The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...

THE FIRST PART. CONTAINING A CONSIDERATION of those Reasons, for which M^r HORD (as he pretended) first Questioned THE TRUTH OF ABSOLVTE REPROBATION.

[illustration]

OXFORD, Printed by L. L. Printer to the University, for T. R. Anno 1653.

THIS TREATISE DIVIDES IT SELFE INTO TWO PARTS, Viz.

• 1. An Introduction.
• 2. A Discourse.

I. The Introduction.

SECTION I.

SIR,

I Have sent you here the Reasons, which have moved me to change my Opi∣pion in some Controversies, of late debated between the Remonstrants and their Opposites, I doe the rather present them unto you,

1. That I may shew the due respect, which I beare your Worship, with my forwardnes to answer your desires, as I can, with re∣gard to Conscience.

2. That you may see, I dissent not without cause, but have Reason on my side.

3. That if I can be convinced, that my Grounds are weake and insuf∣ficient, I may think better of my Opinion, which I have forsa∣ken, then I can for the present.

In the delivery of my Motives, I shall proceed in this Order,

1 I will state the Opinion which I dislike.

2 I will lay down my reasons against it.

Touching the first your Worship knowes these two things very well;

1 That the main 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and Question in these Controversies, and that on which all the rest hang, is, What the decrees of God are, touching the everlasting condition of men, and how they are Ordered.

2. That the Men which have disputed these things may be reduced to two sorts or sides.

The first side affirmes, that there is such an absolute decree, proceeding from the good pleasure of God alone, without the consideration of mens finall Unbeliefe and Impenitency, as, by which he cast∣eth men off from Grace and Glory, and shuts up the farr greater part of men (even of those that are called by the Preaching of the Gospel to Repentance and Salvation) under invincible and unavoyda∣ble sin and damnation.

The other side, disavowing any such decree, say, that the Decree of God to cast off men for ever, is grounded upon the foresight of their continuance in sin and unbeliefe, both avoydable by Grace, and consequently inferring no mans damnation necessary.

TWISSE. Consideration.

WOrthy Sir, according to your desire to take into Consideration this writing directed unto you, at length I have gotten some leasure from other imployments, to addresse my selfe to give you satisfacti∣on in this particular.

1 That I may shew my selfe answerable to that respect which you have deserved at my hands; and not so only, but to my zeale of Gods truth, which hath deserved much more at the hands of us both.

2 That you may the better discern which of us two, whom you put to conferre, doth maintain the cause of Gods truth, and hath the best reasons on his side.

As for the change of Opinion here mentioned, such Professions are nothing strange. But whether such a Profession be in truth, or in pretence, and rather liberty taken to manifest that Opinion, which formerly hath been cherished: as also with what con∣science voyd of all carnall respects, such a change or manifestation is made, it belongs not unto us to judge, but to leave that unto God, who tryeth the hearts and reynes. Sure we are, the heart of man is full of deceitfulnesse, both to deceive others, yea and to deceive our selves, the more need there is to be jealous over our selves, and to car∣ry a watchfull eye over our own soules, and whether we have chang'd a former way, or at the first chose one or other way, and continue to imbrace that, whereof we have been at first informed; not to despise, but in the feare of God, to practice that * 1.1 holy counsell of the Apostle given to the Corinthians, a famous Church, and such as were destitute of no spirituall gift. Prove your selves, whether you are in the Faith, examine your selves: know ye not your own selves, that Jesus Christ is in you, ex∣cept ye be Reprobates? as also to consider how indifferently we carry our selves, in using means to inform our selves in the way of truth, and whether they be not such as doe discover our chiefe care hath been to bring our judgements about, to the im∣bracing * 1.2 of that way (whether Truth or Errour) which formerly we did effect. Cer∣taine it is, that Heresies must be, and that to this end, that they that are approved may be made manifest. And Illusions shall have their course, when the truth of God is not imbraced with love, whatsoever be the pretence of our disaffecting it, whether harsh∣nes to affections, or discrepancy to carnall reason. And when such judgements have their course, Who are priviledged from being seduced? Let our Saviour speake in this, * 1.3 So that if it were possible men should deceive the very elect. Upon what may we be assured to stand firme in time of such temptation? Let the Apostle answer us in this, * 1.4 when after the effectuall working of Satan in them that perish, he comes neere to them to whom he writes in the way of comfort thus, But we ought to give thankes alway to God, for you Brethren beloved of the Lord, because that God hath from the beginning chosen you unto salvation through sanctification of the spirit and faith of the truth. Like as before he did conclude unto himselfe their election, from observation of the work of their Faith, the labour of their Love, and the patience of their Hope. And the greater is the comfort which hereby is ministred unto us, the greater should be our care, to informe our selves aright, in the doctrine thereof, and especially to have an eye unto it, that we doe not shape it in such a manner, that like as it is impossible we should have any assurance thereof, so it will prove equally im∣possible we should draw any comfort from thence.

1. But is it so, as here it is put upon you, that you knew very well indeed, that the main 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and Question in these Controversies, and that on which all the rest hang, is, What the decrees of God are, touching the everlasting condition of men, and how they are ordered?

I assure you, if you knew this, you know more then I doe. I had thought rather that the resolution of the Point concerning Predestination, had depended upon the resolution of the Point touching Grace efficacious, then the contrary. As namely, if Faith be confessed to be the gift of God, and that not with respect to any thing in man, it followeth herehence, that Predestination unto faith, and reprobation from

faith, must proceed mecrely upon the good pleasure of God, and not upon foresight of ought in man.

There was a time when Austin thought, that God elected some to bestow the Holy Ghost up∣on * 1.5 them, that by working that which is good, they might obtain everlasting life: and who were those whom he thus elected? namely such as whom he foresaw would believe: and what was his reason for it? surely this; Quod ergo credimus nostrum est, quod autem bona o∣peramur, Illius est, qui Credentibus dat Spiritum Sanctum; quod profeciò non dicerem, si jam scirem, etiam ipsam fidem inter dei munera reperiri quae dantur in eodem spiritu. Marke I pray the man∣ner of his Retractation, I would not have said (so) if at that time I had known Faith to have been amongst the gifts of God, which are given in the same spirit. So then as soon as Austin came to acknowledg, that Faith it selfe was the gift of God, he therewithall came off from affirming, that Quem sibi crediturum esse praescivit, ipsum elegit, cui Spiritum Sanctum daret ut bona operando etiam vitam aeternam consequeretur. And like as before he maintained, that God elected some (to wit, Believers) to bestow the Holy spirit upon them, that by working good workes, they might obtain also everlasting life; so now having found that Faith also, is the gift of God, he was accordingly to maintain, that God elected some to bestow the Holy spirit upon them, that both by believing, and working good workes, they might obtain everlasting life: so that no longer was the foresight of Faith, to precede election in Austins opinion, to wit, after once he knew Faith to be the gift of God. And accordingly in his Book De Praedestin. Sanctorum, addressing himselfe to the rectifying of the Massilienses in the poynt of Prede∣stination, wherein they did not as yet discerne the truth of God: Adhuc in quaestione caligant de Praedestinatione sanctorum. Cap. 1. And againe, Si quid de Praedestinatione San∣ctorum aliter sapiunt (Deus) illis hoc quo{que} revelabit. Ibid. Marke I pray you what course he takes to rectify them herein. cap. 2. Priùs ita{que} fidem quâ Christiani sumus donum dei esse debemus ostendere: and whereas he had performed this task very sufficiently before, manifesting by divers pregnant passages of holy Scripture, that Faith was the gift of God, and the Massilienses did elude them by such a distinction as this, Faith may be considered two waies, either as touching Initium, the first beginning of it; or as touch∣ing Incrementum the augmentation thereof; and accommodating this distinction said, The passages of Scripture alleadged by Austin proceeded as touching the Augmenta∣tion of it, which they willingly granted to be the work of God; but not as touch∣ing the initiation of it, which they still maintained to be the work of man. There∣fore Austin addresseth himselfe in that discourse of his, to prove that the very Initiati∣on of Faith, is the work of God, and not the Augmentation only. His words are these, Sed nunc iis respondendum esse video, qui divina testimonia, quae de hâc re adhibuïmus, ad hoc dicunt valere, ut noverimus ex nobis quidem nos habere ipsam fidem, sed incrementum ejus ex Deo: tanquam fides non ab ipso donetur nobis, sed ab ipso tantum augeatur in nobis ex merito quo coe∣pit à nobis. And likewise in the 19. cap. of the same Book, having propounded the o∣pinion of the Pelagians, namely that because God foresaw that we would be holy and un∣blameable before him in love, therefore he elected and predestinated us in Christ, before the founda∣tion of the World; and shew'd how this opinion, contradicts that of the Apostle Ephes. 1. 4, 5. where it is said, that, God elected us in Christ, and predestinated us before the foundation of the World, that we should be holy and unblameable before him in love: and perceiving with∣all how the Massilians did avoid this as nothing contrary to their Tenent (though con∣trary to the Pelagian Tenent) forasmuch as they maintained not, that God foresaw any thing but our Faith, and therefore God elected us before the foundation of the World, that we should be holy and unblameable before him in love, (for these were their words) Nos autem dicimus nostram Deum non praescisse nisi fidem & ideo nos elegisse—ut etiam sancti & immaculati gratia atquè opere ejus essemus; what course doth Austin take to beat them off but this, namely to prove, that, Like as Holines so Faith also, and that as touching the Initiation thereof, is the work of God. thus: Sed audiant ipsi in hoc te∣stimonio, ubi dicit, sortem consecuti simus, praedestinati secundum propositum qui universa operatur. Ipse ergo ut credere incipiamus operatur qui universa operatur. So that it is cleer in the opinion of Austin, that to take both himselfe and others off from premising the foresight of Faith unto Gods election, it is sufficient to prove that Faith is the gift of God, the work of God both touching the augmentation, and touching the first introduction thereof. And thus evincing the condition of Predestination, as excluding all fore∣sight of Faith, from the condition of Predestination, as being throughout the work of God in man, rather then taking a contrary course, as if the main 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 were,

what is the condition of Gods decree of Predestination, as here it is pretended and supposed. And albeit it is commonly received of all sides (as if it were without que∣stion) that Faith is the gift of God: yet we find practises on foot, for the working of a manifest innovation herein. For not to speak of their interpretations of their own meanings, as, in what sence they say God workes Faith in us; it is apparent the Remonstrants now a daies, doe as good as professe, that Faith is not bestowed upon us for Christs sake, in as much as they deny that Christ merited Faith for us. For when the Author of the Censure passed upon the Remonstrants Confession, disputeth thus, At si hoc tantum meritus est Christus tum Christus nobis non est meritus fidem nec regenera∣tionem: the Remonstrants in the Answer hereunto, forthwith confesse it in these * 1.6 words, Sanè ita est. Nihil ineptius, nihil vanius est quàm hoc Christi merito tribuere. Si enim Christus nobis meritus dicatur fidem & regenerationem, tum fides conditio esse non poterit, quam a peccatoribus Deus sub comminatione mortis aeternae exigeret. And by the way marke, I pray, that not any difference is put between Faith and Regeneration; manifestly signifying thereby, that as they grant it to be the work of man to believe, so we are comman∣ded to make our selves a new heart. * 1.7

And as for ordering of the decrees, which here is added to compleat the main 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as here is pretended that in my opinion, is so farr off from being the main 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as that it is not to be accounted any 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 at all Theologicall, but meer∣ly Logicall. Let the condition of the decrees be rightly explicated according to Di∣vinity, and we shall have no need at all of Divinity for the right ordering of them. A meer Logicall faculty by light of nature, will serve for this. For the decrees whereof we treat, are meerely Intentiones rerum gerendarum. Now for the ordering of these in what kind soever, we have received Rules of the Schooles, never yet that I know con∣tradicted by any; namely, that they are to be ordered according to the condition of the things intended, which are but two, to wit, the end and the means; and all doe attribute priority to the intention of the end, and posteriority to the intention of the means. It is true, men may erre, in designing the right end, as also, in designing the right means, and these errours are to be discovered, and the truth cleered by that sci∣ence, whereunto the consideration of the end and means belong, and not by Logick. But agreement being made concerning the end and means, there is no doubt to be made, but that according to the most received Rules of Schooles, the end must be ac∣knowledged both first in intention, and last in execution, and contrarily the means last in intention and first in execution.

2. But come we to the Decrees themselves, & the different opinions thereabouts, which follow in the next place. Now here I looked for different opinions about de∣crees, in the plural number, but I find the relation extends no farther then to one de∣cree, and that of Reprobation. So at the first entrance reasons are promised, even in this writing, to be exhibited of chang of opinion in certain controversies in the plurall num∣ber, when in the issue, all comes but to one controversy, and that about Reprobati∣on. Yet the Scripture speaketh fully of Election, sparingly of Reprobation in most places, leaving us to judge thereof, by consequence from the doctrine of Election Yet some passages we have (I confesse) that give light and evidence to both alike. For like as it is said Acts 2. last. that God added daily to the Church such as should be saved. so 2 Cor. 4. 3. it is said, If our Gospell be hid, it is hid to them that are lost, and as it is signified Math. 24 24. that Tis impossible seducers should prevaile over the elect. so 2 Thes. 2. both as much is signified ver. 13. and also expressed ver. 10. 11. that they shall pre∣vaile among them that perish: and the 1 Cor. 1. 18. we are given to understand joynt∣ly, that the preaching of the Crosse is to them that perish foolishnesse: but unto us which are saved it is the power of God. and Rom. 9. 18. that as God hath mercy on whom he will, so also he hardneth whom he will. And like as Acts 13. 48. we read that, as many believed as were ordained to eternall life; which phrase of ordaining to eternall life, I conceive (under correction) to be all one with the phrase of Writing our names in Heaven. Luke 10. 20. and writing us in heaven. Hebr. 12. 23. and this phrase I take to be all one with the writing of us in the Book of life. So on the other side we read, that Whose names were not written in the Book of Life from the foundation of the World should wonder when they beheld the Be••st, and not so only but * 1.8 worship him also. But give we every vessel leave to vent that liquor whereof it is full.

I come to the consideration of the different opinions here proposed, concerning the decree of Reprobation; and herein, I will endeavour to open a clear way to the

right understanding of the truth, that your judgement may have the more free course in discerning it, and withall, to represent unto you, the unreasonable carriage of our Adversaries in the setting downe of our Tenent, whereby you may guesse, what you are to expect from them prosecuting against it. And herein I will insist upon these particulars. The first shall be the Things Decreed. The second the Cause of this de∣cree. The third, the Persons on whom this Decree doth passe. The fourth shall be that claw of Unavoydable Sin, and Damnation.

1. The Things Decreed are here said to be, The casting off from grace and glory, and the shutting of men up under Damnation.

Now I pray observe here in the first place, that, by casting off from grace and glory, we mean no other thing, then the not giving of grace and glory; and by grace, we mean the grace of Faith and Repentance, the grace of Regeneration. For like as in Electi∣on God purposeth (we say) to give this grace unto some, which is the same with shewing mercy on them. Rom. 9. 18. as we suppose; so on the other side, God pur∣poseth to deny this grace unto others, which in Scripture phrase is to harden them, that being made opposite to Gods shewing mercy. Rom. 9. 18. And for the farther clearing of the termes we say, that God by giving Faith and Repentance, doth cure that infidelity and impenitency, which is naturall unto all, as being borne in sin: and by not giving this grace of Faith and Repentance unto others, God leaves their na∣turall infidelity and impenitency uncured. And if this Author means ought else by shutting up under sin, then the not curing of their naturall infidelity and impenitency, he doth us wrong, and what he means thereby I know not. As for shutting up under damnation, that is not our phrase, but we love to speak in plain tearmes, and say, that God doth purpose to inflict damnation on them whom he Reprobates.

Thus much for the cleering of the tearmes, as touching the things Decreed.

Secondly, observe I pray, which is of principall consideration, that here we have no cause at all specified, why he refuseth to give them grace; cunningly leaving it to an improvident Reader to conceive, that the cause of the decree, which is here specified, to be the meer pleasure of Gods will, is indifferently applyable to the not giving of grace and glory, and to the shutting up under damnation as the cause thereof, which is a notorious imposture, yet I doe not think this Author guilty of it, but others rather, who abuse their witts by cunning courses, to deceive the hearts of the simple. Amongst the Fal∣lacies observed by Aristotle, there is one called Fallacia plurium interrogationum, as when many things are put together, and an answer is required to be made, either affirma∣tively or negatively to them all, as if they were but one; when indeed the answer can∣not be made aright, without distinction of the things demanded, the one whereof perhaps requires an answer affirmative, the other negative. As for example, to in∣stance as touching one of the Controversies here declined: We are often demanded, whether every one that heareth the Gospell, be not bound to believe that Christ died for him? Now I say this phrase Christ died for me includes many things, as the benefits which arise unto me by the death of Christ, may be conceived to be many. But let these benefits be distinguished, and we shall readily answer to the question made, and that perhaps differently, as namely, affirmatively to some, negatively to others; as thus. Doe you speak of Christs dying for me, that is, for the pardon of my sins, and for the salvation of my soule: I answer affirmatively and say, I am bound to believe that Christ died for the procuring of these benefits unto me in such manner, as God hath ordained, to wit, not absolutely but conditionally, to wit, in case I doe believe and repent. For God hath not otherwise ordained, that I should reap the benefit of pardon and salvation, by vertue of Christs Death and Passion, unlesse I believe in him and repent. But if question be made, whether I am bound to believe that Christ di∣ed for me, to procure faith and repentance unto me; I doe not say, that I am bound, or that every one who hears the Gospel, is bound to believe this.

Nay the Remonstrants now a daies, deny in expresse tearmes, that Christ merited * 1.9 this for any at all. I am not of their opinion in this; but I see clearly a reason mani∣festing, that Christ merited not this for all, no not for all and every one, that hears the Gospel. For if he had, then either he hath merited it for them absolutely or con∣ditionally. Not absolutely, for then all and every one of them should believe de facto, which is untrue; for the Apostle saith, Fides non est Omnium: Nor conditionally, for * 1.10 what condition I pray can be devised, upon the performance whereof, God for Christs sake should give us faith, and repentance? In like sort, if I am demanded

whether God did decree, of the meer pleasure of his will, to refuse to give grace and glory unto some, and to inflict upon them damnation. To this I cannot answer at once, there being a Fallacy in the demand. But distinguish them, I answer and say, that, as touching the poynt of denying grace, God doth that of his meer pleasure; but as touching the denyall of glory, and the inflicting of damnation, he doth not decree to doe these of meer pleasure, but rather meerly for sin, to wit, for their infi∣delity and impenitency, and all the bitter fruits that shall proceed from them. So that Reprobation according to our Tenent rightly stated, is the decree of God partly to deny unto some, and that of his meer pleasure, the grace of Faith and Repentance, for the curing of that infidelity and hardnes of heart, which is naturall unto all, and partly to deprive them of glory, and to inflict damnation upon them, not of his meer pleasure, but meerly for their finall continuance in sin, to wit, in infidelity and impe∣nitency, and all the fruits that proceed therehence.

2. Now as for the cause of this decree, as likewise of all the decrees of God, when any of our Divines say, that it is the meer pleasure of God, as in some places it is ex∣pressed of some decrees, let them be understood aright; not as if they distinguished be∣tween the decree of God, and the good pleasure of his will; for we know full well, that the decree of God is the good pleasure of his Will, what decree soever it be: but hereby we only exclude, all causes from without, moving God to make any such de∣cree; like as when it is said, Deuteron. 7. 7. The Lord did not set his love upon you, nor chuse you, because ye were more in number then any people, but because the Lord loved you, as much as to say, The Lord loved you, because he loved you. Where we cannot soberly devise any di∣stinction between love and love, as between the cause and the effect; only hereby is ex∣cluded all cause from without. Now we are ready with open face to professe, that of the Will and decree of God, there neither is, nor can be any cause from without: all things from without being temporall, and the Will of God being eternall, and the Will of God quoad actum Volentis, being the very Essence of God; For God is a pure Act and that indivisibly One, whereby he is said to Bee whatsoever he is, as wee doe conceive variety of perfections in God, yet all these are but one indivisible Act in God; and by this one indivisible Act, he both knowes all that he knowes, and will∣eth and decreeth all that he willeth and decreeth. Man when he willeth any thing, as likewise an Angel when he willeth ought, they produce an act of willing passing upon this or that object: but it is not so with God, in whom there is no accident. And therefore Aquinas was bold to professe, that never any man was so mad, as to * 1.11 professe that merits were the cause of Predestination, as touching the act of God pre∣destinating: and why so? why surely upon this ground, because predestination is the will of God: and like as nothing can be the cause of the will of God, as touching the act of willing, so nothing can be the cause of divine predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating. His words are these in the same place; Sic inquirenda est ratio praedestinationis, sicut inquiritur ratio divinae voluntatis. dictum est autem suprà, quod non est assignare causam divinae voluntatis ex parte actus volendi. But because like as the love of God is sometime taken for the good thing which God bestowes, like as Jansenius in∣terprets that place Iohn. 14. 21. He that loveth me shall be beloved of my Father, to wit, of the effect of the Fathers love; and we commonly say, that Passions are attributed un∣to God not quoad Affectum, but quoad Effectum: in like sort the Will of God is taken for the thing willed, as 1 Thes. 4. 3. This is the will of God, even your sanctification, that is, this is willed by him. Therefore Aquinas distinguisheth a double consideration in the will of God, one quoad actum volentis, and so it hath no cause from without; another quoad res volitas, and so it may have a cause. So likewise in predestination as considering it either quoad actum Praedestinantis, and so it hath no cause, or quoad effectum Praedestinationis, and so it may have a cause, as there he professeth, both touching the will of God in generall, and touching Predestination in speciall. Of the will of God in generall, thus; Non est assignare causam voluntatis divinae ex parte actus volendi, sed potest assignari ratio ex parte volitorum, in quantum scilicet Deus vult esse aliquid propter aliud. And of predestination in speciall, thus; Sed hoc sub quaestione vertitur, utrum ex parte effectus praedestinatio habeat ali∣quam causam; & hoc est quaerere utrum Deus praeordinaverit se daturum effectum praedestinationis a∣licui propter aliqua merita. Now thus we acknowledge of predestination, both in the way of a meritorious cause on Christs part, and in the way of a disposing cause on our part. For God we say, hath predestinated to bestow upon us, both grace and glory for Christs sake; where Christ is made a meritorious cause of grace and glory,

but not of the act of predestination. And farther we say, that God hath predestina∣ted to bestow glory upon us, as a reward of grace, as a reward of faith, repentance, and good workes: and to this purpose it is said that God by his grace, doth make us meet partakers of the inheritance of the Saints in light, Coloss. 1. 12. But as for the bestowing of grace on any, we say there is no cause thereof on mans part, For he hath mercy on whom he will. Rom. 9. 18. and he hath called us with an holy calling not accor∣ding to our workes, but according to his own purpose and grace. 2 Timoth. 1. 9.

Now let us apply this to reprobation, which is the will of God, as well as pre∣destination, and if there can be no cause of predestination quoad actum Praedestinantis, because there can be no cause of the will of God quoad actum volentis; Who seeth not, that by the same reason, there can be no cause of reprobation quoad actum reproban∣tis? And if it be a mad thing to maintain that merits are the cause of predestinati∣on quoad actum praedestinantis; it must be as mad a thing to maintain, that any merits of the creature, can be the cause of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis. And this do∣ctrine Aquinas applies expresly to Reprobation it selfe, upon the 9. Rom. Lect. 2^da, at the end of these words Praescientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobatio∣nis: but how? ex parte actus reprobantis? nothing lesse, but rather ex parte effectus; and what effect? not the denying of grace, but only as touching the inflicting of pu∣nishment: thus, Praescientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis, ex parte paenae quae praeparatur reprobatis, in quantum scilicet Deus proponit se puniturum malos propter peccata quae à seipsis habent non à Deo.

And farther we prove this, both by cleare evidence of Scripture, and cleare evidence of reason, and thirdly by as cleare a representation of their infatuation that oppose this doctrine, and particularly of the Author of this discourse.

First by cleare evidence of Scripture. Rom. 9. 11. Where the Apostle proves, that Election stands not of good works, by an argument drawn from the circumstance of the time, when that Oracle, The elder shall serve the younger, was delivered; together with the present condition of Jacob and Esau, answerable to that time; thus, Before the children were borne, or had done good or evill, it was said to Rebecca, The Elder shall serve the Younger, Therefore the purpose of God according to Election stands not of good workes. Now look by what strength of reason the Apostle concludes this of Election, by the same strength of argumentation may I conclude of reprobation, in proportion, thus, Before the Children were borne, or had done Good or Evill, it was said to Re∣becca The Elder shall serve the Younger; therefore the purpose of God according to reprobation, stands not of evill workes: that is, like as good workes are not the cause of Election, so evill workes are not the cause of Reprobation, to wit, quoad actum reprobantis, as touching the very act and eternall decree of God it selfe.

Secondly, observe, I pray, whether my reason be not as cleare; If God upon the foresight of sin, doth ordain a man unto damnation; (thus I am content to propose it in the most rigorous manner) then this is done either by necessity of nature, or by the constitution of God: Not by necessity of nature, as it is confessed; and the cause is evident, for undoubtedly he could annihilate them, and so he can the holiest crea∣ture that lives, as all sides confesse. Therefore it must be by the constitution of God: but neither can this hold. For if so, then God did constitute, that is ordaine, that upon the foresight of sin, he would ordaine men unto damnation. Where observe that the act of divine ordination, is made the object of divine ordination: as much as to say, he did ordaine to ordaine, or he did decree to decree: Whereas the objects of Gods decrees are alwaies things temporall; as for example, We say well, God did decree to create the world, to make man out of the earth, to send Christ into the World, to preserve us, to redeeme us, sanctify us, save us. But Gods ordi∣nation or decree is an act eternall, and cannot be the object of his decree or ordina∣tion. I challenge all the Powers of darknes to answer this, and to vindicate the Tenent, which I impugne, from that absurdity, which I charge upon it, if they can.

O but some will say, it's very harsh to say, that God of his meer pleasure doth or∣dain men unto damnation.

I am content to doe my endeavour, to remove this scandall out of the way of ho∣nest hearts, yea and out of the way of others also.

First therefore consider, is it fit to resist the evidence of divine truth, because it is harsh to mens affections?

Secondly, Wherein consists this harshnesse? Is it in this, that nothing is the cause of Gods decree? and will nothing temper the harshnes of it, unles a thing temporall as sinne, be made the cause of Gods will, which is eternall and even God himselfe? But let us deale plainly, and tell me in truth, whether the harshnes doth not consist in this, That the meer pleasure of Gods will, seems to be made the cause, not of Gods decree only, but of damnation also; as if God did damne men, not for sin, but of his meer pleasure. And this I confesse is wondrous harsh, and yet no more harsh then it is untrue, though in this jugling world, things are so carried by some, who will both shuffle, and cutt, and deale themselves, as if we made God of meer pleasure to damne men, and not for sin, which is a thing utterly impossible: damnation being such a notion, as hath essentiall reference unto sin. But if God damne no man but for sinne, and decreed to damne no man but for sinne, what if the meer pleasure of God be the cause of this decree; what harshnes I say is this? As for example, Zimri or Cosby perished in their incestuous act, and gave up both lust and ghost together, so go∣ing as it were quick to Hell, never fearing the judgements of God, untill they felt them. If we say, God decreed they should be cut off in this sin of theirs, and be dam∣ned for it, What hatshnes I pray in this, though God made this decree of meer plea∣sure? For is it not manifest he did? For could he not if it had pleased him, have cau∣sed them to outlive this sin of theirs, and given them space for repentance, and not space only, but grace also for repentance, seeing as Austin saith, Quantamlibet praebuerit * 1.12 Patientiam, nisi Deus dederit, quis aget Paenitentiam.

Now I pray, what is become of the harshnes of this our Tenent as is pretended? And the truth is, the harshnes lyeth not here, though our Adversaries would faine draw it hither, but rather on the other part of reprobation, as it denotes Gods pur∣pose for the denying of grace, to wit, the grace of Regeneration, the grace of faith and repentance: but on this part, they are not very forward to cry out upon our Tenent, as savouring of harshnes, but themselves rather driven to such straites, as ei∣ther to deny faith and repentaince to be the gift of God (wherein the Remonstrants now a daies, are come so far as cleerely to professe, that Christ merited not faith and Regeneration for any; whence it followeth, that if God doth give faith and repen∣tance unto any, yet it is not for Christs sake that he gives it,) Or being demanded how it comes to passe, that God gives it not to all, if his meer pleasure be not the cause of this difference, as namely in shewing mercy unto some, when he hardens o∣thers, they are put upon this shift to say, that if they would believe, God would give them faith, if they would repent God would give them repentance▪ and one that I have had to deale with, on this very argument, spares not to professe that God doth work in man 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle, credere, & resipiscere, modè Velit.

One thing I had almost pretermitted, and that was, to represent the infatuate con∣dition of this declaration, to wit, as touching the Authors Tenet in opposition to ours, as in saying, that Gods decree to cast off men for ever, is grounded upon the foresight of their continuance in sin and unbeliefe; For this continuance must be understood of finall conti∣nuance therein, least otherwise the contradiction to our Tenent be not duely expres∣sed. Now the foresight hereof is made to precede Gods casting men off for ever: but from what? surely from grace and glory, in contradiction to our Tenent as here it is shaped; and consequently in election, the foresight of finall perseverance in faith and repentance, must be shaped to precede Gods giving grace, to wit, in another world, as if the other world were appoynted for the giving of grace to some, and denying it another; and that the giving of the grace of faith and repentance, and denying it un∣to others, was after the one hath persevered in faith and repentance, and the other in infidelity and impenitency unto the end in this World. For this is it we meane by grace, when we say, God in Election destinates it to one, and in Reprobation decrees to deny it unto the other; and in contradicting us it is fit they should use our termes in our meaning, unles they expresse the contrary, and give a reason of it.

3. As for the Persons on whom this decree passeth, and the aggravation there mentioned, namely of shutting up the greater part of men, even of those that are called,

under sinne and damnation, This is confessed on all hands, That the greatest part of men are reprobated, even of those that are called; and our Saviour hath expresly given us to understand, That many are called but few are chosen. And it is without question, that if it be lawfull for God to deale thus with one, it is as lawfull to deale so with the greatest part, yea with all. And experience justifieth that the greatest part of them that are called doe not performe true faith and repentance: and if they did and dye therein, then the greatest part of them that are called, should be chosen. Whereby it is manifest, that God doth not give Faith and Repentance unto the greatest part of them that are called; and consequently, it is nothing strange, that he shuts up the greatest part of them that are called under Damnation. So that in true account there is no weight at all of aggravation in this. Like as you have read in Newes from Parnassus, that when the French and the Spaniard weighed their powers in the ballance, and the French being found to weigh 25 Millions, and the Spaniard but 20: He thinking to help the matter, and to make himselfe as weighty as the French, clapped into the scale the Kingdome of Naples and the Dukedome of Mil∣lan; but beyond his expectation, the scale proved never a whit the more weighty then before, but lighter rather.

4. As for the last claw, to help the matter with a couple of Epethetes of invin∣cible sin and unavoidable damnation; one of these might have sufficed to be expressed, see∣ing undoubtedly Damnation is no otherwise avoidable by man, then by avoiding sin the cause thereof. For it is undenyable that man dying in sin, his damnation is una∣voydable by the whole power of nature.

But as for the avoydablenes of sin, the Author of this Discourse acknowledgeth it no otherwise then by grace; and we willingly professe, that all sin is avoydable by grace. But by the way it is implied, that such a grace is afforded unto all reprobates, whereby they may avoyd that infidelity and impenitency for which they are dam∣ned. But this we deny. For if this were true then all Reprobates were enabled to believe, to repent, to please God, to discerne the things of God, to be subject to the Law of God; but to say this, is directly to contradict the Word of God, which pro∣fesseth of some, that They could not believe Ioh. 12. 39. of others that They cannot repent, Rom. 2. 5. Of all naturall men, that They cannot discern the things of God, as which seem foolishnesse unto them, 1 Cor. 2. 14. of them that are in the flesh, that They cannot please God, Rom. 8. 8. of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the affection of the flesh, that 'tis enmity against God, and it is not subject to the Law of God, nor can be, Rom. 8. 7. And of the Israelites in the Wildernesse for forty years together, God had not given them eyes to see, nor eares to heare, nor an heart to per∣ceive, Deutron. 29. 4.

INTRODUCTION. SECT. II.

THE first side is divided; for

1. Some of them present man to God, in the decree of Reprobation, considered and looked upon out of, or above the Fall, and make the Will of God, without any conside∣ration of sin in man Originall or Actuall, to be the cause of his eternall Rejection, that so he might shew his absolute and unlimited power and dominion over him, in ap∣pointing to heaven or hell, whom he pleased: and this way goe Calvin, Beza, Zanchius, Piscator, Gomarus.

That way seems to charge God very deepely, and to make him the prime and principall cause of mens everlasting ruine, and the author also, not only of the first sin that entred into the world, but of all other sins likewise, that are successively committed therein, as meanes

to bring men by a course and colour of justice, to those lamentable ends to which he had from eter∣nity appointed them: and so by good consequence, it makes the pure and holy God, to be unholy, and ascribes unto him, farre greater cruelty, then can be found in the most bloudy and barbarous Ty∣rant in the World. Suetonius in the life of Tiberius (one of the veryest Butchers of all the Roman * 1.13 Emperours) reports of him, that having a mind to put the two sonnes of Germanicus (Diusus and Nero) to death, Variâ fraude induxit ut concitarentur ad convitia, & concitati perderentur; He used cunning contrivances to draw them to reproach him, that so he might cover his cruelty in their death, under a pretext of justice. And a little after he saith of the same Emperour, that (because it was not lawfull among the Romans to strangle Virgins) he caused certain little maides to be deflowred by the Hang∣man, * 1.14 that so they might afterwards be strangled. This cruelty of Tiberius, exceeded the bounds of humanity, and yet it comes as short of that, which this way laies to the charge of God, as a temporall death comes short of an eternall, and the power of man in drawing men to offend, comes short of that irresistable power, which the Almighty is able to use, in the producing of sin.

Besides, it takes from men all conscience of sin, and makes sin to be no sin. We use to say, Neces∣sitas non habet legem, Necessity hath no law. Actions in themselves evill, if an absolute necessity bear sway in them, are transgressions of no law, and consequently are no sin (for sin is a transgression of the law) and men when they doe them, they have no reason to be forry for them. The Tragoedian could see this, where he saith, Fati ista culpa est, Nemo fit fato nocens, when one evill action is done, the doer is not in fault, but the decree that necessitates him to doe it.

It takes away likewise from good and evill actions, that defect which they naturally carry with them of Rewards and Punishments, as Saint Hierome tells us, Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus, nec ad * 1.15 virtutes nec ad vitia necessitate tranimur, alioqui ubi necessit as est nec damnatio nec corona est. Where neces∣sity domineers, there is no place for retribution; and therefore none are drawn by the adamantine chains of necessity to virtues or vices, but left free to the choyce of their own wills. When Zeno his servant was punished by him for a fault that he had done, he told his Master out of his own grounds that he was unjustly beaten, because he was Fato coactus peccare, constrained so to doe by his unde∣clinable destiny; and certainly, if malefactors could not chuse but play their rude prankes, they could not be justly punished for them. For all just punishments suppose a possibility of avoyding those of∣fences, of which they are the punishments.

TWISSE. Consideration.

THis Authors pretence being only to oppose that Tenent, which maintaines that the decree of denying grace and glory, and of inflicting damnation doth not presuppose the foresight of final perseverance in sin, you may well marvaile to what purpose this comes in about the different condition of man, consi∣dered by God either as before the Fall, or after the Fall in Adam, it being a question of another nature and meerly Logicall, to wit, about the ordering of Gods decrees of Creation, Permission of the fall of Adam, giving or denying Grace, Salvation or Damnation. The resolution whereof, depends upon the right distinction of these de∣crees, in reference to the end, and to the means tending to that end. For this being Resolved according to the rules of Divinity, the order between them, must conse∣quently be determined, according to the rules generally received in the Schooles, namely thus, The intention of the end is first, then the intention of the means: so that if Salvation be the end, and Creation and Permission of Adams Fall and Raising therehence by Faith and Repentance to be the means, it must be confessed, that the decree of Salvation must be first, then the decree of Creation, permission of sin, and of raising out of sin. So if the damnation of any be the end that God intends, and creation and permission of sin, and of finall perseverance therein be the means; it must be acknowledged, that the decree of damnation, was before the decree of creation, &c. But if salvation and damnation be no ends intended by God, but means rather, as well as creation, and permission of all to sin in Adam, together with the raising of some therehence, and leaving some therein, tending to some farther end, namely, the Manifestation of Gods glory in a certain kind, as the Scripture together with mani∣fest reason doth justify. For God being the supreame efficient, must necessarily be the last end. And even there where the word of God doth testify, that God created the wicked against the day of evill, it doth therewithall give to understand, that what is signified by, To the day of evill, doth not denote the end of Gods actions (that before being expressed to be God himselfe, God made all things for himselfe, not for acquiring ought unto himselfe, for he is so perfect, that nothing can be added unto him) but

for the manifesting of his own most glorious nature: so that if God be pleased to manifest his glorious beneficence on man in the highest degree, and that in the way of mercy mixt with justice; this end requires and bespeaks both creation (no glory at all being manifestable without this) and permission of sin (otherwise it could not be manifested in the way of mercy) and satisfaction for sin (otherwise this mercy could not be mixed with justice exactly) and faith and repentance (otherwise the good which God intends could not be bestowed by way of reward) and last of all Salvation, under which we comprehend, the highest and most blessed condition that the nature of man, continuing a meere man, is capable of. And herehence we con∣clude, that in case the end is such as hath been specified, and all these actions follow∣ing, congruous means tending to that end, therefore the decree of manifesting Gods glory, as above specified, is first with God, and secondly the decree of the means; which means although they are many materially, yet they come all under one for∣mall notion of means tending to a certain end, which according to the severall parts thereof bespeaks them all; and consequently they are all to be considered, as making up the object of one formall decree, called the decree of the means: and the intenti∣on of none of them is before another, but all intended at once, as means tending to that end which is first intended. In like manner if God shall be pleased to intend the manifestation of his glory in Man or Angell, in the way of justice vindicative, the means necessarily required hereunto are, Creation, Permission of sin, and Damnati∣on unto punishment, and all three makes up the object of one formall decree, which is to be called the decree of the means. So that like as God doth not intend the crea∣tures creation, before he intends his damnation, in the same respect he cannot be said to intend his damnation, before he intends his creation, or the permission of his sinne.

And this rightly considered, sets an end unto all quarrell about the different consi∣deration of Man in election and reprobation, which yet is about a Schoole point on∣ly, touching the right stateing of the end and the means, and the right ordering of Gods decrees concerning them. And doth it not set an end also, to all aspersions of cruelty cast upon the holy providence of God, from the guilt of which kind of blas∣phemies, nothing can free them; but confidence in their own way, as if it were the way of truth, and that by convincing evidence of holy Scripture? Whereas it appears how little direction they take from the Word of God throughout, for the shaping of their Tenent in this. Yet neither is any such confidence, able to free them from the guilt of such blasphemies which they utter: well it may free them from the consci∣ence of it, yet if it doe, that is more than I know. And only to these two ends doth this aliene discourse of our different opinions thereabouts tend, as I conceive; name∣ly, to shew the difference of our Divines, and to give vent to those aspersions of blas∣phemy on the first way, as also to make way for a third in part, which comes to be considered in the next Section, in the manner how they fall upon the relation of the second way.

Yet Arminius in his Conference with Junius, might have informed him of three opi∣nions concerning the object of Predestination, dividing the fruit of these into two. The condition of man before the Fall, being considerable two waies, either as before the Fall, but after Creation, which they call the Masse created, but not yet corrupted; or as not before the Fall only, but before the creation also, which we commonly call the Masse not yet created, or Mankind not yet created. As touching the most harsh way of these three, upon examination of Arminius his twenty arguments against it, I find no∣thing worth the speaking of, but meere suggestion of flesh and bloud, which yet be∣ing duely pondered, doe discover most shamefull nakednes.

His arguments against the making of Mankind not yet created, the object of prede∣stination, I have proposed and answered in my Vindiciae gratiae Dei, lib. 1. De Praedestin. digress. 5. if this Author hath any mind to be doing with them, I shall be ready to con∣sider what he saith, as God shall give opportunity.

And in Junius you shall finde, how he laboureth to reconcile them, but very ob∣scurely. Piscator also sets hand to the same work, and carryeth himselfe therein (as his manner is) very clearely, by distinguishing three acts in Predestination. The first whereof he will have to presuppose Mankind not created; for it is the decree of cre∣ating man to different ends. The second, he will have to presuppose Mankind crea∣ted, but not corrupted: for it is the decree of permitting Adam to fall, and all Man∣kind

in him. The third and last he will have to presuppose Mankind both created and corrupted; for it is the decree of raising some out of sin, wherein they are con∣ceived and borne, and leaving some therein. As for the Angells it is without questi∣on, that election and reprobation divine had course concerning them, as well as con∣cerning mankind, and as certain it is, that no corrupt Masse could be the object of divine Predestination in their election and reprobation.

As for Arminius his ordering of Gods decrees in opposition to these waies taken by our Divines, that he hath communicated unto us, in the Declaration of his opinion before the States, pag 47. where leaving out the decree of creating mankind in A∣dam, and the decree of permitting all mankind to fall in Adam, he takes into consi∣deration only, the divine decrees of saving sinfull man.

1. The first whereof is, Whereby he decreed to make his Sonne Christ a Mediator, Re∣deemer, Saviour, Priest and King, by his death to abolish sin, by his obedience to obtain Salvation (formerly lost) and by his power to communicate it. And this decree he saith is absolute.

2. The second is, Whereby he decreed to receive into grace such as believe and repent, and those persevering unto the end, to save in Christ, for and by Christ: but such as believe and repent not, to leave under sin and wrath, and to damne as aliene from Christ. Where observe, 1. This decree of saving such as believe and repent, he calleth a decree absolute, yet this de∣cree passeth upon no particular persons: such a decree is reserved for the last place. 2. God (with him) receives none into grace and favour, unles they believe and re∣pent: Whereby it is manifest, that with him faith and repentance are no fruits of Gods grace and favour: for they must be performed before they are received into Gods grace and favour.

3. The third is, Where by he decreed sufficiently and efficaciously to administer the means which are necessary to faith and repentance. This decree whether he conceives it to be abso∣lute or no, he doth not specify; nor whether he decreed to administer them unto all, nor by whom, whether by men only, or by men or Angells, nor whether by means he understands the Gospel only, and we have cause to doubt thereof. And lastly, which is most obscure, he doth not explicate what he means, by sufficient and effica∣cious administration. Only he adds, that in this administration, he carries himselfe according, 1. To his Wisdome, which shewes what becomes his mercy andseverity, and 2^ly to his Justice, whereby he is ready to follow the prescript of his Wisdome.

4. The fourth and last is, Whereby he decreed to save and damne certain particular persons. Now whereas our Divines generally, what way soever they took, had a care out of their Logick and Philosophy which they had by light of nature, to order the decrees divine, according to the common Rules of Art concerning intentions, as they are found to be either of some end, or of some means tending to an end, this seems to have been no part of Arminius his care. This order of his, I have ransaked in my Vindiciae. lib. 3. digress. 2. And if this Author think good, he may answer thereunto, and doe his best to qualify the absurdities wherewith I charge that order of his.

But as touching the embracers of this first way, whose names he expresseth, he had need to prove it. For divers think otherwise of Calvin, and they represent their rea∣sons for it, out of his own words such as these, De aeternâ Dei Praedestinatione. pag. 970. speaking of Pighius. Augustinum ridet (saith he) ejus{que} similes hoc est pios emnes, qui deum imaginantur postquam universalem Generis humani Ruinam in personâ Adae praesciverit, alios ad vitam, alios ad interitum destinasse, & pag. 710. Cùm de praedestinatione sermo habetur, inde exordiendum esse constantèr semper docui atquè hodiè doceo, jure in more relinqui omnes reprobos, qui in Adam mortui sunt atquè damnati.

As for Beza, I know full well he maintained, that man not created is the object of Predestination, but can this Author represent unto us, any place out of Beza, wherein he should affirme, that God doth decree to damne any man but for sin; or that damnation is the end that God intends in the decree of Predestination to death? In his Questions and Answers he professeth the contrary. pag. 111. Postremò non dixi exitium istorum (he speaks of Reprobates) esse finem deo decernenti propositum, sed gloriam ip∣sius. Nequè etiam simpliciter dixi istos esse exitio destinatos, sed justo exitio destinatos dixi. And in his Book De aeternâ Dei Praedestinatione contrà Sebastian. Castell: ad argument. Castell. 2. pag. 346. Quamobrem etiam illud quoquè probavimus, nos ita loqui non solere, & quanquam à Deo simpliciter conditum dicamus ad perditionem, sed idcircò ut ipsius justa condemnatione Dominus ju∣stitiam suam patefaciat.

