A brief disquisition of the law of nature according to the principles and method laid down in the Reverend Dr. Cumberland's (now Lord Bishop of Peterboroughs) Latin treatise on that subject : as also his confutations of Mr. Hobb's principles put into another method : with the Right Reverend author's approbation.

PRINCIPLE IV.

That Nature hath given to every one a right to all things. De Cive. C. 1. §. 10.

§. 1. THAT is (as he explains it) in a meer natural state, or before men were obliged to each other by any Compacts, it was lawful for every one to do all things whatsoe∣ver, and against whomsoever it pleased him so to do; and to possess, use, and enjoy all things, which he would or could; but Since whatsoever things any one would have, they either seemed good for himself, because he desires them, and do either conduce to his own preservation, or at least may seem to conduce to it: But whether those things do really conduce to this end, he supposes he hath in the former Article proved the Person him∣self to be sole judge. So that those must be coun∣ted as necessary means, which he judges as such: And by the 7th Article aforegoing, those things are done and enjoyed by the right of Nature, which do necessarily conduce to the preservation of his own life and members: Whence it follows, to have and do all things in the state of Nature, is lawful for all men; and this is what is commonly said, That Nature hath given all things to all men: From whence also it is understood, that in the state of nature, Profit or utility, is the measure of Right.

Which Argument in his Annotations to this Article, he thus explains and contracts.

This is so to be understood, that that which anyone may do, in a meer natural state, is injuri∣ous to no man: Not that in such a state it is im∣possible to sin against God, or to violate the Laws of Nature; but injustice towards men supposes Human Laws, which are not in the state of Na∣ture▪ But the truth of the proposition so under∣stood, is demonstrated to the mindful Reader, in the foregoing Paragraphs: But because in some cases, the hardness of the Conclusion drives out the memory of the Premises, he contracts the Ar∣gument, and lays it thus to be seen at once; By Art, the 7th it is proved, that every one hath a right of preserving himself; and by Art. the 8th. Therefore the same person hath a right to use all means necessary thereunto. But by Art. the 9th, Those means are necessary, which he shall judge to be so. Therefore the same person hath a right to have, and possess all things which he shall judge necessary for his own preservation: Therefore in the judgment of the doer, that which is done, ei∣ther by Right, or by Injury. Therefore it is done by Right, because in the state of Nature nothing is injurious.

I have made bold to add this last Clause from what went before, because otherwise the Argument is imperfect.

Therefore it is evidently true, That in a mere natural State, every man hath a right to all things.

§. 2. For the destroying of which Princi∣ple, as also for the answering the Arguments which he brings to support it, I shall in the first place observe, That the Author's Conclu∣sion▪ which he makes from his Premises in his Annotations, viz. That every man hath a right to do, and possess all things which himself shall judge necessary for his own preservation, is not the same which he draws from the same Pre∣mises in the Text, (viz.) That every man hath a right to have, and do all things in the state of Nature. For indeed from his own Principles no other Conclusion can follow, than what he hath now drawn from thence in his Annota∣tion; for no man in his right Senses ever yet judged, that to have, and do all things what∣ever, was absolutely necessary for his pre∣servation; only that he had a right indefi∣nitely to as many of them as he should judge necessary for this End. 2dly, Neither ought a man in the state of Nature to propose the bare preservation of his own Life, and Mem∣bers, as the only end of living, since that may be enjoyed by those who are really very mise∣rable, as may be observed in such as labour under tedious and constant Infirmities, or are

condemned to the Mines, or Gallies, or suf∣fer themselves to be carried away by any do∣mineering, or irrational Appetite or Passion▪And if the preservation of a man's Life and Members, were the only ends of life; then if another in the state of Nature should threaten to kill or maim him, unless he would deny, or blaspheme God, or murther his Father, it were upon this Principle lawful, nay necessa∣ry for him so to do; it being the only means by which he could preserve his life and Limbs. 3dly, Neither doth any man's rash or false judgment, that such a thing is necessary for his own preservation, confer on him a right to that thing; for then God had given him a right to all things they should in any passion, or rash and inconsiderate humour fancy necessary for that end, tho it really tended to their de∣struction, or that of other innocent men; So that if a man should think the blood of his dearest Friend would cure him of some Distemper he lay under, he might lawfully upon this Prin∣ciple murther him (if he could do it safely); And then God should have given men a right of destroying themselves and others, whenever they thought (though falsly) that it conduced to their preservation, the satisfa∣ction of their unreasonable Appetites or Hu∣mours: since such an unlimited Right, or ra∣ther License, can be so far from conducing to

any man's preservation, that if any men should ever have gone about to put it in practice, it would have long since produced not only their own destruction, but that of all Man∣kind.

