The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...

The Answer to the Additions.

1. Some say that God of his meer pleasure antecedent to all sinne in the Creature, originall, or * 1.1 actnall, did decree to glorifie his Soveraigntie and Justice in the eternall rejection and damnati∣on of the greatest part of Mankind, as the end; and in their unavoidable sinne and impenitence, as the meanes.

2. The rest of that side thinking to avoid the great inconveniences, to which the supralapsari∣an way lies open, fall downe a little lower; and present men to God in his decree of Reprobation lying in the fall & under the guilt of originall sinne, laying.

3 That God looking upon miserable mankind lying in Adam's sinne, did decree, the greatest number of men (even those men whom he calls to repentance and salvation, by the preaching of the Gospel) to Hell torments for ever and without all remedie, for the declaration of his severe justice; This way went the Synod.

Let the Reader observe that this Authour in stating the opinion of our Divines al∣leageth no passages out of any of them, no nor so much as quotes the place of any of * 1.2 their writings where this doctrine is to be found in the terme wherein he delivers it, that so, he may take the greater libertie to shape their opinions according to his owne plea∣sure; first, as touching the first observe. 1. How he shapes this opinion. 2, the Persons to whom he imputes it; concerning the first, the Decree is shaped as consisting of two parts; The one sets downe the end, which God intended, the other the meanes where∣by this end is procured.

1. As touching the end, it is hard to say, by his shaping of it, whether the manifesta∣tion of God's glory be made the end, or man's damnation; and if any one conceaves hereupon, that man's Damnation is the end which God intended in the opinion of our Divines, like enough this Authour will be well enough pleased with it. 2. Consider how God's Soveraingtie and Justice are coupled together, as appearing in the eternall rejection and damnation of his Creatures, as if both of them did appeare equally in each. 3. Then rejection is proposed without distinction and specification, that we might know whether he understands it of rejection from Grace, or rejection from Glorie. 4. And in the fourth place, he couples rejection with Damnation, as if both were of equall yoke; signifying Acts temporall; whereas rejection in the Common no∣tion thereof is all one with reprobation, and reprobation is commonly taken for an act eternall, to witt, The eternall purpose of God to deny grace, permit sinne, and inflict damnation for sinne. 5. Damnation is here brought in as belonging to the Decree of the end; and quite left out in the Decree of the meanes: whereas by the very light of Nature it is apparent, that Justice vindicative is manifested no where more, then in the execution of punishment. 6. And lastly Damnation in it selfe is no mani∣festation of Justice any more, then of Injustice; unlesse it be executed as a condigne pu∣nishment for sinne; yet most absurdly he talks of manifesting justice in man's Damna∣tion, without specifying the meritorious cause of Damnation; without consideration whereof, Damnation is no manifestation of Justice, either Divine, or humane. 7. Whereas he sets forth the Persons damned to be the greatest part of Man-kind, this is only to speak with a full mouth, and to gull a partiall Reader, who may be well plea∣sed to have his mouth filled with an emptie spoone: For the Scripture teatheth expres∣lie, that even of them that are called but few are chosen; and clear reason doth mani∣fest, that look how God may deale with one, in the same manner it is lawfull for him to deale with Millions. We love to speak distinctly, and accordingly we say, that all God's decrees; are of doing something for the manifestation of his owne Glory. I say of doing something, for no glory of God is manifested in Decreeing, but in executing his Decrees; As when Solomon saith, God hath made all things for himselfe, even the wick∣ed against the day of evill Prov: 16: 4. So then the manifestation of God's Glory is the end of all his actions. And accordingly if rejection here be taken for God's Decree, no glory is manifested herein, and too absurd it is to account God's eternall Decrees to to be meanes for the accomplishing of his ends: But if Rejection be taken here for a temporall Act, to witt: Of finall dereliction in sinne, then it may be a meanes for the manifestation of God's glory in a certaine kind, namely, his Soveraigntie; for like as God hath mercy on whom he will, in not leaving them finally in their sinnes; but deli∣vering them from the power of it, by bestowing on them the Grace of Faith and Re∣pentance. In like manner, God hardneth whom he will, in denying the same Grace of

Faith and Repentance, and so finally leaving them and permitting them to continue fi∣nally in their sinnes, without breaking them of by repentance. So that God proceed's herein merely according to his pleasure, for the manifestation of that Soveraingtie which he hath as a Creator over his Creatures. Even the same that the Potter hath over his Clay, to make of the same lump one vessell unto honour, an other unto dishonour. No Justice is manifested in this difference, I meane no such Justice as proceedes in reference to the workes of men; for he doth not bestow Grace upon men, because of their good workes; nor deny grace unto them, because of their evill workes; but finding men equall in the state of sinne, he bestowes Grace upon the one to cure sinne in them, and bestowes it not upon others. Yet God is just herein in another respect, namely in as much as he doth no other thing in all this, but such as he hath a lawfull power to doe; As for Damnation, that is clearly an Act temporall; and this the Lord inflicts on none but for their sinnes: And like as in giving or denying grace, God manifested no justice Compensative, but Soveraigntie, only proceeding therein merely according unto pleasure: So in inflicting dā∣nation & denying glory, he manifest's vindicative Justice alone, not proceeding according to mere pleasure herein but according to mens workes, and that according to a Law which himselfe hath given unto men, namely this, Whosoever continueth in sin without repentance shall be damned. 2. The second part of this Decree is concerning the meanes; and the meanes he makes to be sinne and impenitency: It is very well he tooke libertie to set downe their opinion without specifying their words, least they should fly in his face, and convict him of shamefull slaunder. He that intends the end is the Authour of the meanes: this is uni∣versall, we say that the permission of sinne and of impenitencie is the meanes, and this we acknowledge to make way, as well for the manifestation of his mercy in pardoning sinne, as of his Justice in punishing it; it being apparent that neither mercy in pardoning, nor Justice in punishing can have place; unlesse sinne be permitted to enter into the world: O∣ver and above this sinne is stiled unavoidable without all distinction, such is the proper language of the Arminian Court; we say all sinnes are avoydable by Grace, and that no sinne can be avoided in an acceptable manner without Grace, and here I speak not of grace restrayning only, but of Grace sanctifying. Here if it pleased him, he might have put in Damnation also for sinne, as without all doubt a principall meanes of promoting the manifestation of God's Justice; and Thomas Aquinas expresly professeth, that Reproba∣tio includit voluntatem permittendi culpam & damnationem inferendi pro culpa. Reprobati∣tion includes God's will to permit sinne, and to inflict Damnation for sinne; here is the Decree concerning meanes. And as for the end hereof, both Aquinas (and Alvarez af∣ter him) professeth, that the manifestation of God's glory in the way of vindicative Ju∣stice as intended by him, as the end of all this. 2. As for the Persons here named to take this way 1. Calvin though this Authour placeth him amongst the Supralapsarians, yet Lub∣bertus doth not in his treatise of predestination, but opposeth Vorstius in this particular; Cornelius de Lapide, a Jesuite upon the 18: verse of the 9: to the Romans, agrees with Lub∣bertus in this; Calvin's owne wordes are these de praedestinatione pag: 710. Cum de Praedesti∣natione sermo habetur, inde exordiendum esse constanter semper docui atque hodie doceo, jure in morte relinqui omnes Reprobos, qui in Adam mortui sunt ac damnati jure periere, qui naturâ sunt filii irae, When we treate of Praedestination, I ever taught and to this day teach, that we ought to begin it from thence; That all Reprobates are justly left in death, who are dead in Adam, and damned, and that they justly perish, who by nature are children of wrath. 2. Lubbertus shewes Beza also to concurre in the same. 3. Piscator in a small Treatise of the object of Predestination, annexed to his answer to Hemnigius of universall Grace, though he makes the Decree of making all men in Adam to different ends, and of permitting them to fall in Adam to precede the consideration of the Corrupt Masse, as it is evident they must, Yet the Decrees of Election and Reprobation he subordinates to the foresight of the corrupt Masse. 4. And as for Zanchy, let but his Generall definiti∣tion of Predestination be considered, it will appeare that he distinguisheth the particulars of the Decree of Predestination as Piscator doth.

2. I come to the second opinion; and as for the great inconveniencies which here is pre∣tended, that the Authours thereof desire to decline. I have answered hereunto upon, the Treatise of M. Hord, and shewed that not so much to decline inconveniencies have some embraced this way, as rather because this way seemes to be more familiar and plaine, and chiefly because the formall Notions of the particulars of the Decrees of Election and Re∣probation, the one in the Generall seeming to be a worke of mercy, the other of Justice, seeme to suppose a consideration of man in the state of miserie. But supposing that some

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might take this way to avoid inconveniencies, yet I have shewed in my answer to Armi∣nius, that none of these are at all avoided this way. And then againe both these opinions have I endeavoured to reconcile in my Vindiciae, and withall shewed that the difference whatsoever it comes to, is but in apice logico; in a point of logick: both sides concurring in the maintenance both of God's Soveraigne prerogative over his Creatures, to make one ves∣sell unto honour, another unto dishonour, by giving faith and repentance unto the one, and denying it to others; as also in the prerogative of Grace as only effectuall to the wor∣king of men unto faith and Repentance.

2. God decrees both to Create all men in Adam, and to permit them all to fall in A∣dam; These be the Divine Decrees concerning meanes tending to the manifestation of his Glory in the way of Mercy and Justice; except man were created, no Glory at all could be manifested in him; unlesse all were suffered to fall in Adam, there were neither place for mercy, nor Justice: these are generall decrees concerning all; then there are spe∣ciall degrees of difference to be joyned to these generall decrees; 1. The one is of raising some out of sinne by Faith and Repentance, and bestowing Salvation on them by way of reward for the manifestation of God's mercy. 2. The other is of leaving others in sinne, and permitting them finally to persevere therein, and inflicting Damnation for their sinnes, the end whereof is the manifestation of God's Justice: The decree of manifesting these is alone the decree of the end, all the rest are decrees of the meanes tending to these ends; whereof the two first are generall and concerne all, whether Elect, or Reprobate, the rest are speciall, concerning either the Elect alone, or the Reprobate alone. 3. Now here is a colour cast, as if the speciall Decrees did praemise the two generall Decrees: But this is a mere colour, as I have shewed you in my Vindiciae, 2. And even they that take this way, maintaine that God ordaines no man to Damnation but for sinne, and that both a∣ctuall, as well as originall, which is utterly pretermitted by this Authour. 3. The Scrip∣ture is expresse that of them that are called, few are chosen. 4. It is untrue that the Synod went this way, they medled not at all with the ordering of God's decrees.

Mascovius also Professor of Divinitie at Franekar, a violent and stiffe maintainer of the most unsavory speeches which have been uttered in this Controversie, and one that undertooke in the very Synod to make * 1.3 good against Lubbert his fellow Professor, that God did will sinnes, ordaine men to sinne, and would not at all that all men should be saved. And besides this, openly and peremptorily affirmed, that except these things were held and maintained by them, they could not possibly keep their owne ground, but must come over to the Remon∣strants; This man was not only not censured, but publiquely declared in the Synod to be pure and Ortho∣dox, and dismissed only with this kind and friendly motion. That he should hereafter take heed of such words as might give offence to tender eares; and could not well downe with those who are uncapable of such mysteries.

For all this the Authour quotes Antidotū Remonstrantiū pag: 32, this booke I have not seen much lesse have I it at this time in my possession, and therefore I must take it all upon * 1.4 trust. And seeing this man was declared in the Synod of Dort, (as this Authour writes) to be pure and Orthodox, it seemes they did not censure these speeches of his as unsavorie speeches, but rather justified them, though with acknowledgment, that they might give offence to tender eares, and could not well downe with those, who were as yet uncapa∣ble of such mysteries; so that this Authour censureth these speeches of Maccovius for unsavory speeches, without the least disproofe of them (yet is Maccovius, and then was, a Professor of Divinity in the University of Franekar) In like sort by consequent he cen∣sureth the judgment of the Synod, as an unsavory judgment, and their approbation of Maccovius, as an unsavory approbation; Let the Reader judge of what Spirit this Au∣thour is, and whether it may not be said of him, as Moses said of Corah and his compli∣ces, ye take to much upon you ye Sonnes of Aaron: Nay what if this censure of his reflects upon the very Phrases of the Holy Ghost? The two first phrases namely, to will sinnes, and to ordaine men to sinne, are all one: For to ordaine men to sinne is but to will, that such men shall sinne, or that there shall be such sinnes of men. Now the Scripture frequently justifies this; for the 10 Kings to give their Kingdomes to the Beast, what is the meaning of it, But to imploy their Regall power in supporting the Pope-dome? Now was not this a great sinne? Yet the Scripture expresly professeth that is was the will of God it should be so. Rev: 17. 17. For God hath put in their hearts to fullfill his will, and to doe it with one con∣sent, for to give their Kingdome to the Beast, untill the words of God be fulfilled. As expresly doth Saint Peter testifie of some men, that they are ordained to stumble at God's word, and to be disobedient, Christ is a stone to stumble at, & a Rock of offence even to them which stumble * 1.5 at the word, being disobedient, unto the which thing they were even ordained: and by whom could they be ordained hereunto but by God? In like sort we know the abominable

Outrages committed by Herod, Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles and people of Israel, against the Holy Sonne of God (for Iudas betraied him, the high Priests suborned witnesses against him, Herod with his Herodians despitefully used him, Pilate condemned him, the Romane Souldiers scourged him, spit in his face, buffeted him, arraied him like a King in scorne, and crowned him with a Crowne of thornes, and last of all Crucified him between two theeves) yet of all these the Holy Ghost testifies, That in this doing a∣gainst the Holy Sonne of God) they did what God had determined to be done; The words of the Text are these, and that as delivered with one accord by the Apostles and their fellowes; for when Peter and Iohn were let goe, they came to their fellowes and shewed all that the High Priests had said unto them, And when they heard it, they lift up their voices to God with one accord, and said, O Lord thou art the God which hath made Heaven and earth, the sea and all things that are therein, which by the mouth of thy servant David hast said, why did the Gentiles rage and the people imagine a vaine thing; The Kings of the earth assembled, and the Rulers came together against the Lord, and against his Christ, for doubtlesse against thy Holy Son Ie∣sus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israell gathered themselves together, to doe whatsoever thine hand and thy Counsell had determi∣ned before to be done. Now every one knowes that to determine to be done, and to ordaine to be done, and to will to be done are all one: why doth not this Authour censure these speeches for unsavory speeches, as well as those of Maccovius? Why doth not he expose this Synod of the Apostles and others to the same censure? whereunto he exposeth the Synod of Dort? Nay can it be avoided, but that already he hath done so, and that these censure•• of his must necessarily prove the powring forth of Blasphemy against the Holy Ghost? Seeing the speeches are used by the Apostles, which he censureth for unsavorie, being utteredly Maccovius; Is it not apparent that whosoever renounceth those speech∣es, most also renounce the word of God? And shall it be a reproach to us that we cannot keep our owne ground, unlesse the Holy Ghost keepes his ground, and maintaine his owne Di••lect to be savorie in spite of the vise aspersions, that this Authour or any other of his Spirit doth usually cast upon it, not sparing to terme such speeches, unsavorie speeches As for the last phrase That God would that all men should be saved, this is no Scri∣pture; nay it doth imply a man fest Blasphemy, namely that God cannot save them: It is true, the Scripture saith that God willeth that all men should be saved, but what is meant by this note of universalities in Scripture, let Scripture it selfe be Judge. The Pharisees did T••the omne olus as Austine observes not every particular her be, to give the T••th there∣of, but every kind of herbe to give the Tenth thereof; so Peter saw in a vessell let downe from Heaven 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 not every fower footed beast in particular, but all manner of fower footed beasts, see Mat: 3. 5. It is said all Iudea went forth to Iohn and all the region round about Iordan, what can the meaning of this be, but that from all parts of Judea and the Region round about Jordan, of all sorts some went forth to Iohn not that there was not one man left behind in all Judea, and in all the Region round about Jordan. And accor∣dingly Saint Austine interpreted this place above 1200 yeares agoe, namely that God will that of all sorts, some be saved, even of Kings and Nobles some, though but few of such 1 Cor: 1. 27. Now this is not denied either by Maccovius, or by any other of our Divines, only they deny it to be the will of God, that all and every one shall be sayed; for if this were his will, it would follow, first that God is not able to save them, which is to deny the first Article of the Creed, as Austine in this very particular disputed many hundred yeares agoe. Secondly it would follow, that God is changed: for certainely when he damnes men he hath no will to save them. And what is Election Divine? is it any other then the will of God ordaining unto salvation? Now who dares say that all are Elect? Hath not our Saviour expresly told us, that even of them that are called, but few are cho∣sen? Yet might that Synod well admonish Maccovius to take heed of such words as might give offence to tender yeares, and be carefull to expresse the same truth in as inoffensive way as we can: And accordingly having a digression in this very Argument, in my Vindi∣ciae Gratiae I proposed it in this manner, Whether the holy one of Israell without any injurie to his Holy Majestie, may be said to will sinne after a certaine manner: and I maintaine the af∣firmative after this manner; Deus vult ut peccatum fiat ipso permittente, God will have sinne to come to passe by his permission; and Bellarmine confesseth that, Malum esse Deo permitten∣te bonum est. It is good that evill should be by God's permission, which was also the saying of Austine long before. And that non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo: Not any thing comes to passe, except God Omnipotent will have it come to passe, either by suffering it, or himselfe working it; And the eleventh Article of the Church of Ire∣land

framed in the dayes of King J'ames runnes thus; God from all eternitie, did by his un∣changable Counsell ordaine what soever in time should come to passe; yet so as there by no vi∣olence is offered to the to the wills of the reasonable Creatures, and neither the libertie, nor the contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. And Arminius himselfe pro∣fesseth that Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerums uorum implere; God would have A∣chab to fill up the measure of his sinnes, and what is it to fill up the measure of his sinnes; but to adde sinne unto sinne? And this he delivereth without all qualification.

By these instances it appeareth, That they of the first side can easily beare one with another in this diffe∣rence. * 1.6 And to say the truth, there is no reason why they should quarrell about circumstances, seeing they a∣gree in the substance for which they both contend.

1 That the moving cause of Reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the sinne of man originall or actuall. 2. That the finall impenitencie and Damnation of Reprobates are necessary and unavoidable by God's absolute Decree. * 1.7

The difference which this Authour takes into Consideration is about the object of Pre∣destination; and the difference in opinion thereabouts is usually to be observed three∣fold (though this Authour is pleased to take notice of a secondfold difference,) for some conceive the object of Predestination to be man-kind as yet not created; others conceive the object thereof to be man-kind created, but not yet corrupted. A third sort maintaine the object thereof to be man-kind both created and corrupted. Now D. Iunius hath en∣deavoured to reconcile the three opinions, making place for each consideration in the object of predestination; And Piscator after him adventured on the like reconciliation, and hath performed it with more perspicuitie and with better successe in my judgment, then Iunius; And that according to three different acts concurring unto Predestination; The first is, saith he, God's purpose to create man-kind in Adam unto different ends, now this Act doth clearely require the object thereof to be man-kind not yet Created. The se∣cond Act he conceives to be God's Decree to permit all men to fall in Adam; Now this Act he conceives as clearly to suppose the object thereof to be man-kind created, but not cor∣rupted. The third & last Act he conceives to be God's decree to choose some, to shew com∣passion on them in raising them out of sinne by saith and repentance, and of Reprobating others, leaving them as be findes them, and permitting them to finish their dayes in sinne, to the end he might manifest the glorie of his grace, in saving the one; & the glorie of his Justice in damning others. Now this third Act he supposeth manifestly to require the ob∣ject thereof to be man-kind both created and corrupted: Now the Authours of these seve∣rall opinions have no reason to go together by the eares about these three opinions, but with Brotherly love to entertaine one another: First, because the difference herein is not so much in Divinitie, as in Logick and Philosophie; difference in opinion about order in intentions, being meerly Logicall, and to be composed according to the right stating of the end intended, and of the meanes conducing to the end; it being generally confessed, that the intention of the end is before the intention of meanes conducing thereunto. And that look what is first in intention, the same must be last in execution. Secondly, the Au∣thours of these severall opinions about the object of Predestination, doe all agree in two principall points. 1. That all men, before God's eternall predestination and reprobation, are considered as equall in themselves, whether as uncreated, or as created, but not corru∣pted, or lastly, whether created or corrupted. 2 That God's grace only makes the diffe∣rence, choosing some to worke thē to faith, & repentance, & perseverance therein; while he rejecteth others, leaving thē as he findes them, & permitting them to finish their dayes in sinne, whereby is upheld and maintained. 1. First, the prerogative of God's grace as on∣ly effectuall to the working of men unto that which is good. 2. And secondly, the prero∣gative of God's Soveraigntie in shewing mercy on whome he will, to bring them to Faith and true repentance, and hardning others; that is, not bestowing of grace and repentance upon them And seeing they all agree in these momentous points of Divinitie, they have no cause to take it offensively at the hands of one another, that they differ in a point of Logick. Now I have adventured, on this argument to find out to my selfe, and give unto others some better satisfaction, then formerly hath been exhibited, and that by distin∣guishing Two decrees only on each part, to witt, the decree of the end, and the decree of the meanes: As for example, 1. On the part of Predestination and Election, I conceive the end to be the manifestation of God's glorious grace in the way of mercie mixt with Justice, on a certaine number of men. And the Decree of the meanes is to create them and permit them all to fall in Adam and to bring them forth into the world in their seve∣rall generations clothed with originall sinne; and to send Christ into the world to dye

for them, and for Christ's sake first to bestow the grace of faith and repentance upon them, and finally to save them. 2. On the part of Reprobation I conceive the end to be the manifestation of God's glory in the way of Justice vindicative; And the decree of meanes to be partly common and partly proper; the common meanes are to create them and per∣mit them all to fall in Adam, and bring them forth into the world clothed with originall sin; the speciall meanes are to leave them as he finds them, and permit them to finish their daies in sinne, and so not shewing the like grace to them, which he shewed to others. 1. So that the moving cause of Reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the sinne of man originall and actuall; like as on the other side, the moving cause of election is only the will of God, or not faith, or any good workes, whereupon this Authour is loath to manifest his opinion; This doctrine is not only approved by Doctour Whitaker Doctour of the Chaire in the Universitie of Cambridge, and that in his Cygnea Cantio a little before his death, but justified and confirmed by varietie of Testimonies both of Schoolemen, as Lumbard, Aquinas, Bannes, Petrus de Alliaco, Gregorius, Arminensis; of our owne Church and the Divines thereof, as taught by Bucer at Cambridge, by Peter Martyr at Oxon: professed by the Bishops and others, promoted by Queen Elizabeth and farther in the yeare of our Lord 1592: there was a famous recantation made in the Universitie of Cam∣bridge by one Barret in the 37. of Elizabeth whereunto he was urged by the heads of houses of that Universitie. The Recantation runnes thus, Preaching in Latine not long since in the Universitie Church, (Right worshipfull) many things slipt from me, both falsly and rashsly spoken, whereby I understand the mindes of many have been grieved, to the end therefore I may satifie the Church & the truth which I have publiquely hurt; I doe make this publique con∣fession, both Repenting and Revoking my Errour; First I said that no man in this transi••••ie world is so strongly underpropt, at least by the certainty of Faith, that is (unlesse as I after∣wards expounded it) by Revelation that he ought to be assured of his owne Salvation; But now I protest before God, and acknowledge in my conscience that they which are justified by faith have peace towards God that is, have reconciliation with God, and doe stand in that grace by faith therefore that they ought to be certaine and assured of their owne Salvation, even by the certainty of Faith it selfe.

2. Secondly, I affirmed that the faith of Peter could not faile, but that other mens faith may; for as (I then said) Our Lord prayed not for the faith of every particular man, but now being of a better and more sound Iudgment according to that which Christ teacheth in plaine words, Ioh. 17. 20. I pray not for these alone, that is the Apostles, but for them also which shall believe in mee through their word; I acknowledge that Christ prayed for the faith of every particular believer, and that by the vertue of that prayer of Christ; every true believer is so stayd up, that his faith cannot faile.

3. Thirdly touching perseverance to to the end, I said that, that certainty concerning the time to come is proud, for as much as it is in his owne nature contingent of what kind the perseve∣rance of every man is, neither did I affirme it to be proud only, but to be most wicked; but now I freely protest that the true and justifiing faith, whereby the faithfull are most neare united unto Christ, is so firme as also for the time to come so certaine, that it can never be rooted up out of the mindes of the faithfull by any temptation of the flesh, the world or divell himselfe; so that he that once hath this faith shall ever have it; for by the benefit of that justifying faith Christ dwelleth in us and we in Christ, therefore it cannot but be both increased (Christ growing in us dayly) as also persevere unto the end, because God doth give constancy.

4. Fourthly, I affirmed that there was no distinction in faith, but in the Persons believing, in which I confesse I did erre. Now I freely acknowledge the Temporarie faith (which as Ber∣nard witnesseth is therefore fained, (because it is temporary) it is distinguished and differeth from the saving faith, whereby sinners apprehending Christ are justified before God for ever, not in measure and degrees, but in the very thing it selfe. Moreover I adde that Saint Iames doth make mention of a dead faith, and Paul of a faith that worketh by love.

5 Fifthly, I added that forgivenesse of sinnes is an Article of faith, but not particular, neither belonging to this man or that man, that is (as I expounded it) that no true faithfull man either can or ought certainely believe that his sinnes are forgiven: But now I am of an other mind and doe freely confesse that every true faithfull man is bound by this Article of faith to believe the forgivenes of sinnes, and certainely to believe that his owne particular sinnes are freely forgiven him, neither doth it follow hereupon that, that Petition of the Lord's prayer (to wit) forgive us our trespasses is needlesse; for in that Petition we aske not only the gift but also the increase of Faith.

6 Sixtly, these words escaped me in my Sermon viz: As for those that are not saved, I doe

most strongly believe, and doe freely protest, that I am so perswaded against Calvin, Peter Martyr and the rest, that sinne is the true and proper cause of Reprobation; But now being better instructed I say that the Reprobation of the wicked is from everlasting, and that saying of Saint Austine to Simplician to be mòst true; viz: If sinne were the cause of Reprobation then no man should be elected, because God doth know all men to be defiled with it: And that I may speak free∣ly, I am of the same mind and doe believe concerning the Doctrine of Election and Reproba∣tion, as the Church of England believeth and teacheth in the booke of the Articles of faith, in the Article of Praedestination. Last of all I uttered these words rashly against Calvin, a man that hath very well deserved of the Church of God (to wit) that he durst presume to lift up himselfe above the high and Almighty God, by which words I doe confesse that I have done great injurie to that most learned and right good man, and I most humbly beseech you all to pardon this my rashnes, as also in that I have uttered many bitter words against Peter Martyr, Beza, Zanchy, Iunius, and the rest of the same religion, being the lights and ornaments of our Church, calling them by the odious names of Calvin••sts and other slande∣rous termes, branding them with a most grevious marke of reproach; whom because our Church doth worthily reverence, it was not meet, that I should take away their good name from them. Doctor Fulke in like manner maintaines that reprobation is not of workes, but of God's free will, Rom: 9: Num: 2. His words are these, God's election & Reprobation is most free, of his owne will, not upon the foresight of the merits of either of them; for he hath mercy on whom he will and whom he will he hardeneth vers: 18. Yet here is to be distinguished, for the explication of the truth, That God's decree of Reprobation may be considered either as touching the Act of God reprobating and willing, or as touching the things hereby willed or Decreed; As touching the Act of God reprobating, we say as Aquinas saith concerning the Act of God predestinating, namely that no cause can be given thereof as from man, like as no cause can be given of God's will; God's will being eternall, but whatsoever is in man be∣ing Temporall. But as touching the things decreed or willed by Reprobation, these are either the deniall of grace, or inflicting of damnation; As touching the deniall of grace we clearely professe, that like as God of his mere will and pleasure doth shew mercy on some in bestowing the grace of faith and repentance upon them; so God of his mere will and pleasure doth harden others in denying unto them the grace of saith and repentance; and thus it is that Doctor Fulke maintaines God's election & reprobation to be most free of his owne free will, not upon the foresight of the merits of either of thē; but touching the inflicting of damnation, we maintaine that God neither doth inflict damnation, nor ever did decree to inflict damnation of his owne mere pleasure and will, but altogether for sinne, either originall or actuall: further we maintaine, that in no moment of time or na∣ture God doth decree to damne any man before he foreseeth the sinne for which they shall be damned. 2. As touching the second we willingly grant, that by vertue of God's decree, it necessarily and unavoidably followes, that whosoever dieth in finall impeniten∣cy shall be damned, neither doe I thinke this Authour dares to avouch the contrary.

Secondly, as touching finall impenitency, wee willingly professe that upon supposition of God's decree finally to harden a man and to deny a man the grace of repentance: (It being clearely the gift of God as Scriptures testifie. Act: 5. 31, and 11. 18. 2 Tim 2 25) it is impossible that such a man should repent, neverthelesse both repentance is possible, and finall impenitency is avoidable simply (to wit) by grace 3. But this Authour loves not to explicate himselfe, but I suppose he secretly maintaines, that every man hath such a pow∣er, by grace, wherby he may repent if he will, concerning which Tenent of his, we nothing doubt but every man hath such a power, but we deny that such a power is grace; we say it is nature rather, and that for this reason; looke by what power a man may repent if he will, by the same power he may ref use to repent if he will: Now if this were grace, then were grace inferior to a morall vertue: for no morall vertue leaves a man indiffe∣rent to doe good or no; to doe good or evill; but inclines and disposeth the will only to that which is good; so Justice disposeth a man only to just actions, not indifferentlie to that which is just, or to that which is unjust, Tis true never∣thelesse a man that is just may doe an unjust Act if he will, but this is not by vertue of the habit of Justice wherewith he is qualified; But only by reason of the freedome of his will wich is naturall unto him; for justice undoubtedly inclines a man's will only to that which appeareth just, and so every morall vertue inclines the will only to a vertuous Act, not indifferently either to acts vertuous, or to acts vicious; like as on the contrary a vicious habit inclines the will of man only to acts vicious, not indifferently, to acts vici∣ous or to acts vertuous! Secondly grace is supernaturall, it were a Monster in Divinitie to

say that supernaturall grace doth indifferently incline a man either to good or evill; it is impossible it should incline a man save to acts supernaturall; now every supernaturall act must needs be gratious, it cannot be sinfull or evill; lastly whosoever hath a willto re∣pent, such a one hath not only a power to repent, but actually doth repent, as touching the cheifest facultiein, the change whereof repentance doth consist; for that is the will, and it is God that worketh in us both the will and the deed, in every kind of that which is truly good; and surely to have a will to repent is a good thing, if he want power, let him and us, pray for that out of that will and desirewe have to repent, ut quod volumus implere valeamus, that what we desire to doe we may be able to doe, and we have no cause to feare that God will despise so gratious desires.

To these speeches let me adde that of Remigius Arch-bishop of Lyons, who, to Rabanus Arch-bishop of * 1.8 Mentz, objecting that Saint Austine wrote a booke called Hipognosticon against Pelagius and Coelestius, wherein he denied that Reprobates were properly praedestinati ad interitum, predestinate to destruction, an∣swereth, that Saint Austine said not so (but some other man) as it is supposed to purge the Church of calum∣nie, which some ill affected ones did cast upon it; namely that it taught that God by his predestination did impose upon men a necessity of perishing, and did withdraw the word (Praedestination) from the point of Reprobates, and gave it only to the Elect, and so gave great occasion of further Errour and mistake; In this speech of his, it is clearely implyed that it was the constant Doctrine of the Church then, that Reprobates lye under no necessitating Decree of Perdition.

Here we find inserted a passage taken out of Remigius Arcsh-bishop of Lions his an∣swer * 1.9 to Rabanus Arch-bishop of Mentz, as it is to be found in the Historie of Gottescal∣chus written by Doctor Usher Arch-bishop of Armach, pag. 107. Now that discourse of Remigius is not in answer to Rabanus Arch-bishop of Mentz, but unto Hincmarus Arch-bishop of Remes. And withall this Authour is pleased to geld it as he thinkes good: For whereas Remigius hath it thus; quasi Deus sua praedestinatione necessitatem imponeret homini∣bus in suis impietatibus permanendi, & in aeternum pereundi: This Authour renders it thus; That God by his predestination did impose upon men a necessity of perishing, leaving out altoge∣ther the former, namely of imposing upon men a necessite of perishing in their impie∣ties: And every sober man may well wonder at his dealing in this, especially seeing he hath left out that which is most materiall and most considerable; for neither by Austin's Doctrine nor by our Doctrine, hath God imposed upon any a necessitie of perishing, but such as finally persevere in their impieties: And will any man that is well in his wits op∣pose this? Sure I am, nor Hincmarus, nor any other was knowne to mee to oppose this in the Church of God. Neither is there any necessitie inherent in man, on whom it is said to be imposed, but a consequent denomination to God's unchangeable or irresistable will, to damne all such as persist finally in their sinfull courses, without breaking thē off by repen∣tance: All the question is about the necessity of Reprobates persisting in their impieties, which might be objected, & as it seemes was objected against Austin's doctrine of Predesti∣nation, & by this Authour is objected against ours: now by this objection, Remigius cleares the Doctrine of Saint Austine, professing this to be a calumnious imputation, and such as needed not for the answering thereof, that any such course should be taken as the Au∣thour of the booke (intuled Hypognosticon) takes; (to wit) by denying that God predesti∣nates any to Damnation, for this necessitie of persisting in sinnes was not imposed upon them by predestination in their opinion, who thereby understood no other thing then Gods decreeing of such things which himselfe purposed to effect in due time; as both Re∣migius manifested in these words, pag. 155, of the same booke: Non praedestinat nisi quae fuerat ipse facturus, quae uti{que} omnia bona & justa sunt; And Austine in like manner, de bono perseverantiae, cap. 17. In sua quae falli mutari{que} non potest praescientia, opera sua disponere, il∣lud omnino nec aliud quicquid est praedestinare, so the Synod of Valens, Can: 3. Praedestinati∣one autem deum ea tantum statuisse (dicimus) quae ipse vel gratuitâ misericoràiâ, vel ju∣slo judicio facturus erat. In malis verò ipsam malitiam praescisse quia ab ipsis est, non praede∣stinasse quia ab illo non est: And that for good reason, because, Malum non habet causam ef∣ficientem, sed deficientem, as Austine writes De Civit. Dei lib. 12. cap. 7. But as for this ne∣cessitie in sinning, this both we and they willingly professe to flow from the sinne of Adam, which God alone can cure in man and none other, as the same Remigius acknow∣ledgeth Histor. Gottesca. pag. 3. Anima humana & voluntas humana sicut verè manet in morte non diligendo, ita verè transfertur de morte in vitam diligendo: But by whom is this translation wrought? that followes; hac dilectione non fit verè liberū arbitrium id est verè li∣bera voluntas nisi illo liberante, id est libertatem largiente, qui ait, si vos filius liberaverit, tune verè liberi eritis, & nisi illo munere Spiritus Dei, de quo dicit Apostolus; ubi autem Spiritus

Domini, ibi libertas: By this love the will is not made free, but he freeing it, who saith, if the Sonne shall make you free, then shall ye be free indeed, and not otherwise then by the gift of the Spirit of God whereof the Apostle speakes, where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty; nay I am verily perswaded that Hincmarus himselfe against whom Remi∣gius disputeth, is more Orthodox in this argument then this Authour; for thus writes Hincmarus: as is to be seen in the same history of Gottescalchus. pag. 39. quosdam in Massa peccati & perditionis justè deseruit, à qua praedestinatione sua (id est in gratiae praeparatione) occulto (sed non injusto) judicio nequaquam eripuit; Some men God justly deserted in the Masse of sinne and perdition; from which by his predestination, that is, preparation of grace, he never delivered by judgment secret, but not unjust, whereas this Au∣thour will have all men to be delivered from this Masse of sinne and perdition; by a cer∣taine universall grace bestowed upon them, whereby they are put in a kind of indifferent estate to believe or not believe, repent or not repent if they will, which Hincmarus never acknowledged; yet this necessitie of sinning, incident to all that are brought forth into the world, in Massa peccati & perditionis, in the Masse of originall sinne and perdition: is not such either in their, or our opinion, as whereby they cannot but sinne; although they would abstaine from it; though this be obtruded upon us as it was upon Remigius: where∣upon he pleades for himselfe, and such as were of his mind in the Doctrine of predesti∣nation after this manner, pag 53. Nemo it a sentit aut dicit quod Dei praedestinatio aliquem invitum faciat peccare, ut jam non propriae voluntatis perversitate sed Divinae praedestinationis necessitate peccare videatur; No man (saith he) doth so think or speak, as if God's predestina∣tion made a man to sinne against his will, in such sort as he should seeme to sinne, not through the perversnesse of his owne will, but by the necessity of Divine predestination, so say we; neither is this impotency of doing good, any where else, but in the Corruption of the will, it be∣ing a morall impotency according to that of Saint Austine, Libertas sine gratia non est li∣bertas sed contumacia; Libertie without grace, is not Libertie, but wilfullnesse, and Remigius Histor: Gottescal: pag. 29. Exquibus (saith he) speaking of Reprobates, Nemo potest salvari, non propter violentiam aliquam Divinae potestatis, sed propter indomabilem & perseverantem nequitiam suae iniquitatis; Not one of them can be saved, not because of any violence of Divine power, but by reason of the untameable & persevering naughtines of their owne iniquity, & p. 144. De Reprobis nullum salvari ullatenus existimavi, non quia non possunt homines de bono ad malū commutari & de malis ac pravis boni ac recti fieri, sed quia in meliùs mutare noluerunt, & in pessimis operibus us{que} ad fiaē perseverare voluerunt; not only of the Reprobates doe we judge to be saved, not because they could not be changed from evill to good, & of evill & depraved become good & right, but because they would not be chāged into better. & would to the end persevere in wic∣ked workes; So then they could be changed but would not: But in what respect is it said they could be changed? was it in respect of the freedome of their wills without grace? Nothing lesse; see his owne words, pag. 34. Si dixisset generaliter, nemo hominum sine Dei gratia libero benè uti potest Arbitrio, esset Catholicus: Had he said generally that no man can rightly use his free will, without the grace of God, he had been a Catholique. But all the que∣stion is about the manner how this grace doth worke (to wit) whether God gives men grace to believe and repent if they will, and leaves to them to performe the Act of faith and repentance; or whether God worketh the very Act of faith and repentance, not to dispute of this point out of God's word, which clearely teacheth, that, God workes in us the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure. Philip. 3. 13. And that he makes us perfect to every good worke; working in us that which is pleasing in his sight through Iesus Christ: Let us take notice of the discourse between Hincmarus and Remigius on this argument; that * 1.10 till the love of God comes, man is dead; his will is dead to that which is good; Now love is only given to the believers, posse charitatem habere naturae est hominum, charitatem autem habere gratiae est fidelium, De praedestinatione sanctorum, cap. 5. For thus writes Hincmarus, pag. 3. 113. Bonum quod agimus & Dei est & nostrum, Dei per praevenientem gratiam, nostrum per subsequentē liberam voluntatem, The good that we doe is both God's worke and ours; of God by Grace preventing, ours by free will following: To this Remigius answers, and first he saith, Hincmarus discoureseth after such a manner, as if a good worke were partly God's worke and partly ours: And againe as if the beginning of a good worke were God's, but the ef∣fect thereof of man's free will; although as he (Hincmarus) doth endeavour to temper this speech of his, by the addition of grace, not by the fulnesse of it; gratiae adjunctione non etiam plen••tudine, by the adjunction of grace, not also by the fulnesse of it: So he should have done saith Remigius, cum verè totum sit Dei; seeing indeed the whole is God's worke; As the truth it selfe saith, without me ye can do nothing: And the Apostle; what hast thou that

that thou hast not received? whence the blessed and glorious Martyr Cyprian hath so defi∣ned it, saying, we must glory in nothing, seeing nothing is ours: and concludes thus; Bonum ita{que} nostrum totum Dei est, quia totum est ex Deo; & nihil boni nostri, nostrum est, quia nihil boni nostri est ex nobis: Therefore our good workes, are holy God's, and noe good of ours is ours, because it is not of us; and to reconcile this seeming contradiction, in calling it our good, yet denying it to be from us, he concludes thus, omne bonum nostrum, & totum Dei est, do∣nando; & totum nostrum est, accipiendo: Every good thing of ours is wholy God's in as much as he gives it, and it becomes ours full and whole, for as much as we receive it.

Fulgentius is plaine for it to, lib. 1. ad Monium, pag. 6. These whome God foresaw would dye in sinne, he decrees should live in endles punishment; I may take in Saint Austine, and Prosper also, who are judged to be the Patrons of he absolute Decree, as it is set downe in the Sublapsarian way; even they doe many * 1.11 times let fall such speeches, as cannot fairely be reconciled with absolute Reprobation. I will only cite Pros∣per; for Saint Austine, speakes in him; he discoursing of some that fall a way, à Sanctitate ad immunditiem, from holinesse to uncleannesse; saith, they that fall away from holinesse to uncleannesse; lye not under a necessi∣ty of perishing, because they were not predestinate; but therefore they were not predestinate, because they were knowne to be such by voluntary praevarication.

Not long after speaking of the same men; he saith, Because God foresaw they would perish by their owne free will; therefore, he did not by any predestination lever them from the children of perdition. And againe in his answer to the twelvth objection, he hath these words. God hath not withdrawne from any man ability to yeeld obedience, because he hath not predestinated him; but because he foresaw he would fall from obedience; there∣fore he hath not predestinated him.

They are I confesse the wordes of Fulgentius in the 25: chapter of his first booke ad Monium, and in the very next chapter, he doth expresse himselfe in this man∣ner * 1.12 on the point of predestination unto glory; praedestinavit illos ad snpplicium quos à se praescivit voluntatis malae vitio decessuros; & praedestinavit ad regnum quos ad se praescivit misericordiae praevenientis auxilio redituros, & in se misericordiae sub∣sequentis auxilio mansuros: He predestinateth those untopunishment, whom he foresaw to be such as would depart from him through the fault of a naughty will; and he predestinated to the kingdome those whom he foresaw to be such as would returne unto him by the help of mercy prevenient, and would persevere in him by the helpe of grace subsequent; So that upon the same ground he may as well deny predestination unto salvation to be absolute in the opinion of Fulgentius, as predestination unto damnation: Now Vossius in his preface to the Pe∣lagian Historie, having first confessed that all Antients agreed in this, That God did not ordaine any other unto eternall salvation, then such who by his mere gift of grace should have the beginning of faith and good will, and persevere in that which is good, as it was foreseen by him: In the next place acknowledgeth, that Austine and Prosper and the Authour of the booke de vocatione Gentium; and Fulgentius, unto this common opinion of Catholiques did adde this; That this praescience Divine did flow from God's abso∣lute Decree to save them. This I say Vossius writes, though, I see no cause to regard his judgment in this Argument. His distinction is very well knowne of will absolute and will conditionall; which will conditionate he examplifies thus, as when God will have salva∣vation conferred upon a man in case he doth believe; what one of our Divines doth deny a conditionall will, in this sense in reference to salvation? Now what one of the Antients (the Pelagians excepted) can this Authour produce; that doth affirme any such will to be in God, for the bestowing of faith upon a man? For to maintaine this, were in plaine Termes to maintaine, that it was the will of God that grace should bestowed according unto workes: But if the grace of God be bestowed merely according to the good pleasure of God, as Saint Paule saith; God hath mercy on whom he will? By this it is aparent, that this decree is absolute, and consequently that predestination is absolute; And thus Austine coupleth together the doctrine of the bestowing grace not according unto workes, And his Doctrine of predestination as inseparable, each to be granted or denied together with the other. Because this Authour pretends it to be needles to cite Austine, and sufficient to cite Prosper, adding that Austine speakes in him, to wit, after he was Dead; such is this Authours jugling course with his Reader; therefore I will represent Austine himselfe proposing the objection made by the Massilienses, against Austin's doctrine of prede∣stination, as it was sent unto him by Prosper, and then answering it, not leaving it unto Prosper to answer for him: See the objection, sed aiunt (ut scribitis) neminem posse corre∣ptionis stimulis excitari, si dicatur in conventu Ecelesiae audientibus multis, It a se habet de praedestinatione definita sententia voluntatis Dei, ut alii ex vobis de infidelitate, accepta obedi∣endi voluntate, veneritis ad fidem, vel accepta perseverantia maneatis in fide &c. But they say (as ye write) that none can be stirred up by the Goad of correption, if it be said in the Con∣gregation

in the hearing of many, such as touching predestination is the determinate sentence of the will of God, that some of you receiving an obedient will, shall come from infidelitie unto faith, or receiving perseverance shall continue in the faith: But the rest, who continue in sinfull de∣lights, therefore you have not risen, because the succour of commiserant grace, hath not as yet raised you. But if there be any not yet called whom God hath predestinated to be elected by his grace, (or whom his grace hath predestinated to be elected) ye shall receive the same grace, whereby to will and be Elect. And as for those that doe obey, if you are not predestinated to be Elect, the strength of obedience shall be withdrawne that you may cease to obey: Thus farre the objection, Austin's answer followeth thus; When these things are said, they ought not to to deterre us, from confessing God's grace (to wit) which is not given according unto workes, and from confessing predestination according thereunto; like as we are not terrified from confessing God's foreknowledge, if a man should discourse thereof in this manner before the people; whether now ye live well or not well, such shall ye be hereafter, as God foresees ye will be, either good, if he foresees ye will be good; or evill, if he foresees he will be evill: for what if upon the hearing here∣of some give themselves to sloth, and from labour prone to lust goe after their concupisences; shall we therefore conceive that to be false which was delivered concerning God's foreknow∣ledge? And so he proceeds to justifie the truth of this doctrine which was objected against him by way of Crimination, I say to justifie it as touching the substance of it, though as touching the manner of proposing it, he confesseth that to be unreasonably harsh in some particulars; and shewes how that may be proposed in a more decent manner, still hol∣ding up the same truth, Thus Austine was able to answere for himselfe, whilest he was living; Now let us consider how Prosper answers for him after he was dead. And first let us consider the objection it selfe; now it is this, That they who are not predestinate unto life, although they live piously and righteously, it shall nothing profit them, but they shall be reserved so long untill they perish: Now this is painely a part of the objection made by the Massi∣lienses and they were Galli, * 1.13 whom Prosper answereth, for the objection proposed to Austine was, that, strength of obedience should be taken from them; But in the objection of the Galli, whom Prosper answeres it is set dowe in a milder manner, thus, They shall be re∣served untill they perish. Now Austine himselfe accomodates his answer hereunto in particular, De bono Perseverantiae, cap. 22. 1 For shewing the unreasonable harsh∣nessein this manner of proposing it: I wonder (saith he) if any weak man in a Chri∣stian people can by any meanes heare with patience that which followes; as namely when it is said unto them, yee that doe obey, if ye be predestinated to be rejected, the strength of obedience shall be withdrawne from you that you may cease to obey; For thus to speake what seemeth it to be other, then to curse or to prophesie evill after a sort; Then he proceeds to she whow the same truth may be delivered in a fairer manner, still holding up the truth of the doctrine of predestination; If (saith he) a man thinke good to speake something of such as doe not perse∣vere, and need be so to doe. What failes of the truth of this sentence if it be delivered thus? But if some doe obey, that are not predestinated unto the kingdome and to glorie; they are temporarie ones, and shall not persevere in the same obedience unto the end. Then he proceeds to shew how the same objection may be framed against God's praescience, thus; Et si qui obeditis, si prae∣sciti estis, rejiciendi obedire cessabtis; If any of you doe obey, if with all ye are foreseen to be reje∣cted ye shall cease to obey, whereby ye may observe, how Austine in framing the objection, leaves out the Phrase of withdrawing the strength of obedience, as containing a calumnious imputation, and such as Austine had nothing to doe with in the course of his opinion concerning predestination. Thus Austine hath plainely answered for himselfe, and needs noe other to answer for him, and his answer proceeds without all colour of prejudice to his owne doctrine, concerning the absolutenesse of predestination By this let the Rea∣judge of the ingenuitie of this Authour, who conceales all this from his Reader, bearing him in hand, that Austine speakes in Prosper making answere to his objection, whereas indeed there is a vast difference between Prosper's answer for Austine, and Austin's an∣swer for himselfe: But like enough Prosper was willing to condescend to the Galli, * and to gratifie them with an answer, that in his judgment might be more acceptable and satis∣factorie unto them; To the consideration whereof I now proceed, and therein to consi∣der Prosper, not Austin's mind, concerning predestination, as which he hath sufficiently manifested in answer to the same objection, as I have shewed; Therefore (saith Prosper) They are not predestinated, because they were foreseen to be such hereafter by their voluntarie praevarication, what will follow herence? That foresight of sinnes was the cause why they were not predestinated unto life? I answere, first by denying this consequence, for it may as well follow that the Creatours love is the cause why sinnes are forgiven him, for

the Gospell saith of the woman, Luk: the 7. Therefore many sinnes are forgiven her, because she loved much; such illations are not alwaies causall, but very often merely rationall. Se∣condly, let it be causall, and that foresight of sinne is the cause of non predestination un∣to life, and accordingly of predestination unto damnation, yet here I have a double an∣swer. First it is the most generall opinion, that reprobation as it signifies a purpose to damne, and accordingly to exclude from heaven, presupposeth the prescience of sinne: M. Perkins expresly professeth as much, and other Divines at the Synod of Dort; yet this hinders not the absolutenesse of reprobation, which appeares in the purpose of God to de∣ny grace, and that absolutely to some, like as he bestowes it upon others; I meane the grace of faith and regeneration; otherwise grace should be given according to workes: Now let any passage be produced out of Prosper, or any other Orthodox writer among'st the Antients to shew, that God in distributing these graces unto some, and denying them unto others, did not proceed absolutely, but according unto workes; and according to this doctrine, it is well knowne that Austine shaped his doctrine concerning predestination, as it hath been shewed at large in the answer to M. Hord, in the first section; secondly that there may be a cause of predestination and reprobation, Aquinas doth not deny, but how? quoad res volitas, as touching things willed, or, praedestinatione & reprobatione praepartas, by predestination and reprobation prepared, and in this sense Aquinas himselfe confesseth that, foresight of sinne is the cause of reprobation, the nineth to the Romans; & see how he ex∣plicates himselfe, his wordes are these, Lect: 3. praescientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis ex parte poenae quae preparatur Reprobatis: in quantum scil: Deus proponit se puni∣turum malos propter peccata quae à se ipsis habent, non à Deo. The foresight of sinnes may be some reason of reprobation as touching the punishment, which is prepared for Reprobates, in as∣much as God decreeth to punish wicked men for their sinnes, which they have of themselves, not of God: But of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating, there can be noe more cause thereof, then there can be a cause of God's will as touching the act of God willing. And upon this very ground it is, that Aquinas professeth that * never any man was so mad as to affirme that there may be a cause given of predestination, as touching the * 1.14 act of God predestinating; Let us therefore forbeare to impute any such opinion to Prosper or any other of the Antients; which none ever was so mad as to maintaine in the judg∣ment of Aquinas. The same answer will serve for the next, derived out of the same place in Prosper: As for the third of withdrawing strength of obedience; This indeed was object∣ed unto Austine, as if in his opinion God did so; wheras I have shewed also how Austine signifies that he had nothing to doe with that, and therefore he leaves that quite out. And indeed Austin's is cleare and expresse, that as many as God hath not predestinated, those he never bring's unto wholsome and spirituall repentance, whereby a man is recon∣ciled unto God in Christ. Cont: Iulian: Pelag: lib. 5. cap. 4. And consequently he never brings them to any true obedience. The whole sentence in Prosper hath no more moment then the former, and therefore admits the same answer.

A testimony or two I will borrow likewise from some person of note, and those Saint Austin's followers too, who lived about 400 yeares after Saint Austin's time. Remigius the great Patron of Gotteschalke the zea∣tous * 1.15 preacher and publisher of absolute reprobation in those times, in his answer to that epistle, which we sup∣pose to be the Epistle of Rabanus; saying, that God did make the nations of the world, and that he doth will that all men should be saved; he gives such an answer as cannot stand with absolute reprobation; This, saith he, is very true, because God layeth on noe man a necessity of perishing, as he hath laid on none a necessity of sinning: And a little after he is plainer; Those whom God did fore know would live and dye in their wickednesses for reasons most just, should perish, as himselfe saith, Him that sinneth against me, even him will I blot out of my Booke. In the Valantine Synod assembled in the favour of Gotteschalke, we may find these words; Therefore doe the wicked perish, not because they could not, but would not be good, and by their owne fault originall or actuall, also, remained in the Masse of perdition; And in the end of their 3. Cannon: they pronounced Anathema to those, that hold that men are so predestinated unto evill as they cannot be otherwise. That any should be (saith the Councell) predestinated unto evill by the power of God; so as he cannot be otherwise, we doe not only not believe, but also if there be any that will believe so great an evill, with all detestation we denounce them accursed; as the Councell also did.

This Authour grants Remigius to be a Patron of absolute reprobation: But these * 1.16 words of his, this Authour saith, cannot stand with absolute Reprobation: Remigius un∣doubtedly thought they could; otherwise he must have renounced the Doctrine of ab∣solute reprobation and the Patronage thereof, which yet he did not; as this Authour ac∣knoledgeth: Now is it enough for this Authour, to say that these words cannot stand with absolute Reprobation and barely to say it, without proving ought? and truely I have found such to be the imperious carriage of this Authour in manuscript, now I see it in print; But let us endeavour to cleare Remigius, by proving the Contrary:

indevour to cleare Remigius, by proving the contrary. Therefore it is well knowne that the Terme absolute stand's in opposition to Conditionall. Now this distinction of will abso∣lute and will Conditionall Gerardus Vossius doth accommodate in respect of the things willed of God, and gives instance of God's will of saving, which he saith is conditionall: forasmuch as God purposeth not to bestow salvation on any, but such as believe, faith be∣ing by God's ordinance the Condition of obtaining Salvation. In like sort Doctor Iackson in his book of Providence acknowledgeth the distinction of voluntas antecedens, and con∣sequens is to be understood not on the part of God willing, but on the part of things willed: Now the things willed in the decree of Reprobation, are two, contrary to things willed in Election: For as in Election God doth will the conferring of grace, and the con∣ferring of salvation; soe in Reprobation God doth will the deniall of grace and inflicting of damnation: Now Remigius in the passages here produced, speakes altogether of God's will to inflict damnation, and he denies that God's will is to inflict damnation on a∣ny man absolutely, but only conditionally (to wit) in case of finall perseverance in sinne, and so say we with Remigius: But as touching God's will to deny grace, we utterly deny that God will have grace to be denied upon a condition, for nothing can be devised to be the condition thereof, but sinne either originall or actuall. And if upon such a conditi∣on grace should be denied, it should be denied to all seeing before grace is given, all are found to be under sinne actuall or originall, and consequently all should be Reprobates, even every mothers sonne. 2. And if to avoid this, it be said: although all be sinners, yet grace is denyed to none, but such as want a certaine particular obedience; Then up∣on the performing of that obedience grace should be conferred; this is as much as to say that Grace is conferred according unto workes; which doctrine hath ever been abominated by the Orthodox in opposition unto the Pelagians. Now the Apostle clearely makes for us in this, professing that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Now though there passages produced out of Remigius carrie some shew against absolute reprobation from glorie, or unto damnation; yet have they noe colour or shew of oppo∣sing absolute reprobation from grace; As for necessitie of perishing, that is merely condi∣tionall (to wit) in case of finall continuance in sinne without repentance; And as for ne∣cessitie of sinning, that we confesse is found in all, in state of nature, Corvinus confesseth it to be the doctrine of Arminius that, all men naturally are cast upon a necessitie of sinning. * 1.17 And Doctor Potter proposeth it as the doctrine of the Church of England, that, in a naturall man there is no libertas a peccato, libertie from sinning; which yet is to be under∣stood aright, not but that it is in his power to abstaine from any particular sinfull act; for no supernaturall act is or can be sinfull, every sinfull act must needs be an act naturall; and power either to doe or to abstaine from any naturall Act, is not to be denied to any naturall man. But it is impossible that any naturall man should abstaine from any sinne, or doe any naturall good act (so commonly accounted) in a gratious manner, untill grace comes, so to season the heart of man as to love God, even to the contempt of himselfe, and out of his love to doe that good which he doth, and to abstaine from that evill, from which he abstaineth. 2. But if the question be of the manner how this necessitie of sin∣ning is brought upon the nature of man; we say, it is not by the pleasure of God: But by the sinne of Adam, according to that of the Apostle, Rom: 5. By one man sinne entred into the world, and death by sinne: for man by reason of sinne was justly bereaved of the Spirit of God, and begetting children in this Condition, he begets them after his owne Image and likenesse, that is bereaved of the Spirit of God. And we hold it impossible for a man bereaved of God's Spirit, either to doe that which is good, or abstaine from doing that which is evill in a gratious manner.

2. Secondly, I come to the Synod of Valense, when they say, the wicked not perish because they could not doe good, but because they would not. These words may seeme to imply that e∣ven the wicked could doe good if they would; and truely I see noe cause to deny this: But that we may safely say with Austine; that, omnes possunt Deo credere & ab amore rerum tempo∣ralium ad divina praecepta servanda se convertere, si velint: Believe God if they will, and from the love of all things temporall convert themselves to the keeping of God's Com∣mandements if they will; for if a man would goe to Church but cannot, because he is lame, would read in God's word, but cannot, because he is blind: These impotencies are naturall not morall: but the impotency brought upon mankind by the sinne of Adam is morall not naturall. Now morall impotency is found noe where but in the will, or at least is chiefly there, and secondly in the understanding also, as touching knowledge pra∣cticall; and accordingly when Scriptures testifie that they who are in the flesh cannot

please God, Rom: 8: cannot repent, Rom: 24: connot believe Ioh: 12. This impotency con∣sist's cheifly in the corruption of their wills, noted by the hardnesse of heart, Rom: 2. 4. Eph: 4. 18. Againe I have already shewed out of Remigius, that a wicked man can doe that which is good, but by what meanes? (to wit) by grace, not otherwise. The words are these; Si dixisset generaliter, nemo hominum sine Dei gratia libero bene uti potest arbitrio esset Catholicus; had he said generaly, not any man can use his free will without grace, he were Ca∣tholique. And pag. 36: the same Remigius hath these words, In infidelibus ipsum liberum ar∣bitrium ita per Adam damnatum & perditum, in operibus mortuis liberum esse potest, in vivis non potest; free will so damned and lost in Adam, may be free in dead workes, in living workes it cannot: Yet pag. 174: thus he distinguisheth, answerably to the passage alleag∣ed by this Authour. De reprobis nullum salvari ullatenus existimamus, non quia non possunt homines de malo ad bonum commutari, ac de malis ac pravis boni ac recti fieri, sed quia in me∣lius mutari noluerunt, & in pessimis operibus us{que} ad finem perseverare voluerunt. And pag. 143. Florus of the Church of Lyons where Remigius was Byshop, sets downe the same truth more at large, thus, Habet homo post illam damnationem liberum arbitrium, quo vo∣luntate propria inclinari potest & inclinatur ad malum, habet liberum arbitrium, quo potest assurgere ad bonum, ut autem assurgat ad bonum non est propriae virtutis sed gratiae Dei mise∣rantis; Nam & qui mortuus est, potest dici posse vivere, non tamen sua virtute, sed Dei, Ita & liberum arbitrium hominis semel sauciatum, semel mortuum potest sanari, non tamen sua virtu∣te sed gratia miserantis Dei, & ideo omnes homines admonentur, omnibus verbum praedicatur, quia habent posse credere, posse converti ad Deum: ut verbo extrinsecus admonente & intus Deo suscitante, qui audiunt, reviviscant: Man hath after that damnation (to wit) such as fol∣lowed after Adam's fall) free will, so that of his owne will he can be inclined and is inclined to evill, he hath free will whereby he may rise unto a good condition: but that he doth arise to that good condition, is not in his owne power; but of the grace of God compassionating him; for of him also who is dead, it may be said that he may live, yet not by his owne power but by the power of God. Soe man's free will also being once wounded, once dead may be restored, not by his owne pow∣er, but by God's grace pitying him and therefore al men are admonished, to all the word is preach∣ed, because they have this that they may believe, they may be converted unto God, that by the word outwardly admonishing & God inwardly raising, they which heare may revive. As touch∣ing the last, condemning those who say that any should be so predestinated to evill by God, that they cannot be otherwise, this Authour would faine insinuate into his Reader an opinion; That wicked men may change from evill to good of themselves; But neither doth the Councill of Valens, or Remigius a chiefe man therein, intimate any such thing; But only that it is in God's power by his grace to change them, and so hath changed and will change the hearts of many, namely of all his Elect, but not of one other.

That the Remonstrants did not at that time desire that it should be talked of, among the common peo∣ple, who might have stumbled at it, but disputed of, among'st the Judicious and Learned, who as the thresh∣ing * 1.18 Oxen who are to beate the corne out of the Huske, are to bolt out those truthes which are couched and hidden in the letter of the Scriptures. That the doctrine which is loath to abide the triall even of learned men, carrieth with it a shrewd suspicion of falshood, the heathen Oratour shall witnesse for me; who to Epicu∣rus seeing that he would not publish his opinion to the simple people; who might happily take offence at that, answereth thus. Declare thy opinion in the place of Judgment, or if thou art affraid of the assembly there, declare that in the Senate amongst those grave and judicious Persons. Thou wilt never doe it, and why? but because it is a fowle and dishonest opinion. True religion (as Vives saith) is not a thing guilded over but gold it selfe: the more it is scraped and discovered, the brighter and goodlier it is; and so is the truth. Vives de Verbo sidei, lib. 1. pag. 16. Disputations illustrate and set forth true opinions more then silence can; let us not feare therefore (saith he) lest our faith when it is laid open appeare filthy to the beholders. Id ib: Let fa se and superstitious religions in which there is noe soundnesse be afraid of this.

The Jew is loath to reason with the Christian touching his law: And the Turke is forbidden to dispute of his Alcoran, because their religions are brittle like glasie broken with the least touch, Vives lib. 4. pag. 479. But the Christian who is confident of the goodnesse of his faith feareth noe examination; but rather as much as may be, solliciteth and provoketh his adversarie to the Cumbate. Truth whether it be in men or do∣ctrines, is best when it is uncovered.

Of the five considerations proposed in this discourse, as it was first penned and trans∣mitted to a friend, the fifth is changed and in the place thereof this incerted, and it con∣cernes * 1.19 the third instance given of the Synodicall Divines in the Synod of Dort. Now it is already shewed in the answer to the former discourse how immodestly the Authour carrieth himselfe, in charging that Synod with unwillingnesse to come to the triall, who justified their proceedings in the judgment of all the forraigne Divines there present, for whereas the Remonstrants did once and againe professe that they could not in conscience

any longer stay in the Synod, vnlesse it were provided for, that they might treate of Election and reprobation. And that after that manner which they had set downe in their Theses and writings exhibited to the Synod; hereupon the Sinod to give them satisfaction herein ordered, that their opinion not only concerning Election, but also concerning reprobation should be weighed and examined: soe far forth as they in con∣science should judge to be sufficient, for the glory of God, for the edifying and quieting of the Church and all mens consciences; but as touching the manner of pro∣ceeding herein, it perteyned to them to consider and ordeine as they thought good. And it became not those who where cited to appear, to prescribe unto the Sinod. This decree being read the 40 session conteynes the altercation here abouts, betweene the Synod and them. They forsooth would prescribe to the Synod, de modo agendi; The Sy∣nod must not unto them.

The Synod hereupon intreates the judgment of forrain divines. And they all with one consent professe that the Synod had granted the Remonstrants as much libertie for the defence of their cause, as in Equitie could be granted and could well stand with the honour of the Synod. And therefore there is no cause why the decree of the Synod should be altered, or why the Remonstrants should complaine or decline the Authority of the Synod; that nothing was put upon them burthen some to their consciences: And therefore it was in vaine to pretend scruples of Conscience, as in the Session 42 there is a representation made of their unreasonable demaund; namely in the first place to deale upon reprobation &c: whereupon the opinion of forrain divines was required; as whether it was fit to yeild unto them in this, and to treat of reprobation before they treated of Election, who declared by concurring suffrages that course (proposed by them) to be most unreasonable: now let the reader judge how unshamefast that cri∣mination is, which this Author chargeth that Synod with, and consequently all the the forreine divines therein assembled, who justified those Synodicall proceedings with their unanimous consent. Surely this Author hath an high opinion of him∣selfe, and his owne sufficiencies, who thinkes this Bolt of his soone shot, more worth then the concurrent verdict of all those divines, Chosen as eminent per∣sons by their severall Churches, and sentunto that Sinod from many places of Chri∣stendome. Now hee who in the progresse of his unshamefast discourse, spares not thus to Taxe a Synod and all the forrain Divines that assembled therein, no mervell if he forbeare not to charge the Contra Remonstrants in the Hague confe∣rence with the same Crimination, though never so injuriously; Thus indeede the Remonstrants in the Synod of Dort, Criminate their adversaries as appeares in the Synodalia Dodcacena pag: 136. In the conference at Hague the Contra-Remonstrants deprecated that they might not be put to deale on Reprobation, and more at large pag: 159. in the same writings; We reade how Festus Hommius one of the Contra-Remonstrants in that conference at the Hague, hereupon stood up, Exposu∣itque paucis quod non bona fide haec de illis dicerentur, how unfaithfully this relation was made, se libello supplice non fuisse deprecatos ne de reprobatione ageretur; That they did not in their supplication intreat that no disputation should be had of re∣probation▪ and therewithall the truth of the matter as formerly I have set downe in answear to the former discourse, and as for Beza in the conferrence with Ia∣cobus Andreas in the point of predestination: It is true at the first motion he decly∣ned it, and he gives his reasons, 1. namely that thy were not called by the prince of Mompelgard to dispute on this Article but on another which was expressed in the princes letters, as Iacobus Andreas acknowledgeth: 2 and accordingly they had Com∣mission from their Church that sent them, to dispute on that whereunto they were called and not on any other. 3. and soe they came provided to dispute on that which was expressed in the Princes letters who invited them. 4. Then againe it was in a Lu∣theran assembly. 5. neither would Andeas yeild to Beza's motions that the confe∣rence might be transacted by writing. 6. nor that which was to be delivered by them should be taken by notaries. 7. Yet they offered to propose their doctrine on that Ar∣gument before the Prince, and to heare what Jacobus Andreas had to say against it and promised to returne him an answer thereunto; Thirdly, consider it was not predestina∣tion alone, whereof they were unwilling at that time and in that place to conferre about, But two other Articles also, namely as concerning Baptisme, and Images in Churches; why then, doth not this Author plead as well for Images in Churches, as for the con∣ditionall nature of reprobation: as well he may upon the same ground? Fourthly, what

sottishnesse possesseth this Authour to conclude, that because Beza at such a time, and in such a place, and upon such and such tearmes, did refuse to dispute thereon; Therefore all that professe the same doctrine with Beza doe refuse to come to triall there abouts, and consequently that doctrine is suspectable of untruth; whereas it cannot be concluded of Beza simply that he refused to come to a triall, because once at a certaine time and in a certaine place, and in a conference upon certaine termes he did refuse to come to a tryall: For my part, I refuse not to come to a triall with any of them upon any particular: But I noe way thinke fit to entertaine a conferrence here about by wordes of mouth, but ra∣ther by writing; so it will be more quietly carried, so it will be more free from aliene discourse; so each party shall have time both duely to weigh the Adversaries Argument and with due consideration to put in his answer thereunto; And is it not farre more de∣cent that the holy things of God should be handled premeditately, rather then subitane∣ously? Fistly, what if Beza were of opinion that God hath chosen some unto eternall life, and passed by others without any respect had to the personall goodnesse of the one, or naughtinesse of the other, and that this is Saint Paule's doctrine, Rom: 9. This was Saint Austin's opinion also as Vossius acknowledgeth in his historie of Pelagian heresies p. 655. Now will any man thinke him well in his wits who discourseth after this manner; surely Austin's doctrine concerning election and reprobation is suspectable of untruth; Because Beza maintaining the same doctrine some 1200 yeares after, was unwilling to come to a tryall thereabouts at a certaine time in a certaine place, namely at Mompelgard before the Duke of Wirtenberg? Lastly, observe the strange inconsiderations of this Authour; for the Authour of the former discourse promised the Gentleman his friend to whom he wrote, to give him the reason of his change in opinion, not in this point only of reproba∣tion, but in the other points also, for he perceived he was become an Arminian: Now whereas he gives him the reason of his change in one point only, declining all the rest, doth he not manifest his unwillingnesse to deale on all the other 4 points? And may not wee conclude after this Authours manner, that this betrayes no small suspicion, that cer∣tainely his cause is weak and ill grounded in all the rest? In like manner doth this Acha∣tes carry himselfe, he that helps of the other to make his taske for him. It is his usuall course to deale only upon the point of reprobation, as in this place; so in a writing of his to a certaine Scholer, and as I have seen under his hand; It seemes he is well conceited of his sufficiencie on this point: And truely I am very glad to see what he can say for him∣selfe, even on the point of reprobation That which followes is to little purpose, save to shew the plerofphorie of his common place-book: and how easily it is for him to abound, not only in things necessary, but in things unnecessary also: Therefore he tells us what Cicero writes of Epicurus, which may with a farre better grace be retorted upon himselfe then upon Beza, or the Contra-Remonstrants at the Hague conferrence; or the Fathers of Dort, how unfacetiously it is applyed unto them I have already shewed, and further it is well knowne both by Calvins, and Beza's writings, and by that which was done in the Synod of Dort, set forth to the veiwe of all the world, that they have not concealed their opinions from the world on those points controverted; All that are able to read and un∣derstand Latine, may soone come accquainted with them: And M. Hord dealing only up∣on reprobation which is but a part of one of the five Articles, and forbearing to meddle with Election or any other of the five, contrary to the promise made by him unto his friend, doth he not hereby bewray consciousnesse of his owne insufficiencie to meddle thereon? And like enough he hath learned this wisedome from his Abettor (and this is his course) who loves to deale in hugger mugger, and sets others on worke, contented to blowe the coales; yet walkes gloriously at the light of his owne fire, and the sparkes that he hath kindled, vaunting (as I heare) that his peece cannot be answered, and in such termes he commends it unto the Country.

In like manner let the indifferent Reader judge, whether, that which he produceth out of Lodovicus Vives be more against us, then against the Authour himselfe that produceth it; for both Calvin, and Beza and generally our Divines have publiquely professed their opinions, not on predestination only, but on reprobation also, and upon all other points controverted between us and the Arminians; whereas this Auhour sculkes and pulls in his hornes as if he dared not to be seen on other points; only declares himselfe upon the point of reprobation; I meane M. Horde; but as for the other which blowes quick-silver into him, he is loath to be knowne, as if his occupation were with Brontes{que} Steropes{que} & nudus membra Pyracmon, to take paines to make thunder-bolts for Iupiter, or for Mercury ra∣ther; for he is content an other should be the chiefe speaker. 5ly. The Iew he saith, is

loath to reason with the Christian touching his law, and the Turke is forbidden to speak of his Alcoran; But have I shewed my selfe loath to reason with this Brontes, in any par∣ticular difference between us, or with any among'st them that weares a head upon his shoulders? I trust, I never shall, as long as I breath, As for this Authour, the world is wit∣nesse how deeply guilty he is in this kind, contrary to his owne promise: But he may thanke his prompter that he deales in this, and he indeed had made noe such promise to to confine him, but out of his fox-like carriage, makes choise to deale only on this, where he hopes to meet with a favourable winde from vulgar and popular conceits, to to fill his failes to carry him prosperously into their affections, be his Arguments never so weak: never so insipid. Now it is well knowne unto him, that my answer to the former dis∣course hath now been in the the hands of others for the space of two yeares and a halfe, and not the smallest passage thereof doe I find answered here. And this seconds consci∣ence knoweth whether he hath not been full well acquainted with it, before this peece of his did see the light of the presse: Now because this alone might justly prove notori∣ously prejudiciall to the whole, see what a dog-trick hath been played, to antedate the e∣dition thereof, as if it were printed Anno 1633, when it hath been but a few monthes since this hath been knowne unto the world, that the Reader may imagine if it please him, that this was printed before my answere was returned to the former discourse. And to what purpose is the discourse brought to the Bulke, which that hath at present, so many odde things being inserted thereunto; but to provide for their indemnitie that shall say, This was never it answered, whereat I wounder not a little, namely at the cunning and crafty carriage of this second, who for good reason may be accompted the first, in as∣much as he useth the other but as a stalking-horse to promote his owne game, I say I may, and doe wounder not a little at this, for he both carrieth himselfe and others boast of him, as if he were some formidable Creature, and Lyon like to affright all others that should deale with him, when in very truth all his performances savour farre more of the Fox then of the Lyon.

And it is also disstastfull to all the Greek Churches; Moulin in his Anotomy speaking of the Supralapsari∣an doctrine; saith, if it should be so that God hath reprobated men without the consideration of sinne, or hath * 1.20 ordained them to sinne. Yet it is the part of a wise man to conceale these things, or not to know them rather then to utter them: because, when they are taught and defended they fill mens heads with sceuples, and give occasion to the adversaries to the defaming the true religion.

The same may as truely be said of the Sublapsarian way, for as I have said, they are in substance all one; And Sir Edwin Sandes is of the same mind too; for in his most excellent booke caled A survay of the * 1.21 State of Religion, in the westerne part of the world; speaking of the deadly division between the Luthernas and the Calvinists in Germany, he hath these wordes; that, though ••he Palsgrave and Lansgrave have with great judgment and wisedome, to slake those flames, imposed silence in that part to the Ministers of their party, hoping the Charitie and discretion of the other party would have done the like; yet it falls out otherwise; for both the Lutheran Preachers raile as bitterly against them in their pulpits as ever, and their Princes and people have them in as greate detestation; not forbearing to professe openly, that they will returne to the Papacie rather then ever admit that Sacre∣mentary and predestinary Pestilence. And as for the Grecians, we learne also by Sir Edwin Sandes his relation, that they doe mightilie dissent from the doctrines touching the eternall Counsells of God, which Calvin (as some conceive) first fully revealed or rather introduced into the Christian world, and some of his friends * 1.22 and followers have seconded; as thinking it very injurious to the goodnesse of God, and directly immediat∣ly opposite to his very nature, In regard of which, on of their Byshops hath written a booke against it, which hath been sent to Geneva and there received.

And to say on thing more, besides this infamy among Christians, it is very probable that among the too many scandals given to the Jewes by Christians among whom they dwell; This doctrine is not on of the * 1.23 least rubs in the way of their conversion. For they thinke it a bad opinion (saith the same judicious and learned Gentleman) which some of great name have seemed to hold, that God in his everlasting and abso∣lute pleasure should affect the extreame miserie of any of his Creatures, for the shewing of his justice and se∣veritie in tormenting them, or that the calamitie, casting a way and damnation of some, should absolutely and necessarily redound more to his glorie then the felicitie of them all, considering that his nature is mere goodnesse and happinesse, and hath noe affinity with rigour and misery.

And secondly the determination of the end doth necessarily involve the meanes that preceeds the end, as * 1.24 if a man before determined to damnation, he must unavoidably sinne else he could not be damned.

As touching this paticular of M. Moulyn: I have addressed an answer puctually * 1.25 thereunto in my Vindiciae amongst my degressions touching predestination, yet I am content to say something concerning the point it selfe and his judgment thereupon. Re∣probation hath two parts, which this Authour most judiciously confounds, the one is God's decree to deny grace, the other is his decree to inflict damnation; As touching the first, the very execution thereof proceeds merely according to God's pleasure, howmuch more the decree it selfe, which is eternall, and cannot possibly have any precedaneous thereunto; whereas the execution is temporall, and temporall things may have somewhat

precedaneous thereunto. Now that the execution thereof is merely according to God's good pleasure is apparent; the execution thereof being no other then the denyall of grace; And as God of his mere pleasure gives faith and repentance to whom he will; so of his mere pleasure he denies it unto others; otherwise grace should be conferred according unto workes, which was condemned in the Synod of Palestine, Pelagius himselfe sub∣scribing thereunto above 1200 yeares agoe, and all along afterwards it was condem∣ned in divers Synods gatherd together for suppressing of the Pelagian Heresie. Now did M. Moulin think it noe wise part to publish this doctrine, That grace is not given accor∣ding unto workes; but according to the mere pleasure of God? Nothing lesse; Saint Paul plainly professing that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will, he hardeneth. Come we to reprobation as it signifies God's decree to inflict damnation without consideration of sinne, our adversaries would faine shape our opinions thus, and none more eager this way, then this Authour, I meane him that is thought to be the suggester at first, and since the Interpolator and Promotor of all this; But this is a most notorious untruth; nay how can we maintaine this, who imbrace the definition of reprobation given by Aquinas, where he saith, that repobation includes a will to permit sinne, and to inferre damnation for sinne, so doth M. Perkins, and him have I justified against Arminius in my Vindiciae; And not a∣ny one of our Divines doth maintaine that God intends to damne any man but for sinne, and finall perseverance therein without repentance. And the former point concerning the first act of reprobation, being granted, which neither Sir Edwin Sandes, nor any Luthe∣ran that I know, denies; the doctrine concerning this latter act of reprobation will be found to containe noe difficultie at all, forasmuch as we utterly deny that God either doth inflict, or ever did decree to inflict damnation according to his mere pleasure; but merely for finall continuance in sinne without repentance. Now let every sober Rea∣der consider, whether there be any harshnesse in all this: But as M. Moulin discourseth here, so did the Massilienses of old concerning Austin's doctrine, as which they would not have at all broached, as appeares in the Epistle of Prosper.—Yet I commend this Au∣thour for his ingenuous confession, that the same may be said of the Sublapsarian way. But to our prejudice he tells us that Sir Ed: Sandes is of the same mind, and therefore conside∣ring the excellencie of the booke, written by him, whereunto we may adde the excellencie of the discourse written by this Authour; let us for the credit and transcendent sufficiencie of these two, renounce not Calvin and Beza only, (poore Snakes as they were) but the whole Synod of Dort; and all the outlandish divines assembled there, and manifesting their concurrance in opinion with those Synodicall Divines, yea and Fulke and Whitaker, and the Universitie of Cambridge as they were then affected, when they drave Barret to a recantation; Yet Sir Edwin Sandes in the place produced, betraies not his owne judg∣ment, but makes relation of the bitternesse of Lutherans in opposing Calvinists: In like manner both Jewes and Gentiles did oppose Christians even unto bloud, for preaching Christ crucified, which was a scandall to the one, foolishnesse unto the other. And shall the truth of Christianitie be any whit the worse thought of for this? why then shall our Doctrine of predestination and reprobation be suspected as untrue, because the Lutheran partie, doe also bitterly oppose it? especially considering, that we with Austine no other∣wise maintaine predestination then as it depends and is grounded upon this, that grace is not given according unto workes, as Austine professeth to have been his opinion, de bo∣no perseverantiae, cap. 14. And we are ready to renounce whatsoever contradicteth this: and the Lutherans themselves professe concurrently with us, that grace is not given ac∣cording unto workes. And by the way observe the Lutheran spleen is exercised not only against the predestinary pestilence, (as they call it) but the Sacramentarie pestilence also. That is, against their doctrine who oppose their ubiquitie and consubstantiation, yet in the very next page the same Knight affirmes, that all the Lutherans are not carried with the same sterne humour, but they only who are called Lutherani rigidi, & that the greater part perhaps which are the molles Lutherani, are quiet enough, neither accompt they otherwise of the Calvinists, then as of erring brethren; whom the rigids have (as is said) threaten∣ed to excomunicate as Schismitiques and Heretiques.—3 The Grecians are said to oppose the doctrine of Calvin in the point of predestination; yet we know our English Divines subscribed unto the same Doctrine in the Synod of Dort; together with all the forraigne Divines there assembled, and the summe therof is but this, that God, both in the election of some, and preterition of others, had noe respect to the personall goodnesse of the one, and personall naughtinesse of the other. And that this was the very doctrine of Austine, and of Saint Paul also in the opinion of Austine, Vossius acknowledeth, and Austine pro∣fesseth

that this doctrine herein is shaped merely according to the rule so generally re∣ceived in the Church of God against Pelagians, that grace is not given according unto mer∣its, de bono perseve: cap. 15.—4. Concerning the Jewes, this doctrine of ours, this judicious (not Sir Edwin Sandes) thinks it probable that doth hinder their conversation: And in∣deed that learned Knight doth professe, that they are opposite to the doctrine here reci∣ted by this Authour, and in the same sentence he professeth them in like manner opposite to our doctrine, in maintaining that the divell and his Angells shall be cast into everla∣sting fire; for thus goes Sir Edwin's relation, as they thinke it a bad opinion which some men seeme to hold, that God in his everlasting and absolute power should affect the extreame miserie of any of his Creatures as here it lyes, so contrarie wise, they think with Origen, that Hell in the ende shall utterly be abolished; and that the divells themselves after a long course of bitter repen∣tance, and punishment shall find mercy at his handes, that did create them: But as touching our difference from this in this particular; This Authour doth not expresse ought so much as probable, to hinder their conversion; as touching the former he hath; for that served his turne, this doth not, and his wit and wisedome being so nere of kinne, noe mervaile if he makes the one to performe service of love to the other But let me say something con∣cerning the opinion it selfe here related, as in the first place; That God doth not effect the extreame misery of his creatures in his absolute pleasure, what is the doctrine opposite hereunto but this, namely that God decrees to damne no man but for sinne, and not ac∣cording to his absolute pleasure? Now what one of our Divines was ever knowne to con∣tradict this; and to affirme that God intends to damne many of his creatures not for their sinnes, but of his owne absolute pleasure? for my part I never read any that maintained this: But we generally say that God in electing some and passing by others, as touching the conferring of grace, proceeded and decreed, and that from everlasting to proceed, not according to mens workes, but according to his absolute pleasure; now this was Austin's judgment as well as ours; and Saint Paul's too, in the opinion of Austine, as Vossius ac∣knowledgeth in the place formerly cited. And Saint Paul speakes plainly, when he saith, God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, and as plainely in saying, That, before the Children were borne, or had done good or evill, that election might stand not of workes but of him that calleth, it is said that the elder shall serve the younger, As it is writ∣ten Iacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated, Rom: 9. 11, 12. And I durst appeale to every sober man's consciencewhether one of these Jewes in reading this would not as re∣dily condemne Saint Paul himselfe, as they condemne us: As for the other part of the do∣ctrine here proposed, namely that the damnation of some should redound more to God's glory, then the felicity of them all. I answere that it is as cleare as the light, that the glo∣ry of God in the way of vindicative justice had not at all appeared, if all had been saved, no nor the riches of his glory upon the Vessels of mercy, whom he had prepared unto glory, if God had not suffered with long patience some vessells of wrath prepared to de∣struction, if we believe Saint Paul Rom: 9 22, 23: rather then the Jewes: and it is apparent that the Lord God, who made allthings for himselfe, tooke this course, namely, to make e∣ven the wicked against the day of evill, and accordingly as to shew mercy on whom he will, so * 1.26 to harden whom he will, also Rom: 9. 18: otherwise as I have often said, grace should be conferred according to merits, that is according unto workes, which is expresly contradi∣ctory both to the word of God. 2 Tim: 1. 9. Tit. 3. 5. And to the decrees of Sy∣nods and Councells, all along against the Pelagians. •• 5. I willingly grant that the de∣termination of the end doth necessarily involve the meanes, that not only preceed but procure the end. But I will utterly deny that sinne is the meanes of dānation, we say rather that permission of sinne is the meanes, whence notwithstanding it followes, not that sin shall come to passe unavoidably, but rather avoidably; whether we consider the free will of man or the decree of God; for every particular sinfull act is a naturall thing, and un∣doubtetdly man hath free will as to doe, so to abstaine from doing any particular Act: and albeit God hath determined that these particular sinfull Acts (instance the particu∣lar outrages committed against the holy Sonne of God by Herod, Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and people of Israel, Acts 5. 28.) shall come to passe by his permission; yet see∣ing withall he hath ordained thē to come to passe contingently that followes that they shall come to passe in such a manner, as joyned with a possibility of not cōing to passe, o∣therwise they should come to passe, not contingently, but necessarily. But it is growne to be this Authours naturall genius miserably to overreach; while he keeps himselfe to his own formes inshaping the opinion of his adversaries, impatient to be beaten out of them and to have his veteres avias à pulmone repelli, oldgrandmothers vain conceits to be pulled out of

Lastly this Authour shapeth us to make damnation an end intended by God, which we conceive to be a very shallow project; we know nothing but Gods owne glory that can be this end: And therefore even there where Solomon professeth that God made the wicked a∣gainst the day of Evill: herewithall acknowledgeth that God made all thinges forhimselfe. * 1.27

At length we have gotten cleare aboard to come acquainted with this Authours full discourse, and not by patches, as hitherto we have done. For here he promiseth to ac∣quaint us with the reasons that have convinced him of the untruth of absolute Repro∣bation as it is carried the upper way and like a Martialist, a man at armes, he tells us they fight against it, and thus the interpolator discourseth.

The first part of the first Argument against the supralapsarians.

sect: 1.

They are drawen ab incommodo from the greater evils and inconveniences, which issue from it naturally: * 1.28 which may be referred to two maine heads. 1 The dishonour of God. 2 The overthrow of religion and government.

It dishououreth God. For it chargeth him deeply with two things, (no wayes agreeable to his nature.) 1 Mens Eternall torments in Hell. 2 Their sinnes on Earth.

First It chargeth him with Mens eternall torments in Hell, and maketh him to be the prime, principall, 2nd invincible cause of the damnation of Millions of miserable soules: The prime cause, because it re∣porteth him to have appointed them to distruction of his owne voluntary disposition, antecedent to all deserts in them; and the Principall and invincible cause, because it maketh the Damnation of Reprobates to be necessary and unavoydable thorough Gods absolute and uncontroulable decree; and soe necessary that they can no more escape it then poore Astyanax could avoyd the breaking of his necke, when the Graecians tumbled him downe from the Tower of Troy.

Now this is an neavy charge, contrary to scripture, Gods nature, and sound Reason. 1 To Scri∣pture, which makes man the Principall, nay the only cause (in opposition to God) of his owne ruine. Thy destruction is of thy selfe ô Israell, but in me is thine help. As I live saith the Lord, I will not the death of the wicked &c. Turne yee, turne yee, why will yee dye He doth not afflict willingly, nor greive the Children of men. To which speech for likeneile sake I will joyne one of Prospers. Gods predestination is to many the * 1.29 cause of standing, to none of falling. 2 It is contrary to Gods nature, who sets forth himselfe to be a God mercifull, gracious, long suffering, abundant in goodnesse &c. And he is acknowledged to be soe by King David. Thou Lord art good and mercifull, and of great Kindnesse to all them that call upon thee: And by the Prophets Joell, Jonah, and Michah. He is gracious and mercifull, slow to anger, and of great Kindnesse. * 1.30 And who saith Micah, is a God like unto thee, that taketh away iniquity &c. He retaineth not his wrath for ever because mercy pleaseth him.

3 'Tis contrary also to sound reason, which cannot but argue such a Decree of extreame cruelty and consequently remove it from the father of mercyes. We cannot in reason thinke that any man in the world can so farre put off humanity and nature, as to resolve with himselfe to marry and beget Children, that * 1.31 after they be borne and have lived a while with him, he may hang them up by the tongues, teare thir flesh with scourges, pull it from their bones, with burning pincers, or put them to any cruell tortures, that by * 1.32 thus torturing them he may shew what his Authority and power is over them. Much lesse can we believe without great violence to reason, that the God of mercy can so farre forget himselfe as out of his absolute pleasure to ordaine such infinite multitudes of his Children, made after his owne image, to everlasting fire; and create them one after another, that after the end of a short life here, he might torment them without end hereafter, to shew his power and soveraingty over them. If to destroy the righteous with the wicked, tempo∣rally, be such a peece of injustice, that Abraham removeth it from God with an Absit, wilt thou destroy the righteous with the wicked? that be farre from thee O Lord. shall not the judge of all the world doe right? How * 1.33 deepely (may we thinke) would that good man have detested one single thought, that God resolveth up∣on * 1.34 the destruction of many innocent soules eternally in hell fire.

Here this Authour carrieth himselfe like another Ptolomeus Ceraunus; or as if he had some cheife place in the lightning legion, not by his prayers, but by his discourse, he seemes to thunder and to lighten all along. When the Lord appeared to Elias, he was neither in the mighty wind, nor in the earthquake, nor in the fire, but in the still and soft voyce. I hope to prove all this to be but Ignis fatuus; Mountebancks use to make great ostentation and crackes, but commonly they end in meere impostures, and it is no hing strange, when men opposing the grace of God, loose their owne witts, and please themselves in the confusion of their owne senses. For when men are in love with their owne errours, they hate the light; yea the very light of nature in the di∣stinct notice of it, would be an offence unto them. Can this Authour be ignorant of that which every meane Sophister knowes, that there be foure kinds of causes, Materiall, Formall, Efficient, Finall; that he should expatiate thus in speaking of a cause without all distinction? Is it strange that God should be a prime cause, and principall in exe∣cution * 1.35 of vengeance? Doth he not professe saying vengeance is mine, and I will repay? Is he not called the God to whom vengeance belongeth? And are not his magistrates his Mini∣sters to execute vengeance temporall here in this world? And can any sober man dout whe∣ther God be invincible whom the Apostle pronounceth to be irresistable? Againe an * 1.36

efficient cause admits farther distinction; for it is either Physicall or Morall: Physicall is that which really workes or executes any thing: as every tradesman hath his worke, which his hands doe make; so God hath his worke, which he executes, and his worke is judg∣ment * 1.37 as well as mercy. I am the Lord which shew mercy and judgment and righteousnesse; for in these things I delight, saith the Lord; and he would have us when we doe glory, glory in this, that we doe understand and know him to be such a God. A Morall efficient is twofold, be∣ing only of a moveing nature, to move others to doe somewhat; as namely either by per∣swading, or by meriting or deserving: He that perswades

moves an other to doe some what; he that meriteth, thereby moves another, either to reward him or punish him.

Now to walke in the light of this distinction, and not to please our selves by walking in dark∣nesse; though God be the prime, principall, and invincible cause of man's damnation in the kind of a cause efficient physicall (which should not seeme strange to an ordinary Christian, who knowes full well that vengeance is God's peculiar worke, as the Iudge of all the world, and that he delights in the execution thereof) yet this hinders not but that * 1.38 man may be the cause of his own damnation in the way of a meritorious cause, justly de∣serving it. Omnis poena Deum habet Authorem, All punishment hath God for the Authour of it: This is a principle acknowledged both by the Arminians and Vasquez the Jesuite; but ne∣ver is punishment inflicted on any by the hands of God, save on those who formerly have deserved it. Consider we farther, as touching the severall kinds of causes formerly mentioned; if the question be which is the principall, Aristotle answereth, that this is not confined to any one kind of them; somtimes the materiall cause, somtimes the formall cause, somtimes the efficient, somtimes the finall cause is the demonstrative cause, the cause propter quam, the cause by vertue where of the effect hath its existence; but this pe∣culiar and speciall cause is described thus, It is that whereby satisfactory answer is made to the question demanding why such a thing is. Now in execution of punishment or condigne vengeance, this satisfactory answer is made by representing the meritorious cause, never by representing the efficient cause: as for example, if it be demanded why such a malefactor is executed upon the gallowes; no sober man will answer, because the Sheriffe cōmanded it to be so, or because the Judge would have it so; but because he robd upon the high way, or committed some criminall fact or other, which is capitall by the lawes of our land, and to be punished with hanging upon the gallowes. In like sort if que∣stion be made why devills or wicked men are damned, is it our doctrine to referre the cause hereof to the mere pleasure of God? Doe not all confesse that God inflicts damnati∣on upon thē merely for their sinnes and transgressions wherein they have continued un∣to death without repentance? Yet we acknowledge that God could have taken them off from their sinnes while they lived if he would, by giving them repentance, as he hath dealt with us, and that merely of his free grace. For we willingly confes that our sinnes are our owne, but our faith is not, our repentance is not. When I say our owne, I meane in respect that they are of our selves; otherwise we acknowledge both faith and repentance to be our owne accipiendo, in asmuch as we receive them; but they are God's gifts, and so they are his dando, in asmuch as he gives them as Remigius speaketh. Now what is become of this Authours pompous discourse? Is it not the like the cracking of thornes in the fire, making a great noise; but the light of distinction, like fire, sets an end unto it, and makes it appeare in its owne likenesse, and proves nothing but a squib. For albeit God in his decree makes the damnation of reprobates to be necessary and unavoidable; yet seeing he makes it not to fall on any but for their sinnes, what colour of dishonour unto God, in ordai∣ning that Iudas shall necessarily and unavoidably be damned for betraying the Sonne of God, and afterwards most desperatly murthering himselfe? If hereupon he could no more avoid his damnation, then Astionax could the breaking of his neck, when the Grecians tumbled him downe from the tower of Troy; will any man that is not bereaved of com∣mon sense make strange of this? It is true God did appoint both Iudas and all other wic∣ked persons, that never break off their sinnes by repentance, unto destructiō, of his own vo∣luntary disposition. For God workes all things according to the counsaile of his will, and if * 1.39 it pleased him he could annihilate them upon the fresh foot of any sin; or after they have suffered the vengeance of hell fire, as many yeares in hell as they lived here in sinne; yea and the devills in hell; as Origen was of opinion; and the Jewes at this day are of the same by Sir Edwin Sandes his relation; whether this Author be of the same or not, I know not. And lastly we willingly confesse that the decree of God was antecedent to the de∣serts * 1.40 of men; for reprobation is as antient as election; and election was made before the foundation of the world, if we believe Saint Paul rather then any other, who either by

word or deed doth manifest himselfe to be of a contrary opinion. Still damnation is in∣flicted by God only for sinne, and in degree answerable unto their sinnes; and only be∣cause of their sinnes as a meritorious cause thereof; though God makes use of it to his owne ends and the manifestation of his owne glory as Solomon professeth namely, that God made all things for himselfe, even the wicked against the day of evill. And Saint Paul tells, that as the Lord suffereth with long patience the vessells of wrath prepared to destruction that * 1.41 he might shew his wrath and make his power known. So likewise another reason hereof he spe∣cifies to be this. That he might declare the riches of his glory upon the vessells of mercy which he * 1.42 hath prepared unto glory. For when we shall behold the unspeakable misery brought upon others by reason of their sinnes; how rich will God's glory appeare unto us, when we con∣sider * 1.43 that had it not been for his free grace delivering us from sinne, we had been swal∣lowed up of the same sorrowes. And thus Alvarez writeth, disput. III. The glory of God's mercy in his elect, and in like manner the manifestation of divine justice on Reprobates; is truely and properly the finall cause why God did permit sinnes both in Reprobates and Angells. And he proves it out of this passage of Saint Paul. So Aquin: 1 p. pag. 23. art. 5. This is the rea∣son saith he why God hath chosen some and Reprobated others, that representation might be made of Gods goodnesse towards the Elect in the way of mercy pardoning them, and on the Reprobates in * 1.44 the way of justice punishing them. And Alphonsus Mendoza a Scotist concurres with them in this; and we see they make Saint Pauls doctrine their foundation. And indeed albeit at the day of judgment there will be found a vast difference between the Elect and Repro∣bates, the one having departed this life in the state of faith repentance, the other in in∣fidelitie and impenitency, in such sort as God will bestow on his elect eternall life by way of reward, and inflict eternall death on the other by way of punishment; yet in conferring the grace of regeneration, of faith and repentance upon the one, and denying the same graces unto the other, the Lord carrieth himselfe not according to mens workes, but mere∣ly according to the pleasure of his owne will, shewing mercy on whom he will and hardning whom he will; in which respect he is said to make men in what condition he will; as Rom: * 1.45 9. 20. Shall the thing formed say to it that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Though in∣deed he makes but one sort of them after a new fashion, leaving the other in the state of naturall corruption wherein he findeth them: And likewise is compared by the same Apo∣stle to a Potter, who out of the same lump makes one vessell unto honour, and an other unto dis∣honour. But to returne, I have, I trust, sufficiently shewed that in all this which he hath de∣livered, when things are rightly understood, and duely considered, ther's nothing found alien from the holy nature of God, no more then it is repugnant to his holy nature to de∣cree and execute vengeance, condigne vengeance, even the vengeance of damnation on men for their sinnes; in such sort that it shall unavoidably overtake all those that breake not off their sinnes by repentance before their death. Nothing more agreeable to Scrip∣ture, nor to the nature of God revealed unto us in holy Scripture then this, and conse∣quently nothing more agreeable to Christian reason. But as for naturall reason; God for∣bid we should make that the rule of our faith, as concerning the resurrection of the dead and the powers of the world to come, the rewards of heaven, and the torments of hell, where the worme never dieth, and the fire never goeth out. And may it not seeme very strange, that a Christian and a Divine, and one magnified by the Arminian party for great abilities should undertake to prove this doctrine to be contrary to Scripture, to the nature of God and to sound reason.