As for Zanchy; Peter Baro, that caused such perturbation in Cambridge about this ve∣ry

argument, he denyes this to have been the opinion of Zanchy, In summa trium de Prae∣destinatione sententiarum; his words are these, Altera sententia est Augustini, posterior etiam Sohnii Heydelbergensis Theologiae Professoris, & aliorum quorundam Protestantium, ut Zanchii, at∣què etiam Bellarmini, qui omnes priorem illam improbant, in hoc inter se consentientes, ut sit prae∣destinatio ab Adami tantum lapsu accipienda.

And as touching Piscator, he handles the question about the object of Predestinati∣on in a small Treatise, annexed to an answer of his to Hemingius, De Universali Gratiâ; and inquires whether the obiect thereof be Humanum genus nondum conditum, or conditum, but nondum corruptum, or both conditum and corruptum; and his resolution is, that in the decree of Predestination, there is place for all these considerations, according to three severall acts comprised therein, which I have formerly mentioned, and so drawes in∣to one all three opinious.

As touching Gomarus in the last place, I have seen little or nothing of his; but when Lubbertus in his Book Ad 99 Errores Conradi Vorstii pag. 807. had professed, Massam consi∣deratam esse a Deo, non ut integram, sed ut corruptam; and was charged by Vostius as deliver∣ing that which was contrary to the doctrine of Calvin, Beza, and Gomarus, he replies that herein he doth not contradict them, but saith he, Illorum dict a quae quibusdam asperi∣uscula videntur, lenio, & in commodissimum sensum interpretor.

But be it so, that all of them made Humanum genus, not corruptum, no nor integrum, but nondum conditum the object of reprobation. I am of their mind that doe so; and was not D^r Whitaker also, whom very wisely this Author conceales? This renowned Pro∣fessor in the University of Cambridge, in a Publique exercise, his Concio ad Clerum, pro∣fesseth, what Paul speaks De luto & sigulo non posse melius exponi quàm de Massâ incorruptâ: and that Bucer understands it thus, Bucerus per Massam intelligit primam humani ganeris ori∣ginem ex quá homo conditus à Deo & fabricatus est. And he disputes at large, that there is no cause of reprobation, and that neither sin actuall, nor sin originall is the cause thereof, and professeth this to be the Opinion of the Church of England. And though now a daies we be upbraided, as if we had learned it of Papists and Schoole Divines, this great light of Cambridge, spares not to make honourable mention of Schoole∣mens sollid discourse on this point, saying, Hanc sententiam Scholastici si ullam egregiè soli∣de{que} pertractarum praeserùm qui insigniores saniores{que} habiti sunt. Lombardus ait, ut praedestinationis nulla merita sunt, ità nec reprobationis. Now the doctrine which he saith the Schoolemen handle so solidly as none more, is the very doctrine which this Author seems here to impugne, as when he saith, some make the will of God without any consideration of sin in men, originall, or actuall, to be the cause of their eternall Rejection; for D^r Whitaker expresseth it thus, His igitur isto modo explicatis, sequitur tertiam opinionem solummodò & necessario veram es∣se, aequè reprobationis ac praedestinationis causam esse dei voluntatem, quandoquidem providentiae di∣vinae munus est omnia ad fines istos certa ratione certis{que} mediis ordinare. Only as touching the end here mentioned, That so he might shew his absolute and unlimited power and dominion over them, in appointing to heaven or hell whom he pleaseth, that I find not in D^r Whitaker. He saith plainly that God predestinated unto death, whom he would, and because he would: Deus igitur ad mortem praedestinavit quos voluit, & quia voluit: (which phrase I willingly confesse I like not so well) but that the end thereof is to manifest his absolute and unlimited dominion and power, he saith not; and Beza in the places before mentioned, referres it to the ma∣nifestation of Gods justice, as the end thereof. And like as he saith, certissimum est dam∣nationem nunquam nisi propter Peccatum infligi; so I should think it nothing lesse certain, that God doth not ordaine any man to be damned, but for sin, especially cosidering that damnation in the notion thereof, hath an essential reference to sin.

Now since I have found such a Champion as D^r Whitaker for the maintenance of this Tenent, have I cause to feare the sharp censures of any professors in the Country? Were he alive, I presume he would be nothing skarred with the imputation of making God, the Prime and Principall cause of mens everlasting ruine; he would I think require a lit∣tle more learning in the Criminator, then to expresse himselfe so crudely. For with∣out all question, God is the prime and principall cause, nay the sole cause of mans everlast∣ing ruine in genere causae efficient is, though this excludes not a meritorious cause of his own damnation on the creatures part, as D^r Whitaker professeth in the words former∣ly alleadging, acknowledged, Damnationem infligi propter Peccatum.

And farther I am apt to conceive, and have undertaken to justify, and that to the view of the World, that albeit mankind not created, be the only object of predestina∣tion and reprobation, yet no mans reprobation is made by God, citra considerationem

Peccati, in as much as I hold that the decrees of creation, permission of sin, and of finall perseverance therein, and lastly of damnation for sin, are not decrees subordinate, but coordinate and simultaneous, as being decrees concerning means tending to the same end, which is the manifestation of Gods glory, in the way of vindicative justice.

And whereas it is farther urged, that hereby God is made the author of the first sin and of all sins; As I find by D^r Whitakers discourse in his Cygnaea Concio, that were he alive he would answer hereunto, That this Author takes his aime much amisse, con∣sidering, that the effect of Reprobation is not sin, but the permission of sin, and Gods means to the end intended by him, to witt, the manifestation of his glory in the way of vindicative justice, is not sin, but the Permission of sin; according to that of Aqui∣nas, alleadged by the foresaid Doctor thus, Sicut Praedestinatio includit voluntatem confe∣rendi gratiam & gloriam, ita Reprobatio includit voluntatem permittendi cadere in culpam & infe∣rendi damnationis poenam pro culpâ. And as I discern no unholinesse in Gods permitting of sin, so neither doe I discerne any cruelty therein. But D^r Whitaker well perceived that this course of Gods counsells, would seem injurious; and therefore after he had proposed his last argument drawn from that of the Apostle, Rom. 11. ô altitudo! thus, Vltimò illa Apostoli exclamatio, ô altitudo, hanc sententiam confirmat. Ne{que} enim tantae altitudinis est ut penetrari nequeat, Deum odisse homines propter peccatum, etiam antequàm nati sunt; immò ra∣tioni convenientissimum est ut Deus ferre nequeat, quod est naturae suae contrarium. But marke wherein the depth the Apostle speaks of, consists in his judgement; Ib i demùm infini∣tum 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & Abyssus est divinae discretionis, quando sine peccati ratione quidam reprobantur & alii qui nihilo erant amore digniores ad vitam & faelicitatem praedestinantur, ut omnis ratio discretionis ad solam dei voluntatem referatur. And because he knew full well that this mysterious depth of Gods counsell, would seem very harsh to carnall affections, as savouring of cruell and injurious proceedings, therefore he takes expresse notice of it, and that in Austins language, saying, Iniquum videtur (Augustinus ait) ut sine ullis bonorum malorum{que} operum meritis unum Deus diligat, odiat{que} alterum; whence he concludes according to Au∣stin thus, Deus igitur hunc diligit, illumquè odit sine meritis ullis operum aut bonorum aut malo∣rum. Hoc videri possit alicui iniquum, sed est aequissimum, quia sic Deo visum est. Ne{que} Augustinus affirmare veritus est, eos Apostoli verbum evacuare qui judicium divinae discretionis ad opera redu∣cunt praevisa aut praeterita; and so concludes the main point he insists on, thus, Non est igi∣tur peccatum originale causa aeternae reprobationis, nedum actuale. So that both Austin and D^r Whitaker, and all our Divines, knew full well in how harsh an accent this truth sounds in the eares of men; yet because the word of God doth testify this truth unto us, it becomes all Christian hearts to submit, and to acknowledge the equity of it, though we are not able to comprehend the reason of it: Though I know full well, some are so violently carried with the zeale of their own way, that they spare not to professe, that they will sooner deny that there is a God, then yeeld to that which the Contra-Remonstrants teach; which for ought I know, is no other then this which D^r Whitaker taught and Preached publiquely in the University of Cambridge, being at that time Professor Regius. And seeing we acknowledge the seeming harshnes of it, as well as our Adversaries, yet because we find it revealed in Gods word, we hold it our duty to embrace it, and therehence conclude that it is aequissimum. Doth it become any one to take the course this Author takes, and by a Parallel between this course of God, and the courses of Tiberius, as also by a saying of Zeno's servant, to cry it down as iniquissimum, and thence to conclude hand over head, that the word of God doth not teach it? Is this a Christian course? is this Theologicall? is this Scholasti∣call? Yet in my judgement the harshnes lyeth not here, to wit, in the point of Gods purpose to inflict damnation; considering that not one of our divines, that I know, doth maintaine that God did ever purpose to inflict damnation, but for sin. Or if there be any harshnes therein, that is to be found in the kind and degree of punishment and everlastingnesse thereof, God holding them everlastingly as it were upon the rack and in quick sence of torment. And yet we maintaine without contradiction a∣mongst Christians, that it is just with God to doe so for one act of drunkennes or a∣dultery, or the like unrepented of; which kind of punishment, never any Tyrant in the world was known to take, or could take. But the harshnes in my opinion, is most pregnant to bring forth distast on the other part of reprobation, which is the purpose of God to deny grace, this being denied to whom he will, and that of meer pleasure; for like as he shewes mercy on whom he will, so the Scripture testifies, that he hardens whom he will. And not only Austin and D^r Whitaker and our Divines generally doe

take notice, how unsavoury this doctrine is in the judgement of flesh and bloud, espe∣cially in comparing it with Gods ordinary course of complaining of men for their disobedience, even of those whom himselfe hath hardned, but the holy Apostle also Rom. 9. 19. Thou wilt say then, and is it so, doth God harden whom he will? Why then doth he yet complaine? For who hath resisted his will? Now in this case, how doth the Apostle stop the mouthes of such, but thus; O man, who art thou that disputest with God? shall the thing formed, say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power o∣ver the clay, of the same lump to make one vessell unto honour and another unto disho∣nour?

But let us come to the consideration of the Parallel here made between the coun∣sells of Tiberius and the counsells of God. This consists of two parts, according to a double story of Tiberius taken out of Suetonius.

The first is his dealing with Drusus and Nero, the two sonnes of Germanicus, these varia fraude induxit ut concitarentur ad convitia & concitati perderentur, he used cunning con∣trivances to draw them to reproach him, that so he might cover his cruelty in their death, under a pretext of justice. What these cunning contrivances are, it is specifi∣ed by Suetonius; but I hope this Author will acknowledge, that it stands him upon, to represent what those cunning contrivances are, which our doctrine imputes un∣to God, to draw them to sinne against God. Our Divines commonly teach, that God as he is able to keep any man from sinne (as he did the Angells that stood, when their fellowes became Apostates, the cause whereof Austin resolves into amplius Adjutorium given by God, either in their creation or after: De Civit. Dei. lib. 12. cap. 9. Isti aut minorem acceperunt amoris divini gratiam quam illi qui in eadem perstiterunt, aut si utriquè boni aequaliter creati sunt, istis mala voluntate cadentibus, illi amplius adjuti ad eam beatitudinis plenitudinem, unde se nunquàm casuros certissimi fierent, pervenerunt,) so likewise that Gods permission is enough to prostitute any man unto sinne. And not our Divines only, but Arminius also and others. Arminius Exam. pag. 152. Quoties voluntas permittitur a Deo ut faciat aliquid, necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum, secùs permissio non fieret. And Pag. 157. thus he de∣fines the permission of sinne, Permissio peccati est suspensio omnium impedimentorum quibus positis peccatum non fieret. Now let any sober man judge, whether herehence it it followeth not necessarily necessitate consequenti•• & suppositionis, that sinne shall be, to wit, upon the removing of all those impediments upon the position where∣of sinne could not be; considering that an impediment of sinne in this case and in Arminius his phrase is every thing quo posito peccatum non fuerit. Vorstius in like manner, in Amicitia duplicatione Pag. 213. Fateor quidem permissione jam positâ in actu necessariò etiam poni rem aliquam permittendam, id{que} ob necessariam talium relatorum ad se invicem habitudinem, at{que} in arguendo mutuam quandam 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 quae ferre non potest ut unum sine altero reipsâ sit, nedum ut alterum extra se quidquam verè agat, altero ne qui∣dem adhuc existente, nedum verè patiente, aut contra. Navarettus in 1. Quest. 19. Art. 9. §. 2. maintaines, Posita permissione infallibilitèr sequi quod permittitur. Austin himselfe supposeth as much where he saith, Ad omnipotentissimam suam bonitatem pertinere, po∣tiùs bona ex malis elicere, quam mala esse non sinere. For hereby he gives to under∣stand, that God permits sinne with a purpose to work good out of evill. Now this manifestly implies, that upon Gods permission of sinne, sinne shall exist. Nay how can this be avoided, unlesse we deny that God alone, is he that keepes us from running into sinne, and maintaine that man can doe this of himselfe, without that speciall grace of God, whereby he keepes us from sinne: yet in the Councel of Palestine, it was concluded, that Gods grace was required to every act, and Pelagi∣us himselfe was driven to subscribe thereunto, and to anathematize those that deni∣ed. Now let us examine what this grace of God is, which is necessarily required to every good act, whether God doth not work the will thereunto, according to that, I will cause them to walk in my statutes, and keep my judgements and doe them: Ezech. 36. 28. or whether it be only such a Cooperate grace, as some now a daies blush not to pro∣fesse as whereby God workes in us, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle bonum modò Velimus, this I can shew under the hand of a zealous Partizan for Arminius. Now I hope there is no such cunning contrivance in the permission of sinne.

Farther, there are certain occasions & opportunities offered for the cōmitting of sin in the course of the World: We willingly ascribe unto God the administratiō of these,

and so doth Arminius; and that not of Occasions only, but of Arguments also inciting unto sin, Disput. Pub. Thes. 9. De Iustitiâ & Efficaciâ providentiae Dei in malo. Num. 6. Efficientia Dei circa peccatum concernit tum actum ipsum tum vitiositatem ejus. Efficientia quae circa initium consideratur vel impeditio vel permissio est; cui addimus administrationem argumentorum & occasio∣num ad peccatum incitantium.

Yet there is a greater power of provocation unto sin then all these, & that is by the practises of Satan, who goeth about like a roaring Lyon seeking whō he may devoure. How coms he to have such liberty? Hath not God power to bind Satan for a thousand years and more if it please him? The Devills sometime besought our Saviour, that he would not send them into the deep; surely they acknowledged thereby his power to send them thither; yet he did not, though he was not ignorant, that their going about was like so many roaring lyons, to devoure the soules of men by provoking unto sin. As for those that Tiberius set about Drusus and Nero to provoke them, what were they comparable to the Devill and his Angells for the practising of provoking courses? But Tiberius bid his servants to provoke Drusus and Nero and not to spare: but can any say truely that we maintaine that God bids the Devill to provoke this Author, or any such Arminian spirit to make such parallels as these? Yet 1 Kings 22. we read when a wicked spirit offers his service to God to intice Ahab that he might goe and fall at Ramoth-Gilead, & that by becoming a lying spirit in the mouth of all his Prophets, the Lord not only accepts it, saying, Goe forth and doe so; but also tells him, thou shalt entice him, and shalt also pre∣vaile. That was a great deale more then was in the power of Tiberius, or his instigators, or the Devills themselves. And did not Ahab deserve as much at the hands of God? And why might not this Author and his fellowes, have deserved so much at the hands of God, as to have a lying spirit put in the mouthes of them, on whom they depend for resolution in poynts of Divinity, and that they prevaile with them also? And why may not he also be thus given over to illusions to believe lies? Nay, what doe we talk of de∣sert in this? Did not the Devill provoke Eve and Adam to sin against God in Paradise? Could not God have kept the Devill off? Why did he not? Cur non intercessit & circum∣scriptorem colubrum cohibuit? to speak in Tertullians phrase. Doth it not manifestly appeare, that it was Gods will to have them tempted, to have them provoked unto sin? & why not? Is it lawfull for a man to lay a bait of gold and silver in his servants way to try his fidelity, and whether such a provocation will make a breach upon his honesty; and shall not such a course be lawfull unto God? for this nothing hinders their liberty of transgressing. And to serve God while we are not tempted to sin against him, is a poor commendation: If thou faint in the day of adversity thy strength is small, saith Solomon. Iob. 1. 11. * 1.16 Stretch out now thine hand and touch all that he hath, and see if he will not blaspheme thee to thy face; as much as to say, Let but Iob be in this manner provoked, and see whether he will not blaspheame. What is the Lords answere? Lo, all that he hath is in thine hand, only upon himselfe shalt thou not stretch out thine hand. Hereupon Satan goes to his work. One messenger comes and brings tydings, saying, The Oxen were plowing, and the Asses feeding in their places, and the Sabeans came violently and took them, yea, they have slaine thy servants with the edge of the sword, and I only am escaped alone to tell thee: Upon the neck of him comes another, saying, The fire of God is fallen from heaven, & hath burnt up thy sheep and thy servants, and devoured them, and I only am escaped alone to tell thee. Upon the back of him comes a third saying, The Caldeans set out three bands, and fell upon the Camells and have taken them and slain thy servants with the edge of the sword, & I only am escaped alone to tell thee. After all these coms a fourth, saying, Thy sonnes and thy daughters were eating and drinking wine in their eldest bro∣thers house, and behold there came a great wind from beyond the wildernesse, and smote the fowre cor∣ners of the house which fell upon thy children & they are dead, and I only am escaped alone to tell thee. Here are provocations enough, and can it be denied, but that God would have Iob's uprightnesse thus to be tried? And hath not God power thus to try any other nothing so upright as Iob (whatsoever be the consequents thereof) unto transgression, though it be even to the cursing of their King and their God? as Is. 8. 21. He that is afflicted and famished, shall goe to and fro in it, and when he shall be hungry he shall even fret himselfe and curse his King and his gods and shall look upward: and Revelations 16. 21. There fell a great haile like talents out of heaven upon the men, and men blas∣pheamed God because of the Plague of the haile, for the plague thereof was exceeding great. Yet Job continued in his uprightnesse, his wicked Wife perceived it, though shee her selfe was enraged, and betrayed the corruption of her heart within, but he was no more effectually brought thereby to sin against God, then Joseph was by the temp∣tation

of his wanton Mistris: though David fell fowlly and shamefully, provoked thereunto by the sight of Bathsheba, and did not God by his providence bring him to the sight of Bathsheba, as he brought Shimei and David after this together, as Arminius and his complices confesse, when Shimei railed on him? A great provocation to so great a Person as David, if not to bid, yet at least to suffer Abishai to cut off that doggs head, as he called him; yet David would not suffer him, and why? Let David himselfe answer; The Lord, saith he, hath bidden him to curse David. It may be the Lord will render un∣to me good, for his cursing this day. He fell not foule upon God, though acknowledging his just providence herein. And to make a Parallele between the courses of God, and the courses of Tiberius that monster of men, in taking a course with Drusus and Nero to provoke them to the reproaching of him, that he might destroy them: Thus David was not corrupted with the provocations of his Subject, as Drusus and Nero were by a fellow Subject to convitiate their Prince. Neither did he fare the worse for this, but no doubt found cause to blesse God for his grace, in restraining him from breaking forth into any intemperancy of tongue or spirit, like as formerly he blessed God for the good counsel of Abigal, whereby he was restrained from shedding bloud, and that his own hand did not save him. And if it be not lawfull for us to provoke another unto sin, will it follow forthwith, that it is not lawfull for God to provoke? One is provoked by prosperity to corrupt his waies, another by adversity is provoked to break forth into impatience and blasphemy? What then? shall not God be acknow∣ledged to be the Author both of prosperity and adversity? Nay, what doth the Lord long before professe what should be his providence towards the Jewes? and that in this very kind of provoking them. Deutron. 32. 21. They have moved me to jealousy with that which is not good, they have provoked me to anger with their vanities: and I will move them to jealousy with those that are no people, I will provoke them to anger with a foolish Nation.

But let us consider more distinctly, what this act of provocation is, and wherein it consists, that we may be the better able to judge in what case we may safely attribute it unto God, and in what case not, that so we may neither ascribe that unto him which doth not become him, nor deny that unto him which doth become him, both these courses being equally blasphemous, and so reputed among Schoole Divines.

Now Provocation in the most usuall phrase of Scripture is by way of exasperation, and it is an incitation unto wrath; and never otherwise taken when man is said to pro∣voke God. And in the same sense it is delivered in the particular fact of Tiberius here mentioned. But when a resemblance is here made between the particular course of Tiberius and the courses of God, Gods provocation of man is not to wrath only, but meant of incitation to any kind of sin, whether it be by way of exasperation, or by way of alluring and enticing, according to the severall passions and affections of man, which are apt to be moved severall waies to sin, amongst which the passion anger is but one. And as it is said of the wrath of man, that it workes not the righteousnesse of God; so it is verified of every other inordinate affection. In the 1 Chron. 24. 1. it is said that Satan provoked David to number Israel. That was not by way of exasperation and moving in him the passion of anger, by the working upon some other passion, whether pride or curiosity: and therefore though it be rendred by the word, Provoked, yet in the Originall the word used signifieth properly to tempt. But consider we provocati∣on according to the propriety thereof in the first place, by way of exasperation.

Now consider, I pray, whether the Ministers of Tiberius did more exasperate Drusus and Nero, then God exasperated Ionah. Ionah. 4. 7. For having prepared a Gourd and made it to come up over Ionah, that it might he a shaddow over his head, and deliver him from his griefe; & Ionah being exceeding glad of the Gourd, God prepared a worme when the morning rose the next day and it smote the Gourd that it withered. And God proceeded farther then this. For when the Sun did arise, God prepared also a fervent east wind, and the Sun heat upon the head of Ionah, that he fainted and wished in his heart to dye, and said it is better for me to dye then to live. And not only so, but justified himselfe in this his impatience. For when the Lord said unto him, doest thou well to be angry for the Gourd? Ionah stoutly answered, I doe well to be angry to the death. It's true, Ionah brake not forth into blasphemies against God, as it seems Drusus and Nero did against Tiberius. Ionah was better brought up under the wings of God then so. Gods grace preserved him from such excesse, but that the Ministers Tibe∣rius set about them, did more provoke them by exasperating courses, then God did in like manner provoke Ionah, it doth not appeare: but had Ionah hereupon broken forth into blasphemies, had Ionah's sinne been excusable or Gods course blameable?

Revel. 16. 21. we read of a great hayle that fell upon the men like Talents out of heaven, and men blaspheamed God because of the plague of the hayle, for the plague thereof was exceeding great. And Isai 8. 21. The Lord prophecyeth, that, He that is afflicted and famished, shall goe to and fro, and when he shall be hungry, he shall even fret himselfe, and curse his King and his Gods and look upward. such plagues are the work of God, for there is no evill in the citty but the Lord hath done it. Amos 3. But let them look unto it, that thereupon take occasion to blaspheme. And Tentatio probationis was never yet that I know denyed unto God, to try whether they will blaspheme God or no. To this end Satan desired to have an hand on Job, yet not so much to try whether he would blaspheme or no, but being confident he should bring him to blaspheme. Job. 1. 11. stretch out now thine hand and touch all that he hath, and he will curse thee to thy face. The Lord gave him leave, and Job acknowledgeth the Lords hand in all that Satan did, saying, The Lord gave and the Lord takes away, yet in all this Job sinned not nor charged God foolishly. Satan desires yet farther liberty, saying skin for skin, yea all that a man hath will he give for his life. But put forth thy hand now and touch his bone, and his flesh, and he will curse thee to thy face. And the Lord said unto Satan, Behold he is in thy hand, but save his life. So went Satan forth from the presence of the Lord, and smote Job with sore boyles from the sole of his foot unto his crowne, and he took him a pot∣shard to scrape himselfe withall, and he sate down among the ashes, Then said his Wife unto him, Doest thou yet continue in thy integrity? Curse God and dye. She manifested the inward cor∣ruption of her irreligious heart. Job might have brought her to a forme of godlines by his pious courses in his family, but litle power of godlinesse doth appeare upon her. For as Solomon saith, If thou faint in the day of adversity thy strength is small. It seems her heart was sowred with Atheisme, thinking the world was governed by chance, rather then by divine providence, and consequently it was all one, whether a man did blesse God, or curse God, and a madnesse to make a conscience of walking in in∣tegrity, and that in Iobs case at this time, whether he did blesse God he must dye, or whether he did curse God he could but dye, and better it was for him thus impove∣rished, thus afflicted, to dye then to live; as for the powers of the world to come, it seems she never had but a tast of them, and that tast never produced any true faith in her concerning them. Here was a sore temptation, the very gates of hell playing up∣on him with their greatest Ordinance to batter (if it were possible) his shield of faith. But what is Iobs answer. Thou speakest as one of the foolish women speaketh. What shall we re∣ceive good at the hand of God and shall we not receive evill? In all this did not Iob sin with his lips. The worke of Satan in the impoverishing of Iobs estate, and afflicting his person, can∣not be denied to be Gods work. As for the work of his wife, why might not that be the work of God, as well as the work of Satan? For did not Satan sin in all this? As our Saviour saith that he was a murtherer from the beginning, and as S^t Peter saith, The devill goes about like a roring Lyon seeking whom he may devoure; so who can make doubt but these courses practised against Iob, were fruits of his murthering and de∣vouring disposition? And all sides now a daies confesse, that the act of the most flagi∣tious sin committed by man or Angell, is the work of God in the way of a principall efficient cause, as well as it is the work of the creature. And as for the sinfulnesse of the act, either of the Devill or his Wife, that was not it which did or could hurt Iob: but the works wrought by Satan, the temptation atheisticall proposed by his Wife, this was the greatest danger in the consideration thereof to corrupt his soule, for that is it alone that workes upon the will to incline it. And as for their sinning herein, that proceeded from the want of Gods feare, according to that of Abraham. Genes. 20. 10. I said surely the feare of God is not in this place, therefore they will slay me for my Wives sake. And albeit God engageth himselfe towards some, for the putting of his feare in their hearts, that they shall never depart away from him. Ierim. 36. 40. yet he hath not en∣gaged himselfe thus farre towards all. For the Apostle plainly professeth, that, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth Rom. 9. 18. and hardning we know is denying the feare of God, either as touching the habituall infusion thereof, or as touching the actuall excitation thereof after it is infused. Yet I deny not but obdu∣ration and excaecation are sometimes promiscuously used, the one for the other, be∣cause of the strict conjunction that is betwixt them. And as touching the particular act of Convitiation, Austin spares not to professe, that even when it is committed by man, it is brought forth by God out of his secret providence lib. 9. Confess. cap. 8. Quid egisti Deus meus? unde curasti? unde sanasti? nonne protulisti durum & acutum ex alterâ ani∣mâ convitium tanquam medicinale ferrum ex occultis provisionibus tuis & uno ictu putredinem il∣lam

praecidisti? And whereas Bellarmine endeavoureth to blast the evidence of this place giving testimony unto Gods secret providence in evill, I have endeavoured to shew the vanity of his discourse in my Vind. Grat. Dei lib. 2. Crim. 3. digress. 2. cap. 13. And in what congruity can it be said, that God bid Shimei to curse David, but that in the same analogy of faith, it may be said, that God bid Iobes Wife in this manner to tempt him? And which of the two was the greatest provocation, Tiberius his Ministers Pro∣vocation of Drusus and Nero; or Shimei's provocation of David rayling on him to his face, the Subject blaspheaming his Prince? undoubtedly the provocation was no∣thing inferior, only here was the difference; Tiberius gave such commandment to his Ministers so to provoke Drusus and Nero, God gave no such commandement (in pro∣per speech) unto Shimei, but rather commanded the contrary in his law, Thou shalt not speak evill of the ruler of thy people. But Gods secret providence, whereby he makes use of all his creatures in what condition soever he finds them, even of Devills and wicked men, to serve his turne by them, either in the way of judgement, or in the way of mer∣cy, and sometimes for triall of the faith and patience of his children, is in Scripture phrase called Gods bidding or commanding. And indeed it is farre more effectuall then his commandment. And Austin by pregnant passages of holy Scripture convi∣cted of this truth, spareth not to professe as much in these words, His & talibus testi∣moniis divinorum eloquiorum quae omnia commemorare nimis longum est, satis quantum existimo manifestatur operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocunquè volue∣rit sive ad bona pro suâ misericordiâ, sive ad mala pro meritis eorum, judicio uti{que} suo, aliquando a∣perto, aliquando occulto, semper autem justo. De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. cap. 21. And touching this particular case of Shimei, inquiring about the interpretation of it, see I pray, how he resolves concerning it. Quomodo dixerit dominus huic homini maledicere David, Quis sa∣piens & intelliget. Non enim jubendo dixit, ubi obedientia laudaretur, sed quod ejus voluntatem proprio vitio suo malam in hoc peccatum judicio suo justo & occulto inclinavit. Ideò dictum est, dixit ei do∣minus. Nam si jubenti obtemper asset Deo, laudandus potius quam puniendus esset, sicut ex hoc pec∣cato posteà novimus esse punitum. And he proceeds farther to shew the reason of this di∣vine providence. Nec causa tacita est, cur ei Deus justo modo dixerit maledicere David, hoc est, * 1.17 Cor ejus malum in hoc peccatum miserit vel dimiserit ut videat (inquit) dominus humilitatem meam & retribuat mihi bona pro maledictio ejus in die isto. And hereupon concludes. Ecce quomo∣do probatur Deum uti cordibus etiam malorum ad laudem at{que} adjumentum bonorum. Sic usus est Iuda tradente Christum. Sic usus est Iudaeis crucifigentibus Christum, & quanta inde bona praesti∣tit populis credituris? Qui & ipso utitur diabolo pessimo, sed optimè ad excercendam & probandam fidem & pietatem bonorum non sibi, quia omnia scit antequam fiant, sed nobis quibus erat necessari∣um, ut eo modo ageretur nobiscum.

But let us proceed to provocations unto other sins, not in the way of exasperation, but in the way of allurements. Achan was a covetous person, at the sacking of Jeri∣cho, it was his hap to light among the spoyle, upon a goodly Babylonish garment, and two hundred shekells of silver, and a wedge of gold of fifty shekells waight. Was not so faire a prey, a sore temptation to a covetous person? How was Demosthenes ta∣ken with a rich bowle that was shewed him by Harpalus, but there was great danger in it, I confesse, yet if desire of prey doth sometimes overrun the sent, may it not as well over∣come the feare of danger, especially considering the opportunity of secrecy to con∣vey it closely into his Tent and hide it there? I saw, saith he, and I coveted them and took them, and behold they lye hid in the earth in the midst of my Tent, and the silver under it. Now can it be denied, but that God by his providence brought him into this temptation, and consequently into this provocation, for to tempt is to pro∣voke 1 Chron. 21. 1. And is it not just with God, to bring any man into such tempta∣tions of what kind, or in what degree soever (seeing no temptation or provocation in this kind or degree, bereaves a man of the liberty of his will) If not, what meant our Saviour to teach his Disciples, and in them us, to pray unto God that He will not lead us into temptation? And what cause hath Achan to complaine of this temptation? We do not read he did; was it not the condition of many others as well as himselfe? Was this prey that he ceazed on, the only spoyle of that great Citty? Were there no Babylonish garments but that one, no more silver or wedges of gold, but that Achan lighted on? Yet they refrained, some out of the feare of God, that restrained them in a gracious manner, and kept them from sinning against him: others though not out out of a feare of God, yet out of the feare of punishment, were moved to beware how they transgressed. For albeit, Libertas sine gratia non est libertas, sed contumacia, as * Austin * 1.18

writes, yet feare of punishment oftimes restraines from committing capitall crimes, though this restraint be not gracious; and considerations of lesse force then these doe prevaile many times with carnall men, both to abstain from evill, and to doe that which is good, though not in a gracious manner. As we read in the Gospell of a wicked Judge, that neither feared God nor reverenced man, yet he would doe the Widdow justice to ease himselfe of her importunate sollicitations where with she mo∣lested him.

Come we to provocations unto sinne of another nature, in satisfying the concupis∣cence of the flesh. David arising out of his bed at eventide, and walking upon the roof of the Kings Pallace, from the roofe he saw a Woman washing her selfe: and the Woman was very beautifull to look upon: we know what followed hereupon. Now was it not God that lead him into this temptation, into this provocation? Surely if this were not just with God, it were in vaine for us to pray, that God will not lead us into temptation; for we need not feare any such temptation, which cannot befall us without violation of Gods justice in the course of his providence. Paul the Apostle, least he should be exalted out of measure, through the abundance of revelations (made unto him, which were very dan∣gerous to puff a man up, and make him swell in the conceit of his own worthinesse being admitted into the secrets of God) was sometimes exercised with a thorne in the flesh, the messenger of Satan sent to buffet him. But the feare of God was alive in him, and stirred up his faith to pray unto God three times that it might depart from him: and the Lord made him a gracious answer, not as yet to deliver him, but to support him in this conflict, and give him the victory over it. For the Lord said unto him, my grace is sufficient for thee, for my power is made perfect in thy weaknesse. This answer put heart into Paul; Therefore, saith he, will I very gladly rejoyce rather in mine infirmities that the power of Christ may dwell in me. Mark I pray, Rahter, in mine infirmities. He would not blame God for thus exercising him, but rather rejoyce to be thus exercised, for as much as this same should doe him no harme; for by vertue of Christs power dwelling in him he should have the victory. Secondly, it should doe him good in preserving him from being exalted out of measure through the abundance of revelations. Therefore, saith he, I take plea∣sure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecutions, in anguishes for Christs sake; for when I am weak then am I strong. And had not Joseph as good cause to conceive that it was the will of God, that he by the unchast motions of his wanton Mistris, should be provoked unto unclean courses, as David had to perswade himselfe, that it was Gods will by the rayling of Shimei he should be provoked unto revenge; that so by the power of his grace, strengthning them against such provocations, they might come forth of their severall temptations, as gold out of fire, more bright more resplendent then before? Ioseph was a faire person and well favoured Genes. 39. 6. Now this was a sore provocation to a lustfull eye. Beauty is said to be of a dangerous nature, as that which makes a man either Praedonem alienae castitatis or Praedam suae. But Joseph had a gracious and a chast heart, his beauty gave him no encouragement to prey upon o∣thers chastity, but being a congruous baite to the lustfull appetite of his Mistris, it was in danger to expose his own chastity to be preyed upon. And as Austin said of Gods providence concerning Shimei, ejus voluntatem proprio vitio suo malam in hoc peccatum judicio suo justo & occulto inclinavit. Who seeth not, that the like may be said of Gods dealing with Ioseph's Mistris? and that without all aspersion of unholinesse unto God. For if he gives Men or Women over unto their lusts, what will be the issue but uncleannesse: Rom. 1. 24, 26. When God gave them up to vile affections, what followed but this? even their Women did change their naturall use into that which was against nature, vers. 27. and likewise also the Men left their naturall use of the Women, and burned in their lust one toward ano∣ther; and Man with Man wrought filthinesse, and received in themselves such recompence of their er∣rour as was meet. Here we have a strange course of Gods providence in punishing sin with sin. For these Gentiles in defiling themselves one with another, in a most unna∣turall and abominable manner, are said to receive such recompence for their errour as was meet. In few words, what is meant by provocation unto any sin? Is it to doe that whereupon man may take just cause or occasion to doe that which he doth without blame? like as the Corinthians provoked Paul, as a foole to loast himselfe, as himselfe ex∣presseth it, for he adds, ye have compelled me. But this cannot be affirmed of Tiberius his ministers in provoking Drusus and Nero. For no provocation could be sufficient to make them unblameable in convitiating their Prince, much lesse can it be said, that God provokes any man in this manner: neither doe I think that any of our adversa∣ries

(as malevolent as they are) dares impute any such crimination unto us, as if wee attributed any such discourse unto providence divine. What then is it to provoke un∣to sin? Is it to doe somewhat upon the consideration whereof, mens passions being moved, they cannot but sin. But this in like sort is equally as untrue, as the former, even of those provocations which were made upon Drusus and Nero by the practises of Tiberius. Or is it the doing of somewhat, whereupon occasion is taken to sinne, to blaspheme? this hath no colour of truth in it. For even man without all transgressi∣on may doe many things, whereupon occasion is taken of doing evill, and therefore we distinguish of Scandalum datum & Acceptum. Nay, though man knowes offence will be taken upon the doing of some things, yet if the doing thereof be commanded by God, he must doe them, what occasion soever is thereby taken to offend. Indeed if they are things indifferent, I must abstaine from the doing of them, in case I know of∣fence will be taken thereat, and that thereby I shall lay a stumbling block in the way of my Brother. For Paul professeth that if meat would offend his Brother, he would never eat meat rather then offend his Brother. But no such obligation lies upon God. For he knoweth full well how some will abuse his mercies, others grow worse and worse by his judgements, breaking forth into blasphemy thereupon: yet no wise man will say that God is the more unholy in the shewing of mercy, and in the execution of judgement. He professeth in plain termes, that to them who feare him he will be a sanctuary, but as a stumbling block, and as a rock to fall upon to both the houses of Israel, and as a snare, and as a net, to both the Inhabitants of Ierusalem, Isai. 8. 14.

As for the last clause of this odious Parallel, concerning the end of Tiberius his course in this, namely that so he might cover his cruelty in their death under pretext of justice. Undoubtedly I should think the putting of them to death was just in case they did convitiate their Prince whatsoever their provocations were. For hereby they deser∣ved death, yea everlasting death and damnation. His sin was in causing them to be provoked hereunto, and so also it might be in the manner of their execution. For it is written of him that fame necavit, he famished them. I know Tiberius was cruell e∣nough, but by the story it seems, that policy, wicked policy moved him unto this; first to intend their deaths because he saw the affections of the people towards them, be∣like for Germanicus his sake, a worthy man according to those times. For when he found that in the beginning of the yeare, vowes were made on their behalfe, to wit, for their preservation he dealt with the Senate, that such rewards ought not to be tendred, but towards such who were of experience and of ripenesse of age: and that hereupon the inward character of his affection towards them being discovered, he laid them open to every mans criminations, varia{que} fraude inductos ut & concitarentur ad convitia & concitati perde∣rentur, accusavit per literas, amarissimè congestis etiam probris, & judicatos hostes fame necavit. And anon after, the same Author discovers the reason of all this, to wit, that seeing Germanicus was but his adopted Sonne, and one Drusus by name was his naturall sonne, and his own sonne Drusus being dead, leaving a sonne Tiberius behind him, he desired to make him as his naturall sonne his successor in the Empire. Aelium Sejanum ad sum∣mam potentiam non tàm benevolentia provexer at quàm ut esset cujus ministerio ac fraudibus liberos Germanici circumveniret: Nepotem{que} suum ex Druso filium naturalem ad successionem Imperii confir∣maret. Sure we are God hath no need of any such politique courses; neither hath he need of any pretext of justice to take a mans life from him. It is confessed now of all hands, that God can annihilate the holiest Angel by power absolute. And if it be in the power of God to keep any man from sin, as I think no wise man will deny, surely it is in his power to refuse to keep any reasonable creature from sin. For certainly though Adam were created in innocence, yet he preserv'd him not in innocency, but left him to himselfe, having exposed him to Satans temptations. The Angells had no Satan to tempt them; God preserved the elect Angells from sinning, and how? let Au∣stin speak in this particular; either by giving them majorem amoris divini mensuram in their creation then their fellowes; or by giving them amplius adjutorium after their cre∣ation. And in particular concerning Adam, the same Author professeth that God gave him, Posse si voluit, but he gave him not, Velle quod potuit. And dares any man deny that it is in the power of God by the deniall of his efficacious grace, to make way for the entring of sin into the World, and that wonderfull work of the incarnation of the sonne of God, and the redemption of the World by him; as also for the manife∣station of his own glory, both in the way mercy by the pardoning of sin, and in the way of justice by the punishing of sin. Let Arminius be heard in this, Who confesseth

that God in the storehouse of his wisdome and power, hath not only sufficient impe∣diments of sin, but efficacious also, by the use whereof, sinne would certainly and in∣fallibly be hindered. His words are these, Praeter illa sufficientia, impedimenta etiam effica∣cia habet in suo sapientiae & potentiae thesauro, quibus productis certô & infallibiliter peccatum im∣pediretur. * 1.19 Which if it be true, certainly it was as true, as touching the hindering of the sinne of Adam, as of hindering any mans sinne else from the time of Adams fall. And as certain it is that God would not make use of any of these impediments, though it is apparent these impediments Arminius speakes of, are of such a nature as whereby sinne would be hindered without any prejudice to the freedome of mans will, as appears by all his instances following of this kind, shewing how God did efficaciously hinder the sinnes of many. And indeed it is evident in reason and such as cannot be denied, unlesse a man will say, that whatsoever course had been taken by God to preserve him from sinne, without prejudice to the freedome of his will, yet neverthelesse he would have sinned: which is in so high a degree absurd, as manifestly to contradict the very light of nature. For seeing Adam in the state of innocency was naturally in∣different, as well to stand, as to fall; and morally more inclined to stand then to fall; (for as much as God had made him good) even in respect of this indifferency it cannot be said, that upon every occasion or temptation unto sin, he would have yeelded thereunto. For such a condition is not an indifferent condition. Nay Philosophers ackowledge that of three sorts of contingents, one sort is of such which they call, Contingentia aequalitèr, that is, such as fall out as often one way as another. And what * 1.20 are these? surely all such and none but such as are subject to a mans free will. And e∣ven of Esau borne in sin (so was not Adam) Austin thinks it strange, that any man should deny, but that there was a course to have called him as effectually, as he called * 1.21 Jacob, had he been pleased to have used it. Now hereby it manifestly appears, that God hath no need of any provoking courses, exasperating courses to draw them unto sinne, let him but withold those efficacious impediments of sin, which are in the store∣house of his wisdome and power, as Arminius acknowledgeth, and sinne hereupon shall enter. For the permission of sinne (by Arminius his distinction of it) is the suspen∣sion of that efficiency whereupon it would be avoided. And if it were a safe course to * 1.22 judge of what becometh God by that which becometh man, we should conclude e∣ven of permission of sin, that like as it becometh not us to permit sinne if it lieth in our power to hinder it, in the same manner it becometh not God to permit any sinne, seeing it lyeth in his power to hinder it. Sed judicia ejus (saith Austin) multa abyssus. Nos certè, si eos in quos nobis potestas est ante oculos nostros perpetrare scelera permittamus, rei cum ipsis * 1.23 erimus: quàm verò innumerabilia ille permittit fieri ante oculos suos, quae uti{que} si voluisset nulla ra∣tione permitteret. In the 2 Kings 2. 26, 27. we read of a desperate course of the King of Moab, that finding the battail to be sore against him, first tryed with 700 men to break through to the King of Edom, but when he could not, he took his eldest sonne that should have raigned in his steed, and offered him for a burnt offering upon the wall; the sight of which barbarous part of his strook griefe into the hearts of the chil∣dren of Israel, so that they departed from him, and returned into their country. What, therefore shall we condemne God, for sending Abraham to sacrifice his sonne, his only sonne, his sonne Isaac? In the 16 Iudg. we read a strange story of Sampson whose faith is commended Hebr. 11. For there we read how he dyes, his heart flam∣ing with desire of revenge, and yet with great devotion prayes unto God to assist him, that he might be avenged of the Philistins for his two eyes. O Lord God I pray thee think upon mee, O God I beseech thee strengthen me at this time only, that I may be at once avenged of the Philistins for my two eyes. And again, Let me loose my life with the Philistins: & he bowed himselfe with all his might, and the house fell upon the Princes, and upon the people that were therein; so that the men that he slew at his death, were more then they which he had slaine in his life. For both the house it selfe was full, and upon the roofe of it there were about 3000 men and women. Here is a strange massacre wrought by Sampson an Israelite upon the Phili∣stins, at that time when the Israelites were in subjection to the Philistins who were their Lords, as sometimes Pharaoh was. For the men of Judah admonished him when they came up to the rock Etam to bind Sampson. Knowest thou not (say they) that the Phi∣listins are rulers over us? Wherefore then hast thou done thus unto us? to wit, in taking such courses as might well provoke the Philistins to root out the Israelites. Yet neverthe∣lesse he comes sparkling with zeale to destroy many thousands of them, yea the Prin∣ces with the rest, and well pleas'd to destroy himselfe with them, to be avenged of

them for his two eyes. And how could this be done by him without some speciall & propheticall instigation & animation received from the spirit of God, we know not. And who doubts, but that God animating him hereunto, all this was lawfull? which without Gods warrant, could be no lesse then abominable & most damnable sins. Yet undoubtedly God did not animate Herod, & Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and people of Israel to do what they did against our Saviour, but rather left them to be ordered by his Law, wherein such things are prohibited. And neverthelesse the A∣postles in their pious meditation with one voyce professe, that, All these were gathered to∣gether against the holy Son of God, to doe those things which Gods hand, and Gods councell had prede∣stinated to be done: and why the like is not to be acknowledged of the most barbarous facts committed by Tiberius, or any other monster of nature, I know no reason. And as touching shamefull courses, no lesse abominable in the kind of acts flagitious, as these here mentioned of Tiberius were, in the kind of acts facinorous; The Apostle professeth both that God gave them up to vile affections, and to the lusts of their own hearts, to the committing of such abominations, and also that herein they received such recom∣pence of their errour as was meet; and the errour which God avenged in this manner what was it, but such wherein Tiberius was as deep, as those whom the Apostle speaks of, namely, in changing the glory of the incorruptible God, to the similitude of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and of four footed beasts, and of creeping things. And they were but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 into which God delivered up Tiberius, and to such God delivered up them of whom the Apostle speaks; and his actions as well as theirs, were equally the fruits of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, into which God gave them up, that so they might receive that recompence of their errour as was meet.