§. 3. And if Mr. H. his own definition of right Reason be true, Art. 7th of this Chap∣ter, That it is a liberty of using a man's Faculties according to right Reason; then certainly right Reason can never judge contradictory Propo∣sitions to be true, as that I should in the state of Nature have a right to all things my Neigh∣bour was possessed of, and his life into the bargain, if I thought it might conduce to my self-preservation; and that this should be likewise as true, and rational a conclusion, that he should have the like right against me; since the word right is never used by any Wri∣ters of this Subject, but with respect to some Law, either Natural, or Civil, which Mr. H. acknowledges in the next Chapter, Art. 1st, in these words. But since all do grant that to be done by Right, which is not done contrary to right Reason, we ought to suppose that done by Injury, which is repugnant to right reason; or which contradicts some truth collected from true Principles by right Reason; but that is done by Injury, which is done against some Law, therefore right Reason is a certain Law, which is called na∣tural,

since it is not less a part of Humane Na∣ture than any other Faculty or Affection of the Mind: as Mr. H. himself confesses in this 2d Chapter of this Treatise De Cive, §. 1. tho he strives to avoid the force of it in his Anno∣tations to this Article; where, by right Rea∣son in the state of Nature, he tells us, He does not thereby understand (as many do) any infallible Faculty in men, but the Act of Ratio∣cination; that is, every man's own true reason concerning his own Actions, as they may redound to the profit or hurt of himself, or other men; and the reason why he calls it a mans own Reason, is, that though in a Commonwealth the reason thereof, that is, the Civil Law, is to be taken as right by all the Subjects; yet out of a Common∣wealth, where no man can distinguish right Rea∣son from false, but by comparing it with his own, every man's own Reason is not only to be taken for the Rule of his own Actions, but also in his own Affairs, for the measure of all other mens Reason: But how this will agree with what follows, I cannot tell; When he calls right Reason that which concludes from true Principles; because that in false ratiocination, or in the folly of men not observing those duties towards others which are ne∣cessary to their own preservation, consists all the violation of natural Laws.

But how false ratiocination, or folly, should give them a right to all they have a mind to

act thus towards others, I cannot apprehend; but from these words of Mr. H. I shall only observe, That though I do not suppose Rea∣son to be any infallible Faculty, any more than the casting up of an Account into a Sum total, though false, to be right Arith∣metick, or true Counting; yet by right Reason, when it is not erroneous, is to be understood the true exercise of that Facul∣ty; not erroneous in its judgments, and there∣fore doth not consist in the bare act of Ra∣tiocination, but in its true effects; that is, when true Propositions, or Premises, being laid up in the memory, those Conclusions are drawn from thence, which when they are practical, and contain true moral Rules of life, are called Laws of Nature.

§. 4. And therefore it is not true, that in a Commonwealth the publick Reason, or Law thereof, are to be always taken for Right; for then if the Laws of the Common∣wealth should enact Parricide, Ingratitude, and breach of Faith, to be exercised as Vertues, and to conduce to the good and preservation of Mankind, they would presently become so; which, I suppose, neither this Author, nor any rational Man would affirm. Nor is his other Proposition any truer, that out of a Commonwealth, no man can distinguish right Reason from false, but by comparing it

with his own; and therefore that must be the measure of all his Actions, from whence he deduces the right of all men to all things; which Argument I shall reduce into the form of a Syllogism, that you may the better judge of its truth. It is lawful in the state of Nature for every one to possess all things, and to do all things towards all men, which some Iudge shall judge necessary for the preservation of his own life and Members: But those things that every man himself shall judge to be necessary to his pre∣servation, those the only Iudge in this case judges to be necessary for this end; (for he had proved before, that himself is the only Judge in the state of Nature, what things are necessary for his preservation;) therefore to have, and do all things, &c. is necessary for a man's own preser∣vation. In which Syllogism the major is cer∣tainly false, because though a man's self be the sole Judge in the state of Nature, yet he may give a false Sentence, and suppose those things to be necessary for his preservation which really are not; neither is there any reason that in the state of Nature, any more than in a Civil State, the bare Sentence of a Judge should confer a true and equitable Right on any man to an Estate, if the Judge determines contrary to all the Rules of Law and Equity. So likewise in the state of Na∣ture, a man's own judgment can confer no

