S. his new Metaphysics which we silly men have not the learning to understand. But it matters not what they say, so they do but stop the mouths of the people, that call

upon them to say something to every new book, that they may without apparent lying, telling them the book is an∣swered. For to answer to confute, means nothing with them but to speak the last word.

Well! but so it is, I. S. hath ranged a great many of my quotations under heads, and says, so many are confuted by the first Corollary, and so many by the second, and so on to the ninth and tenth, and some of them are raw and unapplyed, some set for shew, and some not home to the point, and some wilfully represented, and these come under the second or third head, and perhaps of divers of the others. To all this I have one short answer; that the quotations which he reduces under the first head, or the second, or the third might for ought appears be rank'd under any other as well as these: For he hath prov'd none to belong to any; but Magisterially points with his finger and directs them to their several stations of confutation. Thus he supposes I am confuted, by an argument of his, next to that of Men∣tiris Bellarmine. And indeed in this way it were easie to confute Bellarmines three Volumes with the labour of three pages writing. But this way was most fit to be taken by him, who quotes the Fathers by oral tradition, and not ocular inspection; however if he had not particularly con∣sidered these things, he ought not generally to have condem∣ned them, before he tried. But this was an old trick, and noted of some by S. Cyprian,* 1.15 Viderint autem qui vel fu∣rori suo,* 1.16 vel libidini servientes & divinae legis ac san∣ctitatis immemores, jactitare interim gestiunt quae probare non possunt, & cum innocentiam destruere at∣que expugnare non valeant, satis habent fama menda∣cii & falsorum ore maculas inspergere. I have neither will nor leisure to follow him in this extravagancy; it will I hope be to better purpose, that in the following Sections I shall justifie all my quotations, against his, and the calum∣nies of some others; and press them and others beyond the objections of the wiser persons of his Church, from whence

these new men have taken their answers, and made use of them to little purposes; and therefore I shall now pass over the particulars of the quotations referring them to their places, and consider if there be any thing more material in his eighth Way, by which he pretends to blow up my grounds and my arguments deriv'd from reason.

The eighth Way.

THe eighth Way is to pick out the principles I rely on, and to shew their weakness. It is well this eighth Way is a great distance off from his first way; or else I. S. would have no excuse for forgetting himself so palpably; ha∣ving at first laid to my charge that I went upon no grounds, no principles. But I perceive, principles might be found in the Dissuasive if the man had a mind to it: nay maine and fundamental principles, and self evident to me. And yet such is his ill luck, that he picks out such which he himself says I do not call so; And even here also he is mistaken too; for the first he instances is Scripture; and this, not only I but all Protestants acknowledge to be the foun∣dation of our whole faith. But of this he says we shall dis∣course afterwards.

The second principle I rely upon, at least, he says I seem to do so, is, [We all acknowledge that the whole Church of God kept the faith intire, and transmitted faithful∣ly to after ages the whole faith.] Well what says he to this principle? He says, this principle as to the positive part is good, and assertive of tradition: It is so of the Apostolical tradition; for they deliver'd the doctrine of Christ to their Successors, both by preaching and by writing. And what hath I. S. got by this? Yes, give him but leave to suppose that this delivery of the doctrine of Christ was only by oral tradition for the three first ages, (for he is pleas'd so to understand the extent of the primi∣tive Church) and then he will infer that the third age

could deliver it to the fourth, and that to the fifth; and so to us: If they were able, there is no question but they were willing, for it concern'd them to be so, and there∣fore it was done. Though all this be not true, for we see by a sad experience, that too few in the world are willing to do, what it concerns them most to do: Yet for the present I grant all this. And what then? therefore oral tradition is the only rule of faith. Soft and fair, therefore the third age deliver'd it to the fourth, and so on, but not all the parti∣culars by oral tradition, but by the holy Scriptures, as I shall largely prove in the proper place. But to I. S. the Bells ring no tune, but Whittington.

A third principle he says is this, The present Roman doctrines which are in difference were invisible and un∣heard of in the first and best antiquity.] I know not why he calls this one of my principles, unless all my propositions be principles, as all his arguments are demonstrations. It is indeed a conclusion which I have partly, and shall in the sequel largely make good. In the mean time whether it be principle or conclusion, let us see what is objected against it, or what use is made of it: For I. S. says it is an improv'd and a main position. But then he tells us, the reason of it is, because No heretic had arisen in those days denying those points, and so the Fathers set not themselves to write expresly for them, but occasionally only.] Let us consider what this is, no heretic had arisen in those days denying these points: True, but many Catholics did, and the reason why no heretics did deny those things was, because neither Catholic nor heretic ever affirm'd them. Well! but however, the Roman controvertists are frequent for cit∣ing them for divers points. Certainly not for making vows to Saints; not for the worship of images; nor for the half Com∣munion, for these they do not frequently cite the Fathers of the first 300. years: It may be not, but for the ground of our faith, the Churches voice or tradition they do, to the utter overthrow of the Protestant cause.

They do indeed sometimes cite something from them for tra∣dition; and where ever the word tradition is in Scripture, or the Primitive Fathers, they think it is an argument for them, just as the Covenanters in the late wars, thought all Scripture was their plea, where ever the word Covenant was nam'd. But to how little purpose they pretend to take advantage of any of the primitive Fathers speaking of tra∣dition, I shall endeavour to make apparent in an inquiry made on purpose. Sect. 3. In the mean time it appears, that this conclusion of mine was to very good purpose, and in a manner, confess'd to be true in most instances; and that it was so in all, was not intended by me.