I come to the second instance here made of Tiberius his cruelty, which he compares to those courses, which we out of holy Scripture have learned, to be attributed unto God himselfe. Now this hath long agoe been objected by Bertius, in his Preface to the Conference of Arminius with Iunius; I say objected by him unto Piscator, & thereunto Piscator also hath answered long agoe. And whereas Bertius hath replyed and allowed Piscator a year for putting in his answer thereunto, whereof had he failed, he would in∣terpret it as a confession of his insufficiency, to make good the cause maintained by him. Piscator answers, that he had no need of so long a time as he prescribed him, for after he had read over his book, in the space of two or three daies he addressed himselfe to an answer thereunto, and within a month finished it. Now if the Author of this discourse were ignorant hereof, his ignorance might excuse him, if otherwise he might have, with more credit, occupied himselfe in the answering, at the least, of some chief particulars, whereupon Piscator stands, for the justifying of his doctrine delivered by him, not of his own brain, but according to the word of God, then hand over head, to hold up the crimination without taking notice of the dilution thereof, many years a goe proposed and set forth to the judgement of the world. But I am content to take into consideration, how Scholastically and judiciously he carrieth himselfe in this crimination, as well as in the former: and the rather, because it may be that this odious cōparison he makes more account of (for the preparation of his Auditors to entertain that which followes with the more propitious affectiō) then he doth of the strength of ought that follows, whatsoever he doth or may pretēd to the cōtrary to the point thē.

Tiberius commanded the Virgins to be defloured, that they might be strangled. Now is there any carriage of God taught by us like unto this? If God were disposed to strangle any, certainly he hath no need to have thē defloured first. For it is now a daies confessed even by Arminius himselfe, that God can lawfully annihilate the holiest creature that lives, and that without all respect to sin, or the vitiation of them. And annihilation I think is much more then strangulation; this causing only a dissolution between the body and soule, but annihilation, setting an utter end to body & soule by turning them both into nothing. And farther, had Tiberius only permitted the de∣flouring of them, whē he might have hindered it, though this were a foule part in him, yet I hope no Christian will say, it is a foule part in God, to permit any act never so flagitious, or facinorous when he is able to hinder it; especially when he may hinder it without any prejudice to the liberty of mans will: and that this is in Gods power Arminius acknowledgeth and supposeth at large in his Examen and Treatise there De Permissione. But Tiberius commanded the Hangman to defloure them. But is this our doctrine, that God commanded the ravishing of any, the murthering of any, or any other sin whatsoever? Do we not all teach rather, that God forbids it, and that under

penalty of everlasting death? yet it is true, the word of God expressely professeth out of the mouth of David, that God bad Shimei to curse David, and that he bid the evill spirit to seduce Ahab, that he might goe up to Ramoth-Gilead, and that not to be strangled I confesse, but, which was nothing better to him, that he might fall, and be slain there. But this is a figurative speech, and signifies not properly any command of God, but ra∣ther denotes the secret operation of Gods providence in the hearts of men, even of wicked men; for those as well as Devills, God knows how to make use of, to serve his own turne. And Austin professeth, Deum operari in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum * 1.24 voluntates quocun{que} voluerit, sive ad bona, pro suâ misericordiâ, sive ad mala pro meritis eorum ju∣dicio uti{que} suo, aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, semper autem justo: And, touching the parti∣cular of Shimei, writes thus, ejus voluntatem proprio suo vitio malam, in hoc peccatum judicio suo justo, & occulto inclinavit. As for Tiberius his causing the little maides to be defloured, that might be done without their sinne, they might be ravished, and in that case, that might be their sorrow but not their sin. And as for the hangmans fault, in this, he was not excusable by Tiberius his causing him to defloure them; For Tiberius his causation here∣in extended no farther then to command them. And I hope it was no just excuse for the people of Israel in their Idolatrous courses, that therein they did but keep the sta∣tutes of Omri, and all the manner of the house of Ahab, Mic. 6. Yet neither doth God command any man to doe that which his Law forbids, or to sin against him. And far∣ther we acknowledge with Austin, that sin hath no efficient cause, but deficient. And it is enough with God to expose any man to sin, by not working him to that which is good; it being his office to work us to every thing that is pleasing in his sight. Heb. 13. 20. to cause us to walk in his statutes, and judgements, and to doe them, Ezech. 36. 28. yea, to keep us from presumptious sins, and that they get not the dominion over us. Psal. 19. 14. yea, to deliver us from every evill work, 2 Timoth. 4. 18.

But perhaps some may say; Our doctrine is that God willeth sin to be committed for which men may and shall be punished; like as Tiberius would the Virgins should be de∣floured, that they might be strangled.

And I answer, that Arminius himselfe professeth that, Deus voluit Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere, God would have Ahab fill up the measure of his sinne, that he might be condignely punished. And why may we not say as well, that God would have Tiberius to fill up the measure of his sinnes? And yet like as Tiberius would have the Virgins to be defloured that they might be strangled; so Ahab would have Na∣both accused of blasphemy, that he might be condemned for it, and so put to death and stoned; and all these things were done under colour of Religion. Yet Arminius in reference to these very courses, spares not to professe, that God would have Ahab to fill up the measure of his sinnes, yet doth not Bertius upbraid him for defaming God, with imputing cruelty unto him. Againe, the same Arminius professeth that in their ignominious handling of Christ, God would have the Jewes, progredi quous{que} pro∣gressi sunt, proceed so farre as they did proceed. And was it not Gods will in like man∣ner, that the Gentiles should proceed as farre as they did in the same businesse? Now we know full well by the story Evangelical, how farre they went in their mischievous courses against the Son of God. For Judas betrayed him, and the high Priests both hired Judas hereunto, and suborned false witnesses against him; and both the Herodi∣ans and Souldiers mocked him, and the people urged Pilate to crucify him, and to dismisse 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and Pilate yeelded to the peoples desire, took order to have him first scourged, then crucified. And if it may be truely and piously said, that in these igno∣minious usages of the Son of God, they went as farre as God would have them to goe; why may it not, with as great truth and piety be avouched, that Tiberius also in these his barbarous courses, went as farre as God would have him? Neither doth Ar∣minius give himselfe to qualify the harshnesse of these his affirmations. We say that whatsoever comes to passe, it is Gods will it should come to passe, as Austin expres∣ly professeth, Enchir. cap. 95. Nec aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, and the Articles of Ireland, Artic. 11. professe the same. But withall we explicate it as Austin dothin the words following, by adding the different manner, how they shall come to passe by the will of God, according to the different condition of things that come to passe, namely good or evill; thus, Vult fieri, but how? vel sinendo ut fiat (to wit in case they are evill) vel ipse faciendo (to wit, in case they are good. So then good things God will have come to passe by his effection, evill things only by his permission. And Bellarmine opposing our Divines to the

uttermost of his power in this particular, being convicted in conscience by the evidence of truth is driven to confesse; Bonum esse ut malum fiat Deo permittente, It is good that evill should come to passe by Gods permission, or Gods permitting it. Tiberius willed that the Virgins should be defloured and impiously he willed it. God willed that Davids Concubines should be defloured, and holily he willed it; neither is he delighted with impurity. For the Scripture attributes this unto God, I will give thy Wives unto thy Neighbour, and he shall lye with them in the sight of all Israel and be∣fore the sunne. And this constupration of Davids Concubines served for the chastising of David, as Arminius professeth, Inserviit castigando Davidi; & omnes paenae habent De∣um authorem, All punishments have God for their author; they are the words of the same Arminius. It was impiety and cruelty in Tiberius to cause the Virgins to be de∣floured and strangled But what Christian dares to impute impiety or cruelty unto God for causing the Children of the Sodomites, some in their Mothers wombe, some hanging upon their Mothers breasts, to be consumed with fire and brimstone. It was impiety and cruelty in Tiberius, to will the deflouring of those Virgins, that they might be strangled. But Arminius thought it neither impiety nor cruelty for God to will, that Ahab should fill up the measure of his sinne, that so he might accumu∣late unto himselfe wrath in the day of wrath; for if he had I presume, he would not have ascribed any such will unto God, as he doth in expresse termes. Although he well knew the vast difference between the power of man, and the power of God in executing vengeance; the ones power extending only to the execution of vengeance temporall, but Gods power extends to the execution of vengeance eternall. Now I find a story immediatly following this very story alleadged by this Author out of Suetonius expressing the cruelty of Tiberius in a farther degree, as not contented with the death of them whom he would destroy, and therefore he would keep them alive to torment them: Mori volentibus vis adhibita vivendi, when they desired to dye, he cau∣sed them to live by force; Nam mortem adeò leve supplicium putabat ut cum audisset unum è reis anticipasse eam, exclamaverit Carnutius me evasit, For he accounted death so light a punishment that when he heard one of the condemned persons to have anticipated it, he cryed out Carnutius hath escaped me; for that was the condemned persons name. And when he took notice of them that were inward, when one desired to suffer betimes, he answered him, Nondum tecum in gratiam redii. I doe not as yet beare these so much good will. Now, why may not some Atheisticall person track the steps of this Au∣thor, and in this particular exaggerate the hainousnesse of Gods holy courses as sa∣vouring of cruelty beyond all example, beyond the cruelty of Tiberius, because he holds delinquent creatures upon the rack of eternall torment in hell fire? For certain vindicative courses in Tiberius inferior unto these are accounted abominable, cruell, and impious; how much more (if this Authors argumentation be of force) those courses which the word of God hath informed us to be the courses divine, infinite∣ly beyond the courses of Tiberius in the way of severity and rigour? As for the power of God in producing sinne, we acknowledge none. Above 1200 years a∣goe it was delivered by Austin, that sinne hath no efficient cause, but deficient only. But when the creature sinneth, he sinneth in doing that he ought not to doe; or in doing what he doth, not in that manner he ought to doe; or in not doing what he ought to doe, or not in what manner he ought to doe it; not one of all which is incident unto God. All efficiency both divine and humane is found only about the act substrate unto sinne; and all sides now a daies acknowledge, that God is the author thereof as well as man by an effective concourse, though difference there is about the manner of the concourse: and particularly these; Armini∣us will have Gods concourse to an evill act, to be every way as much as his concourse to a good, and that he concurres to the working of a good act, no more then to the working of an evill act. Which we utterly deny, requiring a dou∣ble concourse to every good act that is not supernaturall, as touching the sub∣stance of the act; One to the producing of the substance of the act, another to the producing the goodnesse thereof, that is, the gracious manner of performing it: For even a naturall man may abstaine from lying, stealing, whoring, blaspheam∣ing; but no naturall man can abstaine from these in a gracious manner, that is, out of the love of God and that such a love as is, Amor Dei us{que} ad contemptum sui, the love of God to the contempt of himselfe: For this manner of performing it is super∣naturall.

Secondly, as touching the matter of divine concourse, to the substance of any na∣turall act. We say God moves the will to the doing of it, as it becomes the first cause to move the second, but how? agreeable to the nature of it, that is, like as he moves naturall agents to doe that which they doe, necessarily; so he moves all rationall a∣gents to doe that which they doe, contingently and freely. What is the Arminian te∣nent to the contrary, namely this, that God workes in man 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle modo velit, as ab∣surd an assertion as ever any man breathed. It is true, many times our Divines in speaking of the secret providence of God in evill, doe expresse themselves in phrases of a very harsh accent in the judgement of flesh and blood, but herein they doe no∣thing exceed sobriety, forasmuch as usually they contemper themselves to Scripture phrase rather within the compasse thereof, then beyond it. Yet Blasphemy is usually imputed unto them without all feare or wit; not considering, that herein they impute blasphemy to the language of the Holy Ghost. As for example.

What an horrible sinne is it for Kings and Princes to imploy their power and au∣thority, not for the supporting of the Kingdome of Christ, by whom Kings reigne, but for the supporting and establishing of the kingdome of Antichrist, as in the Martyr∣dome of Gods Saints, delivered over to the secular power, to that end, and that by censures Ecclesiasticall? Now if we should say that it is God that works thus in the hearts of Kings, thus to imploy their power for the supporting of Antichrist, we should be censured for blasphemers. Yet the Holy Ghost spares not to professe, that God hath put into their hearts to fulfill his will, and to agree and give their Kingdome to the Beast, untill the words of God be fulfilled.

In like sort, from the first Preaching of the Gospell unto this day, many there have been, and at this day are, who are disobedient unto it, and stumble at it either in the whole or in part. If we should say that they who thus disobey, and stumble at the word of God, are ordained thereunto, such as this Author and his Complices, are ready to cry out upon us as Blaspheamers, and to professe that they will rather deny that there is a God, then hold with the Contra-Remonstrants. Yet S. Peter budgeth not * 1.25 to professe, that Christ is a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence, even to them which stumble at the word of God, being disobedient, whereunto also they were ordained.

When we professe that not any thing in the world comes to passe but Deo volente, God willing it, We are censured as Blasphemers, in professing that God doth will that which is evill, and sinne; yet not only the Articles of Ireland, Artic. 11. professe as much, and Austin Enchir. 95. Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit: but the Apostles with one voyce (as touching the contumelious usages of the Sonne of God, both by Jewes and Gentiles, Herod and Pilate) in their picus meditation poured forth before the face of God, professe, that, Both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and People of Israel, were gathered together against the holy Sonne of God, to doe that which Gods hand and Gods councell had before determined to be done.

In like sort, when we speak of Gods giving men over to illusions to believe lies, o∣thers to vile affections, and to uncleannesse through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves, which consisted in this, that, The Women did change their naturall use into that which is against nature; and likewise the men, leaving the naturall use of the Women, burned in their lusts one towards another, men with men working that which is unseemely, and receiving in themselves the recompence of their errour which was meet: and observe here∣hence, that it is just with God to punish sinne with sinne. And as it hath been observed before us, from the daies of Austin, who when Iulian the Pelagian said, this was done, deserendo, replies, taking him at his word, who could not but professe that God doth thus, the Scripture expresly testifying as much; and touching the manner mentioned by him, addeth, whether God doth this, deserendo, or alio modo sive explicabili, sive inex∣plicabili, it matters not. An Arminian spirit spares not to joyne himselfe with Iulian the Pelagian in affronting Austin thus discoursing out of the word of God, and to pro∣fesse, that that doctrine of Gods punishing sinne with sinne is a common errour; whereas the Apostle professeth in expresse termes, that, Herein they received such recom∣pence of their errour as was meet: and what is recompence here but punishment? and wherein consisted it, but in defiling themselves contrary to nature, as the Scripture plainly testifies, saying, Men with men working that which is unseemely, and receiving in them∣selves such recompence of their errour, as was meet. And Arminius spares not to professe, that, Omnis paena Deum authorem habet. Wherein yet we concurre not with Arminius. Wee deny that Omnis paena habet Deum authorem. It is true that Paena positiva, not of all pu∣nishment

that consists in privation, such as sinne is; For Malum, as Austin long agoe pronounced, non habet causam efficientem but deficientem. Yet we confesse that God could keep any man from any sinne, but if he will not, this is not sufficient to make him the author of it. It is only a culpable defect that makes one the author of sinne; that is, when he failes of doing that which he ought to doe. But God is bound to none to preserve him from sinne, any otherwise then his own free will doth bind him; for he hath mercy on whom he will: and so also on the other side, He hardneth whom he will.

Yet I have given no instances in any passages of the Old Testament, which give plentifull testimony of Gods secret providence of evill; the evidence whereof did wring from Austin this confession. Contra Iulian. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 3. Et multa alia com∣memorare possemus, in quibus aliquando appareat occulto judicio Dei fieri perversitatem cordis ut non audiatur quod verum dicitur, & inde peccetur, & si•• ipsum peccatum praecedentis paena peccati. Nam credere mendacio & non credere veritati uti{que} peccatum est. Venit tamen ab eâ caecitate cordis, quae occulto judicio Dei, sed tamen justo, etiam paena peccati monstratur. And in his Book De Grat & lib. arbitr. cap. 20. inquiring how it is said that the Lord bid Shimei to curse Da∣vid; Quomodo dixit Dominus huic homini maledicere David? Quis sapiens & intelligit? How did God bid this man curse David? Who is wise and he shall understand? Non enim jubendo dixit, ubi obedientia laudaretur, sed quod ejus voluntatem proprio vitio suo malum in hoc peccatum judicio suo justo & occulto inclinavit. Ideo dictum est, dixit ei dominus. Nam si jubenti obtemperasset Deo, laudandus potius quàm puniendus esset, sicut ex hoc peccato postea novimus esse punitum. Neither saith he, is the cause concealed, why God thus dealt with Shimei, Hoc est cor ejus malum in hoc peccatum miserit vel dimiserit (I expresse it rather in Austins words then mine own, because the adversaries of Gods truth, think it enough to passe the censure of blasphe∣my upon ought that we deliver herein.) Now the cause was, Ut videat Dominus, inquit, humilitatem meam & retribuat mihi bona pro delicto ejus in die isto, That God may see my hu∣mility saith David, and recompence me good for his cursing this day. Ecce quomodo pro∣batur (thus Austin goes on) Deum uti cordibus etiam malorum ad laudem at{que} adjumentum hono∣rum. Thus, (saith he) he used Iudas betraying Christ, thus he used the Iewes crucifying Christ: and how great good things did he thereby procure to all that should at any time believe? Who also useth the Devill himselfe, though most wicked, yet he useth him optimè most holily, for the exercising and proving of the faith and Piety of the righteous, not to himselfe who knowes all things before they come to passe, but to us, who had need that after such manner God should proceed with us. The adding hereunto, how God wrought in the heart of Absalom to confound the counsell of A∣chitophel, he breaks forth into this exclamation in the beginning of the next chapter. Who would not tremble at the consideration of these judgements divine, whereby God workes even in the hearts of wicked men what he will, yet rendring unto them according to their deserts. Then making mention of Rehoboam his despising the counsell of the Antients, as also that 2 Chron. 1. how God stirred up the spirit of the Philistins and Arabians against Ioram, and they came up upon the land of Judah and laid it wast. Here, saith Austin, it is manifest that God doth raise up enemies to lay such countries wast, whom he judgeth worthy of such punishments. But yet, saith he, will you say they came not up by their own will, or did they so come up by their own will, as to make that untrue which the Scripture saith, namely, that God stirred them up? Nay rather both are true, for both they came up by their own will, and yet God stirred up their spirits to come; which also, saith he, may be delivered in this manner, namely, that both God stirred up their spirit, and also they came up by their own will. Agit enim Omnipotens in cordibus hominum etiam motum voluntatis eorum: For the Almighty doth worke in the hearts of men, the very motion of their will, that he may work by them that which he thinks good to work by them, even he who knoweth not how to work any thing unjustly. Unto these he addeth variety of other testimonies all drawn out of the Word, and concludes, His & talibus testimoniis divinorum eloquiorum quae omnia commemorare nimis longum est, quantum existimo minifestetur, Operari Deum in cordi∣bus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocun{que} voluerit sive ad bona pro suâ misericordiâ, sive ad mala pro meritis eorum, judicio uti{que} suo aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, semper autem justo.

INTRODUCTION. SECT. III.

BEsides it takes from men all conscience of sinne, and makes sinne to be no sinne; we use to say, Necessitas non habet legem, Necessity hath no law, &c. ut est in supe∣riori Sectione, us{que} ad finem Sectionis.

TWISSE Consideration.

THis Motive, as this Author calleth it, hath the first place in the 16^th reason of Arminius; whereby he laboureth to disprove their opinion, who conceive the object of Predestination to be the Masse of mankind not created; as ap∣pears, in the declaration of his opinion made before the States of Holland, &c. and it is the first particular of six, mentioned in that sixteenth reason of his. And why should he divide it from the rest, and not clap them together, into this ranke of motives, to prepare him to the renouncing of that Tenent, which here he impugneth, and adde Arminius his other ninteen reasons hereunto to the same purpose; if himselfe be privy to the cause thereof, I am not? But as it lieth I will consider it. Now it proceedeth upon supposition, that such a necessity of sinning is brought upon man by this decree, as stands in opposition unto liberty. Whereunto I answere.

1. That this decree in reference to the act of denying grace, brings no necessity at all of sinning upon man; it being only the divine decree of not cureing by the grace of regeneration (that is by the grace of faith and repentance) that naturall infidelity and impenitency wherein every man is borne; all men being conjecti in necessitatem pec∣candi, through the sinne of Adam, as Corvinus confesseth, they being his own words. Now let every sober man judge, whether to leave that infidelity and impenitency which God findes in a man uncured, be to bring a necessity of sinning upon him.

2. Secondly, we answer, that notwithstanding that necessity of sinning whereupon all are cast, as Cornivus speaketh, yet there is no sinne committed by a naturall and car∣nall man, which is not committed by him freely: The act of lying, the act of blas∣pheaming, the act of whoring, the act of drunkennesse, gluttony, rayling, and in ge∣nerall, every sinfull act being freely committed, by every one by whom it is commit∣ed, as is apparent by this, that there is not one of these sinfull acts, but is forborne by divers naturall and carnall men, and therein they doe abstaine from the committing of it freely. And yet we say, that even in abstaining from these acts, they doe not ab∣staine from sinne, for as much as they doe not abstaine from them in a gracious man∣ner, and all by reason of that originall corruption which remaines uncured in them, untill such time as God, who hath mercy on whom he will, is pleased to cure it by the grace of regeneration.

3. But because I imagine this Author lets fly at randome, and keeps not himselfe to the precise genius of the Tenent by him impugned, but rather aimeth at our do∣ctrine concerning providence divine, and the decree of God; according whereunto we willing professe with Austin that, Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, Enchir. 95. Therefore I answere in the third Place, That the necessity following upon this will of God, is nothing prejudiciall to the liberty or contingency of second agents in their severall operations. Although I am not ignorant, that now a daies it is the common and glorious course of our Adversaries, very confidently to presume and presuppose, that upon the will of God, passing upon the action of the creature, there followeth a necessity, standing in flat opposition to the liberty of rationall agents; and no marvail, for sic factitavit Hercules, Arminius the great Champion of their cause, his learning

served him to doe so before them. As if the contumelious usages of our Saviour by Herod and Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles and people of Israel, were not performed freely, but by meer necessity opposite to liberty. For it cannot be denied, but that all these were gathered together against the holy sonne of God, to doe what Gods hand and Gods counsel had predestinated to be done. Acts 4. 28. And in like sort, they that through disobedience stumbled at the word of God, did not freely disobey the Word, because Peter professeth of them in expresse termes, that Hereunto they were ordained. And after the same manner it is to be conceived of the Kings, that gave their Kingdomes to the Beast, namely that they did it not freely in as much as the Holy Ghost saith, that God put into their hearts to fulfill his will, and to consent and give their Kingdome to the Beast.

Yet the Church of Ireland in their Articles set forth by as good Authority, as the Articles of the Church of England, Art. 11. having professed that, God from all eterni∣ty, did by his unchangeable counsel ordaine whatsoever in time should come to passe; to prevent such like objections as this Author fashioneth, forthwith adde, Yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the willes of reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor the contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. And Austin in his Book De Grat. & Liber. Arbitr. where he speaks as freely of Gods effectuall Providence working in evill, as no where more, in so much as our Adversaries take great exceptions against his speeches (such as for∣merly delivered) and that in expresse termes: His main drift notwithstanding, and scope in that Book is to prove, that notwithstanding the divine operation, in work∣ing the motion of the creature as he thinks good, yet is the creature never a whit the lesse free in its own operation. And indeed where grace is wanting, there is too much will rather then too little, unto that which is evill; according to that he writes also elsewhere, Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia. And if Gods operation pre∣judiceth not the liberty of the creature, much lesse the will of God. For though not * 1.26 any thing comes to passe unlesse God willeth it, whether it be good or evill, yet with this difference as Austin in the same place professeth, He will have that which is good come * 1.27 to passe by the effecting of it, but evill only by his permitting of it. Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat vel ipse faciendo.

But though Austin and the Church of Ireland, yea and the Word of God teacheth this; yet the Tragaedian, as this Author saith, could see the contrary, that is, perceive the evidence of the contrary, which none of these saw. And is not this a pretty Co∣maedy, that a Tragaedian and Zeno's servant must be brought in, and that in a confi∣dentiary supposition to out face, not Divines only both antient and late, but the very word of God? For it is as clear forsooth, that what comes to passe by the will of God, and by the effectuall operation of God, doth not come to passe freely; and con∣sequently, that the doctrine (which maintaines that evill comes to passe by the will of God, as the crucifying of Christ by the predestination of God, or by the operation of God; as the Rent of the ten Tribes from the two, and the hardning of Pharaoh's heart, so as not to let Israel goe, God professeth to be his work) takes away all con∣science of sinne? All this I say is as cleare (if we believe this Author) as that Seneca's Tragaedies are the Oracles of God. And I pray consider, must it not take away as well all conscience of righteousnesse, whether of faith, or of repentance, or of obedi∣ence; unlesse we deny faith to be the gift of God, repentance to be the gift of God; unles we deny that God is he, Who makes us perfect to every good work, working in us that which is pleasing in his sight, that God is he that putteth his own spirit in us, and causeth * 1.28 us to walke in his statutes, and to keep his judgements and doe them?

Yet what doth Seneca speak of the divine will, or divine operation? Did the Tra∣gaedian under the terme of Fate, denote the divine decree, or the divine administra∣tion of things, which is plentifully revealed to us in the word of God? Austin I am sure thought otherwise in more places then one, in Psalm. 31. on these words, Pronun∣ciabo adversum me, He blames those who when they are found in their sinnes say, Fatum mihi fecit, stellae meae fecêrunt, But saith he, Quid est fatum? Quae sunt stellae? certè istae quas in Coelo conspicimus; & Qui eas fecit? Deus. Quis eas ordinavit? Deus, ergo vides quod voluisti dicere, Deus fecit ut peccarem: Then he tells of others, who said that Mars facit Homici∣dam, Venus Adulterum. So that Fatum with them were second causes, which we all know in their operations, doe both work by necessity of nature, and have no power to main∣tain the free will of man; and in Psalm. 91. Quaeris ab illo quid sit Fatum, & dicit stellae ma∣lae. Quaeris ab illo, quis fecit stellas, quis ordinavit stellas; non habet quid tibi respondeat nisi Deus.

It's true indeed, the Pelagians did object the Stoicall Fate unto Austin, as if his do∣ctrine favoured of it; and what doth he answer thereunto? Nec sub nomine gratiae Fatum asserimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi. Si autem quibusdam omni∣potentis Dei voluntatem placet Fati nomine nuncupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evita∣mus, sed de verbis contendere non amamus.

Yet because we are to give the Devill his right; With what conscience could this Author professe of this Fatum of the Heathens, that their faith thereof did take away all conscience of sinne, seeing it did not take away the conscience of sinne in her, who is made by the Poet to utter this; as appears in the same Author within a few lines af∣ter. For there she professeth, that if God the creator of all, should make his wrath break forth against her, and strike her with a thunderbolt from heaven, yet this were no sufficient punishment for her sinnes. Queen Iocastas word are these.

Non si ipse mundum concitans divum sator Corusca saeva teia jaculetur manu Unquam rependam sceleribus paenas pares.

Shee justifies God and condemnes her selfe, notwithstanding her former words used only as it seems, to pacify the furious moode of her Sonne and Husband Oaedipus. Will not such one day, rise up in judgement against many Christians, who unlesse themselves may be exempted from that providence divine, whereby he moves all things agreeable to their natures, are so apt to condemne God of injustice, and justify themselves, as needing not to have any conscience of sinne? And which is most strange, they acknowledge Fate in this case to be such, as that it necessitated even God him∣selfe; as appears by the last Chorus.

Fatis agimur, cedite Fatis, Non sollicitae possunt curae Mutare rati stamina fusi. Quicquid patimur mortale Genus, Quicquid facimus venit ex alto: Servát{que} sua decreta colus Lachesis durâ revoluta manu. Omnia certo tramite vadunt; Primús{que} dies dedit extremum Non illa Deo vertisse licet, Quae nexa suis currunt causis It cui{que} ratus prece non ullâ Mobilis ordo, multis ipsum Timuisse nocet, multi ad fatum Venere suum dum fata timent.

But as I said before, whatsoever they conceived of Fate, and howsoever they fashio∣ned it, their opinion thereof did not expectorate all conscience of sinne in them, or urge them to justify or excuse themselves in their courses. For it appears both of Oaedi∣pus and Iocasta, that they not only condemned themselves, but became selfe executio∣ners of punishment upon themselves for their foule crimes: the one pulling out his own eyes, judging himselfe unworthy to see the light; and the other destroying her∣selfe. Though whatsoever they or the Poets that set them forth conceived of Fate, in this case of theirs, it was only the Oracles of the Devills, and his illusions that abu∣sed them; God giving them over thereunto, and that no doubt most justly; when in a wicked curiosity they desire to know, what shall become of them and their children: the Devill gives forth his Oracles as he thinks good, afterwards sets his witts on work to accomplish them thereby, to gain the greater credit and reputation to himselfe, and so much the more forcibly holds them in his snares.

But to proceed. This argument or motive is not yet at an end, but like as this do∣ctrine, is pretended to take away all conscience of sinne, which is as much as to say, all desert of sinne on the one side; so it may be extended to shew, how it takes away all conscience of obedience, and all desert thereupon, on the other side; to wit, in good actions. And indeed were it true, that the doctrine did bereave a man of all free will, it were true, as Hierome saith, that where such necessity is, nec damnatio, nec Corona est But Austin hath spent an whole Book in proofe of this, namely; that grace consists with freedome of will, unto that which is good; and want of grace together with God's efficacious operation, even in the worst of things, doth consist also with free∣dome

of will unto that which is evill. But that in the state of nature man hath no free will to that which is good, but is a servant unto sin, I know no man that doth or can deny, unlesse withall he deny Originall sinne with the Pelagians; like as indeed it is written of Grevincovius that great Arminian, that, Grevincovius negavit peccatum Originale, quod & testibus convinci potest. And indeed this Authors discourse bears strongly this way, whatsoever Protestation in shew of words he makes hereafter to the contrary. For it is apparent, that in this place, the face of his discourse stands for freedome of will in all, as well unto that which is good, as unto that which is evill. And albeit there is so little difference between this and his former motive (touching the consci∣ence of sinne) that it seems to be added only to make way for this sentence of Hie∣rome, which yet is nothing to the purpose, unlesse he can prove, that Gods decrees doe bereave men of liberty of their wills: yet very unhappily doth he carry himself herein and in farre different manner from Hierom's expression, though he placeth Corona in opposition to damnation; one whereof, to wit, damnation, implies the merit of sinne preceding: but the other, to wit, Corona, no way implies any meritorious nature of o∣bedience precedanious thereunto. But this Author sticks not to apply a meritorious condition to good actions on the one side, as well as to evill actions on the other. And if good actions were as meritorious, and that naturally too, of the crown of righte∣ousnesse, as evill actions are of damnation. And withall he will have no more to de∣cree, or work the faith, and repentance, and obedience of one, then he doth the infi∣delity, and impenitency, and disobedience of another, least this his will & operation, prove an adamantine chaine, of necessity to draw them to faith, and repentance, and obedience, whereas his wisdome thinks it fit, they should be left to their own choyce, whetherthey will believe and repent, yea or no. For he doth very considently pre∣sume, that every man hath power to believe and repent, and doe any good work; which is as good, as in expresse termes to professe, that there is no originall sinne at all; Notwithstanding so many expresse testimonies of holy writ to the contrary, namely, Iohn 12. of some that, They could not believe. Rom. 2. of others that, They could not repent. Rom. 8. of all that are in the flesh, that, They cannot please God. 1 Cor. 2. of the natural man that, He neither perceives the things of God nor can know them; of the Israelites in the Wildernesse, that, God had not given them an heart to perceive, nor eyes to see, nor eares to heare unto that day. Deutr. 29. 4. But these passages of holy Scripture, seem to have no place in this Authors consideration, if so be they have in his Creed. This bed is some∣thing too short for him to stretch himselfe thereon; and therefore he desires to change his lodging, and to passe from the desert of good actions, to the desert of evill actions, which he formerly insisted upon, and he tells a story of Zeno's servant most suitable to his Iambick taken out of Seneca, though he quotes the place of neither.

Well, Zeno's servant, he saith, when he was punished by his Master for a fault that he had done, told his Master out of his own grounds, that he was unjustly beaten, because he was, Fato coactus peccare: and hereupon making his reckoning without his hoste, concludes that, Cer∣tainly if Malefactors could not chuse but play their rude prankes, they could not be justly punished for them: Wherein he tells us what the servant said; but what the Master answered, there∣of he saith just nothing. Nay doth he truly relate what the Servant said? Nothing lesse, but shapes it, as he thinks good, that making his own bed, he may lye thereon more softly. If we may believe Diogenes Laertius who reports the story, the Servants answer was not Fato coactus sum peccare, but Fatale mihi erat furari. For he took his ser∣•••••••• laying the theefe, & though the servant took advantage from his Masters do∣•••••••• of Fate, to frame an Apology for himselfe, yet would not Zeno permit him to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thereby any priviledge from stripes. For, servum in furto deprehensum verberavit. A manifest evidence that even in his opinion, the destiny he maintained was no just excuse for sinne. And to meet him in his own plea, when he said. Fatale mihi erat fura∣ri, & caedi inquit: this was the answer he made to his servant, which answer of his this Author either conceales, or was not privy to his own ignorance. And indeed Chry∣sippus the Stoick, though an eager maintainer of Fate Stoicall, yet denyed not the li∣berty of mens wills, as appears in Cicero de Fato, though in his opinion this doctrine of theirs did cohere. And Plutarch likewise in his book De Fato professeth as much. Fatum omnia continet, sicut etiam videtur, ne{que} tamen proptereà omnia necessariò eveniunt, sed unumquod{que} suo naturae modo. Neither did Zeno conceive hereby all place to be taken away for per∣swasion, as appears by his answer to Crates, when he took him by the cloake to draw him away from Stilpo, saying, O Crates, commodissimè auribus Philosophum teneas. Cum igi∣tur

persuaseris, tum illum trahe. Nam si per vim egeris, corpus quidem apud te, sed animus apud Stilponem erit. Neither were any Philosophers more studious of Morality then the Stoicks, They wrote De Bonis & Malis, de Affectibus, de Virtute, de Fine, de{que} primâ aestima∣tione, & de Actibus ac de Officiis, de Adhortationibus & dehortationibus, as Diogenes writes in the life of Zeno. And Austin de Civit. Dei cap. 9. professeth of the Stoicks, that, though Omnia Fato fieri contenderent, yet, Non omnia necessitate fieri dicerent. And more then this, whereas the Stoicks were so jealous of maintaining the liberty of mens wills, that they denyed them of all other things to be subject to necessity. Austin professeth that their feare, of subjecting the wills of men unto necessity, in this respect was a cause∣lesse feare. Ibid. cap. 10. Unde nec illa necessitas formidanda est, quam formidando Stoici labo∣raverunt, causas rerum ita distinguere ut quasdam subtraherent necessitati, quasdam subderent; at{que} in his quas esse sub necessitate noluerunt, posuerunt etiam nostras voluntates, ne videlicet non essent liberae, si subderentur necessitati. And then proceeds to shew, that there is a cer∣tain necessity nothing prejudiciall to the will, albeit the will be acknowledged in subjection thereunto. And that necessity he describes to be this, as when we say, that, Necesse est ut ita sit aliquid vel ita fiat; his words are these; Si autem illa definitur esse necessitas, secundum quam dicimus necesse est, ut ita sit aliquid, vel ita fiat, nescio cur eam timemus ne nobis libertatem auferat voluntatis. Herein Austin professeth to goe beyond the Stoicks, in ac∣knowledging a necessity whereunto the will of man is subject, and that without de∣triment to the liberty thereof. Yet in my judgement, it would better become a Chri∣stian Divine, to informe both himselfe and others out of the Word of God, and rest thereon for the discovery of the nature of Providence and Predestination divine, then to goe a forraging among Poets and Stoicks, for the justification of his own, in point of Christian faith, and for the redargution of the way of his Opposites.

INTRODUCTION. SECT. IV.

THese absurdities following too evidently from the upper Way, Others of the same side wil∣ing to decline them as rocks and precipices, doe leave that Way, and present man to God in his decree of reprobation, lying in the fault and under the guilt of Originall sinne; and say, That God looking upon miserable mankind lying in Adams sinne, did decree the greatest part of them to eternall torments in hell without remedy, for the manifestation of his severe Justice.

But notwithstanding this difference among themselves, they agree well enough together. For this little jarre is not (in their judgements) enough to make a breach between them, as we may see in the Conference at the Hague, and in the Synod at Dort. In the Conference at the Hague the Contra-Re∣monstrants have these words. Quoad sententiarum diversitatem in hoc argumento, quod Deus hominem re∣spexit * 1.29 in hoc decreto nondum creätum, vel creätum & lapsum, quia hoc ad fundamentum hujus doctrinae non per∣tinet libentèr alii alios aequitate Christiana toleramus. After this in the Synod of Dort, they permitted Gomarus to goe the Supralapsarian way; and the Delegates of South Holland were very indifferent which way they took. For these are their words, An Deus in eligendo consideravit homines ut lapsos, an etiam ut nondum lapsos, existimant (viz. the Delegates aforesaid) non esse necessarium ut definiatur, modo sta∣tuatur * 1.30 Deum in eligendo considerasse omnes homines in pari statu. And to say the truth there is no reason why they should quarrell about circumstances, seeing they agree in the substance. For they both say.

1. That the moving cause of reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the sinne of man ori∣ginall, or actuall.

2. That the finall impenitency and damnation of reprobates, are necessary and unavoidable by Gods absolute decree.

These two things are the maxima gravamina that the other side stick at. So that these two paths meet at last in the same way. But because this last is chosen by the most, and latest maintainers of the absolute decree, as the more moderate of the two, and the easyer to be defended, I will set down the conclusion which I dislike in their way and words.

God hath absolutely purposed from eternity, of his meer will and pleasure without any considera∣tion of actuall continuance in sinne and unbeliefe, utterly to cast off from grace and glory, Millions of men considered in the fall (even those whom he calls to repentance and solvation by the Preaching of the Gospell) for the manifestation of his severity and Justice.

That all mankind is involved in the first sinne and the fruits thereof, which are corruption of na∣ture, and the guilt of eternall death, I confidently believe. But that God did absolutely intend to leave men in that woefull state for ever, and upon this only sinne, to build a peremptory decree of the una∣voidable damnation of the farre greater part of mankind, I cannot yet be perswaded.

Having thus plainly laid down the position, which I deem to be false, I come now in the next place to deliver my reasons against it, which are of two sorts:

• 1. Such as first made me to question the truth of it.
• 2. Such as doe for the present convince me that it cannot be a truth.

TWISSE Consideration.

HEre breaks out the main reason, that moved this Author to represent the different opinions of our Divines about the object of Predestination, that so a way might be opened unto him at pleasure, to charge the former opinion with what he thought good; and as for the proofe of his criminations, he might the better ease himselfe of the burthen thereof, by shewing the dissent of other Devines of the same profession from the former in this particular, making choyce rather to shape the object of Predestination and reprobation, under the notion of mankind, ly∣ing in the masse corrupt by the fall of Adam. For surely it is to be presupposed, that they did not dissent from their former friends without some reason, and this Author makes bold to insinuate, that these absurdities mentioned by him were the reasons: As when he saith, These absurdities following too evidently from the upper way; Others of the same side willing to decline them, as rocks and precipices doe leave that way. But that these were the motives whereby they were induced to decline the former opinion, and to embrace the latter, he proves not, nor so much as adventureth upon the proofe thereof, but leaves unto his credulous reader to supply that by his forwardnesse, to take it upon trust; as if this discourser by his morall carriage, might winne the opinion of so much worthinesse, as to be a man with whom you may well play at Put-finger in the darke, quicum in tenebris mices. And yet Arminius might have taught him, that there is a mid∣dle opinion between these; namely, of those who make the object of predestination the masse of mankind created, but not yet corrupted. And he puts this opinion upon Junius, and appeals to his Theses, as giving evident testimony thereunto. Now there is no shew or colour of reason, why, to avoyd the absurdities premised by this Author, any man should decline the first way, and embrace the second, which is the way of Junius. And this I conceive to be the main reason, why this second way is altogether dissembled by this Author, or by the spirit that guided him. For albeit it was for this advantage (who hankes after every sorry consideration to serve his turne in the way of motive, learning to represent the multiplicity of opinions hereabouts amongst our Divines:) yet it being a matter of greater moment, to gain the justification of his ab∣surdities charged upon the first way, from the mouthes or practice of our Divines, at least in appearance: and some colour hereof he findes by declining the first way and falling upon the third; but no colour at all by declining the first way and falling upon the second. Therefore he thought it a part of his wisdome altogether to dissem∣ble the second, and to represent the opinion of those Divines who decline the first (yea and second too) and fall upon the third. But suppose Iunius had preferred the third way and not the second, Had he done it out of a desire to decline the absurdi∣ties here mentioned? It is apparent by that his conference with Arminius (which yet he set not forth, but the Arminian party after his death) that he maintaines all these considerations to have their place in Predestination, and therefore makes Hominem communiter consideratum the object of predestination, which as it is a notion abstract from all the three speciall notions of nondum conditum, or conditum, but nondum corruptum, or deni{que} corruptum, so it is indifferently applyable unto them all. And indeed Piscator re∣solves the question about the object of Predestination, namely, that as Predestination includes the decree of creating men unto different ends, so the object must necessarily be mankind not yet created; as it includes the decree of permitting all to fall in Adam, so the object (as he thinkes) must be mankind created, but not yet corrupted; and lastly as it includes the decree of chusing some out of that corrupt masse, and refusing others or leaving them in it. so the object of his judgement must be mankind both created and corrupted. And Arminius himselfe professeth, that the twenty reasons wherewith he disputeth against the first way, may also be accommodated against the other waies. And albeit the followers of the second and third way doe think that they can better maintain their Tenent, and free it from the

absurdities wherewith the other waies are charged; yet it followeth not herehence, that therefore they did justify them, the contrary whereunto appears in the particular of Iunius, as before I mentioned. Moulin indeed disputes against the first, but doth he, to decline that, subsist in the third, as touching the making of the corrupt Masse the object of reprobation? it is apparent he doth not. But as reprobation denotes Gods decree of damnation, he premiseth thereunto, the foresight of finall impenitency. Of this opinion of his, this Author takes no notice. Yet is Moulin sound throughout in the doctrine of election; wherein if this Author did concurre with him, we should no∣thing trouble our selves to take him off from his concurrence with Moulin in that par∣ticular of reprobation. And wee of the first way are willing to professe, that God neither damnes nor decrees to damne any man, but for sinne and finall perseverance therein; nor so only, but in plain termes to pronounce, that in no moment of nature doth Gods intention of damnation precede the consideration of sinne, and final im∣penitency; though we doe not make the consideration of sinne to precede the intenti∣on of damnation, as Moulin doth. And to my understanding, other reasons there are, which cast Divines upon the third way, then the declining of these absurdities men∣tioned by this Author; as namely, that the very notions of election and reprobation, the one being conceived to be an act of mercy, the other an act of justice, doe presup∣pose sinne. And whereas Arminius in his conference with Iunius, produceth five rea∣sons against the first way, no lesse then foure of them proceed on this manner; The first thus, Praedestinatio est voluntas Dei de illustrandâ suâ gloriâ per misericordiā & justitiā: At illa vo∣luntas locum non habet in nondum condito ceu condendo. The third thus, Praedestinatio est pars provi∣dentiae administrantis & gubernātis humanū genus; ergò posterior naturâ actu creationis vel proposito creandi. Si posterior actu creationis vel propositio creandi hominē, jam homo praedestinationis objectum non est consideratus, ut nondū conditus. His 4^th argument is this, Predestinatio est praeparatio super∣naturalium bonorū; ergo praecedit communicatio naturaliū, & proptereà creatio in naturâ sive actu, sive in decreto Dei. His last reason is of the same nature thus, Illustratio sapientiae Dei per creationē prior est illustratione sapientiae Dei quae est administratio praedestinationis, 1 Cor. 1. 21. Ergo crea∣tio prior est praedestinatione. To all which reasons of his, I have answered in my Vindic. Grat. Dei. lib. 1. part. 1. De Praedestin. digress. 5. in severall chapters. Only the second argument of Arminius insisteth upon Gods ordination of mans fall. And to be freed from the trouble of answering this argument, is the only thing that I know we gain, by leaving the first and second way, and embarking our selves in the third. But how freed? surely only so farre, as that the doctrine of election and reprobation, suppo∣sing Adams fall, doth not engage us to inquire into divine providence concerning A∣dams fall. But neverthelesse it cannot be denied, but that had not God permitted A∣dam to fall, he had never fallen. And we that take the first way, acknowledge no o∣ther Providence divine concerning the ingresse of sinne, as sinne, into the world, but in the way of permission. Sinne as sinne admitting no cause efficient, but deficient on∣ly. And it is utterly impossible, that God, either in doing what he doth, or in for∣bearing to doe what he doth not, should in any culpable, or justly blameable manner be deficient. And if it be farther demanded, whether upon Gods permission it follow∣eth, * 1.31 that sinne shall be committed by the creature; We readily professe it doth. This Vorstius acknowledgeth a favorite of the Arminians. Nay doth not Arminius himself deliver it expresly, where he saith, That when God permitteth the willing of ought, Necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum? This he delivers without all qualification of the necessity mentioned, which we doe not. And this also Nava∣rettus a Papist professeth, and though he be a Dominican, yet I know no Jesuite that opposeth him in this. And if any man inferre herehence, that then God determining to permit sinne, did determine that sinne should enter into the World. We willingly grant that God did so ordaine namely, that sinne should come to passe by his permis∣sion. Non aliquid fit (saith Austin) nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse * 1.32 faciendo. And Bellarmine professeth, that, Bonum est mala fieri Deo permittente: so that here∣in God doth not will evill, but that which is good in the acknowledgement of Bel∣larmine; and that in the heat of his opposition against our Divines in this particular. And Arminius is expresse in saying, Voluit Deus Achabum mensuram scelerum implere. And what is this but, Peccata peccatis cumulare? And though the Jesuits and Arminians doe * 1.33 with all their force resist, yet it evidently followes from the notion of efficacious grace embraced by the one, and by the notion of an efficacious impediment of sinne, dictated by Arminius himselfe. For efficacious grace with the Jesuites, consists in the

congruity thereof, and the congruity thereof consists in this, that God foreseeth that upon the confession thereof sinne will be avoided. Now what is the reason why God grants such a grace, whereupon he seeth sin will not be avoided; and denies such a grace, upon the granting whereof, he knowes full well that sinne would be avoided; but because his pleasure is, that sinne shall be committed by his permission, and not be avoyded, although he hath given them grace sufficient to avoid it, as they say, and it was most true of Adam in the state of innocency. In like sort doth Arminius distin∣guish of, Peceati impedimentum sufficiens & efficax, Efficacious hinderance of sinne, is that whereby God seeth sinne will be avoided; sufficient is only that whereby a man may avoid it if he will. But withall he confesseth, that God in the Promptuary of his wisdome, hath not only such impediments as are sufficient to the avoiding of any sinne, but such also, as whereby any sinne would indeed be avoided, were he pleased * 1.34 to grant them. But yet as often as he thinks good to permit sinne, he doth not grant such impediments. And is not this a manifest evidence, that it is Gods will, that sinne shall come to passe (to wit, as often as it doth come to passe) by his permission? But suppose all our Divines that embrace the third way, doe imagine the absurdities here spoken of, to be justly chargeable upon the first way. Yet as he thinks them in an er∣rour, while they conceive they can with ease avoid these absurdities by their third way, let him be pleased to conceive, they may as well be in an errour, in thinking them justly chargeable upon the first way; and consequently their opinion is nothing suffi∣cient to justify, that they are unremoveable by them that embrace the first way.