Well let us proceed to observe how well he performes what he undertakes. And here he saith. 1. That the Scripture makes man the principall, nay the only cause (in opposition to God) of his owne ruine. We answer, the Scripture makes man the only cause of his owne ruine in the meritorious cause; thus man's destruction is of himselfe; But this nothing hin∣ders God from being the cause why vengeance, destruction and damnation are executed upon man; for he is the God to whom vengeance belongeth, & he delights as well in shew∣ing judgment, as in shewing mercy. Indeed did we maintaine that God damnes the Repro∣bate whether man or Angells of his mere pleasure, this Argument of his were seasonable. We know full well that God of his free grace shewes mercy; but judgment only up∣on provocation, and herein he proceeds slowly too; for he is slow to wrath, and easie to be intreated. Yet God's afflicting is not alwaies for sinne; neither doth it alwaies proceed in the way of punishment: when we suffer for Christ we have cause to rejoyce that he counts us worthy to suffer for his name; neither were the afflictions of Iob brought upon him for his sinnes, but for the tryall of his faith, and to make him an example of patience to all succeeding generations; and as for that of Ezech: I will not the death of the wicked; It

is the usuall course of men of this Authours spirit thus to render the wordes, whereas our last English translation renders them thus, I have noe pleasure in the death of the wicked. Now as a man may will that wherein he takes noe pleasure; as a sick-man takes a bitter potion sometimes for the recovery of his health; so God may will that wherein he takes noe delight. And whether it be meant of first or second death it cannot be denied but God wills it; for he workes all things according to the councell of his owne will. Then a∣gaine * 1.46 if we consider the infliction of death as an execution of judgment, God not only willeth this, but delights therein also, as it is expressed. That of Prosper is nothing to the * 1.47 present purpose, we treating here of the cause of damnation, not of sinning; we say God is the God to whom vengeance belongeth, not to whom sinne belongeth. Besides sinne, as sinne, hath noe efficient cause at all, but defficient, as Austine hath delivered many hundered yeares agoe. It is true, it is in Gods power to preserve any man from any sinne; it is in his power to take any man off from any sinfull course by repentance, if he will; but he is bound to none, he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth; and in all this he is not culpable.

In the next place he tels us; It is contrary to God's nature but what? To damne men for their sinnes neverbroken offby repentance? for all our divines maintaine that God is Au∣thour of damnation to none but such; and to such God is not mercyfull nor gratious, nor suffers them any longer, nor shewes any goodnesse towards them; while they lived he did; yea much long suffering and patience, inviting them thereby to repentance; yea and by his; word also inviting many; but after they dye in sinne, therewithall an end is sett to the dispensation of Gods gracious proceedings with them. Much lesse doe we deny him to be good and mercifull and of great kindnesse to all that call upon him. For Gods mercy doth not exercise it selfe by necessity of nature, but by freedome of will; yet he heareth the cry of Ravens and not a Sparrow falleth to the ground without the providence of our hea∣venly father, and the very Lyons roaring after thir prey, doe seeke their meat at the hands of God: These mercyes are temporall; but as for spirituall mercyes, for the working and cherishing of Sanctification these are not extended unto all, but to some only, even to whom he will. And accordingly the elect of God are called vessels of mercy. Yet to the * 1.48 execution of damnation on any he proceeds not till after death, and stayes no longer; so slow to wrath he is towards the worst, and no more slow to the best of them. Who is a God like unto thee, saith Micah, that taketh away iniquity? here this Authour out of wisdome maketh a stoppe, leaving out that which followeth and passing by the transgres∣sions of the remnant of his heretage: That restriction belike he did not so well brooke; but having leapt over that; he is content to take in that which followeth, he retaineth not his wrath for ever, because mercy pleaseth him: to witt, towards the remnant of his heritage, of his people. But I hope nought of this can hinder God from being the Authour of damnation to all that dye in sinne without repentance without any prejudice to his holinesse, though he retaineth wrath for ever against them.

We come to his reason which he calls soūd, saying that it cannot but argue such a decree of extreame cruelty. But what decree? of that wherby he hath decreed to damne all that con∣tinue in sinne without repentance? For to none other hath God decreed dānation in the opinion of any of our divines. But that which he cōmends as sound let us examine. We can∣not in reason think, sayth he, that any man in the world can so far put off humanity and nature as to resolve with himselfe to marry & beget Children, that after they are borne and have lived a while with him, he may hang them up by the tongues, teare their flesh with scourges, pull it from their bones with burning pincers, or put them to any cruell tortures, that by thus torturing them, he may shew what his autority and power is over thē. Much lesse can we beleive that God should ordaine infinite multitudes of his Children to everlasting fire. Is it credible that this Authour himselfe doth not believe that very doctrine which here he impugneth Doth he not be∣lieve that God hath ordained infinite multitudes of those whō he calls Gods Childrē to ever∣lasting fire? doth he not I say believe this as well as we? Doth he not believe that who∣soever dyeth in sinne without repentance shall be damned? doth he not believe that God of his mere pleasure hath made such a decree? It is increedible he should not be of the same faith in this. Are not all Gods ordinances made of his mere pleasure? could he not both ordaine and execute the annihilation of sinners if it pleased him? and that either immediatly upon the committing of sinne, or after some certaine yeares enduring the punishment of hell fire. And as for hell fire it selfe, could not he qualifie or increase the tormenting nature thereof as he should thinke good? All this I nothing doubt but he believes, unlesse with Origen and the Jewes, he be of opinion that the fire

provided for the devill and his angells is not everlasting: what madnesse then, what phrensy possesseth him so to dispute against us, as to dispute against himsefe? Vndoubt∣edly this Authour would have his Reader so propitious unto him, as to understand and interpret him beyond that which his owne words doe import; as namely thus, That God hath not only of his absolute pleasure made such an ordinance, that all who dye in sinne without repentance shall be damned; but rather thus; That God hath ordained that Infinite multitudes of his children shall be damned, not for their owne sinnes, but only out of his absolute pleasure. For this is generally the unshamefast carriage of men of this Authours spirit. Now what one divine of ours can he shew to have maintain'd this? Yet this is the imputation he chargeth upon us, that by our doctrine God resolveth upon the destruction of many innocent soule, eternally in hell fire. Yet this is a very Amphi∣bologious expression. For when were they innocent in his meaning? when they were damned? If this be in his meaning, can he name any divine of ours that affirmes this? Or doth he meane they were innocent when God entertaind this resolution? And doth not he as well as we maintaine that there was a time, when Angels were innocent though afterwards they became devils; yet both then and from all eternity God had entertained such a resolution; For his decrees were everlasting as we say; neither hath he hitherto manifested his opinion to the contrary; whether he maintaineth such an o∣pinion secretly in his brest, I know not; If he doth, and shames to declare it let him pull himselfe by the nose; in the passages he produceth out of Cicero concerning Epi∣curus, and out of Virus concerning such like pag: 9. Yet we doe not say they were inno∣cent when God made his decree of Reprobation. I should shew my selfe an Ignoramus to say so, We say they were neither innocent nor nocent then, forasmuch as till the Cre∣ation no Creature had any beeing but God's decree of Election (and consequently * 1.49 of Reprobation also) had its beeing before the foundation of the world. 2 This manner of reasoning which this Authour calleth sound, I have found long a goe in Castalio, as superficiary a Divine as ever put pen to paper. And by the way observe, all the Devills and Damned men he calls Gods Children: this is the language of their Court. Now what * 1.50 one Divine of ours maintaines that any of Gods children are destinated to eternall fires? S. Paul tells us We are all the sons of God by faith in Christ Iesus: and because we are sons, God hath sent the spirit of his sonne into our hearts crying Abba Father; And that as many as are led by the spirit of God. And if we are children we are also heires, even the heires of God. and heires annext with Christ. And this distinction to witt the children of God, and * 1.51 children of the Devill, hath beene ever since the fall of man, as S. Iohn signifieth where he sayth. In this are the children of God knowne, and the children of the Devill, whosoever doth not righteousnesse is not of God, neither he that loveth not his brother. And anon after * 1.52 he giveth instance in Cain and Abell. Yea & our Saviour gives us to understand the same, where he saith to the Jewes, Ye are of your father, the Devill, and the lusts of the father ye will doe. And whereas we read that in the dayes of Enosh men began to call upon the name of the Lord; forthwith we read c. 6. 2. (For the 5. chap. comeing in betweene containes only the Genealogy of the world from Adam) of the distinction between the sonnes of God * 1.53 and daughters of men, thus, the sonnes of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair, and they tooke, them wives of that they liked. It it is true, Adam is called the sonne of God in reference to creation; And noe marvaile; For he was created in the state of grace: so likwise the Angells for the same reason. When the starres of the morning praysed them, and all the Children of God rejoyced. It is true we thus read, Have we not all one father? hath not one God made us? Piscator interprets these two interrogatories into one: As if God in the first place were represented as a common father unto all; but our Geneva Divines doe not, but the name of father in this place they referre to Abraham. And in not referring it unto God they have the consent of the Jewish Rabbines Aben Ezra and David Kim∣hi; who yet more hansomly doe referre it to their common father Iacob, then to Abra∣ham, the Covenant of God including all the Sonnes of Jacob; not so all the Sonnes of A∣braham, no nor the Sonnes of Isaak but Iacob only. 3. Consider is it decent to conforme the courses of God with the courses of men? May not we consider in like manner against the Lord's foreknowledge, as well as against his decree, & reason thus: what man of common humanity would resolve with himselfe to marry and beget children, did he foresee their wicked courses, and what will become of them for it, namely, to be condemned to ever∣lasting fire with the Divell and his Angells? what shall we therefore conclude that God did not foresee the wicked waies and ungodly courses of all Reprobates, that they would continue in them and die in their sinnes without all faith in Christ and true repentance

towards God? And if he did foresee what would be the ends of them in case he did cre∣ate them and bring them forth into the world, yet seeing he would neverthelesse create them and bring them forth into the world, one after another in their severall times and ages, shall we brand the holy name of God, and reproach him for unnaturallnesse, and barbarous crueltie? Rather I will say what meanes this Auhour so unconscionably to cor∣rupt the state of the question, by mentioning only the shortnesse of their life, and utterly concealing the wickednesse of their life, the only meritorious cause of their torments which they suffer, and accordingly to shape the ends intended by God, to be only the de∣monstration of his power and Soveraingtie over them, without all mention of his justice; whereas we say that in the inflicting of damnation, the cheife glory which, God manifests is only the glory of his justice proceeding herein according to a law which himselfe hath made (as most fit it is the Creatour should give lawes to his creature) and the law is this, whosoever believeth and repenteth shall be saved, whosoever dyeth in sinne without repentance shall be damned. Not one of our Divines (that I know) maintaines, that inflicting dam∣nation, the Lord proceedes merely according to the good pleasure of his will, in the com∣municating of faith and repentance, we willingly confesse the Lord proceedes merely ac∣cording to the good pleasure of his will; and it is expresse Pelagianisme to affirme that grace is given according unto workes. And herein this Authour is very well content to walke in the darke and conceale his most corrupt opinion most opposite to the grace of God. But that damnation should be inflicted without respect to sinne as the meritorious cause thereof what one of our Divines can he produce that affirmeth? Yet thus he is plea∣sed to disguise our opinion (when he findes the poverty of his strength to wage faire warre) and so expose it to the hatred of me; as if God ordained to damne men not for their sinnes, but of his owne mere pleasure. Thus of old the enemies of the Gospell dealt with Christians: for first they would cloath them with beare skinnes, and then set doggs upon them. All that he hath to say to excuse his shamelesse crimination (though so much he doth not expresse here) is only this, that our Divines maintaine the decree of damna∣tion to preceed the foresight of sinne. Yet this is untrue of the most part of them, who premit both the foresight of sinne originall before reprobation from grace, and of sinne actuall before the decree of damnation; I willingly confesse for my part, that I concurre with neither; and if I should, I should withall make the decree of permitting of sinne to preceed the decree of damnation, for which I see no reason; but yet I doe not make the decree of permitting sinne to follow the decree of damnation. I hold these decrees to be∣simultaneous, thus, that God at once decrees both to create men, and suffer them all to fall in Adam, and to bring them forth in their severall generations into the world, and to bestowe the grace of faith and repentance upon the one, and so to save them, and to deny the same grace unto others, finally permitting them in their sinfull courses, and so to damne them for sinne; and all to manifest the glory of his mercy to the one, and the glory of his justice on the other, yea and his soveraingty too, but wherein? not in rewar∣ding the one with Salvation and inflicting damnation on the other; but only in giving grace to the one, and not to the other. And all the difference between our Divines is merely in apice Logico, a point of Logick To wit, as touching the right ordering of decrees, concerning ends, and meanes tending to the ends; all concurring in this, that, God hath mercy on whom he will, in bestowing faith and repentance upon them, and whom he will he hardeneth, in denying the same graces unto others. Now when this Authour shall fairly prove that according to our opinion, God destroyeth the righteous with the wicked; then and not till then, shall he prove that our faith differeth from the faith of Abraham. What Divine of ours was ever knowne to affirme that God damneth any one that dyeth in re∣pentance? Yet it cannot be denied but that temporall judgments befall the righteous, as well as the wicked. When the Lord swept away 70 thousand with a three dayes pesti∣lence in the land of Israel; was it not possible thinks this Authour, that any of God's deare children should perish by that pestilence? To be caried away into captivity by an heathenish nation, I should thinke is a greater calamity then to dye of the pestilence; yet those who were carried away into Babylon with King Iechoniah, the Lord represents by * 1.54 the basket of good figgs; and those the Lord professeth that he had sent them away into Babylon for their good. Were all damned will this Authour say, that perished in the flood? Saint Peter seemes to be of an other opinion, where he saith, To this purpose was the Gospell preached, also to the end that they might be condemned also to men in the flesh, but might * 1.55 live according to God in the spirit. Truly I doe not say so much of them that perished in the conspiracy of Corah, when the earth opened her mouth and swallowed up the conspira∣tors,

nor them only but their wives and children also, especially considering that inter pontem & fontem, mercy may be sought and mercy may be found.

Sect. 2. Containing the first Objection with the answer thereunto devised, and my reply thereupon and an answer thereunto.

* 1.56

But God say some is soveraigne Lord of all creatures, they are truly and properly his owne. Cannot he therefore dispose of them as he pleaseth and doe with his own what he will? * 1.57

The question is not what an almighty soveraigne power can doe to poore vassalls, but what a power that is just and good may doe. By the power of a Lord his absolute and naked power he can cast away the whole * 1.58 masse of mankind; for it is not repugnant to Omnipotencie or soveraingty, but by the power of a Judge, to wit, that actuall power of his, which is alwaies cloathed with goodnesse and justice, he cannot. For it is not compatible with these properties in God to appoint men to hell of his mere will and pleasure; no fault at all of theirs preexisting in his eternall mind.

It is not compatible with justice which is a constant will of rendring to every one his due; and that is ven∣geance to whom vengeance belongeth, namely to the obstinate and impenitent. God is good, saith Saint Au∣stine, and God is just, he may without any desert free men from punishment, because he is good; But he cannot with∣out evill deserving condemne any man, because he is just. In an other place also he saith, If God be beleived to con∣demne any man that by sinne deserves it not, he is not to be believed to be free from injustice. 2. Nor is it com∣patible with goodnesse which is an inclination in God of communicating that good which is in himselfe un∣to his creatures, as farre as he can without wronging his justice. And therefore if God be (as the Scripture reporteth him) good to all; it cannot be that he should of himselfe without any motive in the reasonable cre∣ature, provide for it from everlasting the greatest of all miseries, and that before he thought of making it or bestowing any good upon it.

As touching the Objection I hope this Authour will say so too. As touching the first, * 1.59 namely, that he is the soveraigne Lord of all creatures; and our Saviour Christ will say it for him, if he will not; as touching the last, namely, that it is lawfull for him to doe what he will with his owne. But I find noe need at all of this consideration, to make answer to his for∣mer vaine discourse: for he may see plainly that I have made noe use of these principles: but they have their place to justifie God in other courses; namely, 1. In punishing chil∣dren for the sinne of their fathers in great variety of judgments temporall; as in the con∣flagration of Sodome, and in drowning of the old world. 2. In damning many Infant chil∣dren of heathen men dying in originall sinne unremitted; as M. Mason in his lectures at Magdalen Hall maintained, that, the punishment of originall sinne unremitted was eternall damnation. And M. Hord confesseth as much in his preface, Sect: 4. 3. Yea and in making the Soule of Christ the holy Sonne of God an offering for the sinnes of others. But con∣sider we his answer.

To appoint to hell, what is it but to appoint to the sufferings of the torments of hell? Now doth any of our Divines maintaine that God appoints any man to the suffering of hell torments of his mere pleasure, and not for sinne? They doe not, and therefore this Authours discourse depends upon a mere fiction devised in his own brain. 2. The di∣stinction which here he makes is the distinction of Arminius, who maintained that God can doe that per potentiam, by power, which he cannot doe per justitiam, by justice, which I have disproved at large in a peculiar digression on this argument in my Vindiciae; and not one of my reasons there brought doth this Authour once offer to answer. And * 1.60 this opinion of his doth manifestly imply that God hath a power to doe that which is un∣just. 3. He supposeth very judiciously to his own advantage, that there is a justice in God towards his creature secluding the ordinance of his will; whereas both Suarez and Vas∣quez opposite in other particulars concerning God's justice, doe yet agree in this, that there is no justice in God towards his creature, but upon supposition of his will and * 1.61 ordinance as I have shewed. 4. He may as well say that it is not compatible with the ju∣stice of God to punish (as it signifies to inflict paineon) him who is holy. For justice is as well opposite to the punishing of an Inocent, as to the punishing of him in such a degree. And consequently God cannot in justice put an holy man to death, much lesse annihilate him; which if he saith, he shall contradict Arminius. 5. If it be not compatible with God's justice to inflict hell paines on any man, no fault of his preexisting in the eternall mind, then either Christ suffered not the paines of hell, or was not without fault; or lastly God was unjust in inflicting those paines upon him. 6. In the last place observe, for all this he gives us nothing but his bare word. So that if we give him leave he is like enough to dictate unto us Articles of beleife at his pleasure.

1 By what right is vengeance due to the obstinate and impenitent? Is it due by any other

right then by the ordinance of God? Cannot God pardon it if it please him, yea and cure it too? And if he be pleased to punish it, cannot he punish it as well by annihilation of the obstinate (so to set an end unto his sin as to himselfe) as by condemnation of him? That of Austine is spoken in reference to God's law, whereby he hath ordained that without evill deservings he shall not be condēned (yet Christ suffered hell paines without any evill deservings) In respect of the like law, he shall be unjust, if he he should not re∣ward them, who dye in faith and repentance, with everlasting life. This is only in respect of potentia ordinata, such a power as is ordained by his will. But as for potentia ahsoluta, pow∣er absolute, all confesse that God can annihilate the holy Angels.

2 How doth God communicate grace unto his creatures? is it not by necessity of na∣ture, or freedome of will? Philosophers were wont to argue the eternity of the world by this, that Bonum est sui communicativum, That which is good is apt to communicate it selfe, yea naturally and necessarily: And therefore God being optimus the best, as well as maximus the greatest, was most communicative, and that naturally and necessarily. If the same be this Authours opinion, he is as Atheisticall as they: But if by freedome of will he communicates his goodnesse, then he communicates his goodnesse, as when he will, so likewise how he will, and to whom he will. As Saint Paul expreslely professeth saying, God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, of such places as these this Au∣thour * 1.62 takes no notice, but so much the more Atheologically. Yet I am willing to take notice of what he brings, namely, that God is good to all; And so he is in doeing them good, many and sundry waies; in maintaining their being, But he is not in such sort good to all as he is said to be good to Israel. For he hath not dealt so with any nation, as with them. 2. 'Tis untrue that God communicates unto his creatures that good which is in himselfe: for the * 1.63 good which is in himselfe is of a more transcendent nature, then to be communicable un∣to creatures; such conceits are Manichaicall. God is essentally whatsoever he is: But the * 1.64 goodnesse this Authour speakes of, is of an accidentall nature unto us; And is it decent and not rather abominable to transforme the essence of God into an accident, that so it might be communicated to the creature.

3. If Gods goodnesse incline him to communicate goodnesse unto the creature, as farre as he can without wronging justice, then it inclines him to communicate holinesse un∣to all to preserve all from sinne, to bring all to faith and to repentance, and so to save all. For how could his justice be wronged in this?

4. When he saith, tha God of himselfe cannot without any motive in the reasonable creature provide for it from everlasting the greatest of all miseries; observe what an hun∣gry proposition this is; for will he say tht God can provide for any creature the greatest misery save one, though not the greatest of all without any motive in the creature? But if he can so provide the greatest save one, why not the greatest of all? What colour of rea∣son to put any difference in this! And if the greatest save two, why not the greatest save one? And so we may goe on till we come to the least misery, thereby to convince the un∣reasonablenesse of this assertion. For in cleare evidence of truth, reason cannot discover where to make a stand.

5. And what is the motive he meanes, but the motive of sinne? And what sinne did God the Father see in Christ the Sonne, that moved him to ordaine his deare Sonne to the suffering of hell paines?

6. And as he alledgeth Austine to little purpose, so to the contrary what he writes de predestinatione & gratia is well known. Si humanum genus quod creatum primitùs constat ex nihilo; sine debito mortis nasceretur, & tamen ex iis Creator Omnipotens in aeternum nonnul∣los damnare vellet interitum, quis Omnipotenti Creatori diceret, quare fecisti sic. If mankind which is well known, at first to be made of nothing, were born without the debt of death and sinne; Yet if the Almighty Creatour, would damne some of them to eternall destruction, who would say to the Almighty Creatour, why hast thou done so? And observe his reason, Qui enim cum non essent, esse donaverat, quo fine essent habuit potestatem For he that gave them being when for∣merly they had no being had power to dispose to what end they should be. There is nothing more evident by the light of nature then this. I willingly confesse that that this book though it goe under Austin's name, yet it is thought to be none of Austin's, and that amongst other * 1.65 considerations, by reason of this very sentence in particular, which seemes unto me very harsh, and contrary to Austin's doctrine in other places. But Raynaudus hath discovered at large the vanity of this reason, and shewes by variety of testimonies the concurrence of Antiquitie in bearing witnesse to the same truth. And albeit he confesseth the book not to be Austin's, yet he proves that Fulgentius was the Authour of it, alwaies accoun∣ted to be an Orthodox Father and well known to be a follower of Austin's.

Sect: 3. Containing a Reply to the second Objection, and Answere thereunto.

* 1.66

It is further objected, that we doe and may slaughter our beasts for our dayly use, without any cruelty and iniquity, And therefore God may as well and much more appoynt as many of us as he pleaseth to the torment of hell, for his glory, and yet be just and good to notwithstanding. For there is a greater dis∣proportion between God and us, then there is between us and beasts.

1 For answering hereunto we are first to premise thus much, namely that our slaughtering of Beasts * 1.67 for our dayly use is by Gods ordinance, and appoyntment. We had not the authority of our selves, but God of his bounty towards us, gave it us, as we may see Gen: 9. 2, 3. Where we may observe, 1 That God delivereth up all creatures, Beasts, Birds, and Fishes into the hands of men. 2 That the end why he doth so, is that they might be meat for men, and consequently they might be slaine. Which being so, our slaughtering of Oxen, Sheep and other creatures for our dayly use is to be accounted Gods doing, rather then ours. And therefore the objection should be made this. God may without any breach of good∣nesse or justice appoint bruite creatures to be slaine for mans use, therefore he may ordaine men to be cast into hell torments for his owne use, that is for the declaration of his soveraingty.

2 This being premised I answer further that this comparison holds not, For there is little proportion between the Objects compared, and lesse between the acts.

1 There is but small proportion between the Objects Beasts and Men creatures of a different nature and made for a different end Beasts are voyd of reason and liberty in their actions; creatures whose be∣ing svanish with their breath, made only for the use and service of men upon earth But men are reaso∣nable and understanding creatures, able through the Creators bounty to discerne between good and evill, they are the very Image of Gods purity and eternity and were made for the service of God alone upon earth, and his blessed and everlasting society in heaven So that albeit there be a very great distance be∣tween God and man, yet nothing so great as between God and Beasts It followeth not therefore that if God may appoynt beasts to be killed of his owne free pleasure for mans use. he may with like equity and reason appoynt men of his owne will to destruction, for his owne use We read that God required of his people many thousand beasts for sacrifice, but not one man The first borne of other creatures he cha∣lenged for burnt offerings (except they were uncleane beasts) but the first borne of men were to be re∣deemed. Which sheweth that he put a wide difference between the blood of men and beast. Besides in the 9 of Genesis he gives men power to kill and feed uppon all living creatures; but he straightly forbids them to shed mans blood, and gives this reason of the prohibition, Man is the Image of God; so that we may well conclude, that there is but small proportion betweene the Ob••ects compared-men, and Beasts in respect of this Act of killing and slaughrering. 2 There is farr lesse or rather no proportion at all between the Acts compared Killing and eternall tormenting. A man may kill, but he cannot without barbarous, injustice and cruelty torment his beast, and prolong the life of it, that he may dayly vexe and torture it, to shew what pow∣er and soverainty he hath over it: so I doubt not (though there be some that will not grant it, but charge the Arminians with contumely against God for affirming it) I doubt not, I say, but God may kill a man of his owne free pleasure; yea and resolve him into nothing without any cruelty and injustice; because in so doing he doth but take away what he hath given him. But he cannot without both these antecedently decree to keepe him alive for ever in Hell, that he may there torment him without end, to shew his soveraingty. For this is to inflict an infinite evill upon a guiltlesse creature, to whom he had given but a finite good: And so is the comparison most unequall too, in the acts compared, and therefore proveth just nothing.

Belike as many as have not the word of God, to read this Authours acute observa∣tions out of Gen: 9. 2. 3. (For he would not seeme to be any of the blunter sort) doe * 1.68 sin as often as they kill a chicke to feed upon, though beasts of prey doe as much as this comes to, and more without all sin. 2 Yet M Perkins thought it enough to take notice that commonly it is received as lawfull, without enquiring whence this authori∣ty proceeds And noe Christian doubts, but our very bodyes, and soules and all, we have from our maker. 3 Are all beasts for meat? Or hath not man power to slaughter any but for meat? Where doth the Authour find this in Gen: May we not kill Lyons, Beares, wolves, unlesse we eat them forthwith, or pouder them up, that by degrees we may make meat of them? so of snakes, and Adders and all the Serpents that Lybia brings forth? 4 I deny that our slaughtering of oxen is in this respect, or in any respect to be ac∣counted Gods doing rather then ours. For Gods appoyntment in this, is but of the na∣ture of a permission, not of a command. We may live by fruits and hearbs and Mar∣malads and sucketts, or butter, milke and cheese, if we think good. Were it a Comman∣dement, yet would it not follow that it is Gods worke rather then ours. For he cōmands good workes and forbids evill workes. Now will this Author herehence conclude, that our good workes are rather Gods workes then ours. I trow he will not 5 Therefore wee keepe to our owne argument, and not regard his infatuation of it, and we were in a pretty case, if we should suffer our adversaries to shape our Arguments If they once have the grinding of our Tooles, no marvaile if they soone grind out all the edge of them. We say

it is lawfull for man to doe all this that is spoken of, upon our fellow creatures, and shall not God have as much power over us? Doth not the Apostle himselfe dispute after this manner, and make the power which God hath over us, equall to the power which the Potter hath over the worke of his own hands and over the clay also. Shall the thing for∣med say to it that formed it why hast thou made me thus? hath not the Potter power over the clay of the same lump to make one vessell unto honour and another unto dishonour? We cannot take life from a creature without pain, deadly pain: if we have lawfull power to inflict pain up∣on another creature, hath not God greater power to inflict pain, yea the greatest pain upon us, and that without all respect to sinne? And that this God can doe as Lord of life and death, both Vasquez the Jesuite acknowledgeth, and Medina pronounceth ex concordi Theologorum sententiâ, by the unanimous consent of all Divines, as elsewhere I have shewed and proved by variety of demonstration; like as Raynaudus confirmes it by the concurrant testimony of the Antients in the places formerly mentioned. 2. In the next place he comes to his answer, and saith that the comparison holdes not. And I commend this Authours wisdome in troubling himselfe with no more objections, then he thought himselfe able to Master. For who would not keep his shinns whole the best he can? But I wounder he comes off no better, even then, when he makes choice of such adversaries, as he thinks he can well grapple with.

1. Little proportion will serve turne; it is enough for us that they are all God's creatures; and surely there is lesse proportion between the Creatour and the creature, then between one creature and another. Yet sure I am, every creature that hath life is more noble then a creature without life, such as a Potters vessell is; yet look what power the Potter hath over his vessell; the Apostle tells us that God hath the same power over his creature man. Secondly, the Authour was sensible of the weaknes of this bowstring, and seeing it would * 1.69 not hold, therefore he relyes upon another, and thats his owne deforming and disfigu∣ring our argument, drawing it from the comparison of man's power over his fellow crea∣tures, with God's power over us; to conclude therehence that God the Creatour hath as great power over his creature; as man by God's graunt hath power over his fellow crea∣tures. From this due course of comparison which we propose, this Authour drawes us to a wild comparison of the power of God over beasts, with the power of God over man; which is not ours, but an immodest and unshamefast fiction of this Authour; and that grounded upon immodest foundations as before hath been shewed. Thirdly, yet why not so great a difference between God and man, as between God and beasts? Is not the di∣stance infinite? Is it possible to be lesse, seeing man is but finite, and God infiinte? For still the perfection of man is but in the way of perfection create. But God's perfe∣ction is of a transcendant nature it being uncreat: which when School-men have conside∣red, they have affirmed that the perfection of creatures is to be measured not by approxi∣mation to God who is, ens primum, the first being, but by their remotion rather à non esse, from not being; As I remember to have read long agoe in Paulus Venetus, and which then seemed to me most congruous, nither to this day doe I see any just cause to oppose it. 2. I come to the second answer; And here I find this discourse to breath the spirit of Ar∣minius, as truly as if it were spit out of his own mouth. Now Arminius on this point I have answered at larg, as this Authour well knowes: he is content to passe that by, and keep himselfe still like a Sow in beanes, without raising any noise of solving ought hath been * 1.70 delivered in proofe hereof. But though he lets passe that wich I have delivered without answer, renewing only Arminius his objection; yet I will not let this his answer to his own objection passe without a reply.

1. Therefore whereas he saith there is no proportion between killing and eternall tormen∣ting. Imarke his cunning carriage, he doth not say there is no proportion between killing and tormenting wich are two acts; and acts are somewhat capable of proportion. And surely if he had, killing would appeare to be the worst of the two; since to kill is to torment and somewhat more, even to destroy the being of a man. Therefore the comparison which he shapes is between killing and eternall tormenting; that is not between two acts, as he pre∣tends to from the comparison, but between one act, and the eternall duration of an other act, which is the quantity thereof in reference to time, such is this Authours jugling. Yet notwithstanding the disproportion of these things, hence it followes not, that killing is the more desirable of the two; considering that many apain there is which man would be content to endure, rather then to loose his life? So farre is it from being worse, and that beyond all proportion. Austine somewhere professing of infants pain in hell, that is poena mitissima, the mildest pain, & such as they had rather endure then to have no being at all.

2. But take it for an intollerable tormenting; if there be no proportion between killing and eternall tormenting; whereas there is some proportion between man and beast, then it were reasonable for any man to desire to be turned into a beast rather then to be eter∣nally tormented: now let every reasonable creature consider, the sobriety of such a choice. 3. If only the eternity of it makes killing to be preferred before tormenting, then it is not to be denyed, but tormenting a creature in hell fire a thousand or ten thousand yeares may be performed by God upon an innocent man, only eternall torment cannot. Yea and so ten thousand to an hundred thousand yeares, and so forwards untill it comes to be eter∣nall, which indeed can never be; it being a thing utterly impossible to attaine from a be∣ginning unto eternity by degrees. A finite added to a finite being never able to make it infinite. And therefore to maintain a thing infinite in quantitie, Aristole hath taught us that it is to maintain a multitude of infinites (and indeed an infinite of infinites.) For if the parts be but finite, it is impossible that the whole consisting of finite parts can be in∣finite. 4. Though man cannot without barbarous cruelty torment his beast, and prolong the life of it; Yet I hope this Authour will not deny this to be in the power of God, and that for the least sinne committed by man. And this was it that I proposed in my answer to M. Hord, to shew the power of God in such a kind, wherein it were abominable crueltie in man to exercise his power: like as the barbarous cruelty of Tiberius is set forth by them that write the history of his life. And the truth is, it is a very difficult point to resolve how it can stand with justice divine thus to deale with a creature, though a sinner. Yet I know many courses are taken to solve this difficultie, and the best that I have met with is this in my judgment; That a man dying in sinne, his sinne continueth eternall (never broke off by repentance) as well as the pain, yet this upon examination is found to have its flawes, and will not satisfie. So that the best and finall resolution is to have recourse to God's absolute power, as a Creatour over his creatures. And that absolute power will make it good even over an innocent creature as over a creature nocent. And it were very strange to affirme that God hath not as much power over us as we have over our beasts, namely to put them to pain, to doe us service. Now if it be lawfull to inflict but one degree of pain upon an innocent creature, what reason can be given why he cannot inflict two degrees, and if so why not three, and so ascen∣ding to the highest degree? Then as touching the duration of it, if he can inflict such a pain for an houre, he may as well for two houres; and for a whole day: And if for a day he may as well for two daies, yea for a week▪ 1 for a week he may as well for a moneth, and if for a moneth, he may as well for two or three; if for three, as well for six; and if for six, as well for twelve; and if for a yeare, as well for two; and as well for foure, and so in infinitum; from tenns to hundreds, and from hundreds to thousands For no reason can possibly make evidence where we ought to make a stand; in such sort as that an afliction in such a degree is lawfull, and immediatly after increasing becomes un∣lawfull. 2. Yet consider we speak not now of decreeing, but of executing (whereas the ob∣jection proceeded concerning God's decreeing) Now between the decree and the execu∣tion, sinne may intercede by God's permission, and that necessarily thereupon as Armini∣us himselfe confesseth. But now to the point whereon we are in present, we suppose the person to be most holy, even as holy as the Sonne of God; on whom notwithstanding were inflicted, as all confesse, either hell paines, or that which was equivalent to hell paines. 3. Yet this evill thus inflicted will never come to be infinite, still it continueth fi∣nite, though in infinitum; it being utterly impossible by addition to make that which is fi∣nite become infinite. 4. But were it infinite, yet this Authours caution would help us a∣gainst the Authour himselfe. For the good which God hath given such a creature, is al∣so infinite, to wit his being. How much more if God preserve that creature from sinne, which by Arminius his cofession, makes a man more miserable, then hell paines it selfe. Lastly that there is such an absolute power in God Raynaudus justifies both out of the twelvth of wisdoome. Cum sis justus, juste omnia disponis. Ipsum quoque qui non debet puni∣re * 1.71 condemnare externum existimas à tuâ virtute. This reading he professeth to be corrupt and nothing coherent with the text; And the true reading ought to be this, Ipsum quoque qui non debet puniri condemnas. And shewes that this reading is followed by Austin, q. 53. and Saint Grigory. 3. Morall: cap. 11. This also he justifies to be Orthodox by the testimo∣ny of the Antients. Macarius homil. 15. Deus sui juris est, quod vult facit. Si velit pro po∣testate & jure suo mittit justos in Gehennam, ac peccatores in regnum. Out of Chrysostomt l. 2. De compunctione cordis sub finem. Si te agentem quod tibi preceptum est conjicii jubeat Domi∣nus tuus in Gehennam, aliqua tibi datur contradicendi potestas. Out of Austine in Psal. 70. in

the beginning Multum movet Dei amor & timor, Timor Dei quia justus est; Amor quia misericors est. Quis enim diceret ei quid fecisti, si damnaret justum? quanta ergo misericordia ejus est, ut justificet injustum? Then he represents the School-men maintaining the same. Ariminenses, Camariacenses, Medina, Secarius in cap. 7. Iosuae à 39. and Lorinus in cap. 12. Sap: v. 12. Yet is not Raynaudus of their opinion who maintaines reprobation to be be∣fore the foresight of evill workes; neverthelesse he is peremptory in justifying this; And Fulgentius whom he conceives to be the Authour of that book de praedest. & gratia, which goes under Austin's name, in a little treatise of his intituled Censura inofficiosae censurae, which is added to his Valerianus integrae vitae labis{que} purus.

Sect. 4.

* 1.72

But it is replyed by some (who will rather speak unreasonably and against common sense then lay down the conclusions which they have undertaken to maintain) that it is more elegible to be tortured in hell then to want or loose a being. For he that wants a being enjoyeth no good, but he that is tormented in hell, hath a being, and by consequent something that is good. If therefore God may take away a man's being that is in∣nocent, and turne him into nothing for his pleasure, much more may he torment him in hell.

I am glad to see my name so often remembred by this Authour in his margent; for a long time I desired to know his way by certaine evidence; for I would not suffer my selfe * 1.73 to be carried away with rumours; and withall I found some contradiction in the relations I received from different persons, but at length I was so happy as to see it under his own hand, and there to observe not his judgment only, but the strength of his affections also. Now let the Reader observe the cunning carriage of this Authour, and how farre off it is from all ingenuitie. For what I discourse, being drawne thereunto by Arminius his ex∣cursions, that this Authour obtrudes upon me, as if the defence of the cause I tooke in hand had drawn me thereunto, notwithstanding that I have professed the contrary. For thus I write l. 1. pag. 1. De electione Sect: 4. pag. 127. In the canvasing of this section Arminius runs out at large, saving that most of these things which here he heapes up are aliena, and no∣thing pertinent to the present purpose; as pertaining rather to the decree of reprobation, then to the decree of election. And a little after I write thus; Hence it is that Arminius expa∣tiates and transfers his disputation from the point of election, to the point of Reprobation too un∣seasonably: Yet wisely affecting the incolumity of his wavering cause. By that right (saith he) which God hath over his creature, he cannot ordaine any man to the suffering of pain without the foresight of sinnne. To wit that his cause might stand upright, and that this examiner might omit nothing that tends to the making of his opinion plausible with his propitious reader, it was needfull that he should make use of some such transition, though never so unreasonable but seeing such are the wiles and artifices of our Adversaries to confound all Scholasticall method, it shall not be unseasonable for me to weigh what he delivers as briefly as I can. Therefore after I had refused Arminius on that point, where he denyes, that God can doe that injustice, which he can doe by power; after this manner I enter upon a new digression concerning this point. Hitherto have I followed Arminius in his extravagants. For M. Perkins hath not pro∣ceeded so farre; as to affirme that God hath power to afflict an innocent creature, neither hath his Adversaries objected any such thing unto him, as justly inferred from ought delivered by him. So that all such have well hardened their foreheads, who faigne that our opinion cannot well subsist without the help of so horrid and so harsh an assertion, to wit, That it is better to be miserable, then not to be at all. It is true, some may conceive that though this were a truth, it were to be suppressed, rather then affirmed by reason of the harshnesse of it. Let every one consider aright that I undertake the defence of M. Perkins, and it is he that hath uttered this harsh assertion, (namely, That God can inflict hell paines without a∣ny demerit in the creature) out of Cameracensis: And it stood me upon to defend M. Per∣kins so farre as I had reason for it. Now finding the maine argument whereby Arminius maintaines the contrary (to that other, yet more harsh proposition) to be most unsound; and even this assertion which sounds most harsh in the eares of many, not only to be maintained by Austine himselfe and and divres Schoole-Divines, but answered by many arguments, the solution whereof was never expedited by any; have I deserved so sharply to be censured for representing all this in the way of justifying M. Perkins, whose defence I undertook against Arminius?

1. My words are these translated, God can annihilate the holiest creature, which Arminius confesseth, how much more is it in his power to afflict an innocent creature, and that for ever, considering that not only according to Schoole-divines, but also accor∣ding to Austine, yea according to the truth it selfe, it is more to be desired to have being un∣der

any pain, then to have no being at all. And afterwards I propose not one argument of mine own for the justifying of this, but only represent the discourse of Austine hereupon, as it is analized by Durandus that Schoole Divine. Now why are not the School-men censured, as men speaking unreasonably and against common sense? Nay why is not Austine censured as one that had rather speak unreasonably and against common sense; then lay downe the conclusion which he hath once undertaken to maintain, as well as my selfe? Yea and much more considering that the discourse proving this, is Saint Austin's; and had I not added on the by these four words etiam secundum ipsam veritatem, there had been no place at all for any censure to be past upon me. If a man finding himselfe convicted by Austin's dis∣course shall confesse that what he writes is true, is it equity to censure him as one who had rather speak unreasonably and against common sense, then lay down the conclusi∣ons which formerly he hath undertaken to maintain. When in the mean time no censure is at all passed upon Austine, who alone is the player of the game, he that stands by professing only in his judgment, he playes his game well.

2. If Austine hath spoken unreasonably and against common sense, how comes it to passe that this censurer hath not taken the paines to represent unto the world the unrea∣sonablenesse of his argument? This authour spends his mouth frankly in censuring, but takes no paines to free his Reader from errour, by solving arguments produced by Austin for the proofe of that wich this Authour conceives to be an errour.

3. Nay he doth not so much as answer that one argument, which here is proposed by me. An argument which the Scoole-men use as sufficiently convincing the truth, as Du∣randus and Ricardus. Yet considering the unreasonable condition of such adversaries, who take no course to convince or confute their opposites, but imperiously to cry them down; I have taken the paines to call to an account both Austin's arguments and others proposed by Schoole-Divines, and to devise with my selfe what answer might be made unto them, so to performe that for my adversaries, which they shew no hart to per∣forme for themselves, and I was borne in hand that such a digression of mine should be extant long ere this.

4 Yet by the way I wonder not a little that one thing is pretermitted. For if I mistake not, this very Authour is the man that heretofore hath been very full mouthed in censu∣ring, not so much the doctrine it selfe, as a certain answer I made to an argument brought out of Scripture against it; namely from those words of our Saviour, It had been better for that man if he had never been born. My answer was, that it was spoken according to the judgment of man, though indeed erroneous; and that after this manner phraseo∣logies of Scripture doe proceed I there shewed. Now this Authour hereupon spared not to professe, that if this were true he would turne Atheist. I wisht that Friend of mine to whom he spake this, to perswade him the next time he met with him, to enquire and con∣sider well, whether Maldonat the Jesuite doth not imbrace the same interpretation. And indeed if such protestations would carry it, this Authour would prove a very potent and formidable adversary, I have seen the like under his own hand, namely this, As Plutarch said of the old heathens who sacrificed men that they might pacifie their gods: that it had been better with Diagoras to say, There is no god, then to think that God is such a one that delights in the blood of men: And hereupon he adds this Protestation, I protest unto you I think it less dishonourable to the blessed Trinity, to say with the Atheist, there is no god, then to feigne such a God, as the decree of Reprobation maintained by the Contraremonstrants maketh him to be. This man I find is resorted unto and consulted with by the Arminians, as if his judgment were an oracle; and I willingly confesse he deserves to be in some great place unto them: and no place in my judgmentmore fit then to be unto the, à protestationibus. Yet I doe not pre∣scribe but leave it to their discretion to prefer him as they think good: but how comes it to passe, that here he is silent in reviving the reproaches he cast upō my answer to the Scri∣pture before mentioned? Is it because Maldonat the Jesuite hath been since found by him to embrace the same interpretation? And he is loath to fall so foule in censuring such as he is? Yet here he falls foul on me for professing my approbation, not of Schoole-men but of Austin's discourse. This makes me call to mind what was delivered of him sometimes by a London Minister; as that he should perswade a young Divine to study Bellarmine; as also what censures others have passed upon some writings of his. And it hath been my hap to see under his own hand such a counsaile as this givē to a friend of his. These things have I represented unto you the rather, because I would give you occasion to learne that in your younger dayes, which I have learned by late and long experience in my selfe, and that in these two things. First in reading Bellarmine and other adversaies to our Church; I have divers times

noted such speeches in them, as to my thinking involved contradiction, or had shew of absurdity, or might either give advantage to our selves, or breed prejudice unto them; but when afterward I came in cooler blood to weigh the words better, and to consider the circumstances more narrow∣ly. I found that I did mistake their meaning, and that an itching desire to find an advantage, made me to take shadowes for substance. And the like mistake in my selfe I observed, when I read the fathers, or the Scriptures, ready to interpret every thing either in favour of mine own cause, or in prejudice of the adversaries: And concludes sententiously thus; Nimirum ita est ingenium nostrum, facile credimus, quae nimium volumus. If such be the genius of this Authour, though he thinks not good to spare me for Austin's sake, yet methinks he should spare me for Richardus sake, or at the least for Maldonat's sake. This calls to my remem∣brance an Epigramme which D. Hoskins my chamber-fellow in New-Colledge some∣times made upon the fleas, (that sore troubled him as he lay in his bed.) And the conclu∣sion was thus;

But if ther's nothing that can slack Your rage and your correction, Yet ô remember you are black; And spare me for complexion.

So we proceed.

Sect. 5.

* 1.74

To the first part of this reply, namely, that it is more desirable to be in hell, then to be nothing. I oppose three things. 1. The speech of our Saviour concerning Judas: Woe be to that man by whom the Sonne of man is betraied, it had been good for that man if he had never been born Two things especially are set forth in these words of our Saviour. First the misery of Judas the betraier of the Lord. Woe be &c. Secondly, the greatnes of his misery, It had been good &c. It is as much as if the Lord had said, Judas the traitour shall be damned, and therefore so woefull will his condition be, that it had been good and happy for him, if he had never re∣ceived a being: good in earnest, as the Interpreters doe generally expound it, not in the opinion and esteem of weak minded, faint-hearted-men only as some few understand it. For first let it be granted that Scripture speaketh of things sometimes according to men's opinions, yet without reason to fasten such an expostiō upon any Scripture, is to doe, as dunces doe in the Schooles, who being not able to answer a place in Aristotle where∣with they are charged, shift it off, and say, (loquitur ex aliorum sententiâ, he speaks according to the opinion of o∣thers.) 2. This scripture cannot in reason be thus expounded. First because it is an argument and ground by which Christ declareth the truth and greatnesse of the misery of Judas, Woe to the man &c And why woe? Because it had been good &c. But it were no argument to shew his woefull estate by, to say that it had been good for him, that he had never been born in the opinion of men, who mistake the case but not in truth. 2. because this exposition would teach and encourage men to be Atheists and Epicures. In the second of Wisdome, we read how voluptuous men doe stirre up one another to enjoy the good things, that are present, to fill them selves with wine and ointments, to leave some token of their jollity in every place and to practise all manner of wickednesse. And what is their motive? a false perswasion that their soules shall dye with their bodies; and that they should have noe being after death. If this conceit would flesh them thus in their opinions and voluptuous courses, how freely and eagerly (may we thinke) would they pursue their carnall and sinfull delights, if they could be but once perswaded, that, after all their pleasure they should be in better case then if they had noe being? Secondly, I oppose common consent. Where shall wee pick out a man, but will say (if he speak from his heart) that he were better to vanish into a thousand nothings, then to be * 1.75 cast into hell. What is the reason why men are so afraid of hell, when they are touched to the quick with the conscience of their ungodly lives, and the expectation of eternall vengeance, that with Job they curse their birth day, and wish an hundred times over that they had never been, or might cease to be, that so they might not come into the place of torments, but because they judge a being there to be incomparably worse, then no being any where? And why are men who are sensible of hell fire so strongly curbed in the feare of feeling it, even from darling and beloved sinnes, but because they apprehend it to be the most terrible of terribles? Feare of being annihilated can never doe that, which the feare of hell doth.

M. Mason went great bellied with these choise conceits, and therefore he will bring * 1.76 them in though it be by the cares, in spite of his own friends: like as Arminius did be∣fore him, to vent a certaine argument of his, which yet had a very unhappy issue to the betraying of the Authours nakednesse most shamefully; and his argument was this, To be happy is better thē simply to be; therefore to be miserable, is worse then simply not to be; now the consequence is most inconsequent. For therefore to be happy is better then simply to be; because, to be happy, includes being, & addes hapines thereunto. And one good added to a∣nother good must needs make the whole compound better. In like manner, If to be mise∣rable doth include the evill of not being and adde another evill thereunto, the whole compound must needs be worse. But to the contrary it is apparent, that, to be miserable doth not include the evill of not being, but the good of being rather; and consequently there is no just proportion between misery and happinesse, And therefore though to be happy is better then simply to be (as including being, and some good thing more) yet thence it followes not, that to be miserable, is worse then not to be; for as much as, To

be miserable, doth not include the evill of not being and adde some evill more to it. Now the first that affirmed this harsh position, namely, that to be miserable is not worse then not to be at all, was Austin, and he not only affirmes it, but disputes it, and proves it by vari∣ety of arguments, not one whereof is answered by this Authour or by any friend that I know. And from Austin the School-men have taken it, and added this one argument to confirme it over and above those of Austine's, To turne a man into nothing is to destroy a man's universall being; but to inflict torment upon him doth destroy only particular being, to wit, his being in ease and pleasure. Now to have a man's particular being destroyed is not so bad, as to have a man's universall being destroyed. Now I come to consider how this Authour carrieth himselfe in overthrowing his own fiction. For albeit the position im∣pugned by bim, be no fiction (for it was the opinion of Austin and of divers School-men) yet the bringing it in here, as if it were an answer made by us to any of our Adversaries objections (as this Authour doth) as if we stood in need o•• any such aide is a mere ficti∣on. And first he states it at pleasure to serve his own turne, of being in hell to be more desira∣ble, whereas the Authour whom he opposeth delivers it of, esse mi erum to be miserable and misery is as well in respect of sinne, as in respect of bodily torment Nay it is confessed by Arminius himselfe, That the misery of sinne is greater, then the misery of torment. So, that if it be uncouth to say, that to be under the torment of hell is better then not to be at all; it ought to seem more uncouth to say, that it is better for a man to be guilty of sin, then to have no being at all. Now I doe not find that this Authour in all his Mountebank-like amplifications, did take this into consideration. Againe when it is said. That to be miserable is better thē not to be, this is to be understood aright, not as if misery it selfe were desirable, but being only, though with the adjunct of misery thus, to have a being though in mise∣ry is more desirable, then to have no being at all And so if it beapplyed to the misery of torment, and that in hell, it ought to be taken thus, To have a being though in hell is more desirable then to have no being at all. And it is apparent, that in not being at all, there is nothing at all desirable, but in being; though under the greatest pain there is something desirable, to wit, being. Now I consider his reasons.

He objecteth the saying of our Saviour to Iudas. Woe be to that man by whom the sonne of man is betrayed, it had been good for that man if he had never been born: and indeed the betray∣ing of the Sonne of God his Lord and master, was a most facinorous act, especially being committed by the way of a kisse, & with sweet words saying Hayle Master. And School∣men doe distinguish between, the misery of sinne, and the misery of pain, in such sort that al∣beit they deny the latter to be worse then not being, yet they doe not reason so of the former. But because Iudas was not so sensible of the miserable condition of the one, as of the other; therefore our Saviour sets forth the woefull condition of that state where∣of he, and generally all are most sensible. Whence we may well argue, that our Saviour speakes in conformly to man's sense and judgment, and it was not long ere the terrours of a guilty conscience took hold of him, and he went forth and hang'd himselfe. Yet our Saviour saith not, It had been good for Iudas if he had never received any being, but only this, If he had never been borne▪ now being is not received in a man's birth but in the conception rather. And undoubtedly, if Iudas had perished in his mothers womb it had been much better for him. As Arch-byshop Whitgift sometimes in the Court of high commission said, of one that was accused and convicied o•• some foule crime committed by him in the ve∣ry house of God That better it had been, that his neck had been broken at the first, then that he should live to be o••scandalous to the Church of God And yet as if our Saviours wordes were not enough for this Authour in saying, It had been good for that man; therefore he patch∣eth it out with a supplement of his own, thus, It had been good and happy for that man, if he had never received being. So that whereas Aristotle made happinesse to consist in an aggre∣gation of all good things this Authour with his divinitie thinks good to mend Aristtotl's Philosophy, by placing happinesse in the want of every good thing very learnedly and judiciously. Vulcan who made thunder-bolts for Iupiter, when he was cast out of heaven had a shrewd fall, and contracted such lamenesse as stuck by him ever after. So this Au∣thour who forgeth thunder-bolts and arguments for others, being fallen upon oppositi∣on to the prerogative of God's grace and his Soveraignty over all creatures; no marvaile if his logick and philosophy halteth; and his infirmity so contracted may increase so farre, as in the end to bereave him of commō sense. He contents himsele as his manner is with saying, that Interpreters doe generally expound it as he doth; some few he confesseth understand it other wise, but most concurre with him, to wit, that, it is delivered in ear∣nest; what a jest is this as if any Interpreter was ever known to say, that our Savour spake

not in earnest. Neither doe I know any that interpreteth the place as he shapes it, as if our Saviour spake according to the opinion of weak-minded faint-hearted men only. Not one that I know putteth any such difference of men under the torments of hell. Like as the Prophet speakes of the stoutest, as well as the weakest, Can thy heart endure, or thine hands be strong in the day that I have to deale with thee, or the Lord rather by * 1.77 the Prophet. The School-men suppose without difference, that the damned wish they had never been borne, or rather that they had never been. So the Saints of God in this life have broken forth into passionate expressions in the time of their extremity; Maldo∣nate on this place gives instance in many; but the question is whether these proceed from the judgment of right reason; or erroneous rather, through the vehemēcy of passion, whose course is as Aquinas observes, extinguere rationem, to extinguish reason. And it is one of the three things as Aristotle observes in his bookes De Animâ, that hinders the mind in her judgment. The other two are, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a Disease, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sleep; the third is passion; how much more when passion is stirred up by the sorest disease of all other the torments of hell fire?

1. But if I am glad to see the issue whereto he drives his discourse. For he grants that the scripture speakes sometimes according to men's opinions: but without reason to fa∣sten such an expression upon any Scripture, is to doe as Dunses doe &c. he gives no in∣stance; I will supply the want thereof, and that out of one of those dunses a follower of Iohn Duns an eminet school-man, from whose name school-men are called dunses, whom this Authour was woont to magnifie; Lychetus a Minorite is the man, who is the first that I have found hitherto maintaining that God's purpose of election of any particular man may cease; and the purpose of reprobating the same may come in the place thereof. So the purpose of reprobating Iudas may come in the place thereof, and that without all change in God. This is a doctrine that now a dayes growes in request Penotus hath taken it up without betraying from whom he had it: And Franciscus à sanctâ Clarâ after him, and some of our Arminians I find inamoured with it. Now this Lychetus, when he is char∣ged with the doctrine of Scotus as directly opposite hereunto, his answer is in part that he speakes according to the opinion of others. Now I desire not upon better termes to contend with M. Mason. For Austine hath given many reasons to prove that simply and absolutely not to be, is not a thing desirable, above being, though joyned with never so great misery of pain. And the School-men acknowledge that Austine herein delivers his judgment, and withall they concurre with him as Scot, Biel, Durandus, Maldonat. And it is evident that to be turned into nothing, is an universall destruction of being; so is not in∣flicting of punishment, as both Durandus and Maldonat argue the case. And saying that not to have any being at all is better for Iudas then to be in torment, here is something affirmed of a subject that makes him of a better condition then otherwise, which hath no place, but upon supposition of a subjects existence, & that in distinction from an attribute affirmed of him, which constitutes him in a condition of betternes, now that that which is nothing, by reason of being nothing, should be better the something, is one of the wil∣dest expressions, I think that hath been heard of since the world began; And therewithall creatures began to have a being. Againe consider, take Gabriel the Arch-Angell most ho∣ly as a creature, and let every sober man judge, whether it were better for him not to be, then being holy as he is to be tormented in hell fire. I should think that albeit God should torment me with hell fiire yet if he should preserve my soule from sinne & in the love of him out of the sense of his love towards me, I should have infinitly more cause to rejoyce then to complain, how weak soever I am at this present. Thirdly, if it be better and more desirable to have no being at all, then to be in hell fire; then this is to be uderstood of hell fire, either without limitation of time only: or with limitation. If only it hold in re∣spect of everlastingnesse, then it followes it is better to be in hell fire, provided a man shall not everlastingly continue there, then to have no being at all, though it be for a thousand yeares, not only twise told; but a thousand times over and over, and that multiplied Cubically, and yet no end of multiplication of the time of tormenting. If it be better to have no being at all then to suffer hell torments so long, then it is better to have no being at all, then to suffer hell torments halfe so long: For no reason can be given to the contrary; In a word it will follow, that it were better to have no being, then to suffer hell torments one houre, or halfe an howre, or a quarter, or a minute, or halfe a minute. For no reason can define the bounds within which it will be better to suffer the paines of hell fire, then to be turned into nothing, and beyond which it will be worse. But M. Mason saith secondly. This Scripture cannot in reason be thus expounded: And

he gives his reason for it: Because it is an argument and ground by which Christ decla∣reth the greatnesse or truth of the misery of Iudas: and I pray let every sober man judge, whether this be not a sufficient amplification of that misery, that they shall wish they had never been, or that they might be turned into nothing, rather then suffer such tor∣ments. How many preferre death before this worlds misery, and so goe on to destroy themselves; will it therefore follow that death indeed, though it should be an utter aboli∣tion of man, is not so bad as to suffer the miseries of this world. The mistake of a dam∣ned person wishing not to be, consists not in conceiving his torments to be unsufferable with any content or patience, but in conceiving that by not being, he should have ease, which is a most absurd conceit, arising merely from distraction of mind throug extremity of anguish. So that all things rightly considered, here is no encouragement for men to become Atheists & Epicures, unlesse this be an encouragement thereunto, that their pain shall be so extreme and unsufferable, as to make them desire, and utter they know not what, such distraction of mind and and perturbation of judgment shall surprize them. A false perswasion that mens soules shall die with their bodies, and that they shall have no being after death, urgeth every man indifferently to take his delights and pleasures while he may; whether this delight and pleasure be taken in courses vicious, or in courses ver∣tuous, because death sets an end, as to them; so to their pleasures and delights. But if their greatest happinesse, or misery doth begin in joy, or sorrow after death; and this is well known unto them: sober reason doth suggest unto them to provide for the obtaining of that happinesse, and declining that unhappinesse, above all other, according to that La∣dies resolution in Sophocles, and that upon this ground 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, there I shall con∣tinue for ever. But when he saith the wicked will the more eagerly pursue their carnall and sinfull delights, because after all their pleasures they shall be in a better case, then if they had no being. I long to have the judgment of any lewd person throughout the world concerning this; as namely whether he takes any comfort or encouragement to sinfull courses from this; that albeit he shall be cast with the devill and his Angells into hell fire that never goeth out. Yet this condition is a better condition, then not to have any being at all; whereas this better condition consists only in this, that being is better then not be∣ing; not in this, that he hath any ease, or is lesse obnoxious to torment and sorrow, which shall be so unsufferable, as to provoke him to wish, that he never had any being at all. Or that forthwith he might be turned into nothing.

Secondly, I oppose common consent. Where shall we pick out a man but will say (if he speak from his heart) that he were better to vanish into a thou and nothings, then to be cast into hell? What is the reason why * 1.78 men are so afraid of hell, when they are touched to the quick with the conscience of their ungodly lives, and the expectation of eternall vengeance, that with Job they curse their birthday, and wish an hundred times over, that they had never been, or might cease to be, that so they might not come into that place of torments; because they judge a being there to be incomparably worse, then no being any where? And why are men, who are sensible of hell fire, so strongly curbd and held in with feare of feeling it, even from dailing and be∣loved sinnes, but because they apprehend it to be the most terrible of all terribles? feare of being annihila∣ted can never doe that which feare of hell doth.

And is he well in his wits that talkes of a thousand nothings? I looked whereto it would come with such like wild discourses, even to runne out of common sense at last. * 1.79 Yet all this that he discourseth of, for the substance of it is no other, then Austine hath taken notice of in his very argument; and shewes the vanity of it, and the errour of man's imagination, conceiving the condition of being nothing, to be a condition of ease and rest from sorrow & pain; againe aske the same men whether they would not be content to be turned into dogges, wolves, snakes, toades, rather then to be under the torments of hell fire; aske againe whether they would not be contēt, to be turned into devills, so they might be free from the torments of hell fire. Aske the Adulterour whether he would not be con∣tent to lye with an other mans wife all his daies, rather then to suffer (shall I say) the torments of hell fire? Nay rather then dye possest of the joyes of heaven. Aske this Au∣thour whether he would not be content to maintaine stiffly, that grace is given accor∣ding to workes, and that a man is justified by his workes, rather then suffer the paines of hell fire, yea though it were against his own conscience. As for me were I a damned crea∣ture, yet according to this judgment which God hath given me cōsidering that the glory of God's justice is manifested in my condemnation, though extreamity of pain would transport me into as wild wishes, as this Authour justifies; yet according to right reason I should rather be content to suffer, then wish that I were turned into a bruit beast, or into a devill, or into nothing. I think the whole nation of sober divines would justifie me

in this undoubtedly God is able to worke me or any man to this resolution without sin.

2. If, because men through feare of hell and expectation of eternall vengeance doe with Job curse their birth day once, and wish they had never been; therefore it is better to be nothing then to be in hell: By the same reason, because they doe no other then Job did, it must follow, that it was better for Iob to be nothing, then to be under such torments. But if Iob's desire was an unsober and unreasonable desire in this, why might not their desire be as unsober and unreasonable also, proceeding not so much from calme reason, as from the strength of passion inflamed and disordered through extremity of tor∣ment. We know that men upon the rack doe sometimes make confessions, even against the light of their own consciences. And feare of evill sometimes distracts as much as the sense thereof; as in him who hearing the sentence of death passed against him at Paris, fell into a sweat of blood. And it was wont to be said, that pejor est malo, timor ipse mali. Fran∣cis Spira in the time of his distraction confest as much of hell it selfe. And if one desire, once having course, prove unreasonable, why should the renewing of it a thousand times over prove lesse unreasonable. And let the judicious observe the hand of God, in strik∣ing this Authour with such giddinesse even in this argument, (which he conceives of all other to be advantagious to his cause) so as at every turne to supplant himselfe, and to be∣tray the shamefull nakednesse of his discourse. As first, in talking of a thousand nothings. Secondly, In putting the case of some cursing their birth day, but how? as Iob did. Now will any sober man make the like collection of Iob's cursing his birth day, as this Author doth from others cursing theirs. Thirdly, and lastly in calling hell fire the terrible of all terribles. Who seeth not that this proceeds in reference to such things, which as they are feared, soe they may be felt; and supposing a subject existing, as to feare it before it comes, so to feele it when it is come but such is not the condition of being nothing. And when he feignes us to conforme to his crude conceptions, namely to conceive annihilati∣on to be a thinge feared, he pleaseth himselfe in his owne fictions. He no where finds me to speake of annihilation as a thing to be feared, no more then I speake of it as of a thing that is to be felt. Onely I say that it is a condition no way desirable by a reasonable crea∣ture, no more then the suffering of hell fire. But whereas hell fire cannot be suffered of any unlesse he hath a being, here is something found desirable, to wit the continuance of being. But in the condition of being nothing, there is not found any thing to be a fit Object of mans desire.

The third thing which I oppose is common sense; which judgeth paines, when they are extreame to be worse then death. Hence it is that Job being tormented in his body by the Devill cursed his birth day, mag∣nified * 1.80 the condition of the dead, and wished himselfe in the grave, plainely preferring the losse of his being, before that miserable being which he then had. And hence it is that men even of stoutest and hardest spirits (as we see by dayly experience) would (if they might enjoy their option) choose rather to have no bodyes at all, then bodyes tormented with the stone or gout, or any other sharpe and sensible disease It is a knowen saying grounded on this judgement of sense. Praestat semel quàm semper mori, better it is to dye once then to be allwayes dying. This the tyrant Tiberius knew very well, and therefore he would not suffer those, towards whom he purposed to exercise his cruelty, to be put to a speedy death, but by lingring torments. And Sue∣tonius repo••t••th of him in that chapter, wherein he reckoneth up his barbarous and cruell practises; These, sayth he, who would have dyed through the extremity of their torment, he used meanes to keepe alive (nam mortem adeo leve supplicium putabat) For he accounted death so light a punishment; that when he heard that one Carnulius, a man appoynted to torments, had prevented him, he cryed out, Carnulius me evasit Carnulius hath escaped mine hands. To a prisoner entreating him to put him quickly to death he gave him this answer, Nondum tecum redii in gratiam, I am not yet friends with thee; accounting it a great kindnesse to put him quickly to death, whom he might have tortured. Many that were called into question did partly wound themselves in their owne houses, Ad vexationem ignominiosam vitandam, to prevent that paine and ignominy, which they knew they should endure; And partly poysoned themselves in the mid'st of the Court, as they were going to their a••••aingment for the same cause Seneca speaking of one Mecaenas, who was so a frayd of being dead, that he sayd he would not refuse weakenesse, deformity, nec acutam crucem, no nor the sharpest cru∣cifying, so that he might live still in these extreamityes, he calleth his desire. Turpissimum votum, a base, and most ignoble, and unnaturall with, and censureth him for a most effeminate and contemptible man; because in all his evills he was afrayd of that which was the end of all evills, the privation of his being And certain∣ly we must needs conceive and censure them to be stocks and stones, rather then flesh and blood, who can so put of all feeling, and sense, as to thinke a tormented being in hell, to be a lighter and lesser evill, then no being at all.

We know that death to such as Iob was, is not only better then extreame paines, but better then all the joyes of this world; by how much to be present with the Lord * 1.81 Christ, is better then to be absent from him; and we know, sayth Paul, to the unspeak∣able comfort of all true Christians, that when the earthly house of this our tabernacle is dissolved we have a building of God not made with hands, but eternall in the heavens.

So that I wonder not a little at these wilde discourses of this Authour. When he saith that even the stoutest and hardest spirits would choose rather to have no bodyes at all, then bodyes tormented with the stone or gout, what other is this then to desire that they were impassible; would they not desire to have no soules too? and to be without sense like stocks and stones? But let every sober man judge whether this be a reasonable desire; what Christian justifies Iob in cursing the day of his birth? What Martyr hath not rejoyced in suffering, not naturall diseases, but the cruellest torments that most cru∣ell, and spightfull Tyrants could devise to be inflicted upon them? And even to suffer other evills by course of nature brought upon us with patience, acknowledging the hand of God therein, and submitting unto his will, justifying him as righteous in all his wayes, and holy in all his works, and condemning our selves: even this long a goe hath beene accounted for Martirdome in the judgement of Chrysostome. It is true such proverbs have had their course in most nations. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, praestat semel quam semper mori. And amongst us. Better eye out then allwaies aking, better one dead then allwaies dying. But shall we take this hand over head without a difference between a Christian & unchristian, and heathenish interpretation? As many as had an opinion of the immor∣tall condition of the soule, and withall of different conditions of men in joy, or sor∣row, according to the condition of their life spent in their courses vertuous, or vici∣ous, if they were well perswaded of their life past, they might accordingly think it bet∣ter for them to dye then live; And it is noe lesse desirable to them, who had no comfort in their life past. Bradwardine hath such a meditation. Mallem non esse quàm te offendere, I had rather have no being at all then to offend thee, speaking unto God. Yet in sinning a∣gainst * 1.82 him we are matter of his glory, which we are not, when we have no being at all. Matter of his glory I say, either in pardoning sinne, or in punishing it, or both. But what sober man will justifie such a saying, I had rather have no being at all then be troubled with the stone, or gout? Is not this the proper place for patience to have its perfect worke. And if it be urged that this holds true only in evills tolerable, not in case they prove intolerable. I answer that surely the pain of stone or gout is not intolerable, not any in the judgment of Paul, whose profession was this I am able to doe all things (his mea∣ning is to suffer all things) by the power of Christ that inableth me: and when upon his pray∣er * 1.83 that the messenger of Satan might be removed from him, he received this answer from the Lord, My grace is sufficient for thee, and my power is made perfect in thy weaknesse, What is Paul's resolution hereupon, though in himselfe a very weak creature? I will gladly therefore rejoyce in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may dwell in me. Therefore I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecution, in anguish, for Christ's sake. For when I am weak then I am strong. Doth not this extend to the very torments of hell suffered by our Saviour for our sakes. Undoubtedly, if the glory of heaven possesse the soule, though the paines of hell seize upon the body, such a one shall have more cause to rejoyce then to complain. These courses of Tiberius I had cause to take notice of in mine answer to M. Hord. For, whereas he slaundered our doctrine concerning the absolutenesse of God's decrees, and conforming them to the cruell courses of Tiberius: whereupon I shewed, that if such comparisons were not odious, but allowable, we might in like manner compare God's courses in punishing sinne temporall with torment eternall, with courses of Tiberius here specified. And because nothing hath a greater shew of cruelty in Tibe∣rius then such courses of his as these. Hence they may with the same liberty conclude, that the divine Majesty is cruell (which is a horrible thing to utter) and unjust in punish∣ing men everlasting in hell fire, for sinnes committed by them for a very short space in the course of their lives. But let this Authour consider, were heathen Princes more exas∣perate against any then against Christians, or were more cruell courses taken against any then the servants of God. Yet did these Christians prevent their bloody and barbarous desires by murdering their selves? Did they not rejoyce in tribulation? Yet death they might well preferre before the sweetest life. That they might enjoy the Lord Christ And Austine hath long agoe in this very argument shewed, that even in destroying themselves they aimed at being at a state of freedome from sorrowes. So farre were they from affe∣cting to have no being at all. And first, he distinguishes of the will as it signifies an appe∣tite naturall; or as it signifies an absolute desire. As it signifies nature or appetite naturall; so by no meanes can it desire to have no being. All naturall desire being for rest, but nature findes no rest in its destruction: Rest of nature supposeth its being, and adds somewhat over and above thereunto, namely freedome from trouble, unde siquis dicat vellem non esse, magis quàm miserum esse; respondebo, mentiris, quia cum miserum nolis esse tamen vis. Thus

Durand analizeth Austin's discourse hereupon. Then he proceeds to shew that the deli∣berative appetite cannot affect not being, for the avoiding of evill, save only according to erroneous reason. All which this Authour takes no notice of, but pleaseth himselfe in his own confusion. All creatures have in them, vestigia Dei, saith Luther, to wit, in respect of their being; But man is, Imago Dei. Shall right reason suggest the destroying of this for pain's sake? Durandus proceeds & shewes how according to erroneous reason a man may destroy himselfe, by reason of some present miserable condition urging him; conceiving that thereby he shall arrive to some secret existence wherein he shall be free, as from the good things, so from the evill things of this world. Unde Agustinus ubi supra dicit, quòd aliqui urgente miseriâ sese interimūt, eo quòd confugiunt ubi melius fore putaverint. A second manner is this, the vehemency of evill suffered may so over-cloud and trouble reason, as to make them conceive, that to have no being at all is better then to be in misery, which is absurd, saith he; for as much as the privation of evill is not good, but by reason of obtai∣ning of the contrary good; but no such good can be obtained in being nothing, howsoe∣ver men through errour of judgment may faigne it otherwise. In which case he makes choice of nothing (thinking to make choice of something) and consequently his election is erroneous, as Austine concludeth. But Seneca is the best flower in this Authours pre∣sent discourse; and the censure which he passeth upon one Mecaenas, who, so he might live, would not care what torments he suffered. Where by the way I observed; that albeit this Authour represents the common sense of heathens only in this. Yet all heathens were not of the same mind. Secondly, I observe that Seneca who censureth him did look for an immortall condition after death, which it seemes was no part of Mecaenas his Creed. And upon this ground his censure might proceed. And indeed otherwise it is very strange that he should censure him for effeminatenes, in respect of a resolute mind to endure tor∣tures, which we know full well is usually accounted virile aliquid, rather then muliebre, the part of a man, more then the part of a woman. Thirdly, I find in Austine, that this was the opinion of Varro and the Stoicks, that it became a man to destroy himselfe, rather then to endure some evills, and in this doctrine of theirs, he findes some contradiction to another doctrine of their own, which was this, Hanc esse naturae primam quodammodo & maximam vocem, ut homo concilietur sibi, & propterea mortem naturaliter fugiat, This is the first and greatest voice of nature, that man should be at one with himselfe, and therefore natural∣ly flieth death. And herein Austine himselfe acknowledgeth them to deliver a truth. Now consider, is a man at one with himselfe when he destroyes himselfe? Is he not rather at odds with himselfe in making a man's fortitude to be a selfe destroyer? If so be that de∣serves to be called fortitude, as there Austine speakes: Or how can the duty of preserving a man's selfe, be the greatest voice of nature, if there be found a voice of nature counter∣manding it, and commaunding a man to kill himselfe? In suffering evills there is place for the exercise of patience, of true fortitude and magnanimity of mind: But in the utter destruction of nature there is no place for the exercise of any vertue: which vertue was so farre advanced by the Stoicks, as touching the power of it, as to be able to descend into Phalaris his Bull, as Cicero discourseth in the last of his Tusculane questions Yet not only great evills, for the insufferable nature of them did urge them to destroy themselves, but meaner evills most unreasonably. What moved Cato to destroy himselfe, but because he would not come under Caesar? His stout spirit could not endure subjection. Yet he read over Plato's discourse of immortality the night before, and felt the edge of his sword, which some censure as an argument of some pusillanimity. The Spaniard, who was whipt through Paris never changed his pace, affecting to maintaine the reputation of spanish gravity and resolutenesse, though he smarted the more for it. And shall not our being in the likenesse and Image of God, be preferred before not being, though conjunct with a∣ny dolorous suffering: when this Authour will have no being, to be a lighter and lesser evill then hell paines; doth he not most manifestly signifie that it is a burden more easie to be borne? Thus ere he is aware most contradictiously he supposeth that, even in not being, there is a being. For how is it possible that an evill can be borne, and that with more ease then some other evill, by him who hath no being at all. But let him straine his wits to de∣vise where first pain begins to be so great, that a man's utter destruction is to be prefer∣red before it, seeing it is apparent that all pain is not such.

The 6. Sect:

To the reason on which the reply is grounded, which is melius est esse, quàm non esse. It is better to be, then to have no being. I answer that it is a Sophisme or, a fallacy a non distributo ad distributum. To be in it selfe is * 1.84 better then not to be, but it is not universally true in all particulars. Againe it is true in some cases, & ex hypo∣thesi,

si caetera sint paria; If there be any equality in the Adjuncts, It is so farre from being simply true; that our Saviour limiteth it, and putteth a case wherin it is not true but the contrary to it is true: That is the case of Judas of which we have said somewhat before. It had been good &c. Which words St. Hierome expounding saith; it is simply and plainly averred by our Saviour, that it is better to have no being, then an evill being. This was the judgment too of Job. Why died I not saith he, in the birth? why did the knees prevent me? and why * 1.85 did I suck the breasts? For now should I have lyen still, and been quiet, and should have slept then and been at rest. In which words he plainly implyeth, that he thought it better to have had no birth and being, then such a pain∣full and miserable being. This was also the opinion of Solomon. So I returned saith he, and considered all the op∣pressions that are done under the sunne; and behold the teares of such as were oppressed, and they had no comforter &c. Wherefore I praised the dead which are already dead, more then the living which are yet alive. Yea better is he, then both they, which hath not yet been, who hath not seen the evill works that are done under the sunne. The words doe clearly shew that Solomon did think it better to be dead, and to be deprived of being, then to be oppressed by the mighty, and to be without comforters, that is then to have a miserable and mournfull being.

Indeed so Hierome saith, but that is not all he saith. For he labours to prevent suspici∣on * 1.86 that Iudas had some being before he was borne: which was the errour of Origen. And the words of our Saviour seemes to favour it as Iansenius observes. Quibus verbis Orige∣nianum quid significare videtur, quasi homo ille fuerit antequam nasceretur, quia nulli potest benè esse nisi ei qui fuerit. And Hierome himselfe upon Eccles. 4. 3. writes that some were of that opinion; namely, Arminas nostras antequam ad nostra corpora ista descendant ver∣sari apud superos, & tam diu beatas esse, quamdiu coelesti Hierusalem & choro perfruantur Angelico. Neither doth Hierome there passe any censure upon the Authours of such an o∣pinion. Here indeed upon Mat. 26. 24, he saith, We must not hereupon think that Iudas had a being before he were born, because a well being can agree to none but such as have a being. Which argument Hierome doth not answer. For when he adds, sed simpliciter dictum est, multo melius esse non subsistere quàm malè subsistere. This rather confirmes the antecedent, namely, that it had been well for Iudas, if he had not been; then gives any tolerable or colourable answer to the consequence made therehence. And is not the authourity of Austine as good as the authourity of Hierome in this? Iansenius embraceth Hieromes ex∣position; but Maldonat doth not, but at large disputes for another interpretation, the very same which I delivered before I were aware of Maldonates exposition. And Ianse∣nius though he followes Hierome in expounding this place, yet he professeth, that both Euthymius of old, and Caietan of late do understand this place in the same manner that Durandus doth, namely, de nativitate ex utero, of Iudas his bringing forth into the world, distinguishing his birth from his conception, ut sit sensus, after this meaning, Bonum erat vel fuisset ei, si cum erat in utero matris suae non fuisset editus in lucem, sed mortuus tunc fuisset; & sepulchrum ipsius uterus matris extitisset; si enim tunc mortuus fuisset non incidisset in tan∣tam & talem condemnationem, quantam & qualem natus propter immensum perditionis scelus erat excepturus. It had been good for him, if being conceived in his Mothers wombe he had ne∣ver been brought forth, but then had dyed, and his Mothers wombe had been his grave. For had he then dyed his condemnation had been nothing like so heavy, as now it is. Let me adde here Maldonat's interpretation of this place which is memorable. Of this passage some dispute subtelly more then enough how it could be better for Iudas not to have been, whereas not to be is no good; to be damned is some good (meaning in respect of being) For he that is damned is somewhat and every thing that is, as it hath a being is good. Hierome signifies that some though Iudas had a being before he was born; and that Christ of purpose sayd not, it were better for that man, if he had never been; but if he had never been born, to signifie that though he had not been born; yet he should have had a beeing, and so to have had naturall good things without evill. I i∣magine that Hierome herin noted the Originists, whose opinion was that as soules were from the beginning created, and each according to his merrit either to remaine without a body, or to be cast into a body as into a prison. And indeed Origen so writes on this place, as he seemes not to be farre off from such an opinion. After the same manner allmost doth Euthinius interpret this. But such like phrases of speech are not to be accommodated to the subtillty of the Schooles. For they speak proverbiall speeches and vulgar, which commonly are somewhat hyperbollicall, as Iob 3. 11. Why hast thou brought me out of the wombe? would I had perished, that the eye might not see me, that I had been as if I had not been, from the wombe carried to the grave. And Ier: 20 14, 15, and chap: 33. Let the day perish wherin I was born. For all these proceed not from any deliberate judgment of the mind; but by way of complaint, whose course is to am∣plifie evills. Christ therefore in like manner speaks of Iudas, as it was to be thought he would speak of himselfe being in torment. Now it was very credible that he would say; I would I had never been born, it had been better for me never to have been born, then to suffer these paines: considering that Job and Jeremy most holy men have uttered the like speeches, under farre lesse sufferings. Adde to this that Christ saith not, It had been better that Iudas had not been born

born; but that it had been better to him, to wit, in his opinion and judgment: As we see it befalls many suffering bitter evills, to preferre death before life, sorrow & pain before judgment, where∣as without doubt to live is better then to dye.

In the next place this Authour saith, this was also the opinion of Solomon. Better is he then both they, which hath not yet been; The words, saith he, do clearly shew that Solomon didthinke it * 1.87 better to be dead and deprived of being, then to be oppressed of the mighty, and to have no comfor∣ters, that is then to have a miserable and mournfull being. Surely Solomon was not ignorant that of them that are dead there are two conditions; some in the state of damnation; others in the state of salvation. To be with God in the state of salvation, we make no question but that it is a better condition, then to be living here on the earth in the greatest happinesse that the world can affoord. But to be dead and in the state of damnation, can it enter in∣to the heart of any sober Christian, to believe that Solomon ever thought such a conditi∣on to be better then to live here on earth, in the most afflicted condition that is incident to the sonns of men? And doth this Authour well in coupling death with deprivation of being, as if every one, or any one that is dead were deprived of being? Surely all the dead are not deprived of all kind of living. For God is the Father of Abraham, Isaak, and Iacob; And he is not the God of the dead but of the living. Againe consider who are more oppressed by the men of this world then the Children of God? For as our Saviour told his disci∣ples The world will love her own, but because ye are not of the world, and I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you All that will live godly in Christ Iesus shall suffer * 1.88 persecution, saith Paul, and through manifold temptations we must enter into the kingdome of God. And our Saviour forewarned his disciples, Ye shall be hated of all men for my names sake. Now is it credible, that, this Authour should beleive or conceive that ever King So∣lomon was of such an opinion, as to professe, that it is better for the Children of God to be deprived of being then to live in oppression? Consider farther, the words cheifly perti∣nent to this Authours purpose alleaged out of King Solomon are these, Better then they both is he which hath not yet been. Now I presume this is spoken not of such an one, who as yet hath not been; though hereafter he shall be. For such an one may be in as great oppressi∣on when his time comes, as any other is, or hath been, amongst those that have lived be∣fore him▪ But rather of such an one as never yet hath been, nor never shall be Now judg whether this can admit any sober sense, unlesse in a vulgar phrase, according to the intem∣perate expressions which in time of oppression are uttered by men wherein as Maldonat observes, there is allwaies something hyperbolicall, and such as must not be examinedac∣cording to the subtilty of the Schooles. For consider, is there but one such that never yet was, nor evershall be; or are there many such? If many such, how come they to differ, who have nothing wherein to differ? What a vaine imagination is it to talke of particulars that never had, or shall have existence, to ascribe unto them a better condition then is found * 1.89 in them, that have not being only but life also? We know Cicero hath professed & that ac∣cording to the opinion of Stoicks, that a vertuous man may descend into Phallaris his Bull without any destruction of his happy condition. I have consulted Solomo Iarhi upon this place, and he tells us what he hath seen in the Jewes Midrach, namly, that there are 974 generations which have growen old and wrinckled from the creation, who yet never were created, and belike the Authours thereof conceive that Solomon spake of one of these. Rabbi Aben Ezra, proposeth the question, how can any better condition be said to be unto him, who was never created. And his answer is, that we must not wonder at such a speech of Solomon; for such speeches have their course. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 by reason of the shortnesse or streightnes of the languages; and therefore we must expresse our selves figuratively, and to speake hyperbollically is to speake figuratively. I betake me to Mer∣cer hereupon to acquaint my selfe with his judgment upon this place. Hoc autem dicitur; saith he, semper magnitudine aerumnarum hujus vitae considerata. Coeterum Christus aliâ rati∣one habitâ beatos pronunciat, qui persecutionem patiuntur propter justitiam maximè & Dei nomen; quia spiritualia & coelestia considerat repositam illis coronam gloriae in futurum. Noster Solomon externa tantum & praesentis vitae incommoda perpendit quae vere hydra est. Thus he speakes allwaies having his eyes fixt upon the greatnesse of the miseries of this life, but Christ in an other respect pronounceth them blessed who suffer persecution for righteousnes sake, especi∣ally and for the cause of God, because he considers spirituall and heavenly things, the Crowne of Glory laid up for them against the time to come. Our Solomon considers only outward things and the incommodities of this life present, which indeed is as it were a Serpent with seven heads. This is the first expression of Mercer in his interpretation of this place, which is as much as to say, that, Solomon speakesherein according to the judgment of a naturall man. But

Mercer hath yet a farther reach then this, which followeth by way of instance or exem∣plification thus, Sienim earum ratio habeatur ab eo qui illas perfert, mortem peroptat, aut etiam nunquam fuisse. For when he that suffers these miseries shall consider the weight & heavines of thē he wil be ready to wish he were dead, or that he had never been; & no marvaile: For as Mal∣donat observeth, even holy men of God such as Iob & Ieremy, have broken forth into such imprecations, judicio dolore corrupto, as he speakes, the pain which they suffer corrupting their judgment, this is to speake not only according to the judgment of a naturall man, but according to the judgmet of a man himselfe that suffers such miseries. Furthermore Mercer taketh notice of the School-mens discourses to the contrary, juxta Scholarum sub∣tilitatem, according to accurate judgmment, as Maldonat speaketh. Sophisticantur nostrorum nonnulli, praestare adhuc malè esse, quàm omnino non esse. Some of ours dis∣pute that it is better to be in an ill case, then to have no being at all. Now doth Mercer oppose this? Nothing lesse he rather admits it, and without contradiction thereunto, proceeds in his interpretation Sed ut ut sit, vis malorū consideratur. Buthowsoever that be, the force of the evill is considered, to wit, as before hath been shewed. 1. As in the judgment of a naturall man looking no farther then to the evills of this world. And 2ly, according to the sense & judgment of him that suffers them, Quomodo & Christus dicebat de Iuda, melius fuerat ho∣mini illi si nunquam natus fuisset gravitatem praevidens tormentorum illius. After which man∣ner Christ sayd of Iudas, It had been better for that man if he had never been borne, foreseeing the greivousnesse of his torments. The Antient Greeks and Latines used the like proverbe, Op∣timum non nasci, aut ubi natus sis, quam ocyssime aboleri. Graecum epigramma inquit

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

The best condition was not to be borne; the next to dye soonest. Such were the con∣ceits of naturall men in consideration of the evills of this world. And Cicero is full of such passages in the first of his Tusculans questions. In the last place I meet with a faire translation of this passage of Solomon in Piscator, who sets his translation on the other side to the translatiōns of Iunius, & thus it runnes. Sed beatiorē ut ris{que} judicabam eū, qui non videt facta ista mala quae fiunt sub sole. But more hapy then both I judged him that hath not seen the evill workes that are done under the Sun. For albeit in the Hebrew something more there is, which is not here expressed, to wit, which hath not been. Yet he conceives the last words to contain the fuil sense of them; and therefore he interprets these words of those who have perished in their Mothers wombe, or in their infancy or childhood, not of those who ne∣ver had any being, perceiving manifestly the foule absurdity of such a speech according to accurate calculation. And Mercer himselfe professeth that both these expressions are of the same force in Solomon, and so that is more plainly set downe in the latter, which is more obscurely expressed in the former, which is a very usuall course in Scripture.

To this assenteth Sir Fran••s Bacon in his Colours of good and evill; where against this Mathematicall position (as he caus it) that there is no proportion between something and nothing, and that the before the * 1.90 degree of privation 〈◊〉〈◊〉 eater then the degree of diminution; he excepteth that it is fal••e in sundry ca∣ses, and among the est in 〈◊〉〈◊〉; namely, when the degree o•• diminution is more ••••••••tive then the degree of privation In this case at 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈…〉〈…〉 much better then a diminution. Hence the 〈…〉〈…〉 formes of speech. Better eye out l••e 〈…〉〈…〉 Make or mar &c Some evills o•• paines (perhaps) either for their lightnes be∣cause they may be well end ••e••; or for their 〈…〉〈…〉 because they are quickly over; are lesse: hen resolution into nothing And a man had better for a wh•••••• 〈…〉〈…〉 them, then loose 〈…〉〈…〉 to be ••••d of them: because his being may afford 〈◊〉〈◊〉 presently, or afterward such and ••o many 〈…〉〈…〉 things, as will more then recomp••nc•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pain••s. But when his paines a•••• so many and violent, 〈…〉〈…〉 no other good then a poore being, or to ••inch him, that he cannot enjoy or Joy in the good•• that remaine, it were a thousand times better for him to have no being; and such a••e the paines of 〈◊〉〈◊〉▪ which for the•• greatnesse are infinite, producing many miserable weepings and waitings & ••••••••ning of teeth all symptomes of intolerable greifes, and for their ••eng•••• eternal. The wo••me never ••••eth, the fi••c is never quenched but the breath of the Lord as a river ofbr••••▪stone doth kindle it forever. And therefore it is incomparably better to cease to be, then to live in th••se torments, which cannot be equalled by any good, which a being can make us capable of, much lesse by that poore little 〈◊〉〈◊〉 good, which is all the good the damned injoy in hell.

This Sophisticall evasion therefore and all others of the like sert notwithstanding. I doubt not but I may safely say, that the unavoidable damna••••••n of so many mi••••ions, cannot be absolutely and antecedently intended by God, without the greatest injustice & cruelty which may in no wise be imputed unto God. Plu∣tar••h speaking of the Pagans, who to pacifie the anger of their gods, did sacrifice to them men and wo••men; it had been much better with Di••gor is and his fellowes to deny the being of a God, then confessing a God to thinke he delights in the bloud of men. How much rather may we say it were better to be an Atheist and deny God, then to believe or report him to be a devourer of the Soules of men? The like argument is pressed by Eusebius against those cruell and merc••••es gods of the Pagans, doubtles, saith he, if there were any foot-step or sparke of goodnes in them for which they might deserve to be called good, they would be disposed to doe good, and desirous to save all men, they would love justice and take a care of men. And being such how could they delight in their sl••ughter &c. Yea he concludeth that they were devills or evill spirits; and not Gods or good spirits, because if they were good they would doe good; whereas those that are evill use to doe hurt. I will therefore shut up my first reason with the speech of Prosper, God indeed is the Creator of all men, but yet of no man for this end, that he might be damned; the reason why we are created is one, and why we are damned an th••r.