Well! but however it might be in the first three ages, yet he observes that I said, that in the succeeding ages secular interest did more prevail, and the writings of the Fathers were vast and voluminous, and many things more, that both sides eternally and inconfutably shall bring sayings for themselves respectively. And is not all this very true? He cannot deny it; but what then? why then he says, I may speak out and say, all the Fathers after the first three hundred years are not worth a straw in order to decision or controversie; and the Fathers of the first three hundred years spoke not of our points in difference, and so there is a fair end of all the Fa∣thers and of my own Dissuasive too; for that part which relies on them, which looks like the most authorita∣tive piece of it: There is no great hurt in this, If the Fathers be gone, my Dissuasive may go too; it cannot easi∣ly go in better company, and I shall take the less care of it, because I have I. S. his word, that there is a part of it, which relies upon the Fathers. But if the Fathers be go∣ing, it is fit we look after them, and see which way they go: For if they go together (as in many things they do) they are of very good use in order to decision of controversie; if they go several ways, and consequently that Controvertists may eternally and irrefutably bring sayings out of them

against one another, who can help it? No man can follow them all; and then it must be tried by some other topic which is best to follow; but then that topic by it self would have been sufficient to have ended the Question. Second∣ly, If a disputer of this world pretends to rely upon the au∣thority of the Fathers, he may by them be confuted, or de∣termin'd. The Church of Rome pretends to this, and therefore if we perceive the Fathers have condemned do∣ctrines, which they approve of, or approve what they con∣demn, which we say in many articles is the case of that Church, then the Dissuasive might be very useful, and so might the Fathers too, for the condemnation of such do∣ctrines, in which the Roman Church are by that touchstone found too blame.

And where as I. S. says, that the first three ages of Chri∣stianity medled not with the present controversies; it is but partly true, for although many things are now adays taught, of which they never thought, yet some of the errors which we condemn were condemn'd then, very few indeed by disputation, but not a few by positive sentence, and in explications of Scripture, and rational discourses, and by parity of case, and by Catechetical doctrines. For rectum est Index sui & obliqui; they have without thinking of future controversies and new emergent heresies, said enough to confute many of them when they shall arise. The great use of the Fathers, especially of the first three hundred years is to tell us what was first, to consign Scripture to us, to convey the Creed, with simplicity and purity to preach Christs Gospel, to declare what is necessary and what not: And whether they be fallible or infallible, yet if we find them telling and accounting the integrity of the Christian faith, and treading out the paths of life; because they are persons whose conversation, whose manner and time of living, whose fame and Martyrdom, and the venerable testimony of after-ages have represented to be very credible, we have great reason to believe that alone to be the faith,

which they have describ'd, and consequently that what∣ever comes in afterwards and is obtruded upon the world, as it was not their way of going to heaven, so it ought not to be ours. So that here is great use of the Fathers wri∣tings, though they be not infallible, and therefore I wonder at the prodigious confidence (to say no worse) of I. S. to dare to say; that [as appears by the Dissuader the Protest∣ants neither acknowledge them infallible, nor useful, Nay that this is my fourth Principle.] He that believes Transubstantiation, can believe any thing; and he that says this, dares say every thing; for as that is infinitely impossible to sense and reason, so this is infinitely false in his own Conscience and experience. And the words, which in a few lines of his bold assertion he hath quoted out of my book, confute him but too plainly. [He tells us, (so saith I. S.) the Fathers are a good testimony of the do∣ctrine deliver'd from their Forefathers down to them, of what the Church esteemed the way of salvation.] Do not I also (though he is pleas'd to take no notice of it) say, that although we acknowledge not the Fathers as the Authors and finishers of our faith, yet we owne them as helpers of our faith, and heirs of the doctrine Apo∣stolical: That we make use of their testimonies as being (as things now stand) to the sober and the moderate, the peaceable and the wise, the best, the most certain, visi∣ble and tangible, most humble and satisfactory to them that know well how to use it. Can he that says this, not acknowledge the Fathers useful? I know not whether I. S. may have any credit as he is one of the Fathers, but as he is a witness, no man hath reason to take his word.

But to the thing in question, Whatever we Protestants think or say; yet I. S. saith [our constant and avowed doctrine (meaning of the Church of Rome) is, that the testimony of Fathers speaking of them properly as such is infallible. If this be the avowed doctrine of the

Roman Church, then I shall prove, that one of the avowed doctrines of that Church is false. And second∣ly, I shall also prove that many of the most eminent Do∣ctors of the Church, are not of that mind, and therefore it is not the constant doctrine, as indeed amongst them few doctrines are.

1. It is false that the Testimony of the Fathers speaking of them properly as such is infallible. For God only is true, and every man a lyar; and since the Fathers never pretended to be assisted by a supernatural mi∣raculous aide, or inspired by an infallible spirit; and in∣fallibility is so far beyond humane nature, and industry, that the Fathers may be called Angels much rather than infallible; for if they were assisted by an infallible spirit, what hinders but that their writings might be Canonical Scrip∣tures? And if it be said they were assisted infallibly in some things and not in all, it is said to no purpose; for unless it be infallibly known where the infallibility resides, and what is so certain as it cannot be mistaken, every man must tread fearfully, for he is sure the Ice is broken in many places, and he knows not where it will hold. It is certain S. Austin did not think the Fathers before him to be infallible, when it is plain that in many doctrines, as in the damnation of infants dying Unbaptiz'd, and especially in questions oc∣curring in the disputes against the Pelagians about free will, and predestination, without scruple he rejected the do∣ctrines of his predecessors. And when in a question be∣tween himself and S. Hierom about S. Peter, and the second chapter to the Galatians, he was press'd with the authority of six or seven Greek Fathers; he roundly an∣swered, that he gave no such honour to any writers of books, but to the Scriptures, only as to think them not to have erred;* 1.17 other Authors he read so as to believe them if they were prov'd by Scriptures, or probable reason. Not because they thought so, but because he thought them prov'd. And he appeals to S. Hierom, whether he were