It is true there is no cause of breach either of Unity or Amity between our Divines upon this difference, as I shewed in my digressions De Praedestinatione Digress. 1. seeing neither of them derogate either from the prerogative of Gods grace, or of his sove∣raignty over his creatures, to give grace to whom he will, and to deny it to whom he will, and consequently, to make whom he will vessels of mercy, and whom he will vessells of wrath; but equally they stand for the divine prerogative in each. And as for the ordering of Gods decrees of creation, permission of the fall of Adam, giving grace of faith and repentance unto some, and denying it to others, and finally saving some and damning others, whereupon only arise the different opinions, as touching the object of predestination and reprobation, it is meerly Apex Logicus, a poynt of Lo∣gick. And were it not a meer madnesse, to make a breach of unity or charity in the Church of God, meerely upon a poynt of Logick? Thus have I justified the improba∣bility and utter unlikelihood, that ever any schisme will be made in the Church of God, upon these nice and meer Logicall differences, in my Vindic. Grat. Dei, which this Author is acquainted with as appears by a passage that hereafter he representeth therehence, and that farther into the Book then these my digressions are upon the point of predestination, but is content to take no notice thereof, least it might hinder the course of his Scene, whereunto it is fit he should be serviceable. And as for the two Articles here mentioned, wherein they are said unanimously to agree, and which he calls maxima gravamina. It is true they doe agree herein, but it may be in a farre other sense, then he is willing should be taken notice of. For as for the first,

1. That the moving cause of reprobation, is the alone will of God, and not the sinne of man ori∣ginall or actuall.

1. This is true in proportion to election, that like as no good work of man is the moving cause of election, but only the will of God; so no sinne or evill work of man is the cause of reprobation, but only the will of God.

1. That so it is of election, the Apostle both

1. Saith, Election is not of Workes but of him that calleth.

2. And proveth thus, Before Esau and Iacob were borne, or had done good or evill, it was said, The Elder shall serve the Younger; therefore Election is not of Workes (that is of good workes) but of him that calleth.

2. That so it is of reprobation, I prove by the same argument of the Apostle, thus, Before Esau and Iacob were borne, or had done good or evill, it was said the Elder shall serve the Younger; therefore reprobation stands not of workes (that is of evill workes) but of the meer pleasure of God.

1. And like as this is farther evident by Gods course of calling in the point of Election, as the Apostle intimateth, for as much as God calleth effectually whom he will in bestowing faith and repentance upon

them. For as the Apostle afterwards professeth, He hath mercy on whom he will.

2. So it is as evident in the point of reprobation, in as much as God refuseth to call whom he will, by denying faith and repentance unto them, as afterwards the same Apostle professeth, saying, that God hardneth whom he will.

2. And this doctrine we doe explicate by distinguishing that which our Adversa∣ries desire to confound, least their cheating carriage should be discovered, as former∣ly I have shewed.

For Predestination and Reprobation, may be considered either quoad Praedestinantis & Reprobantis actum; or quoad Praedestinationis & Reprobationis terminum, as much as to say, quoad res praedestinatione & reprobatione praeparatas, that is, either as touching the act of Predestination and Reprobation, or as touching the things decreed by Predestination or Reprobation. Now as touching the act of Predestination never any man (saith Aquinas) was so mad as to say that the merits of man are the cause of predestination. And why so? Because the act of predestination is the act of Gods will, and formerly (saith he) I have shew∣ed, that there can be no cause of the will of God, as touching the act of God willing, but only as touching the things willed by God. Now apply this to reprobation. For is not reprobati∣on as touching the act of God reprobating, the very act also of Gods will? This can∣not be denied: and herehence it followes, that like as there can be no cause of Gods will, as touching the act of God willing, so there can be no cause of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And like as it was a mad thing in Aquinas his judgement to say, that merits were the cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating; so it is no lesse madnesse in his judgement, to maintain that either sinne originall or actuall, can be the meritorious cause of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating.

And what are the reasons hereof in School-divinity? Why surely these. 1. Prede∣stination and Reprobation are eternall, but good workes and evill workes of the creature are temporall; but impossible it is, that a thing temporall, can be the cause of that which is eternall. 2. The act of Predestination and Reprobation is the act of Gods will, and the act of Gods will, like as the act of his knowledge, is the very es∣sence of God even God himselfe; and therefore to introduce a cause of Gods will, is to bring in a cause of God himselfe. 3. If works or faith foreseen be any moving cause of Divine election, then either they are so of their own nature, or by the meer constitution of God. Not of their own nature, as it is apparent; therefore by the constitution of God: but this cannot stand neither. For if by the constitution of God, then it would follow, that God did constitute, that upon foresight of mans faith he would elect him, that is, ordaine him to salvation. And what I pray is to constitute? Is it any other then to ordaine? And herehence it followeth, God did ordaine that upon foresight of mans faith, he would ordaine him unto salvation: Whereby the e∣ternall ordination of God, is made the object of his eternall ordination; whereas it is well known, and generally received, that nothing, but that which is temporall, can be the object of divine ordination which is eternall. In like sort I dispute of repro∣bation: if sinne be the cause thereof, then either of its own nature it is the cause there∣of, or by the ordinance of God: Not of its own nature as all are ready to confesse: if you say by the ordinance of God, then it follows God did ordaine, that upon the foresight of mans sinne, he would ordaine him unto damnation. For reprobation is Gods ordaining a man unto damnation, as touching one part of the things decreed thereby; which we come to consider in the next place, and that both in election and in reprobation, having hitherto considered them as touching the act of God electing or reprobating, and shewed that thus they can have no cause.

But as touching the things decreed, thereby they may have a cause as Aquinas pro∣fesseth and we professe with him. As for example to begin with election.

The things decreed or destinated to a man in election are two, Grace and Glory. Now both these may have a cause: For both Grace is the cause of glory; and Christs merits are the cause both of grace and glory. But let grace be rightly understood. For in the confuse notion of grace many are apt to lurke, thereby to shut their eyes a∣gainst the evidence of truth. For no marvail if men be in love with their own er∣rours; and in proportion to the love of errour, such is their hatred of Divine truth op∣posite thereunto. Now by grace, we understand the grace of regeneration, whereby

that naturall corruption of mind and will (commonly called blindnesse of mind and hardnesse of heart) which we all bring into the world with us through originall sin, is in part cured. More distinctly we call this grace, the grace of faith and repentance, whereby our naturall infidelity and impenitency is cured. Now this grace we say God bestowes on whom he will, finding all equall in infidelity and impenitency. For so the Apostle tells us, that, God hath mercy on whom he will. And as God bestowes it on * 1.35 whom he will, not finding any cause in man any way moving him, either in its own nature, or by divine constitution, moving him to bestow this grace on any. So the Apostle 2 Timoth. 1. 9. God hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling, not according to our workes, but according to his own purpose and grace. And indeed we being all found dead in sinne, what could be found in one to move God to bestow the life of faith and re∣pentance upon him, more then upon another? And if any such thing were found in man moving God hereunto, then should grace be bestowed according unto works, that is in the Fathers phraise (as Bellarmine acknowledgeth) according unto merits; which was condemned 1200 years agoe, in the Synod of Palestine: and Pelagius him∣selfe was driven to subscribe unto it, otherwise they had condemned him also.

But as touching the conferring of glory, God doth not bestow this on whom he will, finding men equall without any moving cause thereunto, even in man; For though there be no moving cause hereunto in man of its own nature, yet there is to be found, a moving cause in man by constitution divine, whereby God is as it were moved to bestow solvation on some, and not on others. For God hath made a graci∣ous promise, that whosoever beleeveth and repenteth, and continueth in faith and re∣pentance unto death shall be saved, and whosoever beleeveth not and repenteth not shall be damned. So then though men are equall in originall sinne, and in naturall corruption, and God bestowes faith and repentance on whom of them he will, curing their corruption in whom he will: yet when, he comes to the conferring of glory, men are not found equall in morall condition; and accordingly God cannot be said on like manner, to bestow glory & solvation on whō he will; For he hath tyed himselfe by his own constitution to bestow solvation on none, but such as dye in thestate of grace. Yet, I confes, some say that God bestows solvation on whom he will, in as much as he is the author of their faith & repentance, & bestows these graces on whō he will, yet certainly there is a different manner in the use of this phraise of bestowing this or that on whom he will. For when God bestowes faith and repentance, he findes them on whom he will bestow it, no better then others: But when he comes to the be∣stowing of glory he findes them, on whom he bestowes that, farre better them others.

Now we come to the things decreed in reprobation, and these are two.

1. The denyall of the grace of regeneration, that is, of the grace of faith and re∣pentance, whereby mans naturall infidelity and impenitency is cured.

2. The denyall of glory, and the inflicting of damnation. The first of these, to wit, the denyall of grace mentioned, is made to whom he will. And it must needs be so, in ease God gives this grace to whom he will. And the Apostle professeth, that as God hath mercy on whom he will, so he hardneth whom he will. And as God denies this grace to whom he will, so did he decree to deny it to whom he will: Yet there is a diffe∣rence considerable: For albeit God hardneth whom he will, by denying unto them the grace of faith and repentance; yet notwithstanding, like as it is just with God to inflict damnation upon them, for that sinne whether originall or actuall, wherein he findes them, when the ministry of the word is afforded them: so like∣wise it cannot be denied to be iust with God, to leave their infidelity and impenitency wherein he finds them uncured. But yet because God hath not made any such consti∣tution, namely, that whosoever is found in infidelity and impenitency, shall be so left and abandoned by him: therefore he is properly said, as to cure it in whom he will, so to leave it uncured in whom he will, finding them all equall in originall sinne, and consequently lying equally in this their naturall infidelity and impenitencv. So wee may iustly say, there is no cause at all in man of this difference, to wit, why God cures infidelity & impenitency in one and not in another, but it is the meer pleasure of God that is the cause of this difference. And if any list to contend hereabouts, we shall be willing to entertaine him, and conferre our strength of argumentation on this point.

2. But as touching the denyall of glory and inflicting of damnation, which is the second thing decreed in reprobation, there is alwaies found a cause motive, yea and meritorious hereof, to wit, both of the denyall of the one & inflicting of the other: And God doth not proceed herein according to the meer pleasure of his will, & that

by reason of his own constitution, having ordained that whosoever continueth final∣ly in infidelity, in profane courses, and impenitency shall be damned. And albeit on the other side it may be said in some sence (as formerly I have shewed) that God saves whom he will, in as much as he is the author of faith, which he bestowes on whom he will; yet in no congruous sence can he be said to damne whom he will, for as much as he is not the author of sinne, as he is the author of faith. For every good thing he workes, but sinne and the evill thereof he only permits, not causeth it. And lastly, as God doth not damne whom he will, but those only whom he finds fi∣nally to have persevered in sinne without repentance: so neither did he decree to damne, or reprobate to damnation whom he will, but only those who should be found finally to persevere in sinne without repentance.

Now let us apply this to the Article we have in hand, which is this; The moving cause of reprobation is the only will of God, and not the sinne of man originall or actuall: and for the explication hereof, according to that which hath been formerly delivered, We say that reprobation doth signify, either a purpose of denying grace, as above mentioned, or a purpose of inflicting damnation. And each may be considered, either as touch∣ing the act of Gods decree, or as touching the things decreed. We shew how the Ar∣ticle holds or holds not, being differently accommodated.

1. As touching the things decreed,

1. As touching the deniall of grace, We say, That God decreed of his meere good pleasure to deny unto some the grace of faith and repentance, for the curing of that naturall infidelity and impenitency which is found in all, without any mo∣tive cause hereunto found in one more then in another.

2. As touching the inflicting of Damnation, We say, That God decreed to in∣flict damnation on some, not of his meer pleasure, but meerly for their finall perse∣verance in sinne without repentance.

2. As touching the very act of Gods decree, We say, Nothing in man could be the cause hereof, but the meer pleasure of God, as Aquinas professeth it a mad thing to devise in man a cause of divine predestination, as touching the act of God prede∣stinating, & as I have shewed, because both are eternall and the act of Gods will, which is God himselfe: and withall to devise a cause hereof, is to cast our selves upon an unavoydable absurdity, as namely to say, That God did ordaine that upon the fore∣sight of this or that in men, he would ordaine some of them to solvation, and others unto damnation. And indeed the harshnesse of the Tenent, consists chiefly in con∣founding these different considerations, whereby a colour is cast, as if we main∣tained that God did decree to damne men of his meere pleasure and not for sin.

2. As touching the second which is this, That the finall impenitency and damnation of reprobates are necessary, and unavoydable by Gods absolute decree. Here as it were to make weight, impenitency and damnation are clapt together, as unavoydable by Gods ab∣solute decree; whereas it is without all question, that supposing impenitency to be fi∣nall, damnation is unavoydable by the Law of God, as who hath ordained, that whosoever dies in impenitency shall be damned. And as for impenitency, doth this Author, or any Arminian deny it to be a fruit of that originall corruption wherein all are borne? I perswade my selfe they doe not. Corvinus professeth of all, That by the sinne of Adam, they are, conjecti in necessitatem peccandi. Then againe doth he main∣taine * 1.36 that any is able to cure this but God. It seems he doth not by that which fol∣loweth, where he signifieth that God (in his opinion) did not absolutely intend to leave men to that woefull estate wherein they were borne. What then? Will he have God bound to cure it in all? If so, then certainly he doth cure it in all. For it were impossible God should not doe that, whereunto he is obliged in the way of justice. But nothing more manifest, then that God doth not cure it in all: therefore certain∣ly he is not bound to cure it in all. But I imagine he conceives that God is ready to cure it in all, and it is mans fault that he doth not cure it in any. As much as to say, if man would doe somewhat which he may doe, then God would give him repen∣tance. Here is good stuffe towards; and undoubtedly, this is the criticall point as touching the nature of efficacious grace. Yet this I know full well, how carefull the greatest Rabbies amongst the Arminians are to decline. And will it not manifestly follow herehence, that the grace of repentance is given secundum merita, according to some good work of man that went before? Which was condemned in the Synode of Palestine above 1200 years agoe; Nay what will you say, if their doctrine hereabouts

in the issue thereof comes to this, namely that God doth work in man, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle credere; modo Velit, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle resipiscere, modò Velit, as I can shew it under the hand of one? and I have cause to suspect that it comes also from another manner of hand, then his, with whom I have had to deale with. And in this case it shall not be true that God shews mercy on whom he will, in giving faith and repentance, but rather he shall shew mer∣cy on whom man will. And like as when a question is made, why such a man is re∣warded by the Magistrate, no wise man will answer because it is the pleasure of the Magistrate so to reward him, but rather represent the cause on mans part, why he was reward: so if God shews mercy in giving repentance according to some preparation found in one man, rather then in another, it shall not be said, that God hath mercy on whom he will, but rather the reason on mans part is to be represented, why God doth give him repentance. Yet these Petitions he calls maxima gravamina on the part of Reprobation.

And will he not give us leave to propose in proportion hereunto, our maxima grava∣mina, as touching their opinion in point of election? namely. 1. That it is not the meer pleasure of God, but the faith and repentance of a man foreseen, that is the mo∣ving cause of divine election. 2. And that every man hath power to believe and re∣pent, and no man hath more cause to be thankfull unto God; for giving him any more grace to believe and repent (in the way of grace preventing) then he gives to reprobates. I speak of reprobate men, but for ought I yet know to the contrary, I may as well deliver it of the reprobate Angells. And as touching that which they call grace subsequent, which is only Gods concurrence, seeing God affords that to a∣ny sinfull act, they may thank themselves, rather then God for that, like as for Gods concurrence unto any act of sinne. These doctrines are no gravamina to the tender consciences of our Adversaries.

The doctrine opposite to this which here he dislikes must needs be this, God hath not absolutely purposed from eternity of his meer will and pleasure, but upon consideration of actuall con∣tinuance in sinne and unbeliefe, to cast off men from grace and glory. Now this actuall conti∣nuance in unbeliefe I presume must be finall; and upon the consideration hereof, God casts them off from grace: but I pray from what grace? surely from the grace of faith; otherwise it stands not in any contradiction to our Tenent. So that their doctrine in the issue comes to this, Whom God foresees that they will not believe unto death, he decrees that they shall not believe unto death: and applied unto repentance, thus; Whom God foresees that they will not repent unto death, he decreeth that they shall not repent unto death. This is the sober and savoury doctrine of these impugners of the grace of God: and yet they perceive not what a spirit of giddinesse possesseth them in this.

It is without question (I think) that God leaves many in that woefull estate which here is called corruption of nature (no more, without any specification wherein it consists) the guilt whereof is eternall death; and seeing that if he so leaves them, it cannot be denied, but that God intended so to leave them. All the question is, Whe∣ther God did absolutely intend to leave them. Now had this Author, as he professeth his dislike of Gods absolue intention hereof, so dealt clearly, and shewed how he did intend so to leave some, as namely upon what condition, or upon foresight whereof, and withall given some proofe of his assertion, his ingenuity had been commendable. Yet we say, that God did not at all intend to leave men in this state. For the terme, men in this place being indefinite, it is capable of truth either way. And this Author defines not whether he speaks of some or of all. We willingly grant, he doth not leave his elect in that woefull state, but brings them out of it by faith and repentance; which are expressely called the gifts of God, in holy Scripture. But as for Repro∣bates, I doe not find he gives either faith or repentance unto them. And Austin lib. 5. contra Julian. Pelag. cap. 4. speaking of the Non praedestinati: Illorum neminem (saith he) adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualem{que} paenitentiam, quâ homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo, sive il∣lis ampliorem patientiam, sive non imparem praebeat: and if not unto repentance, then cer∣tainly neither doth he bring any of them unto faith. Then againe, it were worth the knowing of this Author, whether any Infants of Turkes and Saracens departing this life in their infancy, are left in this woefull estate. If none are left but all are saved, is it not a pretty guilt of eternall death, for which not any suffers? And you may guesse by this whether this Authors Pretence of ac∣knowledgement of naturall corruption be not only from the teeth outward:

If any heathen Infants dying in their infancy, are left in this wofull estate, and suf∣fer eternall death for that naturall corruption, let this Author answer, whether God intended to leave them in this woefull estate absolutely or no. For I professe wil∣lingly, I cannot imagine how God should intend this concerning such Infants and not absolutely, seeing before they come to the use of reason, there is no place for Di∣vine foresight of any thing in them, to put a difference between some and others.

II. The Discourse it selfe, consisting of

• 1. Motives inducing,
• 2. Arguments convincing.

1. Motives inducing.

DISCOURSE. SECT. I.

THe Reasons of the first sort are these foure which follow.

1. The Novelty of it. I can not find absolute and inevitable reprobation to have any footing in Antiquity. The upper way was never taught or approved by any of the Fathers * 1.37 (even the stourest defenders of grace among them against the Pelagians) for the space of 600 years after Christ: nor the Lower way till the time of S. Austin, which was above 400 years af∣ter him.

They did all generally agree upon the contrary Conclusion, and taught men in their times, That it was possible for them to be saved, which in the event were not saved, and to have repented which repented not, and that there was no decree of God, which did lay a necessity of perishing upon any sonne of Adam.

This that I say M. Calvin himselfe doth ingeniously acknowledge, speaking of election, and repro∣bation, according to Gods foreknowledge, Ne{que} haec vulgo recepta opinio solius vulgi est, habuit enim sae∣culis * 1.38 omnibu magnes Authores; The Opinion of a conditionall decree hath had great Authors in all ages.

Reverend Beza speaking likewise of the same opinion, speaks to the same effect in these words; In quem errorem sanè turpissimum. Origenes Veteres pleros{que} tum Graecos, tum Latinos adegit, Into which most * 1.39 foule errour Origen drew many of the Ancients both Greeks and Latines. But Prosper amongst the rest S. Austins Scholler doth very cleerly witnesse it, Pen è omnium (saith he) parem inveniri & unam sententiam qua propositum est, Praedestinationem Dei secundum praescientiam receperunt, ut ob hoc Deus alia va∣sa contumeliae; alios honor is vasa fecerit, quia finem uniuscujus{que} praeviderit, & sub ipso gratiae adjutorio in qua futurus esset voluntate & actione praescierit. All did grant with one consent, that God decreed mens ends according to his foresight of their actions, not otherwise.

To these Testimonies let me adde two or three particular instances for the farther clearing of the newnesse of it.

Minutius Faelix brings in the Pagans objecting to the Christians, that they hold an inevitable event of things, and did feigne and frame to themselves an unjust God, who did punish in men their una∣voidable destinies, and not their ill choyces in these words. Quicquid agitis ut alii Fato, ita vos Deo ad∣ditis: Iniquum igitur Deum fingitis, qui sortem in hominibus puniat, non voluntatem. The objection he thus answers. Illud Fatum est quod de unoquo{que} Deus fatus est. Christians hold no other Fates then Gods de∣crees, Qui cum universam praescit materiam pro meritis & qualitatibus singulorum etiam fata determinat; & ita in nobis non genitura plectitur, sed ingenii natura punitur. God that foreknew all men and their actions did accordingly determine their retributions.

S. Hierome an eager opposer of the Pelagians in many places of his writings hath the same thing: Ex praescientiâ dei evenit ut quem justum futurum scit prius diligat quam oriatur ex utero & quem peccatorem * 1.40 aderit antequam peccet. To the same purpose he speaks in another place, Dilectio & Odium Dei vel ex praescientiâ nascitur futurorum, vel ex operibus, alioqui novimus quod omnia Deus diligat, nec quicquam eorum oderit, quae creavit. And in his Book against Pelagius he saith, Elegit Deus quem bonum cernit. The summe of all which speaks is but this, that there is no decree of damning or of saving men, but what is built upon Gods foreknowledge of the evill and good actions of men.

I will shut up my instances with the judgement of the Councell of Arles against the Pelagians in * 1.41 the yeare 490. or thereabout. This Councell subscribed to the Letter which was written by Faustus against Lucidus the Praedestinarian, and made the Anathema's and curses which he therein denoun∣ceth against him and such like, to be their own; some of which were these, Anathema illi qui dixerit, illum qui peri it non accepisse ut salvus esse possit, and againe, Anathema illi qui dixerit, quòd vas contum∣liae non possit assurgere ut sit vas in honerem.

By this and the like speeches which I have met with in the Ancients being convinced, that the do∣ctrine of absolute reprobation (and election too) was unknown unto them, I begin to call it into question. For albeit I make not the decisions and determinations of the Fathers or Councells the rules of my Faith (because they are but men and therefore subject unto errour) yet I honour their gray haires, and their grave assemblies, and doe vehemently mistrust those doctrines which they never approved or taught, but disliked and condemned.

TWISSE Consideration.

AS touching the pretence of Antiquity; I find many are very apt to make plausible use of this, when either indeed, or at least in their imagination, it seems to serve their turnes. And because I am put upon it, I will speak somewhat of it in generall, and then proceed to consider it as it is appyable to the present occasion.

As concerning the first, I find no small equivocation in the word Ancient: For if we compare an ancient man with a younger, in all probability the ancient is likely to be more wise then the other; because he hath more experience, by reason of the length of his daies, according to that of Job. 12. 12. Amongst the ancient is wisdome, and in length of daies is understanding. But this holds not of that which is ancient, as it signifies that which goes before another. For it is well known, that youth goeth before old age; yet no man will say, that the opinions of men in their youth, are more likely to be sound, then the opinions of riper age. Neither doth any man call or account youth Antiquity. Yet our Fathers we call our Ancients, because they have gone before us, but little reason there is in my judgement, to count their faith the more sound by reason of such Antiquity; no more then why the opinions of man in his youth, should be reputed more sound, then the opinions of his age. For as there is a youth in man; so there is to be acknowledged a youth of the world; and so like∣wise of the Christian World, even of the Church of God. The Holy Ghost speaks in this language. For even they who were the great Ancestors of the Jews in the daies of Jeremy, are called the youth of Israell, as the youth of Gods Church. Jerem. 2. 2. I remember thee with the kindnesse of thy youth, and the love of thy marriage, when thou wentst after me in the wildernesse, in a land that was not sowen. Israel was as a thing hallowed unto the Lord, &c Ezech. 16. 60. I will remember my Covenant made with thee in the daies of thy youth. In like sort the Ancients counting them immediately from the Apostles daies, are the ve∣ry youth of the Church Christian. Now like as it is not to be exspected that a man should have as great perfection of knowledge in his youth, as in his age; so neither is it to be supposed, that the Church of Christ should have as great perfection of know∣ledge in her youth as in her age. This is to be understood caeteris paribus; otherwise there lies a double exception against it: the One in the way of Gods extraordinary mercy, the Other in the way of Gods extraordinary judgement. For God may ex∣traordinarily inspire a young man with the spirit of Prophecy, and so make him wiser then the aged. Such was the condition of Gods exuberant grace in the daies of the A∣postles, enduing them with power from on high, not only to instruct them with all spirituall wisdome and understanding in the mysteries of the Gospell, but ena∣bling them also to expresse it in diverse languages, that so they might be able Mi∣nisters of Christ, to carry the glad tidings of salvation over all the World. On the other side, the sinnes of the Christian world not embracing Gods Truth with

love, may deserve at the hands of God, that he should give them over to illusions to believe lies. Then no marvaile if our former light set in obscure darknesse, and de∣generate daies come in place of better and more noble times; which may more easily come to passe, considering that the light of the Gospell is a spirituall light of faith, no naturall light of reason; though even this naturall light of reason comes to be a∣mended and perfected by that light of grace.

But it may be said, that They who lived neer the Apostles daies, are like to be bet∣ter acquainted with the truth of God then wee. I have found some to please them∣selves in this conceit, and it runns smooth and glibb, and it seems very plausible to winne approbation. But as Austin saith of some things, that acutule sonant, but discussa reperiuntur obtusa: so many times it falls out, that reasons plausible at first, when explo∣ration comes, prove very unsound; like the fruit Solinus writes of, which grew about Sodome, Faire to the eye, but being crushed in cineres abeunt & vanam fuliginem. And for the discovering of the emptinesse of this reason, I proceed thus.

When you say of those Ancients, that they were neer to the Apostles. I demand whether the meaning be, they were neer to the times of the Apostles, or neer to the Persons of the Apostles, or neer to the word of the Apostles. The former two, doe nothing at all conduce to the perfection of Christian knowledge, or soundnesse of faith. For certainly both Jews and Heathens professed enemies to the crosse of Christ were as neer to their Times and Persons as believing Christians, but they were not so familiarly acquainted with their word. But as touching familiar acquaintance with the word of the Apostles; as also the embracing of it by faith: Nothing I trust hindereth us from being as neer to the Apostles, as the Ancients were. Nay it is well known, that as touching divers peeces of the books of the New Testament, we receive them for Canonicall, which many of the Ancients doubted of. And as touching di∣vers books concerning the times of the Old Testament, they are discovered unto us to be Apocryphall, which to many of the Ancients were not.

But it may be said, that these Ancients to whom they pretend so much reverence (which indeed is but reverence to themselves, and to serve their own turnes) were so neer to the Apostles, that they not only were partakers of their writings, but of their Preaching also by word of mouth? To this I answer.

1. That it is a very rare thing to meet with any such now adaies, unlesse it be some counterfeit Author: neither doe I find any such alleadged by any, least of all by any Arminian, who yet upon my knowledge doe discourse after this manner, as touching their neernesse to the Apostles.

2. But suppose there were any such, and they should tell us what they heard preached by the Apostles, shall we take their relations for Oracles, and make the word of God to consist, partly of that which is written by them, and partly of that which is not written, but delivered by word of mouth, and commended unto us by tradition? Then farewell the doctrine of Protestants concerning the rule of faith, that it is only the written-word; and let us with the Papists, joyne thereunto traditi∣ons to make up a compleat Rule of Faith.

It may be farther said, that by reason of their neernesse to the Apostles, they may be better acquainted with the meaning of the word written.

To which I answer; if so, then either from the Apostles own mouthes, or by rela∣tion from others. Of any that report what they heard from the Apostles own mouths, they alleadge none. If they did, what were this other then to bring in Tradition to be a Rule, if not of faith, yet of interpretation of Gods word, which is as foule every way as the former, considering that soundnesse of faith, is grounded upon the sound∣nesse of interpretation of Gods word. If only by relation from others, the same ex∣ceptions lye against this and over and above, this must be of somewhat farre lesse au∣thority then the former: it being so difficult a matter to report from another with∣out adding somewhat of his own, whether it be much or little, as Chaucer speaketh.

Lastly, let the Commentaries of these daies, be compared with the Commentaries of the Ancients, and let the indifferent reader judge, which of them are most true, most learned, most substantiall. So that I suppose, I may be bold to conclude, that this reason drawn from the neernesse of the Ancients to the Apostles, how plausible soever it seems at first sight, yet indeed is of no force.

Now to the contrary we have these reasons.

1. Like as it is fit every man should profit in the knowledge of God more and more, as long as he lives: so in all likelihood, the Christian world doth profit more and more, as they draw neerer to the end of the world, excepting those times of Gods judgements in giving the world over to illusions to believe lies. Austin did profit, as in other points of Christian knowledge, so in this as concerning Predestination, and blames the Massilienses for not profiting with him. De Praedestin. lib. 1. cap. 4. Videtis quid tunc de fidei & operibus sentiebam, quamvis de commendandâ dei gratiâ labor arem; In qua sententia istos fratres nostros esse nunc video: quia non ficut legere libros meos, ita curaverunt pro∣ficere mecum.

2. We have more means and helps for our furtherance in Christian knowledge, then they had, and that in divers respects. First, because we enjoy their labours, they enjoyed not ours, nor the like before them. So that by the reading of their writings we soon attain to that knowledge which they had, they communicating it unto us; and it were very strange we should adde nothing thereunto; especially considering that Veritas was wont to be accounted temporis filia: and Aristotle accounts it an easy thing to adde; Any man saith he may doe that, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and thus, saith he, Arts come to their perfection 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. A tall man is able to discover much farther then a Dwarfe, but let a Dwarfe be advanced upon the shoulders of that tall man, and he will discover much farther then he. Let then those Antients goe for tall fellowes in the discovery of Christian truth, let the Divines of moderne ages be but Dwarfes, as the Children of Israel seemed to be, but Grashop∣pers in comparison of the Canaanites, especially to the sonnes of Anack; yet if by their pious labours and industries, which they have with much ingenuity communi∣cated unto us, they suffer us to get upon their shoulders, shall not we though Dwarfes, be enabled hereby to discover somewhat more then they? The Eagle is a fowle of great strength and soareth high, the highest of all Kites and Haukes, yet let her carry a Wren along with her on her shoulders in her aëriall ascentions, when she is weary and can fly no higher, can it seem strange, if the Wren carried thus high by this Ana∣kim of fowles, presumes of her own strengh to fly a little higher then she? or is this a∣ny glory to the Wren, or disparagement to the Eagle?

2. Secondly Have not we better helpes of Art then they, especially as touching the knowledge of the Tongues, and Logicall resolutions of the Text. The Latine Fathers most of them were little acquainted with the Greek; neither Latine nor Greek Fathers were usually much acquainted with the Hebrew: Origen amongst the Greek, and Hierom amongst the Latine, had not their fellows for this.

3. Lastly, the Ancients in their daies were not so put unto it as the latter; No∣thing did more quicken them, or doth us, then contentions with Heretiques. And therefore look how they were exercised with Heresies, so it is to be expected they were best seen in those Articles of Faith, which were most shaken by Heretiques. This both Austin and Gregory take notice of; and Austin is most frequent herein, some passages to this purpose I shall relate hereafter. Now before Pelagius his daies, the Fathers were much exercised in opposing the Manichees, and accordingly gave them∣selves to the maintenance of Free-will, as Aniarius observes by the relation of Six∣tus Senensis. But Pelagius was the first that opposed Gods grace; and therefore those * 1.42 Fathers that contended with him, gave themselves chiefely to the maintenance of Gods grace.

And now am I come to the treating of Ancients no longer in generall, but in a spe∣ciall reference to the doctrine of predestination. Now herein the Papists themselves (who in other points labour to beat us down with nothing so much as with the noise of Antiquity) are willing to confesse that in the point of grace and predestination we need not trouble our selves, with inquiry after the doctrine of the Ancients before Pelagius rose, and that upon the ground before mentioned, to wit, because they were nothing exercised hereabouts. As for example Bellarmine, De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. lib. 1. c. 14. having proposed diverse passages of the Fathers favouring, as it seemed, the do∣ctrine wherewith Pelagius troubled the peace of Gods Church, makes Austin to an∣swer for him, Veteres Patres qui ante Pelagium floruerunt, quaestionem istam nunquam accuratè tractasse, sed incidentèr solum, & quasi per transitum illam attigisse. Addit verò (saith Bellar∣mine) in fundamento hujus sententiae, quod est, Gratiam Dei non praevenire ab ullo opere nostro, sed contrà ab illâ omnia opera nostra praeveniri, ita ut nihil omnino boni quod attinet ad salutem sit in nobis, quod non sit nobis ex Deo, convenire Catholicos omnes & ibidem citat Cyprianum, Ambrosi∣sium

& Nazianzenum: yet he takes a course to reconcile them to the truth; so doth Sixtus Senensis Bibl. Sanct. lib. 6. Annota. 251. so doth Alvarez. de Auxil. lib. 5. disp. 37.

Again consider. The decrees of predestination and reprobation are secret, nei∣ther doe they appeare of what condition they are, but by the manner of their executions. Now their executions doe consist partly in bestowing salvation on some, and inflicting damnation on others; partly in bestowing the grace of faith and repentance on some, and denying it unto others. As touching salvation and dam∣nation we willingly professe, that the salvation of men of ripe years, doth alwaies presuppose Faith and perseverance therein; and the damnation of others doth alwaies presuppose finall perseverance in sinne unrepented of. But we deny that herehence it followeth, that either faith precedes the decree of salvation, or sinne precedes the de∣cree of damnation, or the prescience of either. That faith cannot precede election, nor sinne reprobation, is evident; For as much as election and reprobation are eter∣nall, but faith and sinne are things temporall: but that wich is temporall cannot pre∣cede that which is eternall. Neither doth it follow, that because faith precedes salva∣tion, therefore faith precedes the decree of salvation. For it is faith existent in time that precedes salvation; but no Divine will say that faith existent in time, precedes Gods decree of salvation, unlesse it be some such as maintaine with Vorstius, that Gods decrees are not eternall. In like sort, it is sinne existent in time, that precedes damnation; but no wise Divine will say, that sinne existent in time precedes Gods de∣cree of damnation; the former being a thing temporall but this decree eternall. Last∣ly, neither will it follow that because faith precedes salvation and sinne damnation, therefore the foresight of faith, is antecedanious to the decree of salvation, and the foresight of sinne is antecedent to the decree of damnation. For no Enthymeme of this nature is sound, but so farre forth as it is reducible into a good Categorical Syl∣logisme, whereof these Enthymems are uncapable. For Enthymems reducible unto good Syllogismes must agree, either in their Subjects or in their Predicates, but these doe not. Again all the termes in a good Enthymeme must be expressed in that Syllo∣gisme whereunto it is reduced▪ But each of these Enthymemes consisteth manifestly of four termes; as in the first, the••e, Faith, and the Foresight of faith, Salvation and the Decree of salvation; Of the second, these, Sinne, and Foresight of sinne, Damna∣tion and the Decree of damnation; and consequently that Syllogisme whereunto ei∣ther of these quaternary of termes is clap'd, cannot be good; For no Categoricall Syllogisme is good that consisteth of foure termes. As for the reducing of them into a Syllogisme Hypotheticall, such Reductions were never heard of in the Schooles of the learned and that for just reason; because that is no course to justify the sound∣nesse of the Enthymemes, but a meer begging of that which is in question. As in case a man should reduce it thus; If faith be precedanious to salvation, then the foresight of faith is precedanious to the decree of salvation; But faith is precedanious to salva∣tion, Therefore it is precedanious to the decree of salvation. In this Hypotheticall Syllogisme, the consequence of the Major is the very Enthymeme which is in questi∣on, for the substance of it and consequently no proving of it, but a meere begging of it. Yet notwithstanding we doe not deny, but that God did decree that no man should be saved, but such as being of ripe years, should be found to persevere in faith unto death none should be damned, but such as should be found finally to persevere in sinne. The other execution of these decrees consists (as I said) in the bestowing of the grace of faith and repentance on some, and denying it unto others. Now the question is, Whether God be indeed the author of faith and repentance, yea, or no; and because the Arminians dare not professedly deny this. (though lately they are come so farre as professedly to deny that Christ merited it) therefore let the question proceede about the manner how God bestowes it, as namely, whether he bestowes it of his meer pleasure on some, denying it to others, or, Whether the reason why God bestowes it on some and not on others, be, because God findes some good work in one, which he findes not in another. This question being decided, it will clearly ap∣peare, whether predestination proceeds upon the foresight of ought in man, yea or no. For if God of his meer pleasure doth bestow faith on one, and not on another, it followes undeniably, that God predestinated him hereunto absolutely, and of his meer pleasure, without consideration of any future work of man. But if God be∣stowes faith on man upon consideration of some precedent work of his, which was

not the work of God, then (and not otherwise neither) it will follow, that upon the consideration of that future work of man, God did elect him unto faith, or pre∣destinate faith unto him. So that if we desire sincerely and ingeniously to inquire what was the opinion of the Ancients about the absolutenesse of predestination, we should state the question as touching Predestination unto faith, and not as touching Predestination unto salvation. For we all confesse that God predestinated no man unto salvation, but such as he foresaw, coming unto ripe years, would believe sooner or later. And therefore the main question between the Remonstrants and Contra∣remonstrants was, whether this decree were the whole decree of Predestination, and whether there were not another decree of Predestination besides, as namely, whether God did not decree to bestow faith on some, and deny it unto others. And secondly to inquire, Whether this decree of bestowing faith on some, did not proceed accord∣ing to Gods good pleasure, without consideration of any different work in man. And the most compendious resolution hereof, is to inquire of the manner how God carrieth himselfe in the bestowing of faith and repentance on some, and denying it unto others; as namely, Whether on his meer pleasure he hath not mercy on some, giving them faith and repentance, and of his meer pleasure, denyes the gift of faith and repentance unto others. Now let the Fathers, (whosoever thinks good) be ad∣mitted to bring in their suffrages on this Article, and remember what was decreed in the first Synode that was gathered, to make peace in the Church after Pelagius had disturbed it, namely, Gratiam non dari secundum merita, that is, as Bellarmine acknow∣ledgeth, Gratiam non dari secundum opera. Lastly, all of us now a daies consent, as * 1.43 touching Gods concourse to the substance of every act of the creature whether good or evill. Now let this Author or any other, represent unto us, what footing he finds in Antiquity concerning this. But I come to answer particularly, according to this Authors text.

He cannot find absolute and inevitable reprobation to have any footing in Anti∣quity. Belike he can find reprobation evitable; a strange phraise either way. These attributes applied to damnation doe carry a faire sense with them, damnation being a work of God wrought in time, and undoubtedly may be avoided, may be incurred for the time to come. But reprobation is eternall as God himselfe, and how that should be fancied to be of an avoidable condition for the time to come, I cannot comprehend, unlesse this Author be of their opinion, who desire to shape Gods de∣crees of a revocable nature, as being both to impute unto him an impotent immuta∣bility, as some are pleased to phraise it.

But leave we reprobation unavoidable, take we the absolute nature of it into con∣sideration: this he cannot find in all Antiquity. But consider I pray, he pretends these motives, as inducements to change his former opinion: so then belike, he stood sometimes for reprobation absolute; but did he find any footing in Antiquity for it, what time he embraced it? if he did formerly embrace it, notwithstanding he found no footing in Antiquity for it, why should he now relinquish it, for finding no foot∣ing in Antiquity for it? Belike the older he waxeth, the more he groweth in love with Antiquity. Again when formerly he did embrace the doctrine of absolute re∣probation, upon what grounds did he embrace it? was it because he was in hope he should hereafter find Antiquity for it? or was it only for the authority of them who brought him up in this opinion? What sorry grounds are these to build a mans faith upon? Yet this is not our course to impose Articles of faith on any, but rather to endoctrinate them out of the word of God. If then a mans Christian faith be built upon the Word of God, is it a Christian course to renounce it, or to question the in∣tegrity of it, because he finds no footing in Antiquity for it? What then shall become of the faith of Laicks, and such as are unlearned? Must the writings of the Fathers be translated into all vulgar Languages, and the unlearned addict themselves to the study of them, least otherwise their faith prove a wavering faith, for want of finding Antiquity to favour it? Belike the writings of the Prophets and Apostles, are no part of Antiquity, in this Authors more mature judgement. But if formerly the doctrine of absolute reprobation were received upon the evidence of Gods word, as it is fit the faith of every Christian should be grounded thereupon, especially the faith of a Divine called to be a Teacher of others; I should think there were no just cause of al∣teration, but upon discovery of the errour of those grounds, whereupon formerly it was builded; and the discovery hereof alone, were chiefly to the present purpose,

namely to shew just cause of change of mind, & alteration of judgement, but no such course doe I find taken here. These motives and reasons here proposed, may carry a shew of reason, why a man being yet to chuse his faith in these particulars, possessed with neither way, but indifferent, might preferre one way before another, one opini∣on before another, but nothing sufficient to justify a change, unlesse the weaknesse of former grounds be laid open. For it may be that the former grounds might be such as upon due comparison would be found to overweigh these pretences. For upon view that I have taken of the discourse following, I find not one argument drawn from those places of Scripture that treat of election and reprobation; these I find are purposely declined as so many rocks, as if the Author feared to make shipwrack of his errours (pardon my boldnesse in so naming them, Austin is my precedent in this saying, Hoc scio contra istam praedestinationem quam secundum scripturas defendimus, neminem ni∣si errando disputare posse) but in the mean time while he fears to make shipwrack of his errours, let him take heed least he make shipwrack of a good conscience.