The Authority of S. Francis Bacon is most aliene from the present purpose, according to * 1.91 the instance given by him, which is onely of a destruction of a member, as Better eye out then allwayes akeing. Yet this holdes not, save of such an akeing, as is more evill and dangerous, then the sight is beneficiall, but we speake of the universall destruction of the creature. The same ap∣peares by the generality of the exception given, as in case the decree of diminution be more sensible (for so I conceive it should be, and not sensitive) then the decree of privation. Whereby it is ma∣nifest that he speakes of such a privation whereof the creature is sensible, though sensible with lesse smart and paine then the decree of diminnion. Otherwise if it be taken in comparison of no sense of the one, and some sense of the other, it would follow herehence that death is to be preferred before a paine: For every man is sensitive of the one, no man is sensitive of the o∣ther. I desire no fairer way to come to an issue in this particular, then that which is here propo∣sed by this Author. He grants that some evil & pains, either for lightnes or shortnes are lesse then re∣solution into nothing. Yet with a perhaps only As if by reason of a pain in his back, he were in doubt to resolve whether it were better for him to be turned into nothing, then to endure it. Is this man yet resolved whether it be better for him to suffer Martyrdome for Christ, then to be (I do not say resolved; for as I know no composition of nothing; so neither do I know any re∣solution into nothing) turned into nothing? ••t is not credibile: How then cōes in this parenthesis of a perhaps, was it to set a good face, upon his argumēt? or was it because he saw the dangerous con••equence of this his concession, being direct & absolute? For I find him more cunning then solid throughout like a crafty Crowder For seing himselfe cōfesseth that some pains & Sorrows are willingly to be suffered by every reasonable man, rather then that he should be turned into nothing. Let us divide the latitude of pains & sorrows into a thousand degrees, if he think good: And then let him set down unto us at which degree it begins to make a mā more miserable, thē to be turned into nothing. In like manner as touching the durance of these sorrows; if he sayth that the suffering of hell pains for an hour, for a day, for a year doth not make a mā worse, thē to be turned into nothing. Let him define ūnto us where that proportiō of time in suffering hell begins, which makes a mā more miserable thē to be turned into nothing Divers Divines maintain that Christ suffered hel pains for us: Wil this Author say that this made him more miserable thē to be turned into nothing? Had he suffered thē to this very day, what helhound wil dare to say it had been better for him to be turned into nothing? If S. Austin prayed, Da Domine quod jubes & jube quod vis. Lord give me grace to do what thou cōmmādest, & thē cōmand what thou wilt. Pe∣lagius spighted Austin for this.) May we not in like māner pray Lord give us grace to bear what thou layest upon us, & then lay upon us what thou wilt? Nay is it not Austins profession that the punishēnt of infants dying in Originall sin is mitissima & such as they thēselves would not choose to be turned into nothing, to be freed frō it? And is it not in the power of God to give a mā strength to bear the very pains of hel & that without sin? Did not Christ suffer thē without sin, even such sorrows as the Greek Church professed in their Liturgy to be unknown sorrows, as Bishop Andrews sometims observed in a passiō sermō of his? And if it be in the power of God to inable a mā to bear the pains of hel for an hour, a day, a year; is it not in his power to enable thē to hold out in suffering thē, & that without sin for the space of ten thousand years, & that in in∣finitū? Again al this while this Author takes no notice of the misery of sin, which Arminius (his wel beloved) professeth to be greater thē the misery of punishēnt. And he gives his reason for it, becuse illud bono divino, hoc humano oppositū est. That is opposit to a divine, this to ā humane good? Wil he say that it is better for a mā to be turned into nothing, then to rob, steale, take the nāe * 1.92 of God in vain, profane the Lords sabbath, to ly with another mans wife, to oppose truth against his knowledge & cōscience? If this be his opiniō can he plead the cōmon consent of the world, or the cōmō sense of mā for this? See by the way how he virifies the being of mā which he calls a poore little entitative good God looked upon al things that he had made, & behold they were ve∣ry good, not the least fly, or ēmet, or worm is excepted frō the cōmendatio, yet mā was made af∣ter the Image & likenes of God. In other creaturs are foūd vestigia Dei, footsteps of God, as Mar∣tin Luther observes out of the Antients, but mā is Imago Dei the very Image of God; Yet this Au∣thor cals it a poor little ētitative good; & barely sayth it, & when he hath done, wipes his lipps frō al sophisticatiō, & claps that upon the back of his adversaries very authoritatively. Then the question is only of Miseria paenae, whether it makes a mā worse then annihilatiō, not in a cōpli∣cate condition with sin, which is the condition of the dāned. Yet thus he carrieth it to serve his turn; whereas in Arminius his opinion, the sinfull condition of the dāned, makes them more mi∣serable then thir torments. But if the torments of hell in thēselves are able to make a man in a worse condition then to be turned into nothing, then an holy Angell or Saint should choose ra∣ther to be turned into nothing, thē to suffer the torēnts of hell. And the Schoole divines dispute severally of the misery of sinne, and the misery of torēnt, & that with such different resolutions upon the point, as to maintaine, that albeit the misery of torment is not so bad as utter ānihila∣tion, yet the misery of sinne, is. Yet therein I willingly professe I am not of their mind. For

what? are not the Children of God sinners? Now what sober Christian will affirme, that it were better for them to be annihilated, then to be sinners. If you say, therefore it is not better for God's children to be annihilated then to be sinners; because they are not only sinners, but they are in the state of grace. I proceed farther, and demand whether God's Elect before their calling, being yet in the state of sin, as Manasses and Saul before their vocation, were better to be annihilated, then to be as they are. What if I am a sinner, yet while I have any being I may mourne for my sinne, I may serve God, I may enjoy his fa∣vour in the pardoning of my sinne, is not this a better condition then not to be, which is a condition conjunct as well with the destruction of sanctity as of sinne?

But the former argument, which he takes so much paines to enervate, he calls a sophi∣sticall evasion, and addes that so are all others of the like sort, very magisterially and re∣solutely. But what those others are he doth not so much as name. Not so much as one of Austin's, whose discourse alone I proposed on this point; together with an argument of Durand's, neither of all which doth he touch, yet I am the marke set up by him to shoote at, not Durand, not any one of the School-men, not Austin whose discourses alone I pro∣posed. And as for the argument here mentioned, melius est esse, quam non esse; It is better to be then to have no being, therefore it is better to be in hell torment then not to be. This is neither argument, nor any of those that I proposed out of Durand and Austin. Durand's argu∣ment is, To be annihilated is an universall destruction of man's nature, not only of his well be∣ing, but of being: but hell paines is the destruction only of his well being not of his being. Neither is it answerable to the argument formerly mentioned by him p. 19. which was this. He that wants a being enjoyeth no good, but he that is tormented in hell hath a being, and by consequence some thing that is good. Now this argument cometh nerest to Maldonats discourse upon that of our Saviour, speaking of Iudas. It had been good for that man he had not been borne. Some, saith he, dispute subtilly more then enough, how it could be better for Iudas, not to have * 1.93 been; whereas not to be is no good, to be damned is some good. For he that is damned is somewhat; And every thing that is, as it hath a being, is good. And we know that man's being is no com∣mon good but a speciall one, as being made after God's owne Image and likenesse. And looke with what judgment this Author extenuates, being humane, calling it a poore, little entitative good; with the same judgment he might extenuate Angelicall being. For even among Angells some have their portion in hell fire. But now he comes to his first propo∣sition, that unavoidable damnation of so many millions can not be absolutely and antecedently intended by God, without the greatest injustice and cruelty. The question is of the suffering of hell paines, whether it be worse then to be annihilated? This Authour runnes upon the terme damnation, which is a civill and judiciall act. Is there no difference between these? They that say Christ sufferd the paines of hell, doe they say Christ was damned? Then to speake with a fuller mouth he puts in the damnation of so many millions, whereas if the damnation of one may be intended by God without injustice after what manner so∣ever, undoubtedly the damnation of never so many millions may. Then he helps himselfe with the Epithite of unavoidable added to damnation, and the terme absolutely affixed to God's intention, to no purpose that I know, but to abuse himselfe and others by con∣fusion; for feare least the truth should break forth to their conviction. To intend damna∣tion avoidable, what is it but to intend it conditionally. And to intend damnation not ab∣solutely, is all one with to intend it conditionally. Now to intend the damnation of any man conditionally is with this Author as much, to intend his salvation as his damnation. Yet this he calls the intention of damnation. And Bradwardine hath long agoe maintai∣ned and demonstated by evidence of reason, that there is no conditionate will of God: And this Authour will not say (I suppose) that God did intend that Christ should suffer hell paines conditionately, or that if he did intēd it absolutely, he was unjust in so doing. Now both D. Iackson expresly confesseth, that the distinction of will antecedent and conse∣quent in God▪ is to be understood, not as touching the act of willing, but as touching the thing willed. And Gerardus Vossius acknowledgeth that after the same manner must the condi∣tionate will, which is ascribed unto God, be interpreted. Now we willingly confesse that the thing willed and intended by God to Reprobates, namely, damnation, befalls none, but in case they dye in sinne without repentance. And as already I have shewed not any of our Divines maintaine that God intended to damne any man but for sinne. Only the maine point of difference between us is, as touching the conferring & denying grace, even the grace of regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance. Herein we willingly confesse that God carrieth himselfe merely according to the pleasure of his own will, according to that of the Apostle, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Now on this point this Authour keeps himselfe close, and

earthes himselfe within his own concealements, lest he should betray the bitter Leven of Pelagianisme, in maintaining that grace is conferred according unto workes, which cannot be avoided by him, if once he comes to deale on this Argument. He thinks he hath great advantage in the point of Reprobation, and very free he is here, but declines the point of election, and point of conferring grace, which argueth a naughty disposition, practising by indirect courses to circumvent and suppresse the truth, rather then conferre any thing for the clearing of it: yet see his confused carriage in the very point. For when he speakes of damnation avoidable and unavoidable, he takes no paines to manifest in what sense he takes it to be avoidable; as whether by power of nature, or power of grace. Is it his meaning that any man's damnation is avoidable by grace? We deny it not. Or is it his meaning that it is avoidable by nature? we utterly deny this. But this man counts it his wisedome not to speake distinctly, but worke his advantage upon confusion of things that differ; but let all such take heed, least utter confusion be their end. But if it be his mea∣ning that all men have power to avoid damnation if they will, to wit, in as much as they have power to beleive if they will, to repent if they will: I would he would deale fairely once, and come to this. The Scripture is expresse, That they that are in the flesh cannot please God, that the naturall man discerneth not the things of God, that they are foolishnesse unto him, * 1.94 neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned. That, they cannot beleive, can∣not repent. Of the Children of Israel in the wildernesse that, God had not given them eyes to see, eares to heare, nor hearts to perceive fourty yeares. And truely we take faith and repen∣tance to be the guift of God. And the habits of them not to be a power to beleive and repent if a man would, but an habituall and morall inclination of them to believe, to re∣pent. And habits (as it was wont to be said) Agunt ad modum naturae, doe worke after the manner of nature. And it is very strang that supernaturall grace should not. And long a∣goe I have learnt in Austin, that to doe good, and obey God if a man will, is rather nature then grace. For the will alone is all in all as touching acts morall, good or evill; and till the will be changed, we are as farre off as ever, from performing any thing that is plea∣sing in the sight of God. This is the peculiar glory of God's grace, To make us perfect to every good worke, and to worke in us that with is pleasing in his sight through Iesus Christ, and this he doth according to his good pleasure. For grace is not conferred according unto * 1.95 workes. That was condemned as a pestilent doctrine long agoe in the Synod of Palestine, and all along in divers Councells against the Pelagians. How gladly should I imbrace any delineation of this Authours opinion in the point of grace and free will, the rather, be∣cause I seem to smell who he is by this which followeth. For I remember sometime un∣der whose hand I read it; namely, that, Plutarch speaking of the Pagans, who to pacifie the an∣ger of their gods, did sacrifice to them men and women, should say, It had been much better with Diagoras and his fellowes to deny the being of a God, then confessing a God, to think he delights in the blood of men. But allbeit this supercilious and confident professor be of Plutarch's mind in this, I willingly professe I am not. I know no naturall reason why he should de∣light more or lesse in the bloud of beasts, then in the bloud of men. Only it pleased him by the bloud of Bulls and Goats to represent the delight he took in the satisfaction made in the blood of his own Sonne. We know in what errand the Lord sent Abraham three dayes journey, namely, to sacrifice his Sonne upon mount Moriah; had not God hindred him it had been done; Abraham knew no other but that it should be done, when he an∣swered his Sonne saying, My God will provide himselfe of a burnt offering. Abraham did not * 1.96 break forth in this man's language, to say he would rather deny there was any God, then believe he delights in bloud; neither had he delighted in bloud, though Isaak had been sacrificed, but in the obedience of his servants. Nor had Isaack received any losse by this. For Abraham knew that God was able to raise him from the dead. Did not Samson sacri∣fice himselfe. Christ was content to shed his precious bloud for us, and we by his grace shall be content to shed our bloud for him, & that according to his good will and plea∣sure. Let heathens thus discourse who are nothing acquainted with the powers of the world to come; but a foule shame it is for Christians to comply with them. But, how much rather, saith this Authour, may we say it were better to be an Atheist, then to beleive or re∣port him to be a devourer of the soules of men. Yet I cannot be perswaded it is better to be an Atheist then to belive even this. For I must not give ground to a confident Theologue for his bare protestation sake. What is it I pray for God to be a devourer of the soules of men? Is it any other then to be a tormenter of of them in hell fire? Now doth not this man believe that God deals so with millions of soules? Doth not he professe, that, the breath of the Lord as a river of brimstone doth kindle that fire? what out recuydance hath pos∣sest

the spirit of this Cavaliere that he should flaunt it to the world in this manner? It seemes his atcheivements known so well to the world have puft him up, that he swells with the conceit of it: And 'tis enough for him now to brave it with protestations in∣steed of arguments, wherein having known him so well heretofore, I cannot but wonder at the poverty of his spirit; he will battle so long upon his credit and reputa∣tion with the world, that it will crack at length; and he prove bankrupt: So that protest what he will no man will trust him for a groat. Now in that manuscript of his, which it was my hap sometime to have a view of, his protestation upon the book of that saying of Plutarch was somewhat different, thus. I protest unto you, I think it was lesse dishonour a∣ble to the blessed Trinity to say with the Atheist there is no God, then to forme such a God, as the decree of Reprobation maintained by the Contraremonstrants, maketh him to be. This pro∣testation though it had course in private, yet here it is changed that it might not see the light of the Presse. For it is well known that this toucheth nearely a whole Synod of the Church reformed; and that countenanced by King Iames and divers worthy Divines of this Kingdome subscribing to it, some yet living, and two of them in Apice Episcopali, in E∣piscopall dignity. Yet what is that doctrine of the Contraremonstrants that he pincheth up∣on? It is well knowne that their generall tenet is that God ordaines no man to damna∣tion but for sinne; some difference there hath been, and is about the ordering of God's decrees, which is merely apex Logicus, & what my opinion is thereabouts is well known; namely that in no moment of time or reason doth God ordaine any man to damnation, before the consideration of sinne, more particularly thus; that all besides the Elect, God hath ordained to bring them forth into the world in their corrupt masse, and to permit them to their selves, to go on in their own waies, and so finally to persevere in sinne, and lastly to damne them for their sinne, for the manifestation of the Glory of his Justice on them, & of the greater mercy on the vessells of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glo∣ry; inasmuch as he hath of his free grace provided better for them, then for millions of others. Only as touching the grace of regeneration, of faith and of repentance; he did not only ordaine of his mere pleasure to bestow that on his Elect, and not on Reprobates; but in time he doth of his mere pleasure conferre that grace on some; denying it to o∣thers. This doctrine is so dishonourable to the Trinity in this Authors judgment, as that to deny there is any God at all, he thinks to be lesse dishonourable: A prodigious asser∣tion! We have the lesse cause to be moved, when he preferred the annihilation of our natures, before the suffering of hell paines. When he seemes to preferre the annihila∣ting of the blessed Trinity, before the renouncing of his own vile fancies. As for that of Eusebius, true it is, the god's of Paynims sought only the destruction of those that ser∣ved them, and that not of their bodyes but their soules also. The true God put Abraham once upon the sacrificing of his Son, for the tryall of his faith and obedience, but percei∣ving his obsequious readinesse, took a course to restraine him. Of him it it is true, He sa∣veth both man and beast, and the eyes of all doe wait upon him, and he gives them meat in due sea∣son, he heareth the cry of Ravens, and not a sparrow lights upon the ground without his provi∣dence; The very Lyons roaring after their prey do seek their meat at (the hands of) God. Yet if he be pleased to save our soules, we have reason to submit unto him in doing what he will with our bodies, which yet one day he will raise, glorious bodyes, when mortality shall be swallowed up of life. We acknowledge no other end of man's creation, and of all o∣ther Divine Acts of God, but his own glory. For even there where Solomon professeth, God hath made even the wicked against the day of evill, he withall acknowledgeth, that both them and all things, he hath made for himselfe. God of his mere pleasure created all, but of his mere pleasure he damneth none. But every one that is damned is damned for his sin, & that willfully committed & contumaciously continued by them that come to ripe yeares. For as Austin saith Libertas sine gratia non est libertas, sed contumacia: Liberty without grace, is not liberty, but willfullnesse or contumacy. I come to the second part of his first argument.

The second part of the Argument.

Sect. 1.

* 1.97

Secondly, this opinion chargeth God with mens sinnes on earth, and makes him the Authour, not of the sinne only that entred by Adam into the world, but of all other sinnes, that have been, are, or shall be committed to the worlds end. No murthers, robberies, rapes, adulteries, insurrections, treasons, blasphemies, persecutions, or any other abominations whatsoever fall out at any time, or in any place, but they are the ne∣cessary productions of God Almightys decrees. The Scripture I am sure teaches us another lesson. Thou art not a God, saith David that hast pleasure in wickednesse. And the Prophet Esay tells the people, that when they did * 1.98 evill in the sight of the Lord, they did choose the things which he would not. Let no man say when he is tempted I am tempted of God. For God cannot be tempted with evill, neither tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted when

he is drawen away with his own concupiscence. And St. John when he had referred all the sinnes of the world to three heads, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life; tells us that, they are not of the Father, but of the world. To which speeches let me adde the speech of Stracides (though not of the same authority.) Say not * 1.99 thou it is through the Lord that I fell away; for thou oughtest not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou he hath * 1.100 caused me to erre; for he hath no need of the sinfull man.

2. Pious antiquity hath constantly sayd the same, and prest it with sundry reasons; some of which are these as follow. If God be the Authour of sinne, then he is worse then the Devill; because the devill doth only tempt and perswade to sinne, and his action may be resisted, but God, by this opinion, doth will and procure * 1.101 by a powerfull and effectuall decree, which cannot be resisted. This is Prospers argument, who to some ob∣jecting that by St. Austin's doctrine, when Fathers defile their own Daughters, and Mothers their own Sonnes, Servants murther their masters, & men commit any horrible villanies, it cometh to passe because God hath so decreed. Answereth that if this were layd to the Devills charge, he might in some sort cleare himselfe of the imputati∣on. Quia etsi delectatus est furore peccantium, probaret tamen sc non intulisse vim criminum. Because though he be delighted with man's sinnes yet he doth not, he cannot compell men to sinne: What a madnesse therefore is it to im∣pute that to God which cannot be justly fathered upon the Divell.

2. He cannot be a punisher of sinne: For none can justly punish those effences of which they are the * 1.102 Authors. This is Prospers argument too. It is against reason to say that he wich is the damner of the Devill would have any one to be the devills Servant. This reason Fulgentius useth likewise illius rei Deus ultor est, cujus Auhor non est. Tertullian also before them hath sayd. He is not to be accounted the Author of sinne, who is the forbidder yea and the condemner of it.

3. He cannot be God, because he should not be just, nor holy, nor the Judge of the world, all properties essentiall to God. And this is Basil's reason, who hath written a whole Homily against this wicked assertion. It is all one (saith he) to say that God is the Author of sinne, and to say he is not God.

3 Upon these and the like considerations I may well conclude, that, the opinion which chargeth God with the sinnes of men, is neither good nor true.

It is first layd to the charg of our Divines that by this their opinion, they make God the * 1.103 Authour of sinne; not of the first only that entred by Adam into the world, but of all other sinnes, that have been, are, or shall be committed in the world, as murthers, robberies, rapes, adulteries, in∣surrections, treasons, blasphemies, heresies, persecutions, or any other abominatiōs. But in all these wastfull discourses not a word of proofe. The charge is made in the first place, the proofe last. All that he labours to prove here is, that God is not the Author of sinne. Bellarmine hath bestowed, or rather cast away a whole book on this crimination, to him Arminius re∣ferrs Perkins, telling him that he should have answered Bellarmine. I have taken some paines to performe that taske upon that motion of Arminius. I would I could receive from this Authour a reply to any materiall particular thereof, the rather because I understand in part his Zeale for Bellarmine in his age, correcting the harsh exceptions he hath made a∣gainst him in his younger dayes. And let every indifferent Reader compare this Authors discourse, with that discourse of Bellarmine, and judge indifferently what an hungry peece this is in comparison to that of Bellarmines; And whether his paines had not been better bestowed in replying upō my answer thereunto, then to adde such scraps as these to that full table of Bellarmin's provision; and whether these deserve any answer, that whole discourse of Bellarmine being refuted throughout. Bradwardine disputes the question, Si & quomodo Deus vult & non vult peccatum. I say he disputes it indifferently on both sides; and let every Schollar judge and weigh, whether it be not a very ponderous argu∣ment, and consider well his resolution, and where he differrs any thing from our Divines in this Calvin observing how frequent the Scripture is in testifying God's hand to be o∣perative in abominable courses, thereupon writes a Treatise. De occultâ Dei providentiâ in malo; in all which he exactly conformes himselfe to Scripture expressions. And these and such like vile Criminators may as well taxe God's word for making God the Author of sinne, as Calvin; who most accurately conformes himselfe to the testimonies of Divine Scripture. I remember to have heard a disputation sometimes at Heidelberge on this Ar∣gument, where Copenius the President or Moderator made manifest, that look upon what grounds they criminated Calvin for making God the Authour of sinne; upon the same grounds they might criminate the very word of God to make him the Author of sinne. For Calvine throughout in his expressions conformes himselfe to the language of the ho∣ly Ghost. Yet, what one of our divines can he produce, affirming that, God takes pleasure in sinne. Piscator confesseth that, God taketh no pleasure in the death of him that dyeth, upon that place in Ezechiel; how much lesse in wickednesse. And he illustrates it in this manner: For albeit it cannot be denyed, but that God willeth the death of him that dyeth. For he is the God to whom vengeance belongeth; yet he takes no pleasure in it. Like as a sick-man would be content to take a bitter potion for the recovery of his health; yet he takes no pleasure in that bitter cup. And in like manner, albeit, God hardened Pharaoh's heart that he should not let Israel goe; and as the Apostle speaks, hardeneth whom he will. Whereby it comes to passe infallibly that they doe not obey the Gospell, as appeareth by the objection following.

Why then doth he complaine. For who hath resisted his will? And albeit the Saints of God expostulate with him in this manner; Why hast thou caused us to erre from thy wayes, * 1.104 and hardened our hearts against thy feare? Yet we know that God takes no pleasure in disobedience, or in the hardnesse of any mans heart, nor can be the Authour of evill, with Sir Francis Bacons distinction in the booke formerly mentioned by this Authour. Non quià non Author, sed quià non mali. So that albeit he hardens whom he will unto disobedience, & in the prophet Esayes phrase causeth men to erre from his wayes. Yet the Lord himselfe we know is righteous in all his wayes, & holy in all his workes, though we are not able to dive into the gulfe, and search out the bottome of his judgments, and no marvaile. For they are unsearchable; Yet we make no question but through Gods mer∣cy convenient satisfaction may be found without any such shāefull course of dismēbring scripture, and taking notice only of such passages as represent Gods displeasure against sin * 1.105 & sinners, and dissembling all other passages which drave Austin to confesse, occulto Dei judicio, by the secret judgement of God, fieri perversitatem cordis, the perversity of mans heart hath its course, much lesse by setting thē together by the eares. And I nothing doubt but the issue will be on the part of such, as are of this Authours spirit, either wholly to deny originall sin, or so to emasculate the vigor of it, as to professe that it is in the power of mā to cure it; or notwithstāding the strength of it, to beleive & repēt if he will; which * 1.106 though they pretēd to be wrought by a certain universal grace; Yet I nothing doubt but we shall be able to prove that such a power is mere nature and no grace. Be it so that wicked men in their wicked courses do chose the things that God would not, Who would thinke that this Author, who makes such a florish should content himselfe with such beg∣garly arguments; or that the world should be so simple as to be terrifyed with such scar∣crowes? For is it not apparent that in scripture phrase there is voluntas praecepti, a will of * 1.107 commandement, as well as voluntas propositi, a will signifying Gods purpose and decree? So thē though they chuse the things that God willed not in reference to his will of com∣mandement; yet it might be Gods will, that is his purpose that even such sinnes should come to passe. For was it not the will of God that Pharaoh should not let Israel goe for a while? Did he not harden him to this purpose that so he might make himselfe knowne in the land of Egypt by his judgemēts? & did he not reveale this to Moses to the cōfort of the childrē of Israel, & keepe thē from despaire in contēplation of the obstinacy of Pha∣raoh's * 1.108 spirit, when they were assured that God had an hād in hardening Pharaoh to stād out? And doth not Bellarmine professe that malū fieri permitt sin & Deo bonū est, it is good that evill should cō to passe by Gods permission? And shall it be unbecōing the divine nature to will that which is good? And where is it that Bellarmine affirmeth this? even there where he opposeth the same Doctrine of ours which this Authour doth. but with more learning an 100 fold then this Authour betrayeth, and withall carryeth himselfe with farre more ingenuity. For he takes notice of those places of Scripture whereupon our Di∣vines do build, and accommodates himselfe to aswer them by some intepretation that he thinks good to make of them, which this Authour doth not 2. But what if there be no such text as this Authour builds upon? For looke what the word is, used in the originall Ps. 5. 4. the same is used Es. 66 4 Now that in Ps. 5. 4 This Authour renders not that wouldest not iniquity, but that hast no pleasure in iniquity And why then shall not that Es. 66. 4. be accordingly rendred thus. They choose the things wherein I had no pleasure, or wherein I had no delight, and not as he expresseth it the things that I would not. Hereupon I imagined our Enlish tranlation had thus rendred it, but consulting that, I found the con∣trary. For thus they render it. They choose the things wherein I delighted not. It is true the Geneva renders it thus: But doth it become him to preferre and follow the Geneva tran∣slation before the last and most authenticall translation of the Church of England? In like manner the practise of Geneva must be of authority to cry us downe in the point of the morality of the fourth commandement. Were not the man well knowne to be sound at heart, his favourites might well suspect him to praevaricate, in making so great a cry, and yet yeilding so little wooll. In the next place he alleadgeth that of Iames. Let no man say when he is tempted that he is temptedof God. For God temp∣teth no man: But every man is tempted, when he is drawen away with his owne concupiscence * 1.109 Now Peter Martyr on the first to the Romans deales at large upon this place, and disputes strangely indiscoursing of Gods providence in evill. I would this Authour had taken the paines to answer him at least, that he might performe somewhat tanto dignum hiatu, worthy of the great gaping he makes. It is true Bellarmine hath

taken him to taske after a sort in his eigth chapter of his second book de Amiss. gratiae & statu peccati. And I have replyed upon Bellarmine at large in my Vindiciae, in that large digression wherein I take Bellarmine to taske in that book of his, whereunto I referre the Reader. Yet to say somewhat of this place befor I passe. It is apparent that the Apostle in this place doth not so put off from God the workes of tempting as to cast it upon Satan; but onely so as to shew, that whatsoever the divine providence is there about, either by the ministry of Satan (who is God's minister in hardening men to precip••tate courses (I Kings the last) or otherwise, yet still the sinner is unexcusable; for as much as he is then only tempted (effectually) For so it is to be understood; otherwise it were not true, as it appeares in the case of Joseph tempted by his Mistris) when he is draw∣en away by his own concupiscence. It is true, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and pride of life is not of the Father but of the world, they are the members of that body of sin which we brought with us into the world. This is propagated unto us all by naturall generation. * 1.110 Holy Iacob the Son of holy Isaak a Patriach, & of holy Rebeccah a Prophetesse was borne in sin as well as Esau; and Seth as well as Cain, and this seemeth to be called the image of Adam, after his fall Behold I was shapen in wickednesse, sayth David, and in sin hath my Mo∣ther conceived me. And except a man be borne againe he cannot see the kingdome of God. This, though a mystery, yet is nothing strange to us, whom God in mercy hath reserved unto these times or grace; But it was very strange to Nicodemus a Ruler in Israel. This hath been the condition of man ever since the fall of Adam; and arising merely from the with∣drawing of God's spirit from him, and that most justly upon their first sin in tasting of the forbidden fruit. So that even this condition proceeded originally, as from the sin of our first parents in the way of a meritorious cause, so from the just judgment of God ta∣king his holy Spirit from him, which God was not bound to doe, as appeares by this, that by vertue of the Covenant of grace which he hath made with us in Christ, he doth not take his spirit from us, though too often we sin againsthim. No not from David, notwith∣standing those foule sinnes committed by him, at appeares by his prayer unto God; that, he would restore him to the joy of his salvation, signifying therereby that he had lost that. And that God would not take his holy Spirit from him, manifesting hereby that still he retained that. And considering that God proceeded with Adam herein in the way of judg∣ment, Austine acknowledgeth Concupiscence to be a punishment of sinne, as well as sin, and a cause of other sinnes, in his fifth book against Iulian the Pelagian cap. 3 As for that of Siracides, say not thou, God hath caused me to erre. As it is true that no man must cast the blame of sinning upon God, & think himselfe blamelesse: So it is as true that in considera∣tiō of our own inability to stād of our selves & prones to fall (evē to fall away like water spilt upō the ground that cannot be recovered; containe it selfe it cannot, but it may easi∣ly becontained) the Church doth sometimes expostulate with God (such is the liberty and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which he vouchsafeth unto his Children) in an holy manner saying, Wherefore hast thou caused us to erre from thy waies, and hardened our hearts against thy feare; Not that this he doth, infundendo malitiam, by infusing malice into them but, non infundendo gratiam, by not infusing such grace into them as to preserve them from sin For as Martha said unto Ie∣sus, Lord if thou had'st been here our brother Lazarus had not dyed. So may we say if the strēgth of thy grace had been operative in us, we had not sined in this or that particular. It is true God hath not need of the sinfull ma: much lesse of his salvation or damnation. But if he will of mere pleasure manifest his own glory, either in the way of mercy pardoning, or of justice punishing, he must permit sin to enter into the world, & forbeare that provi∣dence whereby, as he did keep the Elect Angells, so he might have kept man also from sinning. As for the reasons of p••o••s Antiquity to prove that God cannot be the Au∣thour of sin, they are very needelesse in this controversy between us & our adversaries, the question between us not being thereabouts, but rather about the manner of God's providence. Our Adversaries so denying him to be the Author of evill, as withall they deny him to be the Authour of any good in the actions of men. We on the contrary take care, so to maintaine that God is not the Author of sinne, that withall we maintaine that he is the Author of all good, both morall and naturall, and much more supernaturall. Yet as I have considered the seven reasons of Bellarmine to this purpose collected out of the Antients; so I am content to take into consideration the three reasons produced by this Author. 1. As touching the first to manifest how su∣perficiarily and absurdly he carieth himselfe therein, observe the wildnesse of his reaso∣ning besides all rules of sobriety. If God (sayth he) be the Author of sinne, then he is worse then the Devill, because the Devill doth only tempt and perswade to sinne, and his action may be resi∣sted.

Let all the Universities of the world be judge between us of the shamefull irregu∣larity of this discourse. His syllogisme is hypotheticall; for the first proposition is hypo∣theticall and conditionall. Now all such syllogismes by the rule of all Schooles must pro∣ceed either from the negation of the consequent, to the negation of the antecedent; or from the affirmation of the antecedent, to the affirmation of the consequent; but no such processe is made here. And indeed it should be framed thus to inferre the proposition un∣dertaken to be proved. If God be the Authour of sin, then he is worse then the Divell; but God is not worse then the Divell; therefore he is not the Authour of sin. But this Authour disputes after no such manner. But his affection carrying him all along to cast some foule aspersion on our Doctrine in some particular or other, and being withall in heat of passion, he doth most shamefully involve and entangle himselfe And indeed quite besides his present pur∣pose, he aimes only at this to prove that our doctrine concerning God's powerfull and ef∣fectuall decree, doth more make God the Authour of sin then the Devill, which is utter∣ly aliene from that he proposed in this place. Yet I am willing to doe him this favour, to help a lame Dogge over the stile, and to expedite him in this Argument, whereof he can∣not so dext'rously deliver himselfe though quite besides the purpose. Thus therefore the argument should proceed according to his irregular intention. If God doth will and procure sins by a powerfull and effectuall decree, which cannot be resisted, then is God worse then the De∣vill. But by the doctrine of our Divines God doth will and procure sins by a powerfull and effe∣ctuall decree which cannot be resisted; therefore by the doctrine of our Divines, God is worse then the Devill. Thus have I endeavoured to bring this argument to some shape, which had no tolerable proportion before. Now let me shew the corrupt nature of it, that the Reader may discerne what spirit he breathes, that is the Authour of it in a mixture both of igno∣rance and abominable profanenes. And first I begin with the major proposition. And here first let the Reader judge whether it be not this Authours opinion, that, God doth will and procure sin by some decree, though not by a powerfull and effectuall decree that cannot be re∣sisted. For otherwise did he acknowledge every will of God as it signifies his decree, to be powerfull, and effctuall and irresistable, what need he cumber his Reader with such unneces∣sary Epithites, cast in like lumber only to trouble the course of disputation? Now if he grants that God doth will and decree sin by a powerfull and effectuall decree. 1. He must contradict himselfe. For formerly he cited, Es. 66. 4, to prove that men in wicked courses, doe choose the things that God would not. 2. If God doth will it, but not by a powerfull and effectuall, & irresistable decree, let him shew what that decree is, whereby he wills sins. Now this is commonly accounted a decree conditionall; and let him speak plainely then & tell us upon what condition it is that God doth will and procure sin in the world, and I am verily perswaded he is to seek what to answer. 3. If God doth will and decree it, it can∣not be avoided, but it must be, by a powerfull and effectuall decree which cannot be re∣sisted; seeing the Apostle saith plainly speaking of his decree, that it cannot be resisted. Up∣on these considerations I am perswaded, that this Authour doth utterly deny that God doth at all will sin, or decree that any such thing shall come to passe in the world, & that these attributes of powerfull, and effectuall, & irresistable, are used by him not for distincti∣on sake, but meerly for amplification, that so he might speake with a full mouth. Now having brought this Authour home to himselfe, and delivering himselfe and his meaning plainely, I am very willing to cope with him on this point. Yet what need I, having so fully disputed the point in a certaine digression in my Vindiciae lib. 2. Digrees. 4. The title whereof is this, Whether the holy one of Israel without any blot to his Majesty may be said to will sin. And forthwith I answer, that, God may be said thus farre to will sin, in as much as he will have sin to come to passe. And for explication sake it is added, that whereas God will have all the good things of the world, whether naturall, morall, or spirituall come to passe by his working of them: Only evill things he will have come to passe by his permitting them. But this Authour affects to worke upon the ignorant; and he doth not affect to trouble their braines with answering my reasons, least thereby he should raise many spirits, and afterwards prove unable to lay them. And this discourse of M. Hord's some of that sect thought good to have it coppied out, and communicated to people in the Country, as accommodated to their capacities, and so more fit to promote their edificatiō in the plausible way of Arminian religion: well therefore in the proofe of this tenet, namely, that God will have sin come to passe by his permission. I prove first by Scripture. God hath put in their hearts (that is in the hearts of the 10 Kings) to fulfill his will. Now marke what is the object of God's will, in the words following, and to agree, and give their kingdōes unto the beast untill the words of God shall be fulfilled: now by giving their Kingdomes unto the beast, is not to depose or dethrone themselves, or to part with their Kingdomes, but only to submit their regall authority to the executiō of the beasts wrath

against the Saints of God. Like as in the dayes of Popery, when the Saints of God were by Popish Prelates condemned for heresies, then they were delivered into the hands of the secular powers, the sherifes to burne thē at a stake. Now this the holy Ghost makes the object of Gods will, and their agreement thus to execute the Popes Antichristian pleasure is said to be Gods worke. For God is said to put it into their hearts to doe this evill of his. Of disobedient persons the Apostle professeth that they are ordained to stūble at Gods word, * 1.111 wherein undoubtedly they sin. Paul likewise testified of some that God sends thē strong de∣lusions, that they should beleive a lye. of others that God gave them up to uncleanes through the lusts of their owne hearts to dishonour their owne bodyes betweene thēselves. And to a Reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient. Now let every sober man judge whether when God blinded the eyes of the one and hardned the harts of the other, it were not his will, that those foule things which were committed by them should come to passe by his permissiō. Then consider what the Apostles with one consent testifie concerning those a∣bominable * 1.112 acts committed against the holy son of God, namely that both Herod & Pon∣tius Pilate with the Gentiles & people of Israel, were gathered together to doe what Gods hand & his coūsell had before determined to be done. This the Apostles deliver to the very face of God in their prayers & holy meditatiōs. And let every Christian consider, whether it the Scrip∣ture had not made mention of this, & any one of us had used the like prayer & medita∣tiō, this Author & all that are of his spirit, would not have beene ready to spit in our faces & cry us downe for notorious blasphemers. Yet the Apostles indued with the spirit of God feared not to be found guilty of violating the Lords holinesse in all this. Hence I proceed∣ed to the passages of the Old Testament for the confirmation of the same truth. As name∣ly that whereas the desolatiō of the holy Land begun by the Assyrians, finished by the Babyloni∣ans, could not cōe to passe without many enormous sins. Who can deny, that it was Gods will that these things should come to passe, considering that Assur himself is acknowledg∣ed by God to be the rod of his wrath and the staffe of his indignation, whom God would send against an hypocriticall nation, & against the people of his wrath would he give him a charge to take the spoyle, & to take the prey, & to tread them downe like the mire in the streets? Hence I proceeded to shew how that it is Gods usuall course to punish sin with sin. Now when God exerciseth his judgments, shall not those things justly be said to come to passe by his will, which are punishments of foregoing sinnes? See the judgment of God denounced against Amaziah the Preist of Bethell. Thou sayst prophecy not against Israel, & drop not thy word a∣gainst the house of Isaac. Therefore thus saith the Lord, Thy wife shall be an harlot in the Citties, * 1.113 & thy sons & thy daughters shall fall by the sword. And in like manner Solomon saith The mouth of a strange woman is a deep pit, he that is abhorred of the Lordshall fall therein. The in∣cest of Absolom defiling his fathers cōcubines in a shameles manner, came it not to passe * 1.114 by the will of God, whose word is this; Behold I will raise up evill against thee, out of thine owne house, & I will take thy wives before thine eyes, & give them unto thy neighbour, & he shall ly with thy wives in the sight of this sun? The defection of the ten tribes frō the house of David, came it not to passe by the will of God, when God himselfe testifies that it was * 1.115 his worke, & not his will onely? Thus saith the Lord the God of Israel, I will rent the king∣dome out of the hands of Solomon, & give ten tribes to thee, speaking to Ieroboam; here we have Gods will for it. And againe the word of God came to Semaiah the man of God saying, speak to Rehoboā the son of Solomon King of Iudah, & unto all the house of Iudah & Benjamin, & to the remnant of the people, saying, Thus saith the Lotd, ye shall not goe up, nor fight against your bre∣thren, * 1.116 the children ef Israel; returne every man to his house; for this thing is from me. Here we have Gods word for it. Who can deny that the hardening of Pharohs heart, that he should not let Israel go; the selling of Ioseph into Egypt by the hands of his unnaturall brethren came to passe by the will of God? I proceed to prove the same truth by evidence of reasō. First because God permits sin to come to passe as all confesse, though he could hinder it, if it pleased him, & that without all detriment to the free will of the creature why then doth he permit it? but because he would have it come to passe, & accordingly permission is reckoned up by Schoole Divines amongst the sinnes of Gods will, like as allso is Gods commandment. Now what God commandeth if it be done, it is said to come to passe by the will of God, albeit the things that God commandeth, seldome; the things he permits, allwayes come to passe; according to the common tenet of Divines, even Vostius & Armi∣nius not excepted. Againe it is the common opinion of all, that therefore God permits sin, because he can and will worke good of it, which plainly supposeth that sinne shall come to passe if God permits it, & consequently it must needes be the will of God, it shall come to passe. Thirdly it is granted on both sides that the act of sin is Gods worke in the way of an efficient cause, not the outward act onely which is naturall, but the inward act of the

will which is morall, even this as an act is the worke of God: How can it be then but the deformity and vitiousnesse of the act, must come to passe God willing it, though not working it, considering that the deformity doth necessarily follow the act, in reference to the creatures working it, though not in respect of Gods working it? Lastly all sides a∣gree that God can give effectuall grace, whereby a man shall be preserved from sin infal∣libly. Wherefore as often as God will not give this grace which is in his power to give, doth it not manifestly follow that he will not have such a man preserved frō sin? To these I added the testimony of divers; as that of Austin. Not any thing comes to passe, unlesse Good * 1.117 will have it come to passe, either by suffering it to come to passe, or himselfe working it. If good he workes it, if evill permits it, 'tis true of each that he wills it. & cap. 96. It is Good, saith Austin, that evill should come to passe. And Bellarmine himselfe so farre subscribes hereunto, as by professing that It is good that evills shoul come to passe by Gods permission. The same Austin confesseth that The perversity of the heart comes to passe by the secret judgment of God And againe that after a wonderfull and unspeakable manner, even those things which are com∣mitted against the will of God (to wit against the will of his commandment) do not come to passe besides the will of God; to wit the will of his purpose. Anselme the most ancient of schoole Divines in his booke of the concord of foreknowledge with free will; Considering * 1.118 saith he, that what God willeth cannot but be when he wills, that the will of mā shall not be con∣strained by any necessity to will or no; and withall will have an effect follow the will of man. In this case it must needs be that the will of man is free, and that also which God willeth shall come to passe, to wit by that will of man. Now observe what in the next place he concludeth hence In these cases therefore it is true that the worke of sin, which man will doe, must needs be, though man doth not will it of necessity. And in his concord of predestination and free will. In Good things God doth worke, both that they are, and that they are good, in evill things he workes onely that they are, not that they are evill. Hugo de sancto Victore 1. De sacr. 4. p. 13. When we say God willeth that which is good, it sounds well; but if we say God willeth evill it is harsh to eares, nei∣ther doth a pious mind admit of the good God, that he willeth evill, for hereby he thinkes the mea∣ning is that God loves and approves of that which is evill, & therefore the pious mind abhorres it, not because that which is said is not well said, but because that which is well said is not well understood. To these I adde the testimony of Bradwardine at large. A man reputed so pi∣ous in those dayes, that the Kings prospe ous successe in those dayes was cheifly imputed unto his piety; who followed him in his warres in France as Preacher in the camp. In the last place I make answer to the Sophisticall arguments of Aquinas and Durandus, and the frothy disputation of Valentianus, all of them standing to maintaine the contrary. Now let every sober Christian judge of this Authors proposition, when he saith that If God doth will and procure sin &c. he is worse then the Devill. For I have made it evident by variety of Scripture testimonyes, by reason, and also with the concurrence of diverse learned Divines; that it is Gods will that sin should come to passe, even the horrible out∣rages committed against the holy sonne of God were before determined by Gods hand and counsell. Now what followes herehence by this Authours dicourse; but that the holy Apostles yea and the Spirit of God do make God worse then the Devill. So little cause have we to be impatient, when such horrible blasphemyes are layd to our charge, when we consider what honourable compartners we have in these our sufferings. Yet see the vanity of this consequence represented most evidently; For albeit the will of Gods decree be powerfull & effectuall and irresistable, and consequently every thing decreed thereby shall come to passe powerfully, effectually, irresistibly, yet this respects onely the generality of the things eveniency, not the manner how For onely things ne∣cessary shall by this irresistible wil of God, come to passe necessarily: But as for con∣tingent things, they by the same irresistable will of God shall come to passe also; but how? not necessarily but contingently; that is with a possibility of not comming to passe. Now the free actions of men are one sort of contingent things They therefore shall infallibly come to passe also by vertue of Gods irresistible will; but how? Not ne∣cessarily but contingently, that is with a possibility of not coming to passe in generall as they are things contingent: And in speciall they shall come to passe not contingent∣ly onely but freely also; that is with a free power in the Agents by whom they are acted to doe otherwise. Yet there is another difference according to the morall condition of these actions For if they are good and so farre as they are goood they come to passe by Gods working of them, but if they are evill, and so farre as they are evill they come to passe onely by Gods permitting; according to that of Austin. Non aliquid sit nisi omnipotēs fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo. Not any thing comes to passe, but God willing it either by suffering it (to wit in case it be evill) or himselfe working it (to wit in case it

be good.) And according to that eleventh Article of Religion agreed upon by the Arch-Bishop, and Bishops, and the rest of the Clergy in Ireland, which is this; God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsell ordaine whatsoever should come to passe in time; yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liber∣ty nor the contingency of the second causes is taken away but established rather. Farther consi∣der it is confessed by all, that God concurres in producing the act of sinne, as an effi∣cient cause thereof not morall, but naturall. And Aquinas himselfe, though he de∣nyes that, Voluntas Dei est malorum, Because indeed as Hugo de Sancto Victore observes by the will of God is commonly understood in this case Voluntas approbans; his will approving it, and loving it. And so it is justly denyed that God doth will evill things, speak∣ing of the evill of sinne. Yet Aquinas professeth, and disputes and proves that Actus pec∣cati est a Deo, the Act of sinne is from God. Like as the Act of walking is from the soule, though the lamenes in walking ariseth from some disease in the legge. Now the Devill concurres not in this manner to any act of sin; neither is the efficient cause thereof in the Kinde of a Naturall efficient, but onely Morall by tempting and per∣swading. What therefore? shall we conclude as this Authour doth without feare or witt or honesty, that by the confession of all men God is hereby made worse then the Devill? To what abominable courses do the wilde witts and profane hearts of these men expose them? The greatest works of Satan in moving men to sin are comprehended un∣der blinding and hardening of them. Now these operations are also attributed to God. And like enough he doth usually performe them, not by the ministry of his holy An∣gells, but by the Ministry of Satan and his Angells of Darkenesse, as we read. 1. Kings 22. v. 21. 22. 23. Ioh: 13. 27. Acts 5. 3. What then shall the Devill so farre possesse our hearts as to break forth into such intolerable blasphemyes as to conclude hereupon that God is bad, or worse then the Devill. The providence of God I willingly confesse is wonderfull, and mysterious in this, like unto the Nature of God, to be adored rather then pryed into. So this providence to be dreaded rather then for satisfaction to every wanton and wild witt to be searched into. Yet all confesse that the Lord could hinder all this if it pleased him, and rebuke Satan and restraine the power, and stop the course of sin, and prevent occasions leading thereunto, but he will not, and why? But because he knowes it becomes his allmighty power and wisdome infinite, rather exmalis bene facere, quàm malum esse non sinere, To worke good out of evill, then not at all to suffer evill. Lastly what meanes this Authour to carry himselfe so as to betray so strange ignorance in mitigating Satans operation in tempting unto sin; as if this were not sufficient to make him the Authour of sin. Especially considering the reason that moves him here∣unto, which is meerely the delight that he takes in dishonouring God, and being a de∣sperate spirit himselfe to make as many as he can partakers of the same desperate con∣dition. For cupiunt perditi perdere, sayth Cyprian, cum sint ipsi paenales, quaerunt sibi ad poenam comites; being damned themselves they desire to damne as many as they can: And being bound in chaines and kept to the judgement of the great day, they desire to have as many companions as they can in drinking of that cup of trembling, and sucking the very dreggs of that cup of trembling and wringing them out. For as the Historian ob∣serves. Maligna est calamitas, & cum suo supplicio crucietur, acquiescit alieno; Calamity makes a man of a spightfull nature, and when himselfe is tormented, he takes content in this that others suffer with him. And as the Oratour observes, Nullum adversarium magis me∣tuas, quàm qui non potest vivere, potest occidere. No adversary more to be feared, then he who cannot live himselfe, yet can kill another. This makes a coward resolute; when he must needs dye, he will fight like a mad man, and kill all he can. I say what meanes this Authour to carry the matter hand over head, as if it were without question; That he is not the Authour of sinne; who onely is a Morall cause thereof, but rather he that is the naturall efficient: whereas great Divines carry it to the contrary. As name∣ly Dominicus Soto in his first booke of nature and grace chap: 18. Although (sayth he) there are many that thinke it hard to explicate, how in the hatred of God, which hath an in∣ward and indivisible malignity, God can be the cause of the entity, but not of the fault: Yet this is not so hard to be understood. Then he proceeds to shew how this may be. First laying for his ground what it is to be the cause of sinne, thus; In morall actions he is altogether, and is judged to be the cause, who by a law, or help, or counsell or favour or perswasion moves any one either to good or evill. Observe I pray the doctrine of this School-Divine directly contrary to that which this Authour supposeth without all proofe. For in the judgement of Dominicus Soto, he onely is to be accounted the cause

of another mans sinne, who is the morall cause thereof, as by tempting, counselling, perswading thereunto, And upon this ground he proceeds to free God from being the Authour of it after this manner. But as for God he by all these wayes moves his creatures to that which is good and honest, and none at all to evill. Neither is the doctrine of Dominicus Soto alone; but the common doctrine of the Divines of Salamancha, as Molina con∣fesseth in his disputation 23. And albeit Molina the Jesuite were of another opinion. Yet Vasquius the Jesuite professeth that he was ever of the same minde with Dominicus Soto and the Divines of Salamancha in this; In his 129 disputation upon the first part of his Summes. As for Prosper he hath no such argument. But first observe the Objecti∣on whereunto he answereth, was made against the Doctrine of Austin; as the Authour acknowledgeth. Whence it followeth that looke how this Authour chargeth our do∣ctrine, after the same manner was the doctrine of Austin charged above 1200 yeares agoe; let the indifferent hereby take notice of the congruity of our doctrine with the doctrine of Austin in this particular, and the congruity of this Authours spirit in charg∣ing us with the spirit of the Semipelagians in charging Austin after the same manner. Secondly consider the objection there made t'is this. Quod quando incestant Patres filias, & matres filios; vel quando Servi Dominos occidunt ideo fiat, quia ita Deus predestinavit, ut fieret. When father commit incest with their Daughters, and mothers with their sonnes. Or when servants kill their Lords; therefore this comes to passe, because God hath so predestina∣ted that it should come to passe. Consider, in this objection the fault of these abominable courses is not layd upon those that commit them, but onely upon God; as if Gods pre∣destination did worke in such a manner, as to compell men or women to commit such and such abominations. And so Prosper conceives the Argument to proceed, as if this were their intention. And accordingly makes answer. Si Diabolo objiceretur quòd tali∣um facinorum ipse Author, ipse esset incentor, were it objected to the Devill that he were the Authour of such sinnes, and did inflame men to the committing of them (which in∣deed is the Devills course and not Gods) yet I thinke, sayth he, that the Devill might in some sort disburthen himselfe of this crimination, & talium scelerum patratores de ipsorum voluntate vinceret, and make it appeare that their owne wills were the committers of such sinnes. Quia etsi delectatus est furore peccantium, probaret tamen se non intulisse vim cri∣minum. Because though he tooke pleasure in the fury of sinners, yet might he justifie that he forced no man to sinne. After the same manner proceeded the 11. objection of the Galles; Quod per potentiam Deus homines ad peccata compellit, God by his power compells men to sin. And as touching the notion of predestination it is true the Antients used that onely in reference to those thinges which were wrought by God. Nihil ergo talium (to wit of wicked actions) negotiorum Deus predestinavit ut fieret. Predestination being onely * 1.119 of such things, which come to passe by Gods working of them. Yet the same Austin professeth that such things which come to passe by Gods permission (of which kind are all manner of sinnes) even those came to passe God willing thē, though not by Gods predestinating of them. And as touching Senacherib who was slaine by his owne sonnes; the Lord professeth saying, I will cause him to fall by the sword in his owne land. And up∣on * 1.120 Amaziah the Priest of Bethel the judgment was pronounced from the Lord, Thy wife shall be an harlot And whatsoever comes to passe it is Gods will it should come to passe, sayth Austin, how much more that which comes to passe in the way of judg∣ment.

2 I come to his second reason to examine whether he carryeth himselfe any thing more handsomly in that. If God be the Authour of sinne he cannot be the punisher of sin. This argument is better shaped then the former; but forthwith he tells us that he can∣not be in justice the punisher of that whereof himselfe is the Authour. Wherein are two particulars neither of which were expressed in his argument, the one is the appli∣cation of it to the same sinne whereof he was the Authour, which was not expressed in the Argument. And without this application the Argument is of no force. For earth∣ly Magistrates are sinners, yet the punishers of sinne in others, yea of the same kind of sinne. As though a Magistrate be a profaner of the name of God, yet he may execute the law on them who doe profane the name of God, and that justly. Then what is it that makes a man the Author of sinne? It is well knowne, that though it be unlawfull for a man to permit sinne, if it be in his power to hinder it, yet unlesse God permit sinne, it cannot be committed by any, Nos certe, saith Austin, sieos in quos nobis potestas est ante oculos nostros perpetrare Scelera permittamus, rei cum ipsis erimus. Quam vero innumera∣bilia ille permitit fieri ante oculos suos, quae utique si voluisset nullâ ratione permitteret. Cer∣tainely

if we suffer those, over whom we have power, to commit sinne, we shall be guilty together with them. But how innumerable are the sinnes which he suffers to be committed before his eyes, which if he would, he could hinder, so that by no meanes they should cōe to passe. Or is he the Au∣thour of sinne who is the efficient cause of the act of sinne? It is Aquinas his doctrine, that, the act of sinne is from God, and that in the kind of an efficient cause; and it is commonly received to be the first cause in the kind of efficients, subordinate to none, and all other subordinate to him. Nay more then this Scotus professeth, and after him the Dominicans, that, God determineth the will to every act thereof (though sinfull) as touching the sub∣stance thereof, but how? Surely no otherwise then to come to passe agreeably to their na∣ture; necessary acts necessarily, free acts freely. So Barwardine maintaines that God neces∣sitates the will of the creatue; but how? To performe acts thereof freely. Suppose they did maintaine that God in his omnipotency did impose a necessity upon our wills, as Su∣arez imputes to our Divines that they so teach. Yet in this case Suarez the Jesuite will ju∣stifie them, that therein they deliver nothing that either doth include contradiction, or * 1.121 that doth exceed God's omnipotency. Neither did I ever meet any colour of reason, why God might not as wholy determine the will to any free act thereof, as concurre with the will to the producing of the same act. And that in the concurrence of God and man to the same act, the first cause should be in subordination to the second; or the second cause not in subordination to the first, is against all reason, and obnoxious to manifold con∣tradiction, as I have shewed in my Vindiciae. Whereas for God to move a creature to eve∣ry * 1.122 act of his congruously to his nature, and so to determine him, is most agreeable to rea∣son, and nothing at all obnoxious to contradiction. And yet notwithstanding I see noe sufficient reason to conclude these determinations, as touching things naturall, such as is the substance of every naturall act, there being a power to performe that in a naturall A∣gent. Of supernaturall acts the case is different. It seemes to me enough, that God will have this or that evill come to passe by his permission. For when God created the world out of nothing; what transient action of God can be imagined, when there was no mat∣ter at all for any such transient action to worke upon; God's will was sufficient to have that to exist which before had no being: And why may not the will of God be sufficient for the existence of the motion of each creature after it hath existence? But supposing these determinations of the creatures wills to be necessary, if God will not determine them to good what will follow herence? Surely nothing but evill; unlesse man can deter∣mine himselfe to that which is good without God. For as for simple concurrence with∣out subordination in working, as I said before, that cannot be affirmed without palpable and grosse contradiction, as I have proved in the digression formerly mentioned, proceed we yet farther. I know nothing doth more intimately concerne God's secret providence in evill, then the hardning of the creature to disobedience. Now the Scripture which is the very word of God, and the dictates of the Holy Ghost doth plainly and expressely teach, that albeit God commanded Pharaoh to let Israell goe, yet withall he hardened his heart that he should not let Israell goe for a long time, which refusall of his was wilfull and presumptuous disobedience. In like sort as touching obedience and disobedience to the Gospell, the Apostle tells us plainly that, God hath mercy on whom he will, to performe the one, and whom he will he hardeneth, thereby exposing them to the other. And hereupon this objection is made, Why then doth God complaine (to wit, of man's disobedience) for who hath resisted his will? And we know what answer the Apostle makes hereunto. O man who art thou that disputest with God? shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power of the clay of the same lump to make one vessell unto honour, another unto dishonour? Now will any sober Christian conclude herehence that be∣cause, God hardned Pharaoh that he should not let Israell goe, therefore he is the Authour of sinne. The Lord hath bid Shimei to curse David. Consider what Austine writes upon this. Quomodo dixerit Dominus huic homini maledicere David, quis sapiens & intelliget? Non e∣nim jubendo dixit, ubi obedientia laudaretur; sed quod ejus voluntatem proprio vitio suo ma∣lam, in hoc peccatum judicio suo justo & occulto inclinarit, ideo dictum est, Dixit ei Dominus. How said the Lord to this man that he should curse David; Who is wise and he shall understand? For he said this not by commanding Shimei so to doe, in which case his obedience had been com∣manded; but in as much as Shimei's will through his own vitiousnesse being evill, the Lord incli∣ned it to this sinne by his just and secret judgment. Thus saith he, The Lord useth the hearts of the wicked to the praise and benefit of the good: so he used Iudas betraying Christ: so he made use of the Jewes crucifying Christ. And how great good did he procure therehence to all believers? Who also useth the Divell who is worst of all, yet he makes best use of him to exercise and prove

the faith and piety of the godly. So he wrought in the heart of Absalom to refuse the counsell of Achitophell, and make choice of that counsell which was nothing profitable. Who may not well tremble in the contemplation of those Divine judgments, whereby the Lord workes in the hearts of wicked men whatsoever he will, yet rendring unto them according to their merits. Then he proceeds to give other instances of Scripture to manifest God's working in the hearts of men, and when he hath done, he concludes in this manner; His & talibus testimoniis divi∣norum eloquiorum satis, quantum existimo, manifestatur operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocun{que} voluerit sive ad bona pro suâ misericordiâ, sive ad ma∣la pro meritis eorum, judicio uti{que} suo aliquando occulto, semper autem justo. By these and such like testimonies of Divine Scripture, I take it to be sufficiently manifested, that God doth worke in the hearts of men, to incline their wills whithersoever he will, either to those things that are good, of his mercy, or to such things that are evill, for their deserts, in the way of judgment, which is sometimes known, sometimes secret, but alwaies just. And all this he shewes, to be wrought by God without prejudice to the freedome of their wills. And why should David pray after this manner. Lord incline mine heart to thy testimonies, and not to covetousnesse; If it were not in God's power to incline the hearts of men to covetousnesse? Yet I trust no sober Christian will conclude from this prayer of David, that God by executing such a power is the Author of sinne. Lastly this argument is drawne from God's justice, so is the third, which is to confound rather then to distinguish the reasons produced by him. We say that God cannot possibly be the Author of sinne, the necessity of his nature stands in opposition thereunto. For first sin hath no cause efficient but deficient only, as long agoe it hath been delivered by Austin. 2ly, a cause deficient or defective is either in a culpable manner, or in a manner nothing culpable. As for example, that Agent is defective culpably, that ei∣ther omits the doing of that which he ought to doe; or omits to doe it after that manner which he ought to doe it: now I say it is impossible that the divine nature can be defe∣ctive either of these waies, and consequently it is impossible that he should be the Author of sin, whereas he saith this is Prosper's argument it is untrue. He saith indeed it is against reason, that God who damnes the Devill should will that any man should be a Servant to the Di∣vell: but forthwith he expounds himselfe. 1. Expounding what that cōdition is of being the Devills servants, whereof the objection did proceed. Now the objection was this, That the greatest part of men were created for this, that they should doe, not the will of God, but the will of the Devill: Now this objection saith Prosper proceeds from the Pelagians: Qui Adae pec∣catum transiisse in omnes diffitentur, who deny the sin of Adam to have passed unto all. So that, to doe the will not of God, but of the Divell, is to be in the state of naturall corruption, and under the power of originall sinne, whereby they are not God's servants, but the Devills; this is not the condition of God's children in the state of Grace. Now Prosper shewes how originall sinne passeth over all, not by the will of God; and secondly, how it passeth over all by the will of God: Not by the will of God instituente; but by the will of God ju∣dicante: His words are these. Haec servitus non est institutio Dei, sed judicium. This slavery of sinne which came upon all by Adam's sinne is not God's institution but his judgment. As much as to say it came not upon a man by God's first creation, but by his judgment upon him, because of his first trangression; so that if divine judgment be the will of God; it is appa∣rent Prosper is so farre from denying that slavery to have come upon all men by the just will of God, as that he expresly acknowledgeth it. It is true as Fulgentius saith, that, God is not the Authour of sinne, but the revenger of it. And it is as true that it is as just with God to punish sinne with sinne, as Scripture justifies; as St. Austine observes, and improveth at large divers Scriptures to this purpose, in his fifth Book against Iulian the Pelagian, and third chap. Tertullian in saying, he is not to be accounted the Authour of sin, who is the forbid∣der, yea the condemner of it, falls directly upon the same ground that Dominicus Soto, with the Divines of Salamancha, and Vasquez the Jesuites, in explicating what that is which makes me to be the Authour of a morall action; as namely, by commanding, by counsel∣ling it, and perswading it; and indeed condemnation is but consequent to a law forbid∣ding this or that. Now it is apparent that God in this respect ought to be accounted the Authour of every good action, but of none that is evill. For he commands only that wich is good, and counselleth and perswadeth thereunto, but forbiddeth and disswadeth every thing that is evill. Of this no notice at all is taken by this Authour, neither taketh he any care to shew what that is, that maketh any agent justly to be accounted the Au∣thour of sinne.

3 His third reason is all one with the former as drawne from God's justice and holi∣nesse and his being Judge of the world. For it is the property of the Judge to condemne

transgressours, whereupon his former Argument insisted, and that allso was drawne from God's justice. But I remember well what the Poet coupleth together when he saith,

Accessit fervor capiti numerus{que} lucernis.

Honesty retaines the Creature from being the Authour of sinne not his nature, he be∣ing peccabilis by nature, but so is not God; It is impossible absolutely for him to be found defective any way in a culpable manner. He may withhold Grace from any man, I speak of Grace preservative from sinne. Neither is he unjust herein; for he is bound to none. At length he comes to prove the crimination laid upon his adversaries, as followeth.

Sect: 2.

But this opinion doth so. For albeit the writers that have defended it (Piscator and a few more of the blun∣ter * 1.123 sort excepted) have never said directly and in terminis, that God is the cause of sinne; yet have they deli∣livered these things; from which it must needs follow by necessary consequence that he is so.

For they say. 1. That, as the decree of Reprobation is absolute, so it is inevitable. Those poore soules which lye under it must necessarily be damned. It is saith Marlorate a firme and stable truth, that the man * 1.124 whom God in his eternall counsell hath rejected, though he doe all the works of the Saints, cannot possibly be saved.

2. That without sinne this decree of Reprobation cannot be justly executed. God, saith Piscator, did * 1.125 create men for this very purpose, that they might indeed fall; for otherwise he could not have attained those his principall ends. He meanes the manifestation of his justice in the condemnation of Reprobates; and of his mercy in the salvation of the Elect. Maccovius allso saith the same. If sinne had not been, the manifestation of justice and mercy (which is as much as to say, as the damnation of Reprobates) had never been. * 1.126

3. That God decreed that Reprobates must unavoidably sinne, and sinne unto death, that his eternall ordinance might be executed, and they damned. We grant saith Zanchy, that Reprobates are held so fast un∣der God's almighty decree, that they cannot but sinne and perish; and a little after he saith, We doubt not * 1.127 therefore to confesse, that there lieth upon Reprobates by the power of their unchangable reprobation a ne∣cessity of sinning, yea of sinning to death without repentance, and consequently of perishing everlastingly. Calvin also saith, that Reprobates obey not the word of God, partly through the wickednesse of their own hearts, and partly because they are raised up by the unsearchable judgment of God to illustrate his glory by their damnation. I will end this with that speech of Piscator. Reprobates are precisely appointed to this evill, to be punished everlastingly, and to sinne: And therefore to sinne that they might be justly punished. * 1.128

4. That as he hath immutably decreed that Reprobates shall live and dye in sinne. So he procures their sinnes in due time by his Almighty hand, partly by withdrawing from them grace necessary for the avoiding * 1.129 of sinne, and partly by moving and inclining them by his irresistable and secret working on their hearts; to sinfull actions. Calvin saith, that men and Devills and Reprobate-men are not only held fast in God's fet∣ters, so as they cannot doe what they would, but are also urged and forced by God's bridle ad obsequia prae∣standa, to doe as he would have thē: & in the next chapter these are the words, that men have nothing in agita∣tion, * 1.130 that they bring nothing to action, but what God by his secret direction hath ordered, is apparent by ma∣ny cleare testimonies. In that Section following he saith. And surely unlesse God did worke inwardly in the minds of men, it would not be rightly said, that he takes away wisdome from the wise. In these two chap∣ters * 1.131 that which he mainly driveth at, is to shew that God doth not only behave himselfe privatively in pro∣curing the sinnes of men, but doth allso put forth powerfull and positive acts, in the bringing of thē to passe. And in the second book and fourth chapter after he had said, that God may be said to harden men by for∣saking them, he putteth in another way by which God hardneth them, & that he saith commeth a great deale * 1.132 nearer to the propriety of Scripture phrases, namely, by stirring up their wills. God doth not only hardē men by levaing them unto themselves, but by appointing their counsells, ordering their deliberations, stirring up their wills, confirming their purposes by the Minister of his anger Satan. And this he proveth by the worke of God on Sihon King of the Amorites▪ and then insinuateth the end too, why God thus hardens men in their * 1.133 wicked courses; which is that he might destroy them. Quia perditum Deus volebat, obstinatio cordis divina fuit ad ruinam preparatio; Because God intends his ruine he prepared him for sin by his induration.

The summe of all these propositions is this; God who from all eternity appointed many miserable men to endlesse and unavoidable torments, decreed, for the bringing about of their intended ruine, that they should without remedy live and dye in a state of sinne: and what he thus decreed from everlasting, he doth power∣fully effect in time, so governing, over-ruling & working upon the wills of those Reprobates, that they have no liberty or ability at all in the issue, of avoiding their sinnes, but must of necessity commit them. Thus they teach; and therefore by just consequences they make God the Authour of sinne; as it will plainly ap∣peare by these following considerations.

Poets tell us there was a time when Giants on earth set themselves to fight against God * 1.134 in heaven; & because the place of his habitation was out of their reach, they laid moun∣taine upon mountaine hill upon hill, Pelion upon Ossa, that so they might make their ap∣proaches unto him, & beseige him in his own fastnes: this fable is a monumēt of the ship∣wrack of that truth among heathen-men, which the Lord had preserved unto his Church upon record in his holy word. For when after the great Deluge in the dayes of Noah, men began to be multiplied upon the face of the earth, they consulted how they might for∣tify themseves against the like inundation for the time to come; and thereupon encou∣raged thēselves saying, Goe to let us build us a City and a town, whose top may reach unto the

Heaven that we may get us a name, least we be scattered upon the whole earth. But how did∣the Lord deale with these presumptuous adventurers? The Poet's faign that Iupiter de∣stroyed them with his thunderbolts; and as for one of them Typhoeus by name, a proud fellow, he laid him fast enough under the hill Aetna in Sicily, where he breaths out smoak & fire like the great Polan out of a Tobacco-pipe somewhat bigger then a good Caliver. But the Scripture tels us, how that for their saying, Goe too, let us build. &c. the Lord an∣swered them with a Come on, let us goe downe and there confound their language, that every one perceive not one anothers speech. This Author herhaps is but a Pygmie for bodily pre∣sence, yet he may be a Gyant for his wit, and found 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to fight against God in a spirituall way in the opposing of his truth. As Gamaliel sometimes advised the high Priest with his counsell to take heed, lest they were found even fighters against God. It is true this Author no doubt perswades himselfe that he fights for God, in as much as he affects to free him from being the Author of sin. But let not the simple Reader be deluded with shewes, but seriously consider whither all this doe, which he makes about the point of Reprobation doth not clearly tend to the overthrowing of God's free grace in election: which is so much the more foule, because he doth it underhand; as conscious to himselfe of his owne impotency to impugne it openly, or fearing the generall opposition of our Church against him, & therefore he practiseth to undermine it. And this I have found to be his course divers years agoe in his private undertakings to draw proselytes unto him, namely to decline the point of grace, & of election, to deale only upon Reprobation▪ and there to put his concurrent to begin, as if he would have a young Divine to inform a Se∣xagenarian, as I have seen under his own hand. But see the hand of God upon him in con∣founding his language, as when he stands for Reprobation evitable & avoidable, & reproa∣cheth his adversaries for maintaining Reprobation inevitable & unavoidable. This is the phrase of his Schoole. For I do not remember to have met with it any where, but in him, & his disciples: Now what man of common sense doth not observe this phrase to be appli∣able only to things that are to come; but of a contingent nature; so that they may be avoy∣ded & declined; but by no means apply able to things already done, & that more then ma∣ny thousand years agoe. For what sober man could heare with patience another discourse of the avoidable nature of Noah's flood now in these daies, & to maintain that it is at this day avoidable: what fustian like to this? Might he not as well take liberty to discourse of the Aequinoctiall pasticrust? It was wont to be said, that this alone God himself could not perform; namely to cause that which is done to be not done. As Aristotle in his Eth relates a saying of one Agatho to that purpose. Now reprobation is confessed by all to be of the same age with election; & election was as the Apostle tels us, performed by God before the foundation of the world And is not this Author then besides himself, when he pleads for evitable & avoydable Reprobation. But albeit this Author makes the worst of our o∣pinions and expressions, yet I will not requite him by making the worst of his, that were base & inglorious, and to be overcome. I will therefore hearken to the Apostles counsell where he saith, Be not overcome with evill, but overcome evill with good. I will make the best of his, and according to the distinction of God's will used in Schooles; as it is taken either quoad actum volentis, or quoad res volitas, as touching the act of him that willeth, or the things willed. So I will imagine that he speaks of Reprobation, which is the will of God, not as touching the act of God Reprobating & making such a decree, but as touching the thing decreed, & this thing decreed he will have to be of an avoidable nature. Now this we wil∣lingly grant, & utterly deny, that this any way hinders the absolutenes of God's decree. We say with the 11 article of the Church of Ireland, that God from all aeternity did by his unchangeable councell ordain whatsoever should in time come to passe, yet so as hereby neither the contingency nor liberty of the second causes is taken away, but established rather. So that whereas we see some things come to passe necessarily, some contingently; so God hath ordained that all things shall come to passe that do come to passe; but necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, that is, avoidably & with a possibility of not comming to passe. For every University Scholar knows this to be the notion of contingency, yet will not I content my selfe with the article of Ireland, for this Aquinas thus distinguisheth. For * 1.135 having proposed this question, Whether the will of God doth impose a necessity upon the things willed. To this question this Author with whom I deale would answer affirmatively, saying, it doth impose a necessity on all such things, or at least obtrude such an opinion upon us; & himself undoubtedly thinks that in case Gods will be absolute it must cause a necessity upon all things willed therby, both which are utterly untrue, & this last utterly denyed by Aquinas. For first, every will of God is absolute in the judgment of Aquinas, which I prove

thus; That will which hath noe cause or reason thereof is absolute: This proposition I presume this Authour will not deny: But the will of God hath no cause in the judgment of Aquinas therefore every will of God is absolute by his doctrine: Yet this absolute will of God imposeth not a necessity upon all things willed by him, but only on some things. * 1.136 Divina volunt as non omnibus sed quibusdam necessitatem imponit. And in the body of that question thus he writes, The distinction of things necessary and contingent proceeds from the * 1.137 distinction of God's will. For when a cause is effectuall and powerfull to worke, the effect follow∣eth the cause, not only so farre as to be brought to passe, but also as touching the manner of its coming to passe. Therefore seing the will of God is most effectuall, it not only followeth that those things come to passe, which God will have come to passe, but that they come to passe after the same manner also, after which he will have them come to passe. Now God will have some things come to passe necessarily and some things contingently, that there may be an order in things for the perfection of the world. And therefore for the producing of some effects he hath fitted causes necessary, which cannot faile, by which effects are brought forth necessarily: And for the producing of other effects, he hath fitted causes contingent, such as may faile in working, from which effects are brought to passe contingently. So that upon suspicion that God doth will a thing, that thing shall certainly and infallibly come to passe; but how? Not allwaies necessarily or contingently. And that certaine and infallible eveniency of things is called also necessity in the Schooles; but not necessity simply, but only upon suspicion, which may well consist with absolute contingency. But to make the point yet more cleare; Let us distinctly consider the things decreed; For they that have an evill cause delight in confusion, and feare nothing more then the light of distinction. Now the things decreed by Reprobation are either deniall of Grace, which is joyned with the permissi∣on of sinne: Or damnation for sinne, according to that on Aquinas, Reprobation in∣cludes * 1.138 the will of permitting sinne, & inflicting damnation for sinne. Now both the permissi∣on of sinne, and damnation of God's part are his free acts; and therefore come to passe freely. But upon supposition that God will deny a man Grace, it is impossible that such a man should have grace. Secondly, secluding grace, there is noe actuall transgression for which a man is damned, but may be avoided; man having power for that naturally; though naturally he have noe power to performe every good act. The reason is because amongst good acts some are supernaturall, as the acts of the three Theologicall vertues, Faith, Hope, and Charity: But noe sinfull act is supernaturall, all such are naturall. Now it is confest on all hands that, notwithstanding man's corruption by reason of origi∣nall sinne, yet he hath still power and free will to performe any naturall act, and accor∣dingly he hath free power to abstaine from it. So that Iudas had free will to abstaine from betraying his Master; After he had betrayed him, he had free power to abstaine from destroying himselfe; so that as these sinnes of his for which he was damned were a∣voidable by him, in like manner his damnation for these sinnes was avoidable. And allbe∣it God had determined that Iudas by Divine permission should betray his Master, and destroy himselfe, according to to that of Austin, Iudas electus est ad prodendum sanguinem Domini; Iudas was ordained to betray his master. And that of the Apostles jointly. Of a truth against thy holy Son Iesus both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and people of Israell were gathered to doe what thy hand, and thy counsell had before determined to be done. Acts: 4. 28. Yet herehence it followes only, that it was necessary (to wit, upon this supposi∣tion, namely, of the Divine ordinance.) that these things should come to passe, namely, both * 1.139 Iudas his betraying of Christ, and Herods mocking of him, and Pilates condemning him, and the peoples crying out away with him, together with their preferring of Barrabas a murtherer before him, and the Souldiers crucifying him. But how came it to passe? Not necessarily, but contingently, that is in this Authours phrase evitably and avoidably, in∣as much as it was joyned with an absolute possibility to come to passe otherwise; Nor with a possibility only but with a free power in the agents to have forborne all these contumelious carriages of theirs towards the son of God. For both Iudas had free will to abstaine from betraying him, and Herod with his Herodians could have abstained from their contumelious handling of him, and Pilate from condemning him, and the Preists and people from conspiring against him; and the Souldiers from crucify∣ing him, only they had no power to abstaine from all or any of these vile actions in an holy manner, as no man else hath power to abstaine from any evill in a gracious manner, without grace: Yea without the Grace of regeneration which alone plants in us both faith in God, and a love of God to the very contempt of our selves, and no performance of any good or abstinence from any evill, is acceptable

with God unto eternall life, unlesse it proceed from this faith and this love. That which is here produced out of Marlorate is a strange speech, and such as I never read or heard from any before: and such, as whereof I can give no tolerable construction. And is it fit that every extravagant passage that is found in any Writer of ours should be brought forth to charge our doctrine with? It were a fitter speech for a Papist who maintaining the absolutenesse of Reprobation, doth withall maintaine an apostacy from grace, which we do not, If Marlorate had any such opiniō he sings therein to himself, & to his own Mu∣ses What Divine of ours maintains that God hath decreed to damne any man otherwaies then by way of punishment for sin continued in unto death without repentance? Had he spoken of Good works morall only, it is true any hypocrite is capable of them; and none taste deeper of Damnation then hypocrites. But as for the worke of true faith & true re∣pentance; it is the generall profession of our Divines, that as faith and the spirit of repen∣tance once given, never faile, so they shall infallibly bring a man unto everlasting life, and free him from condemnation. But any thing serves this Authors turn to vent his sto∣mack: And I am perswaded, there is not one more of all our Divines that he can shew to concurre with Marlorat in this. And if there were is it fit their improvident & inconside∣rate expressions should be cast in their teeth that avouch them not, but rather conceive them to be void of all sobriety? Brentius apud Marloratum in illud, Ioh. 15. 2. Omnem palmitem in me non ferentem fructum tollet, &c. Caeterum haec sententia occurrit curiositati carnis quae solet argutè, magis quàm reverenter de praedestinatione disserere, & pro suo ingenio colligere nullum à Domino ad vitam aeternam electum posse damnari, etiamsi pessimè vivat. Nullum item à Domino ad ignem aeternum deputatum posse salvari etiamsi optimè vivat; se itaque velle pro suâ libidine vivere. Ut ut enim sollicite lahoret, non tamen posse decretum Dei infringere. Respondet hic Christus, Omnem palmitem, &c. qnod dicitur. Quid ad te de occultâ Dei praedestinatione? Hoc tu videris, ut tu in me maneas, & fructum feras, reliquae dispensationi & prudentiae Dei committenda sunt. Nam etiamsi videar is ad aeternam salu∣tem praedestinatus, non tamen fructum feras, abjicieris in ignem tanquam infructuosus pal∣mes. He instances in Saul, then whom there was not a better man in Israel. That which is here cited out of Marlorat his Expositio Ecclesiastica, it is set down as in Calvin's Commentary: but no such thing is found in Calvin. And it may be that is the fault of the Printers mistaking. And Marlorat's own exposition succeeds in a few words thus. Quae ideò dicuntur non ut fideles inde ansam arripiant de suâ salute dubitandi sed ut carnalis securitas & ignavia ab hominibus tollatur. And the next sentence whence this question is taken seems to cohere with this, though a great C. as if it were Calvin's comes in between, and it begins thus. Certum est enim dècretum Dei à nemine infirmari posse; quia Deus non est ut homo qui poenitentiam agat, & retractet sententiam semel de∣cretam. Then followes the passage here alleadged, and at the heels of it these words: Time igitur, & in solam Domini eligentis manum respice ut salutem per Dominum no∣strum Iesum Christum assequaris. Undoubtedly Marlorat approves of Brentius his ex∣position, otherwise he would not have placed it in his Expositio Ecclesiastica. Now Brentius brings in the very saying for which Maldonat is criminated, as the objection of some carnall person. Therefore when Marlorat seems to justifie such a saying, it must be in another sense; and that either of good workes in shew, of which Bren∣tius also observed, that such might have been found in Saul: Or of workes in di∣stinction from faith. And accordingly he concludes with exhortation feare: that is not to be secure, how good soever his workes are; but to have an eye to God and trust only to him, that so he may obtain salvation through Jesus Christ. Calvin in Ioh. 15. 6. Arescere dicuntur instar emortua sarmenta quae à Christo resecta; sūt quia sicuti initiū vigoris ab ipso est ita & continuus tenor. Non quòd ex electis aliquem contingat unquam execari: sed quia multae hypocritae in speciem ad tempus florent & virent, qui postea in reddendo fructu spem domini fru∣strantur. They are said to to wither like a branch cut off, such as are cut off from Christ: because like as the beginning of their vigour is from him, so also their continuance. Not that at any time it falleth out that any of Gods Elect is cut off, but because many Hypocrites carry a faire shew for a time as if they were green and flourishing, who afterwards in rendring fruit make void the Lords Expectation.

2. The decree of Reprobation as touching one part of it, cannot be executed without sin; For it is a decree of inflicting damnation for sin, so that there is no place for damna∣tion, where sinne and that as a meritorious cause preceeds not. I had thought this Au∣thour needed not to runne out to Piscator and Maccovius for proofe of this; nei∣ther Arminius nor the Authour is of any other opinion I am confident, then

that the decree of damnation cannot be executed on any without the precedency of sin in the party who is to be damned. But there is another part of Reprobation For as Aqui∣nas speakes, it includes the will of permitting sin. Now the execution of this decree, which consists in the permitting of sin, doth not require the precedency of sinne. For when God first permitted the Angels to fall, this permission of his did not require any precedency of sinne in them; nor the permission of Adam to fall; it cannot be said without manifest contradiction, that it did. For before the first sinne there was no sinne. Piscator saith that, God created men for this very purpose that they might fall; he saith, hoc consilio, which is as much as to say, with this purpose, not, for this purpose; to wit, to permit them to fall; And God purposing this, purposed that they should fall by his permission. For Arminius confesseth that in case God permits a man to will this or that, Necesse est ut nullo argumentorū genere persuadeatur ad nolendum. It must needs be that no argument shall perswade him to will that, which God permits him to will. And that it is good that evill should come to passe by God's permission, both Austine hath affirmed, & Bellarmine subscribed. And shall it not be law∣full for God to will that which is good? Undoubtedly neither justice punishing, nor mer∣cy pardoning, can be manifested without sin, either to be punished, or pardoned, or both: neither is it credible to me that this Authour thinks otherwise. And is not the manifestatiō of God's mercy on some, and his justice on others, the supreme end of God's providence towards mankind, and consequently by the most received rules of Schooles first inten∣ded, even before the permisson of sinne? For if the permission of sinne were first intended, then by the same rule of Schooles, it should be in the last place executed; that is, God should first manifest his mercy and justice in pardoning some, and punishing others, and afterwards suffer them to sinne; such is the learning and judgments of these Divines. And as for the foresight of sin, it is apparent, that it presupposeth God's purpose to permit it; and more then that, it presupposeth the fruition of it. Now it is well knowne, that sinne in its own nature is meerly possible. How comes it to passe, that from the condition of a thing meerly possible, it hath passed into the condition of a thing future? This cannot be done without a cause; and that cause must be eternall; for the effect was eternall. For from everlasting sinne was future; for from everlasting God knew it to be future. Now there is nothing everlasting, but God himselfe, therefore he must needs be the cause of this transition whereby a thing meerly possible in its own nature became future. And therefore, either by his knowledge he was the cause thereof, or by his will and decree. Not by his knowledge; for that rather supposeth thē to be future, then makes them such. It remaines therefore that the will of God, and that alone makes every future thing to passe out of the condition of a thing meerly possible, into the condition of a thing future, and that from everlasting. Let this Authour satisfie this argument, and I will ease him of all further paines, and lay down the bucklers before him.

3. It is untrue that by our Doctrine Reprobates doe unavoidably sinne. I have alrea∣dy demonstrated the contrary. For as I said, Malum semper habitat in alieno fundo, every actuall sinne is a naturall act; a worke of grace may be supernaturall as touching the sub∣stance of the act, so is not the worke of sinne, but allwaies naturall. Now no Christian that I know affirmes that a man in the state of sin is bereaved of free will in things natu∣rall. Nay we generally confesse, he hath free will in things morall, only as touching things spirituall he hath no freedome left therein: therefore as I said before, Iudas might have naturally forborne to betray his Master; naturally forborne to destroy himselfe. If some object, the common opiniō of Divines is, that in a state of nature there is noe libertie for sinne. I answer; first out of Aquinas, that this is to be understood of sinne in generall, * 1.140 not of any in particular: Licet aliquis non possit gratiam adipisci qui reprobatur à Deo, ta∣men quod in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur ex ejus libero arbitrio contingit. Though a man that is reprobated of God cannot obtaine Grace, (for how should he obtaine it if God will not give it? will they say that Grace is given according unto workes?) yet that he falls in∣to this or that sinne, this is a contingent thing, and proceeds from his own free will. So say I eve∣ry sinfull act committed by man in the state of naturall corruption, is committed freely in such sort that he might have abstained from it, but I doe not say that he could abstain from it in a gracious manner. But whether he doth that which is good, he doth it not in a gracious manner; so that still he sinneth more or lesse, and all by reason that as yet he hath neither faith in God, nor love of God, which are the fountaines of all gracious a∣ctions, both in doing that which is good, and in abstaining from that which is evill. As for Zanchi's saying, That God holds Reprobates so fast that they cannot but sinne. This act of God is no other then his denying them grace to breake of their sinnes by repentance, and

to turne unto God. Now the Apostle professeth that as, God hath mercy on whom he will, so he hardeneth others, even whom he will, in denying this grace unto them. And marke what objection he shapes hereupon, thou wilt say then why doth he yet complaine? (to wit of men's disobedience: for of nothing else doth the Lord complaine.) For who hath resisted his will? Observe the chaines wherewith God holds them fast irresistably, to wit the chaines of ob∣duration. Let the Authour therefore charge St. Paul as well as Zanchy for making God the Authour of sinne, and indeed he might have abounded in passages out of holy Scri∣pture alleadged to the same end, whereunto he alleadgeth these out of our Divines; yea and Papists too. But Piscator, Zanchy, and Calvine, these are his proper markes to shoote at, ever since he learnt in his age to correct the errours of his youth in taking frivolous ex∣ceptions against Bellarmine. As for a necessity of sinning brought upon all by the sinne of Adam. Arminius acknowledgeth it, and this Arminius is acknowledged by Corvinus in his answer to Lilenus. Only God takes it away from his Elect at the time of their calling and regenerating, and leaves it upon the rest; and who can say black to the eye for this? Will we not give him libertie to have mercy on whom he will, and harden whom he will? Then let us fly in the face of Paul as well as Calvine & Zanchy for so plainly teach∣ing this. The hardnesse of men's hearts is the immediate cause why they obey not God's word; But there is another cause also that our Saviour takes notice of, and that is this; That God doth not regenerate them, or hath not elected them. Of this our Divines may well take notice, because Moses before hath done the like. The Israelites profited neither by hearing of God's word, nor by the seeing of his mighty workes, I say by none of these did they profit unto repentance; and what was the reason hereof? Surely the hardnesse of their hearts, as Moses signifies, Thou art a stiffe-necked people. Yet he takes notice of another cause and that is this, Yet the Lord hath not given our hearts to perceive, nor eyes * 1.141 to see, nor eares to heare unto this day. So our Saviour in the Gospell; He that is of God hear∣eth God's words, ye therefore heare them not, because ye are not of God Now to be raised up in * 1.142 Calvin's Phrase, to illustrate God's glory in their damnation, is no other then to be brought forth into the world, and not to be borne of God, that is, to have the grace of regene∣ration denied them, and consequently to be suffered to goe on in their sinnes; and last∣ly to be damned for their sinne, to the manifestation of the glory of God's ju∣stice. Solomon saith as much, The Lord made all things for himselfe, that is for the manife∣station of his glory, even the wicked against the day of evill. And St. Paul Rom: 9 by shewing mercy towards some, signifies how God formes some after one manner, by hardening o∣thers * 1.143 he formes them after another manner comparing the 18. v. with the 20. And in the 21. He justifies God in this, and that in reference to different ends, which are the manifestation of his glory different waies, saying, Hath not God power over the clay of the same lumpe to make one vessell unto honour, and another unto dishonour. And verse 22. What if God to shew his wrath and to make his power known, suffered with long patience the vessells of his wrath prepared to destruction. v. 23. And that he might declare the riches of his glory upon the vessells of mercy which he hath prepared unto glory? What one of our Divines expresseth himselfe in this argument more fully, or more liably to carnall exceptions following the judgment of flesh and bood, then St. Paul doth in this? Here by the way as touching Piscator, I must fetch after mine answer in his behalfe, to that which in the entrance to this Section was delivered of him, and overseen by me. For this Au∣thour confessing that our writers have never said directly in terminis, that God is the cause of sinne, which introduction of his is the very same which Bellarmine useth, opposing our Divines on this very argument, lib. 2. Deamissione gratiae & statu peccati. cap. 4. Afterwards by a parenthesis brings in an exception of Piscator, and some other of the blunter sort, with∣out naming one of them. And though he name Piscator yet he quotes no place; for if he had, he should withall direct his Reader to the grounds whereupon Piscator affirmes this, namely that, God is the cause of man's fidelity. And it is the very place formerly mentioned in these words. He that is of God heareth God's words, ye therefore heare them not because ye are not of God now what reasonable mā can deny, but that it is a sin not to heare God's words; then doth not our Saviour plainly professe, that the true cause hereof is, because they are not of God? Now if to be of God in this place doth signifie God's Election, then the cause of their sinnes hereby is made God's not electing of them. But if this phrase, To be of God, signifie God's regenerating of them, as I thinke it doth, then God's not regenerat∣ing of them is made the cause of this their disobedience in not hearing God's word's: and indeed the evill of sinne hath noe efficient cause but deficient only, as Austine hath deli∣vered long agoe. And God is not bound to any, either to elect him, or regenerate him; so

that in failing to regenerate mā, he doth not deficere, or faile in any culpable mā ner: now let every indifferent Reader judge, whether here be not, Dignus vindice nodus a knot wor∣thy to be loosed; & it will require some worth of learning in him that solves it. And is it de∣cent for this Authour to censure a man for a conclusion made by him out of the word of God, without shewing the faultinesse either of his interpretation thereof, or of his conse∣quence framed therehence? So that this Author's wit & cunning is more to be cōmended in not specifying the place where Piscator delivers this doctrine, then either his learning or his honesty. He was loath to raise spirits, & afterwards to prove unable to lay them. There∣fore thus I answer in behalfe of Piscator; though God her by me made the cause why sōe heare not God's words, to wit, in as much as he doth not regenerate thē, nor give the eies to see, nor eares to heare, & an heart to perceive according to that of Moses. Yet he doth not make God any culpable cause, neither indeed is he any culpable cause, while he failes * 1.144 to performe so gracious a worke towards thē: the reason whereof is this. He and he alone is a culpable cause, who failes in doing that which he ought to do: ut God all be it he doth not regenerate a man, yet he failes not of doing that which he ought to doe. For it is no duty of his to regenerate any man; for he is bound to none. Now to be the Authour of sinne is not only to be the cause thereof, but to be a culpable cause thereof. Undoubtedly God could preserve any man from sinne if it pleased him, and if he doth not, he is nothing faulty. Secondly I answere that in true account, God is only the cause, why our naturall infidelity is not healed, our corruption not cured. Like as a Physitian may be said to be the cause why such a man continues sicke in as much as he could cure him, but will not: Soe God could cure the infidelitie of all, but will not. Only here is the difference, the Physitian may be a culpable cause, as who is bound to love his neighbour as himselfe; but God being bound to none, is no culpable cause of man's continuance in sinne, and in the hardnesse of his heart, albeit he can cure him, but will not. As for Piscator's saying here mentioned, Reprobates are appointed precisely to this double evill, to be punished everlastingly, and to sinne; and therefore to sinne that they may be justly punished. Hereing are two things charged upon Piscator. 1. That Reprobates are precisely appointed by God to perish e∣verlastingly. To this I answer that noe Arminiā that I know denies Reprobates to be appoin∣by God to everlasting damnation. All the question is about the manner of appointing them; namely whether this appointment of God, proceeds meerly according to his meer plea∣sure, or upon the foresight of sinne. We say it proceeds meerly according to the good pleasure of God, and not upon the foresight of sinne preceding. And this we not only say, but prove thus. If reprobation proceed upon the foresight of sinne, then it were of men's evill workes. Now looke upon what grounds the Apostle proves, that election is not of; good workes, upon the same ground it is evident that reprobation is not of evill works: for the argumēt for the one is this. Before Iacob & Esau were borne or had done good or evill; it was said to Rebekah the elder shall serve the younger, therfore election is not of good works. In like manner thus I reason concerning Reprobation, Before Iacob and Esau were borne or had done good or evill it was said to Rebekah, the elder shall serve the younger, therefore re∣probation is not of evill workes. 2. If God doth ordaine any man to damnation upon fore∣sight of sin, then this sin foreseen is the cause of the Divine ordinance; but sin foreseen cannot be the cause why God ordained man to damnation; as I prove thus. If it be the cause then either by the necessity of nature; or by the ordinance of God; not by necessi∣ty of nature. For undoubtedly God if it pleased him could ordaine to annihilate them for their sinnes, instead of punishing them with eternall fire. Nor can it be the cause of any such decree by the free ordinance of God. For if it were, marke what intolerable absur∣dityes would follow, namely this, That God did ordaine that upon the foresight of sinne he would ordaine men unto damnation; whereby God's eternall ordination is made the object of God's ordination; whereas all know that the Objects of God's decrees (which are all one with his ordinations) are things temporall, not things eternall. 3. If the fore∣sight of sinne goes before the decree of damnation, then the decree of permitting sinne goes before the decree of damning for sin; that is the permission of sinne was first in in∣tention, and consequently it ought to be last in execution; that is, First man should be damned for sin, and not till afterwards permitted to sinne. The second thing charged up∣on Piscator is this, that, Reprobates are precisely appointed to sin. Now here the crimination grates not upō the manner of being appointed thereunto; otherwise a way could be open∣ed for a progresse in infinitum. Now why should it be any more a fault in Piscator to say of some that they are appointed to sinne; then in Peter to say of some that they are ap∣pointed to disobedience: or in all the Apostles to professe that all the outrages commit∣ted

by Herod and Pilate, by the Gentiles and people of Israell were such as Gods hand & his counsell had before determined to be done? or why doth Piscator make God to be the Authour of sinne in this, more then Peter and all the Apostles? And considering this man's unconscionable carriage in this, let the Reader take heed how he suffers himselfe to be gull'd by this Authour, and drawne to censure such speeches in Piscator, as making God the Authour of sinne, when hereby he is drawne ere he is aware to passe the like cen∣sure on the Apostles? And the holy Ghost himselfe, whose expressions are the same for substance with the expressions of Piscator. It is farther observable that Piscator saith, That Reprobates by reason of this Divine ordination doe sinne necessarily. I answer, Piscator was an excellent Scripture Divine, but noe School-divine; and therefore noe marvaile if he want the accuratenesse of Scholasticall expression. Yet I salve him thus. They sinne necessarily * 1.145 upon suspicion that God will have them to sinne by his permission; but this is noe neces∣sity simply so called, but only secundum quid. But God decrees the manner of things com∣ming to passe, as well as the things themselves; as before I shewed out of Aquinas. Soe that all be it it must needs be, that sinne come to passe, in case God hath decreed it shall come to passe; yet if the question be, after what manner it shall come to passe, I answere, not necessarily, but contingently and freely, that is not onely with a possibility of not comming to passe, but with a free power in the creature to abstaine from that sin which is committed by him. For God ordained that every thing that doth come to passe shall come to passe agreably to the nature thereof, and accordingly moves every creature to worke agreeably to their natures. Necessary agents, necessarily, contingent agents contin∣gently. Free agents freely. And as formerly was mentioned, every sinfull act is a naturall act; and a man hath free power even in the state of corruption either to doe, or to leave undone any naturall act. And Piscator in other places dealing with Vorstius, clearely pro∣fesseth as I well remember (though the the place come not to my memory) that wicked men doe commit those things freely which are committed by them. And it is an excellent saying of Austine, that, Libertas sine gratiâ non est libertas sed contumacia, Liberty without grace, is not liberty but wilfullnesse; & indeed they shew too much will therein, rather then too little: and in denying liberty to them that want grace, he speakes of liberty morall, which is only unto true good, not of liberty naturall, which hath place only in the choice of meanes, and is inseparable from the nature of man: But true morality sets a mans soule in a right condition towards his right end.