not of the same minde concerning his own works. And for that S. Hierom hath given satisfaction to the world in di∣vers places of his own writings.* 1.18 I suppose Origen is for his learning to be read as Tertullian, Novatus, Ar∣nobius, Apollinarius, and some writers Greek and La∣tin, that we chuse out that which is good and avoid the contrary. So that it is evident the Fathers them∣selves have no conceit of the infallibility of themselves or others (the Prophets, and Apostles, and Evangelists only excepted,) and therefore if this be an avowed doctrine of the Roman Church, there is no oral tradition for it, no first and self evident principle to prove it; and either the Fathers are deceiv'd in saying they are fallible, or they are not: If they be deceiv'd in saying so, then that suffici∣ently proves that they can be deceiv'd, and therefore that they are not infallible; but if they be not deceiv'd in say∣ing that they are fallible; then it is certain that they are fallible, because they say they are, and in saying so are not deceiv'd. But then, if in this the Fathers are not deceiv'd, then the Church of Rome in one of her a∣vowed doctrines is deceiv'd, saying otherwise of the Fa∣thers than is true and contrary to what themselves, said of themselves.

But 2. If it be the avowed doctrine of the Church of Rome, (as I. S. says it is) yet I am sure it is not their con∣stant doctrine. Certain it is S. Austin was not infallible, for he retracted some things he had said; and in Gratians time, neither S. Austin nor any of the Fathers were esteem∣ed infallible, and this appears in nine chapters together of the ninth distinction of Gratians decree,* 1.19 but because this truth was too plain to serve the interest of the following ages; the gloss upon cap. Nolo meis, tells us plainly, that this was to be understood according to those times, when the works of S. Austin and of the other holy Fa∣thers were not authentic, but now all of them are commanded to be held to the last title; and a marginal

note upon the gloss says, Scripta Sanctorum sunt ad un∣guem observanda. So that here is plain variety, and no constant oral tradition from S. Austins time down∣wards, that his and the fathers writings were infallible, till Gratians time it was otherwise, and after him, till the gloss was written. It is as Solomon says, There is a time for every thing under the Sun. There is a time in which the writings of the Fathers are authentic, and a time in which they are not: But then this is not setled, no constant business. Now I would fain know whether Gratian spake the sense of the Church of his age or no? If no, then the Fathers were of one mind, and the Church of his age of a contrary; and then which of them was infallible? But if yea, then how comes the present Church to be of another mind now? And which of the two ages that contradict each other hath got the ball, which of them carries the infalli∣bility? Well! however it come to pass; yet the truth is, I. S. does wrong to his own Church, and they never decreed or affirm'd the Fathers to be infallible. And therefore the Glossator upon Gratian was an ignorant man, and his gloss ridiculous, Ecce quales sunt decretorum glossato∣res, quibus tanta fides adhibetur; said A. Castor, and Duns Scotus gave a good character of them; Mittunt & remittunt & tandem nihil ad propositum. But the mistake of this ignorant Glossator is apparent to be upon the account of the words of Gelasius in dist. 15. cap. San∣cta Rom. Eccl. where when he had reckon'd divers of the Fathers writings, which the Church receives; he hath these words, Item Epistola B. Leonis Papae ad Flavi∣anum Episcopum C. P. destinatum, cujus textum aut unum iota si quisquam idiota disputaverit, & non eam in omnibus venerabiliter acceperit, anathema fit Now although this reaches not neer to infallibility, but only to a non disputare, and a venerabiliter accipere, and that by idiots only, and therefore can do I. S. no service, yet this which Gelasius speaks of S. Leo's Epistle to Flavia∣nus

the Glossator falsly applies to all the works of the Fa∣thers, against the mind of the Fathers themselves quoted by Gratian in the ninth distinction, and against the sense of Gelasius himself in that very chapter which he refers to in the fifteenth distinction. It may be I. S. had not so much to say for his bold proposition as this it self comes to, which if he had ever seen, he must needs have seen in the same place very much to the contrary. But that not only the Fathers themselves have taught him to speak more modestly of them than he does, and that divers leading men of his Church have reprov'd this foolish affir∣mative of his, he may be satisfied if he please to read A∣quinas Authoritatibus Canonicae Scripturae utitur sacra doctrina ex necessitate argumentando,* 1.20 authori∣tatibus autem aliorum Doctorum Ecclesiae quasi arguendo ex propriis sed probabiliter. Now I know not what hopes of escaping I. S. can have by his restrictive terms [the testimony of Fathers speaking of them properly as such] for besides that the words mean nothing, and the testimony of Fathers is the testimony of Fathers as such, or it is just nothing at all: Besides this I say, that Aquinas affirms that their whole authority (and therefore of Fathers as such) is only probable, and therefore cer∣tainly not infallible. But this is so fond a proposition of I. S. that I am asham'd to speak any more of it; and if he were not very ignorant of what his Church holds,* 1.21 he would never have said it.* 1.22 But for his better information, I de∣sire the Gentleman to read Alphonsus a Castro, Melehior Canus and Bellarmine.* 1.23

It is not therefore the constant doctrine of the Romanists, that the Fathers are infallible; for I never read or heard any man say it but I. S. and neither is it the avowed do∣ctrine of that Church, unless he will condemn all them for heretics that deny it; some of which I have already nam'd, and more will be added upon this occasion.