Right upon him, when he quits the only true Rules of his Judgment, which in this State can only be the Laws of Nature, or right Rea∣son, and the nature of things, and Mankind, from whence only they are drawn. Nor can there be any State supposed, either Natural, or Civil, in which there is no Rule of Hu∣mane Judgment, or that whatsoever a man's mind shall rashly suppose things to be, that they must presently become such as he hath fancied them: Since the utility of things ne∣cessary for the preservation of Humane Na∣ture depend not upon mens rash judgments, but upon the force of their natural Causes; and a man by thus falsly judging, that he had a right to all things that he hath a mind to, and that they are absolutely necessary for his preservation, can no more make them become so, than if he should judge that Ratsbane were Sugar-candy, it would be thereby pre∣sently turned into wholsome Food: So like∣wise those general, and universal Causes, which procure the preservation, or mischief of Mankind, do depend upon such fixt Princi∣ples in Nature, as are not to be altered by the judgment of any Judge, whether he be a sin∣gle man in the state of Nature, or the Su∣pream Powers in a Commonwealth.

§. 5. But this Error of Mr. H. concern∣ing the force of his Sentence, which thus fals∣ly pronounces an absolute Dominion over all men, and all things, to be necessary for his preservation, and thereby to confer a Right thereunto; seems to proceed from hence, That he having observed in a Civil State the Sentence of the Supream Magistrate, or Judge, had that force with the Subjects, that whether his Sentence were according to the Rules of Law, or natural Equity, or not, it was nevertheless to be obeyed, and submitted to: Whereas this Submission proceeds whol∣ly from their Consents who instituted the Commonwealth, in order to the publick Good, and for the putting some end to Con∣troversies; since all the Subjects must submit to the Judgment of the Supream Power, or Magistrate, whether it be right or wrong; because they are all satisfied, that it conduces more to their common quiet and safety, that some few should sometimes suffer through an unjust Judgment, than that Controversies should be endless, or at least not without Civil Wars, or Disturbances. So that it is evident, That it is only from a greater care of the Com∣mon Good, than of the Lives or Estates of any particular person that lays a foundation for this Prerogative, which though I grant be∣longs to all Supream Powers, yet if this once

come to be generally and notoriously abused by constant course of wilful Violence, Op∣pression and Injustice, so that the Subjects cannot longer bear it, they will quickly make their appeal somewhere else, unless they are hindred by some predominant Power, or Force over them.

§. 6. But on the other side it is certain, That men in the state of Nature cannot ad∣mit of any final Judgment, or determination of a doubt or difference, besides an evidence either from the things themselves, or from that trust or credit they place in some mens either Judgment or Testimony, whereby all manner of doubt or scruple is clearly remo∣ved out of the minds of the Parties concern∣ed; and that it appears evident to them, that they are not imposed upon; neither can there be any end of debates amongst divers Pre∣tenders, unless one Party being convinced by the strength of the other's Reasons, come over to his, or their Opinion; or else being satis∣fied of the Knowledge and Integrity of some third Person, as an Arbitrator, do willingly submit to his Sentence.

§. 7. For Humane Nature will ever ac∣knowledge a difference between right Rea∣son, and false; and between a just, and an

unjust Judgment; and 'tis only Truth and right Reason that have this Prerogative, that they can confer a right on us of doing those things which they prescribe. For even Mr. H. in his definition of Right, acknow∣ledges, that it is only a liberty of using our Faculties according to right Reason; where∣as all Error, or false Judgment, whether it be concerning Necessaries for the preserva∣tion of Life, or in any other practical matter, can give no man a right of doing that which he then falsly judges necessary for his preser∣vation. And therefore Mr. H's Conclusion, where he acknowledges at last, That right Reason is that which concludes from true Princi∣ples; and likewise that in the false reasoning, and folly of men, in not understanding their Duties towards other men, consists all the violation of the Laws of Nature; grants as much as I can de∣sire; but how this will agree with that loose definition of Reason, where he supposes every man's reason to be alike right, I desire any of his Disciples to shew me. Therefore to con∣clude, I can only allow that to be practical right Reason, which gives us leave to under∣take things reasonable and possible, and that forbids a man to arrogate to himself alone a dominion over all men, and all things, which is needless and impossible, indeed wholly per∣nicious to his preservation.

