A brief disquisition of the law of nature according to the principles and method laid down in the Reverend Dr. Cumberland's (now Lord Bishop of Peterboroughs) Latin treatise on that subject : as also his confutations of Mr. Hobb's principles put into another method : with the Right Reverend author's approbation.

PRINCIPLE III.

That there is a mutual will or desire in all men in the state of Nature, of hurting each other.

§. 1. WHich Mr. H. thus endeavours to prove in the same Chapter of his De Cive.

There is a will (says he) indeed in all men of do∣ing hurt in the state of Nature, but not from the same cause, nor alike culpable. For one man, accord∣ing to a natural equality, allows to others all the same things as to himself, which is the part of a modest man, and of one that rightly measures his own strength; another esteeming himself su∣perior to others, will have all things to be lawful for himself only, and arrogates an honour to him∣self above others, which is the part of a proud disposition; therefore the will of hurting is in this man from a vain glory; and a false esteem of his own power, as it is in the other from a necessity of defending his own Goods and Liberty against the other's violence. Besides, since the strife of wit is the greatest amongst men, it is necessary that very great discord should arise from that Conten∣tion;

for it is not only odious to contradict, but also not to consent; for not to consent to another in a thing, is tacitly to accuse him of error in that matter; so likewise to dissent in very many things, is as much as to count him a Fool; which may ap∣pear from hence, that no Wars are more sharply prosecuted, than between different Sects of the same Religion, and the Factions of the same Commonwealth, where there is a strife concern∣ing Doctrine, or Civil Prudence. But since all pleasure and satisfaction of mind consists in this, That a man may have somewhat, by which, comparing himself with others, he may think highly well of himself; it is impossible but that they should shew their mutual hatred and contempt sometimes, either by laughter, words or gestures, or by some outward sign, than which there is indeed no greater vexation of, mind, neither from which a greater desire of hurting can arise. But the most frequent cause why men desire to hurt each other, arises from hence, that many desire the same thing at once; yet (which very often happens) they neither may, nor can enjoy it in common, nor will yet divide it; from whence it follows, that it must be given to the stronger; but who is the stronger, can only be known by fighting.

§. 2. From which, I shall first observe, That it is not true, that in the state of Nature,

there is in all men a like will of hurting each other: For in this State, the first, and most natural condition to be considered is, when men have not as yet at all provoked each o∣ther, nor done them either good or harm. And in this condition, none but a Fool, a Wicked man, or a Mad-man can have any desire to hurt another, who hath given him no provocation for it: Though I grant, that there are too many men (such as Mr. Hobbs describes) who will arrogate more things to themselves, than they either deserve, or real∣ly need; yet even in these men, there is not a will to hurt every man alike, but only those who stand in their way; and whose Goods, or other things, they may think may be use∣ful for themselves. Nor yet are these all Mankind, since he grants there are some, and perhaps as many, or more; who, according to natural equality, will allow to others all the same things, as to themselves, which he grants is the part of a modest man, and who makes a true estimate of his own strength. And certainly, if this modest man judges ac∣cording to right reason, who allows to others the same things, as to himself; this violent or proud man (he here describes) cannot acquire any right to the liberty or goods of others, from his own unreasonable judgment, and false estimation of his own strength or merit:

Nor is this self-defence, of the modest or ho∣nest man, properly a desire to hurt the other, but only a necessity to defend himself against his assaults, since he had no intention to hurt him, before this violent man gave him a just provocation.

§. 3. As for that strife of Wit, which (as he says) is the greatest among men; though there may be some difference in Opinions, and Contentions arise from thence; Yet doth it not therefore follow, that there must from thence necessarily arise a desire in all men, of hurting or destroying others: For there are many of so equal and reasonable a disposition, that they can find no cause of hating, much less of hurting others; though they often dif∣fer from them in opinion; or that they must take all others for fools, if they prefer their own Judgment before another Man's.

And as for Mr. H's Instances, that there are no Wars more sharp than those between the different Sects of the same Religion, or the Factions of the same Commonwealth, these Examples will not make out that for which he produces them; Since he grants, Wars about Religion do seldom happen, but amongst those of different Sects in the same Religion; which shews it doth not proceed from the Natural State of Mankind, which

ought to be governed by Reason, not Super∣stition; much less from natural Religion, but from an unreasonable Superstition, or blind Zeal, too often inflamed by the Priests of either Party; making it not their own, but God's Cause, or Glory, (as they call it) for which they would have them fight, per∣secute, and destroy each other. And as for the Wars and Contentions between the diffe∣rent Factions of the same Commonwealth; it is apparent they have no place in the meer state of Nature; since they are produced by mens entring into Civil Society; aud there∣fore they are not fairly urged by Mr. H. as an Instance of their desire to hurt each other in the state of Nature.

§. 4. In answer to his Assertion, That all sa∣tisfaction of the mind is placed in something, by which a man comparing himself with others, may thereby think highly well of himself: And there∣fore it is impossible but they must declare their ha∣tred and contempt of each other, sometimes either by laughter, &c. than which there can be no grea∣ter vexation, neither from which a greater desire of revenge doth usually arise.

I thus reply: First, Neither does this Ob∣servation reach, so that they must needs take pleasure in puting a higher value upon them∣selves, than they deserve; or that right Rea∣son,

or Prudence, should perswade them to affront others, either by Words or Actions: Neither yet to take for Affronts, and mortal In∣juries, all those things, which any silly, ill-bred Fellow may happen to do: Since such quarrels do not proceed either from Nature, or Reason, but from foolish Customs, and bad Education; as appears in making, giving the lie, an af∣front, which was not so, till about an Age a∣gone; neither is among other Nations, but us Europeans, any occasion of a Quarrel: Nor yet is there any necessity, but that men may, and often do differ from each other, in opini∣on and words too, without giving one ano∣ther the lie, or any just occasion of offence: And therefore these are no sufficient grounds to raise a general Rule of the Natural state of all Mankind, from the indiscretion, or ill manners of some, nay many men.

§. 5. As for his last Reason, from the de∣sire of divers men at once to the same thing, which cannot be decided without fighting.

In answer to this, I grant this may be true amongst Brutes; as also amongst brutish and unreasonable men: But since God hath endued men with Reason, either to divide the thing, if it be capable of division; or else to use it by turns, where it is not, where

divers have an equal right in it; or else to leave it wholly to the first occupant; since e∣very man hath a natural right to what he thus acquires, as is fully proved in the precedent discourse. Therefore granting mens Lusts and Passions do often encline them to War and contention, yet are not they therefore de∣termined, or necessitated thereunto; seeing God hath given Man Reason to foresee, as also to prevent the evils of War; and has likewise endued them with as strong Passions (as Mr. H. acknowledges) to incline them to peace; as hath been more fully made out, when we speak of the Natural State of Man∣kind: Neither in the state of Nature, hath God made so niggardly a distribution of things, that no man can desire; or make use of any thing necessary for life, but presently another must start up to be his competitor for it: Since if men lived according to right Reason, and the necessities of Nature, and still used the Fruits of the whole Earth in Common, there would be yet left a sufficient stock to supply the Necessities of them all, without coveting the Goods of others, or tak∣ing away that they are already possessed of.