Well! but how shall we know that the Fathers testimony, is a testimony of Fathers speaking properly as such? for this doughty Question we are to inquire after in the pursuit of I. S. his mines and crackers: He says in two cases they speak as Fathers. 1. When they declare it the doctrine of the present Church of their time. 2. When they write against any man as an heretic, or his Tenet as heresie. It seems then in these the Fathers testimony is infallible. Let us try this, 1. All or any thing of this may be done by Fathers supposed such, but really, not so: and if it be not infallibly certain which are and which are not the writings of the Fathers; we are nothing the neerer though it were agreed, that the true Fathers testimony is infal∣lible. Or 2. If the book alledged was the book of the Fa∣ther pretended, and not of an obscure or heretical person; yet it may be the words are interpolated, or the testimony some way or other corrupted; and then the testimony is not infallible, when there is no absolute certainty of the wit∣nesses themselves or the records: and what causes there are of rejecting very many, and doubting more; and there∣fore in matters of present interest and Question of Uncer∣tainty and fallibility in too many, is known to every lear∣ned man, and confessed by writers of both sides. 2. It is very seldom that any of the Fathers do use that expression of saying, This or this is the doctrine of the Church; and therefore if they speak as Fathers, never but when these two cases happen; the writings of the Fathers will be of very little use in I. S.'s way. 3. And yet after all this, if we shall descend to instances I. S. will not dare to justifie what he says. Was Justin Martyr infallible, when he said that all Christians who were pure believers did believe the Millenary doctrine? Certainly they were the Church, for the others he says were such as denied the resurrection. But was Gennadius or else S. Austin fathers; and they infallible in the book de dogmatibus Ecclesiasticis, in which he intends to give an account of the doctrine of the

Church; I. S. Seems to acknowledge it by affirming a say∣ing out of that book to have been then de fide; which be∣cause it had been oppos'd by very many of the fathers, he had no reason to affirm, but upon the witness of Gennadius putting it into his book of Ecclesiastical doctrines; and he afterwards calls it the testimony of Gennadius deliver∣ing the doctrine of the Catholic Church.* 1.24 It is there said, that all men shall die (Christ only excepted) that death might reign from Adam upon all. Hanc ratio∣nem maxima Patrum turba tradente suscepimus: This account we have receiv'd from the tradition of the greatest company of the Fathers. If this be a traditi∣on delivered by the greatest number of the fathers, then 1. Tradition is not a sure rule of saith; for this tradition is false, and expresly against Scripture: and 2. It follows that Tradition was not then esteemed a sure rule of faith; for although this was a tradition from so great a troop of fathers (at he says it was) yet there were in his time, alii aeque Catholici & eruditi viri, others as good Catholics and as learned, that believ'd (as S. Paul believ'd) that we shall not all dye, but we shall all be chang'd; and however it be; yet all that troop of fathers he speaks of, from whence the tradition came, were not infallible, for they were actually deceiv'd. Now this instance is of great consideration and force, against I. S. his first and self evi∣dent principle concerning oral tradition. For all that num∣ber of fathers if the rule of faith had been only oral tra∣dition, would horribly have disturbed the pure current of tradition, and of necessity must have prevailed in I. S. his way, or at least the contrary (which is the truth, and expresly affirm'd in Scripture) could never have had the irrefragable testimony of oral tradition. But thanks be to God, in this the Church adher'd to the surer word of Prophecy, the Scripture prov'd the surer rule of faith. But again S. Austin or Gennadius says, That after Christs resurrection the souls of all the Saints are with

Christ, and that going forth from the body, they go to Christ expecting the resurrection of their bodies. This he delivers as the Ecclesiastical doctrine; and do the Pa∣trons of Purgatory believe him in this to be infallible? for my part I think S. Austin is in the right; but I think I. S. will not grant this to be the avowed and constant doctrine of his Church.

The second case, in which they speak as Fathers, is when they write against any man as an heretic, or his tenet as heresy. But this is so notoriously false, as nothing is more; and it is infinitely confuted by all the Catalogues and books of the fathers reckoning the heresies; where they are pleased to call all opinions they like not, by the names of heresy.* 1.25 Philastrius writes against them as heretics, and puts them in his black Catalogue, who expounds that of making man in the image and likeness of God, spoken of in Genesis, to signifie the reasonable soul, and not rather the Grace of the Holy Spirit. He also accounts them he∣retics who rejected the LXX, and followed the translation of Aquila, which in the Ancient Church was in great repu∣tation. Some there were who said that God hardned the heart of Pharaoh,* 1.26 and these he calls heretics, and yet this heresy is the very words of Scripture;* 1.27 and some are reckon'd heretics for saying that the Deluge of Deu∣calion and Pyrrha was before Noahs flood. But more consider able is that heresy,* 1.28 which affirm'd that Christ de∣scended into hell, and there preach'd to the detained, that they who would confess him might be sav'd. Now if Philastrius or any other writer of heretics, were in this case infallible, what shall become of many of the Or∣thodox fathers who taught this now condemned doctrine. So did Clemens Alexandrinus, Anastasius Sinaita, S. Athanasius, S. Hierom, S. Ambrose, and divers others of the most eminent fathers; and S. Austin affirm'd that Christ did save some; but whether all the damned then or no; he could not resolve Euodius who ask'd the que∣stion* 1.29.