§. 8. But to avoid this difficulty, Mr. H. and his Followers fly to the Subterfuge of a natural necessity in men, that so judge thus falsly, and act contrary to the Laws of Na∣ture, or Reason: And therefore in his Preface to this Treatise, he supposes all men to be evil by Nature, and makes them necessarily determi∣ned by their Appetites and Passions (before they are endued with Reason and Discipline) to act mis∣chievously, and unreasonably; and therefore tells us, that Children, unless you give them every thing they desire, cry, and are angry, and will strike their very Fathers and Mothers; and it is by nature they do so, and yet are blameless; as well because they cannot hurt, as also that wanting the use of Reason, they are yet free from all its Duties: But the same persons, when grown up, and having got strength enough to hurt, if they hold on to do the same things, they then begin both to be, and to be called evil. So that a wicked man is almost the same thing, as an overgrown Child, or a man of a childish disposition, because there is the same defect of Reason at that age, in which by Nature, improved by Discipline, and experi∣ence of its inconveniencies, it commonly happens to be amended. So likewise the Author of Tractatus Theologico Politicus, who more open∣ly than Mr. H. (but upon the same Principles) endeavours to destroy all Religion, both Na∣tural, and Revealed; argues to this purpose,

in the 16th Chap. of the said Treatise. First, By the Law of Nature, He understands nothing but the Nature of every Individual; according to which, we conceive each of them naturally determi∣ned to exist after a certain manner. Thus Fishes are ordained to swim, and the great ones to de∣vour the less: Therefore Fishes live in the Wa∣ter, and devour each other by the highest Right: For Nature considered simply, hath a right to all things it can do, or its right extends it self, as far as its power; Since the power of Nature is but the power of God, who hath the highest right to all things. But because the power of Vniversal Nature, is nothing but the power of all the Indivi∣dual Creatures together, it follows that every Individual hath the highest right to all things it can do; that is, it extends it self as far as its power. And since it is the first Law of Nature, that every thing should endeavour, as far as it is able, to preserve it self in its Natural State: and that, without any consideration of other Creatures, but only of it self: Therefore it follows, that eve∣ry Individual hath the highest right to exist, and operate, as it is thus naturally determined: Nor will he allow any difference, by Nature, between men and other Creatures; neither between men endued with Reason, and those that have not yet attained the use of it; neither between Fools and Madmen, and others that are of sound Vnder∣standing; and his Reason is this, For whatever

any Creature doth by the force of its Nature, it doth it by the highest Right, viz. because it acts as it is by Nature determined, neither is it able to act otherwise: Therefore among men, whilst con∣sidered as living under the meer Empire of Nature, as well he that doth not yet understand Reason, or hath not acquired a habit of Virtue, lives by the highest Right, according to the Laws of his own Appetite, as well as he that directs his Life according to the Rules of Reason. So that as a Wise-man hath a Right to all things that Reason dictates, or of living according to its Rules: So likewise the ignorant and foolish hath a like right to all things which their Appetites desire. So that every man's Natural Right, is not determined by Right Reason, but by Power and Appetite. For all men are not naturally ordained to operate according to the Laws of Reason, but on the con∣trary are born ignorant of all things; and before they come to know the true Rules of life, or acquire a habit of Vertue, a great part of their life slips away, tho' they are never so well educated: And therefore he concludes, that whatever any one does in order as he thinks to his own preservation, or the satisfaction of Sensual Appetites, whilst he is in this meer state of Nature, it is lawful, because the only Rule he hath to act by.

§. 9. Having given you all that can be said for this wicked, as well as foolish Opinion,

in their own words; I shall now endeavour to confute it. In the first place therefore I ob∣serve, that this which they call the right of Nature, and which Mr. H. defines to be a state of perfect Liberty, is in their sense no other than that of absolute necessity: And there∣fore I shall leave it to the Reader to judge how properly this word Right belongs to Brutes, Infants, and Fools. For the Word Right is used by those that treat of Ethicks, only in respect of reasonable men, as capable of de∣liberation and judgment, and endued with freedom of Action, and so subject to Laws. For to call that necessity, by which Fishes de∣vour each other, and Mad-men beat their Keepers, a Right, were as proper to talk of a Right of Stones to fall downwards: no Phi∣losophers but these, ever using the word Right for necessity, but a liberty left by the Law of Nature, of acting according to Reason: 2ly, The last Author confounds the nature of Beasts, Fools and Mad-men, who have no knowledge of a God, or sense of a Moral Good and Evil, with that of rational Crea∣tures, who are ordained for greater ends, and to be governed by a higher Law, than that of meer Appetite or Passion: And I desire these Gentlemen to shew us, that such unrea∣sonable Appetites and Passions do necessarily and unevitably carry men to act constantly