But proceed we with him about the inquiry what footing this doctrine finds in An∣tiquity. * 1.44 He saith he cannot find it; but it is more then I find that ever he made any convenient search after it, his whole discourse hereupon is of so hungry a nature. The absolutenesse of election and reprobation, we conclude in Christian reason from Gods absolute carriage in giving and denying grace, understanding thereby the grace of regeneration. Now the absolutenesse herein, as we suppose, consists in bestowing this grace on some, and denying it to others, according to the meer pleasure of the Lords will. Now hath not the Apostle (more ancient then all the Antiquity he speak∣eth of) professed in expresse termes, that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth? What need we seek farther amongst the Ancients for the iustification * 1.45 of this? And that mercy here is meant, such a mercy in bestowing faith on some, which is denied to others, in converting the wills of some unto good, when others are not converted, I could prove by variety of places out of Austin, whose authority in this case is farre more worthy, then all the authority this Author produceth. Neither is this the voyce of Austin only, but of Ambrose also in that famous saying of his Quem vult religiosum, facit, so much magnified by Austin. And not Ambrose alone, but Nazian∣zen * 1.46 also, and Cyprian are alleaged by him, as concurring with him in the foundation of the doctrine of predestination, which he makes to be the freedome of Gods grace in converting whom he will. And which is farre more then this, yea farre more then all that can be produced to the contrary, by the very Prayers of the Church e∣very where in use, he iustifies the generall concurrence in that which he accounts the foundation of predestination. As when their common course was to pray unto God, that he would be pleased to convert unto the faith of Christ the hearts of Heathens; and wherein did this conversion consist, but in giving them faith and repentance: ma∣nifestly giving us to understand thereby, that the whole Catholique Church did con∣curre in this Article of Faith, that it was in the power of God according to his free grace, to convert whom he would unto the faith of Christ, and consequently not to convert whom he would. For if there were any cause on mans part, why he doth not convert some converting others, then there were also on mans part, a cause why God doth convert some not converting others, and consequently grace should be gi∣ven according unto works, that is in the phrase of the Ancients, Gratiam dari secundum merita (as Bellarmine acknowledgeth) which was ever accounted expresse Pelagia∣nisme, * 1.47 and was as expressely condemned in the Councel of Palestina above 1200 years agoe, and Pelagius himselfe was driven to subscribe unto it, by shamefull dis∣simulation so to prevent Anathematization of his own person.

But the upper way (saith this Author) was never taught or approved by any of the Fathers for 600 years. Here breaks forth another reason of this Authors (or his that directed him) cunning carriage in distinguishing the two waies of our Divines in maintaining the absolutenesse of election and reprobation, to wit, that in the course of his dis∣course he might serve his turne with both, and where Antiquity served not his turne against the one, yet might it serve his turne, as he thought against the other. But the truth is, there was no such question at all ventilated in those daies, as touching the ob∣iect of predestination, no nor in Austins neither, nor many hundred years after, that I know. And no marvell; For it concernes the ordering of Gods decree aright, which is meerly Logicall, as I have shewed in my Vind. Grat. Dei. Its true that S^t Austin doth usually accommodate that of S^t Paul, Rom. 9. 21. concerning the Masse, unto

mankind considered in Massa damnata as he commonly calls it, that is, in the cor∣rupt Masse; but not alwaies, but sometimes he speaks of it, and accommodates it cleerely unto the Masse of mankind uncorrupt, yea, as yet not created, as there I have shewed. And as for the right ordering of Gods decrees, and the right stating of the object of predestination and reprobation, We desire no better, nor other ground then that of the Apostle, God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth, that is, he cures infidelity and hardnes of heart in whom he will, by bestowing faith and repentance upon them, and leaves it uncured in whom he will by deny∣ing faith and repentance unto them. And as for the rigour of this Tenent (as it is commonly accounted) of making the Masse of mankind not created the object of predestination, I have already shewed the vanity of that conceit and denominati∣on; for as much as hereby neither is the decree of damnation made to precede the consideration of sinne, no nor of finall impenitency in any moment of nature, nor in any moment of nature is the decree of salvation made by mee, to precede the consideration of finall perseverance in faith and repentance. But whereas some, who are most rigid indeed in their discourse, make the decree of saving some and damning others to precede the decree of creating and permitting of sinne both o∣riginall and actuall; others who are most dissolute, make the decree of creating and permitting of sinne, to precede the decree of saving some and damning others, My Opinion is equally removed from these extreames, and conceives none of these decrees to be either way subordinate, but all coordinate and simultaneous, as being decrees only of various means, tending to one and the same end; thus God doth decree both to create some, and to permit to sinne, and finally to persevere therein, and to damne them for their sinne, to the manifestation of his glory in the way of justice vindicative. On the other side, God doth decree to create others, and per∣mit them to sinne, and raise them out of sinne by faith and repentance, and reward them with everlasting life, to the manifestation of his glory, in the way of mercy mixed with justice.

Farther consider that as touching predestination it selfe, there was no question mo∣ved thereabouts in the Church of God, before the daies of Pelagius; and what cre∣dit can they get, who consult with them in such points, wherein they were not exer∣cised. For we find by experience, that to contend with Heretiques hath been an or∣dinary means in the course of Gods providence, for the more diligent inquisition af∣ter the truth of God and happy discovery thereof. Sancta Ecclesia (saith Gregory) in * 1.48 suâ semper eruditione instruitur, dum Haereticorum quaestionibus impugnatur. And Austin in like manner, Didiscimus, saith he, singulas quas{que} Haereses intulisse Ecclesiae proprias quaestiones, contra quas diligentius defenderetur scriptura divina, quam si nulla talis necessitas cogeret. And on the other side, before question hath been moved on a poynt, the Fathers have de∣livered themselves somewhat improvidently, whereupon Heretiques have taken advantage to countenance their errours by the writings of the Ancient. This Hierome observes in the poynt of Arrianisme, proving thereby, that the Ancient * 1.49 Writers before the Arrian Heresy arose, were no competent judges in that poynt. Si me causas vitiorum (saith he) in Patrum Scriptis nescire respondero non statim illos Haere∣ticos judicabo. Fieri enim potest ut vel simpliciter erraverint, vel alio sensu scripserint, vel a Li∣brariis imperitis eorum paulatim scripta corrupta sunt, vel certè antequam in Alexandriâ quasi daemonium Meridianum Arrius nasceretur. Innocenter quaedam & minus cautè locuti sunt & quae non possunt perversorum hominum calumniam declinare. Marke it well, Before Arrius like a Devill from the South rose up, the Fathers delivered some things innocently, yet lese warily, and such as cannot avoid the calumny of perverse persons. Upon the same ground it is, that Austin excuseth Ticonius, and that in * 1.50 the same particular wherein he approached neere to Pelagianisme, to wit, before the Church of God was acquainted with that Heresy; his words are these, Sed non erat expertus hanc Haeresin Ticonius quae nostro tempore exorta multum nos, ut gratia Dei quae per Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum est adversus eos defenderemus, exercuit; & secundum id quod ait Apostolus, Oportet Haereses esse ut probati manifesti fiant in vobis, multò vigilantiores diligentiores{que} reddidit: ut advérteremus in scripturis Sanctis, quod istum Ticonium minús attentum, minus{que} sine hoste sollicitum, fugit, etiam ipsam scilicet fi∣dem donum illius ese, qui ejus mensuram unicui{que} partitur. Ticonius considered not that faith it selfe is the gift of God, neither was he so carefull to look into the truth of this; and why? surely because he had no enemy to put him to it, as being not

acquainted with the errour of Pelagius. But this Heresy, saith he, arising in our daies, hath put us upon the defence of the grace of God, which is given us through our Lord Jesus Christ, and hath made us more watchfull and diligent to observe, that even faith it selfe is his gift, who distributes to every one a measure thereof. Hence it is that the same Austin, when Prosper signified that those of Marseiles would rest contented if he could make good the opinion which he maintained in the point of predestination, out of the Writings of the former, and more ancient Divines, re∣turnes for answer, that there was no need hereof, considering that They living be∣fore this Heresy was known, (to wit, of Pelagius) were not at all put upon the dis∣cussing of this question, which surely they would have done, had they been constrai∣ned * 1.51 to make answer to any such as the Pelagians were. See his own words, Si hujus sen∣tentiae defensionem ex divinorum eloquiorum nos praecedentibus Catholicis tractatoribus promerem, profectò hi Fratres quibuscum nos agimus, acquiescerent. Hoc enim significastis Literis vestris. This was Prosper's motion; now mark Austin's answer. Quid igitur opus est ut eorum scrutemur opuscula, qui priusquam ista Haeresis oriretur, non habueruni necessitatem in hac difficili ad solven∣dum quaestione versari, quod proculdubio facerent, si respondere talibus cogerentur. Charity did suggest unto him, this would have been their course, had they been exercised with Pelagius, as he was. For it was his own case. For there was a time when himselfe thought that albeit holinesse and good works consequent to faith toge∣ther with salvation, were the work of God, yet faith it selfe he conceived to be the work of man; to wit, before he was exercised with Pelagius as appears, Liber Propositionum ex Epistolâ and Romanos. Non ergo elegit Deus opera cujus{que} in praesci∣entiâ, sed fidem elegit in praescientiâ, vel quem sibi crediturum esse praescivit, ipsum elegit cui Spiritum Sanctum daret, ut bona operando eriam vitam aeternam consequeretur. For he pro∣fesseth in the words following that he then conceived, Nostrum esse credere, to be∣lieve was a work of our own. Afterwards he retracteth this, Retract. lib. 1. cap. 25. professing, I had never said this, had I known faith it selfe to be the gift of God, Si scivissem fidem ipsam inter Dei munera quae dantur per Spiritum Sanctum reperi∣ri. Nam quamvis credere & operari utrum{que} nostrum sit propter liberum voluntatis arbitri∣um & quae non nisi volentibus nobis fiunt, utrum{que} Dei donum est qui & credere, & velle, & perficere subministrat. The Papists themselves, notwithstanding the great de∣votion they pretend towards the Ancients, yet are driven to devise what may be said to excuse them; as in the very point of Free-will they desire to excuse Chrysostome. Sixtus Senensis, Biblioth••••. lib. 5. annotat. 101. Uel dicendum est sicut etiam Annianus in Praefatione Commentariorum Chryjostomi in Math. annotavit Chry∣sostomum interdum naturae nostrae vires plus aequo extulisse ex contentione disceptandi cum Manichae∣is & Gentilibus, qui hominem asserebant vel naturâ malum vel fati violentia ad peccandum com∣pelli. Nay what think we of Vossius himselfe, from whose labours it is, and nothing of their own, that our Arminians would seem to breath so much Antiquity. This Vossius professeth, they mistake him that taketh him to be of any other opi∣nion in the poynt of predestination, then Austin was of. De Historicis Lat. lib. 2. cap. 17. Yet doth he acknowledge that Austin did reject the opinion of the Ancients both Greeks and Latines who went before him, in the point of predestination. Histor. Pelag. pag. 655. Patres Graeci & Latinorum illi qui ante Au∣gustinum vixerunt, ipse{que} aliquandiu Augustinus, verba Apostoli interpretari solent de e∣lectione quorundam ad salutem secundum fidem & pietatem praevisam; & aliorum reprobatione aeterna ob praescientiam malorum operum quae in vita acturi essent. Sed Augustinus (here comes in the Adversative) rejectâ hâc opinione existimabat Apostolorum loqui de quo∣rundam electione ad vitam, aliorum item praeteritione, non habitâ vel in his vel in illis ra∣tione, sive bonorum, sive etiam malorum quae personalia forent. And which is more then this, Pag. 653. professeth a third interpretation of that passage Rom. 9. 11, 12, 13. differing both from Austins interpretation, and from that of the Fathers Greeke and Latine that went before him, and makes it disputable, which is truest, though this third opinion hath no footstep amongst the Anci∣ents, and thus he carrieth himselfe, notwithstanding all the pretence of his reverence of Antiquity. And to vindicate Austins interpretation, as well as the rest, from countenancing absolute reprobation, he calls in to help at a dead lift, the doctrine of the Jesuits, concerning Scientia Media. And I desire upon no better termes to contend then this in Scholasticall Divinity, whether this doctrine be not a most unsober invention without all ground. And

whereas Vossius acknowledgeth Austins opinion to be for the absolutenesse of electi∣on (and he professeth himselfe to be of Austins opinion.) I dare appeale to any learned Divines sober judgement, whether this doctrine of Scientia Media doth not equally justify the absolutenesse of reprobation, as the absolutenesse of election. Yet after all this, I would not have any think, that I reject any of these ancient Fa∣thers, that seem to be most opposite to Austins opinion in the point of predesti∣nation. I think they may be fairely and Scholastically reconciled without acknow∣ledging so much difference between them, as Vossius maketh, and that by such an interpretation as sometimes is admitted by Vossius himselfe, of his own phraise of his own distinction, though he dreames not of the applyable nature of the same to the will of God in predestination. His distinction is of Voluntas Dei antecedens, & volun∣tas consequens; and this he makes equivalent to that other distinction of the will of * 1.52 God, to wit, Absoluta & Conditionalis. Now this Conditionall will of God he in∣terprets not quoad actum volentis, but quoad Res volitas: Like as Doctor Jackson pro∣fesseth * 1.53 in expresse termes, that the former distinction of voluntas antecedens & consequens, is to be interpreted, namely, quoad res volitas, and not quoad actum volentis. Now ac∣cording to this construction, there is no difference between them and Austin, nor the least impediment to the making of the will of God, both in predestination and re∣probation to be most absolute. For though sinne be acknowledged to be the cause of the will of God in reprobation quoad res volitas, that is, in respect of the punish∣ment willed thereby, this hinders not the absolutenesse of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis. And unlesse we understand the Fathers thus, we must necessarily charge them with such an opinion, whereof Aquinas is bold to professe, That never any man was so madde as to affirme, to wit, that any merits should be the cause of Predestination quoad actum praedestinantis. And why so? to wit, because pre∣destination is the act of Gods will, and there can be no cause of Gods will quoad actum volentis. Now who seeth not that by the same reason there can be no cause of divine reprobation quoad actum reprobantis; for even reprobati∣on is the act of Gods will, as well as predestination, and every way it must be as madde a thing to devise a cause of reprobation quoad actum reproban∣tis.

They did all generally agree, saith this Author, upon the contrary conclusion. Now the con∣trary Conclusion to absolute and unavoidable reprobation is to maintain conditionall and avoidable reprobation; but this is not the contrary conclusion here specified by this Author, but rather that damnation was avoydable, such is his loose dis∣course; whereas there is no question at all concerning damnation, whether it be conditionall or absolute. We all confessing, that like as salvation is not ordained to befall any man of ripe years, but upon the performance of faith and repentance and finall perseverance therein; so damnation is not ordained to be the portion of any, but upon their finall perseverance in sinne. In like sort as touching the possibility of salvation, not one Divine of ours, that I know, denyes the possibility of any mans salvation while he lives in this World. Doctor Jack∣son indeed hath an opinion, that a man may proceed so farre in sinne in this life, that the doore of repentance may be shut upon him. Wee have no such o∣pinion; We acknowledge, that as God calls some at the first houre, so may some be called at the last houre of the day, yea the Thiefe upon the Crosse, yea, inter Pontem & Fontem. In a word, We say plainly, that it is possible for any man at any time to be saved by grace giving repentance: without repentance none can be saved; which is, I presume, without question between us. In like sort it is possible for any man to repent, provided that God be pleased to give him re∣pentance, and whether God will give him repentance or no we know not. Therefore the Apostle instructs Timothy after this manner, The servant of the Lord must not strive, but must be gentle towards all men, apt to teach, suffering the evill, in∣structing them with meeknesse that be contrary minded, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, if at any time God may give them repentance, that they may acknowledge the truth and come to amendment out of the snare of the Devill, of whom they are taken Prisoners to doe his Will. Here is clearely an acknowledgement of a possibility of repentance, sooner or later, but up∣on the gift of God, not otherwise. The contrary opinion whereunto, this Author seemeth in this passage very strongly to savour of, but alleageth not one Father for the proofe of it, to give us some document of his judicious

carriage in the survey of the Fathers which here he pretends to have been made by him, and that with very great ostentation; Yet I seem to be very well ac∣quainted with the spirit that breatheth here; and I wonder the passages of the An∣cients to this purpose (which yet I am perswaded are nothing to the purpose) are not collected out of Doctor Ushar's discourse In causa Godaeschalci inscribed to Gerar∣dus Vossius; and I doubt not but the issue will be this, that God is ready to give all men repentance in case they performe somewhat; and so the grace of repentance shall be given according to mens works, which was condemned 1200 years agoe in the Sy∣nod of Palestine, and ever since accounted no better then flat Pelagianisme. And which is worse then this, as that which stands in opposition to common sense, they wil be driven to professe, that God is ready to give a reprobate repentance, in case he will repent, yea the very will to repent, in case he will repent. This desperate reso∣lution I have already found by experience, and if I be not deceived, breathed by the very same spirit that breatheth heere.

At length we are like to receive an account of this Authors judicious survey of the Ancients out of Calvin and Beza. Ne{que} haec vulgò recepta opinio solius vulgi est; (saith Cal∣vin) habuit enim saeculis omnibus magnos authores. To this I answer,

1. That this is farre from justifying, that absolute reprobation, and absolute ele∣ction had no footing in Antiquity, that the Upper way was never taught for the space of 600 years, nor the Lower way till the time of S^t Austin. Though in all ages it had great Authors to impugne it, yet it might also have in all ages as great Au∣thors to maintain it, and more too, for ought these words of Calvin in his opinion doe manifest to the contrary.

2. Albeit not some but all had maintained election and reprobation to proceed according to foreknowledge of mens works, yet this nothing hinders the absolute∣nesse either of election or reprobation. For consider, it is one thing to speak of ele∣ction unto grace, another to speak of election unto glory; one thing to speak of re∣probation, as it signifies a purpose to deny grace, another thing to speak of it, as it signifies a purpose to inflict damnation. It was never known I think, that any main∣tained, that God upon the foresight of mens faith, did elect them unto faith, or pur∣pose to give them faith; or that God foreseeing men would not believe, nor repent, did decree that they should neither believe nor repent. Upon which brainsick conceit our Arminians are cast now a daies, and all the embracers of Scientia Media: But ma∣ny of them professed indeed that God did decree to bestow salvation upon them whom he foresaw would finally persevere in faith and repentance; and to damne those whom he foresaw would finally persevere in infidelity or impenitency. We ac∣knowledge as much as they, but still the way is open to enquire of the order of these, namely, Whether the foresight of faith and repentance were before the decree of salvation, or after it, or simultaneous with it: Whether the foresight of infidelity and impenitency were before the decree of damnation, or after it, or simultaneous with it; but where is any such question to be found amongst the Ancients? We wil∣lingly professe that God did not purpose to bestow eternall life on any of ripe years, but as a reward of their faith and repentance and good workes; that God did not purpose to inflict damnation on any of ripe years, but as a condigne punishment of their finall infidelity and impenitency; and the Ancients who maintained that God decreed to save some and damne others, according to his prescience of the piety of the one, and impiety of the other, had no other meaning that I know, or this Author is able to make good, or any other, as I am perswaded.

3. But let us farther enquire what those Ancients thought concerning faith and repentance; as whether they thought them to be the gifts of God, or no; dares this Author or any Arminian deny, they maintained them to be the gifts of God, the Scripture being so full and expresse for this? Secondly, enquire what their opinion was concerning the manner how God gave faith to one, and not to another, as 'tis manifest he did not, he doth not give it to all; as namely, whether it was of the meer pleasure of God, that he converted some, and not others; or whether he bestowed faith on some, and not on others, because he found those some to have prepared themselves for the receiving of faith, not so others. If it was of the meer pleasure of God, it manifestly followeth, that election unto grace and reprobation from grace, was absolute: which is the main thing in question in these our daies. For we who are accounted most rigid herein, doe not affect to say, That God decreed to save

whom he will, or to damne whom he will; but to the contrary we say, God decreed to save none, but such as believe and repent, and to damne none, but such as dye in infidelity or impenitency: but we professe willingly, that God decreed to bestow faith and repentance on whom he would, and deny it to whom he would, the Scrip∣ture being expresse, that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth. And Austin is most frequent in this profession, and this is that Grace which he acknowledgeth to be the foundation of predestination, and wherein both Cyprian, and Nazianzene, and Ambrose did agree with him. And Ambrose in speciall sort he mag∣nifies for this profession. And Calvin hereupon observes, that whereas the Pelagians charged him, with differing from the ancients herein. Valet Augustini testimonium, saith he, apud eos, qui libenter in Patrum authoritate acquiescunt. Quanquam non patitur Augustinus se a reliquis disjungi, sed claris testimoniis divortium hoc cujus invidia gravabant eum Pelagiani, o∣stendit falsum esse. Citat enim ex Ambrosio (lib. de Praedestin. sanct. cap. 19.) Christus quem dignatur vocat (here is the criticall point of this question concerning the absolutenesse of election and reprobation) Item si voluisset ex indevotis fecisset devotos. Sed Deus quos dig∣natur vocat, & quem vult religiosum facit. Si ex Augustino integrum volumen contexere libeat, le∣ctoribus ostendere promptum esset mihi non nisi ejus verbis opus esse: sed eos prolixitate onerare nolo. This was Calvins judgement, as touching the judgement of Antiquity in this.

4. Yet I confesse there was a time when Austin did not conceive faith to be a∣mongst the gifts of Gods spirit, but being exercised with the Pelagians, he came to acknowledge the speciall grace of God in this; and hereupon made faith an effect of predestination, and not any precedent thereunto, and doubts not, but the Fathers would have expressed as much, had they been exercised with the Pelagians as he was; for so much he signifies unto Prosper as before I shewed, and withall shewes how in the foundation of predestination they agreed with him, in as much as they agreed in the nature of grace, acknowledging the conversion of the heart to be the gift of God; And not they only, but the whole Catholique Church, as appeared by their com∣mon prayers, that God would convert the hearts of Infidells; and to say, that God doth not convert the hearts of men according to the meer pleasure of his will, but according to mens preparations, is clearly to maintaine that God gave grace accor∣ding unto works, which doctrine was generally exploded as meer Pelagia∣nisme.

5. Suppose they did all acknowledge the decree of election and reprobation, to be conditionall, yet if they interpreted this conditionally, not quoad actum Volentis, but quoad Res volitas, this is nothing opposite to the absolutenesse of election and reproba∣tion quoad actum elegentis and reprobantis, but only quoad res volitas, to wit, salvation on the one side, and damnation on the other side. And we willingly acknowledge that God hath not ordained that salvation or damnation shall befall any man but in case they believe and repent, or refuse to believe, or repent. Now that the Ancients did in this manner understand voluntas conditionata in God, Vossius himselfe (upon whom our Arminians doe most depend as touching the authority of the Ancients) doth im∣providently, and ere he is a ware, confesse. Hist. Pelag. pag. 638. his words are these. Aliqua absolutè vult & simpliciter: quomodo creare mundum voluit & extremo die volet resurrectio∣nem carnis. De qua voluntate intelligi debet illud, Psal. 115. 3. Deus noster in coelo, quaecun{que} voluit facit. & Apost. ad Rom. 9. 19. Voluntati ejus quis resistit? Aliqua item vult cum condi∣tione quae idcirco in effectum non prodeunt nisi conditione impletâ: quomodo omnes homines salvari vult, sed per & propter Christum fide apprehensum. Atqui non omnes fide aphrehendunt Christum, sed abs{que} paenitentiâ ac fide plurimi de hoc mundo decedunt. Quo respectu tales in aeternum statuit dam∣nare. De conditionatâ illâ voluntate extant longè plurima apud Veteres Scriptores. Aliqua hoc loco ascribemus.

Such indeed are Beza's words upon that of the Apostle, Who hath given first unto God? Rom. 11. 35. Est autem etiam hic locus (saith he) diligenter observandus adversus eos qui fidei, vel operum praevisionem faciunt electionis causam. In quem errorem sanc turpissimum. Origenes ve∣teres pleros{que} tum Graecos tum Latinos adegit donec; tandem Dominus Augustinum per Pelagianos ad hunc agnoscendum & corrigendum errorem excitaret. The first part this Author con∣ceales, it being by Beza delivered as touching election; and this Author deales pur∣posely on reprobation only. The latter part likewise he passeth by; for Beza confines this which he saith of the Ancients to a certain time, namely, the time preceding the troubles raised by Pelagius. But this Author had rather it should runne at randome without any determination; and then againe, the mentioning of Austin raised by God

upon occasion of Pelagius his doctrine, to take notice of this errour, and correct it, he well saw was like enough to blast all the shew he makes of the Ancients, especially considering how that Pelagian faction was not by Austin only, but by the Catholique Church of those daies beaten down. And it is well known how the writings of Au∣stin were countenanced, and how many Councells of those daies, made decrees a∣gainst the Pelagian Heresy. And for both these passages, it seems he was beholding to Vossius in his Pelagian History, Lib. 6. Thes. 8. which is this, Graeci Patres semper, Pa∣trum verò Latinorum illi qui ante Augustinum vixerunt, dicere solent, eos esse praedestinatos ad vi∣tam, quos Deus p••e recte{que} victuros praevidit, sive ut alii loquuntur quos praevidit credituros, & perseveraturos, &c. Quod ita interpretatur ut praedestinatio ad gloriam facta dicitur, secundum prae∣scientiam fidei & perseverantiae. And next unto some passages alleadged out of Origen he brings in these two passages of Beza and Calvin. Now it liked not this Author to take his course to begin with Clemens Alexandrinus, and his Scholler Origen, as Vos∣sius doth: For albeit Origen was a man for his learning of great authority in the Church of God, in such sort that it was wont to be said, that Origenis ingenium Eccle∣siae Sacramentum, and no marvail if many followed him, and 'tis usuall even with Hie∣rome in his Commentaries to follow him. Yet after his death, his Writings were found at length to have a very ill savour in the Catholique Church. And amongst o∣ther foul opinions found in him, one nearly concerning this very particular we have in hand, was that which Vossius there delivers in this manner, Veterum multorum opinio est, putâsse eum animas corporibus vel praedestinatorum, vel reproborum uniri pro iis quae bene vel male egissent ante conditum corporeum hunc mundum. Judge I pray whether here be not a sweet nosegay for the Divill, as touching the foresight of works, not to come, but of works past before they were borne, and thereupon their soules united either to bo∣dies predestinated unto life, or reprobated unto death. Yet Vossius would not have us think either Origen deceived by Clement (which no man ever said that I know, neither doth Vossius pretend any such thing) or that Chrysostome was deceived by them, or those that followed, by him, all this seems to be delivered only to crosse Be∣za, who professed the Greek and Latine Fathers were deceived by Origen. Yet it is well known of what estimation Origen was in the Church, none of the others like him, but what is his reason? because forsooth Ireneus lib. 4. cap. 76. professeth that God did destinate heaven to them that should believe; and to them which should not believe, hell. But could he be ignorant that Fulgentius professeth the selfe same, lib. 1. ad Monimum; namely, Deum praedestinasse ad regnum quos ad se praescivit misericordiae praevenientis auxilio redituros, & in se misericordiae subsequentis auxilio esse mansuros. Yet this very Author in his Preface professeth that Fulgentius amongst others, albeit they maintained that God did destinate no others to salvation, then such as whom he fore∣saw by the pure gift of his grace, would have the beginnings of faith, and a good will, and persevere in good, yet notwithstanding they withall maintained, that this prescience divine of their faith and perseverance, did flow from Gods absolute de∣cree to save them. Nay Austin himselfe in Joan. Tract. 42. (as Hunnius and others alleage him, and I find it true) hath these words of those of whom our Saviour saith, Therefore you heare not, because ye are not of God; Praecogniti erant quòd non fuerant credituri eâ fide quâ solâ possint a peccatorum obligatione liberari; and afterwards saith, secundum hanc prae∣destinationem loquutus est Dominus. But will it herehence follow that Austin did deny absolute predestination? Vossius himselfe acknowledgeth the contrary of him, as * 1.54 well as of Fulgentius, namely, that Gods foreknowledge of perseverance in good, proceeded from Gods absolute decree of saving them. And let every sober reader judge whether upon the same grounds it doth not follow, that Gods foreknowledge of mans perseverance in infidelity, doth not likewise follow from Gods absolute de∣cree of reprobating him. For what is the ground of the former, but this, that God had absolutely decreed to give faith unto some? Now doth it not herehence follow, that God absolutely decreed to deny faith unto others? For as Ambrose saith, and as Austin alleageth out of him, si voluisset ex indevotis fecisset devotos. Yet am not I of Vos∣sius his opinion in this. I say rather, Gods foreknowledge of one mans faith, pro∣ceeds from his decree not of saving him, but of giving him faith; and Gods fore∣knowledge of another mans finall perseverance in infidelity, proceeds from Gods decree, not of damning him, but of denying him grace to cure his infidelity. And as for the decree of salvation, I deny it to be in any moment of nature, before the de∣cree of giving grace; in like sort, I deny the decree of damnation to be in any mo∣ment

of nature before the decree of permitting mans infidelity to continue uncured unto the end. And the criticall question in this point consists in this, Whether the granting of grace, or deniall of grace, be not meerely of the pleasure of God, and not according to any different dispositions in man; by grace understanding grace ef∣fectuall to the working of faith and true repentance. And unlesse the Ancients be shewed to have maintained, either that faith, and repentance, are not the gifts of God; or, that if they be the gifts of God, that God dispenseth his effectuall grace for the working of them, not according to the meer pleasure of God, but according to the different dispositions of men; all that they talke of the Ancients in this point, is meerly vaine and to no purpose.

But I come to Prosper, whose relation, I doubt not, this Author takes to be of greatest moment. Now to this I answer.

1. To say that, Penè omnium par invenitur & una sententia, qua propositum & praedesti∣nationem Dei secundum praescientiam receperunt, doth not prove that there is no footing a∣mongst the Ancients for absolute predestination. Neither doth Vossius alleage halfe so many Fathers for this opinion, as were those Bishops who joyned with Cyprian in decreeing the Rebaptization of Hereticks.

2. This seems to be related by Prosper, not so much out of his own opinion, as by way of an objection proposed by the Massilienses, desiring Austin to shew how it is to be answered. Illud etiam (saith he) qualiter dilucitur quaesumus demonstres quod retractatis Priorum hac de re opinionibus, penè omnium invenitur par & una sententia, &c. And this is farther evidenced by these words of Prosper. Obstinationem suam vetustate defendunt ut ea quae de Epistolâ Pauli Romanis scribentis, ad manifestationem divinae gratiae praevenientis Ele∣ctorum merita proferuntur, a nullo unquam Ecclesiasticorum ita esse intellecta ut nunc sentiuntur, af∣firment.

3. Observe, When Prosper urged them to expound those passages in S^t Paul, af∣ter what meaning they thought best, they forthwith professed ingeniously that they found nothing in the Fathers that gave them content: their words related by Prosper are these, Nihil se invenisse quod placeret.

4. Bellarmine, De Grat. & liber. Arbit. lib. 2. cap. 14. takes notice of this obje∣ction drawn out of Prosper and answereth it, according unto Austin in this manner, Augustinus ipse in libr. de Bono Persev. cap. 20. dicit Veteres Patres, qui ante Pelagium floruerunt, quaestionem istam nunquam acuratè tractasse sed incidenter solùm & quasi per transitum illam atti∣gisse. Addit verò in fundamento hujus sententiae quod est, Gratiam Dei non praeveniri ab ullo opere nostro; sed contrà, ab illo omnia opera nostra praeveniri, ita ut nihil omninò boni quod attinet ad sa∣lutem, sit in nobis quod non sit nobis ex Deo, convenire Catholicos omnes; & ibidem citat Cypria∣num, Ambrosium, Nazianzenum. So that it appears hereby, that Austin did not ac∣knowledge the former Writers to have embraced this opinion, though the Massilien∣ses pretended so much. And herewithall he openeth unto us, a way how to conceive aright of their opinion in predestination; namely, that as many as acknowledge Gods grace preventing us in every good work, they all are to be accounted to agree with him in the doctrine of predestination. For it is apparent, that in the contrary doctrine Pelagius grounded his opinion concerning predestination. And Austin him∣selfe sometime thought that God, quem sibi crediturum esse praescivit, ipsum elegit, cui spiri∣tum sanctum daret, ut bona operando vitam aeternam consequeretur: and why so? because for∣sooth he at that time conceived it to be mans work to believe, which saith he, I had never said, had I known faith it selfe to have been amongst the gifts of the holy Ghost. Retract. lib. 1. cap. 25. and therefore De Praedesti. Sanct. cap. 1. in his answer to the Letter of Hilarius, mark what course Austin takes for the justifying of his own doctrine concerning predestination. Prius fidem quâ Christiani sumus donum Dei esse debe∣mus ostendere. And Bellarmine in the place above cited professeth, that Austin did herehence rightly collect out of the Fathers, Gratuitae praedestinationis sententiam & fidem in Ecclesiâ Catholicâ semper fuisse. Ne{que} olim (saith he) defendi potest praedestinatio ex operibus praevisis, nisi aliquid boni ponatur in homine justo, quo discernatur ab impio quod non sit illi à Deo; quod sanè (saith he) Patres omnes cum summâ consensione rejiciunt. In like sort, Junius in his answer to Baro for the justifying of gratuitous predestination, counts it sufficient to prove, Fidem esse donum praedestinantis & miserentis Dei ex praedestinatione ipsius. And adds saying, Hoc omnes Patres uno consensu ex Christo & Paulo agnoverunt. Ipse Justinus Mar∣tyr Apolog. 2. & alii. Gravissimè verò Clemens Alexandrinus (in hac alioqui palestrâ non ita exercitatus) ut sequentia saecula. Stromat. lib. 2. Basilidis & Valentimi dogma esse dicit, quod fides

à naturâ sit. In my poor judgement, the Fathers, as many as stated predestination ac∣cording to the prescience of mens works, had no other meaning but this, that God did predestinate no man to eternall life, but such as coming to ripe years should be∣lieve in Christ and repent; no man unto eternall death, but such as should finally per∣severe in infidelity and impenitency; so making works foreseen the cause of salvati∣on, but not of Gods decree. And Aquinas was bold to professe that, Nemo fuit it a in∣sanae mentis qui diceret merita esse causam praedestinationis divinae quoad actum praedestinantis. And 'tis a good rule that Gerson gives, that holy mens Writings are not to be urged precisely according to the letter, De Vitâ Spirituali animae Sect. 1. co. 11. Notet his quód Doctores etiam sancti sunt magis reverenter glossandi in multis, quàm ampliandi: quoniam non om∣nes semper adverterunt, aut advertere cogitaverunt ad proprietatem locutionis. Improprietas autem non ampliari debet, sed ad proprietatem reduci, alioquin quid mirum si augetur deceptio.

5. We know what answer Austin himselfe makes unto this, De Praedestin. Sanct. cap. 14. Quid igitur opus est ut eorum scrutemur opuscula, qui priusquam ista Haeresis oriretur, non habuerunt necessitatem in hac difficili ad solvendum quaestione versari, quod proculdubio facerent si respondere talibus cogerentur.

6. As before I shewed, Fulgentius himselfe maintaines predestination to be secun∣dum praescientiam; yet Vossius acknowledgeth him as well as Austin, to have maintained the absolutenesse of predestination.

7. Lastly, this passage concerneth predestination alone, as it signifies the divine decree of conferring glory; but who ever was known to maintaine the divine decree of conferring grace to have been secundum praescientiam, according to foresight of any work in man? For this is plainly to maintain, that grace is given according unto works, which in the Ancients phraise is all one, as to acknowledge, that grace is gi∣ven according unto merits, which is direct Pelagianisme, and condemned 1200 years agoe in the Synod of Palestine.

As for that of Minutius Foelix, We deny that God doth, sortem in hominibus punire, non voluntatem. We doe not say, Genitura plectitur; we say that in every one who is pu∣nished by God, ingenii natura punitur; Wee confesse that Fatum illud est quod de unoquo{que} Deus fatus est; and that pro meritis & singulorum qualitatibus, etiam fata determinat. Yet the holy Ghost professeth in the mouthes of all his Apostles, that both Herod, and Pon∣tius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and People of Israel, were gathered together against the holy sonne of God, to doe that which Gods hand, and Gods councell pre∣determined to be done; and yet this predetermination divine, I should think, was no∣thing prejudiciall to the liberty of their wills.

As for Hierome, this Author saith that he was an eager opposer of the Pelagians, but no where doth it appeare, that the point of predestination comes in question be∣tween them. These very passages out of Hierome are proposed by Grotius in his Pie∣tas Ordinum Hollandiae, and answered by Gratianus Civilis punctually, and long before by Bellarmine Lib. 2. de Grat. & lib. arb. cap. 14.

I answer, what is this any other, but that which the Fathers many of them have pro∣fessed in saying, that predestination is secundum praescientiam; And doth not Fulgentius affirm the same? Yet is he acknowledged by Vossius, a maintainer of the absolutenesse of predestination as well as Austin. Did Hierome deny faith to be the gift of God? or granting it to be the gift of God, did he maintaine, that God gave it according unto works? If not, but according to the meer pleasure of his will, having mercy on some, while he hardned others; the case is cleare, that he maintained absolute electi∣on unto faith. As for Gods decree of salvation and damnation, we willingly pro∣fesse, that God decreed to save no man but upon his finall perseverance in faith and piety; to damne none, but such as finally persevere in infidelity and impenitency. Now compare we these decrees together, the decree of giving faith, and the decree of saving; which of these are most likely to be the foremost; it is apparent that salvation is more likely to be the end in respect of faith, and faith the means in respect of salva∣tion, then the contrary. And the generall and most received rule of Schooles is, that the intention of the end is before the intention of the means. I think the glory of God in the way of mercy, mixed with justice is the end of both; and that the decrees of giving faith and salvation are simultaneous, as decrees of means tending to the same end, and so neither before the other. But Hierome saith, that, ex Praescientia futu∣rorum nascitur dilectio vel odium. I confesse he doth in a disjunctive manner thus, vel ex praescientia vel ex operibus. And we know that passions such as Love and Hatred, are

commonly said to be attributed to God, not quoad affectum but quoad effectum, and so they may fairely stand for salvation and damnation, which proceed ex operibus in Hieroms phraise. But admit he means hereby, decretum salvandi which rising expraescien∣tia fidei, must presuppose the decree of giving faith to precede. I answer then, there is to be acknowledged an impropriety of speech, and here is place for Gersons rule, Sancti non semper adverterunt ad proprietatem locutionis. And the rather because Hie∣rome we never find exercised in this Controversy. And it is against common rea∣son, that faith should be intended before salvation. And lastly, this were to impute unto him to acknowledge 2 motive cause of Predestination quoad actum praedestinan∣tis: which Aquinas professeth against, as a thing impossible; namely, that there should be a cause of Gods will quoad actum volentis; Nay he is bold to say that, No man was so mad to say that merits are the cause of Predestination quoad actum praedestinantis.

The last part of this Authors performance in the poynt of Antiquity is the Coun∣cell of Arles, subscribing as he saith, the letter which was written by Faustus against Lucidus the Predestinarian (for so he styles him) and in his Epistle he insists upon two Anathema's, the one this, Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui periit non accepisse ut salvus esse possit. The other this, Anathema illi qui dixerit quod vas contumcliae non possit affurgere, ut sit vas in honorem.

First, I will answer as touching the Anathema's themselves, then as touching the credit and authority of this story.

1. As touching the Anathema's. The first proceeds as well of him that is baptized and afterwards perisheth, as of him that is a Pagan and never was baptized, and perish∣eth in his Paganisme, as the Anathema it selfe witnesseth, if it be repeated at full, thus, Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui periit non accepisse, ut salvus esse possit, id est, vel de baptizato, vel de illius aetatis Pagano, qui credere potuit & noluit. By which latter clause it appears, that accipere ut salvus esse possit, is no other then to receive Possibilitatem credendi (I say Possibilita∣tem not Potentiam, because I find this is Faustus his usuall phraise, as it was the phraise of Pelagius before him) and this is as much as to say, that every man hath power to believe if he will. Now observe I pray, This kind of power is meerely nature, not that which we commonly call Grace, whereby we understand something distinct from nature. And Austin acknowledgeth both, De Gen. contr. Manichae. lib. 1. cap. 3, that all men, possunt credere si velint; and that this is no more then is signified by that naturall illumination wherewith God enlightens every man, when he comes in∣to the world, Iohn. 1. 9. And, De Praedest. Sanct. cap. 5. Posse habere fidem, sicut posse ha∣bere charitatem, naturae est hominum. Fidem verò habere, sicut & charitatem habere gratiae est fidelium. And more then this, the state of the question between Pelagius and the Ca∣tholiques of those daies is so proposed by Austin, as not at all to consist about the possibility of believing or doing any good work, but meerly about the willing & doing of it. In so much that Austin professeth, that if Pelagius would acknowledge the will and doing of good to be from God, as he did the possibility hereof to be from God, there should be an end of all controversy between them, and Pelagius should be recei∣ved as a good Catholique. This appears in his book, De Gratiâ Christi contra Pelagium & Caelestium cap. 6. Pelagius his words were these speaking of God Qui ipsius voluntatis & o∣peris possibilitatem dedit. Hanc autem possibilitatem (saith Austin) in naturâ eum ponere de verbis ejus superioribus clarum est. Sed, ne nihil de gratiâ dixisse videretur, adjunxit, qui{que} ipsam ipsam vo∣luntatem gratiae suae adjuvat semper auxilio. Now this adjutorium possibilitatis, in what sence he delivered it, Austin professeth to be obscure, both as touching the nature of it, and as touching the manner how he conceived the nature of man to be aided thereby; but in other places, saith he, where he speaks more plainly, it appears to consist in giving a law, and affording instruction. Now by the way mark Austins ob∣servation upon these words of Pelagius, Qui{que} ipsam possibilitatem gratiae suae adjuvat semper auxilio; non ait, saith Austin, ipsam voluntatem vel ipsam operationem, quod si diceret, non abhorrere à doctrinâ Catholicâ videretur. Now, voluntatem adjuvari, in Austins meaning, is, Voluntatem praeparari à Domino ut velit; & operationem adjuvari is, voluntatem corrobora∣ri ne frustrà velit. The one operation he calls grace prevenient, the other subsequent, according to that, Nolentem praevenit ut velit, volentem subsequitur ne frustrà velit. And cap. 25. of the same Book, Non solum Deus posse nostrum donavit at{que} adjuvat, sed etiam velle & operari operatur in nobis, whereby it appears that Voluntatem at{que} operationem no∣stram adjuvari à Deo, is Deum operari in nobis & velle & operari quod bonum est; which if Pelagius had acknowledged he had been received for a Catholique. So that

he excepted not against him for acknowledging Possibilitatem volendi, at{que} agendi quod bonum est.

As touching the second Anathema, I say that Vas contumeliae may be taken in a dou∣ble sense: either to signify a vessel deserving contumely, deserving wrath; or to sig∣nify a Vessell ordained to contumely, and to the suffering of eternall wrath. In the first sense, there is no question but a man may change from being a vessell of contume∣ly, or a vessell of wrath, into the condition of a vessell of honour; but in the second sense, it is as impossible there should be any such change, as it is impossible there should be any change in God, whereof I think there is no question: and both Faustus and Lu∣cidus might take the phraise in the former sense: but if they did take it in this latter sense, dares this Author justify them?

2. Now I come to the credit and authority of this story concerning the Councell of Arles; and

1. I say, suppose it be a truth; yet about the yeare 494. there was a Roman Councell wherein Gelasius and 70 Bishops with him justify the writings of Austin, and Prosper, and condemne the writings of Cassian and Faustus, by whose procurement it is here pretended the Bishops of Arles subscribed this Epistle of Faustus unto Lucidus. And the Fathers of this pretended Councell of Arles are not reckoned up a∣bove sixteen.