4. It may be this Authour could not be so inconsiderate as not to perceive that even those expressions concerning Gods decree, which he criminates in our Divines are Scrip∣ture expressions; therefore to helpe his cause here he imputes unto them, that they main∣taine that God decreed this immutably; as if himselfe could be content to grant that these things are decreed by God, but not immutably. And would this Authour have the will of God to be of a mutable condition, like unto ours? I am confident he dares not pro∣fesse so much; for albeit he licks his lips at a conditionall decree, yet how doth he con∣ceive this to be mutable? For to resolve to save men upon condition of faith, and repen∣tance, and perseverance; and damne others in case they continue in infidelity and impeni∣tency; if accordingly none be saved but such in whom faith and repentance, and finall perseverance therein is found, none damned but such as persevere in sinne unto death; what change is there in all this? Unlesse this be it, that God did not resolve to save any particular person untill his finall perseverance was accomplished; And so God may be said in processe of time, to change from not willing to willing one man's salvation, and another man's damnation: In which case God's decree also should not be eternall, but begin in time. Againe as touching that which followes of of God decreeing that Reprobates shall live and dye in sinne. I answer, to decree not to re∣generate Reprobates, is to decree that Reprobates shall not be regenerated, for they are not able to regenerate themselves; and to decree that they shall not be regenerated, is to decree that they shall live and dye in sinne, by God's permission, he resolving never to shew such mercies to take them of from their sinfull courses by repentance. And so long as they are not borne of God, they will not heare his words, as our Saviour testifies say∣ing, Yee therefore heare them not, because ye are not of God. As for sinne procured by the hand of God, which he obtrudes upon our Divines; not one passage doth he produce for that. Yet as I remember I have read such an harsh expression in Piscator dealing a∣gainst * 1.146 Vorstius, which at this time doth not come to my remembrance; but withall I re∣member that Piscator being charged therewith by Vorstius, forthwith represents certaine passages of Scripture concerning Gods's providence in evill, and appeales to the judg∣ment

of every sober Christian, whether to do that, which therein is attributed to God, be not to procure sin. It is apparent that Joseph acknowledgeth, that the Lord sent him into Egypt, yet was this brought to passe by the parricidiall hands of his brethren. And it is no lesse plaine that God hardened Pharaohs heart that he should not let Israel goe And by Arminius his Definition of effectuall grace, it is evident that by Gods denying it, sin doth follow infallibly. And so likewise upon Gods permission of willing this or that, he professeth that it must needs be, that by noe kind of argument shall such a one be perswaded to nill it. I come to the meanes whereby he is said to procure it. The first is, by withdrawing grace necessary for the avoyding of sin. Now of this he gives no instance out of any of our Divines. 2 I know no grace which this Authour accounts necessary, that any of our Divines teach to be withdrawen by God. 3 God indeed doth not determine their wills to that which is good; but this Authour doth not ac∣count any such determination necessary to the avoyding of sin. 4 Prohibition, denun∣tiation of judgment, dehortation and such gracious actions, God doth neither with∣draw, nor withhold from the wicked, who are partakers of this grace as well as Gods children, as often as they meet in the same congregation for the hearing of Sermons.

5. An effectuall restraint from sin, I know none but the feare of God; yet this he withdrawes not from the wicked; for they never had it; nor from the children of God; only he doth not stirrre it in them at all times, so often as he suffers them to sin, which yet may be to gracious ends. As I for the confirmation of their faith, that nothing, no not sin shall separate them from the love of God; when they shall find the goodnesse of God minding them of their errours, and bringing them to repentance. 2 As also to make them smart for their former security and wantonnesse in beholding the uncom∣fortable issue of it. 3 To provoke them to walke more carefully and circumspectly for the time to come, standing upon their guard, and keeping the watch of the Lord. 4. To cure their pride, according to that of Austin. Audeo dicere, Utile est superbis in aliquod apertum manifestum{que} cadere peccatum. I am bold to speake it, It is good for a proud man to to fall into some open and manifest sin. I come to the second stay, whereby he objects to our Divines that they maintaine that God procures the sinnes of men, and that is by his moving and inclining them by his irresistable and secret workings on their hearts, to sinfull actions. To which I answer first that not any of the passages alleadged by him out of Calvin (who alone makes totam paginam in this of his) makes mention of Gods irresi∣stable working; or of moving or inclining unto sinfull actions. And let every sober man judge whether a bridle is fit to urge men to action, and not rather to restraine from action, and this is the force of the first Quotation. But this Authour through heat cor∣rupting his imagination tooke a bridle for a spurre. His second testifies only this, that man doth nothing but what God decreed, and by his direction appointeth; and this also upon pregnant testimonies of scripture; never undertaking to shew Calvins inter∣pretation to be false, or his accommodation of them to be incongruous. In the third he grants that God workes in the mind of men. In the 4. he saith that God stirrs up the wills, and confirmes the purposes of wicked men for the execution of his judgment by Satan the minister of his wrath. Where consider he doth this by Satan, that is he gives them over to Satan for this; so that 'tis Satan that stirres up their wills and confirmes their endea∣vours, by Gods permission without restraint either immediate or mediate by the mi∣nistry of his good angells; and all this is but to execute Gods judgments. And that it is just with God to punish sin with sin, both scripture testifies in divers places, and Austin confirmes with variety of Scripture testimonies, in his lib. 5. contra Julian: Pelag: cap. 3. The last is that God's worke it is to harden mans heart, and thereby prepare him to de∣struction? And let every sober reader that is not willing to be cheated both of his faith and honesty all at once, examine these places in Calvin, and the Scriptures whereby he proves that which he affirmes; and let him but aske the Authour these questions. If Calvin delivers nothing in all this but what he proves out of Scripture, why is he found fault with more then the word of God. If Scripture be mis-alleadged and mis-under∣stood by him, why do not you confute him? 2 Though Calvin in all this makes no men∣tion of Gods inclining wicked men to sinfull actions; yet Austin doth as before I have shewed, and that by, variety of Scripture testimonies. And if this be to make God the Authour of sin, why hath he not so much ingenuity as to confesse at least in the close of all, that Calvin makes God the Authour of sin, no more then Austin doth; and nei∣ther of them more then the word of God doth, and therewithall renounce the Scrip∣tures and turne Atheist. 3 As the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh to his destru∣ction,

so did he the heart of Sihon also Nowsee what Cardinall Caietan writes upon thisve∣ry place. Utram{que} homines partē (spiritum & cor, hoc est superiorem & inferiorem) male dispo∣sitam * 1.147 à Deo intellige negativè penes dona gratuita; positivè autem quoad judicium, inclinatio∣nem & prosecutionem bòni sensibilis. Ita quod Deus spiritum Regis durum (hoc est non ceden∣tem petionibus) reddit, & non dando ei gratiam acquiescendi, & coo operando eidem, ad af∣fectum securitatis & boni proprii, & similiter roboravit cor ad affectum boni, victoriae, & hu∣jusmodi. Each part of King Sihon, his spirit and heart, that is the upper and lower part being ill disposed by God (understād this negatively) as touching guifts of grace; but positively as touch∣ing his judgment, affection, and prosecution of a sensible good. So that the Lord made the Kings heart hard; that is not to yeild to the request made, both by not giving grace to rest satisfied, and by cooperating with him, to the affecting of security and his own good. And in like manner he hardned his heart to the affecting of victory, and the like. I have not heard that this my op∣posite hath been ever ready to censure Caietan for making God the Authour of all this; yet noe passage I am perswaded throughout all Calvin's works can be found compara∣ble unto this. Yet was Caietan noe Jesuite, he need not spare his censures.

I come to the sum of that which he hath delivered in a whole leafe. The first where∣of is this, that we teach, That God appointed many miserable men from all eternity to unavoidable torments Now that God appointed many fom eternity to everlasting tor∣ments, this Authour acknowledgeth as well as we. As for the avoidable condition of them, it is confessed on both sides, that they are avoidable only by breaking off their sinnes by repentance before their death; and by this we acknowledge them to be avoidable of all and every one, as well as they. But we say God doth not grant this grace to all. For he is not bound to give it to all, noe nor to any; but he vouchsafeth this grace to whom he will, and he denieth it to whom he will, and this St. Paul hath taught us, where he saith, God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth. The second is, that we teach, that God to bring about their intended ruine, decreed that they should without remedie live & die in a state of sin. To this I answer, that it is a most absurd conceite, to make the tormen∣ting of any man God's end. We have learnt of King Solomon that, God made all things for himselfe; here is the end of his actions, the manifestation of his own glory And albeit, he made the very wicked also against the day of evill; yet the end thereof was, for himselfe, as formerly specified, that is for the manifestation of his just wrath, and that God hath power without any difference in the matter, to make some vessells of wrath, and some of mercy, as he thinkes good. The Apostle plainely teacheth us, where he saith, Hath not the Potter power over the clay of the same lump to make one vessell unto honour, and another un∣to * 1.148 dishonour. And if any man's wicked proud heart make insurrection against this truth, the Apostle hath taught us to stop his mouth with this, shall the the thing formed say to him that formed it why hast thou made me thus? Shall not God have as much power over the masse of mankind, as the Potter hath over the clay? So that this is God's end not man's damnation, but his own glory. Haec loquendiratio saith Calvin, this manner of speech, finem creationis esse interitum aeternum, the end of man's creation is his everlasting destruction, nus∣quam * 1.149 apud me occurret, shall never be found in my writing. So Beza in his questions and an∣swers, I say God hath ordained not judicio, for judgment, but, judicio, for just judgment, that is to manifest his justice upon them. Secondly, we deny that God suffers them to persevere in their sinfull courses without giving them grace to repent, to the end that he may damne them; But with Alvarez every way standing as much for absolute Repro∣bation as Calvin; that God suffers them to sin, and to persevere therein, and damnes them for their sin, to this end, namely, for the manifestation of the glory of his justice. And as for this Authour's opinion in premising the foresight of sin to the decree of damnation, I have already represented the manifest absurdity thereof, as namely in this, that seing God cannot foresee sin, unlesse he first decree to permit it, it followes that by his opinion, the decree to permit sin must preceed the decree of damnation, that is sin is first in inten∣tion, and then damnation. Whence it followes that if sin be first in intention, it must be last in execution; and consequently men shall be first damned for their sin, and after that suffered to commit sin; this is the glorious issue of the premises of this Authour. His third and last is, that by our doctrine, God for the effecting of all this powerfully doth so governe and work upon the wills of Reprobates, that they have noe libertie or abilitie at all in the issue of a∣voiding their sinnes, but must of necessitie commit them To this I answer, that no other pow∣er is requisite for the effecting of all this; then 1. To suffer all men to fall in Adam, 2. To bring forth all men in originall sinne, which alone deserves damnation as Mr. Hoord confesseth, and as this Authour sometimes read in his Lectures at Magdelen Hall. 3. Not to regenerate Reprobates, but to suffer them finally to persevere in their

ungodly courses, without giving them grace to break off their sins by repentance. 2. Yet we deny, that all power and ability is taken from Reprobates to avoid actuall sinnes: We grant willingly, neither Elect, nor Reprobate, have any power to avoid sinne o∣riginall, all of them being conceived and brought forth into the world in the corrupt masse. But as for actuall sin, not only regenerate have power to avoid that, and that in a gracious manner; but every Reprobate hath power to avoid that in a naturall man∣ner. My reason is because though a good worke may be an act supernaturall; yet a sinfull work cannot be so, but every actuall sin is an act naturall for the ground and substance of it But every naturall & carnall man hath power freely, either to doe any act naturall or to abstaine from doing it, though when they abstaine from doing it, as from committing murther, adultery, theft, slaunder, or the like, they never abstaine from it in a gracious manner: Like as any morall good worke, they have libertie to doe, but they cannot doe it in a gracious manner. This proceeds meerly from the Spirit of regeneration; which Spirit of regeneration the Lord never bestowes upon any Reprobate.

Sect: 3.

Thus they teach, and therefore by just consequence they make God the Authour of sin; as it will plainly * 1.150 appeare by these following considerations. 1. It is ordinary to impute sin to those who have not so great an hand in the production of it, as hath the Almighty, by the grounds of this opinion. For first, the Devill is called the Father of lies, and by the like reason of all other sinnes. And therefore he that committeth sinne, is said to be of the Devill, and to be the child of the Devill. And sin is called the the worke of the, De∣vill, which the Son of God appeared to loose. And why is the Devill so called, but because he doth egge and * 1.151 allure men by inward suggestions and outward temptations to fall into sin? This is all he doth or can doe. But God doth much more, if he necessitate, and by his decree first; and next by his powerfull and secret wor∣king in the soules of men, determine their wills irresistibly to sinen. For to determine is infinitely more then barely to perswade; for as much as sin must needs follow the determination, but not the perswasion of the will. God is therefore a truer cause of sin, by this doctrine then the Devill. 2. Wicked men are esteemed Au∣thours of their own offences; because they plot, purpose, choose, & commit them, and are immediate Agents in the acting of them. But God by this opinion doth more: for he overruleth the projects & purposes of wic∣ked men, and by an uncontroulable motion proceeding from an immutable decree, carrieth all their delibe∣rations, resolutions, choices, and actions precisely that very way; so as they cannot chose but doe as they doe, whatsoever they may think to the contrary. They have indeed (potentiam in se liberam) a power in it selfe free to chose what they refuse, or to refuse what they chose, to determine themselves this way or that way, as liketh them best; but they have not (Liberum usum) a free use of this their power. God doth determine their will before it hath determined it selfe, and maketh them doe those only actions, which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their wills out of any absolute dominion over their own actions, have pre∣scribed. More rightly therefore may God be called the Authour of those offences. For deeds whether good or bad are owned more truly by him that overruleth them, then by the servile instruments that only execute and doe them.

3. Wicked counsellours and they who allure and advise men to sin, are accounted by God and men to be the causes of those sins to which they are the perswaders, and have been punished for those misdeeds which others through their instigations have committed. Jezabell Ahab's wife was reputed and punished as the mur∣therer of Naboth; because she counselled and contrived the doing of it as we may see, 1 Kings 21. 23. 25. But what is counselling to inforcing? Evill counsells may be refused, but an allmighty power cannot be resisted. God therefore that useth this (according to their doctrine) in the production of sins, is much more an Au∣thour of them, then he that only useth the other.

After two leaves spent, first in the charge; and secondly in proving that God is not the Authour of sin in a fumbling manner, and thirdly in representing the doctrine of our Di∣vines * 1.152 at pleasure, now at length he comes to make it plainly appeare, that by just consequence they make God the Authour of sin, as he saith, will plainly appeare by certaine considerations fol∣lowing: which in few words come but to this in generall, namely, that God doth more then the Devill, or wicked counsellours in alluring and advizing others to sin, more then wicked persons in acting of their own sins. But by this discourse of his, he is as farre off as ever from proving that we make God the Authour of sin. For consider, either by doing more he understands, that God doth the same which the Devill & wicked mē do; & more: or though he does not the same, yet he doth that which is more then that. If his meaning be that God doth the same which the Devill & wicked men doe, this is notoriously untrue, considering thē as tempters, & advizers, and perswaders unto sin. For God on the contrary forbids sin, perswades to repentance, to obedience both by his word and by his spirit; and indeed the spirit workes not, but by the word which is called the sword of the spirit; All holines of life is comprised within the compasse of ten commandements; these were given by the Lord frō mount Sinai, pronounced by the sound of a trūpet; to these the Lord calls his people saying, stand in the waies and behold, and aske for the old way, which is the good way and walke therein & ye shall find rest unto your soules. For the transgression of these the Lord expostulates with thē, Heare ô heavens and hearken ô earth, I have nourished and brought up a * 1.153 people, & they have rebelled against me. Whē they have gone astray he exhorts the, and that most pathetically to returne by repentance, by promise of salvation, and threatning judg∣ment * 1.154 if they doe not repent. O Ierusalem wash thine heart from wickednes, that thou maist be * 1.155

saved, how long shall thy wicked thoughts remaine within thee? I have seene thy adulteries, and thy neighings, the filthinesse of thy whoredome on the hills, in the feilds, and thine abominations. Woe unto thee ô Ierusalem, wilt thou not be made cleane? When shall it once be? And to pro∣voak * 1.156 them the rather unto repentance, he represents himselfe unto them as easy to be in∣treated, as slow to wrath, and one that by his patience and long suffering leades them to re∣pentance. And to this end he gives charge to his Ministers, namely, by representing the gracious nature of God to admonish them of their sinnes, to call them to repentance, to obedience. And to this purpose to represent his promises which he hath annexed un∣to godlinesse, both the promises of this life, and the promises of a better life that is to come. Yea and his threats also both of judgments in the world to come, to the casting both of body and soule into hell fire; and thereupon to exhort us to feare him above all others. And judgments of this world, as, famine, pestilence, and the sword of the enemie, To deliver them over into the hands of beastly people, skilfull to destroy; To send Serpents, and Cockatrices among them that will not be charmed, and that shall sting them; and that without all mercy. Surely these are not the courses of Satan or wicked counsellours. Therefore they doe not as God doth, neither doth God doe that which they doe and more also. 2. If it be said that albeit the Lord doth not as the Devill doth, and wicked men doe in perswading them to sinne; yet he doth that which is more then this. I answer, that neverthelesse he cannot be accounted the Authour of sinne, in case the doing of this alone doth constitute an Agent the Authour of sinne. Now as for∣merly I have shewed this was the opinion of Dominicus Soto, and of the Divines of Sa∣lamancha: yea and Vasquez the Jesuite professeth, that he was ever of that opinion. Againe if to doe more then this, be to become the Authour of sin; both this Authour and all that are of his Spirit doe maintain as well we, that God doth that which is farre more then this. For I presume he will not deny, but that God is he, and he alone, who doth support our natures in the committing of sin; & who maintaines our senses in their vigour and quick∣nesse, without which we could take noe pleasure in sin, and that concurres to every act of sin, in the way of cause efficient, not morally, which alone makes one to become the Au∣thour of sin, by the judgment of Divines formerly mentioned; but physically and natu∣rally, which no creature can doe, namely become a naturall coefficient cause to the act of another man's will. Nay which is most considerable, I presume this Authour hath so much accuratenes in School-learning, as not to deny that when the Devill tempts us, or wick∣ed counsellours doe tempt us to sin, God concurres with them in this act, and that in the kind of a cause efficient physicall. For in him we live and move and have our being; what is * 1.157 it to have our being from him, but that he is the Authour of it in the kind of a cause ef∣ficient? In the same sense doe we live in him, and in the same sense doe we move in him. It stands us upon as much to maintaine this, as to maintaine that God is our Creatour. For unlesse all things doe subsist in him neither were all things created by him. Now this is a great deale more then to perswade. For a weake man is able to perswade, but noe crea∣ture is able to performe these parts which God doth in the act of every thing created by by him. So that hereby the Reader may evidently perceive, that the discourse is as farre off as ever, from proving God by this Doctrine of ours to be the Authour of sin, any more then he is constituted the Authour of sin by the doctrine of this Interpolator. But I am content to examine the things he proposeth particularly and severely.

1. The Devill, saith he, doth only allure men by inward suggestions, and outward tempta∣tions to fall into sinne: But God doth much more if he doe necessitate, and by his decree first; and next by his powerfull and secret working in the soules of men, determine their wills irresistibly to sinne. For to determine is infinitely more then to perswade. Now to this I have already an∣swered by shewing. 1. That albeit God doth more then this, yet seeing he doth not this: if the doing of this alone constitutes one the Authour of sin, as many great Divines have concurrently maintained; still God is free from being the Authour of sin. This Authour barely supposing, not once offering to prove the contrary. 2. Himselfe confesseth that God concurres to the act of every sinne, and that in the kind of a cause efficient naturall. And I may be as bold as to say of this, that it is infinitely more then to per∣swade; like as he saith of God's determining the will and necessitating thereof. Now I proceed to a more particular examination of his discourse. And here first I wonder not a little at this Authour's distinction of the Devill's inward suggestion from his out∣ward temptations. For I confesse freely I know noe outward temptation of Satan, di∣stinct from his inward suggestions. Outward occasions and provocations to sinne I know none wrought by Satan, any farther then as he in some cases is

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God's instrument, as in afflicting Iob. For surely God hath not given over the world, or any part thereof to the goverment of Satan; this is in his own hand still; and hereby oc∣casions and opportunities are offered from time to time for a man to advantage himselfe in sinfull courses, either in the way of profit, or satisfying his unclean lusts. And Armi∣nius confesseth that the administration of Arguments and occasions, which provoke to such an act, as cannot be committed by the creature without sinne, if not by Gods intention, yet at * 1.158 least according to the creatures affection, and often according to the events that arise therehence. This administration, I say Arminius confesseth, doth belong to the Divine providence. And these arguments, he saith, are objected & ther to the mind (of man,) or to his senses out∣ward or inward; and that either by the mediate worke of the creatures comming between, or by God's immediate action. And that the end of this Divine administration is to make tryall whe∣ther the creature will abstaine from sinne, even then, when it is provoked thereunto. As, for the triall of David, was Bathsheba going ••o••th to wash her selfe objected to David, whereup∣on he was inflamed with lusts Ioseph was not, though farre more strongly sollicited by the temptations of his wanton Mistris. Secondly, to necessitate the will or determine the will are noe phrases of our Divines. The first is used only by Bradwardine (as at present I remember) sometimes Arch-Bishop elect of Canterbury; The other is that phrase of the Dominicans. Now they are of age and able to answer for themselves. Why doth not this Authour answer a chapter or two in Bradwardine, a chapter or two in Alvarez, where they dispute this and resolve the question affirmatively. Surely hereby he should performe a worke more worthy of a Scholasticall Divine, then by so hungry a discourse as this. Secondly, consider neither Bradwardine maintaines that God necessitates; nor Al∣varez that God determines the will to sinne, but to every naturall act, in which kind of acts sinne is to be found: Why then should this Auhour carry himselfe thus in his crimi∣nation? We know sin is meerly privative in the formall notion thereof; an obliquitie such as concerning which, Austine hath long agoe deliverd, that it hath noe efficient cause, but deficient only. And divers waies Divines have shewed how God may be the authour of the act, yet not the Authour o•• the sin, and illustrated it by various similitudes. As of a man riding upon a lame horse, he makes him goe, but doth not make him halt. The sun shining upon a dung-mixton, makes it evaporate, but doth not make it stinke. The sun makes flowers to evaporate and send forth their favours as well as a dung-mixton; but that the one evaporates a sweet odour the other an unsavory, is frō the nature of things themselves on which the sun beates. In like sort the Sun by the heat thereof provokes all things to engender according to their kinds, even frogs and toades & snakes, as well as other creatures profitable for the use of man in the way of food; yea of vipers flesh good use is made in the way of physicke. And God knowes how to make good use even of the sinnes of men. and of the rage and malice of Satan. If an underw-heele being out of his place, the upper wheele in a jacke or clocke will set him going in a wrong way, as well as all the rest in a right way; his motion is from the upper whele, his irregular motion from himselfe. A good Scribe meeting with moist paper will make but sorry worke The writ∣ing is from himselfe, the blurring from the moistnesse of the paper on this very question whether the act of sinne be from God, Aquinas maintaining the affirmative, illustrates it by a distinction of the halting motion of a lame legge; the motion, saith he, is from the soule, the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is frō the imperfection of the Organ, the infirmitie of the legge. Yet this Authour carrieth it hand over head, as if to be the Authour of the action, were to be the sinne; not considering that himselfe maintaines, that God is the Authour of the action, and that in the kind of a cause efficient naturall. Thirdly, when Bradwardine maintaines that God necessitates the will to every good act thereof, he withall professeth that he necessitates it ad liberum actum suum that is to worke every act thereof, freely. Soe when Alvarerz maintaines that God determinates the will to every act thereof, he with∣all maintaines that God determines the will to worke free ye and so Aquinas. For when he workes upon contingent causes, he moves thē to bring forth their effects contingently; like as when he workes upon necessary causes, he moves them to produce their effects ne∣cessarily. And like as to move contingent causes to produce their effects contin∣gently, is to move them to produce their effects with a possibility to the con∣trary. Soe to move free causes, to produce their effects freely, is to move them to produce their effects with an active power to the contrary. But to proceed, whereas he saith, that sinne must needs follow the determination; it is as true. 1. In this Authour's judgment, that it must needs follow upon God's cōcurrence to this act. If he say that this concurrēce is necessary to every act, I answer, it is necessary to the substance of every act,

but not at all required to the sinne; though this Authour carieth it blindfold after this manner. Secondly, so say we is determination required to the substance of every act. And Gods concourse with the creature is not coordinate, like as one man concurres with an∣other in moving a timber logge, which is the expression of the Jesuites, thereby mani∣festing the vilenesse of their opinion, as we can demonstrate, and that more waies then one by evident demonstration, as I have allready shewed in my Vindiciae. Let this Authour an∣swer * 1.159 those digressions if he can, I am confident he will never answer them while his head is hot; nor all the Rabble of the Arminians. We know God is the first cause, and all other are but second causes in comparison to him. Yet we willingly confesse that the provi∣dence of God is wonderfull and of a mysterious nature in this; but such as whereunto the Scripture gives pregnant testimonie, as scarce to any thing more. So jealous he is least his providence should be denied in evill, wherein indeed it is most wonderfull; and he takes unto himselfe the hardning of men's hearts, and blinding of their mindes, and pro∣stituting them to abominable courses, even to vile affections and thereby to punish sinne with sin, as Rom: 1. Therein saith the Apostle, they received the recompence of their errour. This hath Austine also by Scripture suggestion testified at large in his book. De gratiâ & Libero arbitrio in two large chap: & likewise in his fifth book against Iulian the Pelagian & third chap: this also the Adversaries have been driven to confesse in a strange manner, as to give instance first in Bellarmine whose words are these. God saith he, praesidet ipsis volun∣tatibus eas{que} regit & gubernat, torquet & fl••ctit in iis invisibiliter operando, ut licet vitio proprio malae sint, tamen à divina providentia ad unum potius malum quàm ad aliud, non positivè, sed permissive ordinentur. God is president over the Wills, and so rules and governes, wrests & turns them, working invisibly in them, that albeit through their own fault they are evill, yet by the di∣vine providence they are ordered to one evill rather then to another, not positively but permis∣sively What one of our Divines hath said more then this comes to, or so much, professing that God rules and governes the wills of men by his invisible operation, ordering them to one evill rather then to another which St. Austine calles inclining them? And the Pro∣phet David we know prayes, that God would encline his heart unto his testimonies and not to covetousnesse, arguing thereby that God hath power to incline a man's heart to cove∣tousnesse. But Bellarmine saith more then this, in saying that, God wrestes and bends them, torquet & flectit; those are his words; although he seemes to blast all this in the end by saying that this is done permissivè, by permission, in flat contradiction to himselfe, whose expresse purpose is to shew that God doth not only suffer wicked men to performe evill acts, and to desert the godly, but somewhat else also, namely, to rule and governe their w••lls, to wrest and bend them by an invisible working in them, to commit one ev•••••• rather then another. Secondly consider their generall doctrine of congruous grace, standing in a necessary conformity and correspondency to another vile doctrine of theirs concern∣ing the foreknowledge of God, called by them Scientia media By this doctrine of theirs God foresees in what ease and by what motives man being moved to abstaine from this or that sinne, he will abstaine from it: And againe in what case and after what manner being moved to abstaine from sinne, he will not abstaine from it And God makes choice at his pleasure how to move him, whether after such a manner in which case he foresees he will abstaine from sinne; or after another manner in which case he foresees he will not ab••••aine. Now who is so blind as not to observe, that as often as a man sinneth, it is the will of God, that is the decree of God he shall sin, by the very groundes received by our Adversaries. Thus much as touching my first answer concerning the necessary con••e∣quence of sinne upon God's operation to be acknowledged by our Adversaries, accord∣ing to the tenour of their own doctrine, as well as by us. 2. My second answer is this. Al∣beit God determines the will to any vertuous act, morally good; whether in the way of doing some morall good, or in the way of abstaining from some motall evill; yet unlesse God give man some faith and love, as fountaines out of which every morall worke must proceed, that it may be acceptable with God; such an one shall necessarily sinne, though not as touching the act done, yet as touching the manner of doing; for as much as without true faith and love he can neither performe any morall good worke, nor abstaine from any morall evill worke in a gracious manner. Now let every sober man judge, whether God be bound to give every man faith and love, without which all is one as touching the preserving a man from sinne in generall, whether the will of man be determined by God, to an act morally good, or morally evill. In each of which God determines the will only to the substance of the act: So that whether God cooperates to the substance of the act or noe, and whether this cooperation be by way of determining the will or noe; still there

will be a necessary consequence of sinne to every act of man, if God doth not bestow the spirit of regeneration upon him, which spirit of God we know was given to our first pa∣rents; though not under this notion of the Spirit of regeneration, and whereof they were justly bereaved upon the first sinne committed by them; And because all we have been derived from them since their fall, therefore we have received our natures from them deprived of the Spirit of God, and therein continue untill such time as it pleaseth God for Christ sake, to restore it unto us, which he doth in regenerating us. Thirdly, and last∣ly upon the very permission of sin, it followes necessarily that sin shall be, by the doctrine not of Piscator only, but of Vorstius and Arminius also; yea and of the learned amongst the Papists, as Navarettus and Penottus: And the very definition of Permission of sinne by Arminians justifies it; as also the Jesuites doctrine concerning gratia congruâ. For if God will not afford that grace, upon the grant whereof men will abstaine from sin, as God well knowes; but such a grace, upon the grant whereof man will abstaine from sin, which also is well known unto God; doth ••t not manifestly follow that such a one shall sinne, though not sinne necessarily, but contingently and freely. 2. In the next place he tells us that wicked men are esteemed Authours of their offences: Now by the way this is not so; To be a sinner is one thing to be an Authour of sinne is another thing. And to be an Authour of sinne is in reference rather to anothers sinne, then to ones owne. And Martinius tells me that, Authour est cujus autoritate & sententiâ aliquid fit, cujus testimo∣nio ut aliquid credamus, adducimur. Qui hortatur ut fiat. Ita{que} authorem & dissuasorem Cicero opponit. He is the authour by whose authority and judgment a thing is done, by whose testimo∣nie we are induced to beleive ought; who exhorts to the doing of ought. And therefore Cicero makes Authour and disswader opposite. But to proceed with this Authour who set the Prin∣ter on work for the edition of this peice. Men, he saith, doe plot purpose, choose and commit offences, and are immediate agents in the acting of them. But God by this opinion doth more; for he overuleth the projects and purposes of wicked men, and by an uncontroulable motion, proceed∣ing from an immutable decree, carrieth all their deliberations, resolutions, choices, and actions precisely that very way, so as they cannot choose but do, as they doe, whatsoever they may thinke to the contrary. To which I answer, that it becomes every man to give the Divell his right, & and not make him worse then he is, nor wicked men neither. Now noe wicked man doth will or choose sinne as sinne Nemo vult esse incontinens, saith Aristotle, although they doe such things as doe sufficiently evidence their incontinent disposition. For the object of the will is only good; neither can any thing be willed by man, but, sub ratione boni, under the shew of good: whether this good be in the kind of profit, or in the kind of pleasure, or in the kind of honesty. So Lucretia when she killed her selfe, she did it for the preservation of the integrity of her mind in the opinion of the world, and that they might know that she consented not unto Tarquinius; but was forced by him. So then the act is it they doe or choose to doe for some motive or other, which whether it be pleasure or profit, or credit they get thereby, that makes not the act sinfull, but only that it is against some law or o∣ther, forbidding it And this act, (all sides confesse) is the worke of God, as well as the worke of man; as in whom we move, like as in him we live, and have our being. And Bradwar∣dine maintaines that of every act of the creature God is a more immediate cause then the * 1.160 creature it selfe, who••e act it is. This he proves of the creatures conservation, of the crea∣tures action, of the creatures motiō; & to this he proceeds by certaine degrees. And in all * 1.161 this God doth not transgresse any law, as man doth too often in the performing of many a naturall act, and only in performing acts naturall is sinne committed, never in perform∣ing any act supernaturall; all such acts are in a peculiar manner the work of grace 2. God overruleth no man's good projects or purposes, otherwise then as when accepting their intentions he will not have them put such in execution because perhaps he hath reserved that for another time & person. As when David was purposed to build God an house, & was encouraged therein by Nathan: yet the Lord sent Nathan shortly unto David to give him to understand, that he reserved that work for Solomon his Son; yet so well accepting David's purpose that he promised to build his house. But if God at any time overruleth the wicked projects and purposes of men, whether good or evill, let us blesse him rather for this then curse him; by cursing them that maintaine this good providence. Yet in o∣verruling them, whether he doth it immediately, or by the ministry of his good Angells; not by working immediately upon the will, as this Authour dreameth. For that is not the way to worke agreably to the reasonable nature of man (though so he worke also by generall influence affoarded cōmon to all agents) but by representing to the understan∣ding congruous motives to divert them from that they doe intend; whether in a gracious

manner, as he diverted David from his purpose to massacre the whole house of Nabal; or only in a naturall way, whereby he diverts wicked men from their ungodly designes, by representing the danger thereof, to make them feare, & so to restraine them. Will the De∣vill himselfe be over prone to blaspheme God for this? yet in this alone he doth more then either the Devill or man can doe; though this be not all that he doth. For he doth co∣operate to every designe and execution of the creature, be it never so abominable; which neither man, nor Angells can doe. And he hath power to give over unto Satan, and to harden any man, and that more effectully then any Devill can doe. The Devill could not say with truth that He would harden Pharaoh's heart, that he should not let Israel goe. Nor when he had let them goe, I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he shall follow after them, to bring them back. The Devill could not say in truth, as the Lord did to David, I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them to thy neighbour, and he shall lye with thy wives in the sight of the sunne. Nor as he said to Ieroboam, Behold I will rent the kingdome out of the hands of Solomon, and will give ten tribes to thee. Nay the very permissiō of sin so as whereby it shall infallibly come to passe, is not in the power of any creature, but in God alone. And shall it follow, that because God doth more, both as touching the act it selfe, and touch∣ing the sinfull condition of it, then any creature can doe, therefore God is the Authour of sinne? whereas when God moves a man or carrieth him on to any good morall workes, whether in doing that which is vertuous, or abstaining from that which is vitious, this man shall certainely sinne, though not in so great a degree, unlesse God be pleased over and above to regenerate him, and to bestow faith, and love on him, for as much as in this case, though he doe an act vertuous, yet shall he not doe it in a gracious māner. & though he doe abstaine frō an act vitious yet he shall not abstaine frō it in a gracious manner. Let this man therefore proceed, & maintaine (if he thinks good) that except God doth bestow the spirit of regeneration upon all and every one throughout the world, he is the Authour of sinne, not only when he moves them to such acts which are evill, but also when he moves them to the doing of such as are vertuous, or to the abstaining from those that are vitious. As for his phrases noe wise man will regard them, but only such as are content to feed on huskes for want of better food. As, when he talkes of motion uncontroulable, which makes a noise, as if men's wills would controule his motion, but cannot: whereas God as the first mover moves the creature most congruously unto his nature; without which motion of his the creature could not move at all. The like noyses makes the phrase immutable decree; as empty things many times give the greatest sound: whereas by vertue of God's immutable decree it is, that it cannot otherwise be; then that as necessary things cannot but come to passe necessarily; so contingent things cannot but come to passe con∣tingently, and the free actions of men freely. But by the way he manifest's how he licks his lips, at a Mutable decree of God, even of that God with whom, as St. Iames speaketh, there is no variablenesse, nor shadow of change. He doth acknowledge, we maintaine, poten∣tiam in se liberam; but then he saith, we doe not maintaine, liberum usum; a most absurd di∣stinction. For noe power deserves to be stiled free, save that it is of free use and exercise. And what a prodigious thing is it to affirme, that it is not within the almighty power of God to cause that this or that shall be done by a reasonable creature freely: this is it that Bradwardine proposeth to the judgment of all to consider, whether it be not an unreaso∣nable thing to deny this unto God. God doth determine their will before it hath determined it selfe, and maketh them doe those only actions, which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their wills out of any absolute dominion over their own actions, have prescribed. Thus he relates the opinion of our Divines; whereas neither determining, nor necessitating (as I said before) are the expressions of our Divines, but of Papists; yet he laies not this to the charge of Papist's: Noe nor to the charge of Bellarmine, for saying that God doth not only rule, and governe, but wrest and bend them, and that to one evill rather then to an other. If Scholars of our Universities use any such phrases, it is no other then they find in use among School-divines. It is true indeed Jesuites oppose the Dominicans in this. This Authour sides with the Jesuites, but why doth he not take to taske any one chapter in Alvarez on this point to answer, to overthrow their grounds, which are no other then the very word of God, and cleare reason doth justifie. And the ground of the Jesuites in opposing, is meerely an invention of their own, concerning a certaine knowledge of God called a middle knowledge; a vile invention, and a palpable untruth, and controulable of manifest contradiction. For they suppose a thing knowable by God, as future, before God's will hath passed upon it to make it future, being in it's own nature meerly possible; and consequently cannot passe out of the condition of a thing meerly possible, into the

condition of a thing future without a cause. Now noe cause can be devised hereof with any colour of reason, but the will of God. For first, the cause hereof must be eternall, see∣ing the thing it selfe, of the cause whereof we dispute, is eternall to wit, the fruition of a∣ny thing. This I say was eternall, for it is known with God from all eternity. Now there is noe eternall cause to be found, but in God alone, therefore the cause why things meer∣ly possible in their own nature, became future, and that from everlasting, must be found in God alone. Therefore it must either be the will of God; or the knowledge of God that did make it future; and seing the knowledge of God rather supposeth them to be future, then makes them so; what remaines but that the will of God must necessarily be the cause hereof? Nay consider whether the Jesuites themselves doe not manifest more ingenuity by farre, then this boisterous Theologue, that thinks to carry all with the blast of his words, the resolution of whose arguments generally, neither having the word of God for their ground; nor any confest principle of reason. Whereas not the greatest, Angell of God will take upon him such an authoritative manner of discourse. For did we grant, that God by his Allmighty will did impose any necessity upon our wills. Yet Suarez confesseth that * 1.162 so to worke, doth neither involve any contradiction, nor exceed the Allmighty power of God: Whereas we are ready to prove and have already proved, that their doctrine of God's concourse without subordination of the second causes to the first, implies flat contradic∣tion We say the wills determination of it selfe is the worke of God, otherwise faith and love and every gracious act shall not be the worke of God. Againe the wills determina∣tion of it selfe, is no other then the wills operation; and this Authour that opposeth us dares not deny the wills opperation to be the worke of God. But what School divine can he produce that delivers himselfe in so absurd a manner; as to say that God first deter∣mines the will, and that afterwards the will determines it selfe; especially speaking of such actions of the will as are produced by the power of nature? The wills determination of it selfe, we say, is the worke of God moving the creature agreably to the nature thereof; that is to be carried necessarily to that which is it's end, and appeares to be good in gene∣re convenientis: and freely to the meanes, which appeare to be good, in genere conducentis, as fit to pronounce the end intended. All confessing (Durand excepted) that God works the act; the question whether he works the act absolutely, the will a second agent subor∣dinate unto God, as to it's Creatour? Or conditionally, modo vellimus, provided that we will it, God the first agent subordinate to the will of the creature? This Authour will have it to be wrought by God, that is conditionally, in dependence upon, and expectation of the operation of the creature, which we say is most absurd First because thus the first a∣gent is made subordinate to the second agent, which is most unaturall. Secondly, observe a manifest contradiction. For the question is about, actus volendi, the act of willing, in man. Now if God produce this act upon supposition, that man produceth this act, then the same act is produced by God upon supposition, that it is produced by man. If it be pro∣duced by man, what need is there of God's producing it by way of supplement? Thirdly, by this meanes the thing is made the condition of it selfe. For hereby it is said, this act is made upon condition that it doth exist; & so the selfe same thing shall be before & af∣ter it selfe. 4. Thus man's production of the act shall be noe worke of God, which holds off faith and repentance, as well as of any naturall act, in this Authours opinion. Fiftly, It is not possible the will can produce the act unlesse God produceth it, If then God doth not produce it unlesse the will doth produce it, in this case there shall be noe act produ∣ced. For if I goe not to London unlesse you goe with me; nor you goe to London unlesse I goe with you; here is no going at all till one saith I say I goe, and his resolution carrieth the other with him if the others depend thereupon. 6 Whereas to helpe at a dead lift the Jesuiticall doctrine of, Scientia media, middle knowledge, is called in after this manner; God foreseing that at such an instant the will of man will produce such an act, if God be plea∣sed to concurre; and upon this foreknowled••e God resolves to concurre This doctrine I have already confounded by shewing the apparent falsity of this supposition. For seeing the wills producing such an act at such an instant, is a thing merly possible in it's own na∣ture, & no more future then not future; It is impossible that this should passe out of the condition of a thing meerly possible into the conditiō of a thing future without a cause: And noe cause hereof can be but the will of God, as I have often proved. It followes that the wills producing such an act, depends rather upon the will of God to have it produ∣ced, then on the contrary, that Gods producing such an act, dependes upon the creatur's will to produce it. As for that which followes of the absolute dominion that the will of the creature should have over it's action (I presume he meanes independent) it sounds

more like the voice of the Devill, then of a sober Christian. Yet it is more then I know that Lucifer himselfe challengeth any such absolute Dominion over his actions unto himselfe; If he doth, I know noe greater sinne that hee or the crea∣ture can be guilty of; unlesse in case grosse ignorance doth excuse it. To deny God to be▪ the first Agent is to deny his God-head; and if hee be, primum agens, hee must be primum liberum too, the first free agent. And to make our selves to be prima libera, the first free agents, what is other then to advance our selves into the very Throne of God's Soveraigntie; and doe wee not feare least his wrath smoake us thence. And if all this that hee contends for were granted him, that nothing but mere necessitie were found in the motion of men's wills; yet Suarez will justifie us from speaking contradiction, or delivering ought that exceeds the compasse of God's omnipotencie. And what if all the world were innocent, yet God should not be unjust in casting the most innocent creature in∣to hell fire; as Medina professeth, and that by the unanimous consent of Divines, and Vasquez the Jesuite acknowledgeth this to be in the power of God as he is Lord of life and death, and in the last chapter of the booke, de praedestinatione & gra∣tiâ which goes under Austin's name, there is an expresse passage to justifie it. And al∣beit that worke be not Austin's, yet it is lately justified to be the worke of a great fol∣lower of Austin's, and as Orthodoxe as he; namely, the worke of Fulgentius as Raynaudus the Jesuite hath lately proved, and justified that passage also; together with that which is usually brought by School-Divines to prove it out of the twelfth * 1.163 chapter of Wisedome, and shewes the right reading, as followed by Austin and Gregory. And withall represents a pregnant passage taken out of the fifteenth Ho∣mily of Macarius to the same purpose. And out of Chrysostome in his 2. De compunctione cordis, about the end thereof. And out of Austin upon Psalme the seven∣tieth, about the beginning. And to these he addeth Ariminensis, Cameracensis, Sera∣rius, and Lorinus, all maintaining the same. And this is evident by consideration of the power, which it pleased the Lord to execute upon his holy Son, and our bles∣sed Saviour, and by the power which he gives us over brute creatures. This I say, if all that he contends for were granted, should rather be concluded therehence, name∣ly, that in this case the creature should be innocent, then that God should be the Authour of sinne; especially considering that God performes in all this noe other thing then belongs unto him of necessitie; as without which his moving of the se∣cond causes, it were impossible the creature should worke at all, which we have made good, by shewing the manifest absurdity of their contrary doctrine, who maintaine a bare concourse Divine either in subordination unto the agency of the creature, or without subordinating the operation of the creature, to motion Di∣vine. But we doe subordinate it, as without which the second cause could not worke at all, and by vertue whereof it doth worke, and that freely, so farre forth as li∣berty of will is competent to a creature; but not so as to make the creature com∣peere with his Creatour. Let man be a second free Agent, but set our God that made us evermore be the first free Agent; least otherwise we shall deny him the same power over his creatures, that the Potter hath over the clay of the same lumpe to make one vessell unto honour and another unto dishonour. This power in my ma∣ker, the Lord hath given me eyes to discerne as taught us in his holy word, and an heart to submit unto it; and to his providence in governing my will, even in the worst actions that ever were committed by me, without any repining humour against his hand; though I thinke it lawfull for us in an holy manner to expostulate with God sometimes in the Prophets language and say, Lord why hast thou caused us to erre from thy waies and hardened our hearts against thy feare? Which yet I confesse he brings to passe at noe time, infundendo malitiam, by infusing any malice into me, who naturally have more then enough of that leaven in me; but, non infundendo gratiam, not quickning in me that holy feare, which he hath planted in me, of which grace I confesse willingly, I have a great deale lesse then I desire, though the least measure of it is a great deale more then I doe or can deserve. Neither shall I ever learne of this Authour after his manner to blaspheme God if at any time hee shall harden my heart against his feare. Though this Authour speakes commonly with a full and foule mouth, yet his arguments are lanke and leane; and of noe substance but words. As

when hee saith that, God over-rules men's wills by our opinion. Now to over∣rule•• a man is to carry him in despight of his teeth. Wee say noe such thing but that God moves every creature to worke agreably to it's nature, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, free Agents freely; though nothing comes to passe by the free agency of any creature, but what God from all eternity, by his unchangable counsell hath determined to come to passe. As the eleventh Article of Ireland doth professe by the unanimous consent of the ArchBishop, Bishops and Clergy of that Kingdome, when those Articles were made. So I speake warily and circumspectly, the rather because one Do∣ctour Heylin doth in a booke intituled, The History of the Sabbath, professe, Chapter 8. page 259. That, that whole booke of Articles is now called in, and in the place thereof, the Articles of the Church of Ireland confirmed by Parliament in that Kingdome. Anno 1631. A thing I willingly confesse at first sight seemed incredible unto mee; namely, that Articles of Religion agreed upon in the dayes, of King Iames, should be revoked in the dayes of King Charles; but ex∣pect to heare the truth of that relation. For the Authour thereof hath never as yet deserved so much credit at my hands, as to be believed in such a particu∣lar as this. But to returne, this Authours text is nothing answerable to the mar∣gent. For first, imperare to command, is one thing, and to over-rule is another thing: though he that doth, imperare command ought, is commonly accounted the Authour thereof, as a cause Morall, from whom comes the beginning of such a worke. But utterly deny that God commands evill, and the truth is wee acknowledge noe other notion of evill then such as the Apostle expresseth in calling it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 an incongruitie to the law of God, which law commands some∣things and forbids other things. I come to his third reason. 3. I grant wicked counsellours and perswaders are deservedly accounted the Authors of sinne: The common use and acception of the words as I shewed in answer to the first, is observed to denote such. Therefore Cicero makes Authour and disswader opposite; and by law they are punishable in the same degree with the Actors. But God is noe counsellour or perswader to any lewd course, but forbids it, and disswades it, and that with denuntiation of the greatest judgments among trangressours. 2. I willingly confesse that councelling is farre inferiour to enforcing; yet in Scripture phrase earnest intreaty, or command is oftentimes exprest by compelling as Mat, 14. 22. Mark: 6. 45. Luk: 14. 23. Gala: 6. 12, and 2. 14. 1 Sam: 28. 23. 2 Chron: 21. 11. And noe marvaile for hereby many times men are drawen full sore against their wills to doe that which they would not. It is true God's power cannot be resisted, but neither hath any man any will to resist that motion of God whereby he workes agreable to their natures, then indeed there were place for resisting. If the Lord carrieth on a covetous person, such as Achan to covet a wedge of gold and a Babylonish garment, and coveting it move him accordingly to take it, and convey it away secretly, and hide it in his tent, what resistance doth he make in all this? Or what is done in all this lesse agreably to his covetous dispo∣sition, then to the disposition of Toades and Addars, when he moves them ac∣cording to their nature to sting and poyson? So he moved the Babylonians com∣pared to Serpents and Cockatrices to sting a wicked people. Doe not the Scrip∣tures * 1.164 plainly professe that God did send them? Is not Assur in this respect called, the Rod of God's wrath and the staffe in his hand? Was it not called the Lords in∣dignation? * 1.165 Is he not compared to an axe and a sawe, shall the axe boast it selfe a∣gainst him that heweth therewith? Or shall the saw extoll it selfe against him that mo∣veth it? Still he confounds the act with the sinfulnesse thereof, speaking of God's producing sinnes; whereas sinne is never produced, it being only an obliquity con∣sequent unto the act of such a worker as is subject to a law. And our Adver∣saries confesse that God is the cause of the act; as well as we. Yet will they not hereby be driven; to professe that in producing the act he produceth the sin. As for that which he speaks of Inforcing, we may well pitty him, that when he wants strength of reason, he supplies that by phrases. We deny that God inforceth any man's will. Nay it is the generall rule of Schooles, that, voluntas non potest cogi, the will cannot be forced: We maintaine that every act of the will, especially in naturall things (such as a sinfull act must needs be: for only gracious acts are supernaturall) is not only voluntary (which is

sufficient to preserve it from being forced) but free also, by as much libertie as the cre∣ature is capable of, only we deny that the will of man is primum liberum, a first free agent, that is the prerogative of God alone, the first mover of all, and the supreme Agent thus: I have dispatched my answer to his first reason consisting of three parts I come unto the second.

Sect: 4.

If we could find out a King that should so carry himselfe in procuring the ruine and the offences of any Subjects, as (by this opinion) God doth in the affecting of the damnation and transgressions of Repro∣bates, * 1.166 we would all charge him with the ruine and sinnes of those his Subjects. Who would not abhorre, saith Moulin, a King speaking thus. I will have this man hang••d, and that I may hang him justly, I will have him murder or steale. This King saith he should not only make an innocent man miserable, sed & sceleratum, but wicked too, and should punish him for that offence (cujus ipse causa esset) of which himselfe was the cause. It is a cleare case, Tiberius, as Suetonius reports, having a purpose to put some Virgins to death, because it was not * 1.167 lawfull among the Romans to strangle Virgins, caused them all to be deflouered by the hang-man, that so they might be strangled. Who will not say that Tiberius was the principall Authour of the deflouring of those Maides? In like manner (say the Supralapsarians) God hath a purpose of putting great store of men to the second death; but because it is not lawfull for him by reason of his justice, to put to death men innocent * 1.168 and without blame, he hath decreed that the Devill shall defloure them, that afterwards he may damne them It followeth therefore that God is the maine cause of those their sinnes.

If a King should carry himselfe as God did in hardning Pharaoh's heart that he should not let Israel goe; and when he had let Israel goe, to harden his heart that he should follow af∣ter them; we would acknowledge such a one, not to be man but God. And then surely * 1.169 whatsoever our Arminians would thinke of such a one, we would thinke noe otherwise then Solomon did of him of whom he professed, that, he made all things for himselfe, even the wicked against the day of evill. If God doth but permit a man to will this or that, ne∣cesse est, saith Arminius, it must needs be, ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad no∣lendum, that noe kind of argument shall perswade such one to abstaine from willing it. And I hope Arminius hath as great auhority with this Authour, as Mr. Moulin deserves to have with us. Noe King hath power to dispense any such providence as this. St. Paul tells us plainly, that, God hath ordained some unto wrath; and as he hath made of the same lumpe some vessells unto honour, so hath he made other vessells unto dishonour. The Lord pro∣fesseth that he kept Abimelech from sinning against him. Thus the Lord could deale with all if it pleased him; Why doth he not? is it not for the manifestation of his own glory? For to this purpose he hath made all things. And that, he suffers with long patience vessells * 1.170 of wrath prepared to destruction. And what to doe doth he suffer them? But to continue and persevere in their sinfull courses without repentance; the Apostle plainly tells us that it is, to declare his wrath and make his power known. This is not the voice of any Doc∣tor of ours now a dayes, but of St. Paul. And shall Mr. Moulin be brought in to affront St. Paul? For recompence let the Jesuits be heard to whom the nation of the Arminians are beholden for their principall grounds; Wherefore doth God give effectuall grace unto one and not unto another, but because he hath elected the one and rejected the o∣ther? And I appeale to every sober Christian, whether the absolutenesse of reprobation doth not as invincibly follow herehence as the absolutenesse of Election. But touching Mr. Moulin, I have heard that Doctor Ames somtimes wished that he had never medled in this argument. I am not of Doctor Ames his mind in this; though it were I thinke most fit every one should exercise himselfe in those questions, wherein by the course of his studies he hath been most conversant; so should the Church of God enjoy, plus dapis & rixae multo minus, invidiae{que}. I doe admire Mr. Moulin in his conference with Cayer as also upon the Eucharist, and on Purgatory, he hath my heart when I read his consola∣lations to his Breathren of the Church of France; as also intreating of the love of God. I would willingly learne French to understand him only, and have along time desired, & still to get any thing that he hath written. I highly esteem him in his Anatomie though I doe not like all and every passage; yet but few are the passages wherein I differ from his opinion. I have been very sory to observe how by his doctrine in the point of reprobati∣on he overthrowes his own Orthodox Doctrine in the point of Election. I would he would answer Sylvester who hath replied to his admirable letters written to Monsieur Balzak. I could be well content, were I once free, to supply what is wanting to Wa∣leus his Apologie for him against Corvinus. But to the point, the passage here propo∣sed

by him is I willingly confesse somewhat harsh. I will have this man hang'd, and that I may hang him justly I will have him murther or steale. But compare it with that of St. Paul formerly mentioned, God suffers the vessells of wrath prepared to destruction, that he may de∣clare his wrath, and make his power known. And that of Eli's children, They obeyed not the * 1.171 voice of their Father, because the Lord would slay them. And that Amaziah would not heare: For it was of the Lord that he might deliver them into his hands, because they sought the Gods of Edom. And that of Ieremiah Doubtlesse because the wrath of the Lord was against Ieru∣salem and Iuda, till he had cast them out of his presence, therefore Zedekiah rebelled against the King of Babel. And observe how neare Mr. Moulin is to expose these holy passages of Scripture and the doctrine contained in them in like manner unto scorne, ere he is aware. And let him soberly consider, and without any humour of complying with our Adver∣saries out of a desire to charme them who will not be charmed, to what end God doth finally permit some to persevere in sinne, and can he find any other but this, for the ma∣nifestation of the glory of his vindicative justice in their condemnation? And without a∣ny desire to charme, I have shewed plainly, that God doth not permit any man to sinne, and finally to persevere in sin to the end that he may damnethem: But that he both per∣mits them finally in sin, and damnes them for their sinne, for the declaration of his wrath and power on them; and also that he may declare the riches of his glory, upon the vessells of his mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory: If he put a difference between permissi∣on of sinne, and a will that they shall sinne; I would entreate him not to stumble at this. For what difference between God's will to permit man to sinne, and to will that man shall sin by his permission: And the tragicall acts committed on the holy Son of God by Herod and Pilate, the Gentiles and people of Israel, the Apostles say not they were permitted by God, but that they were predetermined by the hand and counsell of God. Mr. Moulin's * 1.172 care is to avoid harsh expressions; & it is a commendable care. For why should we caus∣lesly expose the truth of God to be the worse thought of, and provoke men to stumble at it by unnecessary harshnesse? Yet I find the Scripture it selfe delivered by the holy Pro∣phets and Apostles is nothing so scrupulous. Malim dicere, saith Mr. Moulin, I had ra∣ther say, Deum non decrevisse dare alicui gratiam, quâ convertatur & credat; that God hath * 1.173 decreed not to give some one grace whereby to be converted and believe; quâm dicere eum decre∣visse ut homo sit incredulus & impoenitens, then to say God hath decreed that man should be in∣credulous and impenitent. And he gives his reason thus. Vox enim decernendi aptior est ad ea designanda, quae Deus statuit facere, quàm ea quibus statuit non mederi. For to decree is fitter to denote such things as God hath purposed to doe, then such things as he hath purposed not to cure. And indeed the Ancients in this sense take the word predestination, to be only of such things as God himselfe purposed to worke; as Grace and Glory, and the damnation of impenitent sinners. But if God decrees not to cure impenitency and infidelity in some; judge whether upon this ground. it may not well be said, that God decrees that the impe∣nitency and infidelitie of some shall continue uncured And Mr. Monlin confesseth that God decreed that the Jewes should put Christ to death. His words are these, Deus vetuit homicidium, idem tamen decrevitut Iudaei Christum morte afficerent. God forbad murther yet * 1.174 he decreed that the Iewes should kill Christ. Yet by the way consider, God hath no need of the sinne of man, that he may put him to death justly. For undoubtedly God could anni∣hilate any creature that he hath made, the most holy Angells without any blemish to his justice. Yea by power absolute he could cast the most innocent creature into hell fire, and continue yet just still, as formerly hath been shewed, and Raynaudus justifies, and repre∣sents variety of testimonies for this, not only of School-divines, one of whom professeth that it is concors omnium Theologorum sententia, the common opinion of Divines; but of the Ancient Fathers also. And therefore though to strangle Virgins was not lawfull for Ti∣berius; yet a greater & more severe worke then this is lawfull for God. Neither doth God cōmand any impure course to any, but under pain of eternall damnatiō forbids it. But as he hardened Pharaoh's heart that he should not let I srael goe; so can he harden any man's heart to doe as foule a work as this. And St. Paul testifies that he gave up the heathens to their hearts lusts, unto uncleanes, to defile their own bodies between themselves, which turned the * 1.175 truth of God into a lie, & worshipped & served the creature forsaking the Creatour, who is blessed for ever amen For this cause God gave them up to vile affections; for even the women, did change * 1.176 the naturall use into that which is against nature. And likewise the men left the naturall use of the women, and burned in their lusts one toward another, and man with man wrought filthinesse. * 1.177 And this is noted by the Apostle to have been a work of judgment. For it followes, they received in themselves such recompence of their errours as was meet. I grant Tiberius was the

principall Authour of deflowring those Maides. For he commanded it, and that, as I have shewed, makes a man the Authour of a crime, both out of School-divines, and out of Ora∣tours; but God gave no such cōmand to these heathens thus to defile themselves. And this Authour doubts not, but God cooperates to the substance of every act; notwithstanding the absoute dominion of the will over her actions, for which he pleades. And it cannot be denied unlesse the word of God be therewithall denied, that, in him we move, as well as in him we live and have our being. And though God gave not commandement to Absalom. to defile his Fathers Concubines, yet he tells David saying; I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them to thy neigbour, and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of this Sun. For * 1.178 thou did'st it secretly, but I will doe this thing before all Israel, and before the Sun. It is utter∣ly untrue which this Authour obtrudes upon us, as if we thought it unlawfull, for God by * 1.179 reason of his justice to put to death men innocent and without blame. Was any more innocent then the Son of God? yet he gave him to suffer somewhat more then the death for the sins of men. Neither must we be gull'd with his phrases of the Devills deflouring of men, when by him they are carried away into abominable courses, so as to oppose Scripture & blaspheme God, the language of the holy Ghost being this that all the outrages com∣mitted upon the holy Son of God by Herod and Pontius Pilate, the Gentiles and people of Israel, were such as, God's hand and counsell had before determined to be done. And the like cruelties or worse were executed upon the Saints of God by their Kings, who imploied their soveraigne power in executiō of the beast's behests; yet this is called the will of God. God hath put into their hearts to fullfill his will, and to agree to give their kingdomes to the beast untill the word of God be fulfilled. And the truth is if God permit such abominable courses and hardens men's hearts, occasion being offered they will commit them, accor∣ding to the common proverbe. He must needs goe whom the Devill drives. And the very de∣finition of the permission of sinne given by Arminius doth convince this, though he car∣rieth himselfe very superficiarily explicating God's providence in this, and the nature of obduration; which I have prosecuted at large in my Vindiciae, in answer to Bellarmine, es∣pecially where I treat of the abduration of Pharaoh chap: 11. Neither doe we make dam∣nation * 1.180 the end whereunto God permits sinne; but both permisson for sinne and damna∣tion for sinne, we make the meanes tending to another end, namely, the manifestation of God's glory in the way of justice vindicative, which in Scripture phrase is called the de∣claration of his wrath. And to make God the Authour of sinne by these courses, is clearely * 1.181 to charge the holy Ghost with blasphemie, seing the holy Ghost gives cleare testimony to all this in the word of God.

Sect. 5.

That God is the Authour of men's salvation and conversion, all sides grant; and yet he doth noe more in the procuring them then these men report him to doe in the Reprobates impenitency and damnation The * 1.182 salvation and conversion of the Elect, say they, he hath absolutely and antecedently, without the foresight of any deserving of theirs, reselved upon, and by irresistable meanes in their severall generations, draweth them to believe, repent, and indure to the end, that so they might be saved, and his absolute decree accomplished. On the other side, the damnation, the sinnes, and the finall impenitency of Reprobates, he hath of his alone will and pleasure peremptorily decreed; this his decree he executeth in time drawing them on by his uncon∣querable power and providence from sinne to sin, till they have made up their measure, and in the end have inflicted on them that eternall vengeance, which he had provided for them. What difference is here in the course which God taketh for the conversion and salvation of the Elect, and the obduration and damnation of the Reprobates? And therefore what hindereth but that God (by their grounds) may as truely be stiled the prime cause and Authour of the sinnes of the one, as of the conversion of the other?

The Fathers thought it a plaine case; and therefore they did make sinne an Object of prescience, and not predestination and bent the most of those arguments by wich they refuted this foule assertion, against an ab∣solute, irresistable and necessitating decree. as I could easily shew, but that I feare to be over long. Only I will cite some few of those Authour's words whom the learned & reverend Bishop hath alleadged in favour and for the defence of the Predestinarians, and the maintainers of Gotteschalk's opinion The Church of Ly∣ous in their answer to the positions of Johannes Scotus, which he framed against Gotteschalke hath these words, Whosoever saith, tthat God hath laid a constraint, or necessity of sinning upon any man, he doth manifestly and fearefully blaspheme God, in as much as he maketh him, by affirming that of him to be the very Au∣thour of sinne. Remigius Arch. Bishop of that Church explaining the Churches opinion in that point of pre∣science and predestination in seven severall rules; in the fift of those rules, he hath these words to the same purpose. God, saith he by his prescience and predestination, hath laid a necessitie of being wicked upon noe man. For if he had done this, he had been the Authour of sinnes. And thus in my iudgment doth it plainly appeare that by absolute Reprobation, as it is taught the upper way, God is made to be the true cause of men's sinnes.

Observe the false carriage of this Authour, That God is the Authour of men's salvation * 1.183 and conversion, he saith, all sides grant; as if there were noe difference between Arminians,

and the Orthodox; between him and us in this. We say God workes faith and regenera∣tion in us, and that for Christ's sake. The Remonstrants in their Censura censurae, in ex∣presse termes deny that Christ merited faith and regeneration for us; and judge by this indifferently, whether they make faith and regeneration to be the guift of God. Or when they doe in termes professe this (as Epicurus, verbis Deos posuit, re sustulit) whether they doe not equivocate. Aske this Authour in what sense he makes God to be the Authour of man's conversiō, whether any otherwise thē, 1. In giving men power to believe if they will to repent if they will. 2. In perswading unto faith & repentance. 3. In concurring with man to the act of faith & repentance. Now as touching the first, that mere nature & not grace, Deo credere & ab amore rerum temporalium ad divina praecepta servanda se convertere omnes possint si velint, saith Austin, All men can, if they will, believe God, and from the love of tempo∣rall * 1.184 things convert themselves to the keeping of God's commandements. Now this is noe more, then, posse fidem habere, posse charitatem habere, to be capable of faith of charity, and this is, na∣turae hominum, of the nature of man; As Austin testifies in another place, where he saith pos∣se fidem habere, posse charitatem habere, naturae est hominum, fidem habere, charitatem habere, * 1.185 gratiae est fidelium. To be capable of faith and charity, is the nature of man, but to have faith and to have charity is the grace of the faithfull. Consider in reason; supernaturall grace is not in reason to be accounted inferiour to a morall vertue; but so it will prove, if it be but a power to be good if we will. For morall vertue doth not give a man a power only to doe good if he will, but it inclines and disposeth the will unto vertuous actions. So justice is not an indifferency of condition leaving it to man whether he will be just or noe; but it makes him just, and so disposoth him to just courses. Againe if grace supernaturall doth only give power to believe if one will; this being a free power, it is indifferent as well not to believe, as to beleive; as well not to repēt, as to repent. For liberty is alwaies to act op∣posite; whence it will follow that by vertue of supernaturall grace a man is disposed not more to faith, then to infidelitie, not more to repentance then to hardnesse of heart and Impenitency. 4. Consider, a man hath noe need of supernaturall grace to inable him to refuse to repent, seing naturally he is sufficiently disposed hereunto; & necessarily by rea∣son of that naturall corruption which is hereditary unto him. By all this it is apparent, that a power to believe wrought in a man by supernaturall grace, is not a free power work∣ing freely; but rather a necessary power working necessarily; like unto the condition of a morall vertue, which restraines man's naturall indifferency to good or evill, and disposeth him only to good. And consequently as many as maintaine no other power to be given unto man by grace, then to believe, if a man will; they deale like Pelagians, who called that which was meerly naturall, prevenient grace. Lastly if God be the Authour of man's conversion, because he gives him power to convert, if he will; he may as well be called the Authour of non conversion, and perseverance in sinne, because God gives power not to convert, and to persevere in sinne, if he will. 2. As touching the second, If God be the Authour of man's conversion, because he perswades thereunto, then certainly he is not the Authour of sinne, because he perswades not thereunto. 3. If God be the Authour of conversion, because he cooperates thereunto, then certainly he may be as well said to be the Authour of every sinfull act. For that he doth cooperate thereunto, I am very confi∣dent this Authour will not deny. Now I could earnestly entreate the Judicious Reader to examine well this Authour's opinion in these particulars, and compare them with his former discourse, that he may have a cleare way opened unto him to judge with what con∣science he carried himselfe in his former discourse, imputing unto us that we make God the Authour of sin; albeit in treating of God's providence in evill, we generally have the expresse word of God before our eyes; and in our explication thereof doe rather qualify the seeming harshnesse thereof, then aggravate it. For undoubtedly by the tenour of his discourse, looke upon what grounds he denies God to be the Authour of sinne, he must withall deny God to be the Authour of faith, of repentance, of conversion; And look upon what grounds he makes God the Authour of conversion; upon the same grounds he must make God the Authour of sinne: As in case to give power to believe, if we will; and to cooperate with us in the act of faith, be to make him the Authour: Or if only upon perswading us to believe, God is said to be the Authour of faith; then it followes as a suf∣ficient Apologie for us, that we make not God to be the Authour of sinne; seing none of us conceive him to be a perswader of any sinfull act; but rather a disswader and forbidder thereof and that upon paine of eternall damnation. But on the contrary we make a vast difference between God's operations in sinfull actions, and God's operations in actions gracious. As first, every sinfull act is alwaies within the compasse of acts naturall; noe su∣pernaturall

act is or can be a sinne. Now to the producing of any act of morality, every man notwithstanding his corruption hath in him a naturall power. But there is noe naturall power in man to the performing of an act supernaturall. God must inspire him with a new life called in Scripture, the life of God; and make him after a sort partaker of the divine na∣ture; and give his own Spirit to dwell in him, in such sort, that, being crucified with Christ, * 1.186 we hence forth live no more, but Christ liveth in us. These supernaturall acts are but few ac∣cording to the three Theologicall vertues, Faith, Hope, & Charity, whose offsprings they are; the love of God to the contempt of our selves hope in God to the contempt of the world, as touching the worst it can doe unto us: and faith in God, to the quenching of the fiery darts of the devill. As for all other good acts, in the producing of them, God hath a dou∣ble influence; one common as they are acts naturall, touching the substance of them; ano∣ther speciall as touching the gracious nature of them, proceeding from faith and love. But as touching evill acts, he hath noe influence in the producing of them, but that which is common, and to the substance of the acts; none at all as touching the evilnesse of them, the reason whereof is that which was delivered by Austin long agoe. Malū non habet cau∣sam efficientem sed deficientem, Evill hath no cause efficient, but deficient only. And it is impossi∣ble that God should be defective in a culpable manner. The creature may, the Creatour cannot: And the ground of the creatures defective condition is accounted to be this, that he was brought out of nothing, & consequently of a fraile condition. And it is received ge∣nerall as a rule in Schooles, that a creature cannot be made, impeccabilis per naturam, that is such a one, as by nature cannot sinne. This was delivered long agoe by Anselme one of the first of School-divines; In evill things God doth worke, quod sunt, that they are; non quod mala sunt, not that they are evill; But in good things God doth worke, Et quod sunt, & quod bona sunt, both that they are and that they are good. Here this Authour sets down our opini∣on concerning Election and Reprobation at his pleasure. We say with Austin that, pre∣destination is the preparation of grace, that is the Divine decree of conferring grace; And both he and all confesse, it is also the decree of conferring glory. And because in making of this decree, God had respect unto some only, not to all, both men and Angells, there∣fore in this consideration it is called the decree of Election, in distinction from the decree of reprobation. Now this grace is of a double nature; for either it is grace custodient from sinne, and the decree of granting this was the election of Angells, called in holy Scripture, The elect Angells; or grace healing, after men have sinned, and the decreee of granting this is the election of men, commonly in Scripture called God's Elect, in refe∣rence unto this. It is farther to be observed that Austin grounds the Orthodoxe doctrine of predestination and election upon the Orthodoxe doctrine concerning grace. And the absolutenesse of the one he built upon the freenes of the other, in not being given accor∣ding unto men's merits. As it appeares, de bono perseverantiae cap. 15. Where having propo∣sed some exceptions of the Massilienses made against his doctrine of predestination, com∣ming to make answer thereunto, he begins thus, Ista cum dicuntur, saith he. ita nos à confi∣tenda Dei gratia, id est, quae non secundum merita nostra datur, & a confitenda secundum eam predestinatione sanctorum deterrere non debent When these things are objected, they must not de∣terre us from confessing God's grace, I meane such a grace as is not given accordiog unto works; nor from confessing the predestination of Saints according thereunto. Now if the absolutenesse of predestination be grounded upon this, that, grace is not given according unto merits, (the scripture phrase denies it to be given according unto workes. But Bellarmine acknow∣ledgeth that in this Argument, merits and workes are taken by the Ancients in one and the * 1.187 same sense.) it followeth that as many as deny the absolutenesse of predestination must therewithall maintaine, that, Grace is given according to men's merits or works. And the reason is evident: For if God doth not give grace according unto men's works, but of his mere pleasure decreed to give grace unto some, and not upon consideration of their works. And this is to elect absolutely, and antecedently without the foresight of any deser∣ving, yea of any works; though by that expression which this Authour useth he doth suf∣ficienty manifest, that his opinion is, that God elects not only upō the foresight of men's, workes but upon the foresight of men's deservings. It is farther considerable to prevent the reaches of such crafty foxes as we have to deale with, whose course is in joyning the decree of conversion and salvation together, to translate that which belongs unto one, unto the other most unreasonably: For albeit God proceeds according to the mere plea∣sure, and without all respect to workes, in conferring grace, and decreeth accordingly to conferre it: Yet he proceeds not merely according unto pleasure, and without all respect of works in conferring glory; but according unto a Covenant which is this, whosoever be∣leiveth

shall be saved, and accordingly he bestowes the kingdome of heaven by way of re∣ward for faith, repentance, and good workes. This hath Christ deserved at the hands of * 1.188 his Father that our weake performances should be thus rewarded. Lastly, it is farther to be considered that God, as he thus bestoweth salvation by way of reward of our faith, repentance &c; so from everlasting he did decree to bestowe salvation, namely, by way of reward. Not that either faith, or repentance, or good workes, any or all of these were the cause (least of all the deserving cause) of God's decree, or antecedaneous to his decree; but of his mere pleasure decreed both to give the grace of faith and repentance, and to bestow eternall life by way of a reward thereof, as may farther be proved and that clear∣ly divers waies. 1. By the Apostl's discourse; where he discourseth after this manner, Before Esau and Iacob were borne, or had done good or evill, it was said that the Elder shall * 1.189 serve the younger; therefore election is not of workes: But if election did proceeed upon the foresight of faith, repentance, and good workes, or any of them, then it might justly be said, that it were of faith, repentance, or good workes or of all of them; And the force of the Apostles argument extends to conclude, that election is noe more of faith or of re∣pentance, then of workes; not only because faith and repentance are workes, and so ac∣counted in Scripture phrase, as it appeares. Io: 6. 29. But cheifely because before men are borne, they are uncapable of faith and repentance, as of good workes. 2. If faith were a motive cause unto election, then either it were so of it's own nature, or by consti∣tution Divine: not of it's own nature as it is apparent. If by constitution divine, mark what strange absurdities follow; namely this, that God did ordaine, that upon the fore sight of faith, he would ordaine men unto salvation, whereby God's eternall ordination is made the object of his ordination, whereas the Objects of God's de∣crees are alwaies things temporall, never any thing that is eternall. 3. It can∣not be said that God giveth salvation to the end he may give them faith, but it may farre more congruously be said, that God gives faith to the end that he may save them; therefore the intention of salvation is rather before the intention of giving faith, then the intention of giving faith is before the intention of giving salvation. Or better thus, if God foresee faith before he decrees salvation, then the intention of giving faith (without which God cannot foresee faith) is before the intention of giving salvation; and conse∣quently the giving of faith should be the last in execution; that is men shall first be saved, and aferwards have faith bestowed upon them, to wit, in another world where they live by sight and not by faith. I come to the decree of reprobation; the Objects whereof are two, proportionable to the two objects of election or predestination. The first is permissi∣on of sin, the second is, Damnation for sinne, according to that of Aquinas, Reprobatio inclu∣dit voluntatem permitendi culpam & damnationem inferendi pro culpâ. Reprobation includes a will to permit sinne, and to inflict damnation for sinne. The first object of reprobation I say is, permission of sinne; not Sin as this Authour would have it, but permission of sinne: Be∣cause these decrees, to wit, of permitting sinne, and inferring damnation for sinne, are de∣crees of meanes conducing to a certaine end. For like as in election God decreeth to be∣stowe faith, repentance, and obedience on some, and to reward it with everlasting life for the manifestation of his glory in the way of mercy mixt with justice: So in Reprobation he decrees to permit others to sinne, and finally to persevere therein, and to damne them for their sinne to manifest his glory in the way of vindicative justice. Now whosoever in∣tends an end must also be the Auhour of the meanes conducing to that end. Now God, though well he may be the Authour of permission of sinne, yet he cannot be the Author of sinne: Albeit upon God's permission of sinne it followeth that sinne shall exist. Now to permit sinne is all one with denying grace, whether it be grace Custodient to preserve from it, or grace healing to pardon and cure it after it is committed. Now like as the Lord hath mercy on whom he will in pardoning their sinne, and healing it by faith and repen∣tance: So he hardeneth whom he will by denying faith and repentance. So that as God of his mere pleasure grants the grace of faith and repentance unto some; so of his mere plea∣sure he denies it unto others. And so in Reprobation he decreeth of his mere pleasure to deny it. But albeit the Lord of mere pleasure proceeds in the denying of faith and repen∣tance, whereby alone sinne is cured, and so of mere pleasure suffers some finally to perse∣vere in sinne, yet in inflicting damnation he doth not carry himselfe of mere pleasure without all respect to men's workes; but herein he proceeds according to a law which is this, whosoever believeth not, and repenteth not, shall be damned. And like as God damnes noe man but for his finall perseverance in sinne. So from everlasting he did decree to damne noe man, but for his finall perseverance in sinne. So that by vertue of the Divine decree of

reprobation, sinne and finall perseverance therein is constituted the cause of damnation; but by noe meanes is it constituted the cause of the decree of reprobation; neither doth the foresight of sinne precede it. For first, like as upon this doctrine, that, Grace is not given according unto workes, the absolutenesse of predestination is grounded in the judg∣ment of Austine as by necessary consequence issuing there from: In like sort upon this, that grace is not denied according unto men's workes, as necessarily followeth the ab∣solutenesse of Reprobation. Secondly, looke by what reason the Apostle proves, that Election is not of good workes, namely because, before the children were borne or had done any good, it was said the Elder shall serve the Yonger; by the same reason it evidently fol∣loweth that reprobation is not of evill workes, because, before they were borne or had done good or evill, it was said the Elder shall serve the Younger, Esau's reprobation being as emphatically signified under his subjection to Iacob his younger, as Iacob's election was designed by his dominion over Esau his Elder brother. 3. If sinne be the cause of the decree of Reprobation, then either of 'its own nature, or by constitution divine. Not by necessity of nature; for undoubtedly God could annihilate men for sinne, had it plea∣sed him. If by constitution Divine, mark what absurdity followeth, namely this, that, God did ordaine that upon foresight of sinne, he would ordaine men unto damnation. 4. If fore∣sight of sinne precedes the decree of damning them for sin, then the decree to permit sin much more precedes the decree to damne them for it, as without which there can be noe foresight of sin; and consequently permission of sin is first in intention, and then damnati∣on; and therefore it should be last in execution; that is, men should first be damned, and afterwards permitted to sin, to wit, in an other world. 5. And lastly Reprobation is the will of God; but there can be noe cause of God's will, as Aquinas hath proved; much lesse can a temporall thing be the cause of God's will, which is eternall. Upon this ground it is that Aquinas professeth, Never any man was so mad, as to say that any thing might be the cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating. So may I say, it were a mad thing to maintaine that any thing can be the cause of Reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. For the case is altogether alike; the will of God being alike un∣capable of a cause in both, whereas this Authour saith, that, God by our opinion doth draw men on by his unconquerable power from sin to sin; 'tis mere bumbast. All men being borne in sin must needs persevere in sin, unlesse God gives grace to regenerate them. For whe∣ther they doe that which is morally good, they doe it not in a gracious manner; or whe∣ther they abstaine from evill, they doe it not in a gracious manner. He that is of God hea∣reth * 1.190 God's wordes, ye therefore heare them not saith our Saviour, because ye are not of God. Ar∣minius acknowledgeth and Corvinus after him, that all men by reason of Adam's sin are cast upon a necessitie of sinning. He askes what difference is there in the course which God ta∣keth for the conversion of the Elect and obduration of Reprobates; and I have already shewed a vast difference; and here in breife I shew a difference; He hath mercy on the one in the regenerating them, & curing the corruption he finds in them, he shewes not the like grace to others, but leaves them unto themselves; as touching the evill acts committed by the one, he concurreth as a cause efficient to the act which for the substance of it is naturally good. For ens & bonum convertuntur, every thing that is an entity so farre is good, but he hath no efficiency as touching the evill, as which indeed can admit no efficiencie, as Austin hath delivered of old, Man himselfe is only a deficient cause of sin, as sin, and that in a cul∣pable manner, which kind of deficiency is not incident to God. But to every good act he concurres two manner of waies & that in the nature of a positive efficient cause in both, namely, to the substance of the act by influence generall, and to the goodnesse of it by in∣fluence speciall and supernaturall.

It is true the Fathers made sin the object of prescience, not of predestination; the rea∣son was because they took predestination to be only of such things which God did effect in time; Now sin is none of those things that come to passe by God's effection, but only by God's permission. And that such was the notion of predestination with the Fathers, I prove first out of Austin. In sua quae falli mutari{que} non potest praescientiâ opera sua futura dis∣ponere, * 1.191 illud omnino nec aliud quidquam est praedestinare In his foreknowledge, which can neither be deceived nor changed to dispose his own workes, that is to predestinate and nothing else. And sin, not being the worke of God, no marvaile if it come not under predestination. Se∣condly, out of the Synod of Valens, Praedestinatione autem Deum ea tantum statuisse * 1.192 dicimus quae ipse vel gratuita misericordiâ, vel justo judicio facturus erat. We say that God by predestination ordained only such things as himselfe would work, either of his free mercy, or in just judgment. Againe it is as true that they made even sin it selfe the Object of God's will, witnesse that of Austin. Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo

ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo. Not any thing comes to passe but God Allmighty willing it, either by permitting it or working it. So the eleaventh article of the Church of Ireland; So Arminius * 1.193 Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum implere, God would have Ahab to fulfill the mea∣sure of his sins. So scripture often mentioned. And Austin gives the reason of it, malum fieri bonū est, it is good that evill should be. Bellarmine confesseth as much, namely that, Mala fi∣eri * 1.194 Deo permittente bonum est, It is good that evills should come to passe by God's permission. And shall not God have liberty to will that which is good? When he saith of the Ancients, that, They refuted this foule assertion of an absolute, irresistable and necessitating decree as he could easily shew, but that he feares to be overlong. It is nothing but froth; It is not the first time I have had experience of such like Pyrgopolinices eloquence of his. Bradwardin hath demonstrated that the will of God is absolute throughout speaking of his decree, and none conditionall and his demonstration is this, If there be any will of God conditionall, then the condition whereupon it proceds must be willed by God or no; to say it is not, is to acknowledge some things to exist in the world, in the producing whereof, God hath noe hand, which is generally disclaimed; And Durand, who affirmes some such thing, is op∣posed generally, and indeed his arguments are very sleight. But if God doth will that con∣dition; then either he wills it absolutely or conditionally; If absolutely, then the cause is gained. For then that which was first willed, was willed also absolutely not condi∣tionally. As for example, if God wills a man's salvation upon condition of faith, if with∣all God's will be, and that absolutely to give him faith, it followeth that God wills that man's salvation, and that absolutely. If it be answered that the condition is willed not ab∣solutely, but upon another condition; of that other condition I enquire whether God willed it or noe. If noe, then something is produced in the world, in the production whereof God, hath no hand, which is very inconvenient; If you grant that he willed that also, I farther demand whether he willed it absolutely or conditionally? If absolutely then all that depended thereupon were absolutely willed, and so the cause is obtained. If you say this condition was willed also conditionally, so a way is made to a progression in infinitum, which is a thing unsufferable by the consent of all. And as many as are put to give instance will forthwith manifest the nakednes of their cause. This demonstration of Bradwardine I sometimes represented to this very Authour in our private walking and communication, and he professed it was a very ingenious argument. As for the other terme Irresistable this manifests this Authour's meaning, that some will of God, speaking of his decree, is of a resistable nature. Whereas St. Paul to the contrary plainly gives us to understand that God's will is irresistable; & the Psalmist saith, that the counsell of the Lord shall stand. And my counsell shall stand, and I will doe whatsoever I will. And therefore his de∣crees are resembled to mountaines of brasse. As for the lost terme necessitating. For the Gentleman paies us in words, for want of better coine, not considering that words are * 1.195 but winde, he would cheat his Reader by this, presuming he would be so simple, as to be∣lieve that God by this decree of his takes away the liberty of the creature, but it doth not; nor any contingency, as the eleaventh article of Ireland doth particulate: and Bradwardine who peculiarly useth this phrase, understands hereby noe other necessitie then upon sup∣position, which Alvarez shewes by generall concurrence of School-Divines, that it may well stand with absolute contingency and liberty, it being noe other necessity, then that which is called, secundum quid, in some respect; And such a necessitie Arminius maketh con∣sequent to permission: & Bradwardine is express that God necessitates the will to produce a free act. And he nothing differs from Aquinas his doctrine, where he maintaines that God's will imposeth noe necessitie upon the creatures will; because he ordaines both ne∣cessary things come to passe, necessarily, and contingent things, contingently, that is with a possibility to the contrary; & likewise free actions freely, that is with a free active pow∣er in the Agent to doe otherwise. But come we to the consideration of the passages produced out of the Ancients. For I presume they are the choicest. For though he feared to be overlong, and therefore could not exhibit all; yet therefore it behoov∣ed him to represent the best. And I believe he could produce more of this na∣ture. For I have been an eye witnes of it under his hand now foure yeares agoe. And though he produce them not, I hope to doe it for him ere we part, to shew how little I feare his concealements, and somewhat of the Predestinarians also, being glad of such an opportunity to discover the wildnesse and precipitation of his judg∣ment touching that which is called the predestinarian heresy here touched by him.

The first is a passage taken out of the Church of Lyons, denying that God hath layed a necessitie of sinning on any man. Another out of Remigius; both represented (yea & ma∣ny

more of this nature) by that most reverend and most learned Arch-Bishop of Armagh Doctor Usher in his history of Goteschalk, 138. and 173. To these I answer. First these An∣cients are about 850 yeares after Christ; yet marvailous orthodoxe considering those times in the point of predestination. And let no man think that they deny a necessity of sinning laid upon all by originall corruption, the consequent of Adam's prevarication. If they were of any other opinion, should it become us to follow them in this? Doctor Pot∣ter acknowledgeth it as the doctrine of the Church of England, that libertas à peccato, li∣berty from sinne, is not incident to a naturall man; it is true he desires to quash it by say∣ing there is yet in man, Libertas à necessitate, à liberty from necessitie; but from what neces∣sity? From the necessity of sinning? If so, why should he then deny a liberty from sin; yet he never taketh any paines to cleare this from contradiction, but blindfoldly followes Bernard, without caring much to understand him. And he looks to be pardoned because Vossius did so before him. M. Fulke, in his answer to the Rhemish Testament, usually distin∣guisheth between libertas à peccato, & libertas à coactione, liberty from sinne, and liberty from constraint; and denying all liberty from sinne to a naturall man, yet grants unto him a liberty from coaction. I have taken some paines to shew Doctor Potter's superficiary carriage in this, and to cleare Bernard; which it may be I will adde to this by the reason of the homogeneous nature of it. In the meane time liberty from sinne is utterly denied to a naturall man, and that by the doctrine of our Church. And noe marvaile seeing Armi∣nius himselfe, and Corvinus, those great patrons of natures power, doe acknowledg this, as before I mentioned; only they say God is ready to remove this necessitie of sinning from all, and every one.

2. But the meaning of Remigius and the Church of Lyons is the same with that of Pros∣per formerly mentioned, in his answer to the objection of Vincentius, where he confesseth, Hominem non redemptum Diabolo esse captivum, a man not redeemed is captivated by Satan; and that, creatura peccatrix poenalem dominationem Diaboli merito patitur, cui (relicto vero domino) sponte se vendidit. The creature sinning deservedly suffers the dominion of Satan by way of punishment, as to whom he sould him selfe voluntarily. Haec quippe servitus non institutio est Dei sed judicium. This slavery of man to Satan is not God's institution but judgment; that is God brought it upon him not of his mere pleasure, but in the way of judgment. Like as * 1.196 Austin in like manner acknowledgeth, concupiscense to be, not sinne only, but the punish∣ment of sinne also. So Remigius and the Chuch of Lyons say; that God imposed it not on Adam but man falling from God brought a necessitie of sinning upon him, & upon all his race; God hereupon justly withdrawing his holy Spirit from him.

2. Why he should alleadge the first passage under the name of the Church of Lyons, I know not; The reverend Bishop acknowledgeth Florus to be the Authour thereof, a Deacon of Lyons pag. 126. Although the same Reverend Bishop acknowledgeth that o∣ther book also that goes under the name of the Church of Lyons now extant in the Bib∣liothecâ Sanctorum Patrum; and wherehence Vossius communicateth unto us his excerpta, was written by the same Florus pag. 115. He had more reason to father his next passage, which he produceth out of Remigius upon the Church of Lyons. For albeit Maldonat cites the booke intituled Liber de tribus Episcoporum epistolis (whence this passage is ta∣ken under the name of Remigius) yet he who set it forth ascribes it to the Church of Ly∣ons, and that by the direction of the Copy, which was in the hands of Nicholas Faber, as appeares Goteschalc: hist: 170. But none doe I find to ascribe this worke of Florus to the Church of Lyons, though the Authour of another booke under that title, the Bish∣op acknowledgeth to be Florus.

3. Florus acknowledgeth that the very Saints of God are under a necessity of sin in a sort, p. 149. In Sanctis licet sit liberum arbitrium jam Christi gratiâ liberatum at{que} Sanctum; tamen tanta est illa sanitas, ut quamdiu mortaliter vivunt sine peccato esse non possint, & cum velint at{que} desiderent non peccare non possūt tamen non peccare. In the Saints of God though there be freedome of will, as freed by the grace of Christ, and made holy, yet this health is such, that as long as they carry this mortall body about thē they cannot be without sin: and though they would and desire to be without sin, yet they cannot be without sin. This I conceive is spoken in respect of the flesh lusting against the Spirit; & of the law in our members rebelling against the law of our mind, & leading us captive to the law of sin. How much more are the wicked in bondage * 1.197 to sinne and Satan, as the same Florus sheweth pag. 142? For whereas Scotus taught, that a man had not lost his liberty, but only the power and vigour of his liberty. Florus opposeth him thus, Non rectè dicit, quia nec sentit, he saith not well, because he thinks not well; sed sicut vigorem & potestatem libertatis, ita ipsam perdidit libertatem, ut jam ipse ad verum bonum

unde cecidit liber esse non possit. As he hath lost the vigour and power of his libertie; so he hath lost libertie it selfe, insomuch that unto true good, from whence he is fallen, he cannot be free; to wit, untill he be freed by the grace of Christ. In like māner Remigius discourseth also, grā∣ting free will only to evill, p. 36. In infidelibus id ipsum liberū arbitriū ita per Adam damna∣tum & perditum, in operibus mortuis liberum esse potest, in vivis non potest. In infidells free will it selfe, so damned and lost in Adam, may be free in dead workes, cannot be free in living works that is, is not free to produce works belonging to a spirituall life. So that they una∣nimously confesse that in respect of originall sin, there is a necessity of sinning, but this is rightly to be understood; namely thus, that true good they cannot doe, so that whatsoe∣ver they doe is evill, only that it is free unto them to doe this or that evill, which is most true. Secondly, thus farre they qualifie this necessitie of sinning, that never any man is carried by the Divine providence, so as to sinne whether they will or no. For albeit Raba∣nus charged them, whom he opposed herewith, pag. 53. Si enim secundum ipsos qui talia sen∣tiunt, Dei praedestinatio invitum hominem facit peccare, quomodo Deus justo judicio, damnat peccantem, cum ille non voluntate, sed necessitate peccaverit. For if, according to them who thinke such things, God's predestination makes a man to sinne against his will; how doth God in his just judgmēt damne him that sinneth, when he sinned not voluntarily but necessarily? Thus they cri∣minated their adversaries: but Remigius answers on their behalfe, who were thus falsly accu∣sed Nemo ita sentit aut dicit quod Dei predestinatio aliquem invitum faciat peccare, ut jam non propriae voluntatis perversitate, sed divinae praedestinationis necessitate peccare videatur. No man so thinks or speakes, that God's predestination makes a man to sinne against his will; so that a man should seeme to sinne, not by the perversitie of his own will, but by the necessitie of divine predestination. But this is the worke of Divine predestination, that he who sins willingly, & per∣severes willingly in his sins, shall against his will be punished. And the truth is taking predesti∣nation as it signifies preparation of Grace, or God's decree to conferre this, rather God's not predestinating a man, or not giving grace, and not making him to be of God, is the cause why a man sinneth, according to that of our Saviour. He that is of God heareth God's * 1.198 words▪ ye therefore heare them not, because ye are not of God. Yet this is rightly to be under∣stood. for God's not conferring regenerating grace is rather the cause why their naturall corruption is not cured, thē that they goe on in their sinfull courses: for naturally carnall men are prone enough to sin, and in this course they necessarily continue, untill God changeth their hearts; necessarily I say, but not against their wills. For sinne is as a sweet morsell, which they roule under their tongue. This may suffice for answer unto these pas∣sages, and withall to represent the vanitie of this Authour's discourse, endeavouring to brand our doctrine with making God the Authour of sinne; more of this hereafter; For I am acquainted with that which he here conceales, and with certaine adjuncts thereun∣to, both touching the opinion of the Church of Lyons concerning falling from grace; as also this Authours bold adventure in two particulars in justifying Vossius, citing the cōfession of Pelagius as one of Austin's sermons; as also defending him in the point of the predestinarian heresie, which Doctor Usher maintaines to be a mere fiction of the Semi∣pelagians to bring Austin's doctrin thereby into disgrace. But Vossius conceives that there was indeed such an heresie, and that the Monks of Adrumetum were the Authours of it. And this Interpolatour takes Vossius his part, and labours by certaine arguments to make it good against he judicious observations of that most reverend and learned Arch-Bi∣shop of Armagh. It may be I shall represent my answer thereunto by wa•• •••• digression; but first I must dispatch my answer to this I have in hand.

Sect: 6.

Many distinctions are brought to free the Supralapsarian way from this crimination all which (me thinks) * 1.199 are no•• better then mere delusions of the simple and inconsiderate, and give noe true satisfaction to the understanding. There is say they a twofold decree.