according to them; so that the men had then no power left, to oppose, resist or restrain them: and tho' we grant that Children are not yet sensible; and Fools and Mad-men are never perhaps capable of the Laws of Reason or Nature, and so cannot be subject to them, nor are to be esteemed amongst voluntary Agents: Yet doth it not follow, that those that are of Mature Age, and sound Minds, and so can∣not plead invincible ignorance of the Laws of Nature, but out of their own wilful hu∣mour, or unreasonable Appetites, neglect to know or learn, or through wilful ignorance transgress it, should claim the like exempti∣on. For though we are not angry with Chil∣dren, or natural Fools, if they cry for, or take away any thing they see, and pity mad peo∣ple, even while they are outragious with those that tend them: Yet have we not the same forbearance and pity for men of sound Minds, and mature Age, if they do the like unreasonable things, and govern themselves by no other Law, but their own unreasona∣ble Appetites and Passions; Since it was in their power both to have known and acted otherwise; and to have deliberated and judged, whether it were not better for them to forbear such evil Acts, than to do them.

§. 10. Neither can invincible ignorance be any excuse as to them; for though perhaps they may not have Brains fit for the Mathe∣maticks, or are not able to deduce all the Laws of Nature from their true Principles; yet by the Precepts of others, as well as their own Reason, and the observation of their own Natures, as well as other mens, they might easily have learnt all the Duties of an honest man; that is, their Duty towards their Neighbour, by that Golden Rule, of doing as they would be done by: And their Duty towards themselves, by endeavouring their own true happiness and preservation, by the only means tending thereunto, viz. Without injuring others; and doing their Duty to∣wards God, in reverencing him, and obeying his Will, when discovered to them; also in endeavouring, to the utmost of their power, the Common Good of Mankind; and all which Principles have been ever so natural to men, that they have in all Ages acknow∣ledged them to have still remained the same. Therefore Mr. H. as also the Author of the Treatise last mentioned, are very much mi∣staken, so directly to oppose our knowledge of the Laws of Nature, to the Rational Na∣ture of Man; as if he were so much beholden to Art for them, that he could never have ac∣quired them himself, without teaching;

which were all one as to say, That because most men learn Arithmetick., therefore it is so absolutely besides, or above Nature, that no man ever attained it of himself, which is contrary both to Reason and Experience, since both Arithmetick and Geometry, as al∣so Ethicks, must have been natural to those that first taught them.

But I have already sufficiently proved by Mr. H's own Concession, That Reason and Experience are as natural to Humane Nature, as Hunting is to Dog's, tho in both of them there is required both Exercise and Experi∣ence to learn it.

§. 11. Nor doth Mr. H's Excuse, which he gives us in the 13th Chapter of his Levia∣than, signify any thing; (viz.) That mens Passions in the state of Nature are no Sins, nor the Actions which proceed from them, as long as they see no Power which can prohibit them; For neither can a Law be known before it be made, neither can it be made, till they have agreed upon a Legislator. To which may be easily an∣swered, that Mr. H. all along proceeds upon this False Supposition, That God is not a Le∣gislator without Divine Revelation; nor that the Laws of Nature are properly his Laws; both which Assertions, if they have been pro∣ved false in the preceding Discourse, it will

certainly follow, that the Laws of Nature or Reason proceeding from God himself▪ are truly Laws; and the Actions prohi∣bited by them are Sins, although men will not through wilful Ignorance discover this Legislator, nor will consent to his Laws. And Mr. H. himself acknowledges in his Chapter of Laws, that the Subjects lie under an obligation to obey them, if it can be made appear to them that the Legislator is endued with a Supream Power over them, and hath both sufficiently established, and promulgated his Laws; both which may be truly affirmed of the Laws of Nature.

§. 12. But indeed Mr. H. and his Followers have done very cunningly in taking away all freedom from Mankind, and to suppose an ab∣solute necessity of all moral Actions; since they could not otherwise destroy the Laws of Nature, and equal Men with Brutes, but by pulling up all the Foundations of moral Good and Evil.

But I need say no more on this Subject to shew the folly and unreasonableness of this Opinion, than to put down Mr. H's words on this Subject in Art. 11. of this Chapter, Where he confesses that this Right of all men to all things, is absolutely unprofitable for Mankind, because the effect of this Right is all one, as if

there were no such Right at all. For although any man might say of every thing, This is mine; yet could he not use it, because of his Neighbour, who might by an equal Right pretend that it was his. Which is as good as to own, that this right is none at all: For he himself in the Ar∣ticle before-going, makes Utility to be the measure of all Right; but here is a Right without any Utility at all; therefore these words Right and Vnprofitable, are contradicto∣ry; for Right refers in this definition to some use or profit that a man may make of his na∣tural Liberty; but to be unprofitable, owns that there is no use or need of this natural Li∣berty in that matter.