That it was not lawful for Christians to swear at all upon any account, was unanimously taught by S. Hilary, and S. Hierom, S. Chrysostom, S. Ambrose, and Theo∣phylact,* 1.30 no not cum exigitur jus-jurandum, aut cum urget necessitas; and that it is crimen Gehenna dig∣num, a damnable sin. Whether that was the doctrine of the Church of Rome in those days, I say not; but if it were, why is the Church of Rome of a contrary judgement now? If it were not, then a consenting testimony of many fathers even of the greatest ranke, is no irrefragable argu∣ment of the truth, or Catholic tradition; and from so great an union of such an authority, it was not very hard to imagine, that the opinion might have become Catholic; from a lesser spring greater streams have issued; but it is more than probable, that there was no Catholic oral tra∣dition concerning this main and concerning article; and I am sure I. S. will think, that all these fathers were not only fallible, but deceiv'd actually in this point.

By these few instances we may plainly see, what little of infallibility there is in the fathers writings, when they write against heretics or heresies, or against any article; and how then shall we know that the fathers are at all, or in any case infallible? I know not from any thing more that is said by I. S. But this I know, that many chief men of his side do speak so slightly, and undervalue the fa∣thers so pertly, that I fear it will appear that the Pro∣testants have better opinion of them, and make better use of the Fathers than themselves.* 1.31 What think we of the saying of Cardinal Cajetan? If you chance to meet with any new exposition which is agreeable to the Text, &c. although perhaps it differ from that which is given by the whole current of the Holy Doctors, I desire the Readers that they would not too hastily re∣ject it. And again, Let no man therefore reject a new exposition of any passage of Scripture, under pre∣tence

that it is contrary to what the Ancient Doctors gave.* 1.32 What think we of those words of Petavius? There are many things by the most Holy Fathers scattered, especially S. Chrysostom in his Homilies, which if you would accommodate to the rule of exact truth, they will seem to be void of good sense.* 1.33 And again, there is cause why the authority of certain Fathers should be objected, for they can say nothing but what they have learned from S. Luke; neither is there any reason, why we should rather interpret S. Luke by them, than those things which they say by S. Luke. And Maldonate does expresly reject the exposition which all the Authors,* 1.34 which he had read except S. Hilary, give of those words of Christ, The gates of hell shall not pre∣vail against it.* 1.35 Michael Nedina accuses S. Hierom as being of the Aerian heresy, in the Qu. of Episcopacy, and he proceeds further to accuse S. Ambrose, S. Austin, Se∣dulius, Primasius, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Oecume∣nius and Theophylact of the same heresy. And Corne∣lius Mussus the Bishop of Bitonto, expresly affirms, that he had rather believe one single Pope,* 1.36 than a thousand Augustines, Hierom's or Gregories. I shall not need any further to instance how the Council of Trent hath de∣creed many things against the general doctrines of the fa∣thers; as in the placing images in Churches; the denying of the Eucharist to Infants; the not including the Blessed Virgin Mary in the general evil of Mankind in the impu∣tation of Adams sin, denying the Chalice to the Laity, and Priests not officiating, the beatification and Divine vision of Saints before the day of judgment. If it were not notorious, and sometimes confessed, that these things are contrary to the sense of a troop of fathers, there might be some excuse made for them, who give them good words, and yet reject their authorities so freely, that it sometimes seems to pass into scorn. But now it appears to be to little purpose,* 1.37 that the Council of Trent enjoyns

her Clergy, that they offer not to expound Scripture against the unanimous consent of the fathers; for (though this a∣mounts not to the height of I. S. his saying, it is their avowed and constant doctrine, that they are infallible, but ad coercenda petulantia ingenia) the contrary is done and avowed every day. And as the fathers prov'd them∣selves fallible, both as such in writing against here∣tics, and in testifying concerning the Churches doctrine in their age; so in the interpretations of Scripture, in which although there be no Universal consent of Fathers in any interpretation of Scripture, concerning which questi∣ons mov'd; so the best and most common consent that is, men of great note recede from it with the greater boldness, by how much they hope to raise to themselves the greater re∣putation for wit and learning.* 1.38 And therefore although in the sixth General Council, the Origenists were condem∣ned, for bringing in interpretations differing from those that went before them; and in the Synod in Trullo* 1.39, all Cu∣rates of souls were commanded to interpret Scriptures, so as not to transgress the bounds and tradition of the fathers; and the same was the way taken in the Council of Vienna, and commanded since in the Lateran under Leo the tenth, and at last in Trent, yet all this was but good advice, which when the following Doctors pretended to follow, they nevertheless still took their liberty, and went their own way, and if they followed some of the Fathers, they re∣ceded from many others; for none of them esteem'd the way infallible; but they that did not think their own way better, left their own reason and followed their autho∣rity. But of late, knowledge is increased, at least ma∣ny writers think so; and though the Ancient interpretati∣ons were more honoured,* 1.40 than new; yet Salmeron says plainly, that the younger Doctors are better sighted and more perspicacious. And the Question being about the conception of the Blessed Virgin, without original sin; a∣gainst which a multitude of fathers are brought: the Jesuit

answers the argument with the words in Exodus 23. Thou shalt not follow a multitude to sin. And to the same purpose S. Austin answered the Donatists.* 1.41 But of this I shall afterwards have occasion to speak more particularly. In the mean time it must needs be acknowledged, that the Protestants cannot more slight the Fathers, than the Je∣suites do, and divers other Doctors of the Church of Rome; though I think both of them do equally think them to be fallible.