1. First an operative, by which God positively and efficaciously worketh allthings. 2. A permissive, by which he decreeth only to let it come to passe. If God should worke sinne by an operative decree, then he should be the Authour of sinne, but not if he decree by a permissive decree to let it come to passe, and this only they say they maintaine. It is true that God hath decreed to suffer sinne; for otherwise there would be none. Who can bring forth that which God will absolutely hinder? He suffered Adam to sinne, leaving him in the hand of his own counsell, Ecclus. 15. 14. He suffered the nations in time past to walke in their own waies Act: 14. 16. And dayly doth he suffer both good and bad to fall into many sins; And this he doth, not because he stands in need of sinne for the setting forth of his glory; for he hath noe need of the sinfull man. Ecclus. 15. But partly because he is (summus provisor) supreme moderatour of the world, and knoweth how

to use that well which is ill done, and to bring good out of evill; and especially for that reason which Ter∣tullian prelleth, namely, because man is made by God's own gracious constitution, a free creature undeter∣mined in his actions, untill he determine himselfe; And therefore may not be hindred from sinning by om∣nipotency, because God useth not to repeale his own ordinances.

2. It is true also that a permissive decree is noe cause of sinne, because it is merely extrinsecall to the sin∣ner, and hath noe influence at all upon the sinne. It is an antecedent only, and such a one too, as being put, sinne followeth not of necessitie. And therefore it is fitly contradistinguisht to an operative decree. And if that side would in good earnest, impute noe more in sinfull events to divine power, then the word Permissi∣on, imports, their maine conclusion would fall, and the controversy between, us end. But first, many of them reject this distinction utterly, and will have God to decree sinne (efficaciter) with an Energeticall and work∣ing will. Witnesse that discourse of Beza wherein he a verreth and laboureth to prove, that God doth not on∣ly permit sinne but will it also: And witnesse Calvin too, who hath a whole section against it, calling it a car∣nall * 1.200 distinction invented by the flesh, and (effugium) a mere evasion to shift off this seeming absurdity, that that man is made blind (Deo volente & jubente) by Gods will and command; who must shortly after be pu∣nished for his blindnes; He calleth it also (figmentum) a fiction, and saith they doe (ineptire) play the fooles that use it. By many reasons also doth he indeavour to lay open the weaknes of it, taxing those who understand such Scriptures as speaks of God's smiting men with a Spirit of slumber and giddinesse, of blinding their minds, infatuating and hardening their hearts &c. Of a permission and suffering of men to be blinded, and hardned, Nimis frivola est ista solutio, saith he, it is too frivilous a glosse. In another place he blameth those that referre sin to God's prescience only, calling their speeches (argutiae) tricks and quirks which Scrip∣ture * 1.201 will not beare; and those likewise that ascribe it to God's permission, and saith, what they bring touch∣ing the Divine permission in this businesse will not hold water. They that admit the word permissive, doe willingly mistake it, and while, to keep of this blow, they use the word, they corrupt the meaning. For

1. Permission is an act of God's consequent and judiciary will, by which he punisheth men for abusing their freedome, and committing such sins day by day, as they might have avoided; and to which he proceed∣eth (lento gradu) slowly and unwillingly, as we may see, Psal: 81. 11. 12. Israel would none of me, so I gave them up &c. Ezeh: 18. 39. Goe and serve every one his Idoll, seeing ye will not obey me &c. Rom: 1. 21. 24. Be∣cause when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, therefore God gave them up unto their hearts lusts, to vile affections and to a Reprobate mind. Rev. 22. 11. He that is unjust let him be unjust still. In these places and many more we may see, that persons left to themselves are sinners only; and not all sinners, but the obstinate and willfull, which will by noe meanes be reclaimed. But the permission which they meane, is an act of God's antecedent will, exercised about innocent men lying under no guilt at all in God's eternall consideration.

2. Permission about whomsoever it is exercised, obstinate sinners, or men considered without sinne, is no more then a not hindring of them from falling, that are able to stand, & supposeth a possibility of sinning or not sinning, in the parties permitted; but with them it is a withdrawing or withholding of grace needfull for the avoiding of sin, and so includeth an absolute necessitie of sinning. For from the withdrawing of such grace sin must needs follow; as the fall of Dagon's house followed Sampson's plucking away the Pillars that were necessary for the upholding of it. Maccovius in two disputations, expounding this word (Permission) cir∣cumscribes it within two acts. The first of which is a Substraction of Divine assistance, necessary to the pre¦venting * 1.202 of sinne; And having proved it by two arguments, that none may thinke he is alone in this, he saith, that he is compassed about with a cloud of witnesses, and produceth two. The first of them is our reverend and learned Whitaker, some of whose words alleadged by him are these, Permission of sinne is a privation of the aid, which being present, sinne would have been hindred. The second is Pareus, for saying that that helpe (which God withdrew from Adam) being withdrawen, Adam could not soe use his endowments, as to persevere. And this doctrine, saith he, is defended by our men, as it appeareth out of Pareus lib, de grat primi hominis c. 4 p. 46. Their permission therefore of sinne being a substraction of necessary grace, is equivalent to an actuall effectuall procuring and working of it▪ For (Causa deficiens in necessariis est eficiens) a defi∣cient cause in things necessary is truely efficient) and so is but a mere fig-leafe to cover the foulenesse of their opinion.

Here we have a very demure discourse proceeding in a positive manner, proceeding from * 1.203 one that takes upon him to be a Master and dictator of sentences; wherein there is little or nothing sound that he delivers of his own; or to purpose that he delivers of others. Nothing of any colour of pertinency, besides what he delivers in the last place touching our opinion of the nature of permission of sin. And I willingly confesse, The divine permissi∣on of sin is a very obscure point, and in my judgment most come short in the explication thereof Arminius hath a large digression upon this place of Permission in generall, and of permission of sin in speciall: It was the first peece of Arminius, the examination where∣of I undertook only with a mind to search after satisfaction therein. And finding noe con∣tent therein, I gave my selfe to enquire thereof in a positive manner; wherein I proceeded very farre, setting downe in foule papers, as they came to hand, whatsoever came into my mind thereabout, which grew into a large proportion, and then set my selfe upon pre∣conceived grounds reasonably well disscurssed by me, to deale with Arminius some five Sections after the beginning of his discourse on this argument, which five first Sections I took not into examination, untill I had dispatched the whole. And having an occasion to deale upon this argument when I came to the defence of M. Perkins his answer to the third crimination, whereupon I deale in the second book of my Vindiciae, I thought good to digresse after the second Section, & to call a certaine proposition of M. Perkins to ac∣count, which was this, Quod Deus non impedit, ideo evenit, quia Deus non impedit. It is the

third Digression of the second book, the title whereof is this, Propositio illa Perkinsii (quod Deus non impedit, ideo evenit, quia Deus non impedit) sub examen revocatur. There is noe digression throughout that book of mine that affords more variety of Philosophicall and Theologicall contemplations, then that; and all about the nature of permission. First, in things naturall. Secondly, in things morall. And these first in good things. Secondly, in evill things. In the course whereof many obscurities and difficulties doe offer themselves to be cleared, & solved by distinction; where comming to an end, I deliver my selfe in this manner. I perceive in how slippery an argument I exercise my selfe, too much exposed to the ca∣lumny of adversaries, and too apt to incurre the dislike of good men; whereas in all my labour I aime at nothing else, then according to my power to explicate the mystery of Divine providence governing all things after a wonderfull manner; And to dissemble nothing, but represent all dif∣ficulties that doe occurre, that both my adversaries may have at hand what to impugne; Our Divines wherein to take paines, either by way of explication of what yet remaines obscure; or by confirmation of what they shall find to be sound yet unsufficiently proved. Now that Digression of mine being so large, I wonder not a little that no one particular thereof is here called to an account by this Divine. And so may others too when they shall consider against whom this man's stomach workes most. For he cannot be ignorant of my answer to M. Hoord his proselyte, if not therein to himselfe. Againe, the exception here in the last place taken against our doctrine of permission, is exactly the same with Arminius his excep∣tion against Mr. Perkins in dealing upon the third crimination, which there I have answe∣red at large, and that in such manner, that I willingly professe, I was utterly to seek at this time, of what I had there delivered; so that upon my consulting the place, the things I there met with, seemed new unto me, in discovering many waies the inconsequence of Arminius his discourse, which yet is the very same with this of Mr. Mason's. Yet he hath not replied upon any one line of all that I delivered there, though they are above 600 in the second Edition of that book. But it may be he takes that for noe better then an idle discourse (yet an answer it is to this very exception of his) & 'tis enough for him to con∣vince the justnesse of that exception made by Arminius, by sound argument. And what is that but a rule given by him, upon his own credit, without indication of the least autho∣rity to confirme it; And though on the contrary I have divers and sundry waies manifes∣ted the falsenes thereof: well I am not resolved to suffer him to passe unanswered, how idle soever his discourse may appeare to be. Foure distinctions of ours he proposeth to invade; not one of them is pretermitted by Arminius in his answer unto Perkins, nor any part of that his answer pretermitted by me. But this is written in English for the indoctrinating of the people, as I remember what was said of M. Hoord's discourse; namely, that it was fit to be coppied out, and communicated unto the Country. He saith these distinctions are, delusions of the simple; when he proves it, then it will be time enough to believe it. But whereas, he saith, they give noe true satisfaction to the understanding, this is rightly to be un∣derstood, to wit, in reference to an Arminian understanding corrupted with the leaven of Pelagidnisme. Yet is he not privy to the understanding of all, so much as of all that are of his own Tenet. But suppose they doe not. The distinctions used by School-Divines to accommodate God's predestination with man's free will, are many and learned, but Caietan professeth of them all that they doe not, quietare intellectum, satisfie the understan∣ding; but what followes; Therefore saith he, Ego captivo meum in obsequium fidei; I capti∣vate mine unto the obedience of faith to wit, because Scripture is evident for both: And why should it seeme strange that God's providence in governing the world should be of a mysterious nature. And however this Authour may censure Caietane in this, yet Alva∣rez professeth that herein, doctissimè, & piissimè loquitur; he speakes most learnedly and most piously. Yet permission, in the judgment of Suarez, is not merely a negation of prohibiti∣on, but conjunct with a positive operation in concurring to the act of sinne; which Aqui∣nas hath proved to be à Deo, from God, though the obliquity of the act be not. And the truth is, man himselfe is not operative in sinne, otherwise then as touching the substance of the act. For sinne, as sinne hath noe cause efficient, but deficient only, as Austin hath long agoe delivered; neither hath he been opposed herein by any that I know. Observe how with him to hinder, and absolutely to hinder is made all one; yet to will, and absolutely to will in God, is not all one in his opinion. I doe not find that God left Adam in the hand of his counsell. For he forbade him to eate of the forbidden fruit, which is somewhat more then to disswade from it. And yet to perswade or disswade another, is not to leave him in the hands of his own counsells. For it is to impart unto him another counsell. Yet though we disswade a brother, and so not leave him in the hand of his own counsell; yet we still

leave him to his own free will. Both these I have insisted upon more at large in the second book in my Vindiciae, Sect: 2. Digres. 3. It is true God hath noe need of setting forth his own glory, noe more then he hath need of making the world; but the existence of sin may be and is necessarily required to the setting forth of God's glory in some attributes of his. For neither can the glory of God's mercy appeare in pardoning sinne, nor the glo∣ry of his vindicative justice, (called in Scripture his wrath, Rom: 9. 23.) in punishing sinne, unlesse there be sinne to be pardoned, and sinne to be punished: Nor the glory of his power and wisedome in working good out of evill, unlesse God give way to the com∣mitting of Evill. And if upon God's permission of sinne, it be not necessary that sinne exist, then it is not in the Allmighty power of God infallibly to procure the ma∣nifestation of his glory, either in the way of mercy pardoning it, or in the way of justice punishing it. But seeing these reasons are not considerable with this supercilious Theo∣logue, it should seeme likely, that looke what he substitutes in the place thereof, will prove substantiall, and satisfie such understandings as his own: And that he represents out of Tertullian, namely, because man is made by God a free creature. This reason was represen∣ted by Arminius before him, and that out of Tertullian, Arminius his huskes are pleasing * 1.204 to him. Such was the condition of the prodigall child when he forsooke his Father; the provender of Swine was acceptable to him. Yet he could not have enough of that. Is not man a free creature to performe naturall acts as well as morall; and morall good as well as evill? Nay are not the Children of God made free by Christ to the performance of actions spirituall? What therefore must God only permit them to performe them, and by noe meanes worke them to the performance of faith, and repentance, and all manner of obedience; yea and keep them from sinning against him, as he kept Abimelech, Gen: 20? See how this Authour displaies himselfe ere he was aware; and withall what the reason is why he affects to deale upon reprobation only, not upon election or grace least his vile opinion miserably defacing the glory of God's grace might appeare with open face in 'its proper colours. Yet it breakes forth more then he could wish, in setting down the end why God permits sinne, to wit, because men are free creatures, therefore it becomes not God to worke their wills to this or that, but only to permit them to doe what they will; if they will sinne to permit them; if they would doe any good worke whether it be faith or repentance, or any other good worke, or to abstaine from sinne, to permit that also; whereby it is apparent that God by his opinion hath noe more hand in working a man to any good worke (excepting the act of commanding and perswading the one, and not the other) then in working them unto evill. For because they are free creatures, therefore it becomes God to leave them unto themselves, and permit them to doe what they will, whether it be good or evill: otherwise God should nullifie his own institution in making them free Agents. Yet consider farther how herein he contradicts the very principles of his own side, both Arminians and Iesuites. For Arminius maintaines that God can hinder a man effectually from the committing of sinne without any prejudice to the liberty of their wills. The like doe the Iesuites maintaine in their doctrine of grace effectuall in the way of congruity, namely, that God can bring any man to faith, to obedience, to any good worke, and accordingly preserve him from any sinne by vertue of grace effectuall, which is shaped by them in such a manner, as to be noe way prejudiciall to the liberty of their wills. But Tertullians authority hath abused his fancy, and exposed him to lay open himselfe in so shamefull a manner. Yet Tertullian will not serve his turn any more, then it doth serve Arminius his turne, as I have shewed in my answer to Arminius lib. 1. part. prima de praedest. Sect: 7, and that at large. Secondly, the reasons he brings for the con∣tradistinction of decree permissive, from decree operative, are very vaine. For 1, the decree operative is extrinsecall to the sinner, as well as the decree permissive. Secondly, neither hath it any influence at all upon the sinne (as which admits noe efficient cause thereof be∣ing of a mere privative nature) but upon the substance of the act, which I presume this Authour will not deny. Thirdly, the decree permissive is not an antecedent only, but such as being put, sinne followes of necessitie, as well as upon the position of the decree ope∣rative; that is of necessitie, by supposition, not necessity absolute. For as Aquinas hath de∣livered and proved, not only the things themselves come to passe by vertue of God's de∣cree, but, modi rerum, severall conditions of them. As for example, necessary things, necessari∣ly; contingent things, contingently; free actions, freely; And that thus the things permit∣ted do alwaies come to passe, not only Piscator with our Divines, as Mr. Perkins, Doctor Whitaker and Pareus doe avouch, but Vorstius also and Arminius, as I have shewed in my Vindiciae, lib. 2. digres. 3. Arminius his words are these, if God permits a man to will this or

that, necesse est, it must needs be, ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum, that no kind of argument move him to will it. Navarettus the Dominican professeth the same, in quaest. 19. pag. prima art. 6. pag. 65. col: 1.

1. That this destinction is rejected by our Divines this Authour brings no tollerable evidence. As for Beza here it is confessed, that he acknowledgeth God to permit sinne, and whereas he addes that he wills it too, it is nothing contradictory to the former. For to permit sinne (speaking of permission divine) is to will that sinne shall come to passe by God's permission. And Austin hath professed of those things that come to passe by God's * 1.205 permission, that they come to passe, Deo volente, God willing them. And the Scripture ac∣knowledgeth as much, that the Kings in prostituting their Royall authority, to the exe∣cuting the pleasure of the Beast, did herein fulfill the will of God. So that God's permis∣sive decree is as effectuall in its kind, as the operative decree in 'its kind; thus farre, that like as what God meanes to worke shall come to passe; so look what God meanes to per∣mit, that also shall come to passe. Neither doe I know any Arminian or Jesuite, that de∣nies God's operative decree, as touching the very act of sinne, by way of concurrence in the producing of it. When Calvin will have the evill of sinne come to passe, Deo volente, God willing it, he denies not any more then Beza doth, that it comes to passe by God's permission of it. But Calvin rests not in a bare permissions and no marvaile. For the Scrip∣ture saith not, that God permitted Pharaoh to refuse to let Israel goe, but plainly and en∣ergetically thus; I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he shall not let Israel goe, I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he shall follow after them, I will rent the Kingdome from Solomon; not I will permit it to be rented; and so throughout. Bellarmine himselfe contents not himselfe with a bare permission, but farther saith, God doth rule and governe the wills of wicked men; yea, torquet & flectit, he wrests and bends them. And Austin often saith, he enclines them unto evill. And whereas it is farther added out of Calvin that a man is blind, volente & ju∣bente Deo, God willing and commanding it. Is it not expresse Scripture, Es. 6. 10. Make the heart of this people fat, make their eares heavy, and shut their eyes. So that Calvin doth but accomodate himselfe to Scripture phrase. But when we come to the explication of this either in Christian reason, or by comparing one place of Scripture with an other, we say that to Make their hearts fat, their eares heavy, and to shut their eys: And to give them the * 1.206 Spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and eares that they should not heare; Is no more then, not to give them hearts to perceive, nor eyes to see, nor eares to heare. Yet where Calvin saith this, I cannot find, the quotation here is so disturbed; but I guesse the Authour would referre us to lib. 1. Institut. cap. 18. prima & secunda Sect: But I find no such thing there, but speaking of God's providence in blinding Ahab, thus he writes, Vult Deus perfi∣dum Ahab decipi; God will have perfidious Ahab to be deceived. This is plaine out of the * 1.207 1 Kings 22. 20. Who shall entise Ahab that he may goe, and fall at Ramoth Gilead; operam suam offert Diabolus ad eam rem, The Divell offers his service for this, saith Calvin. And doth not the Scripture expresly testifie as much? There came forth a Spirit and stood before the Lord, and said I will entise him; And the Lord said unto him, wherewith? And he said, I will goe out and be a false Spirit in the mouth of all his Prophets. Calvin goes on, Mittitur cum * 1.208 certo mandato, ut sit Spiritus mendax in ore omnium Prophetarum; God sends him with a cer∣taine command to become a lying Spirit in the mouth of all Ahab's Prophets. This also the Scripture testifies as expresly, as the former; Then the Lord said, thou shalt entise him and prevaile also; Goe forth and doe so. Now let the indifferent judge, whether this Authour * 1.209 might not as well calumniate the Holy Ghost the Inditer of this Scripture, as Calvin who proceeds but according unto Scripture in that which he delivers. Now let every sober man judge whether hereby it doth not manifestly appeare, Excoecari Achabum, that Ahab was blinded by the Devill, Deo volente ac jubente, the Lord willing and commanding it; but this taken apart from the instance in reference whereunto it is delivered, a man might suspect his meaning were, that God commands a man to shut his own eyes, & blind him∣selfe. And judge I pray whether to say, that this whole providence of God concerning Ahab, was no more then permission, deserves not to be called, figmentum, a fiction, as indeed Calvin calleth it. To this he addes the joynt profession of the Apostles touching God's providence in crucifying of Christ; in Absalom's incest, the Chaldees bloudy execution in the land of Iuda, and the Assyrians before them, which in Scripture is called the worke of * 1.210 God &c. And concludes it to be manifest, Nugari eos & ineptire, qui in locum providentiae Dei nudam permissionem substituunt, that they doe but toy and trifle, who in place of God's pro∣vidence substitute a naked permission. And this Authour doth but calumniate Calvin's ex∣pression, in rendring the word ineptire, by playing the foole. Ineptire in the proprietie

thereof, is in this case to faile of fit and congruous interpretation and accommodation. And may he not justly taxe those who understand such Scriptures, as speake of God's smiting men with the Spirit of slumber and giddinesse, of blinding their mindes, infatuating and hard∣ning their hearts of a permission, and suffering of men to be blinded and hardned? I had thought common sense might have justified him in this; taking Calvin aright, who denies not per∣mission in all this, but nudam permissionem, naked permission; as much as to say these Scrip∣ture passages doe signifie more then permission; And as I have said before Bellarmin him∣selfe doth not satisfie himselfe with a naked permission in such like providence divine as here is mentioned. I thinke he may justly say that to explicate excecation and obduration by permission is such an explication as will satisfie no sober man, and that such a solu∣tion is too frivolous. And as for God's prescience, it is apparent that the horrible outra∣ges committed upon the holy Son of God, the Scripture testifies not to have been fore∣knowen only by God, but by the hand and counsell of God predetermined also; & more then this, cleare reason doth justifie that the ground of God's foreknowing ought, is his foredetermining of it, as I have often proved by invincible demonstra∣tion.

2. Who mistakes the nature of permission most, we or this censurer, let the indif∣ferent judge. It is apparent that he puts no difference between permission humane, and permission Divine. Sure I am Suarez requires to permission divine a concurrence to the act, the obliquity whereof is permitted. And more then that both Scotus of old without question, and the Dominicans of late, and Bradwardine before them maintaine this con∣currence to be by way of determining the will to every act thereof. But all these mistake the nature of permission, if we believe this Authour upon his word where∣in he carrieth himselfe very authoritatively, no Pope like him. Yet he is ready to give his reason for it, though with manifest contradiction to himselfe, but let us consider it.

1. Permission is an act of God's consequent and judiciary will, by which he punisheth men for abusing their freedom &c. Most untrue, and manifestly convictable of untruth by that which himselfe delivered but a little before in this very Section, where he said, It is true that God hath decreed to suffer sinne; for otherwise there would be none. By this it is manifest that whensoever sinne is committed, there had place God's permission of sinne, otherwise there would have been no sinne, therefore permission had place in the very first sinne that was committed by man, and Angells. Judge Reader with what felicity he comes to censure and correct the mistakes of others about permission. As Austin some∣times said of one opposing him, noverit se esse obduratum; so mayest thou not say of this Authour in this discourse of his, noverit se esse excaecatum, let him take notice how him∣selfe is blinded? The Lord giving Israel up to their own hearts lusts; he like a resolute Do∣ctor will have to proceed by way of mere permission. Yet the Lord saith not, he permit∣ted * 1.211 them to their own lusts; and Rom: 1. 24, 26, 28. Observe, first looke what he permitted came to passe throughout, even to abominable courses. Secondly, observe, the judgment of God is noted herein. They received the recompence of their own errour as was meet. What? And are God's judgments executed only by God's permission, and that by the hands of them that are judged and punished? Such is the accuratenes of this Authours divinity comming to correct the mistakes of others about permission. And for the proofe of all this we have this Authour's bare word without any reason or authority represen∣ted by him. As for that of Ezechiel not chap: 18. 39, but chap: 20. 39 Goe and serve every one his Idels; this hath the forme of a command, rather then of a permission; but the Lord hereby signifies, that in serving him, while they serve other Gods, they doe but profane his holy name in serving him, and undoubtedly they provoked God more hereby, then the heathens who served not him at all, but other Gods only. So that the Lord seemes to signifie, that he had rather, they should not serve him at all, as Revelations 3. I would thou wer'st either hot or cold, but seeing thou art luke-warme, I will spue thee out of my mouth; But be it as the Authour would have it, did here God begin to permit them? their former disobedience was it not a consequent of God's permission? For if God had not permitted their disobedience, surely it had not been by the Authours discourse in the beginning of this Section. As touching that Revelations 22. 11. I hope by the same rule of this positive Theologue, not only their continuing to be unjust, was by God's permissi∣on, but their first being and beginning to be unjust was by God's permission also. And surely if this man's word be of any credit, all sinners were first permitted to sinne, other∣wise

they had never sinned, and not the obstinate and willfull only. Were not the An∣gells innocent before their first sin? was not Adam innocent before his first sin? and did not God permit both Angells and men to sin their first sin? If not; what truth is in this authour's word, when he said, God hath decreed to suffer sin? for otherwise there would be none. And if he be not worthy to be believed, in this his credit is crackt, and deserves not to be believed in ought.

2. We have been more beholding unto this Authour, since he came to meet with our distinctions, then throughout all his former discourse; as I have shewed already in part, & shall discover more by God's helpe (not his permission only) ere we part from this. He seemes to be conscious of some thing and fearefull of giving too much advantage, as ap∣peares by his expressiō, when he saith that permission (of sin; for so he should say) supposeth a possibility of sinning or not sinning. Now this is nothing congruous to his former expres∣sions whereby it was made to suppose that, a man is able to stand. For to be able to stand, is to have an active power in him whereby he is able to stand; but to have a possibili∣ty of standing, or not sinning is not so. For though a man hath no power in himselfe to stand or to abstaine from sinne, yet if there be a power in God to makehim stand, and to preserve him from falling, this is sufficient to make good, that a man hath a possibility of standing and abstaining from sinne. And we are willing to confesse that God is able not only to preserve any man that stands from falling, but also to raise a∣ny * 1.212 man that is fallen; and to make him stand. Thus Florus, Habet homo post illam dam∣nationem liberum arbitrium, quo propriâ voluntate inclinari potest & inclinatur ad malum, habet liberum arbitrium quo possit assurgere ad bonum; Ut autem assurgat ad bonum, non est propriae virtutis, sed gratiae Dei miserantis. Nam & qui mortuus est dici potest posse vivere, non tamen suâ virtute, sed Dei. Ita & liberum arbitrium hominis semel sauciatum, semel mortuum potest sanari, non tamen suâ virtutè, sed gratiâ miserantis Dei. Et ideo omnes ho∣mines admonentur, omnibus verbum praedicatur, quia habent posse credere, posse converti ad Deum; ut verbo extrinsecus admonente, & Deo intus suscitante, qui audiunt, reviviscant. After Adam's fall man hath free will, whereby of his own accord he may be and is inclined unto evill, he hath free will whereby he may arise unto that which is good; but to arise unto Good is not of his own power, but of Gods grace commiserating. For of him also who is dead, it may be said, that he may live, yet not of his own power, but by the power of God. So the free will of men being once wounded, once dead may be healed not by 'its own power, but by the grace of God shewing mercy. And therefore all men are admonished, the word is preached un∣to all, because this they have that they may believe, they may be converted unto God; to the end that by the word admonishing outwardly, and God stirring them up inwardly, they which heare may be revived. Observe by the way a manifest incongruity in saying that permis∣sion is a not hindring them from falling, who are able to stand For they who are permit∣ted to fall, and not hindered from falling, are supposed to stand, and not only to be able to stand. It seemes this Authour cannot endure that Permission of sinne, should consist in the withholding of a grace needfull, to abstaine from sinne. Whence it followeth e∣vidently that in this Authour's opinion, either God's permission of sinne is not the withholding of any grace at all; or if it be it is the withholding only of such a grace, without which neverthelesse man may keep himselfe from sinne; and consequently, though such a grace be granted, yet it is indifferent for him to sinne, as well as to ab∣staine from sinne; If it be no withholding of grace at all, it followes that like as when a man sins it is not for want of grace: So when a man abstaines from sinne, it is not by vertue of any grace of God granted him thereunto; Yet the Lord tells * 1.213 King Abimelech expresly I kept thee from sinning against me. If he pretends that some grace is withheld whensoever a man sinneth, but will not say that is was ne∣cessary for the avoiding of sinne it followeth that when man is permitted to sinne, he is no more apt to sinne, then while such grace was denied him, and conse∣quently no more apt to abstaine from sinne when such a grace is granted him, and consequently in granting such a grace he permits him still to sinne, as well as in denying it; and in denying he permits him to doe good, as much as in granting it; So that still it is not God that keepeth a man from sinne, as often as he abstaineth from it, but merely the power of his own free will. Whereby it is evident that this Authour as well denies, that God is the Authour of any good, as that he is the Authour of any evill: But man is Authour of the one as well as of the other. The power of doing good he will grant is from God, neither can it be de∣nied, but that the power of doing evill is from God. He will grant likewise that

God is ready to concurre to any good act if man will, and I presume he will not deny, but that God concurres also to the substance of every evill act. The only difference that remaines is this; God perswades only to good, and disswades only that which is evill. Now this third and last assertion we grant as well as he. Yet he layes to our charge that we make God the Authour of evill, but cares not at all how he denies God to be the Au∣thour of any good in the actions of men, and makes noe place for any grace save such, as is hortatory, which is performed usually by the ministery of men. Yet consider what Bradwardine sometimes Arch-Bishop of Canterbury Elect hath written in this kind be∣fore Luther or Calvin were borne. The title of the fourth chapter of his second booke is this. That free will being tempted cannot of his own strength without the helpe of God and his grace overcome any temptation. Of the first this, that free will strengthned with what crea∣ted grace soever cannot without another speciall succour of God overcome any temptation. of the sixth this, that, That speciall succour of God is the unconquerable grace of God. Of the seventh this; That no man though not tempted, can by the strength of his free will alone without created grace or with created grace, how great soever it be, without the speciall asistance of God avoide a∣ny sin: & all these propositions he demonstrates with variety of argument. Behold the inge∣nuity of this Authour; He flies in the face of Calvin and Beza, and other our Divines, for maintaining that unlesse God by his grace keep and preserve a man effectually from sin∣ning, it cannot be that he should abstaine from sinne. Bradwardine maintained the same before any of these were borne yet he saith nothing to him, lets all his arguments alone; but upbraides us for maintaining the same doctrine, without giving any reason to con∣vict us of our errour. Adde to this, which I have omitted, the Corolary of that seventh chapter in Bradwardin formerly mentioned is this, That it is the will of God, which preserves them that are tempted from falling, and them that are not tempted, both from temptation and from sinne. Not one of the arguments whereby he confirmes any of these positions, doth this Authour goe about to answer. In like manner Alvarez. Positâ permissione divinâ in∣fallibiliter * 1.214 peccat homo; upon supposition of God's permission, man sins infallibly. The propositi∣on he intends to prove in that disputation is this, Therefore a man is not converted because he is not aided of God. But both he and we deny that hereupon a man sinneth necessarily alwaies, but only in some cases. In some cases it followeth, as namely a man borne in sinne, and in the state of corruption, the naturall fruits whereof are infidelity and impenitency, untill God affords a man the grace of regeneration, he cannot believe, he cannot repent. They that are in the flesh cannot please God. Thou after the hardnesse of thy heart that cannot repent. Therefore they could not believe. In which case God is not the cause of infidelity, and * 1.215 impenitency; but these proceed naturally and necessarily from that originall corruption wherein they are conceived and borne. God is only the naturall cause why this their na∣turall corruption continues uncured. For none can cure it but God, it being a work no∣thing inferior to the raising of them from the dead. Yet he is no culpable cause of this. For as much as he is not bound to any, but he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth. So that necessarily without the grace of regeneration, every man continueth in his naturall corruption, devoyd of faith, of hope, and love. These being supernaturall, and whereunto no man can attaine with out supernaturall grace. In like manner, hence it followeth that no naturall man can performe any morall good act in a gracious & accep∣table manner in the sight of God, because ••he fountaines of such performances, are not found in naturall men. But they have a free power as to commit any naturall evill worke; so to abstaine from it; though not in a gracious manner: Free power as to abstaine from any vertuous act, so to performe it also, though not in a gracious manner. They may be temperate, chast, just, and the like; but their vertuous actions are not truly vertues in a Christian account, because they know not God, nor Christ, much lesse doe they believe in him, and performe these vertuous actions out of their love unto him. If Maccovius, and Whitaker, and Pareus be of the same mind, and the Dominicans with them, and Bradwar∣dine before them all; let the indifferent Reader consider what an hungry opposition is made by this Authour, not offering to answer any one of their Arguments, nor of mine neither, in my Vindiciae; Nor saith ought by way of reply upon any answer to the like ar∣gument of Arminius. The resolution of all that here he delivers, determining in a rule * 1.216 himselfe proposeth, without reason or authority to justifie it. A rule as here it is applyed conteining a notorious untruth. For causa deficiens in no case can be efficiens in proper speech, any more, then causa efficiens can be accounted deficiens, unlesse it be understood in divers kinds As for example, efficiens naturaliter may be deficiens moraliter, and deficiens moraliter may be efficiens naturaliter. An efficient cause naturally, may be deficient morally,

and so a cause deficient morally, may be efficient naturally. Least of all can it have place in the present question, which is of the cause of sinne. For sinne as sinne, evill as evill, non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem; hath no cause efficient, but deficient only; as Austin hath long agoe determined; and it is a rule generally received and never that I know de∣nied of any. Againe causa deficiens in necessariis may be culpable I confesse, and so inter∣pretativè (as they say) may be interpreted to be as good as an efficient. As in a civill consi∣deration it is said of the Magistrate, that, Qui non vetat peccare cum possit, jubet. He that forbiddeth not a man to sinne when it is in his power, or when he hath authority to forbid, 'tis as if he should command the committing of that sin. Now this is only in such a case, where the necessitie respects the person who is the deficient cause, as namely in case he be bound in duty to afford help and succour to him that cannot keepe himselfe from sinning with∣out the succour of an other, not otherwise. And therefore it reacheth not to God, who is not bound to preserve any man or creature from sinning; Least of all is he bound to re∣generate a man that is borne in sinne. Adam was created in all sufficiency that the reaso∣nable creature was capable of, without any pronenes unto evill, but rather in a morall pro∣pension to that which was good; And his fall hath brought this corruption upon all man∣kind, even a necessitie of sinning, as Arminius and Corvinus confesse. He wanted no pow∣er to doe that which was good, or to abstaine from sin, but ever since his fall, impotency to that which is good, & pronenesse unto that which is evill hath been the naturall inhe∣ritance of all mankind. And as for the permission of Adam's fall, his sin was in a thing na∣turally indifferent, the holines of his nature not inclining him more to abstain from that fruit any more, then to partake of it. Neither doe we say that God did withhold from Adam any grace that these our adversaries maintaine to be necessary for the avoiding of that sinne which was committed by him. How Adam himselfe was brought by Eve to eate of that fruit is not expressed. As for Eve the temptation which Satan used with her, & which did prevaile is expressed: He allured her with the representation of the power∣full nature of that, to make them as Gods knowing good and evill, & he made this seem credible by the very denomination which God gave unto the Tree, the Tree of knowledge of good and evill. It seemes not likely that she knew who it was that spake unto her in the Serpent, nor that she was acquainted with the fall of Angells. Then againe the desire of knowledge, is no evill thing it selfe, or stands in any contradiction to the integrity of a rea∣sonable creature: Nay nothing more agreeable to the nature of the best, it brings such a perfection with it. Only the errour was, in affecting it this way. God did not keep the De∣vill off; nor reveale unto her who it was that spake unto her; much lesse his apostaticall condition; least of all his project to supplant them. Neither did he quicken that holy feare which he had inspired into her to resist it at the first, & to goe to her husband to acquaint him with it. She might thinke that the knowledge of good and evill might make her more fit for the service of God, then unfit. All which considered, her will being moved to seek this perfection by tasting of such a fruit, there was no cause or reason to hinder her from tasting it, save only the consideration of God's prohibition. For the will of every rea∣sonable creature is naturally apt to affect that which is good, and though that good may prove evill in some circumstance, yet if that circumstance be not considered, the will pro∣ceeds to affect it. How long the Devill was exercised in this temptation we know not. In∣consideration is conceived by Durandus to be the originall of that sinne of theirs; and God was not bound to maintaine this consideration quick in her, and of the danger of such a transgression. In fine she came to a will & resolution to tast of it; to the producing of this act, as a naturall thing, the Lord concurred, as all confesse, namely to the substance of the act. The question is whether he concurred to the effecting of it absolutely or con∣ditionally? It was as true of Adam and Eve, that in him they lived and moved and had their being, as it is of us. We say God as a first cause moves every second cause; but agreeably to their natures; Necessary agents to worke every thing they worke necessarily; Free agents to doe every thing they doe, freely. But to say that God made them velle modo vellent, to will in case they would will, is so absurd as nothing more; The act of willing being hereby made the condition of it selfe, and consequently both before and after it selfe. See what I have delivered concerning this in my Vindiciae lib. 2. Digr: 3. and Digr: 6. of the nature of permission, more at large, where unto this Authour is content to answer just nothing.

Sect: 7.

There are two things say they in every ill act. First, the materiall part which is the substance of the action. * 1.217 Secondly, the formall part which is the evill or obliquitie of it. God is the Authour of the action it selfe, but

not of the obliquitie and evill that cleaveth to it, as he that causeth a lame horse to goe, is the cause of his go∣ing, but not of his lame going. And therefore it followeth not from their opinion that God is the Authour of sinne. First, all sinnes receive not this distinction, because of many sins, the acts themselves are sinfull; as of the eating of the forbidden fruit, and Saul's sparing of Agag, and the fat beasts of the Amalekites. Se∣condly, It is not true that they make the decree of God only of actions, & not of their aberrations. For they make it to be the cause of all those meanes that lead to damnation and therefore of sinfull actions, as sinfull, and not as bare actions. For actions deserve damnation, not as actions but as trangressions of Gods law. 3. To this simile I say that the Rider or Master that shall resolve first to flea his horse, or knock him on the head, and then to make him lame, that for his halting, he may kill him, is undoubtedly the cause of his hal∣ting: And so God if he determine to cast men into hell, and then to bring them into a state of sinne, that for their sinnes he may bring them to ruine, we cannot conceive him to be lesse then the Authour, as well of their sins, as of those actions to which they doe inseperably adhere, and that out of Gods intention to destroy them.

This distinction of that which is materiall and that which is formall in sinne is common∣ly used by Aquinas 1. secun: q: 71. art: 6, in corp: Augustinus in definitione peccati posuit duo, * 1.218 Unum quod pertinet ad substantiam actûs humani, quod est quasi materiale in peccato; cum di∣cit dictum vel factum vel concupitum; Aliud autem quod pertinet ad rationem mali quod est quasi formale in peccato cum dixit contra legem aeternam. So then the substance of the act is the materiall part in sinne; And the opposition of this act to the law of God is the for∣mall part of it, both according to Aquinas; and according to Austin also. And q: 75. art: 1. corp. He defineth sinne to be Actus inordinatus, an inordinate act, and distinguisheth the act from the inordination of it. q: 79. art: 2. He proposeth the question, whether the act of sin be from God? and in the conclusion resolves it thus, Cum actus peccati sit ens, necessariò est à Deo, Considering that the act of sinne is a thing having being, necessarily it is of God. And in the body of the Article, Dicendum quod actus peccati & est ens, & est actus, & ex utro{que} ha∣bet quod sit à Deo; The resolution is that the act of sinne, is both a thing that hath being, and an act, and in each condition it hath, that it is of God. And he proves this both by authority and by reason. As for the defect of this act, that non reducitur in Deum tanquam in causam, sed in liberum arbitrium, that is not charged upon God as the cause thereof, but on a man's free will. And he illustrates it thus, Sicut defectus claudicationis reducitur in tibiam curvam sicut in causam, non autem in virtutem motivam à quâ tamen causatur quicquid est motionis in clau∣dicatione. Like as the defect called halting is charged upon a crooked legge as the cause thereof, and not upon the motive faculty, though from it proceeds all the motion that is found in the hal∣ting: Neither did I ever read any School. Divine that contradicted this distinction. Mr. Mason doth without alleadging any authority for it. Yet he might have alleadged Ar∣minius opposing after this manner, though before him, that I know, not any.

1. We say not only of many sins, but of every sinne, which hath any act therein, that the Acts themselves are sinfull, because every such sinne, being actuall, it is Actus cum defe∣ctu, an act with a defect, that is an act defective. As Aquinas speakes in the place immediat∣ly before alleadged, and this defect is in respect of the law of God. As Austin defineth sinne to be, dictum, factum, concupitum contra legem Dei, A thought, word, or deed against the law of God. And this is enough I thinke to denominate it sinfull But the argument used by this Authour is the very same which was formerly used by Arminius, and whereunto I have answered; lib. 2. de permiss. Sect: 21, and that after this manner. Be it so that the act it selfe is forbidden, and consequently the act it selfe is inordinate; but what will it therefore follow that these two are not to be distinguished, to wit, the act, and the inordination of it? a strange li∣berty of disputing. A man's hand is sometimes inordinate, as being monstrous, either having too much, or too little; as either wanting five fingers, or having more then five: what therefore shall it not be lawfull for us to distinguish between the hand and the monstrosity of the hand? 2. The wall it selfe is white; what therefore shall we not distinguish between the wall, and the white co∣lour of it? A man himselfe is vertuous and vicious; shall this hinder us from due distinguishing between the man and his morall condition, whether vertuous or vicious; Many other arguments are represented by Arminius which this Authour toucheth not; yet in the place forementioned I have shaken them all to peeces, such is the rotten condition of them. And over & above I have proved, not that in every sin the act is to be distinguished from the inordination of it; but that in every sin of commission there is place for this distinction, and that after this manner. Every sinne of commission, is an act inordinate; but in every inordinate act we are to distinguish between the act it selfe, and the inordination of it. And that the act and the inordination of it are two, I prove thus. That if they are one and the same then we may well say that the act is an inordination; but this is most false. For nothing can be affirmed or predicated of the same thing both in the abstract, and concrete (God himselfe excepted) As for example you may say of a wall, that it is white, you cannot say of it that it is whitenes. For the wall is in the

predicament of substance, but whitenes being a colour is in the predicament of quality. 2. A∣gaine an inordination is a privation of order. But no act is formally a privation, and consequent∣ly neither can it be formally an inordination. 3. An entitie positive, & a terme privative can∣not be one and the same formally, but two distinct notions. Now every act is a positive thing, but inordination is a mere privation. 4. Lastly God is confessed by all to be the cause of the act, but if the act be all one with the inordination, he should be the cause not of the act only, but of the inordination, that is of the sinfullnes also.

2. Observe his shifting carriage. It is our Tenet that God is the Authour of the acti∣on it selfe, but not of the obliquity: and himselfe hath expresly acknowledged this to be our tenet in the beginning of this Section Now whereas he makes shew here of proving that we make God the Authour not of the action only, but of the obliquity also, he performes no such matter; but only this, that we make the object of God's decree, not the action on∣ly, but the aberration also; but in all this there is no contradiction unto us; We willing∣ly grant that in as much as God permits sinne, he will have sinne come to passe, by his per∣mission, every good thing that comes to passe, he will have it come to passe by his being the Authour of it and effecting it; the evill that comes to passe, he will have come to passe also, not by his being the Authour of it and effecting it, but only by his permitting of it. So that still that of Austin holds good. Non aliquid fit nisi omnipotens fieri velit. Not any thing comes to passe unlesse God will have it come to passe. And according to the eleaventh article of religion established in the Church of Ireland, God from all eternity did by his un∣changeable counsell ordaine whatsoever in time shall come to passe; and according to the ex∣presse word of God testifiing that the tenne Kings in giving their Kingdomes did here∣in doe the will of God. And that the horrible outrages committed upon the person of * 1.219 the holy Son of God by Herod. Pontius Pilate, the Gentiles and people of Israel were by the hand and counsell of God before determined to be done We say sinfull courses (not hand over head) but unrepented of, lead unto damnation, but not as meanes. For they are neither man's meanes; for if they were, then the end also whereunto they tend, should be inten∣ded by him; Neither are they any meanes of God: For all meanes are the workes of him that intends the end; So is not the sinne of man the worke of God, but the permission of sinne is his worke: And this is the meanes which he intends thereby to bring to passe his intended end, which yet on the part of Reprobates is not the damnation of them, but the manifestation of his glory in the way of vindicative justice, which in Scripture phrase is called the Declaration of his wrath. For God made all things for himselfe, even the wicked a∣gainst the day of evill. And to this end he doth not only permit them both to sinne, and to * 1.220 persevere therein without repentance, but also to damne them for their sinne. And this worke of God namely the permission of sinne is as requisite for the manifestation of his mercy on the part of his Elect, as for the Declaration of his wrath, on the part of repro∣bates. Yet who was ever found so absurd as to say that we make the sinfull actions of men to be the meanes which God useth to bring about the salvation of his Elect. So little cause have we to make use of this distinction as the action it selfe and the sinfullnesse thereof, to shew in what sense it is a meanes which God useth whereby to bring about the damnation of man. For we utterly deny sinne to be any such meanes of God, but the permission thereof only is the meanes whereby to bring about not their damnation, as this Authour suggesteth, but the meanes (together with the damnation for sinne) where∣by he bringeth to passe the declaration of his just wrath. But men of this Authours spi∣rit; unlesse they be suffered to calumniate at pleasure; and corrupt their opposites Tenet at pleasure, they can say just nothing. It is true actions deserve damnation only as they are transgressions of God's law, but we deny that these transgressions are God's meanes, but on∣ly the permission of them is his meanes; and by permitting these transgressions, as also by damning for them, he brings to passe his glorious end, to wit, the declaration of his just wrath. 3ly, It is most untrue that God brings any man into a state of sinne; He brings himselfe into it most freely, God having no other hand in the sinne but as permit∣ting it, that is as not preserving from it. Indeed if he did bring men into sinne, and they not rather bring themselves thereinto, he were the Authour of it. But it is well knowne that sinne cannot transcend the region of acts naturall. All acts supernaturall must needs be the worke of grace, and truly good; But every sinfull act is merely naturall, never su∣pernaturall. Now never any of our Divines denyed a man liberty in his greatest corrup∣tion, unto acts naturall; the Devill himselfe hath liberty thus farre. It is true originall sinne is brought upon all by the sinne of Adam; For hereby the fountaine of humane nature became corrupted; but in this very sin of Adam we had an hand, if there be any truth in Scripture

which testifies that, In Adā we all have sinned. This is the doctrin which the Author spights, though he be more wise then to publish to the world his spleen against it: And I have * 1.221 seen under his hand where he denies originall sinne to be veri nominis pecatum, sinne tru∣ly so called And albeit M. Hoord makes a flourish in saying that God might justly damne all man-kind for the sinne of Adam; and that also was this Authour's doctrine in the lec∣tures which he read at Magdalen Hall; yet I have good cause to doubt whether this be his opinion now, and not rather the same with Pelagius his opinion, saving the difference which Pelagius did put between not entering into the Kingdome of heaven and damna∣tion. As for all other sins which we call actuall, they are, as I said, naturall only, and not supernaturall; and therefore no man wants liberty, as to doe them, so to abstaine from them; Only he wants a morall and Spirituall liberty to abstaine from them in a gracious manner, according to that of Aquinas. Licet aliquis non possit gratiam adipisci qui repro∣batur à Deo, tamen quod in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur, ex ejus libero arbitrio contingit. * 1.222 Though a man who is reprobated of God cannot obtaine grace, yet that he falleth into this or that sinne it comes to passe of his own free will. It is true also even in God's providence concerning acts naturall, there is a great mystery. For as God foretold David that, his neighbour should * 1.223 lye with his wives; and though he sinned secretly, yet the Lord would doe this openly. So he foretold that, upon that Altar which Ieroboam erected, a child that should be borne of the house * 1.224 of David, Iosiah by name, should burne the Prophets bones. And that Cyrus also should build him a Citty and let goe his captives: Yet who doubts, but that Cyrus did freely deliver the Jewes out of Babylon? and Iosiah did as freely burne the Prophets bones upon the alter in Bethel, as ever they did action in their lives? So Absalom did as freely defile his Fathers Concubines. Then againe we deny that the damnation of any man is the end that God intends, but the manifestation of his own glory. And therfore though he hath made the wicked against the day of evill; yet both that, and all things he hath made for himselfe. And to this tends both the permission of sinne, and the damnation of Reprobates for their * 1.225 sin; And in no moment of nature, are either of these intended before the other, both be∣ing joyntly meanes for the procuring of another end. And if permission of sinne were first in intention with God, and then damnation as these men would have it, it followeth evi∣dently by the most generally received rules of Schooles that permission of sinne should be last in execution, that is men should first be damned, and afterwards permitted to fall into sinne. This is the issue of these men's Orthodoxy and accurate Divinity.

Section 8.

The will is determined to an Object two waies. 1. By compulsion against the bent and inclination of * 1.226 it. 2. By necessity according to the naturall desire and liking of it. God's predestination say they, de termineth the will to sinne this last way, but not the first; It forceth no man to doe that which he would not, but carrieth him towards that which he would. When men sin, tis true they cannot choose; And it is as true, they will not choose. It followeth not therefore from the grounds of their doctrine that God's decree is the cause of men's sins, but their own wicked wills.

1. The Ancients made no distinction between these two words (Necessity) and (Compulsion) but u∣sed them in this argument promiscuously; and did deny that God did necessitate men to sinne, least they should grant him hereby to be the Authour of sin, as I have touched before, and shall intimate againe after∣ward. Nor did the School men put any difference between them, as may appeare by the testimony of M. Calvin, who speaking of the School-distinction of the will's threefold liberty; from necessity, from sin, from Misery, saith, This distinction I could willingly receive, but that it confoundeth necessitie with coaction.

2. That which necessitateth the will to sinne is as truly the cause of sinne, as that which forceth it, be∣cause it maketh the sinne to be inevitably committed, which otherwise might be avoided; and therefore if the Divine decree necessitate man's will to sinne, it is as truly the cause of sinne as if it did inforce it.

3. That which necessitates the will to sinne, is more truly the cause of the sinne, then the will is; because it overruleth the will, and beareth all the stroke, taketh from it, 'its true liberty, by which it should be Lord of it selfe, and disporser of 'its own acts, and in respect of which it hath been usually called by Philosophers and Fathers too, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a power which is under the insuperable check and controule of no Lord but it selfe. It overruleth, I say, & maketh it become but a servile instrument, irresistably subject to superiour command and determination; And therefore is a truer cause of all such acts and sins, as proceed from the will so determined, then the will is. For when two Causes concurre to the producing of an effect, the one a principle overruling cause, the other but instrumentall, and wholly at the Devotion of the princi∣pall; then is the effect in all reason to be imputed to the principall, which by the force of 'its influxe and im∣pression produceth it, rather then to the subordinate and instrumentall which is but a mere servant in the production of it We shall find it ordinary in Scripture to ascribe the effect to the principall Agent. It is not ye that speak, saith Christ, but the Spirit of my Father that speaketh in you. I laboured more abundantly then * 1.227 they all, yet not I, but the grace of God which was in me. And I live: yet not I, but Christ liveth in me saith St. Paul. Gal: 2. 20. In these and many other places the effect or work spoken of, is taken from the instru∣ment,

and given to the principall agent; Which being so, though man's will worke with God's decree in the commission of sinne, and willeth the sin which it doth, yet seing what the will doth, it doth by the com∣manding power of God's Allmighty decree, and so it doth that otherwise it cannot doe; the sin committed cannot so rightly be ascribed to man's will, the inferiour as to God's necessitating decree the superiour cause.

4. That which makes a man sinne by way of necessitie, that is with, and not against his will, is the cause of sin in a worse manner, then that which constraineth him to sinne against his will; As he which by power∣full perswasions drawes a man to stab, to hang, to poison himselfe is in a grosser manner the cause of that e∣vill, and unnaturall action then he that by force compells him; because he maketh him to consent to his own death; And so if Gods decree doe not only make men sin; but sin willingly too; not only cause that they shall (malè agere) doe evill; but (malè velle) will evill, it hath the deeper hand in the sinne.

God determines the will to sinne by necessitie, though not by compulsion: this he obtrudes up∣on our Devines as their opinion, but quotes none, is it likely that he who quotes Beza to * 1.228 shew that in his opinion, God doth not only permit sinne, but will sinne; And Calvin to shew, that a man's mind is blinded, volente & jubente Deo; would not quote some or other of our Divines to prove that which he obtrudes upon them? If his common place booke could afford him any such quotation out of any one of them, to shew who they be, and where they say that, God determines the will to sinne by necessity though not by compulsion. Was there ever the like crimination made against any without naming them that say so, and the place where, and their own words? Or hath this man or any of his spirit deserved any credit to be trusted this way? The very phrase of determining in Latine is no word of course with our Divines in this argument. It is the phrase of the Dominicans. But doe they say that God determines the will to sinne? I doe not thinke he can produce one of them that expresseth himselfe so unscholastically, so absurdly. Alvarez saith that, God by his effectuall decree predetermineth second causes to worke. He saith that God doth predetermine * 1.229 the will to the act of sinne, as it is an act. That the first root of contingency is the will of God. Then to what doth God determine the will in their opinion? Is it to the act only and not to the manner of its production? Namely, to produce it voluntarily and freely? No∣thing lesse though this Authour counts it his wisdome to conceale this. God by his omnipo∣tency doth cause, that man whose heart he moves to will and will freely. Againe, God's generall concourse is a divine, immediate influence into second causes whereby they are, foremoved, ap∣plyed * 1.230 and determined to worke every one according to the condition of its nature; The naturall cause naturally; the free cause freely; as I have professedly delivered. Disput. 18. 23. And that in such sort freely, as they can choose to doe otherwise if they will, and that in the very instant wherin they doe what they doe. But come we to consider his answer.

1. Touching that which he saith of the Ancients, he gives us his bare word for it, as touching the confounding of necessitie and compulsion; yet Bernard I confesse willingly, in talking of liberty from necessity, understands by necessity coaction. He saith farther, that those Ancients did deny that God did necessitate men to sinne, least they should grant thereby that God is the Authour of sinne. But I doe not thinke he can shew this phrase of necessita∣ting the will any way to be found among the Ancients, what he hath touched before I have considered, what he shall intimate hereafter, I hope I shall not let it passe unsaluted. And the truth is to necessitate hath such an Emphasis with it as to perswade that whatsoe∣ver a man is necessitated to do, that he doth by constraint against his will. And it is a rule commonly received that Voluntas non potest cogi, The will cannot be forced; which is most true, as touching Actus eliciti, the acts of the will inward and immediate, and not so of actus imperati, acts outward and commanded. But Bradwardine who alone useth this phrase a∣mong'st School-Divines, takes it in no such sense, but only for an effectuall operation of God upon the will moving it to worke this or that, not necessarily, but freely; which this Authour most judiciously dissembleth all along for desparing to prevaile by true and substantiall information of the understanding; perturbundis affectibus suffuratur; by a cor∣rupt proposition of his Adversaries tenet, hopes to worke distast upon the Readers affec∣tions. Bradwardines position is this, God can after a sort necessitate every created will to 'its free act, and to a free cessation, & vacation from act: and hath a Corollary to this effect; That * 1.231 some kind of necesity, and liberty are not repugnant, but may consist together. Againe, God doth after a sortnecessitate every created will, unto every free act therefore, and to every free cessa¦tion * 1.232 and vacation from act that by necessity antecedent naturally. And he addes a Corollary, that some kind of antecedent necessity and liberty are not repugnant, and may consist together.

This distinction of liberty from necessitie, liberty from sinne, liberty from misery, I find in Bernard, and Vossius alleadgeth it only out of him, and the School-men might take it up after him. Bernard hath many obscure passages in the prosecuting of it, especially in refe∣rence to the two first members. Neither doth Vossius take any paines to cleare them

from a manifest contradiction in shew: And no marvaile if Doctor Potter doth not, in stating the opinion of the Church of England in the point of free will, which he under∣takes very magnificently in his answer to charity mistaken; he was content to be led by his blind guid: now the seeming contradiction is this. If there be in a naturallman no liberty from sinne, then is he necessarily carried into sinne; and how then is there any liberty in him from necessitie? unlesse necessitie be taken as all one with constraint. And Bernard sometimes in that very treatise doth clearly expresse himselfe to understand thereby co∣action. And so M. Fulkes in his answer to the Rhemish testament, denying unto man li∣berty from sinne, yet grants unto him a liberty from coaction. And indeed sinne to the profane person is like a sweet morsell which he rolleth under his tongue, as the booke of Iob speaks, he comes not constrained thereunto; but naturally takes delight therein; & I doubt too many there be, who though they are driven to confesse, that a naturall man hath no liberty from sinne; yet they please themselves with a certaine expression of Lindan's, that a man hath free will unto sinne; hoping therehence to conclude when time serves, that a man as he hath freedome to commit it, so he hath freedome to abstaine from it, and so by a backe doore to draw in a Tenet quite contrary to the first, namely that even a natu∣rall man hath liberty from sinne. I am not sure that Lindan did well understand his own expression, so as to know how to make it good, much lesse that they are able who licke their lips at it. But of this, and the clearing of Bernard, and of the difference between li∣berty naturall, and liberty morall I have else where discoursed at large. And Calvin ob∣serving this contradiction might well blame them that confound necessity, with coact∣ion; whereby a way is opened to conclude, that because a man is free from constraint of sinning, therefore he is free from necessity of sinning; whereas originall sin doth necessa∣rily incline him to sinfull actions & courses in generall; though to this kind of sin in speci∣all, or to this particular, in what kindsoever, it doth not: yet by the way it is to be conside∣red, that Calvin in some particulars, as namely in gracious courses, did attribute so much to the efficacy of God's operation upon a man's will, as that the actions performed there∣by though voluntary, yet in his opinion were not to be accounted free; & indeed they are wrought in opposition & as it were in spight of a certain principall of corruption that in part remaines in the very best of God's children. But we see no reason to the contrary, but that, when once God hath planted in us a principle of new life, of the life of grace, by the spirit of regeneration, though all the powers thereof doe incline only to that which is good, like as the powers of naturall corruption incline only unto evill, yet the particu¦lar use and exercise of those is alwaies free: Like as the particular use and exercise of the powers of our corruption is allwaies free to the committing of this or that sinne accor∣ding unto emergent occasions standing in congruity to every man's particular dispositiō.

2. The Authour keepes himselfe to the language of his own Court, but he should not so imperiously put it upon his opposites to concurre with him in the language of Ash∣dod. We know nothing that necessitates the will to sinne, but that originall corrupti∣on, wherein every man is conceived, and which we brought with us into the world. For that makes us impatient of a yoake, like unruly Heyfers; And nothing is more burthen∣some unto us in our corrupt nature, then the holy lawes of God; The statutes of Omri are not so, nor all the manner of the house of Ahab; these are punctually observed, when God's holy ordinances are proudly despised. God moves every creature to worke a∣greeably to 'its nature. Necessary Agents necessarily, contingent Agents contingently, Free Agents freely. He doth not move to any such act as is sinfull, save only where the feare of God is not at all found, or not quickned, but the motions and suggestions of Sa∣tan entertained; nor then neither alwaies; and that not only in his own children, but even in the hearts of the wicked to restraine from sinfull courses in spight of Satans temp∣tations, by injecting into their minds the consideration either of danger, or of shame en∣su••ng, so in a naturall way to restraine from the committing of such an act as is sinfull; es∣pecially when he seeth it prejudiciall to the peace of his Church in generall, or any mem∣ber thereof in particular; otherwise if he gives them over to Satan, and moves them agre∣ably to his suggestions entertained by them, as being naturally well pleased with them, why should this seem strange to any? So that not any sin is inevitably committed by the most wicked creature that lives upon the face of the earth, but he hath power enough (I doe not say to avoid it, an absurd phrase as if sinne were a thing to be forced upon a man whether he would or no, but) to abstaine from it, though not in a gracious manner, that being in the power of them only who have the spirit of regeneration dwelling in them.

3. In the same language he prosecutes his vile cause, giving manifest evidence to the world that it cannot be supported without lyes, nor embraced by any but those whom God in his secret judgments hath given over to strong illusions to believe lyes, It is not incredible to me that ever any Papist or Protestant hath affirmed that God necessitates the will to sinne; They generally acknowledge that evill hath no cause efficient, but defi∣cient only: The terme of God's operation is no other then the substance of the act, which as an entity, and as an act must necessarily proceed from God, as Aquinas hath delivered. And albeit they maintaine that God's concurrence to the producing of the act doth worke upon the will of the creature which, from the first time that Divines came resolutely unto the acknowledgment of this Divine concourse to the act of sin, hath also been received as I have shewed in my Vinaiciae. For Peter Lombard disputing on either side about this concurrence, leaves it indifferent to the Reader to imbrace either part: Either the affirmative that God doth concurre to every act, though it be sinfull or the negative. Yet I say as many as doe maintaine the affirmative, doe so maintaine God's motion upon the creatures will, as to move it only agreably unto it's nature, namely to work freely not necessarily. Like as he moves necessary Agents to work necessarily, and contingent Agents to worke contingently. And if this Authour be ignorant hereof, which may well give him boldnes. For who so bold as blind Bayard? What doth he other in all this but betray his own shame comming to discourse on such an argument, as an asse comes to play upon an harp, as the proverbe speaks. But if he be not ignorant of this, what unshamefastnesse doth he manifest all along, ma∣king bold only upon the simplicity and ignorance of his Reader to gull him, and abuse him, and draw him along to oppose the free grace of God in predestination and regene∣ration, under colour of making God the Authour of sinne in the point of reprobation; which yet he despaires of making good against us without notorious untruths, and that undoubtedly delivered against his own knowledge. For what Authour hath he produced to justifie this that any of our Divines maintaines that God necessitates the will of man to sin? Not any that I know using this phrase Necessitate but Papists, and among'st them none that I know but Bradwardine a man renowned in his time both for eminent lear∣ning, and eminent piety, as appeares by Sir Henry Savill's preface unto that book of his; and he no where affirming that God necessitates any man unto sinne; but only to the substance of the act; & that not so as to make the will work necessarily, as the phrase im∣ports in a vulgar eare, and unto a popular judgment (whereupon alone this Author takes his advantage most unconscionably) but agreably to 'its nature, that is contingently and freely. For were he able to produce any one of our Divines that affirmeth this, why doth he not? Is there any••hing throughout this whole discourse that more requires he should name the man, and quote the places, where this is affirmed, then this? Yet here we find a blank; he carrieth it on magnificently upon his own bare word, which deserves no credit at our hands; And is it possible to believe so foule a crimination without all evidence produced, unlesse faction and partiallity hath blinded his eyes? Should he have laied to our charge that we maintaine that God necessitates the will to any good act, and to overrule the will therein, we should utterly deny it without di∣stinction. It is true he overrules the will of the flesh, but not the will of the Spirit, the regenerate part, but moves it agreably to 'its nature, and to worke not only voluntarily but freely whatsoever it worketh. For albeit the regenerate part is like a morall vertue (though as much transcendent to it, as a thing supernaturall transcends a thing naturall) inclining only to that which is good; yet is it alwaies moved to this particular good rather then unto an other most freely. Like as a man's naturall corruption inclines a man only to evill; yet to this kind of evill or to this particular evill, rather then to that, Man is moved most freely. So that if we maintaine not that God workes a man to every good act, otherwise then freely; let the very conscience of our enemies judge, whether we can maintaine that God necessitates the will either of men or of Devills unto sinne. For it is apparent that God hath a Double influence unto a good act. One unto it as unto an act, and that is influence generall; Another unto it as unto a good and gracious act, and that we acknowledge to be an influence speciall and supernaturall. But as touching an evill act, all sides confesse that God hath but a single influence thereunto and that generall, namely, as it is an act, not as it is evill. And albeit this influence which we call concurrence unto the act, be joyned with an influence into the will of the crea∣ture to move it to the producing of the same act; yet this motion is no other thē whereby

the will is moved to worke agreably to 'its nature; that is freely. Like as all other Agents are moved by God, the first Agents to worke agreably to their natures, necessary things to worke necessarily, contingent things contingently. So that in all this there is no overruling of the will, no liberty taken from her; but rather she is maintained and estab∣lished in her free condition, and moved agreably thereunto; like as in the eleaventh Arti∣cle of Ireland it is expressed. For after it is laid downe that, God from all eternity did by his unchangable counsell ordaine whatsoever in time should come to passe; It is forthwith added that, hereby no violence us offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor the contingency of the second causes is taken away but established rather. But because of a∣nother claw that here is subjoyned by this Authour, it is to be considered that the liber∣ty of the creature is not equall unto the liberty of the Creator God himselfe: But like as all other causes are but second causes, God alone the prime cause; All other Agents but se∣cond Agents, God alone the first Agent. So likewise all other free Agents are but second free Agents, God alone primum liberum, the first free Agent. So that no liberty of the crea∣ture doth or can exempt it from the Agency of God, In whom we live and move and have our being what a proud thing & presumptuous were it for the creature to aspire unto such an exemption. Who oppose us in the point of free will more then Papists? Yet see how Alvarez disputes against this vise and presumptuous conceit, so much maintained by the Jesuites, and after taken up by the Arminians, who live by their scraps, as if they would be content to wash their dishes. The Jesuites discourse thus, That the will may be free, she must have the Dominion of her act, true saith Alvarez, debet habere Dominium sui actûs, * 1.233 non tamen oportet quod habeat primum & absolutum Dominium sui actus, she must have the dominion overher act, but not the first and absolute deminion of her act. And Disput. 117, he proposeth this question, Whether the will hath her dominion of her act, and what dominion this is. In the resolution whereof he proposeth three conclusions.

1. The free will of man hath the dominion of her act as the next cause thereof. In this con∣clusion the Divines on both sides doe concurre. 2. Free will created in the actuall use of Do∣minion and power which she hath over her acts, depends on God as of an absolute Lord, predelibe∣rating, and predetermining before the foreknowledge of the creatures future cooperation what the free will, will doe in particular. This conclusion is held of all those Divines who maintaine that God by his motion or effectuall grace, not only morally, but efficiently and physically doth cause us to worke that which is good, & it is proved, saith he by all those reasons whereby it hath been formery shewed that God by his decree & effectuall motion doth predetermine all second cau∣ses, even such as are free, to worke, preserving their liberty and nature 3. The dominion of her act is not first in the power of free will created, but in the power and dominion of God, especially in respect of acts supernaturall Our meaning is that all dominion & actuall use of dominion which the created will hath as causa proxima the next cause, or doth exercise over her free acts which she produceth, proceedeth from God, as from the cheifest & first cause efficient, & ought to be resol∣ved into him as into the first Authour & first absolute Lord thereof And the truth is the que∣stion of free will, is commonly confounded though there is place of momentous distinc∣ion. For as for free will unto good that is merely Morall, and the resolution thereof, is ac∣cording to the resolution in the point of originall sinne. But free will unto actions in ge∣nerall under an appearance of good, this is naturall liberty; and the resolution thereof de∣pends upon a right understanding of God's naturall providence in governing the world, and working with all creatures in their severall kinds, such operations as are agreable to their severall conditiōs. The first liberty consists in disposing man aright towards his end; like as morall vertues tend to this. But the second liberty consist's only in the right use of the meanes, unto what end soever is projected by us. The appearance of good moving herein is only, in genere boni conducentis, in the kind of good conducing to the end propounded; whether that end can be good or evill, right or wrong. But the appearence of good mo∣ving in the former is only, summiboni, of our cheifest good, the enjoying whereof will make us happy. But to returne, this Authour with whom I deale in present, stands for the will of man's absolute dominion over her acts; as before he did expresse; whereas Alvarez pro∣fesseth utterly against this, Neither doe I blame him for contradicting Alvarez in this; but for carrying himselfe like a positive Theologue, nor so only, but like a peremptory Theologue contenting himselfe to dictate rules to others without all proofe, save this that otherwise we make God the Authour of sinne. Yet this is not any expresse Argument of his neither; but he obtrudes premise, upon us, which I thinke was never affirmed by any Divines of these dayes, unlesse it be by some Libertines, against whom none that I know have disputed more effectually then some of those very Divines which here are traduced

by him. But observe the vile and abominable issue of this Authours doctrine in this parti∣cular, making man as he is a free creature to be the Lord of his own free act; yea and to have the absolute dominion thereof, as formerly he did expesse Sect: 3. For seing the act of faith, of repentance, and the like are free acts; if liberty cannot be maintained unlesse a man hath the absolute dominion of his own act, hence it manifestly followeth, that God doth not determine the will to believe, to repent, or to any good work, yet the Scrip∣ture professeth that God is he, who makes us perfect unto every good worke, working in us that which is pleasing in his sight through Iesus Christ. That it is God who worketh in us both the * 1.234 will and the deed according to his good pleasure. So that if a man should live Methusalch his age, and spend that whole time in a gracious conversation; yet that God doth worke in him either the will or the deed of one gracious act more, it is merely of his good plea∣sure; so little cause have we to presume of perseverance in that which is good by out own strength. And againe all this God workes in us for Christ his sake. Christ hath deserved even this at the hands of God his father. What then is the meaning of this, that God should cooperate with us to the will and the deed, provided that we will? Consider the absurdity of this (upon the supposall of the possibility of such a cooperation, which yet by evident reason may be demonstrated to be utterly impossible.) Did Christ merit any thing for the Angells? yet doth he not cooperate with them to every act of theirs as well as to any of ours? Nay is it possible that any act should exist without God's operation? And is it reasonable to subject such a course of Divine providence to the merits of Christ? Thus we see whereunto this Authour tends in this discourse of his, namely so to maintaine God to be no Authour of sinne, as withall to maintaine that he is no Authour of that which is good, no not of faith, repentance, or any gracious act that is freely per∣formed by any creature man or Angell: we on the other side desire & endeavour so to car∣ry our selves that while we vindicate God from being the Authour of evill, we may not therewithall deny him to be the Authour of any thing, that is good and gracious; which is this Authours course, as appeares manifestly in the issue. And observe his crafty ca∣riage foxe like; Had he dealt upon predestination, and the efficacy of grace, and therein professed plainly that faith and repentance being free acts, every man's will hath an ab∣solute dominion over them; and therefore God doth not determine the will thereunto: For that were to make God the Authour of faith and repentance; how many thousands would have been ready to have flowen in his face, and abhorre such abominable doctrine. Therefore he baulks that, and deales only upon reprobation; and here he layeth to our charge that we make God the Authour of sinne, by necessitating and determining the will to sinne (though his premises herein I have shewen to be most false) therefore he maintains that God doth not determine the will so much as to the act whereunto the sin∣fulnesse accrewes; both because man's will is free; and because so he should be the Au∣thour of sinne. And if once he can make his Reader to swallow this, he doubts not but to take him in the point of predestination and grace also; and make him wary to take heed of maintaining that God determines or necessitates the will of man to any good act whe∣ther it be of faith or of repentance, and that for feare of denying man to have the abso∣lute dominion over his will, to worke himselfe to faith and repentance at his pleasure: and secondly, for feare of makeing God the Authour of faith and repentance and every good act; Like as by saying that God doth determine or necessitate the will to sinne, we make him the Authour of sinne. Behold Reader the issue of this man's Divinity; and whether he be not leading thee into the very chambers of death, by working thee with him to oppose the free grace of God, both in predestination and in regeneration, and the power and efficacy therereof in working thee to faith, to repentance, and to every thing that is pleasing and acceptable unto him, & that through Jesus Christ. Yet we have shew∣ed a manifest difference between God's moving the creature unto that which is good, and moving the creature unto such acts as are evill. For in evill be moves only to the sub∣stance of the act, whereof our Adversaries themselves acknowledge God to be the Au∣thour, that is the efficient cause, and this he performes by influence generall. But as touch∣ing every good act, the Lord moveth not only to the substance of the act by influence generall, but also to the goodnes thereof by influence speciall. He proceeds to tell us what Philosophers teach concerning the condition of the will. And because it is very ab∣surd for a Christian to goe to schoole to Philosophers to learne the condition of Divine providence; he tels us of Fathers too that maintaine the same as he saith, but he quotes neither the one, nor the other. Now I would gladly know what Father hath ever taught that God hath no power over the will of man to convert it, and ex nolentibus volentes fa∣cere,

of unwilling, to make men willing, to worke men to faith, to repentance, to all kind of pious obedience. And as for God's secret providence in evill, how plentifull is the Scrip∣ture concerning this? God is said to have sent Ioseph into Egypt, though this was brought to passe by the parricidiall hands of his brethren; To tell David, that the sword should not de∣part from his house, though this could not be taken up or used, but by the free will of men; To send Senacherib against a dissembling nation; and to professe that this proud King in all his bloudy executions upon the people of God, was but as the axe, or the sawe in the hand of God. The like is testified concerning Nabuchodonosor after him. Nay the Prophet demands, Whether there be any evill in the Citty and the Lord hath not done it; speaking of the evill of punishment, though wickedly executed by the hands of wicked men; that the Lord caused the King of Assur to fall by the sword in his own land, though this was done by the hands of his own children. And as in violent courses, so in impure courses the Scrip∣ture as plainly testifies the secret providence of God to have place therein. And what doth Austin observe from the like places both in his fift book against Iulian the Pelag: c: 3, and in his book de gratia & libero arbitrio, professing, occulto Dei judicio fieri perversitatem cor∣dis, that the perversity of the heart, or will, comes to passe by the secret judgment of God; And the power that God hath over the wills of men to incline them even to evill; that is his phrase as I have formerly shewed, abundantly representing the places where he delivers this. He proceeds not so much in Scholasticall discourse, as in rhetoricall amplification, more like a Shrew vexing him selfe and fretting that he cannot have his will, then like a disputer. That which necessitates the will makes it become but a servile instrument, irresistably subject to superiour command and determination; this action of command comes in most un∣seasonably, it denoting a morall action, commanding not only things agreable, but some∣times contrary to the will of the person commanded. No such thing hath place in God's moving of the will of man (did he move it unto sinne which yet is most false; for he moves it only to the substance of the act.) But why should it seeme strange that the creature should be a Servant to the Creator, and his instrument, and a servile instrument. Yet the notion of servility is very aliene from the matter in hand, that having place only in pro∣per speech as touching morall obedience; that which we treat of, is rather of motions na∣turall, and of the subordination of the second cause to the first, the second Agent to the first. And was ever any sober man known to oppose this with such froth of words as this Authour doth? Doth this Authour himselfe thinke it possible that the Creature can move it selfe, or performe any operation without God's concourse? I doe not think he doth. Doe we not live in God, have we not our being in God? And what is this other then to say that our life and being depend on God, in the kind of a cause efficient? And doth not the same Apostle, and in the same place testifie, and that in the words of an heathen man (to shew that all such did not so maintaine the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 con∣dition of the will, as to maintaine the exemption of it from influence Divine) professe that in God we move also? And the truth is all the question is about the manner of this concourse divine; whereabouts this Authour spends not a word, as if he kept his breath for some other purpose then to deale on that point, which alone is controverted. The ir∣resistable subjection he speaks of is no more then the bereaving of the will of her liberty, which is most untrue For proof whereof I appeale to every man that will but look upon Alvarez, that maintaines this divine motion of will under the notion of determining; And upon Bradwardine, who alone, that I know maintaines the same divine motion un∣der the notion of necessitating: Whereas he infers herehence that God is a truer cause of all such acts and sins that proceed from the will so determined, then the will is. Oftentimes he hath set before us such Coleworts; but we have nothing but his bare word for it. And it depends merely upon this that the action of the creature is not free. Whereas both Brad∣wardin maintaines that God necessitates the creature to every free act of his; And Alva∣rez, that God determines the creature to worke freely. Now is it a sober course hence to inferre, that the act is not free? As much as to say it cannot but be free, therfore it is not free. And yet we know that every one naturally is prone to sinne, and in the best of God's children there is a principle that inclines to sinne. God is confessed by our very opposites to be the true cause of the act; yet not at all the cause of the sin by his concourse. Only they differ from us as touching the nature of this concourse; We say God concurres to the producing of the act as it becomes not an Agent only, but the first Agent; not a cause only, but the first cause; and man as a second Agent, and second cause that moveth in God as the Apostle testifies; like as he lives in God, and hath his being in God. But these men devise God, and man to move to the producing of the same act, as two men in lift∣ing

a timber logge, most indecently: And to free this concurrence from chance, they say sometimes that God workes this or that act in us modo velimus, that is, upon condition that we will But when they consider that God workes the act of willing, as well as ought else; & are demanded to answer upon what condition he workes this what condition will they devise of this? will he say; modo velimus, provided that we will? As much as to say, God will produce the act of willing, provided that it be produced already by us. Others say that God foreseeing that the will of man, at such a time will produce such an act of wil∣ling in case God be pleased to concurre to the producing of it, hereupon he resolves to concurre to the producing of it, whereby the finall resolution is rather into the will of God, then into the will of the creature, I say the finall resolution of every sinfull act com∣mitted by the creature. Secondly here is devised a thing future without all ground. For whereas the act of willing (as for example in Iudas, the act of willing to betray his Ma∣ster, is it in 'its own nature merely possible not future how then did it passe into the con∣dition of a thing future and that from everlasting (For from everlasting God knew it as a thing future) this could not be done without a cause? And what cause could there be of an eternall effect, but an eternall cause which is God alone: And in God nothing can be devised to be the cause thereof, but his will or decree. Therefore to avoid this they must be driven to conclude that all future things became future by necessitie of nature; if not of their own nature; yet at least by the necessitie of God's nature, he producing them all not freely, but by necessitie of nature This is that Atheisticall necessitie where∣upon our Adversaries are cast, while they oppose such a necessitie as depends upon God's decree ordaining all things to come to passe agreably to their natures, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently and accordingly ordaining necessary causes working necessarily, for the producing of the one; and contingent causes working con∣tingently, for the producing of the other; as Aquinas discourseth. 1. pag q. 19, in the Ar∣ticle whose title is this, Utrum divina voluntas necessitatem rebus imponat, whether the will of God imposeth a necessitie on things that come to passe in the world? The reason this Authour brings is a mere Socysme, saying the same over and over againe; As when he saith, For when two causes concurre to the producing of an effect; the one principall overruling cause, the other but an instrumentall & wholly at the devotion of the principall, then is the effect in all rea∣son to be imputed to the principall, which by the force of 'its influxe and impression produceth it, rather then to the subordinate and instrumentall, which is but a mere servant in the production of it. To which I answer, that which he calls overruling, I have often shewed how absurdly it is imputed unto us. For how can that be called overruling which workes not the will contrary to 'its nature, but moves it only agreably to the nature thereof. As for the cause principall, what Scholar of any braines ever denyed God to be the cause principall in any action to the producing whereof he concurres? For is he not the first cause and the first Agent? Are not all other second causes and second Agents? But this Authour hopes his Reader will understand this in reference only to the sinne, not to the naturall act un∣der it, whereas God as touching the sinfullnesse of it is no Agent at all, much lesse a prime Agent; no cause at all, much lesse a prime cause. Then secondly let God never so effectually work any creature to the producing of an act connaturall thereunto, yet if he works the creature therunto agreably to its nature, that is if it be an necessary Agent, moues it to worke necessarily, if it be a contingent agent, moves it to worke contingently; if it be a free agent, moves it to worke freely; then by Arminius his confesion our cause is gained. For God shall be found free from blame, and the creature void of excuse. Now this is clearly our doctrine, and in effect the doctrine of all them, who say that God de∣termines the will, as the Dominicans; or that God necessitates the will, as Bradwardine. For they all acknowledge hereby that God moves the creature to worke freely, in such sort that in the very act of working they might doe otherwise if they would. They con∣fesse this providence of God is a great mystery and not sufficiently comprehensible by humane reason. Cajetan professeth thus much as before alleadged, and Alvarez main∣taines it in a set disputation; And supposing God's concourse as necessarily required to e∣very act of the creature, they are able to prove by evident demonstration, that no other concourse can be admitted, then this whereby God moves every creature and that effec∣tually to every act thereof, but agreably to 'its nature and condition. And this is farther demonstrated by God's fore knowledge, of things future. Another Arminian with whom I have had to deale in this argument, being pressed with this reason drawen from God's foreknowledge and urged to shew how things possible became future & that from ever∣lasting (for from everlasting they were known to God as future) had no way to helpe

selfe but by flying to the actuall existence of all things in eternity. And I have good ground for strong presumption that this Authour with whom now I deale had his hand in that Pye, which was above foure yeares agoe. See the desperate issue of these mens discourses; who are drawen to take hold of such a Tenet to helpe themselves withall; which their best freinds the Jesuites, the Authours of Scientia media, doe utterly dis∣claime. And on the other side the Dominicans who embrace the actuall existence of all things in eternity, are utterly repugnant to the doctrine of Scientia media. So that when the Jesuites are reconciled to the Dominicans in the point of actuall existence of all things in eternity; And the Dominicans to the Jesuites in the point of Scientia media, then these men with whom I deale are like to prevaile, which I doubt will hardly be before Elias comes. Thirdly consider, if when one cause is principall, overruling the other, the effect must be imputed rather to the principall then to the other. It followes evidently that when the causes doe equally concurre without any such overruling of one the other, then the effect is equally imputable unto each, & consequently the sin (For such is this Au∣thour's language in this Argument) is equally imputable to both, to God as well as man; And he is to be accounted the Author of it, as well as man. I appeale to every man's so∣ber conscience that is able to judge indifferently between us in this. But if to avoid this they deny that the concurrence is equall, but that God's concurrence is conditionall, to wit, in case the creature will, and so man is to be accounted the Authour of sinne, and not God, hence it followeth, that seeing God's concurrence unto the act of faith and re∣pentance is of the same nature in the opinion of these men; God is not the Authour of faith and repentance any more, then he is the Authour of sinne, in the language of these disputers. Or if they fly not to this, as I have found this Authour (as I guesse) to deny God's concourse to stand in subordination to man's, then my former argument is not a∣voided; But a third reason ariseth herehence against his former discourse of God's con∣course, namely, that if God and man doe equally concurre unto the act of sinne, then, as I have already shewed, that they are equally guilty of sin. So in the working of faith and repentance man is as forward as God and as much the Authour of his own fatih and repentance as God is, in direct contradiction to the Apostle who saith that, * 1.235 Faithis the guift of God & not of our selves. We willingly grant that God is the principall agent in producing every act, whether it be naturall or supernaturall For in him we move as * 1.236 well as in him we live & have our being But we deny sin, as sin, to be any act but a privation of obedience to the law of God, as the Apostle defines it to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Yet let us examine that which he delivers of the principall agent, & the texts produced by him, that we may not be carried away as he is with a superficiary apprehension of things. And first consi∣der) we might plead as well for such acts as this Authour calls sins, as he doth for acts gra∣cious by his superficiary discourse. For doth not Ioseph comforting his brethren say unto * 1.237 them in like manner. Now then you sent me not hither, but God. But consider farther in that passage alleadged by him out of Mat: 10. 20. It is not ye that speak but the spirit of my Father which speaketh in you. Was not this speech of the Apostles a free action? The labour of Paul more abundantly then of all the rest of the Apostles, was it not a free action in Paul? ••f God determined thē unto these actions, then freedome of will humane stands not in opposition to determination divine; and consequently though the act be evill that is, done by man; yet may God determine the creature to the doing of that act, without any impeachment of the creatures liberty. If God did not determine the wills of his Servants but only afford a simultaneous concourse to their actions, why is he called the cause principall, since it is confessed, God doth afford the like concourse to every sinfull act, as touching the substance thereof.

Againe he repeates the same, when in case of divine determination, he saith, the sinne cannot be so rightly ascribed to man's will the inferiour, as to God's necessitating decree, the su∣periour cause. To which I answer againe, being drawen thereunto by his Tautologies; by the same reason it may be inferred, that when the fire burnes any combustible thing, the burning is rather to be ascribed to God the more principall cause, then to the fire the lesse principall, the first cause being more principall then the second and if it please God so to order it, the fire shall not burne as it appeares in the three noble children cast into the furnace of Babylon, when they came forth there was not so much as the smell of fire upon them. Secondly I answer as before, by the same reason, when the concourse unto the sinfull act is equall on man's part, & on God's, each shall equally be accounted the Au∣thour of that sinne, and not man more then God; Now such a concourse is maintained by this Authour. Thirdly in the working of faith and repentance; since by these mens

opinions God affords only his concourse he shall be no more the Authour of man's faith and repentance then man himselfe is. Lastly be it granted that God is a more principall cause then mā in producing the act; yet there is no colour of imputing unto God the cau∣sality of the sin, who hath no Agency therein, by doing what he ought not to doe, or not in that manner he should doe, this is found only in the creature, who being a free Agent, otherwise then as originall sinne hath impaired liberty, which I hope this Authour will not deny, is justly answerable for his own transgression. As for example, God determi∣ned that Cyrus should give the Jewes liberty to returne into their own land; yet this a∣ction of Cyrus was as free an action, as any that was performed by him throughout his life. God determined that Josiah should burne the Prophets bones upon the Altar at Be∣thel, yet Iosiah did this as freely as ought else: God determined that Christ's bones should not be broken, yet the souldiours abstained from the breaking of his bones with as much liberty as they had used, in case they had broken them. This divine providence we wil∣lingly confesse is very mysterious, and as Cajetan saith the distinctions used to accommo∣date it to our capacitie doe not quiet the understanding; therefore he thought it his du∣ty to captivate his into the obedience of faith. And Alvarez in a solemne disputation proves that it is incomprehensible by the wit of man.

4. His last is delivered most perplexedly. I can make no sense of it as the words lie, but I see his meaning. He supposeth that God by our Tenet makes a man to sin willingly, & that he saith is worse then to constraine a man to sinne against his will. Where observe how this man's spirit is intoxicated when he delivered this. For first he calls that worse which is merely impossible, and that by his own rules. For he holds that sinne cannot be, except it be voluntary, speaking of sinne committed by any particular person. Secondly he supposeth that by our opinion God makes a man to sinne, which is most untrue. For when he acknowledgeth that no sin can be committed by man without God's concourse; will he say that God by his concourse helps a man to sinne? He helps him to the produ∣cing of the act, not to the committing of the sinne. And indeed be the act never so ver∣tuous, if it proceed not out of the love and feare of God, it is no better then such as the Heathens performed; of which Austin hath professed that they were no better then splen∣dida peccata glorious sins: So that if God doth not give a man these graces of his holy Spi∣rit in every act that is performed by him he shall sinne, and not only in acts vitious; and God is not bound to bestow these graces on any.

Section 9.

Sinne may be considered as sinne, or as a meanes of declaring God's justice in mens punishments. God * 1.238 doth not predestiminate men to sinne, as it is sinne, but as a meanes of their punishment. He is not there∣fore, say they, the Authour of sinne.

1. A good end cannot moralize a bad action; it remaineth evill though the end be never so good Bonum oritur ex integris. ••end, manner, yea matter too must be good, or else the action is naught. He that shall steale that he may give an almes; or commit adultery, that he may beget Children for the Church; Or oppresse the poore to teach them patience, Or kill a wicked man that he may doe no more hurt with his example; or doe any forbidden thing, though his end be never so good, he sinneth notwithstanding. And the rea∣son is because the evill of sinne is greater then any good that can come by sinne; forasmuch as it is laesio divinae majestatis, a wronging of God's majesty; and to Divino bono opposita, directly prejudiciall to the good of Almighty God as much as any thing can be. This Saint Paul knew very well, and therefore he tells us plainely that we must not doe evill that good may come thereof. Whosoever therefore willeth sin, though for never so good an end, he willeth that which is truly and formally a sinne, and conse∣quently God, though he will sinne for never so good ends, yet willing it with such a powerfull, and effectu∣all will, as giveth a necessary being to it, he becommeth Authour of that which is formally sinne.

2. The members of this distinction are not opposite, for sinne as sinne, and in no other consideration is meanes of punishment. If God therefore willeth it as a meanes of punishment, he willeth it as a sinne; his decree it determinated at the the very formality of it.

3 This distinction fastneth upon God a further aspersion, and loadeth him with three speciall indigni∣ties more.

1. Want of wisedome and providence. His counsells must needs be weak if he can find out no meanes to glorifie justice, but by the bringing in of sinne, which his soule hateth, into the world and appointing men to commit it, that so he may maaifest justice in the punishment of it.

2. Want of sincerity and plaine dealing with men. Tiberius as Suetonius reports, having a purpose to put the two sonnes of Germanicus, Drusius and Nero, to death used sundry cunning contrivances to draw them to revile him, that reviling him they might be put to death; and herein is justly censured for great hy∣pocrisie. And so if God having appointed men by his absolute will to inevitable perdition, doe decree that they shall sinne that so they may be damned for those sins, which he decreeth, and draweth them into; he dis∣sembleth, because he slaughtereth them under pretext of justice for sinne, but yet for such sins only as he hath by his eternall counsell appointed as the meanes of their ruine.

3. Want of mercy in an high degree, as if he did so delight in bloud, that rather then he will not destroy mens soules, he will have them live and dye in sinne, that he may destroy them, like to those Pagan Princes of whom Justin Martyr Apol: 2, two or three leaves from the beginning saith, They are afraid that all should be just least they should have none to punish. But this is the disposition of Hang-men rather then of Good Princes: And therefore farre be those foule enormities, and in particular this latter from the God of truth and Father of mercies. And thus notwithstanding these distinctions, it is in my conceit most evident that the rigid and upper way makes God the Authour of mens sins, as well as punishment. And so much for the first generall inconvenience, which ariseth from this opinion, namely the dishonour of God.