2. The credit of this story lyeth wholly upon Faustus his relation and his honesty therein, a man infamous in the Church for opposing Austin and his doctrine of grace and predestination, as appears by the Writings of Fulgentius, Petrus Diaconus, Alchimus Avitus and others. Ado Viennensis in Chron. ad ann. 492. writes of him thus. Faustus ex Abbate Monasterii Licinensis apud Regem Galliae Episcopus facius, Pelagianorum dogma destruere conatus (which yet may be made apparent to have been meerly in pretence) in erro∣rem unde qui ejus sensus in hac parte Catholicos praedicant, sicut Germadius de Viris illustribus scribens, omninò errant. Ita enim liberum arbitrium tàm Augustinus quam caeteri Catholici in Ec∣clesia Dei docent ut illuminatio, virtus & salus illi à Christo, per Christum, & in Christo sit. Fau∣stus verò iste ita liberum Christianorum arbitrium docere conatur, ut illuminatio, virtus & salus non à Christo, sed a naturâ sit. Contra hunc scribit beatissimus Avitus Viennensis Episcopus lucidissi∣ma fide ejus redarguens errorem; similiter & Joannes vir eruditissimus Antiochenus Presbyter. Isidore in his Book De Viris illustribus, testifies that Fulgentius wrote seven Books a∣gainst Faustus, Qui mirâ calliditate Catholicus videri volebat cum Pelagianus esset. Auctor quo{que} Vitae 5^ti Fulgentii testatur à Sancto Fulgentio refutatos libros duos Fausti de Grat. & Li∣ber. Arbitrio. And Petrus Diaconus in his Book De Incarnatione & Gratiâ Christi cap. ultim. Anathema dicit Libris Fausti, And this Bellarmine, de Script. Eccles. writes to ad∣monish them, who in these Letters contend, that Faustus was a Catho∣lique.

Farther observe the Bishops who are pretended to have subscribed Faustus his Epistle to Lucidus are numbred these.

• Auxianus.
• Claudius.
• Euphronius.
• Eutropius.
• Faustus.
• Julianus.
• Leucadius.
• Megetius.
• Patiens.
• Paulus.
• Pragmatius.

But the Bishops that were assembled at the Councell of Arles are These.

• Agricii nomine Cataphronius.
• ...Caelestinus.
• ...Caesarius.
• Constantini nomine Leontius.
• ...Contumeliosius.
• ...Cyprianus.
• ...Eucherius.
• ...Florentius.
• Galliani nomine Melerius.
• Joannis nomine Desiderius.
• ...Julianus.
• ...Maximus.
• ...Philagrius.
• ...Praetextatus.
• ...Proitianus.
• Severi nomine Cataphronius.

Thus they are reckoned up on both sides by Vossius, amongst whom there is but one name common. To help this, Vossius deviseth a 4^th Councel of Arles and that the Bishops mentioned to have subscribed Faustus his Epistle, to be the Bishops assem∣bled in the 4^th Councel of Arles, and not those whom we read to have been assembled

at the Third. But that any such Bishops were assembled at a 4^th Councell of Arles he brings no evidence, that I find; but his own conjecture is the best ground for this. And all this pains is taken to salve Faustus his reputation in this. And the reason that moves Vossius to conceive that this subscription was not a meer fiction of Faustus, is this; Because forsooth if this had been a meer fiction of Faustus, surely Maxentius in opposing him, would not have failed to have cast this in his teeth. Binius is eager in the defence of these Episcopall subscriptions, but withall confesseth, that either Fau∣stus himselfe, or some in his name, practised to countenance his Books also by the au∣thority of those Bishops. In fine (saith he) hujus Commentarii & Libelli, ipse Faustus, vel alius quis dolosè addider at haec verba, In quo quidem opusculo post Arelatinsis Concilii subscrip∣tionem, novis erroribus deprehensis adjici aliqua Synodus Lugdunensis exegit, ut scilicet (saith Bin∣nius) aliquo fuco venditari posset quasi scriptum de gratiâ & libero arbitrio Commentarium duae Synodi recepissent & approbassent. Now if such were the dishonest art of Faustus in coun∣terfeiting this, why might he not be as dishonest in counterfeiting the former Episco∣pall subscriptions also? And if Vossius his reason to salve Faustus his credit, were of force in this, why should it not be in force in the other also? For Maxentius we doe not find to have excepted against his fidelity, more in the one then in the other? And why might not Maxentius be ignorant of them both? And in Biblioth. Sanct. Patrum. there is an admonition added to Faustus his Epistle to Loentius, ex Indice Expurgat. M. Script. Pelatii, wherein though Faustus his epistle to Lucidus, is acknowledged to have been approved by the Episcopall subscriptions in the Councell of Arles, yet as touch∣ing Faustus his mendicating authority from those Fathers to his books, De Grat. & Lib. Arbit. The Author thereof spares not in plain termes to give Faustus the lye in these words. Neutiquam tamen ullus ob id existimet ab utro{que} Concilio approbatos tres libros Fausti de Gratiâ, ut ipse mendaciter innuere videtur in ea quae his subjicitur, praefatoriâ Epistolâ ad Episcopum Leontinum &c. But can Vossius shew that Maxentius did cast this jugling course of Faustus in his teeth?

But it seems that Vossius had no great need to trouble himselfe in the vindi∣cating of Faustus his reputation in pretending the subscription of Bishops to his Epistle written to Lucidus. For how doth it appeare that Faustus is the author of a∣ny such pretence? It is true, in the Epistle it selfe that he wrote to Lucidus, he pro∣fesseth that he kept a copy of it, to shew to that assembly of Bishops, Hujus Epistolae exemplar mecum retineo in conventu Sanctorum Antistitum, si ita necesse fuerit, proferendum: by the way observe that this resolution of his, was not absolute, but si ita necesse fuerit, and this necessity he signifies wherein it did consist, namely in case Lucidus by his silence, did give testimony of his continuance in his errour, as he calls it, His words are these, Quod si eam subscriptam transmittere nolueris, aperte adhuc te in errore per∣sistere ipso silentio comprobabis, ac perinde iam necessitatem mihi facies ad personam tuam publi∣cis conventibus exponendam. Now as for that which followes after the end of the Epistle, Et subscripserunt Episcopi, qui ordine subsequuntur qui in eâ quo{que} Synodo ad∣fuerunt.

Auxanius in Christi nomine Episcopus, Relegi & subscripsi Faustus exemplar Epistolae meae Relegi & subscrip. Paulus Episcopus in Christi nomine, Rel. & subscrip. Eutropius &c.

Observe the admonition subjoyned by Henricus Canisius. These subscriptions, saith he, are not in the Manuscript. Hae subscriptiones non sunt in Manuscripto Codice. Consider I pray the fair issue of this Authors learned pretence of Antiquity, he honoureth the gray haires of Faustus, and those grave assemblies mentioned by him whereof we have no certainty; but how honoureth he the grayer haires of Austin, & of all the Assem∣blies against the Pelagians, that you may guesse, though he concealeth it. And herein his devotion to this kind of Antiquity, where he thinketh it will serve his turne, he is content you should conceive it doth exceed the devotion of Calvin and Beza, yea and of Austin also; whose answer to Prosper he is content to passe by as not savouring so much of piety in his judgement, but the Massilienses zeale of the Ancients represented by Prosper unto Austin, that is suitable to his humour, he re∣lisheth that well, and so well that he thinks it fit vehemently to mistrust those do∣ctrines which they never approved, but disliked and condemned. Yet of any condemna∣tion other then what is implied by Faustus, a man infamous, and whose

Writings were condemned by 70 Bishops, he makes no mention. And before Austins daies, and the daies of Pelagius, the Ancients were not exercised with any controver∣sy hereabouts. And was their non-approbation of his doctrine, concerning absolute predestination, any motive to Austin vehemently to mistrust the truth thereof? I think he will not say it was; and therefore I hope he will give Calvin and Beza leave, never a whit the more for that cause, to mistrust the same doctrine, in granting the Ancients to have conceived predestination to proceed secundum praescientiam according unto foreknowledge, he is content to conform himselfe to their judgement; but in mistrusting the contrary doctrine, hereupon you must give him leave to follow his own, or any, rather then not Calvins or Beza's, but even Austins also, though never so much magnified by the Church of God, and his writings countenanced especially against the Pelagians, and the contrary condemned, by other manner of Councells then Arelatense 3^d, and Lugdunense. I remember when Epicurus was demanded why, seeing he followed Leucippus so much, he did not follow him throughout, made this answer saying, I doe as a man that is a thirst when he takes the cup to drink, for he drinks what will serve his turne, and sets the rest by: so you must give this Au∣thor leave to represent his devotion to gray haires, so farre as they serve his turne, and no farther. Yet I have shewed how Austin maintaines, as touching the Ancients that went before him, that they concurred with him in fundomento praedestinationis, which he accounted the the doctrine of Free grace, and cites to this purpose Cyprian, Ambrose, and Nazianzen, and by the common prayers of the Church, that God would convert the unbelievers unto the faith of Christ; that the same doctrine, which was in his judgement the foundation of predestination, as he maintained it according to the Word of God, was generally received in the Church of God.

Before I part from this, I think fit to adde something concerning the stile here gi∣ven to Lucidus, before the revocation of his pretended error; for here I find him stiled the Predestinarian. Now I presume this Author, that pretends so great reverence to gray haires, and so much preferres Antiquity before Novelty, hath good ground for this his denomination of him, and that out of Antiquity. Now I desire he would be pleased to communicate unto us, his learned reading in Antiquity for this; and the rather, because in the whole story of the businesse between Faustus and Lucidus, I find no mention of any such attribute given to his person, or to the doctrine (reputed by Faustus erroneous) maintained by him. The terme Praedestinatus qualirying a person, I find first in Arnobius junior, and from that time I find not the Praedestinati, or Prae∣destinatians mentioned till the daies of Hinemarus, about the year of our Lord God 850. And as for the story of the Predestinarian Heresy, which this Author licks his lipps at, the originall whereof is referred to the yeare 415 by Sigibertus; it is very strange, that in Austins daies it was not known unto him, or being known, not taken notice of by him, nor by Prosper neither after him. And Alphonsus à Castro in his Book contra Haereses, professeth that the Author of this Heresy he found not, neither in Sigi∣bert, nor in any other; because indeed not one of those who wrote of Heresics makes mention of this Heresy, besides Bernard of Lutzenburg in his Catalogue of Heretiques; and he saith no more of it, then what Sigibert mentioneth in his Chronicle. And withall he addes, that after this errour was buried, by the space of almost a thousand years, it was revived by John Husse the Bohemian. Whereby it appears, that Alphonsus was not of this Authors opinion in censuring this Lucidus for a Predestinarian. And the first that I find to intimate so much is Hincmarus about the yeare 850. In like sort Prateölus acknowledgeth that, Quis corum Dux & institutor fuerit, nescitur. But Gerardus Vossius hath herein helped us with this conjecture, referring the originall of this Heresy to the Monks of Adrumetum; and Bishop Usher in his Historiá Godescalci saith, Vossius was the first that charged those Adrumetine Monks to be the author thereof. Yet if I be not deceived, he might be beholding to Coccius for helping him to this conceit. But this makes the matter more strange another way, namely that Austin should not take notice of this Predestinarian Heresy, seeing none was so well acquainted with the opinion of those his neighbour Monks, as he, being the man, whom they consulted about the difference that rose thereabouts, and wrote two Books there∣upon and composed all. And yet I see no reason why Vossius should referre it to the Adrumetine Monks hand over head, when as it is cleer by the relation of them, that came over to Austin to complaine thereof, and to conferre with him thereupon; that they were but few, who were carried away with that errour, whereof they complai∣ned,

and that it was but one, that troubled the place of their Monastery herein, who was as it were the Ringleader to the rest; of which Vossius could not be ignorant. And therefore I see no cause why he should charge them all indifferently, or that party either, who were tainted herewith, as is pretended; seeing there was an Antesignanus who led the rest, of whom Vossius speaks nothing at all; and I suppose he knew some good cause why. Besides, the Predestinarian Heresy is pretended to have risen Ab Au∣gustini libris malè intellectis. Now I find no colour of evidence hitherto, that these Monks of Adrumentum, whom Vossius makes the founders of this Heresy, were led a∣wry by the misunderstanding of Austins writings. Neither doth Vossius any where, that I know, take any pains to cleare this. And I would gladly be beholding to this Author, that pretends so much zeale unto, and skill in the knowledge of Antiquity, and so boldly stileth Lucidus a Predestinarian, for communicating unto us his rare evi∣dences concerning this point, out of his great observations. And so much the rather, to take mee off from mine errour, who since the first time that I travelled in the search after this Predestinarian Heresy in dealing with Corvinus, which is now some three years agoe. I have been apt to conceive that this Heresy from the first, was but a meer fiction of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, cunningly to disgrace thereby the do∣ctrine of St Austin. And since the coming forth of Dr Ushers History in the cause of Godescalcus, I have been confirmed herein; as wherein he gives to understand, that whereas Tyro Prosper wrote hereof before Sigibert, although the Printer hath made him to speak as Sigibert doth, namely, that Haec Haeresis orta est ab Augustini libris malè intel∣lectis: yet that is not the language of Tyro himselfe, but plainly this, Haec Haeresis ab Augustino orta est, and that learned Bishop hath shewed out of two Manuscripts of Ty∣ro, the one in Bennet Colledge in Cambridge, the other in our Kings Library: and this he farther confirmes by comparing the description which Gennadius makes of that, which he calls the Predestinatian Heresy, with the doctrine of Augustin. lib. 5. cont. Julian. Pelag. cap. 4. & de Bono Persev. cap. 15. And withall the same learned Bi∣shop makes it appeare, that look what doctrine Sigebertus ascribes to the Predestina∣tians, the same doctrine was charged upon Austin, and such as concurred with him therein. This I say that learned Bishop proves out of the beginning of the 6 Book Hypemnesticon. Credere nos vel praedicare sugillatis quod Deus quosdam hominum sic praedestinet ad vitam regni caelorum, ut si nolint or are, aut jejunare, aut in omni opere divino vigiles esse, eos om∣ninò perire non posse, nec prorsus sui debere esse sollicitos quos Deus quia voluit semel jam elegendo praedestinavit ad vitam: quosdam verò sic praedestinavit in Gehennae paenam ut etiam si credere ve∣lint, si jejuniis & or ationibus, omni{que} se voluntati divinae subjicerent, in his Deum non delectari & vitam illis aeternam in totum dari non posse, &c. Now this in effect is the very Heresy of the Predestinatians related by Sigebert. Therefore I much desire this Author would take the paines to prove, that this pretended Predestinarian Heresy was indeed recei∣ved to be an Heresy by the Catholique Church, and not rather a fiction of the rem∣nants of the Pelagians, wherewithall to reproach the doctrine of S. Austin in the poynt of Predestination.

Thus have I examined this Authors pretence of the Novelty of our Tenent. I come to the consideration of that which followes.

DISCOURSE. The Second Motive.

ITS unwillingnesse to abide the Tryall. I find that the Authors and Abettors of it, have been * 1.55 very backward to bring it to the Standard, not only when they have been called upon by their Adversaries to have been weighed, but also when they have been intreated thereto by their chief Magistrates who might have commanded them. A shrewd argument (mee thinks) that it is too light.

In the Disputation at Mompelgard Anno 1586 held between Beza and Jacobus Andreas with some Seconds on both sides, Beza and his company having disputed with the Lutherans about the person of Christ, the Lords Supper &c. When they came to this Point, did decline the sifting of it, and * 1.56 gave this reason among others, that it could not then possibly be disputed of, sine gravi eorum offendi∣culo, qui tanti mysterii capaces non sunt, without the great scandall and hurt of the ignorant, and unac∣quainted with these high mysteries.

The Contra-Remonstrants also in their Conference with their Adversaries at the Hague in the year 1611 could not be drawn to dispute with them about this point, but delivered a Petition to the States of Holland and Westfrizland that they might not be urged to it, resolving rather to break off the Conference, then to meddle with it.

In the Synod likewise of Dort, in the year 1618, and 1619. the Remonstrants were warned by the President of the Synod ut de Electione potius quàm de odiosâ Reprobations materiâ agerent, that they * 1.57 should rather dispute of the point of Election, then the odious point of Reprobation.

Can this Doctrine be a truth, and yet blush at the light, which makes all thing manifest? especially considering these things.

1. That Reprobation is a principall Head of Practicall divinity by the ill, or well stating of which, the glory of God, and good of Religion is much promoted, or hindered.

2. That there is such a necessary connexion between the points of Election and Reprobation (both being parts of predestination) that the one cannot well be handled without the other.

3. That Reprobation was the chief cause of all the uproares in the Church at that time.

4. That it was accused with open mouth, and challenged of falshood, and therefore bound in justice to purge it selfe of the crimination.

5. That it may easily be defended, if (as some say) it be such an apparent truth, for Nihil est ad defendendum puritate tutius, nihil ad dicendum veritate facilius, saith S. Hierom.

The striving to lye close and hide it selfe, though perhaps it be not so infallible, yet it is a very pro∣bable argument of a bad cause. Truth covets no corners, but is willing to abide the tryall, whether in men or in doctrines. David knowing his heart to be without guile, offers himselfe ready to the * 1.58 Lords tryall, Search me, o God, and know my heart, try me and know my thoughts, and see if there be any wicked way in me. And our Saviour tells us that, Every one that doth evill, hates the light and comes not to the light, least his deeds should be reproved; but he that doth truth, comes to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God. As S. Paul saith of an He∣retick, he is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 selfe condemned, and so may we say of Heresy and untruth, it con∣demnes it selfe, and by nothing more then by refusing the Touch-stone. He is to be thought an emp∣ty Scholler, who is loath to be opposed, and his gold to be light and counterfeit, that will not have it touched and weighed, and these Opinions to be but errours, which would so willingly walk in a mist, and dwell in silence, when it concernes the peace of the Church so much to have them exa∣mined.

TWISSE Consideration.

VVHo are these Authors of this Doctrine, who here are said to have been backward to bring it to the standard? Is Beza those Authors? whereof was he the Author? Was it the doctrine of predestination as proceeding of the meer pleasure of God, and not upon foresight of mans faith and works? Is it not apparent that this was the doctrine of Austin 1200 years agoe, and that in opposition to the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians? Or was it the doctrine of reprobation, as not proceeding upon the foresight of sinne, but of the meer pleasure of God? Is this Author so ignorant, as not to know what are the conclusions of Al∣varez in the question, Whether there be any cause of reprobation on mans part. Lib. 10. de Auxil. disc. 110. pag. 866.

1. His first Conclusion is this, Reprobation whereby God decreed not to give unto some e∣verlasting life, and to permit their sinne, is not conditionate, but absolute: neither doth it presuppose in God, foresight of the deserts of reprobates, or of their perseverance in sinne unto the last period of their life.

2. His next Conclusion is, In the Angells that fell, there is no cause of their reprobation on their part, as touching the whole effect thereof, but before any foresight of their future sinne, God, pro sua Voluntate, of his meer will, did reprobate some of them, and suffered them to fall into sinne.

3. The third, Infants departing in Originall sinne alone, there is no cause on their part of

reprobation, if they be considered in comparison with others which are not reprobated, and the like is to be said proportionably of men of ripe years.

4. The fourth, Not only comparatively, but absolutely there is no cause of reprobation. There∣fore neither sinne actuall, nor originall, nor both of them foreseen by God, was indeed the meritorious and motive cause of the reprobation of any, as touching all the effects thereof, and the proofe hereof he prosecutes at large.

5. Reprobation as touching the last effect thereof, presupposeth in signo rationis the foresight of sinne originall, or actuall, for which a reprobate is damned. Marke it well, He does not say as the cause for which God decrees his damnation, but as the cause for which a repro∣bate is damned. And Aquinas (whose followers the Dominicans are) expresseth this doctrine in this manner, and that more Scholastically and accurately then Alvarez. Praescientia peccatorum potest esse aliqua ratio reprobationis ex parte paenae quae praeparatur reproba∣tis, in quantum scilicet Deus proponit se puniturum malos propter peccata, &c. in Ad Rom. 9. Sect. 2. in fine, that is, Prescience of sinnes may be some reason of reprobation on the part of punishment, to wit, in as much as God purposeth to punish wicked men for their sinnes. Where sinne is evidently made the cause of damnation, and that by ver∣tue of Gods purpose, but by no means the cause of the decree it selfe. And the same Aquinas elsewhere professeth that, No man was so mad as to affirme that merits are the cause of Predestination, as touching the act of God Predestinating: and that it cannot be the cause thereof, he proves, because nothing can be the cause of Gods will, as touching the act of God willing, but as touching the things willed by God, as formerly he had proved. The same doctrine in effect is taught by Durand in 1. dist. 41. q. 2. Bona∣venture applies the same distinction to reprobation it selfe. Odium aeternum, saith he, im∣plies two things, Principale significatum & connotatum &c. & primum non est ex meritis, sed secundum. This he explicates in the words following, Quod patet si resolvatur, quia Odium est propositum puniendi: Propositum autem nullus meretur sed paenam, that is, Hatred (or re∣probation) is Gods purpose to punish: Of this divine purpose there is no meritorious cause, but only of the punishment. The same was the Opinion of Gandavensis, Scotus, Halensis, as I have shewed in my Vindiciae.

Now judge I pray with how little judgement, or modesty this Author intimates Beza to be the author of the doctrine of absolute reprobation. Perhaps he will say his meaning is, that he was the author of the Upper-way, as touching the making of the object of Predestination mankind not yet created. But to this I answer, that Be∣za doth so indeed, but he was never called to a conference hereabouts, and conse∣quently he never declined it. And that which was declined, he makes to be declined by the abettors, as well as the authors; which cannot be understood of this nice and Logicall poynt, as touching the object of reprobation. The main question is, whether there be any cause of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating: the Ne∣gative whereof, was maintained very generally amongst Schoole-Divines before Beza was borne. And was it ever known, that those I have named did shrink in their heads or decline the triall thereof? What a silly thing is it then to inferre, that because Be∣za at such a time, did decline the disputation hereof, and the Contra-Remonstrants at another time, therefore it is suspectable to be an untruth? Yet let us examine his instances.

Beza he saith did decline the sifting of this doctrine (to wit, of predestination) (for on that they were moved to dispute.) I doubt this Author speaks by rote, and that he is no∣thing at all acquainted with the story hereof, either in Osiander or in Beza, but tran∣scribes only what another hath prompted unto him. For it is apparent by Osianders History, that they did conferre thereof. It is true he stood off at the first, and gave reasons for it, but at length he and his fellowes, condescended to the instance and im∣portunity of their Adversaries, and so came on to the Conference hereabout, His words are these. Praefat. in 2. part. Respons. ad Acta Colloq. Mompelg. Quamvis quò evasura essent reliqua satis prospiceremus, mane nihilominus mutata sententia Illustriss. Principe salutato, in reliquam sequentem Collationem consensimus; eâ tantùm conditione additâ, ne propter proximum Paschae Festum, ea disceptatio longius protraheretur. Et ita demùm ad audiendas D. Andreae decla∣mationes rursum processimus.

Was it this point alone the sifting whereof, as this Author phraseth it, Beza decli∣ned? It is apparent they were no lesse then three Points. This appears by the second part of Beza's answer Ad act. Colloq. Mompelg. as also by the answer of Jacobus An∣dreae, as if he were the mouth of the Prince, namely, that if they list not De Tribus illis

conferre, yet he thought it fit that Theses written by them on those three Articles should be rehearsed in the hearing of all, which afterwards Beza and his fellowes might take home with them to addresse an answer to them afterwards, as they thought good. And these three Articles were concern∣ing, Predestination, Baptisme, and the putting down of Images in Churches. Concerning all which Jacobus Andreae gives his reasons, why he thought it fit they should entertaine farther Conference; Whereunto Beza makes answer in his Praeface to that second part of his Answer Ad Act. Colloq. Mompelg. It is true, this reason Beza gave why he thought it not fit in that place publiquely to dispute thereof, to wit, of predestinati∣on, Quod haec gravissima quaestio publicè in illo caetu allatis utrin{que} contrariis sententiis disceptari abs{que} nonnullorum offendiculo non posse videretur. For both the mysterious nature of it is such, as few are capable of it; the Massilienses professed as much, as appears in Prospers E∣pistle unto Austin, De his taceri exigunt (saith Prosper) quorum altitudinem nullus attigerit. And to the same purpose, even they who durst not dislike Austins doctrine thereof professed as much, as appears by the Letter of Hilarius unto Austin. Consentientibus eti∣am his qui hanc definitionem improbare non audent, ut dicant, Quid opus fuit hujusmodi disputatio∣nis incerto tot minus intelligentium corda turbari? Then again it was in a Lutheran Assem∣bly, and amongst many brought up in the hatred of the doctrine which Beza main∣tained, who in all likelihood would be the more exasperated. Causas verum tacendi * 1.59 tongum est omnes quaerere (saith Austin) quarum tamen est & haec una ne priores faciamus eos qui non intelligunt. No wise man, saith our Saviour, putteth new wine into old bottells. Quanto minus sapit, saith Beza in that Preface of his, qui de praest antissimo vino prius in utres faecibus adhuc, & vappa obsitos immittendo quàm de repurgandis illis & apparandis cogitet. Lastly, Beza perceiveth the practice of Jacobus Andreas standing upon a place of advantage, to urge them to conferre upon such a poynt, the truth whereof is most harsh to car∣nall affections, that so he might have the better opportunity to make them odious. And truly what Jacobus Andreas was, I know not, but Beza sets him forth as a man of a most malevolent disposition to the French Protestants: and our Saviour hath ad∣monished us, Not to give that which is holy unto doggs, or to cast pearle before swine. Yet Andreas to serve his turne, and to draw them into a snare, pleads that the doctrine of Predestination, is not so to be put over in the Schooles, ut non opus sit eam rudi & imperito populo ponere; yet Hunnius a man of the same profession, is so farre diffe∣rent from Iacobus Andreas, that he thinks it not fit to preach before the rude people of prescience divine, but very sparingly; how much lesse would he think it fit to Preach before them of Predestination divine? De Praedest. quest. & respons. pag. 394. his words are these, Interim hoc repeto quod supra monui rudioribus (quibus Apostolus vult lac propinari, non cibum solidum apponi) non esse multum de praescientiâ Dei disputandum, hâc solummodo de causa quia haud perinde capiunt ea quae alias in Scholis in Disputationibus contra adversarios, &, ut Pau∣lus ait, inter perfectos utiliter & ex fundamentis eloquiorum Dei astrui solent. Coram rudioribus er∣go simplicior loquendi ratio & ipsorum captui accommodatior est si dicamus, Deum ad haereditatem regni caelestis elegisse & certo salvare decrevisse eos omnes qui resipiunt, & in vera fide filii Dei ex hâc vitâ decedunt. Its well known what order King Iames took in his time, in the re∣straint of preaching this doctrine in the Pulpits, by any under the degree of a Deane, and counselled the States likewise to forbid the preaching of those controversall points amongst them. And if it were wisdome in them to take this course, without a∣ny prejudice to the truth of the doctrine, why should Beza's with-holding from con∣ference hereupon, be any thing prejudiciall thereto.

But were there not other causes of moment, to move him hereunto, which this Author conceales, and which Beza proposeth in the first place? as namely, that the Prince who invited them hereunto, in his Letters Missive, alleaged no other cause of that meeting, but Infaelicem de Coenâ Domini controversiam, that unhappy Controversy a∣bout the Supper of the Lord. Secondly, that their Citties sent them over according∣ly to this Conference for no other cause, but to conferre thereabours. This Iacobus Andreas acknowledgeth, and giveth a reason why in those Letters of the Prince, there was no mention made of those three Articles, whereabout they were afterwards ur∣ged to conferre, to wit, quod illos in istis quo{que} dissidere non intellexerat Princeps Illustrissi∣mus. And thirdly, because the Feast of Easter approched, and they desired to be at home in their own Citties by that time.

Lastly, doth if follow, that because they declined the sifting the truth of these poynts (as this Author phraiseth it) after such a manner, to wit, by publique dispu∣tation; doth it herehence follow, that they declined the sifting of it? They made

this offer to propose their opinion herein, and the confirmation of it out of the Word of God, in private before the Prince: and if Jacobus Andreas were plea∣sed to propose any Theses against it, they would take them along with them and upon consideration to addresse a convenient Answer thereunto; This Beza sets down in that Preface: Let D. Andrews shew if he can, saith Beza, hanc Christianae do∣ctrinae partem aut à nostris sive scribendo sive concionando praetermissam, aut a suis rectius & acura∣tius quàm a nostris pertractatam. And truly for my part, I no way like such conferences, being privy to mine own imperfections, as having neither such strength of memo∣ry as to command a present use of my knowledge in these poynts upon all occasions, nor such command of my passions, as to keep them from breaking forth in such sort as might be obnoxious to censures, not knowing how I might be provoked; but certainly I feare not to come to the examination of any of their Writings, or to offer mine own to be examined by any of them. One thing I had almost omit∣ted out of Beza, in his Preface to the First Part of his Answer to these Acts. It was Beza's motion that all things passing between them on both sides, might be set down in writing, under the hands of Collators; and this course I confesse I could willingly approve of, and after this manner to conferre with any. But this so faire a motion was rejected by Andreas; He would conferre rather by word of mouth then by writing. A second motion proposed by Beza was this, that what was spoken on both sides, might be set down in writing by Notaries chosen and appoynted thereunto by common consent. But neither would Andreas admit of this. Petivimus, saith Beza, initio ut utrin{que} omnia scriptis propria Collocutorum ma∣nu subsignatis agerentur. Quod cum D. Andreae non placuisset qui verbis agi malebat (for the Auditory was very propitious to him for the most part) postulavi ut utrin{que} dicta à pro∣batis & utrius{que} partis consensu delectis Notariis exciperentur, quae deinde cui{que} parti recognoscere & addita subscriptione confirmare liceret. Haec enim erat profectò justa & sincera colloquendi ratio ut sic falsationi occurreretur. Quum autem ne hoc quidem admitteret D. Andreas, &c. Now let any indifferent person that is not sowred with partiall affections, judge whose carri∣age is to be thought in equity more prejudiciall to their cause, the carriage of Andreas, or the carriage of Beza.

I come to the Contra-Remonstrants unwillingnesse to conferre upon the poynt of reprobation. What their reasons were I know not. But this I am sure of, the Scripture is free in speaking of election, and expresse; not so of reprobation, leaving us to take notice of the condition of reprobation by its opposition to election. And in conformity hereunto, both Austin in his time, and Remigius in his time, and Bradwardine in his time, speaks liberally of prede∣stination, but very sparingly of reprobation. And the doctrine of reprobation as it is nothing lesse mysterious then that of election; so it is farre more harsh to car∣nall affections. And it is well known that at the time of the Hague Conference, Bar∣navelt that ruled the rost amongst the States, was too great a friend to the Arminian Party.

But, what boldnesse doth this Author take in passing his suspicious cen∣sures upon a doctrine, because some defenders of it, at some time have been loath to come to entertaine a publique Conference thereupon? For what argument call you this, The Contra-Remonstrants would not be brought to give their reasons on this point; therefore the doctrine of Austin delivered 1200 years (or thereabouts) before, concerning the absolutenesse both of Predestination on the one side, and of preterition on the other (as Vossius acknowledgeth) is to be suspended of untruth? And if my readinesse to come to the triall hereon doth nothing credit the cause as maintained by others; why should others unwilling∣nesse to come to the same triall, be any disparagement to the same cause, as it is maintained by me or any other? It is well known that Peter Moulin, concurring with us in the poynt of absolute predestination, maintaines repro∣bation to proceed upon the divine foresight of finall perseverance in impenitency. If this Author differed from us no more the M^r Moulin doth, and acknowledged the meer pleasure of God, in giving grace to whom he will, and denying it to whom he will, I doe not think any friend of his would think any whit the worse of him, or charge him with defection from the truth of God in this. Neither can I think, that he ever was of any other opinion, considering how many worthy Divines opposite to the Arminians, doe either conceive, or at least seem to conceive

that the purpose of God to damne, doth presuppose in signo rationis the foresight of finall impenitency, yet concurring with us in this, that all are fallen in Adam and so brought forth into the world in damnatâ Massà, as Austin calleth it. God of his meer pleasure cures this naturall corruption (the fruits whereof are infide∣lity and impenitency) in some, by regenerating them and bestowing the grace of faith and repentance upon them, and leaves it uncured in others by refusing to rege∣generate them, to bestow faith and repentance upon them; We give the hands of Christian fellowship, and brotherly amity one unto another, without all exception notwithstanding some nice differences, which in the issue I hope, will prove to be meer∣ly Logicall, and nothing Theologicall.

Lastly, however this poynt of unwillingnesse in some, to come to conferre in the poynt of reprobation, might cast some colour of suspicion to the prejudicing of their cause; yet least of all did it become this Author to take advantage hereof, consi∣dering that it is his own case, as who declineth not one poynt only, but all the rest in this his discourse, and cleaves only to that of reprobation, nothing answerably (I pre∣sume) to * 1.60 your expectation, who put this task upon him: and whether it be any thing answerable to the promise he made unto you, your self are best acquainted therewith. Yet because the Remonstrants hereupon (to wit, upon the Contra-Re∣monstrants declining this Controversy) have taken liberty to oppose the doctrine of the Contra-Remonstrants in this poynt, so farre forth, as they made construction of their opinion hereupon, by their doctrine concerning election; therefore I will not spare even here, to digresse so farre, as to take notice what they delivered, and to ad∣dresse an answer hereunto, the rather because I find this discourse of theirs inserted in their Relation of that Conference at Hague.

Now, whereas first, by a long deduction upon consideration of the Contra-Re∣monstrants doctrine in the poynt of election, they doe inferre Colloq. Hagh. Bertii p. 120. that like as faith is made by them a fruit of election, so infidelity is by them to be made a fruit of reprobation: this consequence we utterly deny. It only followes herehence, that like as faith, whereby mans naturall infideli∣ty is cured, is by them made the fruit of election, so the denyall of faith, that is, the not curing of mans infidelity, or the leaving of it uncured is the fruit of reprobation. And indeed considering the means must be his work who intends the end, wherehence it followeth, that look what end God doth intend in mans election, the means tending thereunto must be Gods work, as namely, faith; in like sort, whatsoever be the end which God intends in reprobation, the means tending thereunto, must be his work, which cannot be infidelity or sinne, but the permission of sinne rather and infidelity, or the not curing of that corruption and infidelity which is naturall unto us all. Hereupon they proceed to propose two things to be questioned, in congruity to the doctrine of the Contra-Remonstrants. 1. Utrumne Fides in consilio & decreto Dei de electione ad salutem, eam ipsam electionem ordine praecedat an verò consequatur? 2, Ex alterâ parte; An Infidelitas in eodem Consilio & Decreto Dei de reprobatione ad exitium, eam ipsam reprobatio∣nem ordine praecedat an sequatur? The latter of these is only pertinent to our present purpose; yet seeing they handle them both, so farre as to dispute against the opi∣nion of their opposites in both, and carry themselves herein Magnificentissimè, I am content to weigh their arguments, in the ballance of Scholasticall considera∣tion, least some such as this Author, should affect to seem judicious in su∣specting my declining of them to savour of some inability to encounter them.

Thus therefore they beginne.

If faith followes election unto salvation, then also the decree of sending Christ as a Saviour into the World, must necessarily follow that election; But this consequent is absurd, and pertains notably to the ignominy of Christ.

To this I answer. First out of mine own opinion, Thus.

Faith is supposed to follow Election unto salvation, upon no other ground then because the intention of giving faith, is supposed to follow the intention of giving salvation. But this I should deny, and that for this reason, be∣cause this subordination is grounded only upon supposition, that salvation is the end which God intends, and faith the means tending unto that end: but this I deny. First, because the end of Gods actions, is not the salvation of man,

but the manifestation of his own glory. For he made all things for himselfe, Pov. 16. 4. and reason justifies it. For God being the supream efficient, must be the supream end; and being Optimus as well as Maximus, he must needs be both most lovely and most loving, of that which is most lovely, that is, of himselfe. But because some may conceive that though Gods glory be the supream end, yet mans salvation may be the intermediate end: therefore to this I answer; First, let such shew then what is the glory of God, which salvation of the creature setteth forth, and I doubt not, but if that glory be stated right, it will appeare, that not salvation alone, but something else is required to be joyned with it; as namely, the mission of Christ, yea and faith in Christ, to compleat that means, which tend to the procurement of such an end, that is, to the setting forth of such a glory. Secondly, the end whether supream or intermediate is alwaies such as being rightly understood, doth break such a means; but salvation is not so in respect of faith; for it doth not bespeak it, as is appa∣rent in the salvation of Angels, of Infants; as also in this, that it was absolute∣ly possible for God to save even sinners without Christ, as may be demonstra∣ted and I have demonstrated in my Vind. Grat. Dei. by variety of evident reasons.

In a word, if Gods supream end, were the manifestation of his glory on some considered, as meerely possible in doing them good in the highest degree, and that in the way of mercy mixt with justice, and that ex Condigno & ex Congruo; it is ap∣parent, that the means required hereunto, and bespoken hereby, is a body consisting of divers particulars, all together compleating the integrall means required here∣unto. For herehence it followeth, that they must be both created, without which no glory of God at all can be manifested upon them and permitted to sinne, otherwise God could not doe them good in the way of mercy, which supposeth misery, but also that a Saviour must be sent, and he no lesse then the Sonne of God, to deserve the pardon of their sinne and salvation, otherwise it could not be in the way of mercy mixt with justice de Condigno: and faith and repentance must be bestowed on them, otherwise the good done them, could not be by way of re∣ward: and lastly, salvation, otherwise good could not be done them in the high∣est degree. And thus in no moment of nature is the Predestination of Christ either before or after the Predestination of man; as our Brittish Divines maintained at the Synod of Dort; but at once God predestinated both him to be our Head and us his Members; like as Aquinas maintained Christs predestination, and our predestination to be one act in God, and consequently neither could be the cause of another.

Thus have I dispatched mine answer unto them, as touching mine own opinion. But supposing the method of the Contra-Remonstrants sound, in making sal∣vation of man, to be intended by God as an end, and both mans faith in Christ, and Christs Mission to be intended as means. We deny this to be absurd or igno∣minious unto Christ. Lets heare how they prove it, thus; If the decree of sending Christ be posterior to the electing of singular persons unto salvation, then the in∣tention of mans salvation was posterior to Gods intention of satisfaction to his justice, which say they is absurd and foolish, to wit, to decree the salvation of sinners, unlesse first he decree satisfaction to his justice. But I answer ac∣cording to the forme of the Contra-Remonstrants doctrine: First, by proving their order to be sound: Secondly, by shewing the invalidity of the Remonstrants discourse.

First therefore: There was never any other order of intentions acknowled∣ged by the learned, then such as is found between the intention of the end, and the intention of the means tending thereunto. And the Order most recei∣ved is this; That the intention of the end, is before the intention of the means. Now let every man that is is his right Witts consider, which is more like∣ly to be the end, and which the means of these two, Mans salvation, and Christs Mission to satisfy for the sinne of man. Was ever any man known to be so brainsick as to affirme, that the salvation of man is a means tending to this end, namely, the sending of Christ into the World to satisfy for the sinne of man? On the other side, how fair and plausible is it to affirme, that Christ was sent into the world, to satisfy for mans sinne, to this end, that man might be saved? whence it followeth evidently by the most approved rules of Schooles, that the intention of mans salvation is in signo rationis, before the

intention of sending Christ into the world, to make satisfaction for sinne. Againe, if Christs sending into the world to make satisfaction for sinne, be first in intention, then it should be last in execution, by rules undeniable, and such as are manifest by the very light of nature; Whence it followeth, that man should be first saved and after that Christ sent into the World, that, by his sufferings, Gods justice might be sa∣tisfied.

Now I come to the consideration of the Remonstrants argument. The Conse∣quence of the Major we grant, but the Minor we deny. And it is a vaine thing for them to cry out, that it is absurd and foolish to say, that the intention of salvation, precedes the intention of satisfying Gods justice; for words must not carry it: and it is well known that the most empty vessells give the greatest sound. I have shewed how absurd it is to conceive, that man was saved to this end, that Gods justice may be sa∣tisfied, and that 'tis farre more probable to say, That by Christs sufferings, Gods ju∣stice was satisfied to this end, that man might be saved. For the salvation of man we say, was not intended by God simply, but after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of mercy mixed with justice; which end doth not presuppose the permission of sinne, as these Remonstrants shape the matter to varnish over their consequence, with some colour of probability: but rather it bespeaks, both the permission of sinne, and satisfa∣ction to be made for sinne, to the end that so man might be saved, not simply, but af∣ter a certain manner, to wit, in the way of mercy mixed with justice. But suppose they were considered as sinners, Why should the Remonstrants look strangely upon this doctrine, namely, that God should intend the salvation of sinners in signo rationis, before he intended that his justice should be satisfied? For doe not they maintaine, that God by power absolute, can pardon sinne without all satisfaction? But suppo∣sing that God will not pardon sinne without satisfaction, in this case they may con∣tend, that God must first intend to take a course, that such satisfaction may be made, and then intend to save. And let them contend but in the name of reason, and not of clamours, and content themselves, with the infatuation of themselves, with such senselesse conceits, and not spread this scab unto others also. My reason to the con∣trary is still the same, namely, that if God be pleased to save sinners in despight of sinne, in the way of mercy mixt with justice, the case is cleare, that satisfaction for sinne, is rather a means of mans salvation, then mans salvation is a means tending to the procurement of satisfaction for sinne, and consequently the intention of salvati∣on of sinners, is in reason to precede the intention of procuring satisfaction, rather then to follow after it; as the intention of the end, is rather to be accounted before, then after the intention of the means. Yet say these Remonstrants, if a man will be so obstinate, as (notwithstanding the felicity of these Remonstranticall witts in fruitfull inventions and subtile argumentations) still to deny that there is any ab∣surdity herein, thus over and above we prove it. For as yet they have runne them∣selves out of breath. If, say they, the decree of Christ a Saviour, be after the election of parti∣cular persons unto salvation, it followeth that God did decree some particular mens salvation, before he ordained Christs merits to procure their salvation; but this is foolish and absurd.

I answer, No more foolish and absurd then the former: and indeed every one of these consequences for the expressing whereof, they affect to seem very inventious, doe savour of no invention at all; the Consequents doe so evidently, even every one of them appeare as clearely in the Antecedent, as a mans face in a glasse, and are to be accounted rather Tautologies, then deductions, much lesse doe they rellish of any subtilty of wit. So that all this while, they seem to be in travell with nothing but wind, or sick of the disease called Tenasmus, striving mightily to doe somewhat, when indeed they doe nothing at all. And our former argument still hath place, and here also applied, doth manifest, that seeing the merits of the sonne of God are the means of mans salvation, then mans salvation is the end of Christs merits; there∣fore in all probability, the intention of mans salvation, as the intention of the end, should precede the intention of sending Christ to merit as the means, rather then to be subordinate unto it. And indeed if the sending of Christ into the World to merit, should be first in intention, then should it be last in execution; that is, All the elect should first be saved, and then Christ should be sent into the world to merit their sal∣vation. Therefore to mend the matter (for who is so silly as not to perceive, that if the consideration of Christs obedience, as satisfactory, will not serve their turne, surely neither will the consideration of his obedience as meritorious, stand them in a∣ny

stead) they put into this Consequence another clause, without all art, and with∣out all honesty, pretending, that hereby we make salvation destinated to man, before it is decreed to man: as if we put any difference in this case between destination and decree, or as if we make salvation destinated to a man hereby, before it is destina∣ted unto him; whereas we only make the end (that is salvation) intended before the merits of Christ (which are the means of salvation) are intended. And would any man that is in his right witts, say this is to make salvation destinated to a man before it is destinated to him? Farther, it is to be observed, that we may omit nothing, but take notice of the uttermost of their strength, and the rather, because it will notably discover either their ignorance, or which is most likely, (for as much as they doe not directly insist, as they might upon a new argument farre more plausible with the ig∣norant) their unconscionablenesse. For they signify that hence it will come to passe, that the intention of salvation, being before the intention of finding of Christ to me∣rit, salvation shall exist, being decreed as present to God, before Christ is considered as he that by his Crosse hath deserved it. Now had they said before Christ hath deserved it, I should readily have granted it. For I hope none of thē would deny, that the salvation of many a Prophet and Patriarch, existed not only before God, but actually and real∣ly before Christ was crucified. To prevent this elusion of their argument, they ex∣presse it thus, Before Christ was considered as he that hath deserved it. Yet here they fall foule upon an indecent expression. For I will be bold to deny, that Christ was consi∣dered by God, as one that had deserved mans salvation, before he had deserved it. For before he had deserved it by his Crosse, to say, that God considered him as one that had deserved it, is either to erre or to feigne, neither of which is incident unto God. God considered him from everlasting, as one that in the fulnesse of time should deserve it, by suffering upon the Crosse, not as one that had deserved it. For to con∣ceive him after the former manner, is to conceive aright, but to conceive him after the latter manner, is to conceive amisse. But I will take the pains to mend this argu∣ment for them thus. If their salvation were decreed before Christs merits, then their salvation did exist as present with God before Christs merits did exist, as present with God. But this is not to be admitted: Now I come to discover their ignorance, which they betray in this. First, neither Gods prescience, nor Gods decree doth make things to exist, otherwise then in Esse cognito & in esse velito; but this is not to exist. Therefore they qualify it by the addition of the manner, ut praesens Deo; which indeed is Terminus diminuens in this case. For it is present to God by vertue of his de∣cree intentionally only, and not really, which alo••e is to exist. But let this Peccadil∣lio passe. Secondly, Who seeth not that this argument tends to the utter destruction of all distinct intentions of end, and means in God? For if there be any such distinct intentions in God, the one must be acknowledged to be before the other. As for ex∣ample, What was the end of creation? Lets goe no farther then the manifestation of Gods power and wisdome as the end thereof. Now hence it will follow by the quaint∣nesse of this argumentation, that the manifestation of Gods wisdome and power in creating the world did exist, as present with God, before the creation. Is not here a proper argumentation. Spectatum admissi risum teneatis amici.