Well! but at last, of what use are the Fathers to Pro∣testants in their writings? And what use do I or can I make of them in my Dissuasive? First for the Protestants, the Church of England can very well account by her Canon, in which she follows the Council in Trullo, and the sixth Ge∣neral Synod, and ties her Doctors, as much as the Coun∣cil of Trent does, to expound Scriptures according to the sense of the Ancient Fathers; and indeed it is the best way for most Men, and it is of great use to all men so to do. For the Fathers were good men and learned; and inte∣rest, and partiality, and error had not then invaded the world so much, as they have since done. The Papacy, that great fountain of error and servile learning, had not so debaucht the world, and all that good which can be supposed could be ministred by the piety and learning of so many excellent persons, all that we can use, and we do make use of it upon all just occasions. They speak reason and religion in their writings, and when they do so, we have reason to make use of the good things, which by their labours God intended to convey to us. They were better than other men, and wiser than most men, and their Au∣thority is not at all contemptible, but in most things highly to be valued: And is at the worst a very probable induce∣ment. Are not the books of the Canonists and Casuists in a manner little else than a heap of quotations out of their predecessors writings? Certainly we have much more reason to value the authority of the Ancient Fathers.

And now since I. S. requires an account from me in parti∣cular, and thinks I have no right to use them;* 1.42 I shall ren∣der him an account of this also. But first let us see what his charge is. He says indeed I tell him, that the Fa∣thers are a good testimony of the doctrine delivered from their Forefathers down to them of what the Church esteemed the way of salvation. I did tell them so indeed; and in the same place I said, that we admit the Fathers, as admirable helps for the understanding of the Scriptures. I told them both these things together; and therefore I. S. may blush with shame for telling us, that it appears by the Dissuader that the Protestants do not acknowledge the Fathers infallible or useful. But then in what degree of usefulness the Fathers are admitted by us, we may perceive by the instances, of which the one being the interpretation of Scriptures, it is evident, be∣cause of their great variety and contrariety of interpretati∣ons, we do not admit them as infallible, but yet of admi∣rable use; so in the testimony which they give of the do∣ctrines of their forefathers concerning the way of salvation, we give as great credit as can be due to any relator, except him that is infallible.

—Pro magno teste vetustas Creditur,* 1.43 acceptam parce movere fidem.

Nay we go something further; for although in asserting and affirming, in teaching and delivering positively, we do believe them with great veneration, but not without li∣berty and inquiry; yet when we make use of them in a ne∣gative way, we find use of them, much nearer to infalli∣bility, than all the demonstrations of surefooting. For the argument lies thus:* 1.44 In the ages succeeding the three first, secular interest did much prevail, the writings of the Fathers were vast and voluminous, full of con∣troversie and ambiguous senses, fitted to their own

times and questions, full of proper opinions and such variety of sayings, that both sides eternally and incon∣futably shall bring sayings for themselves respectively. This ground I lay of the ensuing argument, and upon this I build immediately; That things being thus, that is, in the ages succeeding the first three (the primitive and purest) the case being so vastly changed, the books so vast, the words so many, the opinions so proper, the contrariety so apparent; it is very possible that two litigants shall from them pretend words serving their distinct hypothesis, especially when they come to wrangle about the interpreta∣tions of ambiguous sayings, and of things so disputed there can be no end, no determination. And therefore it will be impossible for the Roman Doctors to conclude from the sayings of a number of Fathers, (viz. in the latter and succeeding ages of the Church; for of them only the ar∣gument does treat) that their doctrine which they would prove thence was the Catholic doctrine of the Church. And the reason of this is deriv'd from the ground I laid for the argument, because these Fathers are often∣times gens contra gentem; and sometimes one man against himself, and sometimes changing his doctrine, and sometimes speaking in heat, and disputing fiercely, and striving by all means to prevail and conquer heretics; and therefore a testimony of many of them consenting, is not a sufficient argument to prove a doctrine Catholic; unless all consent in this case, the major part will not prove a do∣ctrine Catholic: Of this I have given divers instances al∣ready, and shall add more in the Section of Tradition; for the present I shall only recite the words of the Bishop of the Canaries (a great Man amongst them) to attest what I say.* 1.45 Tertia Conclusio. Plurium sanctorum autho∣ritas, reliquis licet paucioribus reclamantibus firma argumenta Theologo sufficere & praestare non valet. If the Major part of Fathers consenting be not a sufficient argument, as Canus here expresly says, then no argument

from the authority of Fathers can prove it Catholic, un∣less it be Universal. Not that it is requir'd, that each single point be proved by each single Father, as I. S. most weakly would infer; for that indeed is morally impossible; but that when the Fathers of the later ages of whom we speak are divided in sentence and interest, neither from the lesser number nor yet from the greater can you con∣clude any Catholic consent. Ecclesia Universalis nunquam errat quia nunquam tota errat; it is not to be imputed to the Universal Church, unless all of it agree, and by this Abulensis asserts the indefectibility of the Church of God;* 1.46 it never erres because all of it does never erre.