I willingly professe I am to seeke what that Divine of ours is that saith God doth pre∣destinate men to sinne, as a meanes of their punishment. Here this Authour is silent, names * 1.239 no man, quotes no place; Like as in the former he carried himselfe in this manner. The Ancients generally take predestination in no other notion, then to be of such things which God himselfe did purpose to bring to passe by his own operation, not of such things as come to passe by God's permission, Neither can I call to remembrance any Divine of ours that talkes of God's predestinating men unto sinne. But the Scripture affords plen∣tifull testimony of God's will, ordination, and determination, that the sins of men come to passe by God's permission. Was it not God's will that Pharaoh's heart should be har∣dened, so as not to let Israel goe for a while, when he told Moses that he would harden Pharaoh's heart that he should not let Israel goe? Was it not God's appointment that Absolom should lye with his fathers Concubines, when he denounced this judgment a∣gainst him, that he would give his wives unto his neighbour, who should lye with them before the sun? Was it not his will that the ten tribes should revolt from Rehoboam, when he protested of that businesse, that it was from him? Was it not God's will that the Jews and Gentiles should concurre in crucifying Christ when the Apostles professe, that both Herod & Pontius-Pilate, with the Gentiles, and people of Israel were gathered together to doe what God's hand and counsell had before determined to be done? Doth not Saint Peter professe of some that stūbled at the word being disobedient, that hereunto they were ordained? And * 1.240 that the ten Kings in giving their Kingdomes to the beast did fullfill the will of God, as touching this particular? But that God should will or ordaine it as a meanes of pu∣nishment, as if the end which God aimed at, were the punishment, is so absurd and contradictious unto Scripture, that in my opinion it cannot well enter into any judi∣cious Divines heart so to conceive. And marke how this Authour shuffles herein: for first he saith that sin may be considered either as sinne; or as a meanes of declaring God's justice in punishing it. And why doth he not keep himselfe unto this? especially consi∣dering, that not permission of sin only, but the punishment of sin also are jointly the meanes of declaring God's justice. And where King Solomon professeth that God made the very wicked against the day of evill, in the same place he manifesteth what is the end of this; namely in saying that he made all things for himselfe, that is for the manifesta∣tion of his own glory. And this glory is not only in the way of justice; but in the way of mercy also; which this Authour as his manner is, very judiciously conceales; this attri∣bute of mercy lying not so open to this Authours evasion as that of justice. And is it pos∣sible God's mercy and the demonstration thereof should have place where there is no sin? considering that no other evill, or misery, had entred into the world, had it not been for sin, according to that of the Apostle, By one man sin entred into the world, & death by sin. Nei∣ther are these generalls the only end that God aimed at in this, but many other particu∣lars * 1.241 there are, whereby the glory of God's wisedome and power, and grace doth appeare, by occasion of sins entrance into the world. The horrible facts of Jewes and Gentiles cō∣mitted upon the person of the Son of God, were such as whereby the Lord brought to passe the redemption of the world. if Christ had not been crucified what satisfaction had been made for the sins of the world? how could he have been set forth as a propitiation for our sins through faith in his blood? & yet this is not all the glory of God that breaks forth by the permission of sin. The punishment of one sin by another is an admirable worke of God's providence, and that more waies then one. For God can punish, and doth, one man by the sin of an other. The Assyrians and Babylonians committed outrages enough upon the people of God, yet hereby the Lord was just in punishing the sins of * 1.242 his own people, Senacherib blasphemed the God of Israel, the creature his Creator, most unnaturally, this unnaturallnes of his towards God, the Lord avenged by the unnatural∣nesse of his own children towards him: This was the worke of the Lord, as himselfe ac∣knowledgeth. I will cause him to fall by the sword in his own land. Man seeketh the face of the Ruler, but every man's judgment is of the Lord. Many unjust judgments have their course in * 1.243 the world, yet Solomon saith, every man's judgment is from the Lord. It is just with him to

punish unjust courses with unjust courses, and there is mercy in this; for no better way then this to bring mens former wicked courses to their remembrance. As Adonibezek when the thumbs of his hands, and great toes of his feet were cut off, then he remem∣bred his former cruelty; and how that 70 Kings had eaten bread under his Table, hav∣ing the thumbes of their hands and feet cut off; And herein he acknowledged the just hand of God saying. As I have done to others so hath God done to me. And as many as will not in like manner acknowledge the just hand of God in like cases, let them take heed lest Adonibezek one day rise up in judgment against them. Thus it is just with God by one sin of the same man to punish another. For because the Gentiles knowing God, glorified him not as God, but were unthankfull, turning the glory of the incorruptible God into the Image of corruptible things, therefore the Lord gave them up unto a reprobate mind, to doe those things which are not convenient. Therefore God gave thē up to vile affections. There∣fore * 1.244 God gave them up to their hearts lusts, unto uncleanes to defile their own bodies between thē∣selves. And what were these inconvenient things? what was this uncleanes? Wherein consi∣sted this, defiling of their bodies between themselves? The text expresseth it thus. For even their womē changed the naturall use into that which is against nature. And likewise also the mē left the naturall use of the women, & burned in their lust one towards another, & mā with man * 1.245 wrought filthines. But was there any judgment of God to be observed in this? The Apostle hath discovered this also unto us in the words immediately following thus, And they re∣ceived in thēselves such recōpence of their errour as was meet; observe manifestly the just hand of God in all this. As for the manner how God brought all this to passe, we answer with Austin, whether it be modo explicabili, or inexplicabili, by a way that may be explicated by us, or whether it be inexplicabile, the Apostle troubleth not himselfe hereabout, his care was only to shew how great a judgmēt this was: & this is prosecuted farther by Austin in the same place, * 1.246 shewing by variety of particulars, all taken out of the word of God; in the place former∣ly quoted. Neither is this all the glory of God that cōes to be manifested by the permis∣sion of sin. For he knows not only how to judge one sin by another, but to heale one sin by * 1.247 another also. Audeo dicere, saith Austin, utile est superbis in aliquod apertum manifestum{que} ca∣dere peccatum, that so they may be humbled and brought to sobriety, and passe the time of so∣journing here with greater care and feare. Now consider in how hungry a manner this Au∣thour sets downe our tenet concerning God's providence in willing, and decreeing, that sin shall come to passe in the world by his permission; whē he talkes of sin being a meanes of punishment, a most absurd expression, both in a sinister stating of the end, punishment not being the end, but a meanes coordinate to an other end, to wit, the manifestation of God's glory, who hath made all things for himselfe, that is for the setting forth of his own glory; as also in a sinister stating the end, sin being not a meanes (as most absurdly he stiles it) but a meritorious cause of punishment: Like as in reference to the manifestation of his glory, it is not the meanes, but the materiall cause thereof, But the permission of sins, that and not sin is the meanes together with the punishment thereof, tending to the manife∣statiō of God's glory in the way of justice? 1. A good end cannot moralize a bad actiō. We grant it. But seeing it is impossible that the divine hand can doe any bad action, the end of his actions is sufficient to justifie his courses. For as Aquinas hath delivered; God's wisedome is his justice. For he is a debtor to none but to himselfe; and how to himselfe? Not otherwise then in all things which he doth, to carry himselfe so as it becōmeth him∣selfe; * 1.248 that is to order every thing to a right end, which is only the manifestation of his own glory. For himselfe is most lovely; and 'tis his nature to be most loving of that which is most lovely. Now to order all things aright to their congruous ends, is the part of wisdome. And see how extravagant this Authour is in evey one of his instan∣ces. For to steale, to commit adultery, to oppresse, to kill, is to sinne, and in will∣ing any of these, a man wills his own sinne. But the Argument we treat of, is of God's willing the sins of others; as when God's hand and his counsell determined that those things should be done, which by Herod, Pontius-Pilate, the Gentiles, and people of Is∣rael were committed against the holy Son of God; and when the Kings gave their king∣domes to the beast herein they are said to doe the will of God and when every mans judg∣ment is said to come frō the Lord; not only judgmēt just, but even judgments unjust to wit, of men, yet God hath a just hand in plaguing others by thē; man ought not to doe evill that good may come thereof; but God's willing it to come to passe by his permission is no evill at all; Nay it is good; nor so only, but the thing willed by him is good by the confession of Bellarmine, even then when he is opposing us in this very argument; Malum fieri Deo permittente bonum est, it is good that evill should come to passe by God's per∣mission: And it was avouched by Austin many hundred yeares before Bellarmine was

borne. And he professeth that God would never have suffered sinne to have entered in∣to the world, had he not knowne that it appertained to his almighty goodnesse, rather to work good out of evill, then not at all to suffer evill. Compare the judgment of Austin with the judgment of this Authour, and consider whether they differ not as much as light and darknesse. And what wisedome were it for God to permit sinne (when it is in his pow∣er to hinder it, as this Authour acknowledgeth in the sixt Section) if it be a greater e∣vill. (and that to God, as it appeares by his expression of it, Laesio divinae majestatis, the hurt of the Divine majesty) then the good that can come thereby can be? So that the crucifying of Christ was greater in the kind of evil, then the redemption of the world that came thereby, was in the kind of good. No man of common discretion will permit ought (if it lye in his power to hinder it) to his own disadvantage, unlesse he can make thereby, not only an equall advantage, but a greater. But let us farther consider the superficiary speculation of this Divine, more becomming children in the Church of God then a grave and learned Divine. Sinne, he saith, is laesio Divinae majestatis, the wronging of the Divine majesty; but in what sense I pray? Is God any thing the worse for any man's disobedience, and transgression of God's law? Surely like as he is no way advantaged by our obedi∣ence, so is he as little disadvantaged by our disobedience. Yet I affect not to carry that I deliver by the authority of mine own bare word, which is this Authours course most usually; I represent Scripture for it. If thou sinnest, what doest thou against him; yea when thy sins are many, what doest thou unto him? If thou be righteous what givest thou him, or * 1.249 what receiveth he at thy hands? Thy wickednesse may hurt a man as thou art, and thy righ∣tousnesse may profit a Son of man. And in reason, looke of what nature the benefit is that redounds from the creature unto God, of the like nature is the detrement. Now God by making the world acquires no internall perfectiō unto himselfe, but only makes his glo∣rious nature known, and accordingly if the world should have an end, this manifestation should cease; but his glorious nature should still continue the same. And as he manifests his glory by the world, so some creatures he hath made intelligent, fit to take notice of his glory, and accordingly requires at their hands they should acknowledge it, and that not in word only, but by their dutifull obedience; and that for the farther manifestation of his glory, to their good and wonderfull happinesse, if they obey; and their extream sor∣row and misery, if they continue rebellious against him. So that whereas the end of all God's actions being but the manifestatiō of his glory, he doth not loose so much as this, by the sins of men; For he can glorifie himselfe in their just destruction; Nay he can ma∣nifest his glory another way; namely both the glory of his mercy in pardoning their con∣tempt of his majesty done unto him; which men so proud many times they are, can hard∣ly doe; but in such a case prove implacable. Likewise of his grace in curing it, as also his power and wisedome in procuring a strange satisfaction to be made for it in a won∣derfull manner, and that by his own blood; That so way may be made for the manife∣station of his, not royall only, but Divine magnificence in bestowing the kingdome of * 1.250 heaven upon them. So farre is he from being any way hurt by the sins of men in any true reall account. And accordingly as he permits sins dayly; so he offers his free grace dayly for the pardon of them; and to this tended the dayly sacrifice among the Jewes, of a lamb every morning and a lambe every evening. But why then is sinne, said to be laesio Divinae majestatis? I answer this is to be understood not of any hurt done to his majesty in it selfe, but as in the minds of men, who hereby manifest their contempt of the divine ma∣jesty. And they that doe contemne him would put him out of his throne if they could, & wish that there were no God; & the foole would faine bring his heart about to thinke so. But though earthly Kings may be dethroned & sometimes have been, yet he that sitteth in heaven laughs all them to scorne that rise up against him. And bids the potsheard strive * 1.251 with his follow potsheards, not with his maker. Who will set the thornes & briars against me in battells I would goe through them & burne them together. For God is a consuming fire. It is true * 1.252 we must neither do evill that good may cōe thereof; nor permit it neither, if itlye in our power to hinder it. God neither will doe any iniquity nor cā doe, but yet is lawfull for him to permit evill that good may come thereof. Yea & will, or decree that evill shall come to passe by his permission, as I have proved at large in a digression to this purpose & there∣withall discovered the Sophisticall arguments of Aquinas, & Durandus, to the contrary, not to speak of Valentianus; not one part of all which large digressiō do I find āswered by this Author. I have often alleadged pregnant passages of Scripture to this purpose &; Ar∣minius confesseth expresly that God would have Ahab to fill up the measure of his sin; which could not be done but by adding sin unto sin; Yet this is made the object of God's

by Arminius. This will of God to have sinne come to passe by his permission, is effe∣ctuall. For whensoever God permits it, it comes to passe, as both Arminius and Vor∣stius acknowledge, not Piscator only: And amongst Papists Navarettus & Alvarez as be∣fore I have shewed; Yet God hath no efficiencie in the sinne, but only in the act where∣unto sinfulnesse adheres; and the saying of Austin is well knowne. Non aliquid fit, nisi omnipotens fieri velit; Not any thing comes to passe, but that which God will have come to passe. And the eleaventh Article of Ireland is most expresse for this. I am driven to re∣peat the same things often; this Authours frequent Tautologies urge me thereunto.

2. Though the members be not opposite it matters not; it is sufficient they are disparate; the purpose of it being to shew, not that God doth not will sin, but only to shew under what notion he willeth it. Yet it is false and absurd to say that sinne is a meanes of pu∣nishment. For to him it belongs to worke the meanes, who intends the end, but sinne, as sinne, is no worke of God; but the permission of it is his worke, and his meanes, not to this end that he may punish it, but he doth both permit it and punish it for the mani∣festation of his glory in the way of justice, like as he doth also permit sinne in others, not to pardon it; but he both permits sinne, and pardons it to manifest his glory in the way of mercy.

3. I come to the consideration of the speciall indignities wherewith God is loaded by this our doctrine as this Authour pretendeth.

1. And indeed is God's wisedome and providence so strong, as that he is able to find meanes to glorifie his justice without the permitting of sinne? (For God hath no other hand in sinne as sinne, but of permission; to the substance of the act he cooperates as a cause efficient, as all confesse.) For of what justice doe we treat in this argument? Is it of justice remunerative, or justice vindicative? Was it ever heard that permission of sinne was required to make way for God's justice remunerative? Or is it pos∣sible that way can be made for the manifestation of Gods justice vindicative (in Scri∣pture called God's wrath) unlesse sinne be permitted to enter? For though he hates * 1.253 it; yet this Authour confesseth that God permits it, as without whose permission it could not enter into the world. Sect: 6. In the last place this Authour helps himselfe with a phrase of God's appointing men to commit it, which he obtrudes upon us thin∣king to make the ballance on his part the heavier, not considering that words are but wind. We say the horrible outrages committed upon our Saviour, God foredetermined to be done; And told David that he would give his wives unto his neighbour, who should lye with them before the Sun; And that it was his will that the Kings should give their Kingdome to the Beast; this we deliver according to God's word; whereas all this our opposit's discourse is quite besides the word of God; as if he would have us take his ab∣surd conceits in steed of oracles. And doth he not know that Austin sometimes sayd that, Iudas electus est ad prodendum sanguinem Domini, Iudas was chosen to betray his Ma∣ster? Or will he answer that he was the first that said so?

2. To the second I have already answered, and that at large in my answer to M. Hoord, in the preface and second Section. There I have shewed how that it was merely devislish policy in Tiberius to move him to take this course, to make way for a grand child of his own, to bring him to the imperiall throne, This moved him to seeke the death of Germa∣nicus his two Sons, whom Augustus made him to adopt as successours in the empire, & lest the putting of them to death without cause might provoke the people to muti∣ny against him; therfore by cunning contrivances he caused them to be provoked to re∣vile him, that so he might have some cause to justifie his destroying of them; which yet he did not by any publique execution; he was loath to come to that for feare of raising some tumult thereby; Fame necavit, he famished them. Now how hath Satan possessed the heart of this unhappy Divine thus to blaspheme the holy one of Israell by comparing his waies to these abominable courses of Tiberius, not fearing lest his tongue rot in his head while he is uttering of them? Cannot God take the life of any man from him, be he ne∣ver so innocent, and that what way he will, even by punishment, if it please him? For is it not of God's mere mercy that he promiseth, Not to famish the soule of the rightous? As for provoking courses, is it not apparent by these our opposites confession, that to all the provoking courses in the world God doth concurre, and that as an efficient cause of eve∣ry action? And accordingly he did concurre with these provoking courses used by Tibe∣rius. And did not God professe that he would provoke the Israelites by a foolish people, and by a foolish nation he would anger them? How did Shimei provoke David by railing upon him; And how did David interpret it, The Lord, saith he, hath bid him to curse David?

Not that he gave any such command in proper speech, but by his secret providence brought this to passe, using to this purpose the vitious disposition which he found in Shi∣mei, but caused it not. And observe what Austin speakes in the like case of his mother Mo∣nica exercised with the opprobrious speeches of her servant, Quid egisti Deus meus? unde curasti? unde sanasti? Nonne protulists durum & acutum ex alterâ animâ convitium tanquam medicinale ferrum ex occultis provisionibus tuis, & uno ictu putredinem illam praecidisti? My God what diddest thou? how diddest thou cure her? how recover her? Diddest thou not bring forth an harsh and sharp reproch out of an others heart as a medicinall instrument in thy secret provi∣dence, and with one stroke pared away all that rottenesse? Thus Adonibezek when his thumbes and great toes were cut off by his enemies, he acknowledged that God had done to him, as he had done to others. And Solomon testifies that, every man's judgment commeth of the Lord. If every man's judgment, then surely unjust judgments and not just only. And although they are unjust as they proceed frō man; yet are they just as they proceed from God. Like as the parricide of Adramelech & Sharezer committed upon their Father Sena∣cherib, the Lord takes unto himselfe when he saith, I will cause him to fall by the sword in his own land. Yet what was David the worse for Shimei's cursing; neither would he thereby be * 1.254 urged to requite evill for evill upon his subjects; the more inexcusable were the Sons of Germanicus for reviling their Prince Tiberius, though never so much provoked thereunto. Neither was this fact of Tiberius a fruit of Hypocrisy, which is the counterfeiting of ho∣lines, justice was pretended indeed not holines & that through feare. For the wicked man is continually as one travelling with child, A sound of feare is in his eares. The cunning contri∣vances * 1.255 that Tiberius used are specified by this Authour, but he doth not specifie the cunning contrivances that God useth by our opinion, as he obtrudes upon us Belike he was to seek of thē, yet we expresse God's providence herein by no other termes then the word of God it selfe doth suggest unto us; Namely of blinding the mind, of giving over to strong illusions, of hardning the heart, of giving over unto their hearts lusts, unto vile affecti∣ons, unto a Reprobate mind. To all which is required no other thing then the not curing of that naturall corruption, and habituall vitious disposition which is found in the wick∣ed whether in the way of luxury, or in the way of uncharitablenesse, and malice; or in the way of ambition & pride. And secondly the administration of congruous occasions unto this their corrupt disposition, which Arminius himselfe confesseth to be the worke of God's providence in his Theses of providence, and which in Scripture phrase is stiled the leading into temptation; against which our Saviour taught his disciples to pray. Third∣ly the giving them over to the power of Satan. And lastly God's generall concourse in moving all creatures to worke agreably to their natures, necessary things necessarily; contingent Agents contingently; and free Agents freely. But my answer to this I have prosecuted at large in more sheets then here are leaves in my answer to M. Hoord.

3. As for want of mercy, we willingly confesse according to the tenour of God's word (as this Authour delivers himselfe without all respect thereunto) that God shewes no mercy in hardning them. For to harden in Scripture phrase is opposite to God's shew∣ing mercy. And as he is bound to none; so he professeth that, He will shew mercy on whom he will shew mercy, and will have compassion on whom he will have compassion. And this the * 1.256 Apostle takes hold of in prosecuting the doctrine of election and concludeth from hence in part, & in part from God's hardening of Pharaoh, that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, by hardning meaning such an operation, the consequence * 1.257 whereof is alwaies disobedience; as appeares by the objection derived therehence in the words following; Thou wilt say then why doth he yet complaine? (now he complaines only of disobedience) For who hath resisted his will? Manifestly implying that when God har∣dens man unto disobedience, it is his secret will that he shall disobey. Like as when God hardned Pharaoh that he should not let Israel goe; It was God's secret will that he should not let Israel goe for a good while: Secret I say in distinction from the will of command, which is alwaies made knowne to them who are commanded. But it plea∣sed the Lord to make this will of his knowne to Moses, though it was kept secret from Pharaoh; yet afterwards he told Pharaoh to his face by his servant Moses saying. And in∣deed for this cause have I appointed thee to shew my power in thee, and to declare my name to all the world; though Pharaoh believed it not as appeares by that which followeth; yet thou exaltest thy selfe against me, and lettest them not goe. But this Authour together with M. Hoord goeth by other rules, which his own fancy suggest's unto him, he will have God's love and mercy extended to all and every one, Christ's redemption to extend to all and every one; the Covenant of grace to comprehend all and every one; and

upon these universalities he grounds his transcendent consolations; whence it comes to passe, that Abraham the father of the faithfull, was of no more comfortable condition, then the grand Signior among the Turkes: And the grand Siginior had as good grounds of consolatiō as Abraham himselfe. Yet this not shewing of mercy on the vessells of wrath prepared unto destruction tends to the greater demonstration of his mercy on the ves∣sells of mercy prepared unto glory: As the Apostle testifies Ro: 9. 23. And let this Author tell Saint Paul if he thinks good, That this is the disposition of hang-men rather then of good Princes. And this is the perpetuall tenour of this Authour's discourse to conforme God's courses to the conditions of courses humane. Man is bound to shew mercy on all; God is not. God is free to pardon whom he will, man is not. If we permit men to sinne in case we can hinder them, we shall be guilty with them, but how innumerable are the sins committed in the world, which if God would hinder could never be committed? As Austin discourseth lib. 5. contra Iulian: Pelag: cap. 4 In nothing did Nero's cruelty shew it selfe more, then in prolonging the lives of men, that he might torment them the more. What then? Shall we taxe God for crueltie in keeping mens bodies and soules alive for ever in hell fire to torment them everlastingly without end? See what a doore of blasphemy is opened against the just God that will doe no iniquity, by this Authour's unshamefast discourse. * 1.258

By this let the indifferent Reader judge of this Authour's present performance, & with∣all take notice of that which himselfe hath dissembled all along touching his own tenet; namely that of every sinfull act committed by the creature, God is the efficient cause, as touching the substance of the act, as for the sinfulnesse thereof we hold it impossible that God can have any agency at all therein, or any culpable deficiency; forasmuch as he nei∣ther doth ought which he should not doe, or after what manner he should not, nor leaves undone ought which he should doe, or after what manner he should doe, all which are incident to the creature who is subject to a law; but not at all to the Creatour who gives lawes to others, but himselfe works according to the counsell of his own will in all things. The summe is, whatsoever we deliver as touching God's secret providence in evill, we have expresse scripture for us, nothing but pretence of carnall reason against us; which when it comes to be examined, is found subject to manifest contradiction, both as touching their feigning things future without the decree of God; And as touching their conditionall decrees, and conditionall concurrences; ours is not in any particu∣lar; The greatest shew of contradiction on our parts is in the point of necessitie and libertie; Now to cleare this, as others, have taken paines, so have I in my Vindiciae proving divers and sundry waies, that these two doe amically conspire, to wit, the * 1.259 necessitie being only upon supposition; the liberty and contingency simply so called; on∣ly it is not to be expected that there should be no difference between the liberty of the creatures, and the liberty of God the Creator; Or that the creature in her operation should be exempt from the operation of God; The second cause exempt from the motion of the first; whereunto this Authour addresseth not the least answer. As for the diffe∣rence which this Authour puts between the upper way and the lower in making God the Authour of sinne; compare this with Arminius his profession; Namely that the same twenty reasons which he objected against the upper way, may all of them be accommo∣dated against the lower way, all of them admitting of the same distinctions (which this Authour invades) to cleare God from being the Authour of sinne.

The second inconvenience.

Section 1.

The second inconvenienceis the overthrow of true religion and good goverment among men. To this, this opinion seemeth to tend for these reasons. * 1.260

1. Because it maketh sinne to be no sinne indeed, but only in opinion. We use to say necessity hath no law; creatures or actions in which necessity beares sway are without saw; Lyons are not forbidden to prey, birds to fly, fishes to swimme, or any bruit creatures to doe according to their kinds, because their actions are naturall and necessary; they cannot upon any admonition doe otherwise. Among creatures indued with reason and liberty, lawes are given to none, but such as can use their principles of reason and freedome: Fooles, mad-men, and children are subject to no law, because they have no liberty. To men that can use their liberty, lawes are not given neither, but in those actions which are voluntary. No man is forbidden to be hungry, thirsty, weary, sleepy, to weepe, tolaugh, to love or to hate; because these actions and affections are naturall and necessary; the will may governe them, but it cannot suppresse them.

And so, if to deale justly, to exercise charity &c. with their contraries, be absolutely, and antecedently ne∣cessary too, whether this necessity flow from a principall within, or a mover without, we are as lawlesse in these and in the other.

Now if necessity hath no law••, then actions in themselves evill, if under the dominion of abso∣lute

necessity are transgressions of no law and consequently no sins. For sin is a transgression of the law.

This that I say hath been said long agoe. For Justin Martyr speaking against destiny hath these words, * 1.261 If it be by destiny (that is by absolute necessity; For that the Fathers doe generally call by the name of de∣stiny;) that men are good or bad, they are indeed neither good nor bad. A speech like to this he hath a lit¦tle * 1.262 after. It would seem, if this be so, that vertue and vice are nothing, but things are judged to be good or bad by opinion only, which, as good reason teacheth, is very great injustice and impiety. And surely well might he say so. For to what purpose was the Son of God made man, and being man made a sacrifice for sinne? Why was the ministry of the word and Sacraments ordained? To what end are heaven and hell pro∣pounded? Why are exhortations, disswasions, or any other meanes to hinder men from sin applied, if sin be nothing, but a mere opinion?

Christ, the Christian faith, the word and Sacraments, and whatsoever according to the Scriptures hath been done for the applying of the pardon of sinne, are all but mere fables, nay very impostures, if sinne be nothing. And by consequence it is no matter at all, whether men be Christians, Jewes, Turkes, or Pagans, of what religion, or whether of any religion at all. Now whether tendeth this, but to the ovethrow of re∣ligion?

2. Because it taketh away the conscience of sinne. Why should men be afraid of any sinne that plea∣seth or may profit them, if they must needs sinne? Or what reason have they to weep and mourne when they have sinned, seeing they have not sinned truly, because they sinned necessarily?

The Tragedian saith, when a man sinneth, his destiny must beare the blame. Necessity freeth him from * 1.263 all iniquity. Sins are either the faults of that irresistible decree that causeth them, or no faults at all. If ei∣ther; then sorrow, feare, or any other act of repentance whatsoever, may as well be spared as spent. This conceit being once drunke in, religion cannot long continue; For the affections have been the strongest planters, and are the surest upholders of it in the world. Primus in orbe Deos fecit timot.

I come to the consideration of the second inconvenience wherewith our doctrine is * 1.264 charged; And that is nothing inferiour to the former; to wit, The overthrow of true reli∣gion and good goverment among'st men. With what judgment these are termed inconveni∣ces I am to seeke, and I wonder what mischeifes are greater then these inconveniences; But I come to consider how well he makes good his charge.

1. If sinne be no sinne certainely the opinion must be erroneous that conceives it to be sin. I had thought there had been no predication more true then that which is Identi∣call. We are taught that sinne is a trangression of God's law. That the wages of it, in the just judgment and decree of God is no lesse then death even everlasting death, both of * 1.265 body and soule; That God sent his own Son, and made his soule an offering for sinne; that so he might set him forth a propitiation for our sins, through faith in his blood. But let us * 1.266 see this Authour's reason to prove his crimimination. He begins with an axiome, that, Necessity hath no law; and hereupon he doth expatiate with his instances too too imper∣tinently; a course which Bellarmine takes not, whom yet I have answered on this very ar∣gument in my Vindiciae; least of all doth he offer to make any reply upon any parcell of my answer unto Bellarmine. Now this axiome is not applied to Agents unreasonable, but only reasonable, by them who treat thereof. As in case a man be driven to steale, to re∣lieve naturall necessity; yet all confesse that a man is not only unexecusable, but also not to be pitied, if he hath brought this necessity upon him; And never any sober man that I know, denied stealth to be a free action, for all this. It is true Lyons are not forbidden to prey, nor fishes to swimne, nor bruit creatures to doe according to their kind. For they are unreasonable, and consequently not capable of command, otherwise then by spurre, or goad, or the like; nor capable of admonition, in like sort, children afore they come to the use of reason are not capable, of admonition As neither mad men are, nor fooles, such as we call naturall; But this Authour is none such. For then his wit would not serve him for opposition as it doth. It is true likewise, that as man is made after the Image of God, not as touching his part vegetative; nor as touching his part sensitive; but only as touching his part reasonable, consisting of an understanding, whereby he is enabled to know his superiours, and their commands, and admonitions; and of a will whereby he is able to performe obedience both inward and outward, it having command over all parts of the body to set them in motion; whereupon if their Lord command them to come they come, if to goe they goe, if to doe this they doe it; As the Centurion signified, to our Saviour the readinesse of his servants to doe their Masters commands.

At length he comes to conclude that, if to deale justly, to exercise charitie &c. with their contraries be absolutely & antecedently necessary too, whether this necessity flow from a principle within or a mover without, we are as lawlesse in these as in the other, by these he meanes acts of the soule rationall; by the other, he meanes acts of the soule vegetative, or sensitive. Now we utterly deny that any of these are absolutely necessary; Nay we deny that any thing is of absolute necessity, but the being of the Divine nature; and the internall ema∣nations thereof which constitute the distinction of persons in the Trinity. For albeit some

Agents created are Agents necessary, working necessarily; yet the works which they bring forth are not of absolute necessity, because they may be hindred in their operati∣ons; either by Angells as some of them; or at least by the power of God, all of them. And as there are necessary Agents working necessarily; so there are free Agents working con∣tingently and freely; as Angells and men. And albeit a question may be made as touch∣ing acts supernaturall, whether the creature hath any free power to performe them free∣ly; such as are the acts of the three Theologicall vertues, faith, hope, and charity, and none other, (which yet we doe not deny, but grant upon the infusion of a supernaturall prin∣ciple into our soules, which we count formally the life of grace; the cause whereof we take to be the Spirit of God given unto us, and dwelling in our hearts;) yet there deserves to be no question, but that as touching all actions of morall vertues, and of the contra∣ry vitious actions, that there is a free power in man to performe them naturally; untill such time as by a vitious disposition, procured by a custome in vitious courses a man is habitually inclined unto evill; whereby he is made a slave to vice, and thereby hath de∣prived himselfe of a morall liberty unto actions vertuous. For like as a man holding a stone in his hand hath power to throw him or no, or to throw him which way he will; but as soone as he hath throwne him out of his hand; it is no longer free unto him whe∣ther he will throw it or no. In like manner before a vitious habit contracted, man hath freedome morall unto actions vertuous, but not after. This is the doctrine of Aristotle, and thus he illustrates it. For certainely the habit of vertue is not an indifferent pow∣er * 1.267 to doe an act vertuous or vitious, but it is a morall propension and inclination only to acts vertuous. So is the habit of justice a morall propension and inclination to per∣forme only that which is just. The like may be said of every morall vertue in speciall. How much more doth supernaturall grace consist not in a power to believe, if a man will, to love God if he will, to hope and waite for the joyes of heaven if he will, and if he will to refuse to performe any of these acts, but rather an holy and heavenly habit, or weight wrought in the soule of man, moving and swaying it only to gracious acts pleasing & ac∣ceptable in the sight of God, which indeed constitutes a spirituall liberty from sinne, and makes a man become the holy servant of God, willing to receive direction from him, and delighting to be ordered by him in all our waies. On the other side with out grace a man is left in that naturall corruption wherein he was conceived & borne, which makes him a slave to sinne and a vassall to Satan led captive by him to doe his will. Yet not withstanding there remaines in every one his naturall liberty still, which consists only in * 1.268 the choice of meanes conducing to man's end; whereas morall vertue and grace doe order the will a right towards aright end; morall vertues according to the know∣ledge naturall which he hath of his right end naturall, grace according to the know∣ledg supernaturall, which a man hath of his right end supernaturall, which is to be right∣ly disposed and ordered towards God his maker; So that this naturall liberty still conti∣nueth the same; As for example, he that it vertuous so farre forth as he is vertuous, con∣tinueth still free; not as freedome signifies an indifferency to performe an act vertuous vitious, but being thereby disposed only to vertuous actions, he is free whether to exercise this or that vertuous act, according to occasiōs offered; or in the same kind of a vertuous disposition; whether he will doe this or that in particular, as to give in such a proportion, or in such a season, or to such or such persons, in all which being of a vertuous dispositi∣on he is ready to receive directions from the dictates of recta ratio, right reason, otherwise called wisedome. In like manner a vitious person still keeps his naturall liberty, though he hath lost his morall, and is become Servus tot dominorum, quot vitiorum, a slave to so many Lords as there are vices in him, as Austin somewhere speaketh. I say he keeps still his naturall liberty. For let him be a Robber, he still continueth free to make choice of his complices, of places wherein to lye in waite for his prey, of weapons, and the like. Let him be an impure person, still he continueth free to choose whom he will corrupt, to contrive what course he thinks best for the satisfaction of his lusts. Let him be covetuous or am∣bitious, still he contintinueh free to make choice of the meanes conducing to the end ob∣tained by him. In like sort let him be regenerate, a child of God; by this spirit of rege∣neration he is moved only to doe those things which are pleasing to his heavenly father, but still his naturall liberty continueth the same, as whether to exercise the grace which God hath given him in one kind or in another, or in the same kind in what particular he thinks good. If he thinks good to pray, it is free to him to fall upon the confession of his sins, or upon thanksgiving, or upon supplication, & that either for blessings tempo∣rall, and the releife of his naturall necessities; or for grace, and the reliefe of necessities

spirituall; or to exercise himselfe in every kind of these, and that in what order he thinks good. So likewise if he give himselfe to meditation, and make choice of what matter he thinks good, as also of time and place, in all this he is free. None of all these distinctions doth this Authour take notice of, but hand over head talks of freedome to performe, ei∣ther acts vicious, or vertuous; whereas the vertuous man's will, as he is vertuous, is inclined to vertuous courses alone; and the vitious man, as he is vitious, is inclined to vi∣tious courses alone, and not to vertuous. And it was wont to be said, that, Habitus agunt ad modum naturae, habit's (whether vertuous or vitious) they worke after the manner of nature, that is naturally and necessary, as before I have declared of a morall necessity, which still consists with a naturall liberty; either in vertuous, or vitious exercises to make choice of particulars in respect of all variety of circūstances, according as their reason suggests un∣to them in the use of means conducent to the end intended, whether that end be good or bad. No dominion of absolute necessity in all this; Much lesse is any man good by ab∣solute necessity but by freedome of will accustoming himselfe unto good actions accor∣ding to the dictates of reason. But a man that is dead in sinne hath no power to rege∣nerate himselfe; this worke of regeneration is wrought merely by the power of God: Like as the raising of a man from death to life, whereunto it is often compared in holy Scri∣pture, as also to creation; And by regeneration we are said to be made new creatures, now as God workes this in time, so from everlasting he did decree to worke it; and it was wont to be the generall Tenet of Protestant Divines in opposition unto Papists, that a man in his first conversion is merely passive, in which particular Roffensis a Popish Bishop about an hundred yeares agoe opposed Martin Luther. As for a sinfull or a vitious act, that is alwaies an act naturall; For acts supernaturall can neither be vitious, nor sinfull; but merely gracious. And all cōfesse that as all men have naturall power to performe any act naturall, so have they power also to abstaine from it. Only untill a man is regenerate he cannot but sinne; yea though he doe that which is good as touching the substance of the act, or abstaine from that which is evill in like manner; yet can he not performe the one or abstaine from the other in a gracious manner, Therefore you heare not God's word, saith our Saviour to the Jewes, because ye are not of God. They that are in the flesh cannot please * 1.269 God, That all men are cast into a necessity of sinning, both Arminius and Corvinus con∣fesse, as formerly I have shewed. And Doctor Potter acknowledgeth it the doctrine of the Church of England, that no naturall man hath libertatem a peccato, though forthwith he nicks it, in saying they have libertatem a necessitate, not explicating it that so he might cleare himselfe from contradiction, whereas Doctor Fulke usually puts the distinction be∣tween liberty from sin, and liberty from coaction, and denying the former unto a naturall man, he granteth the latter.

Now truely this Theologue taketh very profitable paines to prove that sin is not no∣thing; and exuberates in the proofe hereof to the very solid conviction of all those that imagine it to be nothing, if there be any such creatures in terra Australi incognitâ, which is not very likely; but rather in the Lunary world, or in the Joviall world which is waited upon with foure moones, as they that came lately from the discovery thereof, have made report unto us. But by the way, I hope he doth not juggle with us, and under colour of making sin to be some thing, labour to draw us to an acknowledgment that it is some positive thing, as Doctor Iackson in his last booke the 8th, as I take it of his Commentaries upon the Creed laboureth to prove with great strength of affections; Like as in the same vigour of resolution he professeth that whether God punisheth sinne necessarily or no it is not determinable by the wit of man; but he is not over prodigall of his reasons for either. We are very willing to grant that every sin as sin is something privative, and as touching the act substrate, it is something positive also; And when the Apostle defineth sin by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 if in that word the first letter be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 privative, clearely the forme of sin is made to consist in privation, as much as to say an incongruity to the law of God; that is a privation of congruity thereunto. Now we are come to an end of this, let me admonish the Rea∣der of the wisedome of this Authour; All along; he supposeth that by our doctrine sinne comes to passe by absolute necessity, this I say he supposeth, he proveth it not, though we utterly deny, that any such necessity is consequent to our doctrine. And this himselfe knowes full well. Alvarez, who maintaines that God determines the creatures will to e∣very act thereof, even to the act of sin, utterly denies that any absolute necessity of hu∣mane acts followeth hereupon; or any necessity that stands in contradiction to humane liberty. Bradwardine also sometime Arch-Bishop of Canterbury elect maintaines, that

God necessitates the will to every act thereof, yet denies peremptorily that humane acts comes to passe by absolute necessity, or by any necessity that stands in opposition to the liberty of the creature; Only he saith that some kind of necessity, and that antecedent may well consist with the liberty of the creature. All this, this Author knows; yet takes no paines to disprove their tenet, or answer any one of their arguments; no nor to make good his own consequence, which is the only thing we deny in this present argument of his. As for the other part, namely that in case sin come to passe by absolute necessity, and without any free will in the creature, then sinne is no sinne, which no man denies; This he proves at large, or at least illustrates at large. Secondly observe he talkes of things necessarily comming to passe, not only absolutely but antecedently; whereby he seemes to grant that sins may come to passe necessarily, but not so absolutely as antecedently, and takes no paines to explicate these his distinctions. And in my judgment they have more need of explication, as they are accommodated to sins comming to passe in the world, then as they are acommodated to the eveniency of faith and repentance; Yet I imagine this word Antecedently is brought in of purpose in reference to good actions ra∣ther then in reference unto evill. And whether he will have this terme Antecedently to be an addition to the former terme Absolutely, or only of equivalent force, I know not. But it is the common course of these men to confound their Reader with termes propo∣sed without all explication. But let us endeavour to boult out the meaning of these per∣plexed discourses as well as we can. Will this Authour have saith to come to passe neces∣sarily and that absolutely, but not antecedently? Or will he have faith to come to passe necessarily, but not absolutely and antecedently? or will he have faith come to passe not necessarily at all: If not at all necessarily to what purpose doth he clog his Reader with such unnecessary complements, of absolutely and antecedently? If God decrees to bestow faith upon a man, doth it not, necessarily follow hereupon that such a one shall believe? dares this Authour deny it? Yet we account not this absolutely necessary, but merely u∣pon supposition. Neither doth God's decree impose necessity upon all things; as Aquinas hath long agoe disputed and proved; but only upon some things; that is that some Agents shall worke necessarily; other Agents contingently and freely. In a word God both de∣creeth things to come to passe & the manner of them also; that is that some things shall come to passe necessarily, other things contingently and freely. But God's decree, we say, is absolute not conditionall, of giving faith. And indeed all his decrees are absolute as touching the act of God willing; as Bradwardine hath demonstrated by cleare reason; and Piscator out of the word of God. But the decree of giving faith is not absolute only as touching the act of God decreeing, but as touching the thing decreed. For faith is not given by God to any upon a condition to be performed by man; For if it were, then faith should be given according unto workes, that is, grace should be conferred according to mens workes. And when I consider this Authour's compounding of these termes abso∣lutely, and antecedently, I begin to suspect that like as then a thing comes to passe antece∣dently, when it comes to passe by an Antecedent decree in this Authour's language, (though most absurd.) So in his language, the things are said to come to passe by absolute necessity, when they come to passe by an absolute decree; the decree in his opinion being sufficient to make a thing come to passe necessarily; & an absolute decree to make it come to passe absolutely necessarily. This undoubtedly is his meaning, upō which I am stūbled are I am aware. Now let the sober Reader judge how farre these odde conceits are from all sobriety. Did not God decree to make the world, nay did he not absolutely decree this and antecedently, not conditionally and consequently? What therefore will it here-hence follow that the world had it's existence necessarily, and that by the way of absolute necessity? I had thought this had been the peculiar and incommunicable perfection of God himselfe, namely to exist necessarily, and that in the way of absolute necessity. As for all other things which are but God's creatures, they have only a contingent existence derived originally from the free will of God the Creator. For this I take to be the tran∣scendent perfection of God, To be most necessarily; to worke most freely; Necessity and that absolute, being the greatest perfection of being: So that Bradwardine con∣ceives this to be the prime and originall perfection of God, esse necessario, to be necessa∣rily. On the other side freedome in the highest kind, is the greatest perfection 〈◊〉〈◊〉 operation; and God alone so workes, as without subordination to any supe∣riour Agent; but no creature, man or Angell so workes, as without subordinati∣on to God the first Agent, the first cause, the first free worker. Now I come 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the second particular of this second inconvenience. 2. And that is that our doctrine

taketh away the conscience of sin; and this we willingly grant is consequent upon the for∣mer. For if sinne be no sinne, there is no cause why any man should be troubled with the conscience of sin. But all this being grounded upon a vile and most untrue imputati∣on never yet proved, namely that we make all actions both good and evill to come to passe by absolute necessity, there can be no more truth in the consequent then there is in the Antecedent. We say that every sinne that is, or ever was committed in the world is and ever was committed freely, not only voluntarily; much lesse doth any sinne come to passe by any absolute necessity. For albeit there be some things that come to passe ne∣cessarily by necessity of nature, as proceeding from Agents naturall, working naturally and necessarily. Yet is no worke of nature wrought by any absolute necessity. God be∣ing able to set an end to nature and the works thereof whensoever it pleaseth him; and while nature continueth according to the good pleasure of God, he restraines the course thereof, or changeth it as he thinks good. How much lesse doe the actions of men, not only in respect of God's agency, who is the first cause, but in respect of man's agency, a second cause, and working deliberately and freely come to passe not necessarily, but con∣tingently, and freely; So farre off are they from comming to passe by absolute necessity; to exist by absolute necessity being the incommunicable perfection of God himselfe. But I confesse this Authour sheweth some humanity in the proofe of it, to wit, out of the Tragedian very judiciously and learnedly. Fati est ista culpa; nemo fit fato nocens. It is the fault of fate or destiny, and what comes to passe by destiny is no fault of man's. Yet Zeno the great Patron of Fate, finding his servant in a fault, when his servant excused himselfe up∣on fate, saying it was destiny that he should steale; made a ready answer saying, Et cae∣do, it was his destiny also to be punished; So farre was he from justifying or excusing his servant upon any such ground, or forbearing to punish him. And doth not this Au∣thour know that Iocasta for all her acknowledgment of fate governing all things; yet in conscience of her incestuous courses destroyed her selfe in the same Tragedian? But con∣sider, indifferent Reader, whether this Authour doth not carry himselfe, as if he were dealing with little children, and his purpose were not to informe them; but to abuse and mocke them. For is that all waies the faith or opinion of the Tragedian, whatsoever he puts into the mouthes of this or that Actor? Doe not they represent the absurd pre∣tences of some, as well as the reasonable discourses of others? Then againe who are they that maintaine, Fatum, destiny? Where hath he found this maintained by any of our di∣vines? Yet I confesse this Authour deales ingeniously in one thing, to wit, in walking so fairely in the steps of this forefathers. For thus the Pelagians accused the doctrine of Au∣stin, not only after he was dead, as appeares by Prosper's Epistle ad Ruffinum; but even while he was living as appeares by Austin himselfe; Nec sub nomine gratiae fatum asseri∣mus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi: Si autem quibusdam omni∣potentis Dei voluntatem placet fati nomine nuncupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates e∣vitamus, * 1.270 sed de verbis contendere non amamus: neither doe we maintain destiny under the name of grace, in saying grace is not prevented by any merits of man. But if some are pleased to call the will Allmighty God by the name of fa••e (or destiny) we avoid the profane novelties of words but we doe not love to strive about words. Where observe how first the same crimination was made against Austin's doctrine by the Pelagians, which this Authour makes against ours.

2. The doctrine which the Pelagians opposed in this crimination was this, Grace is not conferr'd according unto workes. 3ly, Austin disavowes all antecedency of workes to the bestowing of grace, how much more to the decreeing of grace to be bestowed on a∣ny, which yet is the beloved Helena of this Authour therefore he talkes so oft against an Antecedent decree. Then againe it is manifest that the greatest maintainers of destiny and sate, did not maintaine it in any opposition to the free wills of men. And Austin him selfe professeth that such a necessity as is expressed in these words, Necesse est ut fiat, it must needs be that such a thing shall come to passe, containes no inconvenience, nor is any way prejudiciall to the free wills of men. His words are these; Sienim necessitas nostra ida dicenda est, quae non est in nostra 〈◊〉〈◊〉, ••••detiamsi nelumus, efficit quod potest, sicut est necessitas mortis; Manifestū est 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nostras, quibus recte aut perperam vivitur, sub ta∣le * 1.271 necessitate non esse, Multa••••im 〈◊〉〈◊〉, quae si nolemus, non facerimus. Si autem illa desinitur esse necessitas, secundum quam dicimus necesse esse ut aliquid ita sit vel ita fiat, nescio cur eam timeamus, ne nobis liv•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 voluntatis auferat. If that is to be accounted our necessity, which is net in our power, but whether we will or no, worketh as it can such as is the necessity of death; It is apparent that our wills whereby we live well or ill are not under the the necessity of fate. For we doe many things, which if we would not we should not doe them.

But if necessity be defined to be such a thing as when we say it must needs be that a thing be thus, or thus come to passe; I know not why we should feare least such a necessity should bereave us of free will. And this Austin delivers to meet with the vaine feares of those, who placed our wills among'st those things which are not subject to necessity, least so they should loose their liberty. Observe this well and compare it with the present discourse of this positive The∣ologue, who thinks to outface Austin with the authority of his bare word. In the words following he manifests that he speakes all this while of necessity in respect of God's de∣cree not simply, but considered as irresistable; by the way making no bones of avouching some decrees of God to be resistable, notwithstanding the Psalmist's protestation What∣soever the Lord willeth, that hath he done both in heaven and earth; And St. Paul's emphati∣call expression of the same truth, saying, Who hath repsted his will? But this Divine is a brave fellow; and thinks to carry all with his breath. For where hath he given us any rea∣son to prove that any decrees of God are of any resistable condition? But let his decrees be never so irresistable, and let that be true which Austin saith, that, Non aliquid fit ni∣si omnipotens fieri velit; Not any thing comes to passe, unlesse God will have it come to passe. * 1.272 And after Austin the Church of Ireland in their Articles of religion. Yet if God will have every thing come to passe agreeably to the nature & condition thereof thus, neces∣sary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, as Aquinas hath not only said, * 1.273 but proved; hereby is no impeachment to the liberty of the creature, but an establishment thereof rather, as the Arch-Bishops, Bishops, and Clergy of Ireland have professed in the foresaid Article; that I may shew some authority for my sayings, as this Authour repre∣sents none for his, but carrieth himselfe like a Master of Sentences, as if he were in his own sufficiency of more authority and credit to be believed, then the Pope in a generall Councell: And albeit my selfe after many others, and some formerly mentioned have shewed in a large digression to this purpose that necessity upon supposition, may well * 1.274 stand with contingency, and liberty simply so called. And in the first place have instan∣ced in necessity of infallibility consequent to God's prescience, which though Cicero thought could not consist with man's liberty, yet Christians have alwaies been of a con∣trary opinion; untill the Sect of the Socinians arose; and Arminians are very apt to shew them so much courtesy as to beare their bookes after them. Secondly I have proved a ne∣cessity upon supposition of God's decree to permit sinne. For the Lord takes upon him to be the keeper of us from sinne, as Gen: 20. 6. He professeth as much to Abimilech, that he kept him from sinning against God. In case God will not keep a man from sinne, what can be expected, but that he will undoubtedly sinne without any prejudice to the liberty of his will, considering that of Austin; Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed con∣tumacia, Liberty without grace, is not liberty but wilfulnesse. Thirdly and lastly upon sup∣position of God's will; And this I prove evidently to passe on every thing which God foreseeth as future considering that contingent things are merely possible in their own na∣ture; and cannot passe out of the condition of things merely possible into the condition of things future, without a cause: And no other cause of this transmigration can be de∣vised with any colour of reason or probability, save only the will of God. Neither doe I find that digression of mine in any the least part weakened, or so much as assailed by ought that this Authour hath delivered; Who sheweth himselfe upon the stage, rather to brave his opposites with the bare authority of his words, then with sound argument to dispute ought.

Sect: 2.

Because it taketh away the desert and guilt of sin. Offences if fatall, cannot be justly punished. 2. The * 1.275 reason is because those deed for which men are punished or rewarded must be their own, under their own power and and soveraignty, but such are no fatall acts or events. Neither temporally nor eternally can sin be-punished, if it be absolutely necessary.

Not temporally, as God himselfe hath given us to understand by that law which he prescribed the Jewes Deut: 22. 25. Which was that it a Maid commit uncleanesse by constraint, she should not be punished. His reason was because there was no cause of death in her; what she yeilded to was through compulsion, be∣ing overborne by power; As a man that is wounded to death by his neighbour; so was a Virgin in that case a sufferer rather then a doer. This particular law is of universall right: No just punishment can be in∣slicted for sinne, where there is no power in the party to avoid it. The speech of Lipsius is but a mere crorchet contrary to reason, (Fatali culpae fatalis poena) fatall faults must have fatall punishments. Did magistrates thinke mens offences unavoidable, they would thinke it bootlesse, and unreasonable to punish them. Nay not only so, but we see by dayly experience, that Judges following the direction of reason have very remissely punished such faults as have been committed through the power of the

head strong & exorbitant passions. Yea we may read of some who have not thought it fit to punish such faults at all. Valcrius Maximus telleth that Popilius a Roman Praetor sitting in judgment on a woman who had in * 1.276 a bitter passion slaine her mother, because she had murthered her children (neque damnavit, neque absolvit) neither cleared her nor condemned her And Aulus Gellius reporteth of Dolabella the Proconsul of Asia, that when a woman of Smyrna was brought before him who had poysoned her husband and son for murthering a son of hers, which she had by a former husband; he turned her over to the Arcopagus, which was the gra∣vest and most renowned judgment seat in the world; The Judges there not daring to acquit her, being stai∣ned with a double slaughter, nor yet to punish her being provokt with just greife, commanded the accuser & offender to come before them an hundred yeares after. And so neither was the womans fact justified, the lawes not allowing of it; Nor yet the woman punished because she was worthy to be pardoned. If wise, magistrates have spared such offenders as have been overswayed with passions, which did but incline, not de∣termine them to their irregular actions; they would never have punished any trespassers, if they had thought them to be such by invincible necessity, Or if offenders did thinke that their offences were their destinies, and that when they murther, steale, commit adultery, make insurrections, plot treasons, or practise any o∣ther outragious villanies, they doe them by the necessity of Gods unalterable decree; and can doe no other∣wise: they would and might comp••aine of their punishments as unjust, as Zenoes servant did; when he was bea∣ten by his master for a fault, he told him out of his own grounds that he was unjustly beaten. Because he was (••fato coactus peccare) constrained to make that fault by his undeclinable fate. The Ad∣••umctine Monks, misled by Saint Austin Epist. 105. ad sixtum Presbyterum, (which he calleth a booke where∣in he setteth downe his opinion concerning Gods grace) did so teach grace that they denyed free will. And this Saint Austin confuted in his booke De gratia & liberoarbitrio. And thinking the grace of God (as Saint Austin taught) to be such as could not stand with freedome of will, they thought that no man should be punished for his faults, but rather prayed for that God would give them grace to doe better. Against this Austin directed his other booke, De correp: & gratiá. In which discourse though it be grace that is still named, yet predestination is included. For as Kimedontius saith truely in his preface to Luther De servo arbitrio. Between grace and predestination there is only this difference (as Saint Austin teacheth Libro de praedest. Sanctorum cap. 10.) that predestination is a preparation of grace, and grace a bestowing of predestination. As Zenoes servant and these Monks did, so would all men judge; did they considerately thinke that men could not choose but offend. And what would be the resultance of such a perswasion, but an inundation of the greatest insolencies, and dissolution of all good goverment.

Indeed if our doctrine make sin to be no sin, and therewithall take away the conscience * 1.277 of sin; it is not to be marvailed, if it take away the desert and guilt of sinne: For as sinne is no sinne; so likewise it is as fit that the desert and guilt of sinne, should be the desert and guilt of no sinne; and so no desert or guilt at all. This Authour to serve his own turne takes great libery of discourse in talking of offences fatall; these were called by Austin profane novelties of words. Yet elsewhere he professeth that if no other thing were meant hereby then the divine providence. Sententiam teneant, linguā corrigant; let thē hold their or∣thodoxe meaning, but let thē correct their language Now by providence divine is meant the will of God, working every thing that is good, and permitting every thing that is evill. And without this will of God not any thing comes to passe in the judgment of Austin. Non aliquid sit saith he, nisi ōnipotens furi velit, vel sinen••o ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo, Not any thing comes to passe, unlesse Almighty God will have it come to passe, either by suffering it, or by * 1.278 〈◊〉〈◊〉 working of it to wit, if evill, suffering it, if good working it; but of each he profes∣seth that God wills it The abominable outrages committed upon the person of the ho∣ly Son of God, were such as God's hand and God's counsell sore determined, that is as much * 1.279 as to say, antecedently determined to be done. And the ••en Kings in giving their kingdomes to the Beast, are said herein to have agreed to dce God's will. Yet this Authour dares not say, that these actions could not be justly punished Yet the maintainets of destiny (as I have shewed out of Austin) denyed that the wills of men were subject to destiny; while * 1.280 this Authour talkes in their language, why doth he not talke in their meaning? And if he talkes in our meaning why doth he not talke in our language? Now Austin farther saith (is I have shewed out of the same place) that they who exempted the wills of men from all necessity, seared a vaine and causelesse feare; professing that as to some necessity the will is not subject, such as is the necessity of death, which befalls us whether we will or no. So to some necessity it may be subject without any danger; and that necessity he expresseth to be such, as when we say, it must needs be that such a thing come to passe. Now such a necessity and no other is granted by us as consequent to the will of God, so that if God will give a man faith, it must needs be, such a man shall believe; if he will give re∣pentance it must needs be, that such a man shall repent; If he will keep such a man as A∣bimelech from sinning against him, it must needs be, that such a man shall be kept from * 1.281 sinning against him. If God will not give a man faith, nor repentance, it must needs be, that such a man will not believe, will not repent. In like manner if God will not keepe a man from sinne, but suffer him to sinne; it needs must be that such a one shall sinne. If God harden the heart of Pharoah, so that he shall not set Israel goe, undoubtedly so it shall come to passe. If God put it into the hearts of the Kings to give up their king∣domes

to the Beast, they shall infallibly give their Kingdomes to the Beast. If he gives men over unto a Reprobate mind to doe things inconvenient, undoubtedly being thus prostituted by God to their own corruption from within, and to the power of Satan from without, they shall doe those inconvenient things, be they never so abominable; yet not necessarily, much lesse in the way of absolute necessity, (as this Authour wor∣deth it, affecting to speake with a full mouth (which is a quality naturall to these Armi∣nians, and runnes in a blood) but proveth nothing) but contingently and freely, not only with a possibility, but also with an active power to the contrary. And if freely, then sure∣ly their works are their own, proceeding from their own power and soveraignty, but yet not supreame and absolute dominion and independent in their operation, on God their maker. God must have the prerogative still of being the first mover, the first cause, the first Agent, the first free Agent; So farre off are we from maintaining that the actions of men have their being by absolute necessity; that we utterly deny any thing in the world to have 'its existence by absolute necessity, saving God alone, as before I have shewed. Sciendum, saith Durand, quod loquendo de necessitate simpliciter, voluntas divina * 1.282 nec imponit, nec imponere potest rebus necessitatem; nec res creatae sunt capaces talis necessita∣tis. We are to know that speaking of necessity simply so called, the will of God neither doth im∣pose, or can impose any such necessity on things, neither are creatures capable of such necessity. But if we speake of such necessity as creatures are capable of under the divine liberty, by cau∣ses intermediate; it is to be said that all things doe not come to passe of necessity; but some doe, and some doe not. God will have some things come to passe by the mediation of causes necessary, & those come to passe necessarily; Others come to passe by the mediation of causes contingent, and those come to passe contingently; Whereby, saith he, 'tis manifest that they say not well, who say that all things come to passe of necessity in reference to the Divine will; because, as hath been shewed, in respect of the Divine will, all things come to passe freely; and therefore speaking ab∣solutely, they may not come to passe, although, upon supposition that they are willed, they cannot but come to passe; but this is only necessity upon supposition.

1. Indeed if men did sinne against their wills; and virgins sometimes are ravished, & men are slaine by force full sore against their wills, they deserved no punishment. But is it possible that a man can will that which is evill against his will? Every ordinary Scho∣lar in the University knowes that axiome, Voluntas non potest cogi, the will cannot be forced. Lipsius his speech, fatali culpae fatalis poena, fatall faults have fatall punishments, this Au∣thour saith, is but a mere crotchet contrary to reason. As if he would teach the very main∣tainers of fate, yea the very first to understand themselves. For fate wherewith our doctrine is charged by our opposites is commonly called Fate Stoicall. Now Zeno was the father of the Stoicks; yet when his servant was taken playing the theife, pleaded for himselfe, saying it was my destiny to steale. Zeno answeared him in his own language, that it was his destiny to smart for it too; right in this same sense that Lipsius spake. Yet Zeno knew full well that he punished his servant freely. And Zeno is well knowne to have been a great Master of morality for all this, which could not consist with denying the liberty of man's will, as this Authour well knowes. And Austin censureth those who feared to subject the will to all manner of necessity, as men transported with vaine and causelesse feares; manifesting thereby that some necessity may very well consist with a man's liberty. Magistrates though they believe with Austin that, Not any thing comes * 1.283 to passe, unlesse Allmighty God will have it come to passe; And with the Church of Ireland, that God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsell ordaine whatsoever should in time come to passe. And with Aquinas that the roote of contingency, is the effectuall will of God; yet may they well thinke it reasonable enough to punish offences; seing that God decrees that some things, even all the actions of men shall come to passe contin∣gently; as well as other things shall come to passe necessarily. For to come to passe contingently is to come to passe avoidably; and if they be the actions of men, freely also. It is incredible that any sober man should remissely punish faults for the exorbitancy & strength sake of the passions, whereby they were committed, but rather in consideration of the potent causes which raised such passions in them, under a colour of justice. And we commonly say the greater the temptation is, the lesse is the sin. So Peter surprised sud∣dainly with feare denied his Master. Yet what saith Aristotle. In some things no force is suffe∣cient * 1.284 for excuse; but a man ought to dy rather any manner of death, then commit them. For those things in Euripedes are rediculous, which moved Alcmaeon to kill his mother. Indeed Pla∣to * 1.285 maintained that things done through passion were not voluntary. But Aristotle a bet∣ter Master then he, disproves it, and by excellent reasons confirmes the contrary. And

whatsoever Popilius the Roman Pretor judged of her, who slew her mother, provoked by her Mothers fact in murthering her children; yet let our lawes be consulted, and the opinion of our Judges in such a case; and whether such a one were not to be condemned; and whether Popilius his judgment deserves to be admitted for the correction of the lawes of our land, and working a reformation in this particular. We should soone have a wild world, if every one being provoked by the insolencies of others should thrust them∣selves into the throne of God for the execution of vengeance; Yet none more unfit for this, then the daughter to execute God's vengeance upon the mother that bare her. Yet it was wont to be held, If I forget not, that potestas patria originally was power of life and death. But all is fish that comes to this Authour's net; like as her fact who poisoned her husband and son for killing a son of hers; destroying two for one without all autho∣rity most unnaturally; and that not hastily, but in a deliberate way by poisoning. And doth it become Christians to admire such heathenish courses of men nothing acquaint∣ed with the divine providence? And was this so doubtfull a case, whether so wicked a wretch avenging her selfe by poison secretly given upon her husband and son for the death of another son of hers, that the sentencing thereof should be put over untill an 100 yeares after? But what of all this? These willfully affect revenge, the execution whereof belongs not to them; but it is just with God to punish sinne with sinne; one man's sinne by another. As of Senacherib the Lord professeth, that he would cause him to fall by the sword in his own land, this was brought to passe by his own children fal∣ling upon him furiously, and as unnaturally as the actions of any of these. How was inno∣cent Naboth used, and by publique sentence condemned to be stoned to death, and ac∣cordingly executed by the practise of wicked Iezabel? Yet Solomon spareth not to pro∣fesse that every man's judgment commeth of the Lord. Never were more abominable cour∣ses executed upon any, then upon the holy son of God: Yet these were all foredetermi∣ned * 1.286 by the hand of God, and the counsell of God, as the Apostles with one voice acknowledge. By the same providence was Ioseph sold into Egypt, God working thereby the preserva∣tion * 1.287 of them that sold him; Thus Sihon was hardened, and the Canaanites, and the Egy∣ptians with Pharaoh their King to their own destruction. Thus the Lord punished Da∣vid's foule sinne by the murther of Amnon contrived by his own brother; and by the sword of Absolon rising up against his own father; and by the sword of Shimei's tongue cursing David; wherein David acknowledged the hand of God. Thus he punished the Idolatry of the Gentiles by giving them over to vile affections, and so prostituting them to abominable courses. What outrages were committed by Senacherib that proud and blasphemous wretch upon the people of God; yet is he called the rod of God's wrath and * 1.288 the staffe in his hand; is said to be God's indignation. And if God leaves any man to his corruption, and offers occasions and temptations from without, which are naturally apt to actuate such corruptions; and withall gives them over to the power of Satan; what is to be expected, but that they will breake forth into murther, as in Senacherib's sons; and the Jewes crucifying the Son of God; into stealth sacrilegious, as in Achan; into adultery and that in an incestuous manner as we see in Absalom; into insurrections, an ex∣ample whereof we have in the ten Tribes revolting from Rehoboam; into treasons as Iu∣das betraying his own Master; and into all manner of outragious villanies, whereof the Scripture makes plentifull mention, and of the providence of God therein? As for God's determining to the act, that is nothing at all materiall to the point in hand, though this Authour in his crude conceits, is much intoxicated therewith; For as much as, whether the wicked are exercised in actions good for the substance of them; or in abstaining from that which is evill, they never a whit the more either performe the one, or abstaine from the other in a gracious manner; and all for want of grace supernaturall, which God is not bound to bestow on any. All sides confesse that Divine concourse is necessary to every act, as without which the creature cannot move. For in God we move, as well as in him we live, and in him we have our being. And about this concourse a question is made, to wit, Whether God's influence be only into the act, and that upon condition, modo nos velimus, provided that we will, is as absurd and contradictious a conceit, as can be devi∣sed; seing the greatest question is concerning the act of willing: And is it possible that God shall worke this act upon condition that it be wrought by us? why, if it be wrought by us, what need is there of God's working it? Can the same act be the condition of it selfe, and so both before and after it selfe? To avoid this precipice others fly to God's prescience, that at such an instant man will produce such an act of will, provided that God will produce it, which is worse then the former. For hereby each Agent's opera∣tion

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is made the condition of the other, whence no operation at all can proceed. Then a∣gaine a thing is fained to be foreseen by God as future, which hath no cause of the fu∣turition thereof, being in it's own nature merely possible, that is no more future indeed, then not future: And nothing but the will and decree of God can make it passe out of the condition of a thing merely possible into the condition of a thing future, as is made manifest by invincible reason. Therefore we say the influence of God necessarily re∣quired to every action, is made into the will it selfe moving it agreably to the nature thereof, to doe whatsoever it doth, not voluntarily only, but freely also; taking liberty a∣right and as it ought to be taken, that is in the choice of meanes tending to an end, whe∣ther that end be a man's right end or no. For it is confessed by Moralists that the mo∣tion of the will towards it's congruous end, is naturall and necessary, not free. But this brave Gentleman carrieth himselfe aloft, and superciliously despising to enter into any of these lists of argumentation; and as if the matter were conclusum contra Manichaeos, con∣fidently supposeth, without all proofe, that we maintaine that all humane actions come to passe by absolute necessity: Whereas to the contrary 'tis evident that nothing in the world hath it's existence by absolute necessity, saving God alone. 'Tis true, God's decree is unalterable, and whatsoever comes to passe comes to passe by his will saith Austin: and the Church of Ireland; By the effectuall will of God, saith Aquinas, as which, he makes the roote of all contingency; And therefore as necessary causes worke necessarily by the will of God; so by the same will of God doe contingent Agents worke contingently; and free Agents worke voluntarily and freely. And observe the immodesty of this Authour, he tells us what Zeno's servant pleaded for himselfe with his Master; but he doth not tell what Zeno answered him, that he conceales; it is enough for him to gull and cheate poore ignorants. The Adrumetine Monks, he saith, were misled by Austin; a vile imputation cast upon that man whose memory hath been alwaies honourable in the Church of God; and the memoriall of his opposites rots. Did Austin misleade them? did he draw them into errour? If they did mistake Austin, shall it be true there∣fore to say they were misled by him? How many mistake and misunderstand God's word; what then? shall we be so audacious and blasphemous, as to say they are misled by the word of God? Why may not such impudent persons proceed, and say they are misled by the holy Ghost? Then that which he saith of these Monks, as misled by Austin, it is a notorious untruth; Cresconius and Felix that came over to Austin of their own heads to complaine of some in their Monastry; laid to their charge indeed that they so taught grace, that they denied freewill; & that this they pretended to have learned out of Austin's booke written to Sixtus the Presbyter. But Austin was not hasty to believe this cri∣mination: And therefore he saith disjunctively of that Monke of whom they complai∣ned, Aut librum meum non intelligit, aut ipse non intelligitur; either he understands not my booke; or himselfe is not well understood by his brethren. If the information were true, then that Brother of whom they complained mistooke Austin. For Austin doth not any where so maintaine grace, as to deny free-will. But if that Brother understood Austin aright in that foresaid booke of his, then he maintained no such opinion as Cresconius and Fe∣lix laid to his charge, but they rather misunderstood him. And this appeared to be most true afterwards. For Florus was the man whom Cresconius and Felix accused, and whom Austin desired of Valentinus the father of them, that he would send over unto him, as Coccius acknowledgeth, & accordingly he was sent over to Austin, as appeares in Austin's booke De corrept. & gratiâ cap. 1. With whom when Austin had conferred, he found him most orthodoxe as himselfe professeth in the chapter mentioned, and therein much rejoyced, and withall signifieth to Valentinus that they deserved rather to be checked who misunderstood Florus. And therefore when Austin in his Retractations comes to take notice of his booke De gratiâ & libero arbitrio, and the occasion of writing thereof, he sets it downe not absolutely, because of those who so doe maintaine grace, as withall they deny free-will, but with a disjunctive addition, thus, or because of those who thinke when grace is maintained, therewithall that free-will is denied. The first was delivered in reference to the crimination made before him by Cresconius, and Felix against Florus; but the latter was according to Austin's suspicion at the first, which proved afterwards to be a truth, as appeares by the first chapter of Austin's booke de correptione & gratiâ; where Florus is justified and magnified by St. Austin, and his criminators condemned. And seing there were none such among the Monks of Adrumetum, as the accusants pretended, who so maintained grace, as to deny free-will; therefore that also must needs be false which fol∣loweth in this Authour, when he saith that against them also St. Austin wrote his other

booke De correptione & gratiâ: And the truth is the whole buisinesse was ended and the tumult appeased between those Adrumetine Monks, before Florus came over; as appeared by the relation made unto him by Florus concerning the amicable composition of all things there. And Austin in this very passage which this Authour grates upon, professeth that he writes not against them; only he answereth such an objection (For I conceive it to be no other) more fully which was made by some of them formerly a∣gainst Florus, and the doctrine of Austin maintained by Florus. The relation whereof was brought unto him by the same Florus, as it seemes. But of this more at large in * 1.289 my digression concerning the predestinarian heresy, which I purpose to subjoine to this. Austin saith indeed that, Praedestinatio est gratiae praeparatio, gratia verò ipsa donatio. Pre∣destination is the preparation of grace, Grace the gift it selfe which was prepared; not the bestowing of it: How can it be? Can a gift temporall be the bestowing of a thing eter∣nall? What entertainment Zeno's servant found at his Masters hands (which this Au∣thour conceales) I have often shewed who taught no such doctrine as destiny as to free a knave from stripes; who as so great a Philosopher had a better judgment in the nature of fate then his servant; and himselfe so well thought of by the whole State of Athenians. Yet was not Zeno so well instructed in the mystery of Divine providence, as we are by the word of God; even from the selling of Ioseph all along to the crucifying of the Son of God; & from thence to the Kings giving up their Kingdomes to the Beast, which should come to passe in the latter part of the last times of the world. But let him make him∣selfe mery with Zeno's servant, who taken in a theevish fact was content to helpe him∣selfe with any pretence; but Zeno we know did not approve of his appology, but prepa∣red a Rod for the knaves back in despite of that. And as for the Monks, the relation that here he makes is merely a fiction of his own braine without all ground. Thus his foundation being ruined, no marvaile if the house he builds thereon must needs totter and fall on his ownpate.

Sect: 3.

2. Nor if this be true can sin be punished eternally, or that tribunall be just on which the sentence of e¦ternall * 1.290 fire shall be denounced against the wicked at the last day. To this I have the fathers bearing witnesse generally and plainly. Tertullian hath there words; The recompence of God and evill can with no justice be given to him, who is good or evill, not freely but of necessity. Saint Hierome saith, where necessity do∣mineers, * 1.291 there is no place for retribution. Epiphanius saith, the stars which impose upon men a necessity of sinning, may be punished with better justice then the men themselves. We place mens nativities under no fatall constell••tions, saith Saint Austin, that we may free the will by which a man liveth either well or ill, from all bands of necessity, because of the righteous judgment of God. Prosper speaking of the judg∣ment of God, by which he decreed to render unto every man according to his works, saith, this judgment would never be if men did sinne by the will and determination of God. Fulgentius also saith the same. It is great injustice in God, to punish him whom he doth not find, but make an offender. This was Saint Peruards opinion too; it is only a will free from compulsion and necessity saith he, which maketh a crea∣ture capable of reward & punishment Out of these restimonies laid together may be collected three things.

1. That the Ancients did use to call a necssity of humane actions good or bad, by the name of destiny, from what externall cause soever this necessity did arise.

2. That they did use these two words (Necessity) and (Compulsion) promiscuously; and therefore thought that necessity as well as compulsion did take away the wills liberty.

3. (Which is for our present purpose) that they believed and contended that the judgments of God on sinners could not be just, if they were held by the Adamantine chaines of any absolute necessity, under the power of their sins.

I will therefore conclude this Argument with the words of Epiphanius writing of the errour of the Pha∣ris••es, who beleived the immortality of the soule, and the resurrection of the dead, & yet held that all things come to passe by necessity. It is, saith he, a point of extreame ignorance; or madnesse rather, for him that * 1.292 confesseth the resurection of the dead, and the great day appointed for the revelation of God's righte¦ous judgment, to say that there is any destiny, any necessity in mens actions For how can the righteous judgment of God and destiny comply and stand together? And (let me adde) how can the beliefe of this and true piety stand together? For where this perswasion that mens sins are necessary, and that therefore there can be no righteous judgment, is rooted in religion will quickly be rooted out.

4. It tendes to religions overthrow; because it makes the whole circle of man's life, but a mere destiny. By it all our doings are God's ordinances, all our imaginations branches of his predestination; and all events in Kingdomes and commonweales the necessary issues of the divine decree. All things whatsoever though they seem to doe somewhat; yet by this opinion, they doe indeed just nothing; the best lawes restrain not one offender the sweetest rewards promote not one vertue, the powerfull'st Sermons convert not one sin∣ner, the humblest devotions divert not one calamity; the strongest endeavours in things of any nature what∣soever, effect no more then would be done without them, but the necessitating, overruling decree of God doth all. And if lawes doe nothing, wherefore are they made? If rules of religion doe nothing, why are they prescribed? If the wills of men doe nothing, why are men encouraged to one thing, scared from ano∣ther?

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ther? and if good endeavours and onsets doe nothing (being excited, continued, limited, controlled and e¦very way governed by an active, absolute, and Almighty decree, to what purpose are they used? Who seeth not plainly whither these things tend? To nothing more then to the subversion of piety and pollicy, religion & lawes, society and government? This did the Romans see full well; and therefore they banished (Mathema∣ticos, the teachers & abetters of destiny) out of Rome. These and the like inconveniencies which come from the uppper way, did worke so with Prosper, as that he calls him no Catholique who is of this opinion. * 1.293 Whosoever saith that men are urged to sinne, and to be damned by the predestination of God, as by a fatall, unavoidable necessity, he is no Catholique.

They did also make the Arausican counsell denounce a curse against such. That any are predestinated by the divine power to sinne, we doe not only not believe, but with the greatest detestation that we can▪ we denounce Anathema to such (if there be any such) as will believe so great an evill. Thus farre of my ••ea¦sons against the upper and more harsh and rigorous way.

2. Undoubtedly if sin cannot be punished temporally, it cannot be punished eternally. We have no need, I should thinke of the Authority of any fathers to justifie this. Where * 1.294 doth this Authour find, that we maintaine that a man is good or evill, not freely but by ne∣cessity, that Tertullian is brought in as opposing us here? Yet we thinke this is worthy of distinction: For was not Adam made by God habitually good? Durand. I am sure, main∣taines that in his creation he was endued with all Morall vertues: & this we read in Scri∣pture, that all things which God made were very good: & as other things were made very good in their kind: So I presume man was made very good in his kind: and how this could be unlesse he were made vertuous, I cannot conceive. So likewise man being brought forth in the corrupt masse; when afterwards he is made good either in the way of justification, or in the way of regeneration; these are no free acts of Man, but rather the free acts of God. I presume this Authour dares not say that man regenerates himselfe But as for the denomination of goodnesse and badnesse in man, that ariseth from any actions of his, I willingly grant all such goodnesse or badnesse is acquired freely, not necessarily.

And as Tertullian takes necessity, to wit in opposition unto liberty; So I presume doth Hierome too; otherwise these two Fathers were yoaked together unequally in this place. Now we know no such necessity domineering in man, as stands in opposition to liberty. Much lesse doe we maintaine any necessity over the will of man, depending up∣on fatall constellations; And as Epiphanius, and Austin discourse thus of necessity in refe∣rence to fatall constellations; So it seemes likely that Hierome and Tertullian did dis∣course of necessity in the same sense. To sinne by the will of God in Prosper is to sin by the predestination of God, as appeares both by the Objection it selfe, and Prosper's answer there∣unto throughout. Now predestination in the fathers meaning is of no other things, thē such as God purposed to worke. And accordingly we answer that no evill in the world, as evill, comes to passe by God's will to worke it; but only by God's will to permit it. And it is Au∣stin's expresse professiō, that Non aliquid fit nisi omnipotens fieri velit. Not any thing comes to passe, unles God Almighty will have it come to passe; but how? Not all after one manner, but after a different manner; some by working them, others by permitting them; vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo; either by suffering it to come to passe, in case it be evill, or himselfe wor∣king it, in case it be good. Fulgentius justifies this sense in his sentence here alleadged. For to sinne by God's will in Prosper, is all one with being made an offender (or made to sinne) by God, in Fulgentius. Now we say God makes many a man good by regeneration; but he makes none evill; only he doth not cure that naturall or habituall viciousnesse, which he finds amongst men, in all. For He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth; and indeed he is bound to none. St. Bernard clearely maintaines that there is noe liber∣ty from sinne in any naturall man; and consequently every naturall man is cast upon a ne∣cessity of sinning; and therefore that liberty from necessity which he grants to man, can be no other then liberty from compulsion; And so Dr. Fulke usually makes the distinction run between Liberty from sin, and liberty from coaction; & denying the one he grants the other.

That the Antients did call that necessity, which ariseth from the will of God upon the will of the creature by the name of destiny; This Authour brings not the least colour of * 1.295 proofe; neither do I thinke he is able to bring any, save only of the Pelagians, who tradu∣ced Austin's doctrine of predestination by the name of destiny. And so they traduced his doctrine in denying that grace was conferred according to mens workes; whereupon it was that he built his doctrine of predestination, as is apparent De bono perseverantiae. c. 15. In the second I wonder this Author observes not how he contradicts himselfe. For if they used these words Necessity, & compulsion; promiscuously; doth it not evidently follow that * 1.296 they distinguished them not? but alwaies tooke them of equivalent signification. But I doe not find that Austin tooke necessity of the same signification with compulsion; when he

distinguisheth of necessity; saying some necessity is such, as whereby a thing befalls a man, whether he will or no; as the necessity of death; and to such a necessity he saith, the will is not subject. Another necessity there is, as when we say, It must needs be, that this, or that come to passe, and he confesseth plainly that the will may be subject to such a necessity, without danger or prejudice to the liberty thereof.

3 And well they might hold that God's judgments were not just on sinners, if they were held by any absolute necessity under the power of their sins. We say that nothing hath either existence, or continuance, by absolute necessity, save God alone. But I guesse this Au∣thour calls that necessity absolute, which flowes from God's absolute decree. Now if he will have God's decrees to be conditionall, it stands him upon to prove it, not bold∣ly suppose it. Especially seeing Aquinas hath professed that never any man was so mad as to say that there is any cause of God's predestination, as touching the act of God's prede∣stinating; and that there can be no cause hereof he proves because there can be no cause of God's will, as touching the act of God willing, as formerly he had proved. And Do∣ctor Iackson in his booke of providence confesseth that the distinction of God's will, in∣to a will antecedent, and a will consequent, is not to be understood as touching the act of God willing; but as touching the things willed. And accordingly, seeing reproba∣tion in it's kind is the will of God, as well as predestination in it's kind; it followeth, that as there can be no cause of the will of God, as touching the act of God wil∣ling; no cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating; so nei∣ther can there be any cause of Reprobation, as touching the act of God repro∣bating. And looke how mad a thing it is for any man to maintaine that there is some cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating. So as mad a thing it must be every way to avouch that there is a cause of Repro∣bation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And truely the Apostle St. Paul plain∣ly manifests that upon what ground he proves, that Election is not of good works (name∣ly because before Iacob or Esau were borne, or had done good or evill, it was said, The elder shall serve the younger) upon the same ground we may be bold to conclude, that Reprobation is not of evill workes. And the same reason manifests that faith and in∣fidelity are excluded from being the causes, the one of Election, the other of Reproba∣tion; as well as good and evill workes. And both Piscator by evidence of Scripture, and Bradwardine by evidence of reason have demonstrated, that no will of God is conditio∣nall, which is to be understood, as touching the act of God willing. And it may be e∣vidently further demonstrated thus; If any thing be the cause of God's will, then ei∣ther by necessity of nature, or by the constitution of God; Not by necessity of nature, as is evident and all confesse, there being no colour of truth for that; besides such an opinion were most dangerously prejudiciall to God's soveraignty, and liberty. If therefore they say, it is by the constitution of God, maske I pray what an insuperable absurdity followeth hereupon. For seing God's constitution is his will, it followeth that God did will that upon foresight of this or that he would will such a man's salvation, and such a man's damnation. And thus the act of God's will is made the Object of God's will, even the eternall act of God's will; Whereas to the contrary it is ap∣parent, that the objects of God's will are things temporall, never any thing that is e∣ternall But as touching things willed, we readily grant, it may be said there is a cause thereof as School-Divines doe generally acknowledge. And thus Gerardus Vossius speaks of the conditionall will, which he faith the Fathers doe ascribe to God. For this is the in∣stance which he gives thereof, as for example, when God ordaines to bestow salvation on a man in case he believe; here faith is made the condition of Salvation, but not of the will of God And in like manner we willingly grant that reprobation is conditionall, in∣asmuch as God intends to inflict damnation on none, but such as die in sin without repen∣ance But albeit predestination, as touching this particular thing willed, may be said to be conditionall according as the School-men explicate their meaning; and reprobation like∣wise as touching the particular of dānatiō mētioned: yet no such thing cā be truely affir∣med either of the one or of the other, as touching the particulars of grāting, or denying the grace of règeneratiō, which are intended also by the decrees of predestinatiō & repro∣batiō. For albeit God intends not to bestow salvation on any, but upon condition of faith; nor damnation on any, but upon condition of finall impenitency and infidelity. Yet God intends not to bestow the grace of regeneration on some for the curing of their naturall infidelity and impenitency. Nor to leave the same infidelity and impenitency uncured in others, by denying the same grace of regeneration unto them. This I say God doth not

intend to bring to passe upon any condition; For if he should, then grace should be con∣ferred according unto works, which was condemned in the Synod of Palestine and all a∣long in divers Synods, and Councells against the Pelagians. So that albeit God proceeds according to a law in bestowing salvation, and inflicting damnation; yet he proceeds ac∣cording to no law, in giving or denying the grace of regeneration for the curing of our naturall corruption; but merely according to the pleasure of his will, as the Apostle te∣stifies saying, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. And if the con∣ferring and denying of this grace be absolute; how much more are the decrees hereof to be accounted most absolute? And consequently that one man is delivered from the pow∣er of his sins, whether originall or habituall; another is not, but still continueth under the power of them; This I say, doth, & must needs come to passe by vertue of Gods abso∣lute decrees. Yet no absolute necessity followeth hereupon. First because no greater ne∣cessity then that which is absolute can be attributed to the existence and continuance of God himselfe. Secondly God did absolutely decree to make the world; yet no wise man was ever known to affirme that the worlds existence was, and is by absolute necessity. In like sort, God did absolutely decree, that Iosiah should burne the Prophets bones, up∣on the Altar; That Cyrus should build his Citty and let goe his captives; That no man should desire the Israelites land, when they should come to appeare before the Lord their God thrice in the yeare; That God would circumcise their hearts, and the hearts of their children to love the Lord their God withall their heart, and with all their soule. To put his feare in their hearts, that they should never depart away from him; To cause them to walke in his statutes and judgments to doe them. To worke in them both the will and the deed, according to his good plea∣sure. Yea to worke in them every thing that is pleasing in his sight through Iesus Christ. Like∣wise * 1.297 that Absolom should defile his fathers Concubines, that the Jewes should crucify the Son of God; that some through disobedience should stumble at the word; that the Kings should give their kingdomes to the beast. Yet these actions were done by them as freely as ever they * 1.298 did ought in their lives; All these things I say by Scripture evidence were decreed by God to come to passe; The good by God's effection the evill by God's permission; and de∣creed absolutely on their parts that did them; if not, let it be shewed upon what conditi∣on on Absolon's part, he should defile his fathers Concubines; upon what condition on the Jewes part, they should crucify the Son of God; upon what condition on their part, o∣thers through disobedience should stumble at God's word; And upon what condition on their part, the Kings should give their kingdomes to the beast. And if they take Ar∣minias his way, let them reply upon mine answere to Arminius; if Bellarmin's, let them reply upon my answer to Bellarmine, that we may not trouble the world with out Tau∣tologies: If a different way from both these, I shall be glad, to be acquainted with it, & give it such entertainement as according to my judgment it shall be found to deserve.

So that with Epiphanius, though we are ready to concurre in denying destiny, which as before we heard out of him was a necessity derived from the starres; yet with Austin we may still hold that the wills of men need not to be exempted from all necessity, to maintaine the liberty thereof, and he gives instance in such a necessity as whereby we say, It most needs be that such a thing come to passe, as no way prejudiciall to man's liberty. And Arminius confesseth, that upon supposition of God's decree it must needs be that the Souldiers should abstaine from the breaking of Christ's bones; yet I nothing doubt, but this action was as as freely performed by them, as any other. For albeit a thing must needs come to passe which God hath decreed to come to passe, yet it is indif∣ferent to come to passe necessarily or freely; which also God determines according to the nature of the things themselves; namely that necessary things shall come to passe necessarily, and contingent things contingently. And to this purpose he hath prepa∣red different Agents, as Aquinas observeth some necessary working necessarily, some con∣tingent * 1.299 working contingently.

4. Still this Author harpes upon the same string imputing unto us, that we make the whole Circle af a man's life a mere destiny; his meaning is that we take away all li∣berty, which is most untrue. As for destiny it is well knowne as before I have shewed that this was the usuall crimination, which the Pelagians cast upon the doctrine of St. Austin; and that, because he maintained that grace was not given according unto man's workes. And what was Austin's answer hereunto, I have shewed before: Si cui voluntatem omnipotentis Dei Fati nomine placet nuncupari, profanas verborum novita∣tes evitamus, sed de verbis contendere non amamus, If men please to call the will of Al∣mighty God by the name of destiny; we avoid profane novelties of words, but we doe not

love to wrangle about words. For God to worke us to faith, to repentance, to every good worke; yea to the very will and the deed, and that according to his good pleasure (for which we have expresse Scripture, both in the old and new Testament, as earst I shewed) & absolutely to decree this is to make the whole circle of man's like, as touching good courses, but a mere destiny, if we believe this Divine; whereas if this be decreed to be done conditionally, then grace must be conferred according to works, which is as true Pe∣lagianisme, as ever dropt from the mouth of Pelagius, & which himselfe was sōetimes dri∣ven torenounce yet this Pelagianisme is the only true divinity, if we believe this Author. Againe if non aliquid fit nisi omnipotens fieri velit, Not any thing cōes to passe, unlesse God Al∣mighty will have it come to passe; whether good or evill; which was sometimes delivered by Austin; and of late professed by the Church of Ireland in the dayes of King James, this is to make the whole Circle of man's life a mere Destiny; if this Author be of any credit so farre as to make his words to be received as Oracles; yet God's word is expresse from the unanimous consent of the Apostles, that both Herod & Pontius-Pilate, wih the Gentiles and people of Israel were gathered together against the holy Son of God to do what God's hand & God's counsell had before determined to be done: Yet were they gathered together to doe such acts, as more facinorous were never known to be done since the world beganne: And if we be∣lieve this Author, all this came to passe by meere destiny: And if this be to come to passe by meere destiny, why should we not believe it? Have we better or more compleate te∣stimony for ought throughout the whole booke of God, then for this? All things that come to passe must needs be the issues of the divine decree; not only such things as come to passe necessarily, by necessary Agents working necessarily; but even such things al∣so as come to passe freely, by free agents working contingently, and freely, as Aquinas hath proved and Austin and the Church of Ireland acknowledged, and the word of God hath justified, and cleare reason demonstrated, for as much as otherwise no future thing could be foreknowne by God from everlasting. For nothing can be from everlasting knowne by God as future, unlesse from everlasting it were future. But without the de∣cree of God passing upon it, no contingent thing can passe out of the condition of a thing merely possible (such as it is in it's own nature) into the conditiō of a thing future. So that whosoever denies God's decree to passe upon every thing that comes to passe throughout the world, must therewithall deny the foreknowledge thereof in the mind of God; Let but this Authour avoid this one argument if he can; but he will never an∣swer it while his head is hot•••• conceive I have had sufficient experience of his strength al∣ready this way, and of the shamefull issue of his adventure therein. He that sayd, Non ali∣quid fit nisi omnipotens fieri velit, Not any thing comes to passe, unlesse the Almighty will have it come to passe, sayd also that God so workes in every creature, as without all prejudice to their own motions. And when the Apostle said, that In God we move, his meaning was not, that the creature did nothing, or moved not at all. All that followeth is of the same stampe a fardell of unshamefast untruthes. Belike when God saith, I will cause them to walke in my statutes and to doe them, God caused them to doe just nothing. In like man∣ner when the holy Prophet expostulates with God in the person of the Church after this manner, Lord why hast thou caused us to erre from thy waies, and hardened our hearts a∣gainst thy feare, the meaning is, why hast thou caused us to doe just nothing. In like manner when God restraines offences, he doth it not by his lawes, When he promotes vertue he doth it not by rewards; when he converts sinners he doth it not by sermons: when thou∣sands were converted in one day, it was not by the ministry of Peter and his fellow A∣postles. This Authours meaning seemes to be, that unlesse man converts himselfe, it is not done by sermons. But see how he overlasheth; whē carrying the matter so as if God's decree necessitated and overruled all by our opinion; yet most absurdly he exempts from this divine decree man's endeavours. And who seeth not that to overrule is to carry the reasonable creature on to doe contrary to his own will and judgment. For unlesse he doth tosse strenuouslly he can prevaile nothing with any sober and indifferent Reader. In like sort to necessitate denotes such a motion whereby the creature is carried to doe a thing necessailry but this is not Bradwardines opinion, who alone amongst Schoole-Di∣vines, that I know, useth this phrase of necessitating. For he saith that God necessitates the creature to his free act, & this necessity is but modall, according to that expression of Au∣stin necesse est ut aliquid fiat, which Austin confessed 1200 years agoe to be no impeach∣ment to man's liberty. But because that phrase Necessitating, is not only of an harsh sound & apt to be taken in a quite contrary sense to that of the Authour's; therefore o∣ther School-Divines, and generally our Divines use it not. And how immodest a course is

this to thinke to choake us with other mens phrases, and that in a quite contrary sense to that wherein the Authour's take it? And as if he had very substantially concluded the point, that lawes doe nothing, rules of religion, and mens endeavours do nothing, whereas he hath performed no part either of a Philosopher or of a Divine in all this, but of a mere tri∣fler; he proceeds to demand why the one are made, the other prescribed; why men are en∣couraged to some things; and scared from the other. He might as well aske what meant King Hezechiah to have any care either of his foode or of taking Physicke for those 15 yeares which God told him, he had added unto his life? What meant Paul to tell the Master of the ship, that unlesse the Mariners were detained in the ship they could not be saved; what meant some to trust to their swimming, others to boards & brokempeeces of the ship to get to land, when the Lord by his Angell had told him, that he had given him the lives of all that sailed with him? In the very daies of Cicero the Stoicks were acquain∣ted with such like arguments made against their destiny, and knew how readily to an∣swer them by distinguishing between Fatalia and Confatalia, as appeares in Cicero's book de Fato, and Turnebus his answer to Ramus thereupon, more at large. Therefore this Au∣thour disputes not logically, if he did, the vilenesse of his argumentation would soone appeare according to it's proper colours; but carrieth the matter all along in Rhetori∣call flourishes, as if his wit served him for that best, whereat I wonder not a little, that he should forsake that wherein his facultie lieth most, according to the reputation that goes of him, & trust to that wherein his best dexterity hath been accounted but inficete. If our doctrine tends to the subversion of policy, religion and lawes, society & goverment In the next place we expect when he will turne starke Atheist and professe as much of the word of God, seing it is manifest our doctrine cheifly is founded upon the word of God even in that which sounds most harsh unto carnall judgment; namely as touching God's se∣cret providence in evill, this Authour not accomodating any answer to any one of those places whereupon our doctrine is grounded. And as for God's providence in working us unto holinesse, his contrary doctrine cannot stand without maintaining that Grace is gi∣ven according unto mens works; which is expresly contradictory to the word of God. 2 Tim: 1. 9. Tit: 3. 5, and opposed by the church of God as the sowre leaven of Pela∣gianisme, from the Synod of Palestine all along. For aske this Authour wherefore God bestowes faith upon one & not upon another, & he hath nothing to answer, but either by denying plainly, that faith is the gift of God; which hitherto they are not growne so impudent as to deny expresly; though the Remonstrants in their Censura censurae come so farre, as to deny that Christ merited faith and regeneration for any man; Or they must answer that the reason hereof is, because the one by some act of his or other hath prepared himselfe for the reception of divine influences, the other hath not. Or in plaine termes as one hath expressed it, that God doth worke in us Credere to believe, modo velimus provided that we will believe. But doth he not worke also the very act of willing? Saint Paul saith he doth; yea every thing that is pleasing in his sight. And how * 1.300 doth he worke in us this will? Is it upon condition, that we will? This is the ab∣surdity whereunto they are driven, still fetching in a priority of mans act to the divine influence, working us to that which is good, yet most preposterously. For what need is there of influence divine to make us to will if of our selves we will already? And this al∣so utterly overthrowes God's prescience of things future, which can have no true foun∣dation besides the divine decree. As for Mathematici which were banished out of Rome, were those Divines, or Astrologers rather? If they subjected the event of all things to the influence of the stars, shall Austin be blamed or the Church of Ireland for subjecting all things to the councell of God's will, and that according to the expresse testimony of holy Scripture both as touching good and evill; only with this difference; good things to his will of working them, evill things to his will of permitting them. As for Prosper's saying in the last place, we make no contingent things throughout the world, much lesse the actions of men to come to passe unavoidably, no not upon supposition of God's de∣cree; but by vertue of his decree both contingent things come to passe contingently, that is with a possibility of not comming to passe; & free things freely, that is joyned with an active power in the Agent, either to suspend his action; or to doe otherwise; as well as ne∣cessary things come to passe necessarily. This I say we avouch with Aquinas, and ac∣cordingly with him maintaine the root of contingency to be the effectuall will of God. Againe I have often shewed that Predestination in the phrase of the Antients is only of such things as God decreed to bring to passe by his effection; notwithstanding this, Austin was bold to professe, that not any thing came to passe unlesse God would have it come

to passe; but evill things only by suffering them; good things by working them, As for compulsion which is Prosper's phrase, and which this Authour corrupts rendring i•• by the urging, which is ambiguous. We deny that man is compelled to acts supernaturall; much lesse doe we grant compulsion to acts naturall; such as are all sinfull acts; yea too connaturall unto him, compared in Scripture to sweet morsells which they roule under their tongue, as the booke of Iob resembles it. By all which we may judge indifferently both of this Authour's sufficiencie and modesty. Austin never said that God predestinated any man to sinne. For predestination with them (as hath been said) was only of such things as God determined to worke. Yet the same Austin confidently professeth of * 1.301 those things which come to passe by God's sufferance (and these we all know to be e∣vill things) that they come not to passe, unlesse Almighty God will have them come to passe,

Thus farre in answer to this Authour's additions to M. Hoord's discourse, and con∣cerning the upper and more harsh and rigorous way which M. Hoord left unprosecuted. pag. 49, there is a passage added, a citation out of Peter, but it is of the same nature with the rest, & add's no strength to the argument; and my answer satisfies it as well as the rest.

P. 52. &c. Is inserted a representation, how the doctrine of our Divines fighteth with God's holinesse.

Sect. 1.

It fighteth with God's holinesse, and maketh him the principall cause of sin in the greatest number of men * 1.302 I know that the defender of it doth not thinke so. For the maine reason which moved the Synod of Dort, & some other Divines before and since, to bring downe predestination thus low, and begin their Reprobation after the fall, was, that they might maintaine a fatall and absolute Reprobation of men, and yet avoid this imputation, as Doctor Twisse hath noted. But what they intended (for ought that I can see) they have not * 1.303 compassed. For it followeth evident enough, even from their conclusions too, that of all the sins of reprobates, which are the greatest number by many degrees God is the true and principall Authour. Two things they say which taken together, methinks, inferre it. 1. That God of his own will and pleasure hath brought men into an estate, in which they cannot avoid sinne, 2ly. That he leaveth the Reprobate irrecoverably in it.

1. That God of his own will and pleasure hath brought men into an estate in which they cannot possi∣bly avoid sinne; that is into the state of originall sinne, which consists of two parts.

1. The guilt of Adam's transgression. 2. The corruption of nature. In both these they say mankind is interessed, not through the force and efficiency of naturall generation, because we all derive our nature from Adam, as our first principle; but by God's free and voluntary order and impuration. It came not to passe by any naturall meanes (saith Calvin) that all men fell from salvation, by the fault of our first parem. That all men * 1.304 are held under the guilt of eternall death in the person of one man; it is the cleare and constant voice of Scripture. Now this cannot be ascribed to any naturall cause it must therefore come from the wonderfull councell of God. A little after he hath the same againe with as great an Emphasis. How is it that so many nations with their children, should be involved in the fall without remedy, but because God would have it so. As roundly doth Doctor Twisse affirme the same. The guilt of originall sinne is derived unto us only by imputation, the filth only by propagation, and * 1.305 both these only by God's free constitution. A little before he hath these words; The fault of our nature com∣meth rom God's free appointment For he doth not cut of any necessity but of his mere will only impute the sinne of Adam to us To this purpose he speaketh a great deale more in the same place. To these sayings Saint Ber∣nard hath the like speaking of Adam's sinne he saith, Adam's sinne is anothers, because we knew not of it; and * 1.306 yet ours, because it was through the just though secret judgment of God, reputed ours.

And this that they say is agreable to reason. For if we be fallen into the guilt of the first sinne and the corruption of nature, only because we were in Adam's loines when he sinned, and derive our being from him, then these two things will follow.

1. That we stand guilty of all the sin•• which Adam committed from his fall to his lives end. For we were vertually in his loines, as well after his fall as before; and in every passage and variation of his life he was still a principle of mankind. But where doe we read that we are guilty of any other of his sins? To the n••st sin only doth the Scripture entitle that sin and misery, which entred into the world and invaded all mankind, as we may see. Rom: 5. 15. 16. 17 &c.