Thirdly, to draw neerer to the discovery of their ignorance. I grant it shall first exist; but how? Not in duration; We acknowledge no such priority in God, between the intention of the end, and the intention of the means; though such a priority in this case is found in man. What then? Ile tell you: They commonly call it a prio∣rity of nature. But take heed you doe not apply it to any of the two kindes of prio∣rity of nature mentioned by Aristotle. For try if you please, and you shall find that none of them can possibly serve the turne; What then is this priority of nature so called? I answer, it is only Prioritas rationis: And so I formerly said, that the intenti∣on of the end is in signo rationis, before the intention of the means. You may farther demand, Wherein doth this Prioritas rationis consist? I answer out of Durand, it con∣sists in this, that, Ratio unius petitur a ratione alterius, and so indeed, Ratio mediorum petitur a ratione finis. This generally holds of the intention of end, and means, as well in God, as in the creature. For alwaies the nature of the end duely considered, doth bespeak what shall be the condition of the means. So that this makes no priority of existence at all, neither in duration nor in nature properly so called, but only such a subordination between them, that the reason of the one, that is, the nature or condi∣tion of the one, depends upon the nature and condition of the other. Now let any

sober man judge, Whether the salvation of man be required to the procuring of Christs merits, and not rather, Christs merits are required to the procuring of mans salvation; which yet is not true of salvation considered simply, but only as to be bestowed after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of justice, and by way of satisfa∣ction made for sinne, that so a man may be saved by grace in despight of sinne. In the close of all they signify that this of theirs in the last place seriously considered will make it appeare, that this doctrine of their Adversaries, tends notably to the di∣minution of Christs honour, and to the annihilation of Christs merits, to wit, unlesse Christs merits be acknowledged the end of mans salvation, and not mans salvation the end of Christs merits, Christ shall be dishonoured, and his merits annihilated. Here they are quite out of breath, and that which is wanting, they leave to be sup∣plied by the serious (they should say ignorant) consideration of their Proselites. They presume this colour of dishonour redounding hereby to Christ, will be suffici∣ent to blow up their Adversaries, though it prove of no more force then a squibbe. This carriage of theirs calls to my remembrance, a mad prank plaid by the English at Delfe, while they were billeted there, which was told me merrily, by one of the number. One of the Souldiers was billeted in an old Widdowes house, and another being a Goldsmith, told him and another consort of theirs, he had a devise to put mo∣ny in all their purses, for he knew how to make a Rex-dolar of three-pence sylver, and in that Widdowes house they would ply their businesse very securely. To work they went, and casting plates of Tinne to the quantity of one of those Dolars, and stamping them full and faire, this Gold-smith, with the quantity of three pence sil∣ver, sylvered them over very fairely, and, least they should seem too light, hangs them up in the chimny in a bagge, that the smoak might bring them to the sadder hew. Thus having met with a mine of Sylver in their lodging, one is imployed as a Merchant-man to goe to the Staple of Cloth, and he laies out their coyne in cloth, whereof afterwards they made good silver indeed: at length one of them paying a debt of his to a Dutchman in Delfe, in one of these Rex-dolars, he found the Dutch to betray some suspicious gestures and interpretations upon the coyne. That was a faire warning to an intelligent man of armes; and hereupon they get them packing ing away with all speed; and home they come, and make themselves merry with the relation. In like sort these Remonstrants shew a great deale of Tinne and trash in these argumentations, and they have not so much as three pence silver to colour it therewithall to cheat the World, if they will be cheated. But they hope the colour of some dishonour by their adversaries doctrine redounding unto Christ, will be ta∣ken for a peece at least of good silver. I confesse, I am somewhat the more merrily disposed at this time, For being taken off from the midst of a sentence, by the courte∣ous invitation of a Gentleman, to come unto him to his Inne: He was pleased to en∣tertaine me with such good discourse, that it did not a little refresh my spirits. His reaches were after new discoveries for the advancement of learning; and endoctrina∣ted me more in one halfe hower, then seventeen years study in the University. For whereas I never learned there, more causes then foure, he was pleased to acquaint me with nine; which I took some pains to learn without book, and they were these, Matter, Forme, Workman, Will, Power, Time, Finding out, Accident, End. And most courteously offered himselfe to enlarge on every one of them; but having left off at a broken sentence, I was desirous to return to my studies Theologicall, and to let those Philosophicall progresses alone. But I protested unto him seriously, that he had informed me more in the number of causes in a short space, then Oxford had done in many years; he entreated I would consider of them, and I promised I would, and conferre of them too, with all the Schollers I companied with; which he took in ve∣ry goo part; and so I took my leave. And finding my spirit not a little elevated with this recreation, I resolved, forbearing my usuall time of supper, to follow these stu∣dies close that night, which truly fell out very happily. For one of those causes be∣ing found out, otherwise called, Invention (as for Judgement, I doe not remember that it was admitted into the number) I made use of it very happily in finding out, or discovery of the foppery of these Remonstranticall argumentations.

Now I proceed to the second Question, as more seasonable to the present occasion. And here first they begin with their former artifice, making infidelity on the part of reprobation, answerable to faith on the part of election, which is most untrue, as for∣merly I shewed: Only the not curing of infidelity by the grace of faith, is made by

us subordinate to reprobation; as the curing of naturall infidelity by the grace of faith, is made by us subordinate to election. But they goe on, as in shaping our Te∣nent at pleasure, so in basting it with their very liberall censures, as absurd and execra∣ble, in such sort, as the bare commemoration of it, they take to be sufficient to represent the horrour of it, and to confute it, and this they commit to the judgement of all the faithfull of Christ. And indeed their best strength lyeth in setting forth their Adversaries doctrine in such colours, as the Devill is painted with. And in this particular, they conceive good hope (no doubt) that propitious Readers will conceive hereby, that the infide∣lity of man is made by their Adversaries the work of God, as well as Faith; Whereas it is well known, that there is so little need of working men to infidelity, that all be∣ing borne in sinne, and corrupted and estranged from the life of God, through the fall of Adam, infidelity is as naturall and hereditary to a man, as any other corrup∣tion. And it is as well known and undeniable, that none can cure it but God, by faith; but this he cures in whom he will, by giving Faith to whom he will, and if he refuse to cure it in any, that, and that alone is enough to make him a vessell of wrath, that so Gods glory may be manifested upon him, in the way of justice vindicative. But come we to their Arguments.

1. The first is this. If Infidelity followeth Reprobation unto destruction, then God can∣not in justice destroy Reprobates for their infidelity. For there is no greater inju∣stice, then to destroy a man for that, that followeth necessarily upon reprobation which is the work of God. To this I answer.

1. According to mine ordering the decrees divine. Secondly, according to the Contra-Remonstrants Tenent in ordering them.

1. According to my ordering of the decrees divine; In no moment of nature or reason is the decree of damnation precedent to the decree of permitting infidelity, or leaving the infidelity of some men uncured, to wit, by denying them faith, by deny∣ing the grace of regeneration. But the decrees of creating all in Adam, of permitting all to fall in Adam, in bringing all men forth into the World in the state of Originall sinne, of leaving this originall sinne uncured in them, and last of all, of damning them for their sinnes; are decrees not subordinate, but coördinate, as decrees de Medi∣is, tending joyntly to one supream end, which is the manifestation of Gods glory upon them in the way of justice vindicative; as also to shew the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory, to wit, by beholding * 1.61 in others that miserable condition, which through Gods meer grace and goodnesse they have escaped.

2. According to the Contra-Remonstrants Tenent, I answer,

1. Many of them doe not maintaine that infidelity is consequent to the decree of damnation, but in the foresight of God, precedent rather: as appears by the Brittish Divines their Theses De Reprobatione; and Alvarez professeth the same. The denyall of grace, and so the permitting of naturall infidelity to remain uncured, they make consequent (as it seems) to a negative decree of denying glory. And to the decree of permitting infidelity, they make the foresight of infidelity subsequent; and this fore∣sight of infidelity they make precedent to reprobation, as it signifies the decree of damnation. And thus farre I agree with them, That in no moment of nature, or signe of reason did God ordain any man to damnation, but for sinne; and conse∣quently in no moment of nature, or signe of reason, did the decree of damnation goe before the foresight of sinne or infidelity.

2. But suppose, as these Remonstrants collect and pick out their meaning, They make the decree of reprobation, in all poynts proportionable to the decree of salva∣tion, that like as the decree of giving faith, they conceive to be subordinate to the de∣cree of salvation; so the decree of permitting infidelity, or denying faith (for herein consists the just proportion, and not as they feigne it, between faith on the one side, and infidelity on the other) is with them made subordinate to the decree of damnati∣on. Then I answer,

1. Their Consequence should be this, If the permission of Infidelity followeth the decree of damnation, then God cannot in justice damne them for Infidelity. Now here is no colour of good Consequence.

2. If they reply, That in case infidelity followeth necessarily upon Gods permit∣ing of it, the Consequence is as good as in case infidelity followed upon reprobation. For even hereby it appears, that infidelity followeth upon reprobation though not

immediately, but by the mediation of the divine permission thereof; but whether it followeth mediately or immediately all is one, as touching the force of the Con∣sequence.

Resp. Now to this I Reply, Granting that all is one, as touching the force of the Consequence: but then consider.

1. All the force of the argument depends not upon the consequution of infideli∣ty, simply unto the decree of damnation, but only upon the necessary consequuti∣on thereof. And yet no mention at all was made hereof, in the Consequence of the Major, but it is brought afterwards over and above most illogically.

2. In this case all the force of the Consequence depends upon the necessary con∣sequution of sinne in generall, or infidelity in speciall, upon Gods permitting of it.

So that whether Gods decree to permit the sinne of infidelity, be antecedent or consequent to the decree of damnation all is one. Yet these Remonstrants make the force of their argument, to consist only in the subordinating of the decree divine, as touching the permission of infidelity to the decree of damnation, which yet appears by this to be of no force.

3. But if they hereupon take a new course of argumentation, and dispute thus; If Infidelity followeth necessarily upon Gods permitting of it, then God cannot in justice damne a man for Infidelity; pretending no injustice to be greater, then to damne a man for that which followeth necessarily upon permission, which is Gods work.

Resp. I answer.

1. That thus their former argumentation is cashierd as unprofitable.

2. We deny this Consequence; and call in no meaner name then Arminius him∣selfe to beare us out in this our deniall. Who expressely professeth, That in case God permits a man, Velle peccatum, necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolen∣dum. Exam. pag. 153. I could adde Vorstius also, herein concurring with Piscator, Per∣kins, and Navarrettus the Dominican is as expressely in this as any other; as also in sub∣ordinating it to the decree of reprobation. Arminius likewise professeth faith and repentance, Nisi Deo dante haberi non posse. Exam. 57. and that both of them are denied to the reprobates by the decree of reprobation. See his own words, At Deus statuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare. Concedo lubens, illam assumptionem, sed rectè intellectam: He laboureth to charme this inconvenient grant of his, but no charme will serve to keep this adder, from stinging and wounding their doctrine of reprobation unto death. He saith, Faith is given by way of suasion. We say, that matters nothing; for so it be given by God wheresoever it be found, and so it be de∣nied to reprobates by the decree of reprobation, we desire no more. We our selves acknowledge, that faith is not given to the elect, but by way of swasion, the Word working faith, running in this manner; Repent and believe the Gospel; and whosoe∣ver believeth shall be saved. For God hath set forth his Sonne to be a Propitiation for our sinnes, through faith in his bloud.

3. At length he proceeds in his charming course, but most unsuccessefully, as whereby his former saying is nothing charmed. His care rather seems to be to eat his own words, as Satan devoured his own children. For distinguishing suasion into that which is sufficient, and that which is effectuall: this effectuall suasion, he confesseth to be administred by the decree of election; but as for that sufficient suasion, though withall he accounts it allwaies ineffectuall, yet he saith it is administred by the de∣cree of providence, not by the decree of reprobation. At length he confesseth, that by the decree of reprobation is denied grace effectuall, that is such a grace as whereup∣on he foresaw they would believe. Now herein I appeale to the judgement of every sober man. Take we two men into consideration, the one elect as Paul, the other re∣probate as Esau. Of two sufficient graces, the Lord foreseeth which of them will prove effectuall with Paul, and which ineffectuall; and he makes choice to give him such a grace, as he foreseeth will prove effectuall. Again he foreseeth of two sufficient graces, which of them will prove effectuall with Esau and which ineffectuall, and makes choice to afford him only that which he knowes will prove ineffectuall. Now what can be the reason hereof, but because he purposeth to shew his mercy in the sal∣vation of the one, and his justice in the damnation of another. Before Arminius came to this resolution, as expressely to professe, That by the decree of reprobation is denyed grace effectuall, he found himselfe in a streit upon his distinction of grace

sufficient and effectuall, and the description of each; he drew his breath very short; and therefore to get, as it were, more liberty of ayre, he concluded that dis∣course with, Haec ex Augustini sententiâ dicuntur. pag. 58. and in the next page. Hisce autem ita explicatis ex mente Augustini & fortè Scripturae sensu. But, What, a mischiefe, doth this great Doctor mean to tell us? First, that he willingly grants that, Deus statuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare (provided it be well understood) and after all this explication, tells us, that all this explication of his is delivered ex sententiâ & mente Augustini, and but perchance, ex Scripturae sensu, concealing all the while what is his own Opinion. Is this to give us the right understanding of that Assertion (Deus statuit decreto reprobationis repro∣bis fidem & paenitentiam non dare) most prejudiciall to his own Tenent at first fight, and much more by the distinction following of Gratia sufficiens & efficax; which he so well perceived, that he is content to clap it upon Austins back to beare the burthen of it; and puts it but upon adventure, that it may prove to be the Scripture meaning. And in like sort, when, pag. 98. having proposed two things to be necessarily unfolded by him. Primò, de Gratiâ sufficiente & efficaci. Secundo, de utrius{que} dispensatione, dispensationis{que} Causis: He leaves off there, giving it over in plain ground. What doth this argue? but that he manifestly perceived, he was not able in any tollerable manner, to shape this distinction in congruity to his own Te∣nent. Let this Author well consider this, that talkes so much of our Divines unwil∣lingnesse to come to tryall in the poynt of reprobation; When Arminius durst not adventure upon the explicating of his own opinion, touching the distinction of grace sufficient and effectuall, and in giving us the definition of each. The like to have been the course of other Arminians, I have known, declining the point of effectuall grace, as a precipice and breakneck unto them: And when others have been put upon it, they have placed it in the grace subsequent, and have not been ashamed to make it consist in this, that God by effectuall grace, doth work in man, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle credere, modo velit, and why not as well, that he workes in man, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Credere, modo Credat, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Resipisce∣re modo Resipiscat. This that I speake, I can shew under the hand of one of them, a great stickler for the Arminian Cause; great I say in respect of affection, not of judgement. And I have cause to conceive, that both this Authors Discourse, and that others I have had to deale withall, is but as a smoake, that for a great part, if not for the most of it, comes out of the same Chimney.

4. Let the argument stand as it doth, let infidelity by Gods permission follow up∣on the decree of damnation, and that necessarily. Yet consider.

1. Gods permitting of it, is no other then the leaving of it uncured: not that hereby infidelity followeth, which was not before; but being in all before, as the fruit of that naturall corruption wherein all were borne, as all confesse, as many as concurre against the Pelagians, in acknowledging Originall sinne. By Gods permission of it, it continueth to be uncured; What actuall sinne is there in the World, or habituall sinne arising thereupon, which God cannot cure if it please him? If then he will not cure it in some, shall it not be lawfull for him to punish it, where he findes the continuance of it unto the end, without breaking off by re∣pentance?

2. Suppose all men had power to doe any good thing; if God will not give them Velle quod possunt (as Austin saith he dealt with Adam in his innocency, and gave the An∣gels that stood, amplius Adjutorium, then he gave the others; whereby it came to passe, that they stood in obedience when the other fell) what shall wee say in this case, is it possible that they should Velle bonum, if God will not work it in them, of whom the A∣postle professeth, that he works in us both the Will and the Deed? Or shall wee here∣upon say, they doe not sinne freely? What shift have they to avoyd this, but either by contradicting the Apostle, and saying God doth not work in us 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle, or by saying that God doth work in us 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle, modò Velimus, as plain a contradiction as ever pro∣ceeded from the mouth of any, The selfe same act, being made before and after it self; for the condition is allwaies before the thing conditioned. And is this to work in us the Will according to Gods pleasure, or according to mans good pleasure? What is it to say, that grace is given according unto works, if this be not?

3. We deny, that any evill act therefore comes not to passe freely, because it comes to passe necessarily, upon supposition of Gods denyall of grace, to refraine from it. For like as good works, are not therefore not wrought

freely by us, because God by his grace workes us to the performance of them; (For who dares deny that it is in Gods power to make us work this or that freely) in like sort, and much more, evill works are not done the lesse freely, because God denies speciall and effectuall grace to abstain from them. For, want of grace doth not take away willingnesse unto that which is evill, but leaves too much rather in man of that kind. As Austin saith, that Libertas sine gratiâ non est libertas sed contumacia. Now where there is contumacy, there is rather too much will then too little. For Contu∣macy is Wilfulnesse.

4. The Schooles teach, that liberty of will consists only, in electione mediorum, in the election of means to certain ends. Now when the Gospel is preached to a car∣nall man, whose ends are only carnall, as the Apostle saith, Philip. 3. 20. They mind earthly things; so farre forth as he shall find it serviceable to his carnall ends, he may believe it and make profession of it, as many times Hypocrites doe, and some∣times in such sort, as it is hard to distinguish, between a true and an Hypocriti∣call professour. This moved the Apostle to exhort the Corinthians, famous for their faith, to examine themselves, and prove themselves, Whether they were in the faith, that is, in faith unfaigned. For there is not only a grosse Hypocri∣sy, whereunto a mans own heart is privy, but a secret Hypocrisy whereof the man himselfe is nothing conscious; yet such a faith undoubtedly is performable by a naturall man. Now when a man rejects the Gospell, the faith and professi∣on whereof he finds nothing serviceable to his carnall ends, doth he not judici∣ously and deliberately, yea and wisely too (according to the wisdome of flesh and bloud) reject it?

5. Austin professeth Lib. 1. De Gen. contr. Manich. cap. 3. That all men may believe if they will, and justifies it in his Retractations. But if the will of man be corrupt, and averse from believing, We justly say, such a man cannot believe; as our Saviour saith, How can you believe that receive honour one of another, and seeke not the honour that cometh of God alone. Joh. 5. 44. yet this is an impotency Morall only, which is to be distinguished from impotency Naturall. For notwithstanding this, it may be truely said, that, All men may believe if they will, and herein consists the naturall liberty of the will. The Morall liberty consists, rather in a sanctified inclination unto that which is good, whereby it is freed from the power of sinne and Sathan; then in a power to doe good if they will, and not otherwise. But I never find that Arminians doe distinguish these.

6. It is not sufficient for Arminians to conclude, that such a thing upon supposi∣tion comes to passe necessarily, therefore it comes not to passe freely.

1. For upon supposition that God decreed to create the World, the creation of the World came to passe necessarily; yet simply the World was made by God freely.

2. In like sort, upon Gods foreknowledge that such a man will not believe it followeth necessarily, that such a one will not believe; and so the like may be said of the most free act that is performed. But will it follow herehence, that it is not done freely?

3. In like sort upon the denyall of an effectuall impediment of sinne, unto a man it followeth necessarily, that such a man will sinne, according to Arminius his do∣ctrine, and this holds applied to any particular sinne whatsoever. But will it here∣hence follow according to Arminius, that such a sinne is not committed freely? no∣nothing lesse.

2. The Remonstrants second argument is this.

What God cannot performe that God cannot will. But God cannot damne a man for infidelity flowing from such a decree of Reprobation.

Resp. 1. But who saith that infidelity floweth from the decree of reprobation? Not one that I know, but Piscator upon these words, Yee therefore heare not my words, because yee are not of God. But understand him aright, it is as if he * 1.62 should say, Therefore such a man goeth lame, because the Physitian will not cure him: yet it is well known the cause of his lamenesse is from within, and perhaps procured by some distemper of his own: yet in case a Surgeon could cure him and will not, he may be said to be the cause of lamenesse; but how? per modum non removentis. This is well known by the learned to be a kind of cause whereof notice is taken in Naturall Philosophy. And in this sense and no other,

it is well known that Piscator makes God the cause of infidelity, and that according to the expresse Word of God. But in my judgement Piscator mistakes the phrase, To be of God, which he conceives to denote election. I rather take it to denote regeneration, as much as to say, yee therefore he are not my words, because God hath not hitherto by re∣generation cured that naturall infidelity which is in you.

2. But take the argument according to the former expression, God cannot damne a man for that infidelity which is consequent to reprobation; And then my An∣swer to the former argument in every particular thereof, may be accommodated un∣to this.

3. The Third followeth. If Infidelity flowes from reprobation, then God can neither require Faith of reprobates, nor seriously offer salvation unto them, but necessarily counterfeit. For it is manifest Hypocrisy, to invite those unto faith and salvation, who are excluded from both by the decree of God.

Resp. 1. Here again Infidelity is made to flow from reprobation; whereas nothing flowes from reprobation by the doctrine of the Contra-Remonstranes, but the not curing of mans naturall infidelity, like as the curing of it by faith, is that which flows from election.

2. I say, There is no simulation at all of God in this. For that wich he pro∣poseth is but this, that, Whosoever believeth shall be saved, and Whosoever believeth not shall be damned. He sends his Ministers to Preach this, and to Beseech them to believe, and to be reconciled unto God, yea, all they meet with. But for whose sake? Not for the reprobates sake, but for the elects sake, Who because they are mixed among re∣probates, and God hath not revealed to his Ministers, Who are elect and who are not (as neither was it fit he should, many of the Ministers themselves, even of those that not only prophecyed in his name, but cast out Devills, being reprobates) there∣fore it was fit their Commission should be generall to Preach to all. Yea, did not the Apostles themselves take notice of this? Doth not Paul professe that, He be∣came * 1.63 all things to all that he may save some? And who were those some, but the ve∣ry elect of God, as the same Apostle elsewhere professeth, saying, I suffer all things for the elects sake. And doth not Austin professe that if we knew who were reprobate, * 1.64 we would no more pray for them, then for the Devills? De Civit. Dei lib. 21. cap. 24.

4. The Fourth and last. If Incredulity followes the decree of reprobation, then God consi∣dered the reprobates in his counsell of reprobation, either as creatable, or as created in the state of innocency, or as falne into Originall sinne. Sed falsa sunt haec omnia. All these things are false. And these things, he saith, are delivered, contra absurdam, detestabilem, at{que} abominabilem sententiam.

Resp. Here is froth enough of words, but a very hungry discourse for substance of argumentation throughout.

1. Yet as I said, All this nothing toucheth them, Who albeit they maintaine that God of his meer pleasure, hath mercy on some, giving them faith and repen∣tance (considering all in the corrupt Masse) and of his meer pleasure hardens others (no worse in nature then the former) by denying them faith and repentance, yet as reprobation signifies the decree of damnation, doe permit thereunto the foresight of finall perseverance in sinne.

2. According to my Ordering of Gods decrees, Who conceive mankind not yet created to be the object of all Gods decrees, they being eternall, and but one act in God, and that act his very Essence, and all other things being temporall. I doe not maintain that the decree of damnation, is in any moment of nature or reason, before the consideration of mans finall impenitency. As neither doe I conceive it to be after this, but both simultaneous; for as much as the decree of permitting all to fall in A∣dam, together with the decree of finall leaving some therein, and the decree of damn∣ing them for sinne, I take not to be subordinate, but coordinate and simultaneous.

3. Whether we take the First-way for shaping the object of predestination, or the Second, or the Third, I Answer.

1. The difference hereabout is in my judgement meerly Logicall, nothing Theo∣logicall; the resolution whereof according to generall rules, is easily made by light of nature, if once it be agreed upon in Divinity, What is Gods end both on the part of election, and on the part of reprobation, and what are the means that tend unto those ends.

2. Which way soever we take of the Three, I never found any reason given by Arminians of any force to take us from it, as I have justified in my Vindiciae, as touch∣ing the First-way; And in my Examination of the Conference between Arminius and Junius, as touching the Second-way; And in my Answer to Corvinus against Ti∣lenus, as touching the Third-way, and therein, I trust, routed and profligated the 20 Reasons of Arminius, proposed against the First and Last-way, but chiefly a∣gainst the First, in the Declaration of his Opinion before the States.

Now I returne to the Author of this discourse, and to the remainder of his second Motive, from whence I have digressed.

I was here passing over unto the third instance, to wit, of the proceedings in the Synod of Dort; but upon my looking into the History thereof, to prepare my selfe for an answer thereunto, ere I was a ware, I lighted upon the reasons of that the Contra-Remonstrants motion to be spared, preferred unto the State. And they ut∣terly deny what is here cast upon them, namely, that they deprecated at all, that they might be spared from conferring upon the poynt of reprobation. But where∣as the Remonstrants had incumbred the point of election and reprobation with sea∣ven Questions, which pertained not to the state of the Controversy concerning the first Article, and being also imperfect and intricate for the most part, and proposed to this end, to draw their Adversaries away from the true state of the Question; They desired to be spared from answering unto them. And upon this Petition of theirs it pleased the States, that leaving those thorny questions, they should come to the handling of the Articles. This is set down in the Preface to those Acta Synodalia, set forth by the Authority of the States. Fol. 10. pag. 1. For after the proposing of these two questions to the Remonstrants, as touching the decree of Predestination. 1. Whe∣ther the intire decree of Predestination were contained in this Article, namely, That God did from everlasting decree to save believers, which no man denies. 2. Whe∣ther they thought faith & perseverance therein, did precede election, as the Causes or Conditions thereof. After the Remonstrants had answered affirmatively unto them both; hereupon they bring in their seaven, for the most part, intricate questions. Re∣ponebant deinde septem alias tum de electione tum de reprobatione, questiones, ad quas a Pastoribus à Classibus deputatis responderi volebant. Quae cum ad controversiae de primo articulo statum non spectarent, etiam mutilae at{que} intricatae plerae{que} essent; eum{que} in finem ab illis proponerentur, ut hoc modo a praecipuo controversiae statu recta{que} agendi ratione, in ambages ad ducerent. Pastores expositâ per Libellum supplicem Illust. Ordd. iniquâ hâc agendi ratione, non quidem deprecati sunt, ne de re∣probatione sententiam suam manifestarent (uti Remonstrantes improbè saepius ipsis objectarunt) sed disertè sententiam suam quantum ad Ecclesiarum pacem at{que} aedificationem sufficere existimarent, non tantum vivâ voce sed & scripto declararunt. Se nimirum cum aeternum electionis singularium personarum decretum ponunt, simul quo{que} ponere aeternum de reprobatione & rejectione quarundam singularium personarum decretum, quum fieri nequeat ut sit electio, quin simul quò{que} sit aliqua repro∣batio aut derelictio. Difficiles omnes circa hunc articulum quaestiones temere excutere, nihil aliud esse quam inutilibus disputationibus & nihil profuturis litibus, Ecclesiam replere, ejus{que} pacem per∣turbare. Declarationem suam hanc Libello supplice expressam, moderatis omnibus, pace••{que} amanti∣bus ingeniis, sufficere debere: Credi videlicet ac doceri ab ipsis, Deum neminem condemnare, imò verò ne statuisse quidem condemnare quenquam nisi justè propter propria ipsius peccata: Placuit ita{que} Illust. Ordd. ut missis illis spinosis quaestionibus, ad articulorum pertractationem deveniretur. And Pag. 136. & 156. I find this objection proposed by the Remonstrants in these words. Pag. 156. In Collatione Haghiensi Libello supplice Illust. Hollandiae & Westfriziae Ordinibus ex∣hibito, deprecati sunt Contra-Remonstrantes ne de reprobatione ageretur: & more at large Pag. 195. Thus, Ipsi Contra-Remonstrantes cum in Colloquio Haghiensi jussi essent, ad interrogata quaedam nostra de reprobatione respondere Magistratui morem gerere gravati fuerint, us{que} adeò ut Collationem caeptam abrumpere se malle profiterentur quàm ut summarum Potestatum imperio se con∣stringi paterentur, nihil aliud conscientiae suae praetexentes quam quod Ecclesiae aedificationi obfutu∣ram eam agendi rationem judicarent. Now to this Pag. 157. Festus Hominus, one present in that Conference, stands up and answers, Exposuit{que} paucis quàm non bonâ fide haec de illis dicerentur. Se Libello supplice non fuisse deprecatos, ne de reprobatione ageretur: caeterùm quia Re∣monstrantes subdolè in ipso Collationis initio, septem questionibus spinosis ac minime necessariis non tantum ad reprobationis, sed electionis quoque doctrinam spectantibus, à recto agendi ordine Contra-Remonstrantes in ambages adducere conarentur. Contra-Remonstrantes Libello supplice apud Illust-Ordd. de tam iniquâ agendi ratione conquestos fuisse at{que} ut Remonstrantibus mandaretur, ne extra justam agendi rationem jam inchoatam evagarentur petiisse. De reprobatione autem Contra-Re∣monstrantes

quantum ad aedificationem satis erat, sententiam suam clarè ibidem explicasse uti scrip∣torum editorum fide probari potest. Idem etiam Reverendus & Doctissimus vir, D. Joannes Becius qui & ipse huic interfuerat Collationi, suo praesens comprobabat testimonio.

Now I come to the Synod of Dort.

4. This Author saith the Remonstronts were there warned by the President of the Synod, Ut de electione potius quàm de odiosâ reprobationis materiâtagerent. And truly at first I wondered not a little, that the President of that Synod should account, the matter of reprobation (which is as much as to say, the doctrine of reprobation) an odious matter, an odious doctrine. For we commonly signify hereby, such a doctrine as deserves to be hated; but I thought withall, that they might expresse rather, what is the condition of it in the event, namely, that it is entertained with hatred, not of all neither, nor of any of those, that submit their judgements to the word of God; but rather of those, and of those only, who follow the judgement of flesh and bloud. Yet I thought good to enquire into the truth of the fact here mentioned; and I find it in the page men∣tioned, and how the Remonstrants themselves doe expresse this, even as here it is ex∣pressed, thus, A Reverendo Praeside moniti sumus ut à negativis enunciationibus abstineremus & de electione potius quàm odiosâ reprobationis materiâ ageremus. Yet I confesse this did not satisfy me; For why should this Author make choyce to expresse it in the Remon∣strants termes, rather then in the words of the President himselfe. Therefore I turne to the beginning of that Session, being Sess. 32. There I find this particular, Submo∣nuit & Praeses ut potius quaestionibus illis inhaererent, quae circa suavem de electione doctrinam ver∣sarentur, quàm ut d•• odiosè doctrinam de reprobatione exagitarent. Now I find a great deale of difference between professing the matter of reprobation, or the doctrine hereof to be odious, and admonishing to spare the exagitation thereof after an odious manner. This indeed being their usuall course, to make it as odious as they can, like as Armini∣us, Doctrinam de praedestinatione odiosam reddere conabatur, as it is professed in the Preface to those Act. Synod. fol. 7. pag. 2. and fol. 8. pag. 2. They professe in like manner of the Remonstrants, namely, that in their Remonstrance they endeavoured, Illust. Ordd. odiosam reddere doctrinam Ecclesiarum Reformatarum, and that not only, de divinâ predestina∣tione, but also de Gratiâ Dei & Sanctorum Perseverantiâ, but all this malâ fide, nec sine aper∣tis, atrocibus{que} calumniis. Moreover I find, Sess. 39. pag. 151. this decree of the Synode gratifying the Remonstrants, and yeelding to their motion made, which was, that they might have liberty to treat as well of reprobation as of election, thus, Quoniam Remonstrantes aliquoties professi sunt, se per conscientiam in Synodo subsistere ulterius non posse, nisi prius caveatur ipsis fore, ut de electione & reprobatione, eâ ratione quam in Thesibus & Scriptis su∣is hactenus exhibitis proposuerunt, in posterùm agatur. Synodus quò magis ipsis fiat satis, publice ac coràm omnibus declarat, statuisse sese ac statuere sententiam ipsorum, non de electione modò, ve∣rum etiam de reprobatione expendere at{que} examinare. Quantum nempe in conscientiâ ad Dei glori∣am, aedificationem & tranquillitatem Ecclesiae, omnium{que} conscientiarum posse ac debere satis esse, ipsa judicaret. Ad agendi verò modum, qui hic est servandus & ordinem quod attinet, suum esse de eo dispicere, non autem fratrum Remonstrantium qui huc sunt citati, quicquam praescribere, existi∣mat. This decree being read to the Remonstrants, they refused to give way unto it. The 40 Session contains the altercation thereabout, between the Synod and them. They forsooth would prescribe to the Synod de modo Agendi, the Synod must not pre∣scribe to them. And they professe against it Sess. 41. pag. 155. in this manner, Nec satisfit nobis si dicatur Synodum permissuram, ut nostram de reprobatione sententiam tractemus quoad illa ipsa ad gloriam Dei, aedificationem Ecclesiarum, conscientiarum tranquillitatem fore judicabit. Nam hâc ipsâ restrictione, nobis praeciditur libertas & plenaria sententiae nostrae defensio, & contra∣riae Impugnatio. Praeterquam quòd non levis suspicandi nobis data sit occasio, Synodum, ubi nos de electione disserentes audiverit, nequaquam permissuram ut Contra-Remonstrantium & eorum quos illi pro Orthodoxis habent, de reprobatione sententiam prout necessarium judicabimus, ad incudem re∣vocari. Hereupon the Synod entreats the judgement of Forraine Divines; and they all with one consent professe, Tantam Remonstrantibus libertatem ad defensionem causae suae con∣cessam esse, quantâ ex ratione & dignitate Synodi Citatis concedi posset. Ac proinde nullam esse causam cur Synodicum decretum mutandum videretur, aut cur Remonstrantes querelam instituerent, vel authoritatem hujus Synodi subterfugerent. Nihil illis esse imperatum quod ullo modo conscientias ipsorum gravare posset. Ac proinde conscientiae velum frustra pervicaciae obtendi. Abundè iis om∣nibus{que} modis satisfactum jam esse. Absolutam illam, nullis{que} circumscriptam limitibus libertatem quam petunt, à Synodo concedi ipsis non posse. Aequum esse ut certis sese legibus submittant, quibus, si exorbitent, coërceantur. Nay in the next Session, which is Sess. 42. there is a representa∣tion

made of their unreasonable demand in these words. Professi sunt sibi agendi modum a Synodo praescriptum, iniquum videri. Sibi permitti velle non tantum primo loco, sed & circa omnes articulos & Theses, singula{que} argumenta de sententiâ Contra-Remonstrantium, & corum quos illi pro Orthodoxis habent, quoad reprobationem agere, quia in hoc argumento calceus illos maximè ur∣geat. Hereupon the Opinions of the forraigne Divines were required, to wit, Whether it were fit to yeeld unto them, as to treat of Reprobation, before they treated of E∣lection, Qui consentientibus declarabant suffragiis, ab omni ratione & methodo esse alienum id quod Remonstrantes peterent, ut prius de reprobatione quàm de electione agere sibi liceret. Their judgements hereupon are here represented severally and at large; First of our Brit∣tish Divines, then of the Palatine Divines, then of the Divines of the Land of Hesse, then of the Helvetians, then of those who were of the correspondency of Weteraw, then of those of Geneva, then of those of Breme, and lastly of those of Emden.

5. Upon the former bald and base pretences, as if, Conclusum esset contrà Manichae∣os, the Author proceeds crowing magnificentissimè, and demanding in this man∣ner.

Can this doctrine be a truth, and yet blush at the light which makes all things manifest, especially considering these things?

1. That Reprobation is a principall Head of practicall Divinity by the well, or ill stating, or ordering of which, the glory of God, and good of Religion, is much promoted or hindered.

2. That there is such a necessary connexion between the points of election and reprobation (both being parts of predestination) that the one cannot be well handled without the other.

3. That Reprobation was the chiefe cause of all the uproares in the Churches of that time.

4. That it was accused with open mouth and challenged of falshood, and therefore bound in ju∣stice to purge it selfe of the crimination.

5. That it may easily be defended, if (as some say) it be such an apparent truth. For, Nihil est ad defendendum puritate facilius, saith S^t Hierome.

Now albeit for the discovery of the vile vanity of this conclusion, I need take no other pains, then to appeal to your, or any sober mans due consideration of the pre∣mises duely examined according to my former answer; yet I think good not to passe it over without such particular consideration as it deserves. First, I pray consider, what is that light that makes all things manifest? Is it the light of Conference? In the Conference of Mompelgard there were diverse other things disputed of, besides this of predestination. Now is the truth manifested hereby in all those particulars? If it be, I pray, let him signify on whose side, whether on the part of Jacobus Andreas, or on the part of Beza? To whom is it made manifest? To either side, or only to that side, on whose side this Author conceives the truth to stand? Doe you not manifestly perceive the crudity of this conceit? Nay, who seeth not, that it is not the condition of conference, but the quality rather and ability of the conferrers, that is apt to ma∣nifest the truth. And such men are able to manifest, as well out of conference in their discourses, either Positive, or Controversiall, as in conference; yea, and farre better; Those discourses being more quietly carried, and more free from altercation, then conferences; especially in case they meet with malignant opposites. And indeed it is the Word of God alone, which is that spirituall light, which giveth manifestation to all spirituall truth. And consequently neither are they to be censured as blushing at the light, that prefer to write quietly of these controversies, then to conferre about them in some cases; or that preferre conference by the penne as Beza did, before con∣ference by word of mouth, though this better pleased the lipps of Jacobus Andreas. Yet neither Beza did refuse to yeeld to Andreas his own way, neither did either the Contra-Remonstrants at the Haghe Conference, or the Divines of Dort, refuse to treat of reprobation, as well as election, as formerly I have shewed by authenticall e∣vidences. But suppose Beza and his fellowes, whether two or three had altogether declined to conferre at all, as in my judgement they had good reason to refuse, must this be censured their blushing at the light? Austin professeth as I have formerly vouched him, that there may be many causes of forbearing to deliver the truth at some times. He little dreamed of exposing the truth thereby to such a censure, as if it blushed at the light. And if some few might be justly censured as blushing at the light, must all for their sakes, by the rules of justice, be made obnoxious to the same censure, and not the Doctors only, but the Doctrine it selfe? Is it not apparent that a true and sound doctrine, may be weakly apprehended by many, though learned, and Veritas est temporis filia, and the accurate handling and maintaining of the truth

in plainer points then this of reprobation, comes not to perfection, but by degrees, and after much ventilating of it in a ruder manner. Thus I think I have crackt the crowne of this conclusion; I may proceed with the greater facility to the rest.

1. That Reprobation is an Head to any part of practicall Divinity, I never read, nor heard till now. But yet in every theoreticall poynt, as touching the nature of God and his attributes, by the true doctrine thereof, the glory of God, and good of Religion is promoted, & by the erronious doctrine thereabouts it is as much impaired. For like as it is blasphemy, to attribute that unto God, which doth not become him; so is it blasphemy also, to deny unto him that which doth become him. As for the entertaining or refusing conference thereabouts, I have already spoken sufficiently; yet two particulars more I have to deliver, which I purpose to subjoyne to the end of those five considerations here distinguished, as remarkable ones, if my memory failes me not.

2. A Connexion I grant there is, between election and reprobation, and the clearing of the truth in the one, doth give light unto the other. But which of these is to be handled first, that the clearing of the truth therein, may give light to the sta∣ting of the other, I should think no sober man would make question. Yet the Remon∣strants at the Synod of Dort, were eager to begin with Reprobation, but were there∣in generally censured by the consent of forraine Divines that assisted there. But that one of them cannot be handled without the other, is a palpable untruth, as appears by the very practice of this Author himselfe, and his own carriage in this businesse. For he undertakes only the poynt of reprobation.