And therefore here is wholly a mistake; for to prove a point de fide from the authority of the Fathers, we re∣quire an Universal consent. Not that it is expected that every mans hand that writes should be at it, or every mans vote that can speak should be to it, for this were unreasonable; but an Universal consent is so required, that is, that there be no dissent by any Fathers equally Catholic and reputed. Reliquis licet paucioribus re∣clamantibus; if others though the fewer number do dissent, then the Major part is not testimony sufficient. And therefore when Vincentius Lirinensis and Thomas of Walden affirmed, that the consent of the Major part of Fathers from the Apostles downwards is Catholic; Canus expounds their meaning to be, in case that the few Dissentients have been condemned by the Church, then the Major part must carry it; Thus when some of the Fathers said that Melchisedeck was the Holy Ghost, here the Major part carried it, because the opinion of the Minor part was condemned by the Church. But let me add one caution to this, that it may pass the better. Unless the Church of that age, in which a Minor part of Fathers contradicts a greater, do give testimo∣ny in behalf of the Major part, (which thing I think never

was done, and is not indeed easie to be supposed) though the following ages reject the Minor part, it is no ar∣gument that the doctrine of the Major part was the Ca∣tholic doctrine of that age. It might by degrees become Universal, that was not so at first; and therefore, un∣less the whole present age do agree, that is, unless of all that are esteemed Orthodox there be a present consent, this broken consent is not an infallible testimony of the Ca∣tholicism of the doctrine. And this is plain in the case of S. Cyprian and the African Fathers,* 1.47 denying the bap∣tism of heretics to be valid: Supposing a greater number of Doctors did at that time believe the contrary; yet their testimony is no competent proof, that the Church of that age was of their judgement; No, although the succeeding ages did condemn the opinion of the Afri∣cans; for the question now is not whether S. Cyprians doctrine be true or no, but whether it was the Catholic doctrine of the Church of that age. It is answered, it was not, because many Catholic Doctors of that age were against it, and for the same reason, neither was their doctrine the Catholic, because as wise and as learned men opposed them in it; and it is a frivolous pretence to say, that the contrary (viz. to S. Cypri∣ans doctrine) was found and defin'd to be the faith and the sense of the Church; for suppose it was, but then it became so by a new and later definition, not by the oral tradition of that present age; and therefore this will do I. S. no good, but help to overthrow his fond hypothesis. This or that might be a true doctrine, but not the doctrine of the then Catholic Church, in which the Catholics were so openly and with some earnestness divided. And therefore it was truly said in the Dissuasive,

That the clear saying of one or two of those Fathers, truly al∣ledged by us to the contrary, will certainly prove that what many of them (suppose it) do affirm, and which

but two or three as good Catholics do deny, was not then a matter of faith or a doctrine of the Church: If it had, these dissentients publicly owning and preach∣ing that doctrine, would have been no Catholics but Heretics.

Against this I. S. hath a pretty sophism, or if you please let it pass for one of his demonstrations.* 1.48 If one or two denying a point, which many (others) af∣firm, argues that it is not of faith; then a fortiori, if one or two affirm it to be of faith, it argues it is of faith, though many others deny it. This conse∣quent is so far from arising from the antecedent, that in the world nothing destroys it more. For, because the denial of one or two argues a doctrine is not Catholic though affirm'd by many, therefore it is impossible that the affirmation of one or two (when there be many dissen∣tients) should sufficiently prove a doctrine to be Catholic. The antecedent supposes that true which therefore con∣cludes the consequent to be false; for therefore the af∣firming a thing to be Catholic, by two or three, or twen∣ty, does not prove it to be so, unless all consent, be∣cause the denying it to be Catholic (which the antecedent supposes) by two or three, is a good testimony that it is not Catholic. I. S. his argument is like this; If the absence of a few makes the company not full, then the presence of a few when more are absent, a fortiori makes the company to be full. But because I must say nothing but what must be reduc'd to grounds, I have to shew the stupendious folly of this argument, a self evident Prin∣ciple, and that is, Bonum, and so, Verum, is ex integra causa, malum ex qualibet particulari; and a cup is broken, if but one piece of the lip be broken; but it is not whole, unless it be whole all over. And much more is this true, in a question concerning the Uni∣versality of consent, or of tradition. For I. S. does

praevaricate in the Question, which is, whether the te∣stimony be Universal if the particulars be not agreed; and he instead of that thrusts in another word which is no part of the Question: for so he changes it, by saying, the dissent of a few does not make but that the article is a point of faith; for though it cannot be supposed a point of faith, when any number of the Catholic Fathers do pro∣fess to believe a proposition contrary to it; yet possibly it will by some of his side be said to be a point of faith upon other accounts; as upon the Churches definition, or the authority of plain Scriptures, but this will be no∣thing to I. S. his hypothesis; for if a part of the Catholic Fathers did deliver the contrary, there was no irrefra∣gable, Catholic, Oral tradition of the Church, when so considerable a part of the Church delivered the contrary as their own doctrine, which is not to be imagin'd they would have done, if the consent of the Church of that age was against it. And if we can suppose this case that one part of the Fathers should say, this is the doctrine of the Church, when another part of the Fathers are of a contra∣ry judgment, either they did not say true, and then the Fathers testimony, speaking as witnesses of the doctrine of the Church of their age, is not infallible, or if they did say true, yet their testimony, was not esteemed sufficient; be∣cause the other Fathers who must needs know it, if it was the Catholic doctrine of the Church then, do not take it for truth or sufficient. And that Maxime which was recei∣ved in the Council of Trent, that a Major part of voices was sufficient for decreeing in a matter of reformati∣on; but that a decree of faith could not be made, if a considerable part did contradict, relies upon the same reason; faith is every mans duty, and every mans concern, and every mans learning; and therefore it is not to be sup∣posed that any thing can be an article of faith, in which a number of wise and good men are at difference, either as

Doctors, or as witnesses. And of this we have a great testimony from Vincentius Lirinensis.* 1.49 In ipsa item Ecclesia magnopere curandum est, ut id teneamus quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est: hoc est enim verè propriéque Catholicum. Not that which a part of the Fathers, but that which is said every where, always, and by all, that is truly and properly Chatholic; and this (says he) is greatly to be taken care of in the Catholic Church.