2. That children are guilty of the sins of all their progenitours, especially of their immediate parents. For they were in their loines when they sinned, and more immediatly then in Adam's. But children are not guilty of their parents faults, nor obnoxious to their punishments, because they are their children as we may see. Exod: 20. 5. where God saying that he will visit the sins of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation of them hate him; plainly implyeth that children are not simply charged with their fathers sins but conditionally if they be haters of God, as their fathers were; if by imitating their wicked parents they become partakers of their sins. In Ezech 18 14 &c. The Lord signifieth thus much in his Apology a∣gainst the cavill of the Jewes For first he saith, that if a wicked man begetteth a son that seet. his fathers sins, & doth not the like, he shall not die for the iniquiry of his father. This implyeth that the derivation of being * 1.307 from the patent doth not render the child obnoxious to the punishment of the fathers sin, nor consequent¦ly to the sinne. For the good child is not obnoxious, and yet the good child is equally in the fathers loines with the bad, and equally receiveth nature and being from him. And then the Lord tells them expresly thus much in two propositions.

1. Affirmatively, The soule that sinneth it shall die. And that it may be known that he speaks exclusively, only the soule that sinneth shall dye; he delivers his mind.

2. Negatively, The Son shall not beare the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father beare the iniquity of her Sonne &c.

Our Saviour in that woefull speech of his to the Pharisees, Fulfill ye also the measure of your fathers. Be∣hold * 1.308 I send unto you Prophets. &c. them ye shall kill and crucifie, that on you may come all the righteous blood. &c. Intimateth apparently, that the Pharisees were not inheritours of their fathers sins & punishments by birth; but by the commission and imitation of their fathers sins, they came to inherit both their sins and plagues. Miserable would our case be on whom the ends of the world are cōe, if children should be guilty of all their Ancestours prevatications. What a world of sins should we be to answer for, personall sins, parents, proge∣nitours sins, to a thousand past generations? A thing with no reason to be imagined. This is the first thing

Whereas I am quoted here to give the reason which moved the Synod of Dort, and some other Divines to begin Reprobation after the fall, namely this, to avoid the impu∣tation * 1.309 of making God the Authour of sinne I doubt this Authour hath so long inured himselfe to leasings, that it is growne naturall unto him to deliver untruthes. For first I make no mention (in that fourth Digres of mine in the matter of predestination) of the Synod of Dort; neither indeed were they the Objects of my thoughts in this particular. * 1.310 That Digression of mine is spent in answering the arguments of those who dispute against Massa nondum condita, and stand for massa corrupta, to be the object of election and re∣probation. In the first chapter I make answer to Mr. Elnathan Parre in an English tract of his, wherein he deales upon this argument. In the second chap: I deale with o∣thers that make choice of the lower way; because it seemes to be the easiest way, which I expresse in the very words of Mr. Doctor Abbats, Bishop of Sarisbury ere he died, and I conceived that indeed this motive prevailed with most; and therefore I thought good so much the more throughly to discusse that. But doe I say they tooke this course to free God from the imputation of sinne? Nothing lesse; my words are these in the Di∣gression cap. 2. Quod plurimos movet, illud est, nimirum quod in sententia illâ de massâ non∣dum conditâ, omnia sint, ut aiunt, intricata & perplexa, & infinitis difficultatibus involuta; in hac verò de massâ corruptà predestinationi hominum praestruendâ contra clara sint omnia, & cum Scripturarum autoritate, judicio{que} antiquitatis planissimè consentientia; where I menti∣on two reasons that moved them to take this way 1. This, in that opinion concerning the Masse of mankind not yet created, all passages are intricate, perplext, and intangled with infinite difficulties; but in the opinion concerning the Masse corrupt, all things are cleare. 2. This, that in this other opinion, all things are most plainly found to agree both with the authority of Scriptures, and with the judgment of antiquity. Now after I had en∣deavoured to discover the insufficiency of this plea in the second and third chapter of that fourth Digression in the matter of predestination. In the fourth chapter I propose mine own judgment concerning the true benefit of this way in making the corrupt masse of mankind the object of election and reprobation; not the judgment of others, as this Authour carrieth the matter; but mine own judgment. For thus I beginne. Ad extre∣mum, vis liberè pronuntiem, quid unicè proficiatur ex hac nostrá praedestinationis Objecti sen∣tentiae temperatione. Dicàm igitur quid sentiam. Hinc nimirum efficitur ut à lapsu primo∣rum parentum, decreto praedestinationis subjiciendo & subordinando liberemur huic unicè pro∣visum esse, ab istius quasi mediae & temperatioris opinionis assertioribus mihi plusquam proba∣bile, aut verisimile videtur, ne scililicet alias peccatum fieri statueretur, decernente Deo, tan∣quam medium ad fines à Deo, in praedestinatione sibi praestitutos accommodatum; unde etiam quàm author peccati constituendus sit, nullâ solidâ ratione explicari posse videtur. In the last place, will you give me leave freely to professe, what we profic by thus tempering our opi∣nion touching the object of predestination? I will therefore deliver what I thinke. So that herein I purpose mine own opinion only, not the opinion of others. Herehence thus we gaine that we are freed from subjecting and subordinating man's fall unto God's decree of pre∣destination. It seemes to me more then probable or likely, that the maintainers of this middle and temperate openion doe provide only against this inconvenience; (that is their way doth in∣deed provide against this, and against no other inconvenience in my opinion) to wit, least otherwise the sinne of Adam should be said to come to passe God willing it, as a meanes conducing to those ends which God intended in predestination; from whence it followes as it seemes, that it cannot be explicated by any solid reason that God is not made the Authour of sinne. All which is delivered by me as my opinion, conceiving that others thinke so too; namely not that God is hereby made the Authour and principall cause of sinne; but that the contrary cannot be explicated by any solid reason. Now Cajetan confesseth as much, namely that in these mysteries, all the distinctions that are used, doe not quietare intellectum, satisfie the un∣derstanding;

and therefore he doth captivate his owne into the obedience of faith. And Alva∣rez justifies him in this, professing herein that he speakes doctissimè & piissimè, most lear∣ned and holyly. And in a peculiar disputation he maintaines that the mistery of Gods providence and predestination, standing with the liberty of our wills, is incomprehensible by us in this world. Lastly, consider, this is delivered only of the first sinne of our first parents, which this authour perverts most shamefully, when he avoucheth that I should acknowledge our Divines, many of them, to embrace this way to avoyd the imputation of making God the principall cause, not of Adams sinne alone, but of sinne in the grea∣test number of men. And to confesse a truth, if sinne be made the meanes for the pro∣curing of the ends which God intends in predestination, undoubtedly God himselfe should be the authour of sinne. For whosoever intends any end, he, and none but he, must be authour in working the meanes which tend to this end. Therefore I said, only that in this case, It seemes that the sinne of Adam was intended by God as the meanes; Whereas in truth and upon due consideration it appeares that not the creatures sinne, but Gods permission of the creatures sinne, is the meanes whereby God brings to passe his glorious ends. Yet not the permission of sinne alone, but joyned toge∣ther with the pardoning of it, and saving his elect in despight of it, is the compleat meanes (together with the procuring of Christs merits) for the manifestation of Gods glory in the way of mercy; And in like manner, not the permitting of sinne alone, but joyned with the punishment of it, is the compleat meanes for the ma∣nifestation of Gods glory in the way of justice vindicative, which in Scripture phrase is called, the declaration of his wrath. And whereas I said that hereby it seemed that it could not by any sound reason be manifested, that God was not the Au∣thour * 1.311 of sinne, by the first way, this Authour avoucheth of the defenders of the lower way which seemes most temperate, that from their conclusions it followeth evidently, that of all the sinnes of Reprobates, which are the greatest number by ma∣ny degrees, God is the true and principall Authour. Observe, this (he sayth) followeth evidently from their conclusions; and forthwith he tells us that he thinks so, or, to his thinking, it doth so. And why is he not the Authour of all the sinnes of the elect also? whereas originall sinne continues in them also, they carry about them a body of death, and have cause to complaine, of a * 1.312 law in their numbers that rebelleth against the law of their mind, and leadeth them captive to the law of sinne. Only there is a principle of spirituall life in them, that renewes their repentance dayly as their sinnes are renewed; but they looke not to be freed, from sinne as long as they live in this world. But let us examine how well he makes good that which he affirmes of the sinnes of the Reprobate, that God is made the Authour of them by our * 1.313 doctrine, of Reprobation. I find that Cornelius a Lapide a Iesuite shapes Calvines doctrine of election and Reprobation, this lower way, and imputes unto him that from Reprobation, according to his doctrine, in Reprobis manat cer∣tus & necessarius lapsus in peccata quaelibet, A certaine and necessary falling into all manner of sinnes, doth flow in Reprobates. But not from these princi∣ples mentioned by this Authour, but rather from two other principles. The 1. that God destinated Reprobates to everlasting punishment, as to their end; and unto sinnes, as to the meanes thereof. The 2. is that man doth nothing freely in negotio damnationis suae; but that in all things he is driven of God, as a bowle by him that throwes it, as an hatchet by him that hewes with it, and as Clay is moved by the Potter, whom he cannot resist. This he imputes, to the defenders of Reprobation the lower way, and particularly to Calvin. This Cornelius denyes not, for ought I know, that by the just judgement of God, though executed according to his will and pleasure, hath brought all men forth into the world in originall sinne, or that any man can be recovered out of it whiles he lives in this world. And as for these two conclusions which he imputes to Calvin: as they are false in them∣selves, so they are as falsely charged upon Calvin. Haec loquendi ratio, nun∣quam * 1.314 apud me occurret, finem creationis esse aeternum interitum. Calvin expresly denyes, that God creates any man to this end, that he may damne him; Neither is sinne any meanes whereby God brings a man to damnation, but the permission of sinne is Gods meanes, and that together with damning for sinne, is the compleate meanes, whereby God brings to passe his end concer∣ning

Reprobates, which is the manifestation of his glory in the way of vindicative justice, called his wrath upon those Reprobates; and in the way of mercy upon his elect vessells of mercy, whom he hath prepa∣red unto glory, as S. Paul plainely teacheth us. The other principle which he ob∣trudes upon Calvin, is as false, and as falsely layd to his charge. In good actions he * 1.315 grants the elect are so caryed to that which is good, as not freely. For he takes Li∣berty to consist in an indifferency to do that which is good, or no; wherein I willingly confesse he is in an errour; but that reprobates do not that evill freely, which they do, is no where affirmed by Calvin that I know nor by any learned or sober Divine. For albeit we all concurre in this with Bernard, that no naturall man hath libertatem a peccato, liberty to keep himselfe from sinne: Yet that he is carryed into this or that particular sinne, we all confesse it is done freely. And the reason is evident, drawen from the difference betweene gracious actions, and sinfull actions. Every gracious action is supernaturall, either as touching the substance of the act, such as are the acts of faith, hope, and love; or as touching the manner of performing them, such as are all vertuous actions, which are not acceptable unto God, unlesse they flow from the former principles, faith, hope, and love: Hereupon there is some colour, that such are not performed freely; but there is no such colour, as if man were not free in perfor∣ming actions vitious; considering that all vitious actions are naturall actions, none of them supernaturall. And surely every naturall man as he hath power to performe any action naturall; so hath he power to abstaine from it. But proceed we along with our present Authour.

1 The first doctrine, that he obtrudes upon us, is such, that I little thought there had beene any difference betweene him and us thereabouts, consisting of two particulars. 1. The one, that God brings all men forth into the world in the corrupt masse, or in the state of originall sinne.

2 The other, that man, in the state of originall sinne or naturall corruption de∣voyd of the spirit of regeneration, is under the servitude of sinne, hath no liberty from it. Now in these particulars I could not imagine that this Authour differed from us, unlesse with Pelagius he entertaines an affection to deny originall sinne. For if all men be borne in originall sinne, seing it is God that takes us out of our mo∣thers wombe, and by whom we are brought forth into this world, it cannot be de∣nyed, I should thinke, that God bringeth all men forth into the world, in origi∣nall sinne. As for the second, Doctor Potter confesseth it as the doctrine of the Church of England, that man in state of nature hath no liberty from sinne. It is true, this liberty he distinguisheth from that liberty, which is called, liberty from necessity, which he grants to a naturall man; to whom he denyes the former, which cannot stand with∣out contradiction. For if a man hath no liberty from sinne he must needs sinne. And therefore Doctor Fulke upon the Remish Testament doth usually distinguish be∣tweene liberty from sinne, and liberty from coaction. And both Arminius and Corvinus confesse that by the sinne of Adam all men are cast upon a necessity of sinning, though God be ready to deliver us from this necessity of sinning upon reasonable termes to be performed on mans part, which latter doctrine we utterly renounce as manifestly brea∣thing the spirit of Pelagius, in a particular generally condemned in the Church of God, namely, that grace is conferred according to works or merits. This makes me conceive that this Authour carryeth himselfe cunningly in the proposition of this doctrine which he imputes unto us, and that he hath a reach more then every one is aware of. And indeed the phrase he useth of bringing men into an estate, is very harsh, though applyed to Adam and Eve our first parents, much more applyed to their race and posterity. For albeit Adam was created in a better state, and afterwards brought into the state of sinne, and bondage of corruption: yet what sinister judgement moved this Authour to impute this unto God, rather then to Adam himselfe? what if God tooke his holy spirit from them upon their fall, whereupon they found themselves naked and were ashamed? was it not just with God to do so? Doth not M. Hord professe, that it were just with God to damne all for originall sinne, if he would; which doctrine was delivered by this Authour in his Lectures at Magdalen Hall, my selfe being an hearer, and a taker of notes from him, upon this very argument. But it may be this is to be accounted amongst the errours of his youth, mistaking Bel∣lermine, which now he is to wise to correct in his age. Who brings malefactors to the

Gallowes, is it the Judge or Sheriffe, and not their sins rather? Yet this, though absurd enough, satisfies him not, but withall he adds that God doth this of his own will and pleasure which phrase is prone to worke a perswasion in the Reader, that hereby is sig∣n••••ed that God brought not man in this state in the way of justice for his sinne, but merely of his own will or pleasure; But what Divine of ours was ever known to main∣taine any such prodigious assertion? Who can deny but that the Judge condemnes a malefactor unto death, & Sheriffe takes order to execute him. Now if question be made why such a man be hanged, will any wise man referre this to the will and pleasure of the Iudge or Sheriffe, and not rather to the malefactours deserts? In like sort it is God that condemnes a man, and inflicts eternall punishment upon him, but is there any colour to say that he doth this of his will and pleasure, and not rather that he doth it in the way of justice provoked thereunto by mens sinnes? Lastly when it is said that God brought him into the state of corruption, who would not thinke that thereby were meant that God was the positive Authour of this corruption? whereas it is apparent that man him∣selfe averted himselfe voluntarily and freely from God, the unchangable good; and converted himselfe unto the creature, which is but a changeable good; And God here∣upon taking his Spirit from him and that most justly; left him where he found him, and that irrecoverably, save by the grace of regeneration. Yet this phrase is more harsh apply∣ed to the race & posterity of Adam, in whose production he hath no other hand, then that which necessarily belongs unto him, as the Authour of nature, namely, the quick∣ning of them, and fashioning of them in the wombe, and bringing them forth into the light of this world. If from a leprous Sire there springs a leprous fruit, shoud this seeme strange? We all derive our nature from Adam fallen from God, and converted unto the creature, and bereaved of God's Spirit most justly for his transgression; why should it seeme strange then, that our natures should be no better then Adam's was after his fall? It is true the propagation of originall sinne, hath alwaies been accounted of a mysterious nature, as touching the manner of it, and very strange and odde conceits have been entertained hereabouts; Some saying that the soule is derived from the pa∣rents a strange conceite even in Philosophy not only in peculiar reference unto the soule reasonable; but generally I find Philosophers have entertained peculiar contemplati∣ons about Datores formarum, in a more generall way. Others have thought that the soule is defiled by the body, as a sweet and soveraigne oyle may be corrupted by a naughty boxe; which is worse then the former, no marvaile that a bodily thing should corrupt that which is bodily; but that a body should corrupt the soule, the one being corporall the other spirituall is beyond comprehension: Farre more probable or rather without question that the soule rather corrupts the body. The positive inclination un∣to evill is that which hath troubled all and made some conceive that it could not pro∣ceed immediatly from God; For if so, then surely not impura, but pura. Others and particularly Arimininsis, as remember, that the corruption came from the breath of the serpent, others as Johannes Bicconius; that the soule though comming pure from God yet knit unto the body, the Lord for the sinne of Adam gives it over to the pow∣er of Satan, who as an universall cause supplies the place of a particular cause in the positive corrupting of it. This at the first seemed unto me as very singular, so a very strange adventure, and that Baccorius is a very rare School-man and more used in the Arabian philosophy then all the rest, save such as were of his own profession. And that I take to be the reason, why Aquinas discourseth as he doth of Intellectus Agens, making it a••ticulty of the soule; and Durand discourseth in such sort of that argument, as i•• he ne∣ver understood the state of the question; which I take to proceed frō this that they were so little acquainted with Averro's philosophy, wherein Zabarell was well seen. And I find him sometimes congratulating his good fortunes in finding that this Iohannes Bacconius was in some particulars of his mind, he doth not say, he learnt it of him. But I know no School Divine comparable to him for depth of philosophicall speculations; yet am I not of his mind in the point of originall sinne. I willingly confesse it is one of the three points wherein sometimes I perswaded my selfe I never should be satisfied in this world▪ And that which most troubled me was the positive nature of it. Wherin Ca∣jetan is thought to discourse strangely also, even to the palate of Pontificians; And Aqui∣nas his definit on of it, calling it, Habitus corruptus; hath cost me no small paines in the discussion thereof. At length I conceive there is no greate cause of so much pudder to be made about it, save that certaine prejudices which we lay for grounds doe cast us there upon. The harmony of man's nature in all parts, excepting

it's due subjection unto God, I willingly confesse was naturall, but whether it did profluere ex principiis naturae, either specificae, or individualis, or was caused and maintai∣ned while Adam stood in his integrity by the speciall hand of God's providence; as some School-men professe finding the difficultie of maintaining the former (which yet might be consequent naturally to it's due subjection unto God for ought I see yet to the con∣trary) I dispute not. But as for it's due subjection unto God in faith and love, and such a love as joyned with the contempt of it selfe; I have reason to conceive that this was not naturall, as flowing from the principles of nature either specificall or individuall, though this latter I heard sometimes maintained publiquely in the University, but rather wrought in man in his creation by vertue of supernaturall grace, and the holy Ghost's residence in him; which supernaturall grace, and holy Ghost's residence had been naturall unto all his posterity, had Adam continued in his integrity. I call it naturall in as much as it had descended unto all his posterity, after the manner of an inheritance naturall. But Adam by his transgression forfeited this blessed condition, not to himselfe only, but to all his posterity, being justly bereaved of the Spirit of God, and left by the Lord where he found him; averted à bono incommutabili, and converted ad bonum communicabile in an inordinate manner, which conversion to the creature is positive, and not evill in it selfe, but as it is joyned with aversion from God; & this makes it an inordinate conversion to the creature, not for Gods sake, that it is not out of the love of God to the contempt of himselfe, which is the character of a child of God but out of the love of himselfe to the contept of God, which is the charecter of a child of this this world. So that as originall righte∣ousnes whereunto we are restored in part by the grace of regeneration, transcends all mo∣tall vertues; so originall sin transcends all morall vices & is found in the most vertuous a∣mongst heathen men (of whom some have been very renowned in this kind, & great ma∣sters of their passions) as well as amongst the most vicious. And it is hard to resolve who have been greatest enimies to the truth of God and holinesse; and generally to the holy waies of God, whether the most vertuous or the most vitious among heathen men. I come to his second position, which he casts upon us, as dissenting therein from himselfe; and it is this, That God leaves the Reprobates irrecoverably in it. Now on this point I would gladly know his contrary Tenet in what sense it proceeds, namely, That Reprobates are not left irrecoverably in originall sinne, or in such state wherein they cannot avoid sinne. For I cannot comprehend his meaning herein. But it was wont to be said of Africa that, semper aliquid apportat novi, alwaies it brings forth some new monster in course of nature. So men of this Authour's spirit: are alwaies bringing forth some new monster in Divinity. For what thinks he? was ever any Reprobate recovered out of originall sin? Nay was ever any child of God recovered out of it while he lived upon the face of the earth? Or doth he thinke himselfe recovered out of it, or is it in his power to avoid it? Perhaps he will say though he cannot avoid sin originall, yet he can avoid sin actuall; and so not only the children of God may if they will, but even Reprobates also. But what? may they avoid all sinne, or some only? What one of our Divines denies that a Reprobate hath power to avoid fornication? We see heathens doe avoid: it Or stealth? For heathens doe so. Or murther? Even heathens have been found very morall and that generally. But this we say; All men in the state of nature, whether they doe good as touching the sub∣stance of the act; yet they doe it not in a gracious manner; Or whether they abstaine from that which is evill, they doe not abstaine from it in a gracious manner; nor can doe. Nay since the fall of Adam, who ever lived free from sinne, the Son of God only exce∣pted? Doth notholy Paul professe of himselfe saying, I doe not the good that I would, but the evill that I would not, that doe I. To will is present with me, but I find not to performe: hat which is good. And if God may justly damne all for sinne originall as Mr. Hoord af∣firmes, why may not God leave all irrecoverably in it; and that justly? So that herein I find my selfe in a brake, not can devise with my selfe in what tollerable or colourable sense he can affirme, that Reprobates are not left irrecoverably in the state of originall sinne; or in such a state, in which they cannot avoid sinne; I say in what sense he can deliver this different from us, I cannot devise. For we willingly grant that there is no particular actuall sinne from which a Reprobate hath not power to abstaine, though he cannot ab∣staine from it in a gracious manner without grace, and that grace we account the grace of regeneration; which is a supernaturall principle of gracious actions, both as touch∣ing faith in God, and the love of God, to the contempt of our selves. Now I guesse his meaning is, that no Reprobate is so left and abandoned in originall sinne, but that God gives him grace to believe if he will, to repent if he will, to love God if he will, & that a∣bove

all things. I guesse, I say, that this is his meaning; but I would have him expresse it, that I might see it under his hand. For till then I find noe apparent difference between him & us, as touching these two principles from whence he deduceth, that God is there∣by made The principall cause of sin in the greatest number of men. And if once he deliver himselfe fairely, and comes to this, the issue of the question to be debated between us will be faire and cleare; namely about this their universall grace, whether all men elect and Reprobate by vertue of supernaturall grace given unto them, have power to beleive if they will, repent if they will. And against this I will dispute after this manner. First in all this there is no difference between us excepting that this power is said to be wrought in man by su∣pernaturall grace. For we say with Austin Deo credere, & ab amore temporalium ad divi∣na * 1.316 praecepta servanda se convertere, omnes possunt si velint. All men can believe God, if they will; and from the love of temporall things convert themselves to the keeping of God's comman∣dements if they will. For all the moment of inclining a man to workes of morallity ly∣eth in the will of man. And therefore marke what followes in Austin, Sed praeparatur voluntas à Domino (supple ut velit) tantum{que} augetur munere charitatis ut possit. But the will is prepard by the Lord (to wit to make it willing) and so much augmented by the gift of cha∣rity as to make it able. And I prove, that looke what I supply is according unto Austin * 1.317 interpreting that of the Apostle, ne{que} volentis, ne{que} currentis, sed miserentis Dei; it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth but of God that sheweth mercy. For he shewes; that the whole both to will and run, is to be ascribed unto God, qui hominis voluntatem bonam & praeparat adjuvandam, & adjuvat praeparatam; who both prepares the good will of man that after he may helpe it, and helpes it being once prepared; where plainly man swilling that, which is good, is made the fruit of God's preparing it; but because there is in man a will of the flesh, resisting this will of the spirit; therefore there is need not of grace preparing only, but of grace adjuvant and helping also, to enable it to doe what it hath a will unto, whence immediatly followeth, running as well as willing. And these two graces praepa∣rant, and adjuvant, are afterward called by the names of grace prevenient, and subsequent, thus; Nolentem praevenit ut velit, volentem subsequitur ne frustra velit. Him that is un∣willing the Lord preventeth to make him willing, and willing he followeth him that he may not will in vaine. And that this double grace is required by reason of the reluctancy be∣tween the flesh and the Spirit, I prove out of the same Austin writing thus, Prima gra∣tiâ est, * 1.318 quâ fit ut habeat homo justitiam si velit; secunda ergo plus potest, quâ etiam fit ut velit, & tantum velit tanto{que} ardore diligat, ut carnis voluntatem contraria concupiscentem voluntate spiritus vincat. The first grace is that whereby it comes to passe that a man is righteous if he will; The second grace therefore is of more power, whereby it comes to passe also that a man doth will, and that so resolutely, and with such fervency loveth (compare this with that of Austin de Gen: contrae Manich: lib. 1. cap: 3.) that by the will of the Spi∣rit, he overcommeth the will of the flesh fighting against it. So that a power to doe good if a man will is one thing; to will that which is good is another thing; and lastly to be able to doe that which it wills is a third thing; yet both these two last are comprehended un∣der sic velle, which Austin calls tantum augeri munere charitatis, to have the gift of charity * 1.319 so much increased in him, as thus; Tantum Spiritu sancto accenditur voluntas eorum ut ideo possint, quta sic velint, ideo sic velint, quia Deus sic operatur, ut velint. The will of God's children is so inflāed by the Holy Ghost, that therefore they are able to do good, because they have a will to it in such a manner (that is with such fervency and eagernes) therefore they have a will to it in such a manner, because God so workes, as to make them willing; to wit, in such a manner. Secondly we say that to believe if a man will, to repent if he will is to be ac∣counted nature, rather then grace, which I prove thus. Supernaturall grace is not infe∣riour to a morall vertue, but a morall vertue doth more then leave a man indifferent to doe vertuously if he will; For it inclines the will to vertuous courses only, and not viti∣ous; Like as vice inclines the will only to vicious courses, and not to vertuous; how much more doth supernaturall grace not leave a man indifferent to doe good if he will; but in∣clines the will only to such things as are pleasing unto God, and not to things displeasing unto him. Againe to have power to believe if we will, is to have power to have faith if we will; But this Austin hath expressely professed to belong to the nature of man, in distin∣ctio fró the grace of the faithfull. Posse fidē habere, sicut posse charitatē habere naturae est he∣minū; * 1.320 fidē habere, sicut charitatē habere, gratiaeest fideliū. The nature of man makes him to have power, to have faith, to have charity; but the grace of the faithfull makes a man to have faith, to have charity. It may be objected out of the former place taken out of Aust: deCor: & grat: c. 11, that habere justitiam si velit, is, gratia prima; to be righteous if he will is the first grace.

I answer, Austin there speakes of the grace that Adam had before his fall, which was this, posse si velit to abstaine from eating the forbidden fruit. And this first grace is called grace in this respect, that there was in Adam no flesh lusting against the Spirit; So that if Adam had but a will to abstaine, he should have no cause to complaine as Saint Paul doth, To will is present with me, but I find no meanes to performe that which is good; Now such a posse si velit is not found in any man now a daies, no not in the regenerate. But all men that have a will to doe good by the grace of God, have withall a posse secundum quid, a power in part a weake power; but this is not sufficient to denominate them simply able to doe that which is good; unlesse the love of God be increased in them, so as to o∣vercome the will of the flesh lusting against the spirit, as I have represented Austin thus expounding it. Thirdly whether tends this, that all men have power to believe if they will, to repent if they will? But to maintaine that faith and repentance are not the gifts of God, bestowed of his free grace on whom he will; but that they are the workes of man's free will, directly contradictory to the word of God expresly professing that faith is the gift of God, and that not of our selves. So repentance is the gift of God; yea that it is God who worketh in us that which is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ. Heb: 13 21. * 1.321 Yea both the will and the deed, and that of his good pleasure. 4ly. If all reprobates have power to believe and repent if they will, and so consequently to persevere if they will; how comes it to passe that not one of them doth believe, repent, and persevere; seing it is confest among Philosophers that such contingents as depend upon the free will of man, are equally propendent on either side to passe as often one way, as the other. But proceed we along with this Authour.

1. Here he grants expresly that the state he speakes of is the state of originall sin; in which state we acknowledge that man hath not libertatem à peccato, freedome from sinne. And Doctor Potter towards the end of his answer to Charity mistaken confesseth it to be the doctrine of the Church of England. Yet doe not we say, but that it is in the pow∣er of any man to abstaine from any particular sinne, it being but a naturall act, and a man hath free power to performe any naturall act or to abstaine from it; so farre forth as to become very vertuous, as much as any man among the heathen, many of whom have been renowned for vertuous conversation. Calvin in the passages here alleadged hath nothing concerning, either the guilt of Adam's transgression passing upon his poste∣rity, or the corruption derived therehence unto them; but only of their falling from eter∣nall salvation in the one; that all are enthralled to eternall death in the other; And that Adam's fall hath enwrapped all in eternall death in the third. My passages quoted, and related out of my Vindiciae are more to the purpose: I say indeed the guilt of Adam's trans∣gression is derived unto us, that is to our persons by imputation; but that very sinne of Adam was the sin of our natures, as Austin speaks. Non modo natura facta est peccatrix, sed & genuit peccatores. Not only our humane nature became a sinner, but also begat sinners. * 1.322 And accordingly it is justly imputed unto our persons, otherwise how could it be just with God to condemne any man for originall sinne; which yet is expresly acknowledged by Mr. Hoord. And the Apostle saith expresly, that in Adam all have sinned. And Au∣stin gives the reason of it. De Adamo omnes peccatum originale trahunt, quia omnes unus fu∣erunt. All draw originall sinne from Adam, because all were that one. So that I have noe cause to doubt but this Authour is of the same opinion untill I find him to avouch the contrary; and so much the rather because he finds it is the opinion of Bernard also. And that the corruption consequent is derived to us only by propagation, I thinke it is with∣out doubt amongst all, who concurre not with Pelagius in maintaining that it is derived unto us by imitation, and so only. Yet notwithstanding it cannot be denied, but that God might have caused the punishment of Adam's sinne to rest upon himselfe only, and immediately destroyed him and created another, and propagated mankind from him. Yea supposing his ordinance of propagating mankind from him, yet God of his mercy might have derived others from him of his mere grace indued with the holy Ghost, if it had pleased him; like as whom he justly damnes for sinne, he might have caused them to have lived one yeare or more longer, and in that time bestowed the spirit of grace upon them to break off their sins by repentance, and from grace translated into glory. As for the reasons here mentioned by Mr. Mason to justifie that which my selfe and others have delivered on the former point, I have noe cause to justifie, because they proceed from a false ground, supposing that the reason of this imputation of Adam's sinne, and propagation of his corruption unto all his posterity, is merely built upon this foundation that we were in Adam's loynes when he sinned, which is untrue.

1 In his first reason he doth miserably overlash; for we could not be guilty of all the sinnes which were committed by Adam from his fall to his lifes end, no not upon the ground whereon this Authour builds; so long we were not in his Ioynes, nor any lon∣ger then till he begat Seth; for from Seth sprang Noah, and we all from him. Neither is it credible that Adam continued to beget children till the last yeare, and month, and day of his life. Indeed we no where read that we are guilty of any other of his sinnes, besides the first; The reason whereof shall be given in the next place.

2 Therefore I say, in answer unto them both, that the ground of imputing Adams sinne unto his posterity, is not onely because we were in Adams Ioynes, but because the first sinne of Adam was it, that bereaved his nature of Gods image; and so brought corruption upon himselfe by an aversion from the Creator and unchangable good, and con∣version unto the Creature, wherein the Lord left him, bereaving him of his spirit; and this nature, by this sinne alone so corrupt, is the fountaine of all our natures; Like as if Adam had stood, of the same fountaine of integrity we had all received incorrupt natures; so that the like cannot be said of any other sinne of Adam afterwards committed by him, nor of the sinne of any other our progenitours succeding him. For as for the wicked, they have no such spirit of God to loose; And as for the Godly, they have indeed the spirit of God, but so as not to be taken from them by the sinnes committed by them, any more then it was from David upon the committing of so foule sinnes in the matter of Uriah; neither do any Godly parents propagate their state of grace to their posterity. And Aquinas is so bold hereupon as to professe, that, Impossibile est, quod aliqua peccata parentum proximorum, vel etiam primi parentis praeter primum, per originem traducantur. * 1.323 It is impossible that the sinnes of our immediate parents, or of our first parents, besides the first, should be derived unto posterity by propagation. For, sayth he, a man generates the same with himselfe in kinde only; not in individuall. And therefore those things, which pertaine to him as a particular person, as acts personall, he doth not propagate unto his children. Now to the nature of man, somthing may pertain naturally, somthing by the gift of grace. And this origi∣nall righteousnesse as a gift of grace was bestowed on the whole nature of mankind in our first parents, which Adam lost by his first sinne; so that like as originall righteousnesse had beene propagated to posterity together with the humane nature, so also the opposite inordination. But as for other actuall sinnes, either of our first parents, or of others, they do not corrupt the na∣ture of man, as touching that which pertaines to nature, but as touching that which per∣taines to his person; therefore other sinnes are not propagated unto posterity. And this reason which Aquinas gives, was long before given by Anselme, De conceptu virginali & originali peccato, cap. 23.

Section. 2.

2 They say that God hath immutably decreed to leave the farre greatest part of mankind in this impo∣tent * 1.324 condition irrecoverab••ely, and to afford them no power and ability sufficient to make them rise out of sinne to newnesse of life; and this decree he executeth in time: and both these he doth out of his only will and pleasure.

Of this proposition there be three branches

• 1. God decreeth to leave them.
• 2. He doth leave them.
• 3. He doth both out of his alone pleasure.

1 God, say they, hath decreed to leave them without sufficient grace, and consequently under an ever∣lasting necessity of sinning. This is the very Helen which they sight for, the maine act of that absolute re∣probation, which with joynt consent and endeavour they labour to maintaine.

Most of them cast their reprobation into two acts; A negative, which is a peremptory denyall of grace and glory to some men lying in the fall; And a Positive which they say is a preordination of the men thus left, to the eternall torments of hell.

Others among them define Reprobation by an act meerely negative, and call it (Non electionem, decre∣tum quo statuit non eo usque misereri.) Thes our Divines in their suffrage define; and in their explication of * 1.325 the Definition which they give, they say that the proper acts of reprobation, as it standeth opposed to ele∣ction, are no other then a denyall of that same glory and grace, which are prepared in the decree of election for the sonnes of God. But in this they all agree, that by the decree of reprobation, grace necessary for the avoyding of sinne, is flatly denyed to reprobates. And if at any time we heare them say, that God hath gratified Reprobates with some grace, (For so sayth Walaeus, reprobates are left, under the common provi∣dence * 1.326 of God, and consequently under some common endowments. And our Divines in the Synod say, Reprobates though they are not elected, yet receive many of Gods graces;) they are to be understood of such Graces and gifts as are insufficient to make them avoyd sinne, as we may see in these two cited places, and many more.

2 God doth actually, according to his eternall and unchangeable decree, leave the Reprobates in their severall times and generations without his grace, under a necessity of finall sinne and impenitency.

This is the second branch of that second proposition. And this they must needs say; For Gods decrees cannot be frustrated; what he purposed before time, without faile he doth in time. I shall not need there∣fore

to prove, that they say so; Neverthelesse to let it be seene how positively and Categorically they say so, I will give an instance or two. The Divines of Geneva at the Synod, among their Theses of Reprobation, have this for one, Those whom God hath reprobated, out of the same will by which he hath rejected them either be calleth not at all, or being called he reneweth not throughly by the spirit of regeneration, ingraftcth not into Christ mystically, nor justifieth &c Like to this is the speech of Lubbert, who speaking of reprobates sayth; To them * 1.327 either he revealeth not the way of salvation, or giveth not faith and regeneration; but leaveth them in sinne and mi¦sery. The same authour speaking against the position of the Remonstrants (viz: That God doth supply to all men sufficient and necessary meanes of salvation, with an intention of saving them) letteth downe this Anti••hesis, God doth not administer to all men meanes needfull and sufficient to salvation, and that with an intention of saving * 1.328 them. And to this his Antithesis Polyander, Wal••us, and Thyscus three other professours of Divinity in the Lowcountryes did set their hands.

It is a usuall course with this Authour to lay unto our charge, that God hath immu∣tably * 1.329 decreed this or that; So that if we had said that all this were decreed by God not im∣mutably, but mutably, we should not incurre the danger of his displeasure so immuta∣bly, and unavoydably as we do. Now to decree not immutably, but mutably, is a phrase that I no where meet with, but among men of this Authours spirit; the congru∣ity whereof I willingly professe, is so farre from mine understanding, as no phrase more. If they would in the name of common sense expound themselves unto us, then we should soone consider what Answer we are to give in. We willingly professe, that all Gods decrees are unchangeable, but of decreeing a thing unchangeably, not any of our Divines discourse, that I know of. We say that God decreeth some things to come to passe necessarily, and some things to come to passe contingently; so doth Aquinas: and we understand his language right well, and approve his doctrine in this particular. We willingly confesse that as God hath chosen some, whom he meanes to deliver from that bondage of sinne, and Satan, whereinto all are cast by the transgression of Adam. And how to deliver them? Surely by bestowing the spirit of grace, and regeneration upon them, so to open their eyes and bring them out of darkenesse into light, and from the power of Satan unto God; In few words by bestowing faith and repentance upon them. All others he hath from everlasting determined not to shew the like grace and favour unto. For we see by experience that to many he gives not faith and repentance. And looke how he carryeth himselfe towards any persons in time, after the same man∣ner he determined to carry himselfe from everlasting. And the Scripture expresly tels us that even of them that are called, but few are chosen; and consequently the number of reprobates must needs be farre greater, then the number of the elect. Now as many as God hath decreed to deny faith and repentance unto, we hold it impossibile for them, upon this supposition, to be recovered out of the bondage of sinne and Satan; because the Scripture in divers places expresly tells us, that faith is the gift of God, repentance is the gift of God; and therefore to whomsoever he will not be so gracious, as to give faith, and repentance, we judge it a thing impossible upon this supposition, that any of them should believe, should repent. And more then this, as touching every particular here delivered, we account it so apparently, testified in holy Scripture, that we wonder not a little with what face this Authour can deny it. Nay, we verily believe that he be∣lives all these as well as we. And the true point of Substantiall difference betweene us is conceled by him all along, which is an argument of no ingenuity; but yet I beare with him in following Lysanders counsell, when the Lyons skin will not hold out, to peece it out with a fox skin; least otherwise his Pelagian tenet would be discovered in a most palpable and grosse manner. For undoubtedly he believes that faith is the gift of God; as also that it is impossible, that they should believe, to whom God will not give faith. But his tenet is, that God is ready and willing to give faith to all, not absolutely, but conditionally; to wit, in case they make themselves fit for it, by performing somewhat on their parts. Now this is as good as in expresse termes to professe, that Grace is conferred according to merits, or according unto workes: For betweene works and merits in this con∣troversy there is no difference, as Bellarmine acknowledgeth; And in the Epistle of Pro∣sper to Austin they are taken promiscuously, as of the same force and signification. Now this doctrine is expresly contradictory to the word of God. God hath saved us and called us with an holy calling not according to our owne workes but according to his owne purpose and grace. The like we have, Tit. 3. 5. And in like manner this doctrine hat: beene con∣demned * 1.330 in the Church of God, as the sowre leaven of Pelagianisme, from the Synod of Palestine above 1200 yeares agoe all along; and Pelagius himselfe was driven to sub∣scribe to the Canons of that Synod of Palestine, wherein Anathema was pronounced upon them, that do, or shall maintaine, that Grace is conferred according unto workes.

If God hath decreed not to bestow faith upon a man, if he hath not decreed to be∣stow upon him the gift of charity, it is impossible, that any worke can be done by such a one proceeding from faith and love, and consequently such a one hath no liberty from sinne, and that no such liberty is found in a naturall man, in an unregenerate, is the do∣ctrine of our Church by D. Potters confession, a Cathedrall Divine, I do not say by the constant doctrine of D. Fulke in his answer to the Rhemish Testament, and if no liberty from sinne be found in such a one, it followes that such a one remaines under a necessity of sinning, not that every sinne, whether of lying, stealing, whoring, murther, or in any other kind is necessarily committed by him; For a naturall man may be as morall as any heathen hath beene, many of whom have beene very famous and renowned in the world for their morality; But whether they are exercised in vertuous actions, or in abstaining from actions vicious, yet still they sinne, forasmuch as they neither performe the one, nor abstaine from the other in a gracious manner, out of faith and love. And therefore Au∣stin was somewhere bold to stile them Splendida peccata glorious sinnes. For novimus non officiis sed finibus discernendas esse virtutes, Vertues are to be discerned not by their offices, but by their ends. The Helen we fight for is nothing but the word of God, and the truth ma∣nifestly contained therein; namely concerning the prerogative of his grace, as effectuall to every good worke, and most Freely given to some and denyed to others, not accord∣ing to mens workes, according to that of S. Paul God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will, he hardneth. This is a part of Gods soveraignty; And it stands all true subjects upon to maintaine the lawfull Soveraignty of their Princes; how much more doth it become the creature to stand for the lawfull prerogative and Soveraignty of his Creator, es∣pecially when he proceeds herein according to the tenour of Gods word, cleare reason and the unanimous consent of all the orthodoxe in the Church of God clearely oppo∣sing Pelagius herein from the Synod of Palestine 1200. yeares agoe to this day.

The difference of opinions here feigned by him about the point of Reprobation, a∣mongst our Divines is like the feigning of a knot in a bulrush. For what is a peremptory denying of grace and glory to some men lying in the fall, other then a denyall of that grace and glory, which is prepared in the decree of election to the sonnes of God, though in∣deed neither of them make it a denyall, which is done in time, but rather Gods decree to deny it. For do not the latter Divines maintaine it to be peremptory, as well as the former? For what difference doth he devise between a flat denyall, and a peremptory denyall; and as for the latter decree belonging to reprobation here mentioned, namely a preordination of the man thus left to the torments of hell do not the latter Divines acknow∣ledge this decree to belong to Reprobation also? Only they professe that God preordaines none to eternall torments in hell but for their sinnes actuall as well as originall, of as many as live to ripenesse of age. Now I would faine know what Divine of ours maintaines the contrary.

1. Our Divines in saying, Reprobation is, Decretum quo statuit non misereri do manifest, that not denying grace, but the decree of denying it, is Reprobation. Walaeus speaketh of no common endowments, though that be a truth, which here is attributed unto them; else how should they be called common endowments.

2. If he decrees to leave Reprobates without grace, and consequently under that neces∣sity of sinning into which all are cast by the sinne of Adam; it is nothing strange, I thinke that God should accordingly leave them therein; though in a different manner, the Lord prostituting some to their own lost's and to the power of Satan, more then others, and making some even by the ministery of the Gospell, proficere ad exteriorem vitae emen∣dationem, quo mitius puniantur; as Austin some where speaketh. If Gods decree cannot be frustrated, as here is avouched; I wonder he should charge us with teaching, that God decreeth this, or that immutably. For if he should change any of his decrees, they should undoubtedly be frustrated. Indeed we do not say, that God decrees Hypotheti∣cally to give grace, to wit upon condition, that men will make themselves fit for it, and for failing herein to deny them grace. And I am very glad to observe so good correspon∣dence in the suffrages of Protestant Divines in the Synod of Dort, and our English also * 1.331 with them.

Sect: 3.

3. God both decreeth and executeth this leaving of men to themselves, of his alone absolute will and * 1.332 pleasure, This is the third branch

1 That they say so; witnesse the suffrage of our English Divines. We affirme that this non election is founded in the most free pleasure of God. And that no man lying in the fall is past over by the meere will of God, is numbred by the same Divines among the heterodox positions; To this purpose also speake The Palatinate Ministers. The cause of Reprobation is the most free and just will of God. * 1.333

That God passeth over some and denyeth them the grace of the Gospell, the cause is the same free pleasure of God.

Thus the Divines of Hessen; God decreed to leave some in the fall, of his own good pleasure; The proofe of this they fetch from the execution of this decree in time. God doth in time leave some of mankind fallen, and doth * 1.334 not bestow upon them meanes necessary to beleive &c. and this out of his most free pleasure; This they joyntly af∣firme and prove it by this reason especially. All men, were lookt on as sinners. If sinne therefore were the cause, that moved God to reprobate, he should have reprobated or rejected all; But he did not Reprobate all; therefore for sinne he reprobated none, but for his owne pleasure, in which we must rest wthout seek∣ing any other cause.

1. Now from these two things layd together, viz. 1. That God did bring men into a necessity of sinning.

2. That he hath left the Reprobates under this necessity, it will follow that he is the Authour of the re∣probates sinnes.

1. Because (Causae causae est causa causati) the Cause of a cause is the cause of its effect (if there be a necessary subordination betweene the causes and the effect) whether it be a cause by acts negative, or positive. But God is the cheife or sole cause (by their doctrine) of that, which is the necessary and immediate cause of the sinnes of reprobates, namely their impotency and want of supernaturall grace; therefore he is (by the same doctrine) the true and proper cause of their sinnes.

2. Because Removens prohibens, &c; that which withdraweth and withholdeth a thing, which being present would hinder an event, is the cause of that event. As for example he that cutteth a string in which a stone hangs, is the cause of the falling of that stone; And he that withdraweth a pillar which being put to uphold a house; is the true cause in mens account of the falling of that house. But God by their opinion withholdeth from reprobates that power, which being granted them, might keep thē from falling in∣to sinne: therefore he becometh a true morall cause of their sinnes, In whose power it is that a thing be not done, to him it is imputed, when it is done, sayth Tertullian, In cuius manu est quid ne fiat, ei deputatur, cum iam fit.

It will not suffice to say that God by withholding grace from reprobates becometh only an accidentall, * 1.335 not a proper and direct cause of their sinnes. For a cause is then only accidentall in relation to the effect, when the effect is beside the intention and expectation of the cause. For example; Digging in a feild is then an accidentall cause of the finding a bag of gold, when that event is neither expected not inten∣ded by the husbandman in digging; But when the event is lookt for, and aymed at, then the cause (though it be the cause only by withholding the impediment) is not accidentall. As a Pilot who withholdeth his care and skill from a ship in a storme; foreseeing that by his neglect the ship will be drowned; is not to be reputed an accidentall, but a direct, and proper cause of the losse of this ship. This being so it followeth that God by this act and decree of removing and detaining grace ne∣cessary to the avoyding of sinne, from reprobates, not as one ignorant and carelesse what will or shall follow, but knowing infallibly what mischeife will follow, and determining precisely that which doth fol∣low, viz: their impenitency and damnation, becomes the proper and direct cause of their sinnes.

That God of his meere pleasure sheweth mercy on some, and hardeneth others is the * 1.336 expresse word of God. Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hard∣neth. Now to shew mercy is to give the grace of faith and obedience, as appeares by the opposition of it to obduration, which is such as whereupon followeth disobedience; as appeares by the objection following hereupon; Thou wilt say then why doth yet cōplaine, For who hath resisted his will? Now God complaineth of nothing but disobedience. Againe to give faith, is to shew mercy. For to have faith is to obtaine mercy. Heretofore ye have * 1.337 not believed, but now have obtained mercy through their unbeliefe. Where to believe & to ob∣taine mercy are made equipollent, & of the same signification. And in reason, if God did deny faith, because of some unpreparednesse in the creature, then God did expect that the creature should first prepare himselfe, and make himselfe fit for faith, that so God might bestow it upon him; & so grace should be conferr'd according to workes; which is contra∣dictious to expresse testimony of holy scripture, testifying that God hath saved us & called us with an holy calling, not according to our workes but according to his owne purpose and grace; & all along hath beene condened in the Church of God for Pelagianisme. Thus we have beene entertained with a discourse containing nothing, but the opinion of our Divines, which none of us deny: Yet in the proposing hereof he hath wasted a whole leafe and more Now he comes to his argument drawen from these two layd together.

1. That God did bring men into a necessity of sinning.

2. That he hath left the reprobates under this necessity. Hence he concludes that God is the Author of the reprobates sins; But this we utterly deny. Therefore this he undertakes to prove by two reasons.

1. Because the cause of the cause is the cause of its effect, if there be a necessary subordination betweene the causes and the effect. But God is the cheife or sole cause (by their doctrine) of that which is the necessary and immediate cause of the sinnes of Reprobates, namely their impotency and want of supernaturall grace. For answer whereunto I say, first begining with the mi∣nor. 1. That the want of supernaturall grace is not the immediate cause of the sinnes of Reprobates, nor the cheife cause; much lesse the sole cause. And I prove it evidently. Let instance be given in any sinne committed by a Reprobate; let it be the sinne of murther, or of fornication, or of theft, or of lying! For if it were, then every reprobate should be guilty of murther, of fornication, of lying, of stea∣ling

For, positâ causâ principali & immediatâ ponitur effectus; Where a principall and im∣mediate cause doth exist, there the effect must needs exist. But it is apparent, that albeit every reprobate doth want supernaturall grace, yet every reprobate is not guilty of murther, of fornication, lying, and stealing. Secondly, If the want of supernaturall grace were the immediate and principall cause of all the sinnes of reprobates; then not only e∣very Reprobate should be guilty of committing all the sinnes formerly mentioned, but at all times every one of these sinnes should be committed by them; Because at all times they want supernaturall grace. And the truth is, every one of these sinnes may be abstain∣ed from without supernaturall grace, and for carnall respects: Only without supernatu∣rall grace they cannot be abstained from, in a gracious manner; as namely out of faith in God, and love to God. He that hath neither faith nor love cannot abstaine from these vile courses out of faith and love. In like sort, heathen men in their generations have beene exceeding vertuous, according to the worlds account of vertue, in modera∣ting their passions, and ordering their conversation aright one towards another; and all this hath beene performed by them without supernaturall grace. Thirdly, The imme∣diate cause of all their sinnes rather of the two, is their naturall corruption, whereby they are habitually turned away from God; and converted unto the creature in an inordinate manner. Like as the immediate cause actionis laesae, of a naturall function of the body imper∣fect, is the disease or infirmity that hath seised upon some part of the body; And the Physitian who is able to cure it, and will not; is the cause why it continueth uncured: But no wise man will say, he is the cause why this or that member in a sicke mans body doth not performe its operation as it should. In like manner as touching the vicious actions of the soule, the want of supernaturall grace is the cause, why those vicious actions continue uncured, because God alone by his grace can cure them; but no sober man that is well in his wits, should say that is the cause of vicious actions; but acknow∣ledge rather the corruption thereof to be the cause of these vicious actions. And indeed all morall philosophy referres the cause of every vicious action, unto the vicious habit depraving the will, and inclining it to vicious courses. Fourthly, Yet farther to repre∣sent the wildnesse of this Authours discourse. The vicious habit it selfe is not the sole cause; no nor the principall and immediate cause of a vicious action in particular. For if it were, then that particular vicious action should alwayes be committed by it; So that an impure person should alwayes commit fornication; a Lyar should alwayes lye; a Theife should alwayes steale; a Murtheret should alwayes commit murther. For it is a rule generally received, that the immediate and principall cause being existent, the ef∣fect must needs exist also. And indeed albeit, habits, whether good or evill, do worke after the manner of nature inclining and swaying the will to the accomplishment of them; Yet the will of man being a free, and not necessary Agent, proceeds not to worke, but according unto judgement and occasions and opportunityes from without. And albe∣it a purser that maintaine himselfe by robbery hath a faire opportunity offered him to advantage himselfe to take a purse; yet if upon consideration he finds himselfe too weake to goe through with it, or that he cannot do it safely, he will forbeare. For al∣beit a vicious habit doth naturally, and necessarily incline him to a naughty end, yet in the choice of the meanes conducing to this end, he is free. How much more plainely doth it appeare, that the want of supernaturall grace is farre off from being either the sole cause, or the immediate, or the principall cause of any sinne committed by a Reprobate. Rather of the two the intestine corruption of the Reprobate is the cause of his sinnes, and the want of grace is the cause why this corruption is not cured. Now albeit a Physitian may sinne in not curing a sicke person, when it lyes in his power to cure him: For we are in charity bound to do to others, as we would have others do unto us; yet God is bound to none, I will shew mercy on whom I will shew mercy, * 1.338 and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion.

2. Observe how sluttishly he carryeth himselfe in the next reason taken from re∣movens prohibens. His rule proceeds both of withdrawing and withholding a thing which be∣ing present would hinder an event. But he gives instance only in withdrawing, as in cut∣ting a string whereon a stone•• hangs; which who so doth, is the cause of the falling of the stone: And in withdrawing a pillar upholding an house, which who so doth, is the cause of the fall of that house: which is most true in naturall things, yet not the immedi∣ate cause, that is to be referred to the nature of the stone, and house; which being heavy things do naturally move downwards. But this Authour contents not himselfe with conforming the condition of Agents voluntary to the conditions of Agents naturall and necessary; but changeth his termes also, and puts the phrass of with∣drawing,

into the place of the former phrase, which was withholding. Now it is true God withholds that grace from Reprobates, which he gives to his Elect; but he with∣drawes and takes no inward grace from them. Yet this phrase of withholding is very im∣proper; For it signifies a forcible restraint of that which was going; Whereas God being Master of his owne grace, gives it to whom he will, and denyes it to whom he will; For he is bound to none. And is it not lawfull for him to doe what he will with his owne? But albeit he carry himselfe very sluttishly in opposing us, yet I willingly confesse he carryeth the matter very clearely in contradicting himselfe; as when he concludeth, that God in withholding that power (that is that grace) which would keep them from sinne (for this alone is our Tenet) hereby becomes a true morall cause of their sinne. I say, herein he contradicts himselfe very handsomely. For himselfe confesseth that God could hinder any man from sinne, but he doth not: And doth it not herehence evidently follow, that God hereby becomes the Authour of sinne, yea of every sinne that is committed in the world? But I see what he will reply by the face of his discourse, namely this; He sayth not that God by withholding that grace which would keep him from sinne, becomes the Authour of sinne; but only by withholding that grace which might keep him from sinne. And indeed so he doth; but marke therewithall how sluttishly he carryeth himselfe in 2 particulars. 1. In deviating from his confirmity to his owne instances. For each instance given is in such a thing withdrawen whereupon the event absolutely followeth; and which not being withdrawen the contrary event not only might be, but would be; as if a string holding a stone being not broken, the stone not only might be held, but would be held. So if the not beene withdrawen, not only the house might have beene held up, but would have pillar had been held up. But upon granting grace he doth not say the creature would have beene kept from sinne, but might have beene kept from falling into sinne. Now what Leger∣deimaine is this? And could he presume his Reader would prove so simple and Sottish, as not to observe this incongruity? 2. He deviates from our tenet. For we do not say, that upon granting grace supernaturall the creature may abstaine from sinne, if he will, but that hereby is wrought in him a will to abstaine from sinne, a desire to do that which is pleasing in the sight of God, though not in such perfection, as to worke out all natu∣rall corruption that is found within us; but that still there is sinne dwelling in us; still there is a flesh fighting against the spirit; Yea, a law in our members rebelling against the law of our mind, and leading us captive to the law of sinne. Hence proceed the manifold and dayly sinnes even of the children of God; but Gods spirit is prevalent with them to renew their repentance, even for sinnes of weaknesse, and sinnes of improvidence and inconsiderat∣nesse; and to keep from presumptuous sinnes, that they may not prevaile over them; That it may not be said of them, as it was of too many among the Israelites, in the wil∣dernesse, * 1.339 Their spots are not the spots of thy children. Nay, which is more, consider; Armi∣nius confesseth that God doth hinder sinne in such a manner, as by granting such a grace, * 1.340 whereupon they not only may, but will and do abstaine from sinne; but he doth not thus hinder it in all. What therefore? shall he be accounted the Authour of such sinnes. Yet I willingly confesse, Arminius and this Authour shake hands in this, that the Repro∣bates have such a grace, as whereby they may abstaine from sinne, if they will. Yet holy Paul confesseth of himselfe, even then, when he was in a better condition (I trowe) then that of Reprobates, to wit, when he wrote the Epistle to the Romans, saying, What I would that do I not, but what I hate that do I. And againe, To will is present with me, but I * 1.341 find no meanes to performe that which is good: For I do not the good thing which I would; but the evill which I would not, that do I. But we deny that a Reprobate hath so much as a will to do good; For such a will undoutedly pleaseth God. But they that are in the flesh can∣not please God.

As for the solution which he feignes to himselfe of his owne argument, by distinction of an accidentall cause, and a proper and direct cause; that is none of ours. This is a gam∣bell of his owne, to delude his reader. God we say is the direct and proper cause of that sanctification which is found in his children to the subduing of their lusts, an inordinate affections; and as direct and proper a cause of leaving their naturall corruption uncured in others: Nor so only but of prostituting men unto their lusts, and giving them over to their vile affections, to committ abominable things, not affording them so much as a naturall restraint from such vicious courses, which he could, and that without any su∣pernaturall grace. And by this postitution of them, he knowes how to pay them home for their other ungodly courses, in such sort, as they shall receive thereby such recom∣pence of their errour as is meet; as Saint Paul hath told us Rom. 1. But this Authour takes little notice of Gods word thereby to informe himselfe of Gods providence; but

roves whithin the spheare of his owne imagination, and rationall discourse, (yet as cor∣rupt as well beseemes him who opposeth the free grace of God) as if he would coyne unto us new oracles, the devises of his owne addle braines. And as for Tertullians rule, which this Authour insists upon. In whose power it is that a thing be not done, to him it is imputed, when it is done. Observe whether this Authour doth not make God the Authour of every sinne that is committed in the world, as well as we. For himselfe, in the 6. Sect. of the second inconvenience, confesseth that if God had not decreed to suffer sinne, there would be none; and addes Who can bring forth that which God will absolutely hinder. So then undoubtedly it is in Gods power, that sinne be not done. For he can hinder it; what followeth then? but that to him sinne is to be imputed, when it is done, by Tertullians rule, appro∣ved by this Authour, quite contrary to the judgment and doctrine of Austin, putting * 1.342 this difference betweene man and God, the creature and the Creator; that if we suffer others to sinne, when we can hinder them, rei cum ipsis erimus; but how many sinnes (sayth he) do we see committed in the world, which could never come to passe if God would hinder them.

Shewing how our doctrine opposeth Gods mercy according to his conceit, and com∣ing * 1.343 to deliver things more closely, as he sayth, and comprehending that which he hath to say under 4. particulars: The 2. whereof this; That it was the sinne of our nature, not by generation, as I have shewed, but by Gods owne voluntary imputation. The proofe whereof and the confirmation of it out of M. Calvin being set downe at large in some 13. lines or more in M. Hords discourse, is here utterly left out, which will be the more remar∣kable by comparing it with what he delivers, concerning another attribute of God here inserted; and which he pretends, also to be impugned by our doctrine, p. 54. where he seemes to sup up that which here he delivered.

Num. 3. These words are inserted. I thinke I may conclude with the words of Prosper, He which sayth * 1.344 that God would not have all men to be saved but a certaine set number of predestinate persons only, he speaketh more harshly, then he should of the height of Gods unsearchable grace. Nay he speakes that which cannot stand with his infinite grace and mercy, especially to the sonnes of men.

The 8. objection of the Galles was this That God will not have all men to be saved, but a certaine number of persons predestinate. Now Prospers answer hereunto is very large, and * 1.345 it begines thus, If about the salvation of all mankind, and calling them unto the knowledge of his truth, the will of God is maintained to be so indifferent throughout all ages, that God may be shewed to have neglected no man altogether; the unsearchable depth of Gods judgement is hereby assaulted. For why did God suffer all nations in ages past, to walke in their owne wayes when the Lord chose Iacob to himselfe, and dealt not so with every nation? And why are they now become Gods people, which before were no people of God, &c? All this makes nothing for this Authour. The next is directly against him, not only at large; but in this very par∣ticular, wherein he alleadeth Prosper not in his answer to this 8. objection, but in his sentence proposed afterwards upon it. For what is this Authours meaning, (in citeing him to affirme, that God not only willeth their salvation whom he hath predestinated, but all men also; or at least that such as say the contrary, do speake more harshly then we ought to speaks of the depth of Gods inscrutable grace) but to cast a colour that Prosper concurres with him; and judgeth that God is indifferunt to save all. But the reason why he only saves some, and not others, is, because some prepare themselves for grace, and accordingly he bestowes it upon them: Others do not prepare themselves, and accordingly God doth not bestow it upon them. Now prosper directly contests against all such, as maintaine this opinion, and that in two particulars. 1. In taking upon them to give the reason of Gods judgements, and that drawen from the wills and actions of men; and which is no lesse impiety, in thinking that grace is bestowed by way of reward for good workes; Or restrayned from men by reason of their evill workes. His words translated run thus, But whosoever referreth the causes of Gods workes and judgements throughout to the wills and acti∣ons of men, and will have Gods dispensations varied according to the changeable condition of mans free will; such a one professeth the judgements of God to be scrutable, and his wayes such, as may be found out. And that which Paul the Doctor of the Gentiles durst not touch, this man thinkes he can unlock and make known. And that which is a fruit of no lesse impiety, the very grace of God whereby we are saved, is given by the way of reward for good workes, and denyed, or restrained for evill workes. So that in each particular Prosper is directly contra∣ry this Authours tenet. Now seeing the most part of men have not the grace of salva∣tion, that is, such a grace as is of saving nature. And the reason by God doth not give

it them, is not in consideration of their evill workes; let any other sober and judicious Aminian be judge, whether God can be sayd to will their salvation (in such a sense as we speake of it) when he denyeth them the grace of salvation, and that not for their evill workes sake, but (which necessarily followeth hereupon) meerely according to the good pleasure of his will. And indeed in Prospers large answer to this eighth objection∣to the Galles, which taketh up almost a whole columne in Austin, this Authour finds nothing at all to fasten upon for his advantage. But yet you will say in his eighth sen∣tence which he proposeth, it is as this authour alleadgeth: I grant it; but observe his cen∣sure well; The inscrutable depth of Gods grace may suffice to keep us from speaking so rashly, as to say that God wills not all to be saved, but only a certaine number of persons predestinate. Where observe, first, he counts it an harsh speech to say, that God willeth not, that all men shall be saved; the reason whereof undoutedly is this, because it is expresly contradictory * 1.346 to a text in Scripture. But then if we object, how can God be sayd to will their salvation whom he hath not predestinated, to whom he will not give the grace of salvation, & that not for their evill workes sake; but according to the meere pleasure of his will. Now Prospers answer in my judgement is this, The depth of Gods inscrutable grace will beare us out in it; so that we need not cast our selves upon so harsh an expression, as to deny that God will have all men to be saved, which is contradictious to the letter of Gods word. In effect it is, as if he should say; It is a secret. This I take to be Prospers meaning, and herein I remit my selfe to the judicious; But sure I am that Prosper is directly contrary to that opinion whereunto this Authour, by vertue of this sentence of his, desires to draw him. In like manner the Authour of the booke, De vocatione Gentium, which is commonly thought to be Prospers, though Vossius affects to entitle it unto another upon no other ground, but because he conceits that Authour, not to be so rigorous in the doctrine of predestination, as Prosper. But let the judicious compare Prospers ca∣riage in this particular, with that Authours, and observe whether they do not exactly agree For that Authour holds up that text of Paul, God will have all to be saved, as Prosper doth, without assaying to cleare it by interpretation as Austin doth, and will have it goe for a secret; and withall he expresly concurres with Prosper in ex∣pressing first, that God doth not give grace for mens good workes sake, nor de∣nyes it for their evill workes. For the ages wherein God so plentifully communi∣cated his grace were no better then the former. Observe farther that Austin himselfe in his Enchiridion treating of this place of Paul, God will have all to be saved, after he hath given two interpretations thereof, the last whereof interpreting it of genera sin∣gulorum, * 1.347 not singula generum, is most generally received, as most congruous both to Scripture phrase in generall, and in speciall unto this very text of Paul, as Piscator observes, and Vossius against himselfe improvidently confesseth. Yet see the ingenuity of this great light in Gods Church. If any man can give any other convenient interpretation, let him, provided we be not driven to deny the first article of Creed, whereby we confesse that God is omnipotent. And this I conceive proceeded out of a desire to hold up the meaning of that text to the uttermost, that the very letter of it may be applyed so we might not be driwen to so foule an inconvenience, as to say that God willeth that mans salvation, which is never saved; which is as much as to say, that such a one therefore is not saved, because God cannot save him. Observe farther; in the dayes of Hincmarus and Remi∣gius, these controversies being revived in the cause of Goteschalk, the church of Lyons writes a booke wherein it treats of the meaning of this place of Paul, whereof he gives fower expositions according to the antient fathers. First, That it is to be understood of genera singulorum, not singula generum; of all sorts of men, not of all men of all sorts. Se∣condly, That none is saved but by the will of God. Thirdly, That God workes in us a will or a desire that all may be saved. Fourthly, That God will have all men to be sa∣ved, if they will; Then they propose their judgement concerning these fower expositions distinguishing betweene the three, first, and the last, thus, In the three first expositions of these words, wherein it is sayd, that God willeth all men to be saved, no absurdity is to be found, no repugnancy unto faith. But as touching the fourth and the last; here we are to take heed, for it gives occasion to the Pelegian pravity, in as much as it affirmes, that God, that he may save men; doth exspect the wills of men: (Now this Pelagian pravity, is the very sub∣stance of our Authours orthodoxy whom I deale with.) Against this errour, (sayth the Church of Lyons) we read Definitions have beene made in the antient counsels of the fathers. This I take out of the extracts, which Vossius hath made out of that booke, which goes under the name of the Church of Lyons, in his Pelagian history. l. 7. c. 4. p. 755, 756.

there is an addition of some few lines in the third Sect: concerning Gods justice, but * 1.348 they adde noe moment at all to the rest; and therefore the answer made in that third Sect: to M. Hord may suffice. And in the same sect: and subsection subordinate to the second assertion, which he obtrudes upon the maintainers of the lower way; which was this, God hath determined for the sinne of Adam to cast away the greatest part of man∣kind for ever; this Interpolation is inserted.

This is so cleare a case that Calvin with some others have not stickt to say, that God may with as much * 1.349 justice determine men to hell the first way, as the latter. See Instit: l. 3. cap. 23. s. 7. Where against those who deny that Adam fell by Gods decree, he reasoneth thus; All men are made guilty of Adams sinne by Gods absolute decree alone, Adam therefore sinned by this only decree. What lets them it grāt, that of one man, which they must grant of all men? And a little after he saith It is too absurd that these kind patrons of Gods justice. should thus stumble at a straw, and leap over a blocke. God may with as much justice decree Adams sinne and mens damnation, out of his only will and pleasure, as out of that will and pleasure the involving of men in the guilt of the first sinne, at and their damnation for it; That is the substance of his reasoning. To the same purpose speaketh Maccovius; Fromhence we may see, sayth he, what to judge of that opinion of our adversaryes viz. That God cannot justly ordaine men to destruction without he consideration of sinne. Let them tell me which is greater to impute to one man the sinne of another, and punish him for it with eternall death, or to ordaine simply, without looking at sinne, to destruction? Surely no man will deny the first of these to be greater. But this God may do without any wrong to iustice, much more therefore may he do the other.

As touching the assertion it selfe here charged upon our Divines, namely that God hath determined for the sinne of Adame to cast away the greatest part of mankind. I have * 1.350 thereunto answered at large in my consideration of M. Hords discourse: Yet let me adde something by way of an apt accommodation of that before delivered to cleare the ambiguous phrase of this Authour, as touching the phrase of casting away. For it may well be doubted whether by casting away (which he makes the Object of Gods determination) he meanes the act of damnation, or the act of denying grace. If the act of damnation, it is most untrue. For Reprobates are not damned for originall sinne on∣ly, but for all the actuall sinnes that have beene committed by them; And as they are, and shall be damned for them; So God from everlasting decreed they should be dam∣ned for them. Secondly, According to my Tenet, in noe moment of nature is Gods decree of damning reprobates, before the prescience, not of originall sinne only, but al∣so of all their actuall sinnes. Indeed I do not make the prescience of sinne to go before the decree of damnation; Nor do I make the decree of damnation to go before the pre∣science of sinne, but I conceive them to be simultaneous. It is true many infants we say perish in originall sinne only, not living to be guilty of any actuall sinne of their persons; why should this seeme strange, when M. Hord himselfe professeth in his preface sect. 4. That all mankind are involved in the guilt of eternall death? If all are guilty of eternall death, then it were just with God to inflict eternall death upon all for originall sinne; How much more is it just to inflict eternall death upon some few, being guilty of it. Therefore observe the foxlike cariage of this Authour. For this former free acknow∣ledgement of the guilt of eternall death adherent to originall sinne in M Hords dis∣course, is quite left out in this, though there it was professed with this asseveration, I confidently believe it. For he well perceived, that this position utterly infatuates the strength of his discourse in this place. And I have still looked when these men will come to a plaine denyall of Originall sinne. Now if God may justly cast all mankind away for sinne originall, and that as touching the inflicting of damnation upon them for it; how much more evident is it to be just with God to cast away all mankind for originall sinne, as touching the denyall of grace unto them? Now let us proceed to that which is here inserted out of Calvin and Maccovius. Now Calvin sayth not that God may with as much justice determine men to hell the first way, as the latter; He speakes not at all of Gods decree of damnation, he speaks only of Gods decree that Adam suâ defectione periret, by his fall should be obnoxious to destruction And he proves it by their acknowledg∣ment, that it was by the counsell of God, that all à salute exciderent unius parentis culpâ, should incurre the losse of salvation by the fault of one parent. Hereupon he demands saying, What lets them to grant that of one man, which they must grant of all men. And a little after, It is too absurd that those kind patrons of Gods justice should thus stick at a straw and leap•• over a blocke And whereas Calvin sayth, as he relates him, that All men are made guilty of Adams sinne by Gods absolute decree alone. First, This is untrue; No where doth he say, that this came to passe by Gods absolute decree alone. If he had, I had thought this Authour would have justifyed him, as well as M. Hord, who in this very place professeth that Originall sinne is a sinne made ours only by Gods appointment. Indeed as M. Hord is now

set forth in print, this passage is not found: but in M. Hord's own copy thus it ranne; M. Mason belike hath gelded him; Yet that of M. Hord's was accounted the quintes∣sence of M. Mason's strength in this argument; and he took upon him the propagating of the manuscripts thereof as my selfe know in some particulars. Likewise the involving of men in the guilt of Adam's sinne and of eternall death, is M. Hord's phrase in one place, as before I have shewed out of the fourth Section of his preface; and that by the only de∣cree of God, did he expresse in this place. The same argument is used by Maccovius ap∣plyed to purpose (so was not that of Calvin's. As for that saying of Maccovius, that God may ordaine men to destruction without respect to any sinne of his that is so ordai∣ned, is not this manifest. 1. In the case of annihilation? For doth not Arminius con∣fesse that God can annihilate the holiest creature that is? 2ly, As touching the suffe∣ring of hell paines. For did not Christ suffer them by the ordinance of his Father? Or was this suffering of his for any sinne of his own? This have I proved more then once in my Vindiciae to be in the power of God: And Medina professeth as much, and that ex concordi omnium Theologorum sententiâ; And Vasquez the Jesuite concurres with Medina in the same opinion. And lately Raynaudus in his justification of Valerianus; who proves this to have been the confession of many of the antient Fathers, and particularly of Ful∣gentius in that booke of his De praedestinatione & gratiâ, which goes under Austin's name. And is it not evident by M. Hord's acknowledgment, when he saith that men are made guilty of Adam's sin, and of eternall death only by God's decree? Which passage of M. Hord's this Authour hath razed out, and wipeth his lips, as if he had done no iniqui∣ty with his Index expurgatorius; not that he hath changed his opinion, as I verily thinke; but because he saw what a funestous blow it gave unto his cause in this particular: Yet is he magnified as a man unanswerable, none daring to take the bucklers against such a Don Quixot; But let the judicious consider this his practise well, & whether he be a man of such authority, as deserving that they should pin their faith on his sleeve, especially con∣sidering that he takes no notice of what I have answered to M. Hord, to reply thereupon; and that there is scarce any thing in all this which I have not answered in my Vindiciae; Yet he continues to clamour still; at least by other Jack a Lents whom he sets up, but an∣swers nothing, but that which is of his own shaping, that making his own bed he may lye the more softly. But let The Reader seriously consider this, that will not be gulled and cheated of his faith, as Pope Caelestinus was of his Popedome; and remember what Austin sometimes sayd, Si lupi concilium fecerunt, ut pastoribus non responderent cur oves consilium perdiderunt, ut ad luporum speluncas accederent? If the wolves have consulted to∣gether, * 1.351 and resolved not to make answer to the shepheards; why have the sheep so farre lost all good counsell, as to come to the dens of wolves?

Pag: 67. Sub-Sect: 2: concerning God's justice there is a passage inserted out of M. Perkins, but it is of no more moment then the rest. In the same sub-section, the three cau∣ses why repobates cannot in justice be bound to believe, are much changed from that they were in M. Hord's discourse, sent unto his freind, which Copy was sent unto me. Yet upon better consideration I find it is not so much changed, as at first sight I conceived. The order of the two first reasons is changed; only in the first here some similies of ex∣ageration are wanting, which are not wanting in the second of M. Hord's.

The second here is most altered. For wheras in M. Hord's first discourse which he ten∣dred to a Freind of his, the reason ranne thus; Because it is God's will they shall not believe; To wit, in our opinion it is altered here thus, from an affirmative to a negative, It is not God's unfeigned will they shall believe; Yet himselfe layes the same thing to our charge in an affirmative manner pag: 78: treating of God's truth sub-sect: 2: the very last words which I answer apart, all that page almost not being found in M. Hord's first discourse. The words are these, Can God speak thus to Reprobates, who by his own decree shall never repent? &c. And in this very place at length he riseth to this affirmative, thus, It may rather be said, it is God's unfeigned will they shall not believe, because it is his will they shall want power to believe. So that I need not to trouble my selfe with adding any farther answer to this, more then I have to M. Hord and to that page 78 concerning God's truth, Sub-sect: 3.

Pag: 69, and Sub-sect: 4. In dealing on God's attribute of justice; After the Authour had proposed his reasons which moved him to thinke that our doctrine of God▪s absolute decree is repugnant to God's justice; he proposeth our answers thereunto, which formerly were but two; but now are inlarged with the addition of a third. The first whereof is, for the forme of it, changed throughout. The comparison of the waies of God with the mysterious attributes of God is changed, not only as touching the forme, but as touch∣ing

the matter; here is no pleading for a reasonable service of God, as there was.

His making man's understanding purged from prejudice and false principles, as it was proposed there, purged from prejudices, corrupt affections, and customes, as it is proposed, to be the Tribunall, according to whose judgment interpretations of Scri∣pture concerning what is just in the courses of God must be allowed or disallowed, I have sufficiently canvased there; Let the Reader be pleased to turne to it, and com∣pare my answer to this Sub-section, and observe how little spirit he had, so much as to question against any one peece of my answer. Here he addes a reason of his former uncouth paradoxe, to wit that, Iustice in men and God are for substance but one, and the same thing, though different in degree, as the greater and lesser light. I have suffici∣ently profligated this in the first Section concerning God's attributes. For this very rule he premiseth in generall to the ensuing discourse of his, most congruously; wilde pre∣mises and grounds to wild discourses.

The difference he puts between the wayes of God & the mysteries of godlinesse I have there also refuted, shewing that albeit some wayes of God's justice are agreable to the judgment of man, as these mentioned, Es: 5. and Ezek: 18, yet all are not, as there I shew at large.

And lastly because he likes rationall discourse so well, I am contented to deale with him at his own weapon, by six rationall demonstrations justifying the absolutenesse of God's decrees, in answer whereunto, he is content to carry himselfe very judiciously, even as mute as a fish.

The second answer of ours which he brings in to reply upon, is inserted a new, & that I come to consider in the next place as I find it set down pag. 10. 71. 72. * 1.352

It is answered that these decrees are set down in Scripture to be the will of God, and therefore they must needs be just. For God's will is the rule of all righteousnesse. To this answer I have these things to reply. 1. This rule in divinity is much abused by the maintainers of absolute reprobation, and may not be admit∣ted in their sense and meaning. For God's will is not a rule of justice to himselfe, as if things were therefore just, because he willeth and worketh them; but his justice rather is a rule of his will & workes, which are the expressions of his will He therefore maketh decrees and executeth them, because they are agreable to that ju∣stice which dwells in the Divine nature: as he maketh nothing which hath not pot••nitam objectivam, a power of being created without implying contradiction to himselfe, or any thing in him; So he willeth and doth no∣thing, but that which may be willed and done salvá justiti••, without wrong to his justice, St. Hierome speak∣ing of the Prophet Hoseas taking a wife of fornication. Hos. 1. 2. Saith it was done in typo, typically, not •• ••ally * 1.353 quia si siat, turpissimii est, because if it had been d••ne indeed it had been a most foule thing. But thou wilt answer, saith he, Deo ••ubente, nihil turpe est, God commanding it nothing is dishonest. Thus much we say, saith the fa∣ther, that God commandeth nothing but what is honest, but he doth not by commanding dishonest things, make those things honest which are abominable, plainly giving us to see what he thought viz: that God doth not will a thing & of make it good; but willeth it because it is in it selfe good antecedently, & before the act of God's will about it.

And thus much doth Zanchy (though a rigid maintainer of absolute reprobation) not obscurely confesse * 1.354 in his treatise De naturá Dei; where he letteth ••all such speeches as make God's justice antecedent to his will and therefore the rule of it, rather then a thing regulated by it. Neither can God will any thing, saith he, which is not just. And againe, The Princes pleasure hath the strength of a law, is a Rule saith he, among the Canonists. But this is true where the King is just and a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nothing but what is just. In which words he plainly maketh the justice of the King am••••edent to that will of his, which must be a law. Many more speeches he useth there to the same purpose. God's will therefore is not a rule of justice to himselfe. To whom then? To us. For by it we are first to ••qua••e all our thoughts, words, and deeds. Secondly to examine them when they are spoken, and done. Primum in aliq••o 〈…〉〈…〉 regula ••ostcricrum, & supremum inferiorum.

2ly. I reply that the•••• absolute accrces of mens in••vitable salvation and damnation are no parts of Gods revealed will. The scriptures teache us no such matter. And therefore to say that they are, is but a mere beg∣ging of the question. It hath alwaies been ordinary with false teachers, to make Gods word a father to their false opinions, that they may stand the faster and winne the greater credit. The Papists ground their Tran∣substantiation, & the Lutherans their con••ubstantiation and obiquity upon the Scripture, Hoc est corpus meū, This is my body. And the defenders of absolute reprobation doe so too. They make their cause to be Gods and entitle his word to it; because they see it is the surest way to defend it, being herein like to some con∣tentious * 1.355 people, who being in law and having a bad cause which they are like to loose, they entitle the King to it, that they may the better uphold it.

3ly Absolute Reprobation can be no part of Gods revealed will. The reason is, because it is odious to right reason, & begetteth absurdities. For nulla veritas parit absurda; no truth begetteth absurdities. Divers truths are revealed in Scripture, which are above, but not contrary to right reason, whether they be matters of faith or life: Faith and reason nature and Scripture are both Gods excellent gifts. And therefore though there may be a disproportion, ye•• there can be no repugnancy between them. The worship which God requireth is Cultus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a reasonable 〈◊〉〈◊〉. And the word of God is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, milke reasonable and without guile. * 1.356

These things therefore, being laid together, it will appeare to be but a mere shift and evasion, when abso∣lute reprobation is pr••ved to be unjust, and therefore unworthy of God; to say Gods will is the rule of ju∣stice; this is part of Gods revealed will, and therefore most just, whatsoever reason may cavill, and say to the contrary.

Doth not this Authour observe the contradictious nature of this proposition Gods will is a rule of justice to himselfe. For a rule of justice to any one is a rule to his will, to be re∣gusated thereby; & can the will be said to be the rule of justice to the will without con∣tradiction? The rule propounded was this, God's will is the rule of all righteousnesse; but the other rule is the rule corrupted by this Authour, when he talks of a will, as a rule of justice to the will. 2. But whether things are therefore just, because God wills them; or that therefore God willeth them, because they are just; undoubtedly that which here is pro∣posed is a truth, namely that whatsoever the Scripture sets downe to be the will of God, that must needs be just. Neither have we any need to improve it any farther then thus. For it is well known, that our Divines in their doctrine of predestination, and re∣probation doe depend on nothing so much, as the evidence of God's word; As this Au∣thor throughout this discourse of his depends on nothing lesse. And therefore he hath cast himselfe upon a strange practice in the former passage, namely to evacuate all our reasons drawn out of the word of God to confirme our doctrine, pleading that the inter∣pretations we make of Scripture are all false, because the contrary doctrine which he maintaines, is justified before the tribunall of humane reason purged from prejudice, and false principles, corrupt affections and customes; Which is as much as to professe in plaine termes, that to find out the truth concerning the decrees of predestination and reproba∣tion, we must leave the oracles of God, and hearken to the oracles of reason, provided that it be purged from prejudice and false principles; from corrupt affections and customes. Now I had thought that the spirit of God alone could purge us from such prejudice and false principles; corrupt affections and customes; And that this spirit of God worketh on∣ly by the word herein, which is called in Scripture the sword of the spirit; Yet this Author * 1.357 tells us not, where this reason thus purged is to be found; save that in generall he saith; that is just or unjust which is so esteemed in the judgment both of best and worst that stand indifferent to the entertainment of any truth, as is to be seen in the former reason ac∣cording to M. Hord's discourse. Now who these best are but the Arminians in this Au∣thours fancy; & the worst, but Anabaptists or heathens; or both I know not; Sure we are none of them in his understanding purged from false principles and prejudice, from corrupt affections and customes; because we doe not stand indifferent to the entertainment of his tenets, which he calls Truths. 3. Where can he shew that I have made use of any such princi∣ples to answer any argument of his against us. I doe not find that any where he can drive me to this though this be the Apostles course, as we may see Ro: 9. Is there any injustice with God? God forbid, how doth he prove it, but thus, because the Scripture attributes such a course to God; I will shew mercy on whom I will shew mercy, and I will have compassion, on whome I will have compassion. 4. But where hath he learnt to be so audacious as to say that, Things are not therefore just because God wills them, but that his justice is rather a rule of his will and works? Before he told us, that justice in man, and God were of the same nature; Now that justice which is the rule of our will is, Justitia obligans, justice binding us to doe this or that; and is Gods justice obligatory likewise to bind him? In making the world, I doe not doubt, but God did that which was just; but was there any justice in God obliging him to the making of the world? who seeth not, what an Atheisticall conclusion followeth herehence, namely that the world was from everlasting, if not necessarily by necessity of nature; yet necessarily by obli∣gation of justice? otherwise for an infinite space of time wherein the world was not made (which must needs have been if the world were not, from everlasting) God had been and continued to be unjust. The Schooles have taught me that there is a justice of condecency consequent to all the actions of God, noe justice of obligation precedent to it. And whereas St. Paul tells us that God works all things accor∣ding to the counsell of his will, both Alvarez and Suarez though School, Divines of opposite families, yet concurre in this that this Counsell is, à libera voluntate acceptum, accepted of Gods free will. And it is observable, that the Apostle calls it not the Counsell of his understanding, but the counsell of his will And Vasqu••z and Suarez both Jesuites, but very opposite about the nature of justice in God; yet both concurre, that there is no justice in God towards his creature, but up∣on supposition of the determination of God's will. It is most true that suppo∣sing the end which God intends, the wisedome of God directs in the right use of congruous meanes; and no other justice then this his wisedome doth Aquinas ac∣knowledge in the Divine nature. And great is the wisedome which God manifests in the

goverment of this world, yet the same wisedome as great as it is doth not equall the in∣finite wisdome of God. But of this I have disputed more at large in my Vindiciae. Where * 1.358 this question is discussed. Whether the will of God be circumscribed or regulated by justice? To no parcell whereof doe I find the least savour of an answer in this Authour. But let us examine how well he proves his own Tenet; And that is first by the authority of Hierome in his preface to his commentaries on Hosea. 2. By the authority of Zanchy; whereto I answer. 1. That if the interpretations of Scripture must be judged of before the Tribu∣nall of reason purged from prejudice and false principles, from corrupt affections and customes; must not the opinions of such as Hierome and Zanchy be judged of before the same tribu∣nall also? 2ly, touching Hierome himselfe. 1. It is true Hierome in that preface under∣stands that command given Hosea to be only in a Type, and for the reason here mentio∣ned; but in his Commentary he interpreteth it secundum historiam, litterally. Neither was the Prophet as he saith, to be blamed in this. For he was not the worse, but he made her the better. Praesertim especially he was not to be blamed, because he did this not luxuriously or lustfully, or of his own will, but in obedience to the command of God. Now let the indifferent judge whether Hierome be not as much for us upon the text, as for our adversary in the preface. 2. Observe that Hierome is nothing for him in the preface. For Hierome speakes there of God's will of command, but we treate of God's will as it signifies not his com∣mand given to man, but his own purpose and decree to doe this or that himselfe. Judge of the extravagancy of this Author by this, and whether his understanding be sufficient∣ly purged from prejudice and false principles, from corrupt affections and customes; as to make the last resolution of our faith concerning the waies of God thereunto, or the un∣derstanding of such as he is, whether best or worst, or of both sizes upon a mere pretence of their indifferency for the entertainement of truths.

We willingly grant with Zanchy that God can will nothing which is not just; Not that hereby we make any justice to precede the will of God; but because he hath a lawfull power to doe what he will; And there is a justice of condency consequent to all his actions. It is otherwise, I confesse, with a man though the greatest of men, as wise as Solo∣mon; though vessells after God's own heart, as David: But hence it followeth not, that be∣cause in an earthly King there is a justice antecedent to his will, therefore it is so in the King of heaven and earth. If this Authour thinke otherwise, let him know I am not yet sufficiently convicted of the purity of his understanding purged from prejudice and false principles &c. as thereinto to make the last resolution of my faith.

Yet I confesse he carrieth himselfe magnificently as if he had attained to this purgati∣on, as when he saith, That these absolute decrees of salvation and damnation, are not part of God's revealed will; But where hath he proved the conditionall decrees that he stands for, are any part of God's revealed will. Where doth he find that God decreed to bestow faith and repentance upon a man, because of some good works of his, or deny it to others for failing of some good worke? As for salvation and damnation we plainly professe, that God intended not to damne any man, but for sinne, nor to bestow salvation on any man of ripe yeares, but by way of reward of his faith, repentance, obedience and good works. Doth not he begge the question all along, whē he carrieth his conditionall decrees in a confidentiary manner, without once offering to prove thè by any one place of Scri∣pture? Here Iexpected he would not begge the question, when he chargeth us to begge the question most insipidly; When it is well known that our Divines are frequent in proving their doctrine out of Scripture; which if it faile of sound proofe in the judgment of his understanding purged from prejudice and false principles; yet with no modesty; whatso∣ever their judgment be) can he taxe them for begging the question. For to begge the question is not once to offer to prove what they say; which is this Authour's dis∣course all along. But to supply the place of arguments, he usually foist's in a phrase at pleasure in expressing our Tenet of God's decrees; as of Decreeing im∣mutably and unavoidably; Or as here he speakes of Damnation and salvation inevita∣ble; whereas we doe not use to clogge our own expressions, or our Readers ap∣prehensions with any such bugheares. We rather say that God decrees all things to come to passe, that do come to passe, and that agreably to their natures, as neces∣sary things necessarily; and contingent things to come to passe contingently. And surely for doctrines of faith, I thinke every sober Christian hath cause to entitle the King to be the Authour of them, this Authour doth not so much for his: Nay the Scripture to him seemed so evidently to make for us (which I desire every wise Reader well to observe) that this drave him to such a sluttish shift, as to except against our interpretations of Scri∣pture

upon noe other ground but this, that the Doctrine confirmed thereby is not conso∣nant to the understanding of men purged from prejudice and false principles, corrupt affections and customes, in the designing of what is just, and what is unjust; And let every indiffe∣rent man judge whether this be not a desperate course, carying with it a secret acknow∣ledgment that the Scripture indeed doth favour the way we take in the Doctrine of pre∣destination and reprobation. And indeed the ninth to the Romans Gerardus Vossius calls Gorgons head whereby we thinke (so evident is the Apostles meaning on our side) to turne all our opposites into stones, though such vants are none of ours; but himselfe it seemes had been stupified by it, had he not timely taken hold of Scientia media, the Je∣suites invention, and as vile an invention as ever reasonable men conceived.

3. Lastly he tells us like a resolute Sir, that absolute reprobation can be no part of God's revealed will; and his reason is; because it is odious to right reason. He doth not shew how it is contrariant to God's word; but bravely presumes that his reason is right, as if he were of the number of that synedrion whose understandings are purged from prejudice and false principles, from corrupt affections and customes; and ere he is aware bewraies what he meanes by reason, when he attributes hatred unto it; And I verily believe his best reason is the strength of his affection. By the way let the Reader observe, that he is as opposite to absolute election, as to absolute reprobation; only he dischargeth his right reason and the spleen thereof against absolute reprobation, not against absolute election. We may ea∣sily guesse the true notion of his right reason in this; his whole discourse savouring farre more throughout of the foxes, then of the Lyons skin. Now I have given him six reasons for the absolutenesse of reprobation, because he appeales to reason purged from preju∣dice and false principles, and not one of them hath he answered, though they went out of my hands now full three yeares agoe. I will adventure to give him some reasons for it also out of God's word. For I desire to follow the crooked serpent which way soever he winds and turnes. Therefore thus I dispute, Predestination is absolute, therefore re∣probation is absolute. For if reprobation be not absolute, but proceeds according to mens evill works, then predestination is not absolute, but proceeds according to mens good works, whether faith or other obedience; according to that of Austin. If Esau be hated for the merit of unrighteousnesse, incipit & Iacob justitiae merito deligi, Iacob beginnes to be be∣loved * 1.359 for the merit of his righteousnesse; and a little before. Si enim quia praesciebat Deus fu∣tura Esaui opera mala, propterea eum praedestinavit, ut serviret minori; propterea praedestina∣vit & Iacob ut ei major serviret, quia futura ejus bona opera praesciebat, & falsum est jam quod ait, non ex operibus. For if therefore the Lord praedestinated Esau that he should serve the youn∣ger, because he foresaw his evill works. For the same reason he predestinated Iacob that he should rule over the Elder because he foresaw his good works; and so false is that which the Apostle saith, not of works. Now that predestination is absolute I prove thus. It is not upon the foresight of faith, much lesse of works, therefore it is absolute. The anteceedent I prove * 1.360 thus; That which proceeds according to the good pleasure of the Lord's will, is not upon the foresight of faith; But predestination proceeds upon the good pleasure of God's will; ergo, The Major proposition I prove thus. This phrase, according to the pleasure of God's will excludes all outward causes; And no wise man will referre the cause of a man's ab∣solution * 1.361 to the good pleasure of the judge, when a man's innocency is the cause of it. For that is the cause of a thing, whereby answere is made to the question, why such a thing is done; And this is the perpetuall phrase of Scripture; as, Is it not lawfull for me to doe what I will with mine own? And, All these things worketh the same spirit, distributing to every man severally as he will; and, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hard∣neth. * 1.362 It pleased the father that in him should all fulnesse dwell. It is so ô father because thy good pleasure was such. It is God that worketh in you both the will and the deed according to his good, pleasure. The Lord loved you because he loved you. Deut: 7. 7. They inherited not the land by their own sword, neither did their own arme save them, but thy right hand, and thine arme. and the light of they countenance because thou diddest favour them.

2. My second argument is, Therefore God gives faith because he did predestinate them; As many believed as were ordained to everlasting life; and God added daily to the Church * 1.363 such as should be saved. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in this place is as much as, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; as appeares by the equipollency of both sentences. Now hence I inferre; Therefore God gives not faith because he hath not ordained them to everlasting life. For if the affirma∣tion be cause of the affirmation; the negation is cause of the negation. And the Scripture as or∣dinarily subjoyneth the deniall of grace to reprobation, as the granting of grace to pre∣destination. For as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, such as perish, is opposite to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, such as shall be saved;

And as the consequent of the one is said to be Faith; so the consequent to the other is the deniall of the same or like grace. As for example, All they that are of God heare God's * 1.364 word; so others heare them not because they are not of God; as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Such as shall be saved are added to God's Church: so in whom is the Gospell hid? only 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in them that perish. Among whom doth Antichrist prevaile by all deceivablenesse? only in them that pe∣rish. Like as for the Elect on the contrary 'tis not possible they should be seduced. Mat: 24. 24, and 2 Thes: 2. 13

3. If predestination were upon the foresight of faith, then it should be only upon the foresight of such a faith as perseveres to the end; whence two inconveniences follow 1. That no man can be assured of his election untill his death, which is quite contrary unto Scripture. For Paul was assured of the election of the Thessalonians by observation of the works of their faith, the labour of their love, and the patience of their hope, 2. In this * 1.365 case none can be strengthened against the power of temptation by the assurance of their election; But thus we are strengthned by Chist. Mat: 24. 24. by St. Paul. Rom: 8. 29. 2 Thes: 2. 13.

4. Election is absolute, therefore reprobation is absolute. The antecedent I prove; If it be neither of faith nor of works, then it is absolute, but it is neither of faith, nor works. * 1.366 Not of works, expresly; Not of faith as appeates by the same reason whereby Paul proves it is not of works. For the reason is this, Before the children were borne or had done good or evill, it was said the Elder shall serve the younger; Therefore election is not of works. Now say I we may as well conclude therehence, therefore it is not of faith; forasmuch as before they were borne, they were as uncapable of faith as of works. The consequence I prove thus; Looke by what reason St. Paul proves, that the election of Iacob was not of good works, because before they were borne 'twas said, The Elder shall serve the younger; by the same reason it is evident that the reprobation of Esau was not of evill works; the subjection of Esau unto his younger brother, as lively representing his reprobation, as the dominion of Iacob over his elder brother represents his election.