From all these premisses it will follow, that the Dissua∣sive did, or might to very good purpose, make use of the Fathers; and if I did there or shall in the following Secti∣ons make it appear, that in such an age of the Ancient Church, the doctrines which the Church of Rome at this day imposes on the world as articles of faith, were not then accounted articles of faith, but either were spo∣ken against, or not reckoned in their Canon and Confessions, it will follow that either they can make new articles of faith, or at least cannot pretend these to be articles of faith upon the stock of Oral Catholic tradition; for this cannot be at all, if the Catholic Fathers were (though Unequally) divided in their testimony.

The rest of I. S. his last Way or Mine is but bragging, and indeed this whole Appendix of his is but the dregs of his sure-footing, and gives but very little occasion of useful and material discourse. But he had formerly promised that he would give an account of My relying on Scripture, and here was the place reserved for it; but when he comes to it, it is nothing at all, but a reviling of it, calling of it a bare letter Unsens't, outward characters, Ink thus figur'd in a book; but whatsoever it is, he calls it my main, most fundamental, and in a manner my only principle; though he according to his usual method of say∣ing what comes next, had said before that I had no Prin∣ciple, and that I had many Principles. All that he adds

afterwards is nothing but the same talk over again concern∣ing the Fathers, of which I have given an account I hope full enough; and I shall add something more when I come to speak concerning the justification of the grounds of the Protestant and Christian religion. Only that I may be out of I. S. his debt, I shall make it appear that he and his party are the men that go upon no grounds, that in the Church of Rome there is no sure-footing, no certain acknowledged rule of faith; but while they call for an assent above the na∣ture and necessity of the thing, they have no warrant beyond the greatest Uncertainty, and cause their people to wander (that I may borrow I. S. his expression) in the very sphere of contingency.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Dr. H. H.
• * 1.2

  The fourth appendix to sure footing.
• * 1.3

  John. 5. 39.
• * 1.4

  John. 20. 31.
• * 1.5

  Acts 1.
• * 1.6

  2 Tim. 5. 14.
• * 1.7

  1641.
• * 1.8

  Page 258.
• * 1.9

  Deus neminem deserit nisi pri∣us deserentem.
• * 1.10

  Josh. 1. 5. 7.
• * 1.11

  Joh. 14. 15, 16, 17.
• * 1.12

  Perspiciensque hanc verita tem, & disci∣plinam conti∣neri in libris scriptis & sine scripto traditionibus—omnes li∣bros tamveteris quam N. T. nec non Traditiones ipsa••, &c. pari pietatis affectu ac reverentiâ suscipit & ve∣neratur.
• * 1.13

  Book 1. chap. pag. 124.
• * 1.14

  Collection of Polemical and moral discour∣ses, Pag. 703,
• * 1.15

  Corneli•• Fr. epist. 42. edit.
• * 1.16

  Rigalt. Paris, 1648.
• * 1.17

  Ep. S. Aug. ad Hierom. qu•• est. 19. Inter oper•• Hierom. 97. & multi•• ••liis locis.
• * 1.18

  S. Hierom. l. 2. apelog. contr. Ruff Epist. 62. ad Theoph. Alex Epist. 65 ad Pammach. & Ocean. & Epist. 76. ad Tranquil. epist. 13. ad Pauli∣num. & praefat. in lib. de Hebr. nomin.
• * 1.19

  Dist. 9. Decret. cap. Nolo meis.
• * 1.20

  Primâ parte q. 1. part. 8. ad 2. arg.
• * 1.21

  Lib. 1. adv. hae∣res. c. 7.
• * 1.22

  Lib. 7. loc. Theol c. 3. n. 4. &c.
• * 1.23

  De verb. Dei lib. 3. c. 10. Sect. Dices.
• * 1.24

  Pag. 315.
• * 1.25

  Haeres. 90.
• * 1.26

  Haeres. 77.
• * 1.27

  Haeres. 71.
• * 1.28

  Haeres. 74.
• * 1.29

  Vide Jacob. Vsser▪ primat. Hibern. cap. de limbo PP.
• * 1.30

  Vide Eras∣mum in decla∣rat. ad Censu∣ras Facult. Thed. Paris. p. 52. edit. Fro∣ben. A. D. 1532
• * 1.31

  Praefat. in Pen∣tateuch.
• * 1.32

  In Epiph. p. 244.
• * 1.33

  P. 110.
• * 1.34

  In Matth. 16. 18.
• * 1.35

  De sacr. tom. orig. & conti∣nentiâ apud Bellar. de Cler. lib. 1. cap. 15. vide etiam hist. Conc. Tri∣dent. l. 7.
• * 1.36

  In Epist. ad Rom. c. 14.
• * 1.37

  Sess. 4.
• * 1.38

  Sess. 11.
• * 1.39

  Canon. 19. ex divinâ scripturâ Col∣ligentes intel∣ligentias.
• * 1.40

  In Epist. ad Rom. 5 disp. 51 p. 468.
• * 1.41

  L. ••••ntr. Donat.
• * 1.42

  Pag. 312.
• * 1.43

  ••vid.
• * 1.44

  Chap. 1. Sect. 1: Dissuasive.
• * 1.45

  Melch. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 loc. Theol. lib. 7. cap. 3. n. 8.
• * 1.46

  Abulens. praef. in Matth. q. 3.
• * 1.47

  I. S. p. 3. 4.
• * 1.48

  Ibid.
• * 1.49

  Common. c. 3.