5. Predestination is defined by Austin to be Praeparatio gratiae, the preparation of grace, therefore reprobation which is opposite thereunto must be the not preparation of grace; that is God's decree not to give grace, like as the opposite is Gods decree to give grace. Now God gives grace not according to works. For he hath mercy on whom he will And here∣upon * 1.367 Austin builds his doctrine of predestination. Now by his doctrine predestination is absolute as Gerardus Vossius confesseth in his preface to his history of the heresy of Pe∣lagius; How can it be otherwise? For if God conferres grace not according to mens works; but according to his own purpose and grace. How much more did he decree to give it * 1.368 not upon any foresight of works, but of his mere pleasure. And the Scripture as clearely testifies, that as God hath mercy on whom he will; so whom he will he hardneth; that is of mere pleasure he denieth grace to some, as of mere pleasure he grants it unto others; And therefore reprobation grounded hereupon must needs be as absolute, as predestination grounded upon the other.

6. Like as in Scripture phrase Faith is said to be the faith of God's elect, election is not said to be of those that are foreseen to to believe; So the worshippers of the Beast are * 1.369 said to be those. Whose names are not written in the booke of life; They that are not written * 1.370 in the booke of life, are described to be such that admire and worship the beast. And the not writing of mens names in the booke of life doth as significantly represent their repro∣bation; as the writing of mens names in heaven. Luc: 10. 20. Rev: 20. 12: doth represent their election. Thus as formerly I gave six reasons to justifie the absolutenesse of repro∣bation, because he pretended the absolutenesse thereof was repugnant to reason; so here I have given six more derived out of the word of God, to prove that this doctrine is the revealed will of God, to stop his empty mouth that clamoureth and only clamoureth that it is no part of God's revealed will. And that this doctrine is not only conformable to right reason, but by convincing arguments in right reason demonstrable I have already shewed; And that all the absurdities this Authour blatters of, they prove to be no better then the mere imagination of a vaine thing. That which here he discourseth of a reasona∣ble service, comes out of it's place, it belonged to the former reason in M. Hord's treatise, and there I have answered it, and shewed the absurd interpretation that he makes of it.

He vaunts that he hath proved reprobation absolute to be unjust, when he hath per∣formed no thing lesse; But making only a greate cracke, he goes out like a squib; and throughout meddles not with one argument that our Divines bring out of Scripture, or reason to justifie their doctrine concerning the absolutenesse of reprobation. And it is ap∣parent

that he denies the absolutenesse of election, as well as the absolutenesse of repro∣bation, and consequently must necessarily maintaine that grace is given according to works; whereupon it was that Austin grounded his doctrine concerning the absolute∣nesse of Predestination: And upon the like ground have we as good cause to ground our doctrine concerning the absolutenesse of reprobation, it being every way as evident, that Grace is not denied according unto works, as that it is not granted according to mens works; And the Scripture is equally as expresse concerning both, where it is said that as God hath mercy on whom he will, so also whom he will he hardneth.

Pag: 75. 76. Treating of God's sincerity Sub-sect: 1. There are two passages inserted * 1.371 taken out of Piscator, before the passages alleadged out of Zanchy and Bucer. For ha∣ving said that, Now God's meaning is (by this doctrine) that the most of those to whom he offereth his grace and glory, shall have neither; forthwith he gives instance in Piscator thus.

And so Piscator saith, Grace is not offered by God, even to those who are called with a meaning to give it, but to the Elect only, Gratia non offertur à Deo singulis ••licet vocatis, animo communicandi eam, sed solis electis. In the same booke he hath such an other speech; Non vult Deus reprobos credere li••etli••gua pro∣fiteatur * 1.372 se velle. Though God in words protest he would have reprobates to believe, yet indeed he will not have them. they make God to deale with men in matters of salvation, as the Poets feigne the Gods to have dealt with poore Tantalus. They placed him in a cleare and goodly river up to the very chin, and under a tree which bare much sweet and pleasant fruit that did almost touch his lips, but this they did with a purpose that he should tast of neither. For when he put his mouth to the water to drinke, it waved away from him; And when he reached his hand to the fruit to have eaten of it, it withdrew it selfe presently out of his reach; so as he could neither eate nor drinke. Just so dealeth God with reprobates; (by their doctrine) He placeth them under the plentifull meanes of salvation, offereth it to them so plainly, that men would thinke they might have it when they will, & yet intendeth fully they shall never have it, withholding from them either the first grace that they cannot believe, or the second grace that they cannot persevere. Did not those gods delude Tantalus? yes doubtlesse. And if God doe so with reprobates, what did he but delude them, and dissenible with them in his fairest and likeliest offers of salvation that he makes them? And this doe Zanchius and Bucer grant by e∣vident consequence, as appeareth by a speech or two of theirs, which cannot stand with their conclusion; and therefore I suppose fell unwarily from them.

This treatise of Piscator De praedestinatione against Schaffman I have the second editi∣tion printed at Herborne Anno 1598. But these words according to their quotations * 1.373 here, are not to be found; the severall distinct passages are distinguished by numbers, which in all editions hold the same, not so the pages. Yet the latter passage quoted p. 143. I meet with in mine p. 128. According to the like difference I try whether I can find out the other, but in vaine. But yet I meet with such matter of discourse as whereunto this pas∣sage is very congruous to be there delivered if any where; yet no such thing is there deli∣vered as num: 74. Schaffman's argument is this, If God calls all to salvation then he will save all. To this Piscator answereth, The proposition is false; But he calls with, animo simplici at∣que vero, a simple mind and true. Sane saith Piscator, as much as to say, I grant that; but so as that he calls them with condition of repentance and faith; Therefore as he promiseth salvati∣on seriously unto them that performe this condition, and therefore performes this promise. So on the contrary he doth seriously threaten death and damnation to them who doe not fulfill the con∣dition, and performes unto him that commination. Then, though God be not capable of hypocrisy yet he doth not alwaies will that what he commands shall be alwaies performed by him to whom he gives that command; Whether by commanding he meanes to prove a man; as to prove Abra∣ham, he commanded him to sacrifice his Son; or because to him whom he commandeth, he will not give grace to performe that command, as he deales with reprobates. And num: 120. To Schaffman's objection which was this; God is no hypocrite, he answers thus; But yet he gives not grace to all to performe what he commands thē. For promiscuously he commands as well reprobates as elect to believe; as many as he calls by the preaching of the gospell; but he gives this grace to his elect alone according to that, To you it is given to know the mysteries of the king∣dome of heaven, but to them it is not given. So that undoubtedly God offers grace (to wit pardon of sinne) with a purpose to communicate it to all that shall believe, according to * 1.374 the judgment of Piscator, neither doth he offer it with a purpose to communicate it to any unlesse they believe. But the grace of faith is not offered to any with a purpose to communicate it upon a condition. For then grace should be conferred according unto works, which is manifest Pelagianisme. As for the other which I meete with p: 128. num: 120: take it at full, and not as it is dismembred by this Authour, who cares not how he calumniates, so he might advantage his own cause. Schaffman's objection was, Deus est unius & linguae & voluntatis, God is both of the same tongue and will. Whereto Piscator answers thus, Your meaning is that God, look what he professeth with his tongue, that he willeth;

But this (saith he) is not alwaies true, nor in all particulars. For by his tongue that is by speech uttered, he professed that he would have Abraham to sacrifice his Son Isaac; yet he would not have him sacrificed. With his tongue he professed by his servant Ionas that he would destroy Nineveh within forty dayes, yet he would not so doe. With his tongue by the ministers of the Gospell he professeth that he would have the reprobates to whom he speaketh among his Elect, to believe the Gospell, in as much as he commands them so to doe; yet he would not have them to be∣lieve, in as much as he will not give them the grace of believing, without will no man can be∣lieve. What therefore is God an Hypocrite? Away with such a blasphemy. He alone is to be ac∣counted an Hypocrite, who counterfeits holinesse when he has none; Such counterfeiting is not in∣cident to God. And let the Reader observe well the immodest cariage of this Authour. Piscator when he saith that God in words professeth he will have Reprobates to believe, he shewes withall in what respect he doth so, to wit, quatenus mandat ut credant, in as much as he commands them to believe. And indeed God's command is usually called God's will, and by none more then by these our opposites. But this Authour drawes this to the signi∣fication of God's will simply so called, which is the will of purpose; And to that purpose leaves out the words whereby Piscator explicates himselfe. Who knowes not that God commanded Pharaoh by his servant Moses to let Israel goe? this is to professe with the tongue in Piscator's phrase, that God would have Pharaoh to let Israel goe. And God's commandement is called God's will in Scripture. This is the will of God even your sanctifi∣cation. * 1.375 But to speake properly it is but the signification of God's will of good pleasure (properly called the will of God) that it should be Pharaoh's duty to let Israel goe, but withall he revealed to Moses that he would harden Pharaoh▪s heart, that he should not let Israel goe. Now let the indifferent judge what this Authour hath gotten by these passa∣ges of Piscator, save only the displaying of his own immodest and calumniating courses▪ then he thinks to please his Reader with the story of Tantalus; wherein there is no con∣gruity to that whereunto it is applyed, For Tantalus à labris sitiens fugientia captat Flumina,—He was an hungred, and would faine eate but could not: He was a thirst, and would faine drinke but could not. God deales so with no man; neither reprobate Jewes, nor Gentiles had any desire to be partakers of the mercies of God offered them in Christ. The Gospell was a scandall to the one, and foolishnesse to the other; But to them that are called it is the power of God and wisedome of God And as they hunger and thirst after God's righteousnesse in his deare Son; so are they satisfied therewith, Let him that is a thirst come and drinke of the water of life freely. And He every one that is a thirst, come ye to the wa∣ters, * 1.376 and ye that have no silver, come buy and eate; come I say buy wine and milke without silver and without money: Wherefore doe ye lay out your silver, and not for bread? and your labour without being satisfied? Hearken diligently unto me, heare and your soules shall live; and I will make an everlasting covenant with you, even the sure mercies of David. Here is no sending of them away empty, which thirst after these waters of life; They all shall draw waters * 1.377 of the wells of salvation. So that here is no such dealing with them, as the Poets feigne was their Gods dealing with Tantalus. My answer to that which he produceth out of Zan∣chy and Bucer the Reader shall find in my answer to M. Hord.

Pag. 76. 77. In the point of threats and comminations; after these words, We never read that threats are thundred out against us for originall sinne. In M. Hord's discourse it is added, Or for that corruption of nature which we brought with us into the world: But this Authour leaves it quite out, with what mind let the Reader judge, and whether he can well brook that originall sinne should be stiled a corruption of nature which we bring with us into the world.

Pag. 78. In the same second sub-section after that of Abslaon's feast, Ioab's congy, the kisse of Iudas, and the Hyaena's teares &c. There is a good passage left out which followeth in M. Hord; and in the place thereof this, which here followeth, foysted in; Let the Reader consider with himselfe, wherefore that was left out; it seemes he was a∣sham'd of that calumniation. But thus it followes here.

Nay the whole ministry (wherein God commandeth, offereth, chideth, entreateth, lamenteth &c.) if this * 1.378 be true, is but a mere imposture; a giving of words without any meaning of answerable deeds; And an impo∣sture so much the greater, by how much the shew of kindnesse is the heartier. For how can a good thing be offered with stronger shewes of a good meaning, then when it is offered with exhortations and entreaties to accept it, with cleare demonstrations of the excellency of it, unfeigned wishes, that the parties to whom it is offered would accept it; and bitter lamentations for their folly in refusing it? With all these enforcements i•• Gods tenderof salvation to Reprobates accompanyed; and therefore in shew most hearty and serious. In a word thusspeaks God, by this doctrine, to Reprobates in the ministery.

O ye Reprobates (once most dearely beloved of me in your father Adam but now extreamly, and im∣placably hated; and by mine eternall & uncontroulable order scaled up under invincible sinne and misery) amend your lives and believe in the name of mine only begotten Son. If you repent, and believe not, there is no remedy, you must be damned; but if you repent and believe ye shall be saved; Though your sins be as red as scarlet, I will make them to be as white as wooll. Thinke not that I would have you dye. For I sweare, as I live, I will not the death of him that dyeth. I would have no man to perish, but all to come to re∣pentance. I beseech you therefore be reconciled. I have cryed and called unto you; I have a long time wai∣ted upon you, that you might repent; And still am I knocking at the doores of your hearts for entrance. O that there were an heart in you to feare me and keep my commandements, that it might goe well with you for ever. What shall I doe unto you; how shall I intreate you? will you not be made cleane, when shall it once be?

Can God speake thus to reprobates, who by his own decree, shall never repent, nor be saved, without the deepest dissimulation?

Judge indifferent Reader whether ever more passion were shewed with lesse common * 1.379 sense. For let the enforcements be never so great and serious in the ministry of the word, under which all the expressions here mentioned are comprehended, yet is it possible, that men can yeild unto them obedience by faith and repentance, unlesse God gives faith and repentance? For doth not the Scripture clearely testifie that faith is the gift of God. To you it is given both to believe in him, & to suffer for him: that it is the worke of grace. Act. * 1.380 18. 27. What hast thou that thou hast not received? And doth not the Apostle accordingly pray on the behalfe of the Ephesians, not for peace only, but for faith and love also from God the father and our Lord Jesus Christ? Is not repentance also the gift of God? Him God raised to be a Prince and a Saviour to give repentance unto Israel & forgivenesse of sins. Then hath God also unto the Gentiles given repentance unto life. If so be God may give them repentance. What then? Shall this Authour's not Logick, but Rhetoricke whereinto his * 1.381 Logick is transform'd to the wonder of all that know him in the University, like some Medusa's head, turne us into stones, and in spight of Scripture evidence drive us to de∣ny, that either faith, or repentance, is the gift of God? For if it be the gift of God, is not somewhat else required to the working of faith in us over and above all these enforce∣ments? Not one Arminian hitherto have I found daring to deny that faith is the gift of God: Yet ever since I read them in their Censura Censurae to deny that Christ hath meri∣ted faith and regeneration for us, I looked when they would come to deale seriously and sincerely; And if they have any such meaning, clearely to professe as much, namely that faith is not the gift of God. But if this Authour's meaning be that God gives it to all that have it, and is also ready to give it to them that have it not, próvided, that they will doe their own part, seing he chargeth us to make God's waies void of truth and synce∣rity, how comes it to passe that this Authour carrieth himselfe so subdolously & shewes so little sincerity and clearenesse in dealing plainly, & telling us that this is his meaning? Is it because we are ready to conclude upon him that he is as errand a Pelagian, as ever was, in maintaining that grace is conferred according to works? Why doth he carry him∣selfe and his opinions in huggar muggar if he be of that mind, and doth not plainly shew himselfe to be a Pelagian, and prove to the world that Pelagianismus est verus Christia∣nismus, Pelagianisme is true Christianity? and in the next place oppose Paul also in saying that God saved us and called us with an holy calling not according to our works, but accor∣ding to his own purpose and grace; and that he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he * 1.382 hardneth?

2ly, Consider further the strange infatuation of this Author, more waies then one. For 1, inquire of him, whether after all this worke of the ministery performed by him unto reprobates, he thinks not himselfe bound to pray unto God for a blessing upon his la∣bours, whereby it may become effectuall unto them, and that upon this ground, because Paul may plant, and Apollo may water, but God is he who gives the encrease. And let him expresse what the encrease is, which he beggeth at the hand of God, whether it be not the performance of those duties whereunto he hath exhorted them in the most emphati∣call manner, that the word of God doth afford any example of. And if no more be re∣quired for the working of man's will to that which is good (having as this Authour sup∣poseth a power to performe obedience if they will) then these enforcements which he so much amplifies; whereto tend his prayers after all these enforcements are used? is it that God will afford his concourse to the act? Why is this a worke of grace? Doth not God afford this to the most sinfull act that is, without all prayers? And is it decent to maintaine that God of himselfe is forward enough to afford concourse to such acts as are evill, be they never so abominable; but to concurre with us to that which is good, he stands off and must be entreated and sollicited by our prayers earnest and fervent,

otherwise he will be slacke to concurre to that which is good, though nothing slack to concurre to that which is evill? Nay is it possible that man should will ought, or doe ought, and God not concurre with him, to the producing both of the will and the deed? Now I had thought prayers tended to the procuring of works of grace, such as con∣course is not, as which is performed of God 1. To sinfull acts, as well as to pious acts. 2. And that necessarily upon supposition that the reasonable creature doth ought. Con∣sider farther, if his prayers tend only to the procuring of God's concurrence, and this concurrence is upon supposition of mans concurrence; let the indifferent, I say, consider the genius of this man's prayers. For albeit the forme of them runnes thus, that God will convert his hearers to faith, to repentance, and to work in them that which is pleasing in his sight through Jesus Christ; yea to worke in them both the will, and the deed, accor∣ding to his good pleasure, to circumcise their hearts, to love the Lord their God with all their hearts, & with all their souls, to heal their backslidings; yea as he seeth all their waies, so to heale them, to cause them to walke in his statutes, and to keep his judgments, and to doe them; yea to put his feare in their hearts, that they may never depart away from him. (For thus he must pray, if he pray in faith built upon God's promises, we having speciall promises for all these particulars;) yet his meaning is no more then this, that as many of his Auditors as he findes willing to doe ought of this, that God will concurre with them to make them willing; And as many as doe performe it, he will concurre to the perfor∣mance of it; as for those that are unwilling, he will not pray that God will make them willing, though that hath been ever the Lords course towards some, as Austin often pro∣fesseth, And as for that prayer of Austin, Da Domine quod jubes & jube quid vis, Lord give me to doe what thou commandest, and then command what thou will. Like enough he spights it as much as ever Pelagius did. But if any are forward to hate & to despite God's word, or the professours of his truth, he will not pray unto God to concurre with them thereun∣to. For he knowes God's forwardnesse to concurre to the performance of every abomi∣nable act without his prayers: Nay in despite of any prayers to the contrary: And doth he not thinke it in vaine for the holiest man that ever was to pray for this? 3. Againe observe he saith that by our doctrine the whole ministery is a mere imposture, & why? be∣cause it is in shew hearty and serious, but in truth nothing so. But what moves him to say this, doth not God procure hereby the conversion & salvation of millions? vea of many of those who have crucified the Son of God; who have persecuted his Church? Do we not believe that a time shall come wherin the Jews shall be cōverted in spight of all their for∣mer obstinacy, & in despight of all their blasphemies powred sorth against the Son of God? But he will say, that grace is shewed only to the Elect by our opinion. But here let every indifferēt person judg between us of the equity of this his discourse. The whole ministery is a mere imposture; because all the inforcements wherewith the tender of salvation unto Reprobates is accompanied is in shew most hearty & serious, but indued nothing so. For what? have the elect of God no part in the ministery? Or dates he say that by our doctrin these insorcements are nothing hearty & serious to them? Thou wilt say the Authour's meaning is, that the whole ministery is a mere imposture towards reprobates; but he saith not so; but thus, The whole ministery is a mere imposture; and afterwards in giving his reason for it, he pleads, that inforcements in shew hearty & serious made to reprobates are nothing so; & hence he concludes that the whole ministery is a mere imposture without any distinctiō of per∣sons, to whom it is a mere imposture 4. Yet I willingly confesse that it is foul enough, that God's courses should be courses of imposture towards any even towards reprobates. But how doth he prove, that God takes any such course with reprobates? To whom hath God sent his word & vouchsafed the ministery hereof according to all the enforcements mē∣tioned accompanying his tender of salvation unto them? is it not unto his Church? What is the preserment of the Jew above the Gentile? much every way, saith Paul, chiefly because unto thē were committed the Oracles of God. And was the Church of Jewes, a Church of reprobates, Were they not the City of God, but the city of the Devill? If these enforcements had been used to the Nativites, there had been some colour for such an imputation; but seing 〈…〉〈…〉 of God's word in all these enforcements is used to the people of God, his pretious people, chosen out of the world to put his name among'st them; shall this mi∣nistery be so carryed, as concerning reprobates? All that he hath to say for this is no o∣ther, but that a great part, or the most part of the people to whom he sends his prophets are reprobates. Be it so, but how doth he prove that God intends this ministery; for the salvation of reprobates; or that he intends it at all for them? If God commands them, as he commanded Ieremiah saying, Goe & cry in the eares of Jerusalem, Thus saith the Lord; they must doe so without difference. For they are not able to put a difference between the Elect and Reprobate, to know who are the one, and who are the other. Austin was willing to pray for all, but yet he professeth,

that if they knew who they were, whō God had ordained unto damnation, they would pray no more for them, then for the Devill himself; so that either the Prophets were not * 1.383 of Austin's mind, or else that they thought that their ministery in God's purpose and ap∣pointment tended to the salvatiō only of Gods elect: But because they knew not, who they are, therefore they prayed for all, and used their ministeriall enforcements indifferently towards all. But like enough this Authour will deny, that the Prophets were of Austin's mind; Therefore I will prove they were in this; The Prophets were undoubtedly of St. Paul's mind; but St. Paul was of St. Austin's mind in this therefore the Prophets also were of St. Austin's mind. Now that St. Paul was of St. Austin's mind, and that his ministery, though performed towards all, yet was intended for the salvation only of God's elect, I * 1.384 prove thus, Though I be free from all men, yet have I made my selfe a servant unto all men that I might winne the more. Observe, he doth not say that he might winne all; Againe, I became all things to all men that I might save some. Who are these some at whose salvation he aimes? I answer they are God's elect, and none but they; and this I prove out of those words of his where he saith, Therefore I suffer all things for the elects sake that they might also obtaine salvation which is in Christ Iesus with eternall glory. Now if his sufferings were for their sakes, undoubtedly his whole ministery was for their sakes; for this alone * 1.385 brought his sufferings upon him. The holy Ghost witnesseth in every City saying, that bonds and afflictions abide me; But I passe not at all, neither is my life deare unto my selfe, so that I may fulfill my course with joy and the ministration that I have received to testifie the Gospell of the grace of God. 5. But be it, that God intends it for Reprobates also, yet not for their salvation; But first to take away excuse from them, as to this purpose he sent Ezechiel. * 1.386 Son of man I send thee to a rebellious nation For they are impudent children; I doe send thee un∣to them, and thou shalt say unto them, Thus saith the Lord God; but surely they will not heare nei∣ther indeed will they cease; for they are a rebellious house, yet shall they know that there hath been a Prophet among them. Or otherwise as Austin hath observed, ut proficiant ad exteriorem vi∣tae emendationem, quo mitius puniantur, that they may profit to an outward amendment of their lives, that their punishment may be the lesse. And consider whether in all this he doth not o∣penly invade, not so muchour doctrine, as the manifest evidence of God's word. For it is apparent that God gives commands to those whose hearts he means to harden, that they shall not obey those commands, though those commands were not made in a cold manner * 1.387 but with strongest enforcements. Thou shalt say to Praraoh, thus saith the Lord, Israel is my son, even my first borne, wherefore I say to thee, let my son goe that he may serve me. If thou re∣fuse to let him goe, behold I will slay thy son, even, thy first borne. Yet before this he told Mo∣ses saying, I will harden his heart, and he shall not let the people goe. And after this, The Lord * 1.388 hardned the heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkned not unto them, as the Lord had said to Moses. And hereupon the Lord deales with him in the way of greater enforcement then before. * 1.389 For the Lord said unto Moses, Rise up early in the morning, and stand before Pharaoh and tell him, Thus saith the Lord God of the Hebrews, let my people goe that they may serve me, For I * 1.390 will at this time send all mine plagues upon thine heart, and upon thy servants, and upon thy people, that thou maiest know that there is none like me in all the earth. For now will I stretch * 1.391 out mine hand, that I may smite thee, and thy people with pestilence, and thou shalt perish from * 1.392 the earth. And indeed for this cause have I appointed thee to shew my power in thee, & to declare my name thoroughout all the world; Yet thou exaltest thy selfe against my people, and lettest thē not goe. Behold tomorrow this time I will cause to raine, a mighty great hayle, such as was * 1.393 not in Egypt since the foundation of it was laid. And The lord said unto Moses, Goe to Pharach; for I have hardned his heart, and the heart of his servants, that I might worke these my mira∣cles in the middest of his realme. Here we have plaine enforcements & those of great pow∣er used by the Lord, yet still the Lord continues to harden Pharaoh's heart, and profes∣seth as much, not fearing the censure of any vile wretch to cast upon him the imputation of imposture throughout the whole course of his ministery. And the truth is all the lear∣ned concurre in distinguishing between, Voluntas praecepti, & voluntas propositi; and count it absurd to inferre the purpose of God, or his will to have such a thing done from his commanding it, though this command be joyned with exhortation, expostulations, wish∣es, or whatsoever other emphaticall expressions; all which the learned conclude under Praeceptum, as a signe of God's will: And the Pelagians of old urged it no farther then as God's precept backt with what exhortations and enforcements soever, thence to con∣clude that man had power to yeild obedience, but not to conclude, it was God's will it should come to passe; and to impute desires unto God in proper speech, which never are accomplished, what an unscholasticall course is it? even as much as to deny him to be God, and to bereave him of his blessed condition, by frustrating him of his desires: Whereas the time shall come, that the Elect of God shall be so blessed, as to have no desire of theirs in vaine. Neither doth the objectour introduced by St. Paul

breake forth into any such blasphemy, as to charge God with any imposture in hard∣ning * 1.394 whom he will; when neverthelesse the ministery of the word hath course with them as well as with any other; but rather proposeth it as a thing unreasonable, that God should complaine of mens disobedince, when himselfe hath hardned their hearts, whereby it comes to passe that it cannot be that they should obey God as they ought. For who hath resisted his will. Yet we know what answer the Apostle maketh to stop the mouthes of all such, as call God to an account for his procedings. But ô man who art thou who disputest with God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay of the same lumpe, to make one vessell unto honour and another unto dishonour? And wilt not thou allow as much power unto God over thee, or over the matter whereof thou wast made, as the Potter hath power o∣ver the clay? Proud man thinks himselfe able enough to believe, to repent. Now God by his passionate expressions in the Prophets discovereth the vanity of this proud con∣ceit, and laboureth by their little profiting by all these patheticall moving courses to manifest the strength of man's corruption; And when they will not learne and receive this instruction by his workes; he tells them the plaine truth of it to their faces. Ye have seen all that the Lord did before your eyes in the land of Egypt, to Pharaoh and all his ser∣vants, * 1.395 and unto all his land. The great temptations which thine eyes have seen, those great * 1.396 miracles and wonders: Yet the Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive, nor eyes to see, nor eares to heare unto this day. Is this the course of imposture, when he tells them to their faces, that albeit he commands them, exhorts them, expostulates with them, and expresses formes of desire of their obedience in his word; yet except God gives them an heart, they cannot perceive; except God gives them eyes, they cannot see; except the Lord gives them eares they cannot heare: What can be more plaine dealing then this? Like as our Saviour no lesse plainly told the Jewes to their face; He that is of God heareth God's words; ye therefore heare them not, because ye are not of God; Yet was he earnest and pa∣theticall enough in exhorting them to repentance by the ministery of Iohn the Baptist; by his own ministery. Ierusalem, Ierusalem that killest the Prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee; how often would I have gathered thy children together as an hen gathereth her chicken under her wings, and ye would not. Behold your habitation is left unto you deso∣late. For I say unto you ye shall not see me henceforth, till that ye say, Blessed is he that com∣meth in the name of the Lord. I come to this Author's Prosopopey; for the truth is his Rhe∣torick surmounts his Logicke, whereat I wonder not a little.

O ye Reprobates, once most dearely beloved in your father Adam. But where hath he found in any of our Divines that Reprobates were at all beloved in our father Adam? We all hold Reprobation to be as antient as election, which St. Paul testifies to have been before the foundation of the world. And to ordaine to damnation I should think is to hate rather then to love; and this ordination divine was from everlasting. And the Scripture hath taught us that the divine nature is without variablenesse or shadow of change. He speakes in the language of his own Court, when he talkes of sealing up * 1.397 under invincible sinne and misery. The Scripture speaks of sealing unto the day of redemption by God's holy spirit which gives them assurance, that they are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation; That God will deliver them from every evill work, & preserve them to his heavenly kinngdome. But no such spirit is given to Reprobates to as∣sure them of their damnation, so to seale them up under invincible sin & misery. They are under the power of Satan; but he hath neither power nor authority to assure them of their damnation. And albeit this Authour fashions a discourse to reprobates, as if they were a sect well known; Yet we are so farre from knowing who they are, that they are (in our opinion) neither known to themselves, nor known to Satan, no nor to God's holy Angells, unlesse he reveale it unto them. If we should have any cause to addresse our selves to Reprobates (which kind of case and occasion is incomprehensible by me) we should describe them no otherwise then thus; O ye who are not only for the present un∣der the power of Satan (and so are all God's elect before the time of regenera∣tion) but will continue vassalls unto him, even unto death, going on from sinne, to sinne and never breaking them off by repentance, but continuing to despise the goodnesse of God leading thereunto. Now this being only in reference to the time to come; I cannot speake to any in present under this forme abso∣lutely, but hypothetically. For none are Reprobates to us, but such who finally perse∣vere in impenitency; Therefore I cannot exhort them to amend their lives under the stile of Reprobates, but as such, who although they are under the power of sinne and

Satan, may for ought I know belong to God's election, and in good time come out of the snare of Satan; And because the ministry of the word is the only meanes whereby God brings men unto repentance, and that by instruction, admonition and exhortation; therefore I doe instruct them in the knowledge of God that made them after his own Image; and how this image of God came to be defaced in them, to wit, by the sinne of our first parents, and how hereupon we became to be shapen in sinne, and borne in sinne, and therewithall children of wrath, and such as deserve to be made the generation of God's curse; then I represent unto them the mercy of God towards man in giving us his Son to beare our sins in his body upon the tree, and suffer a shamefull and bitter death upon the crosse for them; and that for this his Son's sake he offers unto us the par∣don of all our sins upon our repentance, and faith in Christ, and thereupon I exhort them unto repentance: We farther say that God takes no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, but takes pleasure in a man's repentance. We doe not say, neither doth the word of God say, that he willeth not the death of him that dyeth. For undoubtedly he willeth the damnation of all them that dye in their sins without repentance. We doe not say that God would have no man to perish, but all come to repentance. Neither doth the Scripture say any such thing; For that were to deny God's omnipotency. For seing many there be that perish; if this were contrary to God's will, then God's will should be resistible, and we should be driven to deny the first Article of our Creed; As Austine hath long agoe argued the case. But indeed Peter writing to them, who had obtained like pretious faith with * 1.398 the Apostles themselves; and such as were Elect unto sanctification of the spirit; and were begotten againe to a lively hope by the resurection of Jesus Christ from the dead; to them he writes saying, The Lord of that promise is not slack, but is patient towards us (not to us Reprobates; God forbid that we should so corrupt the interpretation of his words; but rather to us Elect, to us called, to us begotten of God) not willing any to perish (to wit of us) but all come to repentance, to wit all of us, whensoever through our frailty we turne out of the good wayes of the Lord. God cries unto you by us, and calls upon you by us; and hath along time shewed great patience, and long suffering, and hereby led you unto re∣pentance; & by his word stands knocking at the doores of your hearts, and calling upon you to open unto him. And the more to move you, he is pleased to expresse himself in the affections of a weake man, who is not able to accomplish his desires, O that there were an heart in you to feare me and keep my commandements; and with great passionatnesse cryeth out unto you, What shall I doe unto you, how shall I intreat you? As if he were to seek what course to take, and willing to use every provocation to excite you and stirre you up, sometimes by gracious promises, as Come and let us reason together, though thy sins were * 1.399 as scarlet &c. Sometimes by threatnings, Woe unto thee ô Jerusalem, wilt thou not be made cleane, when shall it once be. And withall he gives us to understand, & requires us to preach as much unto you also, even to acquaint you with the whole counsell of God, & tell you, that as many as are ordained unto eternall life, as many as to whom the arme of the Lord is re∣vealed; * 1.400 as many as are of God, they obey this calling, they believe, they heare God's words, and turne unto him by true repentance sooner or later; They that doe not, it is because they are not of God. And albeit those words are the words of Moses, O that there were an * 1.401 heart in you to feare me! speaking to them in the name of the Lord; yet the same Moses tells the same people plainly that The Lord had not given them an heart to perceive, nor eyes * 1.402 to see, nor eares to heare unto that Day. And albeit the Lord professeth in like manner by his Prophet Esay, O that thou hadst hearkned unto my commandements, then had thy prosperity * 1.403 been as the flood, and thy righteousnesse as the waves of the sea. Yet this very disobedience of theirs was consequent to the Lord's obduration of them, as appeares Es: 6. 9. Goe say un∣to this people ye shall heare indeed, but ye shall not understand; ye shall plainly see & not perceive. Make the heart of this people fat, make their eares heavy and shut their eyes; least they see with their eyes, and heare with their eares, and convert, and he heale them. Then said the Lord how long? (should this obduration continue) And he answered untill the Cityes be wasted without inhabitant, and the houses without man, and the land be utterly desolate; And the Lord have removed men farre away, and there be a great desolation in the midst of the land; Yet I dare not say of any of you, that ye are Reprobates. For God may open your eyes before you dye to see your sins, and touch your hearts that ye may bewaile them. And whensoever this blessed condition doth befall you, I will stirre you up to give God the glory of it, who alone it is, that worketh in us that, which is pleasing in his sight; Yea both the will and the deed according to his good pleasure. If he never workes any such thing in you, the more inexcusable are you, who presuming of your own power to be∣lieve, * 1.404

to repent; yet are nothing moved with such passionate expressions, unto repentance. If you doe believe there is such impotency in you to good, and that it must needs continue in you, while God continueth to harden you by denying his grace, and there∣upon ye except against Gods course in complaining of their disobedience, whom he hath hardned saying Why then doth he complaine; For who hath resisted his will? I put all such over to St. Paul to receive answer from him Rom: 9. 20. 21. 22. As touching this Author's conclusion; Dares he himselfe say that by God's decree Reprobates shall ever repent or be saved? What then is his meaning? why doth he not expresse himselfe in this particu∣lar; but most unshamefastly earthes himselfe like a foxe, unwilling to bring his vile opini∣on to the light, which I take to be no other then this, that God's decree of giving faith is not absolute but conditionall; namely to give faith to as many, as shall prepare them∣selves for it; And to deny it to none, but such as faile to prepare for it; as much as in plaine termes to professe that Grace is given according unto workes, The very filth of Pelagia∣nisme: Yet hath he no where discovered wherein this preparation consists; that he keeps to himselfe, and to his own Muses.

P. 80. I find another addition to the third Sub-section in these words.

To offer salvation under a condition not possible is in circumstance a great deale worse. For it is a deni∣all * 1.405 under colour of the contrary; a deniall joyned with a scoffe and derision; as was that of the Jebusites, who told David that he should not enter into the fort of Sion, except he took away the blind and the lame. Their meaning was they would never deliver it up unto him; and because they thought it impossible for him to take away the blind and the lame, they told him if he did so, then they would yeeld it up. It was an Iro∣nicall & scoffing denyall of his demand. If the King should make an unrepealable law that no German should be made a Citizen of London or free Denizon of the kingdome, & then make a decree to give some bounti∣full gratuities, but to the Citizens of London, or to the subjects of the kingdome only, & to none but them; And yet for all this should command it to be proclaimed, that he will give them to the Germans upon con∣condition they will be made free men of London, or be incorporated into the Kingdome; would not any man say that the King in this case did dissemble and delude the poore Dutchmen? And if any should say there would be no dissembling in it; For if they would become Citizens or subjects, they should have the promised gratuities, a man might truely answer, that therefore the King doth counterfeit and cousen them, because he makes a tender of them upon a condition not possible by his own decree. In like manner if God have made a decree, that such men shall never believe, and yet offer them heaven upon condition, they will believe, it may most truly be sayd that God doth not only deny them heaven but deny it with a bitter deri∣sion, which is farre from that candor and goodnesse that dwelleth in him.

M. Hord's discourse at the first went no farther then to prove, that In substance it is all one to offer a curtesie under a condition not possible, and not to offer it at all. Here this Author * 1.406 addes that it is in circumstance a greate deale worse. For he saith it is a deniall joyned with a scoffe and derision, as was that of the Iebusites. In my answer to the former part in M. * 1.407 Hord I have shewed that the reason why Salvation is proposed in scripture to be obtaind up∣on a condition to be performed by man, is because God intends to save those, whom he doth save after a manner a greable to their reasonable natures; Namely by instruction, in a law of works, in a law of faith, by admonition and exhortation strengthned with promi∣ses to the obedient, with threatnings to the disobedient. And albeit men are not able to performe this obedience of themselves, being disabled by that naturall corruption, which they have drawn from the Loynes of our father, in whom our natures received a mortall blow, through his disobedience, and became disabled to performe any thing acceptable in the sight of God (for they that are in the flesh cannot please God) therefore the Lord is ready according to the covenant of grace to circumcise the hearts of some, namely of his Elect, To love the Lord with all their hearts, and with all their soules, to put his spirit with∣in them, to cause them to walke in his statutes, to keepe his judgments and doe them. It is true this offer of salvation is proposed to all within the Church, whether Elect or Reprobate; and no marvaile. For the Ministers of God's word are not acquainted with the counsells of God, as touching the election or reprobation of any man in particular: there∣fore they preach unto all, but knowing full well that this their ministery shall be effe∣ctuall only to God's elect, as touching their salvation. Therefore as they indure all things * 1.408 for the elect sake. So for the elects sake it is that they preach the whole counsell of God, ac∣cording as the Lord himselfe instructed Paul saying, Feare not, but speak & hold not thy peace; * 1.409 for I am with thee, and none shall lay hold on thee for to hurt thee. For I have much people in this City. Who are this people but the Elect of God. Yet God makes this use of preaching his word to all, that hereby excuse is taken from thē. For hereby it is made known unto them That a Prophet hath been among them. As for the point of derision. First this Authour pre∣scribes unto God very demurely, that he must not deride him. Yet will he thinke it law∣full * 1.410

full for himselfe to mocke a dogge offering to give some what unto him, when he meanes nothing lesse; but man is growen so proud that he will take it in scorne to be mocked of any, yea of God himselfe, little thinking that he may well deserve to be derided and mocked. Yet the Scripture may teach us this, and that God will mocke some, and therein deale with them according to their works; Because I have called and ye refused; I have stretched out mine hand and none would regard: But ye have despised all my counsell and would none of my correction, I will also laugh at your destruction, and mocke when your feare com∣meth. * 1.411 Secondly I answer that man naturally is presumptuous of his own strength to be∣lieve, to repent; and shall God then be censured for mocking him, when he calls upon him to believe, to repent? Dicere solet humana superbia si scissem, fecissem, sayth Austin, This is the course of man's pride to say had I known it, I had done it. If they are sensible of this * 1.412 impotency, can they not say with Austin, Da Domine quod jubes, & jube quod vis; Lord give what thou biddest, and then bid what thou wilt? Againe if God commands nothing, but what he hath power to command, as namely to believe what he saith, and to doe what he injoynes; why should this be censured mockery in reference to man's disability to performe it, when this disability is brought upon him by the sinne of Adam, in whom we all were, and in him we have all sinned? And which is more; what meanes this Au∣thour * 1.413 to carry the matter thus hand over head, as to talke of an impossible condition without all distinction? Dares he say, that faith and repentance are possible by power of nature? Or doth any of us deny it to be possible by grace? If this be so it followeth that all the question between us should be drawen to this issue; whether God gives the grace of faith and repentance unto all; Yet indeed the truth herein deserves to be put out of all question, it being apparent that, Fides non est omnium, all men doe not believe. Nay it is called in Scripture the Faith of God's elect: So that the, question is about the nature of that grace, * 1.414 without which faith and repentance cannot be performed. Why doth not this Authour expresse his meaning in this, and clearly professe what that grace is whereby the conditi∣ons of faith & repentance are made conditions possible? His subdolous carriage through∣out in concealing his Tenet is sufficient to disparage his cause with all that are indifferent and judicious. The Scripture plainly professeth that faith is the gift of God, repentance is the gift of God; But as he carrieth the matter nothing lesse appeares, then that this is his opinion. Yet I know he dares not in plaine termes oppose the cleare evidence of Scri∣pture in this. Now if faith be the gift of God, & withall he gives it without difference to all thē all must believe, which is notoriously & palpably untrue. If he gives it only to some, thē all the rest are mocked by God according to this Authours discourse; as often as he saith unto them believe, and ye shall be saved. And to whom he saith this, to them he saith also, Oh that there were such an heart in them to feare me &c. If he saith, he gives faith absolutely to none, but conditionally, and upon the same condition he is ready to give to all; this is clearely to confesse that the grace of God is given according to man's workes. Againe 'tis God that worketh in us both the will and the deed, and that according to his good pleasure, * 1.415 if according to his good pleasure, How can it be said that it is according to the prepara∣tion of the creature? Then what condition can be devised whereupon God workes in us the will? If he say the grace which God gives to all, and whereby to believe, to repent is made a thing possible unto all (For thus we must proceed groaping after his meaning, he affecting nothing more then to sculke and earth himselfe in his concealements) I an∣swer first; The Scripture makes no mention of any such power given to any; but to the contrary professeth of all persons unregenerate, that they cannot please God; that They can∣not discerne the things of God. 1 Co: 2. 14: that They cannot believe, that They cannot re∣pent * 1.416 Ro: 24: that they are not subject to the law of God nor can be. 2ly. The Scripture plainly saith that faith is the gift of God, repentance is the gift of God; It doth not say that the power to believe if they will is the gift of God. If he saith by faith is meant such a power, whereby a man may believe if he will, I prove the contrary; then all men should have faith. For in this mans opinion, all men are indued with this power: But the Apo∣stle plainly saith that, All men have not faith. Againe faith is described to be, The faith of God's Elect; but a power to believe if we will, this Authour makes common to the Elect * 1.417 with Reprobates. Moreover if to give power to believe if a man will, be to give him faith, then in as much as God gives power to sinne if he will, he may be said as well, that God gives sinne. Adde to this that to have power to believe, if one will; is rather nature then * 1.418 grace. For it is no more then posse fidem habere; and this is the nature of man as Austin testifies. Posse fidem habere naturae est hominum, fidem habere gratiae est fidelium; 'Tis the na∣ture of man that he may have faith, but it is of the grace of the faithfull, that a man hath faith.

And indeed if faith given us of God, did only inable us to believe, if we will; it were farre inferiour to a morall vertue, which doth not give man power to be vertuous, if he will; or to performe a vertuous act if he will: but makes him vertuous, and disposeth the will to vertuous acts only, and leaves him not indifferent, whether he will performe ver∣tuous acts, or no. To returne then, if no other grace be required to free God from mock∣ing and deriding his creature; surely we are as free as our adversaries from making God to deride and mocke his creature. For we are ready to grant that all men may believe if they will, repent if they will with Austin l. 1. de Gen: cont: Man: cap: 3. & De spiritu & liter â ad Marcellin. cap: 32. & De praedest. in: Sanct: cap: 5. And our reason is this. Not to be able to doe that which a man will doe, is impotency merely naturall; but the impoten∣cy that we speake of, which is hereditary to all mankind by reason of the fall, is impo∣tency morall, and resident in the will of man. For who doubts but that the will to be∣lieve, is to believe? For credimus si volumus: So the will to repent is to repent. For repen∣tance in the root thereof is nothing else but the change of the will. And Pelagius of three things proposed. Posse, Velle, & Agere; he willingly granted the first, to wit, Posse bonum, to be from God; but he denied the other two to be the works of God; but of our free wills; which if he had acknowledged to be the workes of God, as well as the first Austin tells him that, ab Apostolicâ doctrinâ abhorrere non videretur; he should not seeme to vary from the doctrine of the Apostles. And for ought I see this Authour goes not one * 1.419 step beyond Pelagius. He acknowledgeth that God doth perswade and exhort to be∣lieve; so did Pelagius. ibid. cap. 10. He saith also that God doth concurre to the act; but so he doth in his opinion to every sinfull act; so that this is but a generall concourse: and what Pelagian was ever known to deny, but that God might have as great an hand in any good act, as in any naturall act? Now since we acknowledge all this as well as he; what colour hath he to impute unto us, that we by our doctrine so fashion God's provi∣dence, as to make him deride and mock miserable people. Though the Jebusites did mock David, as this Authour gives his word for it, (though I doe not find that Ribbi David Kimhi, or Piscator count it any derision, but a plaine representation of their confidence, that David was never able to take it, such was the strength of the tower••, that the weak∣est, even the blind and the lame were sufficient to defend it.) Though withall Kimhi acquaints us with a strange story out of the Jews Darashe, of a Covenant made between Abraham and King Abimelech, and that concerning not him alone, but his Son and his Nephew, to suffer them quietly to enjoy their own; And that the Nephew of that Abi∣melech was alive at that time when David came to besiege that fort: And that therein the Jebusites had erected two Images, the one blind to represent I saack who in his old age was blind; and the other lame representing Jacob, who by wrestling with God became lame, and in the mouthes of these Images was kept the Covenant which was made be∣tween Abraham and Abimelech. The instance he gives of a proclamation which takes up the greatest part of this supplement (as a great part of this Authour's discourse, is spent in such insicete representations) is most incongruous, not only to the matter where∣unto it is applyed, but to the parts of it selfe. 1. To the matter whereunto it is applyed. For it is proposed in such a case, as men could not obtaine a certaine incorporation, though they much desired it. Now such a thing is not incident to Reprobates, namely that they cannot believe though they would For had they a will to believe, undoubtedly that would be accepted of God. Then. 2 it is incongruous to the parts of the Simile it selfe. For incorporation only is precluded unto Germans by the unrepealable law, he feignes without common understanding. For undoubtedly all lawes of men are repealable by the same authority, whereby they are made. And afterwards the condition of obtaining certaine bountifull gratuities, by vertue of the foresaid incorporation, is proposed most undecently, not of their being incorporated into that society, but of their will to be in∣corporated. Now it is apparent that by the case feigned their incorporation only is pre∣cluded unto them, not their will to be incorporated. In the accommodation he saith, God hath made a decree (by our doctrin) that such men shall never believe. Now what one of our Divines can be produce to justifie this? We say God hath decreed not to give them grace to work them unto faith, but to leave them unto themselves. And is not this Authour of the same opinion? Nay doth he not extend it farther then we doe, even to the Elect, as well as Reprobates? We say not so, but that his elect he doth not leave unto themselves to worke out their faith if they can, but workes them by his grace and holy Spirit there∣unto. Himselfe seemes to be conscious of the falshood of this his imputation dealing upon the point of God's justice. Sub-sect. 2. For having there proposed three causes

why Reprobates cannot justly be bound to believe; The second of them was this in M. Hord's discourse, Because it is impossible that they should believe; because God hath decreed they shall have no power to believe till their dying day. This reason is changed in this Authour's refi∣ning of that discourse (as indeed all these reasons are changed by him more or lesse with∣out replying upon ought that I have answered thereunto, but only putting out, or putting in at his pleasure, to cast a shew that the former discourse of M. Hord's is not answered; such is his subdolous cariage to undermine that truth, which he is not able to oppose in a faire manner with any sound reason; least of all by evidence of Scripture, that flying in his face at every turne; and therefore his best wisdome is to shut his eyes against it.) And here he sayth not in representing his second reason, that God hath decreed they shall have no power to believe, to their dying day; but thus rather; Because it is not God's unfeigned will they shall believe. But now againe in this supplement of his, he returnes to the first, and saith that by our doctrine, God hath made a decree that such men shall never believe. Quo teneam vultus mutantem Protea nodo. But I confesse it is an honour to God's truth, that it cannot be opposed, but in so vile a manner. Yet I have already shewed, that we deny not unto reprobates a power to believe if they will. We deny not the ministery of the word unto them, exhorting them to believe. We deny not but that whosoever hath a will to believe, or doth believe, God must necessarily concurre to the producing of that will, and that act of his. All this we grant, which is the uttermost whereunto this Authour comes; but over and above we say, that God doth not only give his elect a pow∣er to believe if they will, and perswade them to believe; but that also he works them to believe, and not only concurres with them in producing gracious acts, but makes them to concurre with him also; this is the grace, and this alone that he denies to reprobates.

Pag. 85. Treating of the use and end of God's gifts, the Authour hath an addition of some seven lines concerning the Lord's supper, but nothing at all to purpose.

Pag. 87. Of the fift Section next following; The passages out of the suffrages of our Brittain Divines in the Synod of Dort quoted by M. Hord, here they are expressed, name∣ly that there are certaine internall workes preparing a man to justification, which by the power of the word and Spirit are wrought in the hearts of men not yet justified, such as are the know∣ledge of God's will, and sense of sinne, feare of punishment. Now I have shewed that these our Brittish Divines goe much farther; and yet in their fift Article and fourth position, they professe of all such as are none of Gods Elect, that it is manifest they never really and tru∣ly attaine that change and renovation of the mind and affections, which accompanieth justifica∣tion; nay nor that which doth immediately prepare, and dispose unto justification. And there∣fore the preparation that this Authour speaks of as out of them, must needs be a remote preparation. And withall they adde, that They never seriously repent, they are never affected with hearty sorrow for offending God, for sinning, neither doe they come to any humble contri∣tion of heart, nor conceive a firme resolution not to offend any more. Now let every sober per∣son judge, whether God proceeding no farther with them then this, can be said to intend their conversion and salvation. The other position of theirs is this, Those whom God by his word and Spirit affecteth after this manner, those he truly and seriously calleth and inviteth unto conversion. I make no question, but whom God calleth, he calleth seriously, and whom he inviteth unto conversion, that is as I take it, unto repentance, he inviteth truly & seriously thereunto. But that God intendeth either their conversion or salvation, I ut∣terly deny. For did he intend it, undoubtedly he would worke it; For certainly this is in his power. Faith is his gift, and repentance is his gift, and perseverance in both is his gift. And unlesse he gives faith and repentance we hold it impossible that any man should believe or repent. And what a monster is it in Divinity to maintaine, that God's inten∣tions are frustrated, which cannot be maintained without denying God's omnipotency? For no man's intentions are frustrated, but because it lyeth not in his power to bring to passe the things intended by him.

Pag. 88. In the next section following is inserted a sentence of Prosper which no man denies. It is this They that have despised God's inviting will, shall feele his revenging will, but it is rightly to be understood, namely of despising his inviting will all along; and finally; Otherwise if they break of their contempt by repentance, there is mercy enough in store with God to pardon them, and his revengefull hand shall not be felt by them.

Pag. 89. And seventh section, concerning the use and end of God's gifts; divers passages of our Divines are mentioned, shewing the end of God's providence in affording his word unto reprobates. As first out of Calvin, Behold he directs his voice unto them that they may be the more deafe; He kindles a light, but that they may be made more blind; He giveth * 1.420

them a remedie; that they might not be healed. Now Calvin herein points to that of E∣say. Goe and say to the children of Israel, hearing heare but understand not, seeing, see * 1.421 but perceive not. Make the heart of this people fat (or obstinate) and make their eares heavy, and shut their eyes; least they see with their eyes, and heare with their eares, and understand with their hearts, & convert and be healed And Calvin doth but relate what the Lord saith to Esay: Ecce vocem ad eos dirigit. Behold (by this place of the prophet Esay) to what end the Lord sends his prophet to speake unto them. Now if Calvin doth herein misinterpret that place of the prophet Esay, it became this Author to except against his interpretation, and discover the unsoundnes of it; But taking no such course, and con∣sequently by his silence (being an adversary) justifying his interpretation; while he re∣proacheth Calvin in this particular, he reproacheth the Holy Ghost, whose words he represents delivered unto his prophet.

The next passage is taken out of Beza in his Praelud. on the 9. to the Rom: p. 434. where he sayth It ought not to seem absurd, that God unto Reprobates, liuing in his Church, doth offer grace in his word and Sacraments. For he doth it not to this end, that they may be saved, but that they may have lesse excuse then others, and at length be more greviously punished. And indeed why should this seeme aliene from the course of Gods providence revea∣led in his word, testifying that the invisible things of God, to wit his eternall power and * 1.422 Godhead are made manifest by his works, to the ena, men might be without excuse. And what this excuse is. S. Austin tells us saying, It is spoken of such an excuse, as men in their pride are wont to pretend saying, Si scissem fecissem; had I knowne it, I would have done it. And Eze: 2. 5. The Lord manifests the same end of his sending Ezech: unto the Jewes. For he told him, They would not heare. For they were a rebellious house, vet saith he, they shall know * 1.423 that there hath beene a prophet among them. And let every indifferent man judge whe∣ther the very place in Iohn. (If I had not come and spoken unto them, they should not have had sin, but now have they noe cloak for their sin,) doth not justifye that conclusion which Maccovius drawes therehence, namely that Therefore God sent his son unto them, that * 1.424 by the contempt and hatred of his sonne they might procure unto themselves the greater damna∣tion. For he professeth that by his comming and speaking unto them, all excuse was ta∣ken from them. And let every one judge whether contempt in such a manner doth not procure greater damnation. And old Simeon professeth that Christ should be set up, as to the rising of some; so to the falling of others: And long before the Lord professeth that he should be as a net, and a snare to both houses of Israel. Yet I am not of Maccovius his mind in saying, that God proposeth his word unto Reprobates to noe other end, but this: But certainly he proposeth it not unto them to the end that they should be saved by * 1.425 it. And let every sober man judge whether it be not better to ascribe such intentions unto the divine nature as are fulfilled, rather then such as are not fullfilled.

P. 94. Where he layes to our charge that our doctrine hinders piety and godly life Sect: 2. he hath this passage inserted.

It is absolutely decreed that Devills shall be damned; were it not a fruitlesse thing in them by prayers teares and * 1.426 endeavours to seeke to alter it? It is also simply decreed that the soule of man shall be immortall: Is it not a labour in vaine for any man to use meanes that his soule may be annihilated? It is ordained that the sun shall rule the Day and the Moone the Night: that the one shall finish his proper course in a yeare, the other in a month: Would not a mans endeavour to make an alteration in these things be unprofitable and ridiculous.

Although that which I have said upon this Section in answer to M. Hord be sufficient to * 1.427 shew the absurditie of this Authors discourse, yet I think good to accommodate what there I have delivered to this also, especially to the particular instance of Divells. And first it is a thing worthy our consideration that he saith. It is absolutely decreed that Di∣vels shall be damned, Now if this be true, then the divine decree concerning the damnati∣on of Divells is an absolute decree, now this decree is not temporall but eternall. Now if the eternall decree of God concerning the damnation of Divells be absolute, why should not Gods eternall decree of the damnation of men be absolute also: let him mumble upon this argument and acquaint us with his answer thereunto when he thinks good. When he discourseth of the fruitlesse nature of the Divells prayers and teares and endeavours to alter this decree, he seemes to me to suppose that the Divells are not be∣reaved of their free-will to pray, and which were more then wonderfull in their state of innocencie, to shed teares and to performe holy endeavours; and if this were true it were un∣reasonable for us to deny that Arminians had the like power left unto them. But if

they have no such freedome of will, what totter tooke this Author to discourse of the fruitlesse exercise of such a power. Would he not think our braine were crackt, if wee should tell him how fruitlesse his course would be to clamber up into the world of the Moone, seeing it is as possible for him to be Lunatick here, as well as there. Yet if the Di∣vells have any such freedome of will left them whereby they may attaine to holynesse, their endeavours that way though fruitlesse in respect of the altering of Gods decree, yet surely would not be fruitlesse in another respect. For better it were by farre, I should think for them to repent and submit to the will of God in suffering Hell paines, then to blaspheme in suffering them. But be it so, that not only Gods decree be absolute con∣cerning their damnation; but that their first sinne did put them quite out of the way, and is to them as death to men. Yet such is not the condition of men. And albeit the decree of damnation both of Divells and men be absolute, yet neither the one nor the other was decreed to be brought upon them absolutely, but upon the Angells, in case they kept not their owne habitation: upon men in case they did not only sinne, but final∣ly persevere in sinne without repentance: Though in this respect there is no place for the repentance of Angells, yet place there is for the repentance of men, and by repentance to avoid the wrath to come. And lastly, the Divell knowes his condition to be irrecovera∣ble, No man on earth knowes his estate to be so. For albeit according to our doctrine a man may be assured of his election: yet by our doctrine no man can be assured of his re∣probation. Adde this hereunto, Although a man did know he were reprobated to dam∣nation, yet not knowing to what degree and measure of damnation he is ordained, there is place to use his best endeavours in the way of civilitie and morality, that his dam∣nation may be the lesse. In case he did know this also, yet place still remaines to be as morall as he can. For damnation joyned with a condition of better morallity, is better then damnation joyned with a condition of lesse morality. This may suffice as an answer to the other instances, which are farre more wild then the first: as touching the immorta∣lity of the soule which he saith is simply decreed; and it is decreed to be immortall with∣out any course to be taken by man to promote the immortality thereof: But doe any of our Divines maintaine that God hath decreed our salvation in such sort, as to be brought to passe without any course to be taken by men of ripe yeares to promote their salvation? What proportion is there beetween immortality & salvation. God intends salva∣tion to no man of ripe yeares, but by way of reward of faith, repentance, obedience and good works. Doth God bestow immortality upon the soule by way of reward? Was not the soule of man immortall assoone as it was created? Is such the salvation of Gods elect? And what giddinesse possest the spirit of this Author when he discourseth of the vaine labour of any man, that should use meanes that his soule should be annihilated? Supposing that such meanes there are, and may be used, by the forme of his speech, when he sayth, that it is labour in vaine for any man to use such meanes. As for that which followeth of the Sun and Moone. An instance of the same nature hath been given in this very Section and an answer thereunto accommodated in my refutation of M Hords discourse, which this Author could not be ignorant of, as appeares by his altering and changing it almost throughout yet takes no notice thereof to reply thereunto, but keeps himselfe as still as a sow in beanes, thinking it his safest course to be silent. The truth is, God (we say) be∣stowing salvation and inflicting damnation proceeds according to a law, which he hath given unto man: but not so in the giving or denying grace, not so in shewing mercy on some and hardning others, but according to the mee••e pleasure of his will. It were farre more congruous to accommodate the instances he gives to the divine proceedings in this particular. But here he dares not budge, least his Pelagian spirit should bee manife∣sted to all the world, in maintaining that not only in conterring salvation, and inflicting damnation, he proceeds according to mens works, but also in giving and denying grace.

P. 96. Two lines are inserted a little above the Latine verses, but of no moment di∣stinct from the rest.

P. 97. Section the 4. of the crimination last save one, where he saith that three things are usually answered to vindicate our opinion from this crimination, but he conceales who they be, that thus answer: yet would not be thought to feigne it. And the first of these is this That many of them which believe and defend this doctrine are holy and good men, &c. Now here comes in that which he inserts.

The like defence to this did the Epicures of old make in favour of their sensuall and swinish doctrine, which was, that happinesse consisted in pleasure. They said that many of their Sect were honest men, and so much Tully granted to be true, but with exception still against their doctrine. I take, saith he Epicurus him∣selfe * 1.428 to be an honest man, yea and many Epicures have been and are faithfull in freindship, square and constant men in all conditions of life, ordering themselves and their lives, not by pleasure, but by duty. But saith he, this procee¦ded * 1.429 not from the principles of their opinion, but frō their own vertuous inclinations; & the force of honesty by their so doing appeared to be more prevailing in them, then the force of pleasure, which they pleaded for. A little after he hath words to the same purpose; As other mens doctrines are esteemed to be better then their deeds; so these mens deeds seem to me to be better then their doctrine. Like to this answer of Tully to the defenders of Epicurisme, will I shape mine.

I nothing doubt, but this Authour pleased himselfe well in this comparison, and o∣thers likewise of his own sect. For like lettice, like lips, yet all this is carried with a shew * 1.430 of charity, in acknowledging the holinesse forsooth, and goodnesse of their oposites; but it ends in this comparison, right Epicurus like, whose morality (forsooth) was pleaded to countenance his sensuall and swinish doctrine. But whatsoever our lifes be, for testimony whereof we nothing desire to be beholding to the charity of our opposites; Yet surely our doctrin concerning the absolutenes both of election, grounded upon no other foun∣dation then this, that Grace is not conferred according unto workes, as Austin testifies; and of reprobation grounded accordingly upon no other foundation then this, that * 1.431 grace is not denied according unto workes; shall be found no swinish doctrine, but the very truth of God. And let them that oppose it looke well to their waies, least they be not found goatish together with their doctrine at the day of judgment. But how comes this Authour to be so stupid in reading Cicero, and so little understanding him; as in these words to conceive, that he professeth himselfe to have a good opinion of Epicu∣rus? I confesse I marked it the more diligently, because I remember well the comparison that Plutarch makes between the vertuous gloriation of Epaminondas his mother, and the vile gloriation of Epicurus his mother, professing she never saw an happier day, then when she saw her Son Epicurus generating, cum Cyzezena meretriculâ, operis cum Polyano divisis; unlesse this were the morality of her Son, wherein shee gloried that he was not so jealous, but that he could admit a corrivall in the satisfaction of his filthy lusts. And indeed I had also observed other where, that he was a very temperate man, but to this end, that he might take the greater pleasure in the flesh, his senses being the more quick, when they were not clogged and overcome with surfeit. But come we to Cicero his judgment. He takes notice that Epicurus was commended as Comis in amicitiis tuendis, a man of a faire nature in maintaining freindship; yet (saith he) though these things were true (for I affirme nothing) he was not acute enough. I think this is spoken in reference to his doctrine nothing answerable to this commendation of him. For he measured freindship by profit, as in that very book Cicero relateth. Then he takes notice of another commen∣dation given of him, in these words, At multis se probavit, he approved himselfe to many; Et quidem jure fortasse, and truly for good cause perhaps. This is Cicero his concession with a perhaps. But observe what he brings in upon the back of this; Sed tamen non gra∣vissimum est testimonium multitudinis; but the testimony of the multitude (the many) is not most weighty, or most considerable. For in every art or study, or any science, or in vertue it selfe, every thing that is best, is most rare. Then follow the words which this Authour al∣seadgeth not, Ac mihi quidem videtur, quòd ipse vir bonus fuit. And to me truly it seemes that he was a good man; This had been to contradict himselfe, having formerly said, Ni∣hil affirmo, I affirme nothing; he takes into consideration what others said of him, but as for him, he would say nothing of him neither in commendation, nor vituperation. But his words runne thus, Ac mihi quidem, quòd & ipse bonus vir fuit, & multi epicurei fuerunt, & hodie sunt, & in amicitiis fideles (For it seemes indeed that he and Polyaenus cum Cyzi∣z••n•• meretriculà were very faithfull one to the other) & in omni vita constantes & graves, nec voluptate sed consilio officia moderantes; hoc videtur, (here comes in videtur and not till now) major vis honestatis & minor voluptatis. He still affirmes nothing of the life of Epi∣curus, but taking that which others affirmed of him, and admitting it, saith hoc videtur major vis honestatis & miner voluptatis: this testimony of others concerning these particu∣lars did argue more force of honesty, & lesse of pleasure. Ita enim vivunt quidam, ut eorū vita probetur refellatur oratio For so some doe live, that their life is approved, but their opinions condemned And on this point only (to wit concerning his opinion) had Cicero to deale with Epicurus at this time; Atque ut caeteri existimantur dicere melius, quàm facere: Sic ••i mihi videntur facere melius, quàm dicere. And as others are thought to speak better then they live; So these seeme to me to live better then they speake. By these he meanes not Epicu∣rus,

or Epicureans, but those some, of whom he spake immediatly before. And whether this be not the true meaning of Cicero, I appeale to the judgment of every sober man, that shall consider his words. And to requite this Authour, and pay him in his own coyne; I will not tell him what one of his own Sect hath given forth concerning one that preach∣ed in a great place, namely that his Auditory should professe, that the Authour must needs be an Arminian, he preached so honest a sermon; Though on the contrary I have heard of a greate Arminian of Cambridge, that he should professe to a friend of his, comming to him to conferre with him, and take him off from his opinion, if it might be, saying in the close that it was not for the honesty of their conversation who maintained the same, that he was of the same mind; and gave his reason for it out of his own experi∣ence, which I will not mention. But I will make bold to represent what I have read of the Pelagians, to answer this Authour, and so to recompence him in the way of charity. For Chrysostome placeth Pelagius inter viros piè ac sanctè magna{que} cum tolerantiâ viventes, amongst men living piously and holily, and with great patience; as Vossius observes cap: 3. hist: Pelag: and Claudius Menardus before him in his notes upon Austin's book against Iu∣lian the Pelagian. Austin in his 106 epistle acknowledgeth Paulinus to have loved him as the servant of God. And in his retractions he professeth saying, Pelagii ipsius nomen non sine laude posui, quia vita ejus à multis praedicabatur: I made mention of Pelagius his name * 1.432 not without commendation; for as much as his life was magnified by many. Amd in his third booke De peccat: meritis & remiss: c: 1. he sayth, the report that went of him was as of an holy man, and one that had profited much in Christianity. I find likewise good commen∣dations given of Coelestius also and Iulian the Pelagian: And I make no question but an honest and pious man may be sowred with the leaven of Pelagianisme, in that way of Arminianisme ere he is aware, but God may take them off from it ere they dye: Though the eager opposers of God's truth this way, even by such as were termed Semipelagians, Prosper spares not to call Vasa irae, vessells of wrath, in his Epistle to Ruffinus; And the exi∣led Bishops of Africa in their Synodicall Epistle, stile them no better then Vasa irae, vessels of wrath. And upon the conclusion of the Synod of Palestine what tumults were raised, and what abominable acts were committed by the party of Pelagius, is set down in part both by Austin, in the end of his booke De gestis Pelagii, and in a certaine epistle of Innocentius Pope of Rome.

To conclude; Leviathan God's enemy is represented in Scripture, as a crooked Serpent. It pleased King Iames to stile Arminius sometimes the enemy of God. And Austin I am sure stiles the Pelagians, Inimici gratiae Dei; The enemies of God's grace. And no mar∣vaile if they cary themselves like crooked Serpents, turning and winding for their advan∣tage. I have laboured to find out the Meanders of this Authour, which I little suspected at the first, and to meet with him. every where, and encounter him in his greatest fast∣nesse: And let the indifferent judge whether every where he be not found to hold a lye in his right hand. I would to God his eyes were opened, that he might see how he for∣sakes his own mercies, by forsaking the fountaine of living waters, to digge unto himselfe pits, even broken pits that can hold no water. While he looks to be saved by no other grace inherent, then such as whereby he hath power to believe if he will, repent if he will. A lamentable condition, that a man of understanding, and knowledge, and good morality should be thus blinded, nothing perceiving that this is mere nature, and not grace. But what infatuation hath seazed upon the Christian world, when such discourses are mag∣nified as sound and excellent; yea rare peeces, and unanswerable? Let us give God the glory of keeping us in our right wits and senses; otherwise even Flyes with us shall goe for Elephants, and the very illusions of Satan shall be advanced, as strange performances, not only of sober speculations; when they are equally estranged both from soundnesse and sobriety; such as all along looke a squint upon God's word; yet seldome take notice thereof, or are conformed thereunto; but rather proceed in manifest opposition there∣unto, and withall are found clearly devoid of all sound reason, though thereof Pelagians have alwaies vaunted most, but these vaunts are but wind, and prove no more substan∣tiall, then the imagination of a vaine thing.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  M. Mason's Ad-Vitions pag: 2.
• * 1.2

  Answer
• * 1.3

  M. Mason's Additions p. 3.
• * 1.4

  Answer.
• * 1.5

  1 Pet. 2. 8.
• * 1.6

  M. Mason's Additions pag: 3.
• * 1.7

  Answer
• * 1.8

  M. Mason's Additions p. 5.
• * 1.9

  Answer.
• * 1.10

  Heb. 13. 20.
• * 1.11

  M. Mason's Additions p. 6.
• * 1.12

  Answer.
• * 1.13

  And it is sometimes more harshly proposed by the Massili∣enses then by the Galli.
• * 1.14

  p. q. 23. art: 5. in Corp.
• * 1.15

  M. Mason's Additions p. 6. 7.
• * 1.16

  Answer.
• * 1.17

  In answer to charity mistaken.
• * 1.18

  M. Mason's Additions p. 8. 9. 5.
• * 1.19

  Answer.
• * 1.20

  M. Mason's Additions p. 10. 11, 12, 13
• * 1.21

  pag. 10.
• * 1.22

  pag. 11.
• * 1.23

  pag. 12.
• * 1.24

  pag. 13.
• * 1.25

  Answer.
• * 1.26

  Prrov. 16. 4.
• * 1.27

  Pro: 16. 4.
• * 1.28

  M. Mason's Additions p. 14. 15. 16.
• * 1.29

  Hos: 13. 9. Ezec: 33. 11. Lamēt: 3. 33:
• * 1.30

  Resp: ad 12. Object: Vincent: Exod: 34. 6.
• * 1.31

  Ps: 86. 5.
• * 1.32

  Ioel: 2. 13. Ion: 4. 2. Micah. 7. 18.
• * 1.33

  Gen: 18. 25.
• * 1.34

  Answer.
• * 1.35

  Deut. 32. 35. Ps: 94. 1. Rom: 13. 4.
• * 1.36

  Rom: 9. 19.
• * 1.37

  Ier. 29.
• * 1.38

  Gen: 18. 25.
• * 1.39

  Eph: 1. 11.
• * 1.40

  Eph: 1. 4.
• * 1.41

  Prov: 16. 4.
• * 1.42

  Rom: 9.
• * 1.43

  23.
• * 1.44

  Rom: 22. 23.
• * 1.45

  Rom: 9. 18.
• * 1.46

  Eph: 1. 11.
• * 1.47

  Ier. 9. 24.
• * 1.48

  Rom: 9. 18. Rom: 9. 23.
• * 1.49

  Eph: 1. 4,
• * 1.50

  Gal: 3. 26. Gal: 4. 6. Rom: 8. 14. vers. 17.
• * 1.51

  1 Io: 3. 10.
• * 1.52

  Io: 8. 49. Gen: 4. 26.
• * 1.53

  Ioh. 37. 7. Mat: 2. 10.
• * 1.54

  Ier. 24.
• * 1.55

  1 P. t. 4. 6.
• * 1.56

  M. Mason's Additons p. 16. 17.
• * 1.57

  Object.
• * 1.58

  Answer.
• * 1.59

  Reply.
• * 1.60

  Lib. 1 p. 2. digres. 4.
• * 1.61

  Vindic. l. 1. p: 3. digres. 1.
• * 1.62

  Rom: 9. 18.
• * 1.63

  Ps: 73. 1
• * 1.64

  Ps: 147. 20.
• * 1.65

  Raynaud: in adit. ad lib. Intitul. Vale∣rianus Inte∣ger doctrinae labis{que} purus.
• * 1.66

  M. Mason's Addit. p. 17. 18. Object. 2. Perkins lib. de predestin: p. 25.
• * 1.67

  Answer.
• * 1.68

  Repl.
• * 1.69

  Rom: 9. 21.
• * 1.70

  Exam: prae∣dest. Perkin: p. 41.
• * 1.71

  Austine
• * 1.72

  M. Mason's Aditions p. 18. 19. D. Twis: his Vin∣diciae l. 2. p. 1. Digres. 1.
• * 1.73

  Answer.
• * 1.74

  M. Mason's Aditions p. 19. 20.
• * 1.75

  Aug. Epist. ad Bon. 160.
• * 1.76

  Answer.
• * 1.77

  Ezech: 22. 14.
• * 1.78

  M. Mason's Addit. p. 20.
• * 1.79

  Answer.
• * 1.80

  M. Mason's Addit. 3. p. 20. 21.
• * 1.81

  Answer.
• * 1.82

  Bradward. lib. 2. c. ult.
• * 1.83

  Iav, 1. 4.
• * 1.84

  M. Mason's Addit. p. 22.
• * 1.85

  Hierom: in. Matt: c. 26. v. 24. Iob: 3. 11. 12. 13. Eccles. 4. 1. 2. 3.
• * 1.86

  Answer.
• * 1.87

  Eccles. 4. 1, 2, 3.
• * 1.88

  Io: 15. 19.
• * 1.89

  Tusculan, quaest. 5.
• * 1.90

  M. Mason's Adait. p. 22. 23. 24.
• * 1.91

  Answer.
• * 1.92

  Exam. Praedest. Perk. p. 103.
• * 1.93

  Mat. 26. 24.
• * 1.94

  Rom. 8. 1 Cor. 2. 14. Ioh. 12. Rom. 2 Deut. 29. 34. Phil. 1. 29. Eph. 2. 8. Acts. 18. 11. 1 Tim. 2 25.
• * 1.95

  Heb. 13. 21. Phil. 3. 13.
• * 1.96

  Gen. 22.
• * 1.97

  M. Mason's Addit. p. 24. 25.
• * 1.98

  Psal. 5. 4. Es. 66. 4. Iam: 1. 13. 14
• * 1.99

  1 Jo: 2. 16.
• * 1.100

  Ecclus. 15. 12.
• * 1.101

  Prosper resp. ad Object. 11. Vincent.
• * 1.102

  Resp. Obi. 4. Vincent l. 1. ad Monim. c. 19. l. 2. cont. Marcion. c. 9 Basil. Homil. Quod Deus non est &c.
• * 1.103

  Answer.
• * 1.104

  Es. 63. 17.
• * 1.105

  Es. 63. 17. Rom. 11.
• * 1.106

  Aug: de grat: & lib: arbit.
• * 1.107

  Es. 66. 24.
• * 1.108

  Lib. 1. de A∣miss. gratia.
• * 1.109

  Ia: 1. 13. 14
• * 1.110

  Col. 2. 11. Gen: 5. 3. Ps. 51. 5. Ioh. 3. 11.
• * 1.111

  1 Pet. 2. 8. 2 Thes. 2. 11. Rom. 1. 24.
• * 1.112

  Acts. 4. 28.
• * 1.113

  Amos. 7. 16. 17.
• * 1.114

  Prov. 22. 14.
• * 1.115

  2 Sam. 12. 11.
• * 1.116

  1 Kings. 11. 31.
• * 1.117

  Enchiria. cap. 9. 5.
• * 1.118

  Cont. Iulian: l. 5. c. 3.
• * 1.119

  Enchirid: c. 95.
• * 1.120

  Esa: 37. 7. Amos. 7. 16.
• * 1.121

  De auxil. l. 1. c. 2. num. 7.
• * 1.122

  lib. 2. Digres. 7.
• * 1.123

  M. Mason's Ad∣dit. p. 25. 26, 27. 28.
• * 1.124

  Comment in Jo. c. 15. v. 2.
• * 1.125

  Piscat. cont. Shalm. p, 29. Thes. 25.
• * 1.126

  Maceov. dis. 17. pag. 11.
• * 1.127

  Zanch. l. 5. de nat. Dei c. 2. de praedest. part. 4. resp. ad post. arg: prope finem.
• * 1.128

  Calv. l. 3. Instit. c. 24. Sect: 14.
• * 1.129

  Pisc. resp ad dupl. Vorst. part. 1. p. 220.
• * 1.130

  Calv. instit. l. 1. c. 17. Sect. 11.
• * 1.131

  Ibid. c. 18. Sect: 1.
• * 1.132

  Instit. l. 2. c. 4. Sect: 3.
• * 1.133

  Deut: 2. 30.
• * 1.134

  Answer.
• * 1.135

  1. p. quaest. 19. art. 8.
• * 1.136

  1. p. 19. art. 5. & quaest. 23. art. 5. Corp.
• * 1.137

  Aquin. 1. p q. 19. art. 8. concl.
• * 1.138

  1. p. q. 23. art. 3. in corp. Includ it voluntatem per∣mittendi aliquē cadere in culpam & inferendi damnationis poe∣nam pro culpam.
• * 1.139

  Act. 4. 28.
• * 1.140

  Thom: 1. part q. 23. art. 3. ad tertium.
• * 1.141

  Deut. 9. 6.
• * 1.142

  Deut. 29. 3. 4.
• * 1.143

  Prov. 16. 4.
• * 1.144

  Deut: 29. 4.
• * 1.145

  Eph: 28.
• * 1.146

  Io. 8.
• * 1.147

  Deut: 2. 30.
• * 1.148

  Rom: 9. 21.
• * 1.149

  Cal: opuse: 735.
• * 1.150

  M. Mason's Addit. p. 28. 29.
• * 1.151

  Jo: 8. 4. 4. 1 Io: 3. 8. 10. v. 8.
• * 1.152

  Answer:
• * 1.153

  Ier: 6. 16.
• * 1.154

  Esa. 1.
• * 1.155

  Ier: 4. 14.
• * 1.156

  Ier: 13. 27.
• * 1.157

  Act: 17. 28.
• * 1.158

  Disput. theol. pag. 108.
• * 1.159

  Lib. 2. digres. 7. & 9.
• * 1.160

  Act: 17.
• * 1.161

  l. 1. c. 2. 3. 4.
• * 1.162

  Suarez: de auxil. lib. 1. c. 2. num: 7.
• * 1.163

  Raynaud: in in Vindcatio∣ni.
• * 1.164

  Ier: 8. 17.
• * 1.165

  Es: 10. 15.
• * 1.166

  M. Mason's Addit. 2. p. 29. 30.
• * 1.167

  Molin. Anat. c. 12. de praedest. pag. 37.
• * 1.168

  Sueton. vit. Tib. cap. 61.
• * 1.169

  Answer.
• * 1.170

  Gen: 20. 6.
• * 1.171

  1 Sam: 2. 25. 2 Chron: 25. 20. Ier: 52. 3.
• * 1.172

  Act: 4. 28.
• * 1.173

  Anat: p. 23.
• * 1.174

  Anat: p. 16.
• * 1.175

  Rom: 1. 24.
• * 1.176

  v. 26.
• * 1.177

  v. 27.
• * 1.178

  2 Sam, 12, 11
• * 1.179

  vers. 12.
• * 1.180

  Lib. 2, Digr: 2.
• * 1.181

  Rom: 9. 22.
• * 1.182

  M. Mason's Addit. 3. p. 30. 31.
• * 1.183

  Answer.
• * 1.184

  De Gen: cont. Manich. l. 1. cap. 3.
• * 1.185

  De praedest. Sanct: 1. c. 5.
• * 1.186

  Eph: 4. 18. 2 Pet: 1. 4. Gal: 2. 20. Rom: 8. 11.
• * 1.187

  2 Tim: 1. 9. Tit: 3. 5.
• * 1.188

  1 Pet: 1. 9. Mat: 25.
• * 1.189

  Rom: 9. 11.
• * 1.190

  Io: 8. Corvin. de∣fens. Armin. pag: 39.
• * 1.191

  De bono per∣severan: c. 17
• * 1.192

  Con: 3.
• * 1.193

  Enchirid. 95.
• * 1.194

  Act: 4. 28. Rev: 17. 17.
• * 1.195

  Es. 46. 10. Zach: 6.
• * 1.196

  Aug. cont. Iulian: Pela: l. 5. c. 3.
• * 1.197

  Rom: 7.
• * 1.198

  Jo: 8.
• * 1.199

  M. Mason's Addit. p. 31. 32, 33, 34.
• * 1.200

  Colloq Mompel: 2 part. p. 177. Cal: instit. lib. 14. c 18. Sect: 1. vers. 2.
• * 1.201

  Id: ibid. lib. 2, c. 4. Sect. 3.
• * 1.202

  Colloq: Theol. disp: 9. pag. 10.
• * 1.203

  Answer.
• * 1.204

  Lib: 1. cont: Marcion.
• * 1.205

  Enchirid. 9. 5
• * 1.206

  Es. 6. 10. Rom: 11. 8. Dent: 29. 4
• * 1.207

  Sect: 1.
• * 1.208

  vers. 21.
• * 1.209

  vers. 22.
• * 1.210

  Act: 4. 28. Act: 2. 23. 2 Sam: 16. 22, & 12. 12.
• * 1.211

  Ps: 81. 11. 12,
• * 1.212

  Hist: Gotesch: pag. 142.
• * 1.213

  Gen: 20. 6.
• * 1.214

  Lib. 9. de au∣xil disp: 101 p. 803. num. 7 lin: penult:
• * 1.215

  Ro: 8. Ro: 2. Io: 12.
• * 1.216

  l. 2. digrs. 3. Criminat. 3. Sect: 2.
• * 1.217

  M. Mason's Addit. p. 34. 35.
• * 1.218

  Answer.
• * 1.219

  Rev: 17. 17.
• * 1.220

  Ro. 9. 23. Prov: 16. 4.
• * 1.221

  Ro. 5. 12.
• * 1.222

  Thom: 1: p. q: 23. art. 7. ad tertiū.
• * 1.223

  2 Sam: 12. 11. 12.
• * 1.224

  1 Kin: 13. 2. Es: 45. 13. Ezra: 1, 2 King: 23. 16. 2 Sam: 16. 22.
• * 1.225

  Prov: 16. 4.
• * 1.226

  M. Mason's Addit. p. 35. 36.
• * 1.227

  Mat: 10. 20. 1 Co: 15. 10.
• * 1.228

  Answer.
• * 1.229

  De aux: disp▪ 22 Disp. 24. Disp. 26.
• * 1.230

  ibid. Disp: 118. pag. 485. ibid de aux: Disp 1••1. pag. 490. ••. 3.
• * 1.231

  Bradw, de cau∣sa Dei l. 3. c. 1.
• * 1.232

  Id ibid, c. 2.
• * 1.233

  Disp. 22. num: 44.
• * 1.234

  Heb: 13. 21.
• * 1.235

  Eph: 2. 8.
• * 1.236

  Act: 17. 26.
• * 1.237

  Gen: 45. 8.
• * 1.238

  M. Mason's Addit. p. 37. 38.
• * 1.239

  Answer.
• * 1.240

  Act: 4. 28. 1 Pet: 2. 8. Rev: 17. 17.
• * 1.241

  Ro: 5.
• * 1.242

  Esa: 10. Habak: 1.
• * 1.243

  Es: 37. 7. Prov: 28.
• * 1.244

  Ro: 1. 28. verse 26. verse 24. verse 26.
• * 1.245

  verse 27.
• * 1.246

  Aug: contra Ju∣lian: Pelag. l. 5. cap: 3.
• * 1.247

  Lib. 5 cont. Jul. Pelag: cap 3.
• * 1.248

  Aquia: q: 23. de volunt. Dei ar∣ti••. 6.
• * 1.249

  Iob: 36. 6. verse 7. verse 8.
• * 1.250

  Act: 20. 28.
• * 1.251

  Es: 45. 9.
• * 1.252

  Es: 27. 4. Heb: 12. 29. Zeph: 3. 5
• * 1.253

  Rom: 9. 2 3.
• * 1.254

  Es: 37. 38. 7.
• * 1.255

  Iob 15. 20. 21
• * 1.256

  Ex: 33. 19.
• * 1.257

  Rom: 9. 18.
• * 1.258

  Zeph: 3. 5.
• * 1.259

  Lib. 2. digr: 5
• * 1.260

  M. Mason's Addit. pag, 38. 39, 40.
• * 1.261

  1 Jo: 3. 4.
• * 1.262

  Apol: 2. a little beyond the mid∣dle.
• * 1.263

  Fati ista culpa est: Nemo fit fa∣io nocens.
• * 1.264

  Answer.
• * 1.265

  1 Jo: 3. 4. Ro: 6. 23.
• * 1.266

  Es: 53. v. 2. Co: 5. 21. Ro: 3. 25.
• * 1.267

  Eth: l. 3. 5.
• * 1.268

  Eph: 2. 2. 2 Tim: 2. last.
• * 1.269

  Io: 8. Rom: 8.
• * 1.270

  Aug: contra duas epist. Pe. lag: ad Boni∣facium.
• * 1.271

  Austin: de ci∣vit Dei l. 5. cap. 10.
• * 1.272

  Art. 11.
• * 1.273

  1. p. q. 19. art. 8.
• * 1.274

  Vindic: l. 2. digres. 5.
• * 1.275

  M. Mason's Addit. p. 40. 41. 42.
• * 1.276

  Val: max. l. 8. c. 1. Gell: l. 12. c. 7.
• * 1.277

  Answer. 3.
• * 1.278

  Enchirid. c. 95.
• * 1.279

  Act: 4. 28. Rev: 17. 17.
• * 1.280

  De civit. Dei l. 5. c. 10.
• * 1.281

  Gen: 20. 6.
• * 1.282

  In first dist. 46. quaest. 1.
• * 1.283

  Artic: 11.
• * 1.284

  Arist. l 30. 1.
• * 1.285

  Ibid.
• * 1.286

  Prov: 28.
• * 1.287

  Act: 4. 28.
• * 1.288

  Es: 10.
• * 1.289

  This digressi∣on in his late book against. Corvinius pag. 174. 175. &c.
• * 1.290

  M. Mesons Ad∣dit. p 42. 43. 44
• * 1.291

  lib. 2. contra Maxion: Epiph: adversus baer: l. 1. haer. 5. uum. 3. Aug: l. 2. contra Faust. c. 5. Presp. ad object. 10. Vinc: Fulg. l. 1. c. 1. ad Moni. c 22. Bern: l. de grat. & lib. arbit. p. 908.
• * 1.292

  Epiph. l. 1. adv. haer. 16. p. 35. n. 3.
• * 1.293

  Prosp. ad cap. Gal: Sent. 1.
• * 1.294

  Answer.
• * 1.295

  1.
• * 1.296

  2.
• * 1.297

  1 King: 13. 2. Es: 45. 13. Ex, 34. 24.
• * 1.298

  Deut: 30. 6. Jer: 32 40. Ezech: 37. 24. Ezek. 36. 27. Phil: 2. 13. Heb: 13. 21.
• * 1.299

  Collat: cum Ju∣nto pag: 83.
• * 1.300

  Phil. 3. 13. Heb. 13. 21.
• * 1.301

  Enchirid. c. 95.
• * 1.302

  M. Masons Ad∣dit. p 52. 53, 54 55.
• * 1.303

  Vindic: grat: l. 1 par: 1. cap. 4. in∣itio.
• * 1.304

  Instit. l. 3. c. 23. Sect: 7.
• * 1.305

  Vindic. grat. l. 1. par. 1. digr. 4. c. 3. propè finem
• * 1.306

  Bern: Serm. 1. Domi: 1 post. 8. Epiphan.
• * 1.307

  Ezek. 18. 20:
• * 1.308

  Mat. 23. 32. 34.
• * 1.309

  Answer.
• * 1.310

  cap. 4.
• * 1.311

  Rom: 9. 22.
• * 1.312

  Rom. 7.
• * 1.313

  Cornel: in Ep: ad Rom▪ c. 9. 18.
• * 1.314

  Calvin. de oc∣cult. Dei pro∣vid.
• * 1.315

  Rom. 9. 22. 23.
• * 1.316

  Aust de Gen: cont Manich: l. 1, c. 3.
• * 1.317

  Enchirid. c. 32.
• * 1.318

  Aust: de cor: rep: & grat: c. 11.
• * 1.319

  ibid. cap. 12.
• * 1.320

  Aust: de prae∣dest: Sanct: cap. 5.
• * 1.321

  Eph: 28. Act: 5. & 11. 18. 2 Tim: 2. last. Phil. 3. 13.
• * 1.322

  August: de nuptitis c. 34.
• * 1.323

  1. 2. q. 81. ant. 2. in corp.
• * 1.324

  M. Mason Addit. p. 55. 56, 57.
• * 1.325

  Suffr: Brit: art: 1. de Repr: Thes. 1.
• * 1.326

  Walae: Defens: Anat: Armin: c. deRepr. Suffr: Brit: thes: 4. de Reprob.
• * 1.327

  Act: Syn: Suf∣frag: Gener: de Reprob:
• * 1.328

  Act: Syn: Suffr. Lubbert de Re∣prob.
• * 1.329

  Answer.
• * 1.330

  2. Tim. 19.
• * 1.331

  M. Mason Addit. p. 57. & 58. 59.
• * 1.332

  Suffr-Brit. art. 1. de Repr. explic. thes. 1. Orthodox Ibid. thes. 3. he∣terodox.
• * 1.333

  Act. Synod. Pa∣lat. thes. 3. Ibid, thes: 4.
• * 1.334

  Judic Theol. Hassiac.
• * 1.335

  Tertul: l. 1. contr. Maccion. c. 22.
• * 1.336

  Answer. Ro. 9. 18.
• * 1.337

  Ro. 11. 30.
• * 1.338

  Exod. 33. 19.
• * 1.339

  Psal. 19.
• * 1.340

  Deut. 32.
• * 1.341

  Rom. 7. 15, 18, 19. Rom 6
• * 1.342

  Aug: cont: Jul: Pelag: l. 5. c. 4.
• * 1.343

  pag: 63.
• * 1.344

  M. Mason Addit. p. 64. Senten: super 8. c. Gall:
• * 1.345

  Answer.
• * 1.346

  1 Tim: 2.
• * 1.347

  1 Tim: 2.
• * 1.348

  P 65. Sect. 3. sub. sect. P. 66. & 67.
• * 1.349

  M. Mason Addit.
• * 1.350

  Answer.
• * 1.351

  Aug: Ep: 171.
• * 1.352

  M. Masons Additions.
• * 1.353

  Hieron. Proem. in Hosea.
• * 1.354

  Zanch. l. 3. de nat. Dei c. 4. q. 9 thes: 2.
• * 1.355

  Mat: 26.
• * 1.356

  Ro: 12. 2. 1 Pet: 2. 2.
• * 1.357

  Eph: 6.
• * 1.358

  l. 1. part. 3. de re∣prob. digr: 1.
• * 1.359

  Aug: adSimpli∣cian. l. 1. q. 2.
• * 1.360

  Rom. 9. 11.
• * 1.361

  Eph: 1. 5.
• * 1.362

  Mat: 20. 15. 1 Co. 12. 11. Rom: 9. 18. Col. 1. 19. Mat: 11. 26. Phil: 2, 13. Ps: 44. 3.
• * 1.363

  Act: 13. 48. Act: 2. last.
• * 1.364

  Jo: 1. 47. Act: 2. ult. & 13. 48, 2 Co: 4. 3. 2 Thes. 2, 10. 13
• * 1.365

  1 Thes: 3, 4.
• * 1.366

  Rom. 9, 11.
• * 1.367

  Aug: de bono persever. c. 15.
• * 1.368

  2 Tim: 1. 9. Rom: 9. 18.
• * 1.369

  Tit: 1. 1.
• * 1.370

  Rev: 13. 8 & 17. 8.
• * 1.371

  Ro: 9. 18.
• * 1.372

  M. Mason's Ad∣ditions, Lib. de praedest. contra Schafin. p. 74. pag. 143.
• * 1.373

  Answer.
• * 1.374

  Mat. 13. 11.
• * 1.375

  1 Thes; 4. 3.
• * 1.376

  Rev: 22. 17: Esa: 55. v. 1. 2. 3.
• * 1.377

  Es: 12. 3.
• * 1.378

  M. Mason's Additions.
• * 1.379

  Answer.
• * 1.380

  Eph: 2. 8. Phil: 1. 29. 1 Col. 4. 7. Eph: 6. 23. Act: 5. 31. Act: 11. 18.
• * 1.381

  2 Tim: 2. last
• * 1.382

  2 Tim: 1. 9. Ro. 9. 18.
• * 1.383

  Aug: de civi: Dei lib. 21. c: 24. si Eclesia nosset qui prae∣destinati sin•• ire in aeternum ig∣nem cum diabo lotam pro ••is non magis oraret quam pro diabolo
• * 1.384

  1 Co: 9. 19. vers: 22. 2 Tim: 2. 10.
• * 1.385

  Act: 20. 23. 24.
• * 1.386

  Ezek: 2. 3. 4. 5.
• * 1.387

  Ex: 4. 22. 23. v. 21.
• * 1.388

  Ex: 9. 12.
• * 1.389

  v: 13.
• * 1.390

  v: 14.
• * 1.391

  15.
• * 1.392

  16.
• * 1.393

  Ex: 10. 1.
• * 1.394

  Ro. 9. 19.
• * 1.395

  Deut: 29. 2.
• * 1.396

  vers. 3.
• * 1.397

  Eph: 4. 30. 1 Pet: 1. 5. 2 Tim: 4. 18.
• * 1.398

  2 Pet: 1. 1. 1 Pet: 1. 23.
• * 1.399

  Esa: 1. Jer: 13. 27.
• * 1.400

  Act: 13. 48. Es: 53. 1. Jo: 8. 27.
• * 1.401

  Deut: 5. 29.
• * 1.402

  Deut: 29. 4.
• * 1.403

  Es: 48. 18.
• * 1.404

  Heb: 13. 21. Phil: 2. 13.
• * 1.405

  M. Mason's Additions. 2 Sam. 5. 6.
• * 1.406

  Answer.
• * 1.407

  2 Sam: 5. 6.
• * 1.408

  2 Tim: 2. 10.
• * 1.409

  Act: 18. 9.
• * 1.410

  Ezech: 2. 5.
• * 1.411

  Prov: 1. 24. 25. 26.
• * 1.412

  Aug. de grat. & lib. arbitr. cap. 2.
• * 1.413

  Ro: 5.
• * 1.414

  2 Thes: 3 Tit: 1. 1.
• * 1.415

  Phil: 2. 13.
• * 1.416

  Ro: 8. Jo: 12. 40.
• * 1.417

  Tit: 1. 1.
• * 1.418

  Aug. de pradest. Sanctorum c. 5.
• * 1.419

  Aug: de grati â Christi. cap. 6.
• * 1.420

  Instit. l. 3. c. 24. num: 13.
• * 1.421

  Esay. 6. 9.
• * 1.422

  Ro: 1. 2:
• * 1.423

  Aug: de grat: & lib. arbit c. 2.
• * 1.424

  Jo: 15. 22.
• * 1.425

  Es: 8, 18.
• * 1.426

  Addit.
• * 1.427

  Answer:
• * 1.428

  Addit.
• * 1.429

  Cic. de finibus 2. p. 107.
• * 1.430

  Answ.
• * 1.431

  Aug. de bono persever. 15.
• * 1.432

  August: retract. lib 2. cap. 33.