3. As touching the third particular, in charging the doctrine of reprobation, with being the chiefe cause of all the uproares in the Church at that time; this author takes to himselfe a strange liberty of discourse. We read and heare of no small stirres in the Church of Rome, between the Dominicans and the Jesuits; but I never read that the Jesuits laid to the Dominicans charge, that their Doctrine as touching the predetermination of the creatures will to every act thereof, was the cause of any up∣roare in the Church of Rome: But to the contrary rather. I read that in the conten∣tion between the Dominicans and Jesuits in Rome it selfe, wherein Valentianus through some heat in disputation, caught a feaver whereof he dyed within three daies after; of the relation whereof, made by one Pet (that had been a Priest) in Ox∣ford I was sometimes an eare witnesse. The Jesuits were rather taxed for their he∣terodoxy in the poynt de auxiliis, as Petrus Mattheus in his History reports it. And from D. Jacksons mouth, I have heard what a Spaniard should deliver upon the men∣tion of Molina the Jesuit, namely, that he was the man, qui tantos tumultus excitavit, to wit, in Spain. But as for Churches Protestant, he doth well to limit his crimination to a certain time. For the stirre that was raised by Huberus in the Lutheran Churches, was neither caused nor occasioned by our doctrine concerning reprobation. Huberus his cause was, a pertinacious standing for an universall Election. It seems he hath re∣lation only to the Haghe conference, and the uproares, as he calls them, amongst the States only, and their particular, or provinciall congregations alone (as it seems) he denominates the Churches. Now let us consider, Who made those uproares, were they the Contra-Remonstrants, or the Remonstrants only? If he chargeth this upon the Contra-Remonstrants, let him prove it, least he be justly censured for one of those wild beasts, an Emperour was sometimes warned to beware of, they were the slanderers. If the Remonstrants were the authors of these uproares, how doth he prove that the doctrine of reprobation, was the chiefe cause of them, Were not those Arminians voluntary agents in those uproares? If they conceived their opposites do∣ctrine to be unsound, could they not oppose it without uproares, without violent proceedings? Againe, their opposites doctrine, was it never received or preached 'till those daies? Or was there any uproare made thereupon, 'till Arminius his inno∣vating? And is that the chief cause of an uproare, which hath no such consequent ensuing untill it meets with some turbulent spirits, which begin to stirre as innovators in a Church or State. And yet was reprobation that alone, whereupon they stirred? Is it not apparent, that about the five Articles commonly so called, they conferred a∣like? But he saith it was the chiefe cause, and only saith it, yet Molinaeus professing reprobation to proceed, upon foresight of finall impenitency, as in truth it cannot be denied, but that as the Contra-Remonstrants professed, as well in that Conference at the Hague, as in the Synod of Dort, that God did never intend to damne any man

of ripe years, but for finall perseverance in infidelity and impenitency. Did their contentions hereupon, either totally cease or in part? But such criminations are no∣thing strange. We know after what manner of greeting wicked Ahab saluted the ho∣ly Prophet Elijah. Art thou he that troubleth Israel? but he spared not to answer him, I am not he that troubleth Israel, but Thou and thy Fathers house. In the like manner were Paul and Silas entertained Act. 16. 20. when being caught and brought before the Magistrates, heard such an accusation made against them, These men which are Jewes trouble our citty: and preach Ordinances which are not lawfull for us to receive, neither to observe, seeing we are Ro∣mans. And no marvaile if the Devill roares, when he falls from heaven, like light∣ning, and his kingdome is shaken. But because he putts us to it in this crimination, I think it fit to give a tast of the violent proceedings in those parts, as I find them or∣dered in the Preface to the Synod. Dordrac. set forth by the authority of the States. And because uproares concern insurrections against government in Church or State; The first particular I observe of this nature is, Fol. 3. pag. 1. where after Arminius had been much suspected, and divers times urged to declare his opinion, upon certain poynts which hitherto he had declined, saving in a false manner, his protestation in the issue, proving directly contrary to his practice. The Rectors of particular Chur∣ches, sowred with the leaven of his doctrine, openly refuse to subscribe the Confessi∣on of the Catechisme, though the Synod of South-Holland commanded them. Pa∣stores Arminii sententiam amplexi passim in Classibus recusabant mandato Synodi de subscriptione Confession is, ac Catecheseos morem gerere. Here we have the begining of a manifest schisme. Now consider we the progresse hereof. Hereupon a resolution was made (it being high time) by the States, for the calling of a Nationall Synode, in the yeare 1605. a∣bout November 26. the execution whereof, was by divers practises of the Arminian Faction, delayed, and put off from time to time, for the space of 13 years. Fol. 5. pag. 2. Arminius himselfe acknowledgeth, de Heterodoxiâ suâ varios rumores omnes jam ecclesi∣as pervasisse, incendium{que} à se suscitatum ipsa Ecclesiae tecta super are dici. Fol. 8. pag. 1. In the mean time, Anno 1608. the States declared their purpose was, to call a Provinciall Synode in October following, and signification hereof being made, the Rectors of particular Congregations, as many as were addicted to Arminius, being admonished to manifest their considerations in their severall Deanaries, that so they might be fairely sent to the Synod that approached. They put this off also. Illi vero ut antea, ita nunc quo{que} singuli consuetis tergiversationibus pariter hoc detrectarunt. The like refusall was afterwards made in the Synod of South-Holland, though they were urged by the Synod to declare themselves (for as for the Provinciall Synod, that was deferred two months longer.) Whereupon the Synod decreed, that they should give up their considerations within a Months space, or be obnoxious to Censure Ecclesiasticall. Hereupon was means made by Utenbogard, for letters from the States unto those Pa∣stors, to send up unto them their considerations sealed, that so they might reserve them to the Provinciall Synod shortly to be held. In these proceedings a man may easily smell Barnavells hand all along. Hereupon came forth at length Arminius his Declaration before the States. In answer whereunto Gomarus riseth up, as there we may read, Fol. 6. pag. 2. And amongst other courses of Arminius, makes relation of this, as how Spretis Synodorum Classium & Prebyteriorum judiciis ac decretis ad supremi Magi∣stratus tribunal prima instantia prosiluisse, ibi{que} querelas at{que} accusationes suas adversus Ecclesia∣rum doctrinam proposuisse, artibus{que} aulicis favorem sibi Ecclesiis verò odium consiliare diligenter studiisse. And hereupon besought the States, that seeing Contentiones gliscerent, Ecclesiae turbarentur, Cives{que} in partes distraherentur, the Nationall Synod which they had promi∣sed might be gathered together with the first; which yet by the practice of Utenbogard and others was still delayed. Hereupon Arminius his Faction grew so bold, as pub∣liquely to Preach against the received Doctrine, as Bertius spared not to declare him∣selfe; but wherein? Mark I pray the Article well, because this Author drawes all to reprobation. Now the Articles whereupon Bertius declared himselfe, to differ from the Doctrine received, were, De justificatione hominis coram Deo, De Praedestinatione, De Gratiâ Dei, & libero arbitrio, De Perseverantiâ fidelium; and upon these very points after∣wards, proceeded the Conference between Arminus and Gomarus before the States. And one Venator spared not publiquely to broach Pelagian and Socinian errours. Where∣upon he was suspended by the Churches of North-Holland. In spite of whom not∣withstanding, he continued his courses of Preaching. Now whereas the Orthodox Pastors in the Deanary of Alomar considering he was lawfully suspended, and withall

a man of impure life, refused to admit him into their company. Hereof com∣plaint was made to the States, and by Utenbogards practice a Mandate obtained from them, that they should admit him. Now when the States considering the present exigent, were easily like to condescend to a Provinciall Synode, the Ar∣minians moved, that the Deputies to be sent thither, should not be appointed there∣unto by the Churches, according to the usuall course, but only by the States, presuming hereby, that either none, but such as favoured their cause should be sent, or at least such as were lesse alienated from their Opinion. fol. 8. p. But though they could not effect this, yet by their practice it came to passe, that the calling, not only of a Provinciall Synode, but of the yearely Synods were hin∣dered. Shortly after this, finding what liberty they had, they met together of their own accord privily, Sine Magistratus Supremi authoritate magno numero. At{que} ibi inter se initâ per subscriptionem nominum confaederatione seu conspiratione, manifestum in Ec∣clesiis Reformatis Schisma instituunt. That year came forth the Remonstrance. Up∣on this by the practice of the Remonstrants, Vorstius is brought in to be a Profes∣sor in the place of Arminius. For as touching the exceptions taken against him, the Remonstrants professed before the States, he had given them good satisfacti∣on, Fol. 10. pag. 2. Then follow their practises for the removing of such Re∣ctors from their Churches, as were their opposites, and obtruding upon the people such as were of their own Party. At Alcmar, Adolphus Venator, a man of impure life and faith, moved the people to Armes against the Magistrate, whereby he was driven to relinquish his place, and others brought in of Venator his Faction. Fol. 12. pag. 1. Hereupon the Elders and Deacons of that place were removed, and two Pastors, the one having formerly executed his Ministry amongst them for fifty years continuance. Grevincovius in like sort, with the Magistracy of Rot∣terdam, to deprive his Colleague there Cornelius Geselius of his Ministry first, and then by their Sergeants to cast him out of the Citty. Utenbogard sends Remonstrants into Utrecht, and amongst others, Jacobum quendam Taurinum hominem turbulentum & saevum. Fol. 12. pag. 2. In Gelderland also the or∣dinary and annuall Synodicall Assemblies were hindred by the practice of U∣tenbogard, like as still they continued withall their art to hinder the calling of a Nationall Synod, so often promised by the States, and so many years deferred. William of Nassau moved both Utenbogard on the one side, and Festus Hommius on the other side, to consider of a course how these stirres might be pacified. To which motion Festus Hommius makes answer, that in case the Remonstrants dif∣fered from the Churches only in five Articles, he could think of a course where∣by some peace might be made in the interim, untill a Nationall Synod were gathered. This is the more observeable, because this Author layeth all the cause of those uproares (as he calls them) upon Reprobation. But he pro∣fesseth they had great cause to suspect the Remonstrants differed from them in greater points of moment. And these are afterwards declared to be these, Fol. 14. pag. 1. De perfectâ Christi pro peccatis Satisfactione, de Justificatione hominis coràm Deo, de Fide Salvificâ, de Peccato Originali, de Certitudine salutis, & de Perfectione hominis in hâc vitâ. And whereas, they desired the Remonstrants would deale clearly and make known what their opinion was in those poynts: Utenbogard having labou∣red to have a hearing before the States alone, There traduceth the actions of his Brethren in demanding the Declaration of their minds hereupon, as if this were to bring in a new kind of Inquisition amongst them, not to be endured. And hereupon obtaines of the States, that no such Declaration should be re∣quired at their hands. And more then that, finding the Deputies of the Synode by their continuall sollicitations with the States (as it well became them in their places) to be most prejudiciall to their proceedings, they brought it so to passe, that like as formerly their Annuall Synods were hindered, so now it was forbidden to the Deputies themselves, thenceforth to take any such stile unto them, or performe any such office as whereabout they were then imployed. And so the Relator proceeds in setting downe their insolent cour∣ses untill at length perceiving, that by the mediation of the King of Great Brittaine, all for the most part, inclined to the convocation of a Nationall Sy∣nod, they fell plainly on, upon these desperate Counsells openly professing that the calling of a Nationall Councell, would prove prejudiciall to the Majesty

and Liberty of the Provinces, manifesting themselves hereby utterly averse from such a course; which yet hath been most in use in the Church of God, and that of an∣cient times, for the pacifying of contentions arising in matter of Religion. I professe, I nothing affect to spend time in such searches and relations, I had rather imploy it another way, but you see I am driven unto it, to represent the unshamefased conditi∣on of this Narration.

4. And whereas he saith, It was accused with open mouth, and challenged of falshood, it is apparent that the Remonstrants would very well have rested contented with a mutu∣all toleration of one another in their severall waies. For when Utenbogard and Festus Hommius were to meet together, and treat upon some faire course of composition, Utenbogard, together with those of his side, professed they knew no other course for setling peace, but my mutually tolerating one the other; Festus Hommius and others with him on the other side, professed they knew no better course then convocation of a Nationall Synode, and in the interim to tolerate one another, provided they would declare themselves to differ from the received doctrine in the Church, in no other points then in the five Articles. But how they carried themselves herein refusing to declare themselves, I have formerly shewed. And farther, in the pur∣suit of this their practice to enjoy toleration, it is farther storied, by what means they procured a Letter from King James to farther them therein, and after that an Edict to that purpose from some of the States. And consider far∣ther, If any amongst us should rise up, and confederate themselves and im∣pugne any five Articles of the Church of England, and accuse us for maintaining erronious doctrine therein, and challenge us for falshood, if they doe it with never so open mouth, shall this be sufficient to justify them and condemne us, if wee doe not come to a tryall with them to dispute the case, though Wee are the Possessours, They the Intruders and Innovators? Wee maintaining no other Doctrine then that which is by Authority established amongst us, and They which impugne the doctrine received, are they not usually judged amongst us, as such who are rather to be censured then disputed with? And withall consider, that this mutua tolerantia, which the Remonstrants so much pressed and were so glad to enjoy, was with greatest instance stood for long after the Conference at the Hague. Lastly, how often was Arminius himselfe questioned and called upon to give satisfaction for his Heterodoxies, and how often did he decline it? When at the first, Motion was made for his surrogation into the place of Iu∣nius beind deceased, then the suspicions of his Heterodox breaking forth, and they of Amsterdam not well likeing to let him goe from them, amongst whom at that time, he exercised his Ministry; and that because they observed his luxuri∣ant and novelizing Wit, which was like to breed dangerous effects in an Univer∣sity: at length upon the great instance both of Utenbogard and Arminius himselfe, way was made for him unto the Chayre, upon condition he should conferre with Gomarus upon some chief heads of Doctrine, and by a round declaration of his mind thereon, remove all suspicion of Heterodoxy, having formerly by a so∣lemne Protestation given his word, that in case he had any singular opinion of his own, he would not spread it. Hereupon he made open profession, that he con∣demned the chiefe Pelagian opinions concerning grace naturall, the strength of Free-will, Originall sinne, the perfection of man in this life, and Predestination, and that he approved all those disputes, which Austin and other Fathers had writ∣ten against them; and that in his judgement the Pelagian errours were rightly refuted by those Fathers, and withall promised, that he would teach nothing that differed from the received Doctrine of the Churches; and hereupon he was admit∣ted to a Professors place in the University. In the beginning whereof he laboured by all means to quench all suspicion of Heterodoxy in himselfe, and maintained the doctrine of the Reformed Churches, De satisfactione Christi, de Fide justificante, de justifi∣catione per fidem, de Perseverantiâ verè fidelium, de Certitudine salutis, de Perfectione hominis in hac vitâ &c. all which he afterwards contradicted, as also did his Followers. This I say, he then at the first maintained publiquely, contrà sententiam suam (which let every man judge, whether it be not as much as to say, against his own Conscience) and Corvinus is alleaged as in a certain Writing of his set forth in Low-Dutch inge∣niously professing as much, Praefat, in Synod. Dordracen, Authoritate Ordinum Fol. 2. p. 1. But after he had been a yeare or two in the place, he begins to unmaske

himselfe, and by his Publique Lectures, and chiefly by his dealing with his Schollers in private, his heterodoxy discovered it selfe. Here upon the deputies from the Churches of South and North Holland are sent unto him, who acquaint him with the rumours that went of him, praying him that if he disliked ought in the doctrine received, he would sincerely declare it unto his Brethren, to the end, either by a friendly Conference, he might receive satisfaction, or the whole businesse might lawfully be put over to the consideration of a Synod. Arminius his answer was, that he never gave any just cause, why such rumour should be spread of him, neither was it wisdome for him to treat with them as with Deputies, that should make relation of the whole matter to a Synod, though as private persons, he refused not to con∣ferre with them, provided that in case they differed, no relation hereof should be made unto a Synod. The Church of Leyden also admonished him, that there might be a Conference between him and his Colleagues, before the Presbytery of that Church. To them he answered he could not yeeld thereto, without leave from the Gurators of the University, and that he perceived not, that any benefit was like to redound unto the Church by such a Conference. At another time Fol. 4. p. 2. being entreated by the Professors and Pastors with great earnestnesse, that if he had ought to say against the doctrine received in their Confession and Catechisme, he would freely and brotherly communicate it unto them, promising their endeavours to give him full satisfaction, or if not so, yet that he and his Colleagues under certain con∣ditions might come to a faire agreement, to live together in peace, and that the recon∣ciliation being made, nothing which passed between them should be divulged. The answer he made, was this, It was no wise part for him to yeeld to their motion, nei∣ther was he bound thereto, the present meeting being not ordained unto any such purpose, fol. 5. p. 2. Gomarus openly tells him, how it became him to declare his opini∣on, ne{que} ejusmodi subterfugiis diutius hâc in re uti, & fol. 6. p. 2. before the States he repre∣sents his continuall practice thereunto, in concealing his Opinion, His words are these, Quibus insuper artibus opiniones suas disseminare; Publicè scilicet ab Ecclesiis rogatum obtestatum{que}, sententiam suam occultare, privatim vero Pastoribus quos in eam pertrahi posse speraret, ac discipu∣lis suis diligentèr eam inculcare; argumenta Nostrorum praecipua quibus astrui doctrina Orthodoxa soleret enervare, Jesuitarum verò aliorum{que} Adversariorum, quibus doctrinam Ecclesiarum Refor∣matarum oppugnant confirmare, Varias de doctrinae receptae Veritate dubitationes discipulorum ani∣mis ingerere, eandem{que} cum doctrinâ heterodoxâ prius, quasi in aequilibrio suspendere, ac deinde prorsus rejicere, nullam hactenus sinceritatis ac consensus in doctrinâ, licet saepius ab Ecclesiis amanter fraterne{que} rogatum Declarationem edere voluisse. Now let any indifferent per∣son compare the carriage of Arminius the Innovator, with the carriage of the Contra-Remonstrants, standing for the doctrine heretofore received, and judge impartially which of them betrayes the greater distrust of the integrity of their Cause.

5. As for the easinesse of defending it, if it be not, or were not so in their opinion, who are here pretended to have declined the sifting of it, What is that to the purpose? Then who are they, who say it may so easily be defended? I never read any hitherto, who doe not acknowledge a great mystery in the divine providence. And from the daies of Anselme unto this present day, it hath ever been accounted (in my observation) a very difficult poynt to accord predestination divine, with the li∣berty of mens wills. But put the case it may easily be defended, as of evident truth by the word of God, yet notwithstanding, if it be found harsh to mens affections, are they likely to admit it with such ease? I should think it ought to be put out of que∣stion, that God hath mercy on whom he will, in bestowing faith and repentance upon them, and thereby curing their naturall infidelity and hardnesse of heart, as also that God hardneth whom he will, leaving their infidelity and hardnesse of heart uncured; yet when flesh and bloud riseth up against this doctrine thus, Why then doth God com∣plaine; (to wit, of mans disobedience) for who hath resisted his will? And the Apostle addresseth hereunto no other answer but this, O man who art thou who disputest with God? shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay of the same lump, to make one vessell unto honour, ano∣ther unto dishonour? Is flesh and bloud, I pray, apt to rest satisfied with this?

Now as touching the two things I promised to adde, they are these.

1. I pray consider whether in all this, this Author doth not very judiciously pro∣nounce

sentence against himselfe. For you know, your own motion you made unto him, and the promise he made unto you; and I pray consider how answerable here∣unto hath been his performance. The certain Controversies, as touching which he professeth change of Opinion, what are they, but the five Articles so much agitated between the Remonstrants, and the Contra-Remonstrants? Doe you not perceive how he makes choyce only of reprobation to grate upon? Is he not content to lye close as touching foure of them? What is this, but according to his language, the co∣veting of corners? And what willingnesse of abideing the tryall doth this manifest? Yet he pleaseth himselfe in a conceit, of being as free from guile, as David was when he offered himselfe to the Lords tryall, and thereupon advanceth himselfe to the greater liberty of censuring others, such as Beza, and Musculus, and their Fellowes, to∣gether with the Contra-Remonstrants, as too full of that guile, whereof himselfe, by virtue not of his Free-will, but of a grace of God of his shapeing, is voyd. This is an usuall course with those of his spirit, whereof I have had plentifull experience in this very kind. For if you believe them, all the Arminians Geese are Swannes, and all our Swannes are Geese in comparison to them. He hopes you will not think he hates the light, or refuseth to come to the light, (in his phrase) this is the censure he libe∣rally bestowes upon his opposites. For though some of our Divines are willing e∣nough to treat of the five Articles, yet to treat of reprobation, which is a part of one of those, they are not so willing, but this young Master in Israel, out of the pleropho∣rious conceit of his own integrity and sufficiency, is very willing to treat of this of reprobation, though he leaves all the rest alone. Yet I pray make the scales even, What instance can be given, I doe not say of Beza, Musculus, or any one of the Con∣tra-Remonstrants, but of any one of the like condition to himselfe, that being en∣treated by a friend (as this Author was by you) to shew the reasons, why he hath changed his mind from Arminianisme, to the opposite opinions, hath carried him∣selfe, as this Author hath done, to give his reasons only on the part of one of them, and yet passeth his censure so prodigally on others for refusing triall, by the way im∣plying, a glorious ostentation of his own performances to the contrary, as if he had done a notable piece of service, whereas all that he hath performed hereon, by proofe from testimonies of Scripture, are little more then two Leaves, and therein also as it were purposely, declines all those places, wherein the Scripture speaketh direct∣ly of election, predestination, and of that, which in effect, is all one with reprobation. Such places pregnantly speaking hereof, he purposely declines, and yet he calls the places he insists upon, pregnant testimonies; and indeed so they are, but nothing at all to the purpose of predestination, election, or reprobation. Yet I marvaile not he is so well conceited of his atchievements. I remember the Fable of the fly, sitting on a Cart-wheele, in a dry summers day, and saying, See what a dust I make. For, because he hath discharged himself so unworthily with you, he may be bold to conceit, that if he had to deale with Beza, or with any of the Contra-Remonstrants, or of the Synod of Dort, he would make it soon appeare, that Heresy and untruth condemnes it selfe (this is the sweet accommodation he makes of that the Apostles 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) to wit, by their refusing the touch-stone, and his readinesse backed with all sufficiency to come thereto, whereof he hath given so plentifull demonstration in this he hath written un∣to you; as if he had been with some Oracle of late, who had not only revealed unto him, some reasonable motives, and wise carriages of the matter, but inspired him al∣so with some martiall spirit, fit for any encounter, despising his Adversaries, as empty Schollers, and as if their parts were but copper, to his gold. Therefore he may take heart to speak boldly, and shew himselfe in the clear day, when such as Beza make choyce to walk in mistrs, and dwell in silence. Besides his care is very Apostolicall for the peace of the Church, whereas Beza's was not at Mompelgard, nor the Contra-Remonstrants, neither at the Hague Conference, or at the Synod of Dort. For none of these belike, have been so forward to shew themselves unto the World, and upon the stage, for the maintenance of their doctrine (at least in the poynt of reprobation) no not Beza in his Lectures upon the ninth to the Romans. Yet neither this man nor his Oracle hath done ought that I know, but in corners. And in corners I find these spirits exceeding busy; and I have been so happy (for so I account it, although I con∣fesse my time might be farre more profitably bestowed) as to meet with some of their Mysteries, ere I was aware. And I find their Lyons skinnes, doe smell farre more of the Fox then of ehe Lyon.

2. The second is this, Why should their carriage be any prejudice to others, who are as willing to give an account of their faith in these particulars, as any Arminian whatsoever. For my part, I never met with any of them, that I declined, nor I hope never shall. I heartily wish, time might serve me for them all. I have dealt with Armi∣nius his Examen, his Conference with Junius, Corvinus his answer unto Tilenus, I have en∣tred upon Vossius his Pelagian History. I desire I might have time and opportunity, for their Synodalia Dordracena, but most of all with the Jesuits; while I deale with them I learne somewhat, but nothing at all while I am occupied with the Arminians.

3. Let mee adde one thing more: In the Articles of our Church, the seaventeenth is concerning Predestination and Election, not one concerning Reprobation. If any of us, should forbeare to meddle with the doctrine of reprobation in dispute, may we not justly plead, a faire conformity to the wisdome of the Church whereof we are members? And by the way to touch one thing, Might not this be the reason, why this author utterly pretermits the prosecuting his opinion concerning Predestination and election, to wit, least thereby he should fall foule upon the doctrine of our Church, so evidently set downe in that Article concerning the poynt of Predestinati∣on? The Church of Ireland content themselves, with the very forme of that 17^th Article of ours concerning Predestination: Only they premise two Theses; the one whereof is this, God from all eternity, did by his unchangeable Councell ordaine, whatsoever in time should come to passe, yet so, as thereby no violence is offered to the Wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty, nor the contingency of the second cause is taken away, but establi∣shed rather; The other this, By the same eternall Counsell, God hath Predestinated some unto life, and Reprobated some unto death, of both which there is a certain number, known only unto God, which neither can be increased nor diminished.

DISCOURSE. The Third Motive. The Infamy of it.

IT is an Opinion (as it is maintained by the Supralapsarians) odious to the Papists, and opens their foule mouthes against our Church and Religion, and so abhorred (maintained either Way) by all rhe Lutherans, that for this very Tenent, they call us damned Calvenists, think us un∣worthy to be above ground, and in their Writings protest; that they will rather unite them∣selves to the Papists, then to us.

Sir Edwin Sands speaks of men, whom he commends for singular learning and piety, (whose opi∣nion he so sets down, as he declares it to be his own) that they think it were no blemish for the Re∣formed * 1.65 Doctors to revive their doctrine, and to abate the rigour of certain speculative opinions, (for so he is pleased to call them) especially touching the eternall decrees of God, wherein some of their chief authors have runne into such an utter opposition to all the Romish doctrine, as to have ex∣ceedingly scandalized all other Churches withall, yea, and many of their own to rest very ill satis∣fied.

At the closing up of the Conference at Mompelgard, when Frederick Earle of Wortenberg exhorted * 1.66 his Divines to acknowledge Beza and his Company for Brethren, and to declare it by giving them their hands, they utterly refused it, saving, That they would pray to God to open their eyes, and would doe them any office of humanity and charity, but they would not give them the right hand of Brotherhood, because they were proved to be guilty, errorum teterimorum, of most pestilent errours, of which they reckoned this for one. Hemingius left his own side, and joyned with us in the poynt of the Sacrament, but would come no neerer to us, but maintained a distance in this.

It is a Morsell, which the greatest part of the Christian Churches cannot swallow; and therefore I think it would not down very easily with us, and without suspicion.

TWISSE Consideration.

HIs third Topick place, is drawn from the Infamy of this doctrine, and that amongst Papists and Lutherans. And this is a grand motive with him to abhorre it. But I pray consider, was not the doctrine of the Gospell infa∣mous at the first, both amongst Jewes and Gentiles? What time the Jewes were the only people of God, how doth Tacitus out of his worldly wisdome brand them? Doth he not call them Gentem teterrimam, Cenus hominum invisum Diis? And as touching * 1.67 their religious Rites, marke what censure he passeth upon them, Profana illic omnia, quae apud nos sacra, rursus concessa apud illos, quae apud nos incesta, and comparing them with * 1.68 the Rites of Bacchus, saith, Liber festos, laetos{que} ritus posuit, Judaeorum Mos absurdus sordi∣dus{que}. And speaking of the Christians he calls them, Genus hominum propter flagitia invi∣sum. This censure he passeth upon them in the daies of holy Paul, who forbad them to doe evill that good might come thereof, and commands every soule to be subject to the Higher Powers, even then, when soules were at the best, and powers at worst. And see I pray what the King of Ashurs judgement was, concerning the Religion of Samaria and Jerusalem, in comparison to the Religions of their Nations, which were heathenish. Isa. 10. 10. Like as mine hand hath found the Kingdoms of the Idolls, seeing their Idolls were above Jerusalem, and above Samaria. So that of an heathenish Religion, he had a better estimation then of the Religion of the Jewes. Now if some Rabshakeh a∣mongst them should turne heathen (for such a tradition, as I remember is received a∣mongst the Rabbins, namely, that Rabshakeh was a Jew, but turned heathen) and af∣terwards endeavoured to entice the Jewes to doe as he did, and that because of the infamous nature of their Religion amongst heathens, how deserved such a one to be entertained by them? Was he not by the Law of God to be stoned to death? In like manner, if in the primitive daies of the Church, some Christian should turne Jew or Infidell, and practice to seduce others from the obedience of faith, representing unto them how every where it was contradicted, how Christ himselfe was counted a blas∣pheamer, a sorcerer, how the Gospell was a scandall to the Jewes, foolishnesse to the Gentiles, and that in killing the holy Apostles, the world thought they did God very good service. Saint Paul himselfe professing of himselfe and his fellowes, That they were made as the filth of the world, the offscouring of all things. Did this infamy prevaile with * 1.69 Paul, or any other holy servant of God, to remit any thing, in the maintenance of his Christian faith? Nay, doth he not professe, saying, I passe not for these things, neither is my life deare unto me, so I may fulfill my course with joy, and the Ministration that I have received to testify the Gospell of the grace of God? And that in all things, They approve themselves as the Mini∣sters of God by honour and dishonour, by good report and evill report, as deceivers and yet true. * 1.70

Againe, Is it to be expected, that any doctrine should be well spoken of, by such as are opposites and adversaries thereunto? Suppose a rigid Lutheran should by Gods providence, be taken off from their ubiquitary doctrine; and in justifying himselfe for the change of his Opinion, should represent unto them, the infamous condition of that doctrine, both in the judgement of Papists, and in the judgement of Calvinists; I pray consider, How in all likelyhood would this plea be entertained? Could he ex∣pect any better recompence hereof, then to be cast out of their Synagogues? Suppose a Papist should have his eyes opened, and brought to the truth of God in the poynt of justification, and, being demanded the reason of this change of mind in him, should answer, that the infamy of this doctrine, both amongst Lutherans and Calvinists is so great, and that such a morsell, which neither Lutherans nor Calvinists can swal∣low, should therefore (in his judgement) not down very easily with Papists, and without suspicion. Now let any indifferent Reader confider, how this plea in all probability would be received amongst papists. Yet I mean not to quiet my selfe, or content my Reader with this parallell. Of that which he here delivers of Papists, he gives us no evidence but his bare word in pawne, for the credit of this assertion. Nei∣ther

gives he any testimony of Lutherans, their calling us damned Calvenists, and though he had, I pray, what were we the farther off from the kingdome of God for that? And I pray consider, is it not in our power to recompence them, and call them, damned Lutherans, if we list to recompence malice with malice, so to serve our own turnes? And all this is delivered by him without distinction of Papists, learned and unlearned, Dominicans and Jesuits; in like sort without all distinction of Lutherans, whether rigid or moderate. But let us examine his crimination a part.

And first, as for Papists; not one is here named, nor any reference made to any of of them. S^t Pauls prayer was, that they might be delivered from unreasonable men. I think never Sect rose upmore unreasonable then this Sect of Arminians. This Writing came unto my hands, before I had dispatched a large discourse sent unto me from one of same Sect, and therein I have met with pregnant evidences, that more heads then one, were employed thereabouts. And there I am told to my face, that our doctrine of absolute reprobation, we have learned from the Papists. Another with whom I had to doe not long before, professeth in plain manner thus; The Jesuits ten of them for one, favour the absolute irrespective decree, following herein as they think S^t Austin, but especially their S^t Thomas, and Scotus, with all the rabble of rotten Schoolmen, and the whole Tribe at this day of the Dominicans, who are buzy zelots for the cause; of whose consent some amongst us are not ashamed to bragge. If our irrespective decree, be so joyntly maintained by both Jesuits, and Do∣minicans, and that as they think according to Austin, how is it possible our doctrine herein, can be so odious to the Papists? Or what Papists doth he mean, if neither Je∣suits nor Dominicans, nor any such as concurre with either of them? Or if it be so o∣dious unto them, as one Arminian Proselite professeth, how can it be so concordant∣ly maintained by them, as another Arminian proselite avoucheth? And if we have learned it at the hands of Papists, what will these Lutherans gaine, by uniting with Papists rather then with us, that is, with the Masters rather then with the Schollars. And if a Lutheran should be converted to the embracing of our Tenent herein, and to justify himselfe should plead; That we Calvinists are ready to protest, that in the doctrine of reprobation and predestination, we had rather unite our selves with Pa∣pists then with them, Of what moment think you, would this motive be with them, which this Author most inconsiderately proposeth, as a poynt of very ponderous con∣sideration?

But as touching Papists, their dislike of us, he confines it only to the Supralapsa∣rian-way. And indeed that distinction of the Supralapsarian and Sublapsarian-way. was brought in meerely to get thereby some more elbow roome. For if they agree with us in the poynt of Gods absolute and irrespective decrees, how improbable is it, that the doctrine of any of our Divines, in stating the object of predestination to be humanum genus nondum conditum, will prove odious unto them; considering this is a meer Logicall difference, as I have shewed in my Vindic. Grat. Dei cap. 1. pag. 1. De Predesti∣natione digress. 1. Yet as touching the Supralapsarian-way, that opinion is imputed un∣to Junius by Arminius, as also to Thomas and his Followers. Collat. Armin. cum Juni. pag. 4. and if so, how improbable is it, that such an Opinion should be so odious to the Papists, as this Author upon his bare word avoucheth. And Alphonsus Mendoza spares not to professe, that supernaturalls were intended by God before naturalls; and his discourse hereupon, was taken with admiration by his Auditors in Spaine, and he was urged as himselfe professeth, to set it forth in Print. And the Quatuor signa Fran∣cisci Mayronis (mentioned by M^r Perkins De Praedest. Modo & Ordine) doe manifest that he took the same way; and these quatuor signa, Franciscus Mayro received from the do∣ctrine of Scotus. It is well known that in the Synod of Dort, there met Divines diffe∣rent in this poynt, who yet neither hated one anothers doctrine nor persons for this difference; like as so it is amongst us, as in the place above mentioned I have shewed. Nay it is apparent, that Junius took upon him to reconcile all three opinions there a∣bouts, and Piscator after him, who also hath discharged his part herein, farre more clearely then Iunius. And no marvail, Iunius having first broken the ice. But that the truth may not be carried in the clouds of ambiguities, as they desire, who are in love with errour: All the question between these our Divines consists in this, Whether it were the will of God that Adam should fall by his permission, so to make way for Gods glorious ends, to wit, the manifestation of his glory, in the incarnation of the Sonne of God, as also in the way of mercy, in the salvation of some; and in the way of justice, in the condemnation of others. The Supralapsarians maintaine, that such

was the will of God, least otherwise way should be made for the manifestation of Gods glorious works by accident, rather then by Gods providence. Other Divines that take the Sublapsarian way, had rather decline this nice poynt as difficult, then oppose it as odious. But say I, the doctrine wherein both Jesuits and Arminians doe agree, will abundantly serve us to justify us, in the positive and affirmative part of so nice a poynt as this. For by their doctrine of Scientia Media, God did foresee, that upon such an administration of his providence about Adam as was used, Adam would fall; and more then this, that God could have brought forth other administrations of his providence in very great variety, some whereof were such, that if God had u∣sed, Adam would not have fallen. Now being pleased to make use of such an admi∣nistration of providence divine, upon the purpose whereof, he foresaw Adam would fall; and not being pleased to use such a providence, upon the purpose whereof, he had foreseen Adam would not have fallen; I call here all the indifferent of the World to judge, whether it doth not manifestly follow herehence, that it was the will of God, Adam should fall by his permission.

Again, throughout our doctrine, nothing is more harsh then that of Gods deter∣mining the will of the creature, to every act of his, as touching the substance thereof. Dares this author betray such ignorance, as hand over head to professe, that this do∣ctrine is odious unto Papists? Whereas the most learned in the Church of Rome, are well known to maintain it in expresse termes, whereas our Divines course is, to keep themselves to the phrase of Scriptures. And as for the Jesuits who oppose it, and in the place thereof bring in Scientia Media, and Gratia Congrua, shaped after the genius of Scientia Media. I can shew an expresse acknowledgement under the hand of a zealot for the Arminian cause, that between the Gratia praedeterminans of the Dominicans, and Gratia congrua of the Jesuits, there is no such materiall difference at all, but that the absolutenesse of predestination and reprobation doth follow, as well upon the one, as upon the other.

To conclude, I would this Author would be so wise, as once more to consult with his Oracle, and enquire, Whether Papists are more ready to joyne with Lutherans, in their doctrine of Christs Ubiquity, as touching his Manhood, then with us in the poynt of Reprobation, or of Gods concourse. For suppose we held as Suarez is plea∣sed to state our Tenent, namely, Quod Deus omnipotenti voluntate nobis necessitatem imponat; yet the same Suarez saith, that in this very poynt, we are not reprehended of them, as if we affirmed ought, Quod vel in re ipsâ contradictionem involvat, aut Dei omnipotentiam su∣peret. I presume no Papist is so well conceited in the Lutherans doctrine in the poynt of Ubiquity.

From that which he affirmes of Papists, I come to that which he affirmes of Luthe∣rans. And what one instance hath he given of any Lutheran, speaking against our making the corrupt Masse the object of predestination or reprobation? Surely not one, either out of Sir Edwin Sands, nor out of Osiander; Nay what cause is there, why either Papist or Lutheran should, in case the object thus stated (or in a more rigid forme of the Masse Uncorrupt) doth no way constraine us to maintaine, that God doth intend the damnation of any man, in any moment of nature, before the consi∣deration of him, as departing out of this World, under the power of sinne; no nor to maintain, that God doth intend the salvation of any man, in any moment of nature, before the consideration of him, in finall perseverance in faith and repentance, pro∣vided God suffer him, to live untill the use of reason, as I have shewed, and endea∣voured to justify, and make appeare, in my Vindic. Grat. Dei, in the digressions con∣cerning Predestination. For indeed not any of our Divines was, I think, ever known to maintain, that God did intend to damne any man but for sinne; Neither doe I maintaine, that God intended to bestow salvation on any man of ripe years, but by way of reward of his faith and repentance. The true and principall, reall (not verball only) difference between us, and the Arminians, is about Gods bestowing of faith and repentance, and his purpose thereof. Now let any learned Lutheran deliver his mind on this, namely, upon the foresight where of it is, that God gives faith and repentance unto some, and denyes it unto others. When Tossanus makes relation of Hunnius his exposition of that place Acts 13. 48. Et crediderunt quotquot ordinati erant ad vitam, thus, id est, qui sese ordinarant & disposuerant ad audiendum Dei verbum; * 1.71 Hunnius in his refutation of Tossanus his Theses, cites Tossanus to appear before the tribunall seat of the Judge both of quick and dead, and to shew in what place of his writings, this is

to be found, professing that such doctrine is the very Pelagian Heresy, and that him∣selfe never approved it, but disproved it rather, and most constantly impugned it. What Lutheran was ever known so absurd, as to say, that God worketh in us, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle credere, modò Velimus? Yet this doctrine I can shew in expresse termes delivered by an Arminian. But come to the consideration of the instances proposed by him.

The first is the Relation of Sir Edwin Sands. And I remember well to have read in him somewhat concerning the Predestinary Pestilence, so called by some. And I might wonder at this Authors wisdome, in pretermitting that passage; but upon search finding it about Fol. 59. though my Book hath no quotation at all of pages, I ceased to wonder at his concealing of it. I have rather cause to commend his wis∣dome therein, although it expresseth that whereupon this Author formerly touched, as concerning the Lutherans readinesse to returne to the Papacy rather then to admit that Predestinary Pestilence. For predestinary pestilence goeth not here alone, but is joyned with the Sacramentary pestilence, For these two poynts, saith he, are the ground of the quarrell; but he addes I confesse, that the Predestinary pestilence was more scandalous at that day then the former. Yet the same Author professeth Fol. 73. of the Lutherans, that if he fetch an elle forwards one way, for an elle he looseth another way, it is only by a kind of boysterous force and violence against the Calvinists, as in Stras∣borough of late. And the reason hereof he takes to be in part the Absurdities of the Ubiquitary Chimaera. And as for the passage here alleaged, I find it about Fol. 86. Wherein I consider, First that the speculative opinions he speaks of are not about the eternall decrees of God only, or especially above all others, as here by cunning carriage it is pretended. For the words runne thus; It can be no blemish to them to revise their Doctrine, and to abate the rigour of certain speculative opinions, especially touching the eternall decrees of God, the quality of mans nature, the use of works, wherein some of their chiefe Authors have come to such an utter opposition, &c So that the poynts of rigo∣rous doctrine, which were to be qualified in this Gentlemans judgement, are many, but especially three; The first whereof is touching the eternall decrees of God, The second concerning the quality of mans nature, The third concerning the use of Works: So that the doctrine of Gods eternall decrees is not the poynt alone, the rigour whereof especially is to be qualified in this Authors judgement, but this especiall care of qualification, is by him referred to the three poynts formerly mentioned, and that indifferently. Secondly, Whereas this Author relates, that this is delivered, not as out of the relators judgement only, but as out of the judgement of men whom he commends for singular learning and Piety. I find no such matter in the Re∣lation that I have, though I have searched after it, both by considering what went before, and what comes after, as farre as he treats of the same matter. Whether this comes in a second Edition I know not: in mine I find no such thing. So that the weight of this motive hitherto, lies wholly upon the authority of this Gentleman. And surely I should think it were nothing hard to counterballance this authority to the full. And it may be he speaks herein no other thing then wherein he was endoctrinated by his Tutor, as lately an ingenious and grave divine, differing from us in the poynt of reprobation, most ingeniously acknowledged, that he was brought into that opinion of his by his Tutor, who was a Lutheran: And I doubt we have too many such amongst us. Of late I have heard, that one of good place spared not openly to professe, saying, Call us as we ought to be called, for we are Lutherans: I would wee had not too many Popish-hearted amongst us.

Thirdly, whereas this Gentleman adviseth us to revise the Doctrines, and this Author accommodates it only to Gods eternall decrees; I have already performed this, and qualified the rigour of some mens opinions thereabouts. For whereas some have subordinated Gods decree of permitting sinne, to the decree of damnati∣on, I have taken another course, and doe maintain, that in no moment of nature is the decree of damnation, before the decree of permitting finall perseverance in sinne. Again, I presume this Gentlemans meaning is not, that the doctrine of the Church of England is rigorous, as touching Gods eternall decrees. I willingly professe, I desire no better triall of the truth of the Doctrine I maintain hereabouts, next unto the Word of God, then to be tried by the 17^th Article of the Church of England, and by the Articles of the Church of Ireland, set forth in the daies of King James

Thirdly, I would it were put unto this Gentleman, if he be living, Whether in his Opinion, God of his free grace doth bestow faith and repentance on some, thereby to cure that naturall infidelity and hardnesse of heart, which is originally found in all, and of his meer pleasure, he denies it unto other: Or whether finding some mo∣rall difference or preparation in one more then in another, is hereupon moved to give faith and repentance unto them, and deny it unto others. If he shall acknow∣ledge, that God doth shew his mercy to whom he will, that is, of his meer pleasure, and denies it to whom he will, I am ready to professe, that let him state Gods eter∣nall decrees after what manner he will, I shall willingly subscribe thereunto; pro∣vided it be suitable unto the former ground: and as for the unsuitable nature there∣of, if in case it so fall out, let the proofe and evident demonstration thereof, lye on mee. But if his opinion be, that God bestowes faith and repentance on man, moved thereunto by some morall preparation, which he finds in one, rather then in another, I appeale to the Lutherans themselves, whether this be not in plain termes no better then Pelagianisme.

As for his calling their opinions in this poynt, speculative opinions (as this Au∣thor would have us observe) I am willing to observe it: and withall I think, he doth it with better judgement, then this Author doth in calling them pra∣cticall.

And whereas it is pretended, that our Divines have been carried into these opi∣nions of theirs, in opposition to Popish Doctrine, This is so out of season in these daies (notwithstanding the raw judgement of this Author) that our Arminians spare not to professe (as formerly mentioned) and charge us to our face, that we have lear∣ned this doctrine of ours, out of the Writings of Papists. And Grevincovius, a∣gainst Amesius, spares not to pronounce, that They may with better credit fol∣low the Jesuits, then Wee the Dominicans, considering that the Dominicans are the great Administrators of the Inquisition in Spaine. This is delivered as touch∣ing the poynt of grace and Free-will: but as touching the poynt of election and reprobation absolute, I can shew under the hand of an Arminian, that herein there is no materiall difference between the Dominicans, and most part of the Jesuits; so little difference there is between the Gratia Praedeterminans of the one, and the Gratia Congrua of the other. So that if this be true, it is not probable, that hereby we scandalize the judicious and learned Papists; and what those other Churches are which we scandalize, excepting Churches Lutheran, either this Au∣thor knows not, or is well content to dissemble it, to wit, the Churches of Socini∣ans and Anabaptists. And how doe we more scandalize the Churches Lutheran herein, then they scandalize us? Was it ever known, that by meer differing in Opinion from other Churches, Christian men were said to scandalize them? Or if it were so, must not the scandall in this case, be equall on both sides?

As for the leaving many of our own very ill satisfied, why should that seem strange? What doth Carryer write of many well known to him in this our Church of England, of the same mind with himselfe, some Papists, some Lutherans? And may there not be as many amongst the Lutherans, as ill satisfied with the do∣ctrine commonly received amongst them, save that they are farre more forward, to excommunicate all such, as soon as they appeare, then Wee? Besides all this, The poynt of scandall is brought in very unseasonably; For if it be a truth that we maintain and professe, if any are scandalized by it, it is a scandall taken, not gi∣ven: God forbid we should grow so profane, as to account it a scandalous thing to make profession of Gods truth; especially this truth we maintain being so neere to a cleare opposition to Pelagianisme, a Heresy condemned by the Church above 1200 years agoe.

When Frederick Duke of Woortenberg exhorted his Divines to acknowledge Beza, and his Company for Brethren, and to declare it by giving them their hands; The answer of refusall was made by Jacobus Andreas a most bitter enimy, and one whom Beza describes, tanquam virum sanguinarium, and his carriage throughout was most im∣perious. And it becomes an Arminian spirit well, to make the rancour of his mali∣cious heart, a rule wherebyto cry down the doctrine which he abhorred. With a farre better grace might a Papist cry down our faith, opposite to the doctrine of the Church of Rome, by the Popes abhorring it, and damning of it to the pit

of hell. For surely it is fit he should be of farre more authority then Jacobus Andreas; not to speak of the Anathematization of it in the Councell of Trent, nor of the common argument of Papists, in that they deny that we can be saved, many amongst us are of opinion, that a Papist can be saved, therefore better to be a Papist then a Protestant; yet surely it is in the power of our corruption to re∣quite malice with malice, and as much to scorne with our heeles their Brother∣hood, as they ours. But if through the grace of God, we doe not give our selves leave to requite their malice, if that be no scandall to themselves, there is no cause why it should be any scandall unto us. In Sir Edwin Sands about Fol. 59. there is such a relation as this, Though the Princes and Heads of the weaker sides in those parts both of Palsgrave and Landsgrave, have with great wisdome and judgement (to aslack those flames) imposed silence on that poynt, to the Ministers of the one Party, hoping that the charity and discretion of the other sort, would have done the like: yet it falleth out otherwise, that Lutheran Preachers rage hither∣to in their Pulpits. Now let Arminians if they think good, conclude herehence, that seeing there was so little charity and discretion, in the Lutheran Preachers, it becomes them in their writings and Conclusions, to shew as little chari∣ty and discretion as they for their hearts; and that grace of God which they fashion to themselves, will bear them out in this, it beeing meerely the power of their own free-wills. But this is not all I have to say in answer here∣unto.

The phrase in Osiander is not, errorum teterrimorum, but haerescωn teterrimarum, of which this Author saith, they reckoned this for one. And let him speak out and tell us, what were the others. Was not the denyall of Consubstantiation another? As also the denyall of the lawfulnesse of that Baptisme, which was administred by Woemen; (the practice whereof King James reformed in our Book of Common-Prayer:) As also their not concurrence with them in opinion about the Person of Christ, which by their Ubiquitary Chimaera (as Sir Edwin Sands call it) they doe misera∣bly deforme. These and other such like were the errours, whereof this Author saith, Beza and his Fellowes were proved to be guilty of in this Conference, for so I take his meaning, pronouncing thereby sentence tanquam ex Cathedra Judicis; or the Lutheran Party throughout in that Conference: which Conference was not of Predestination alone, but de Caenâ Domini, de Personâ Christi, de Imaginibus, de Baptismo, and last of all de Praedestinatione.

Yet I have not done with this. For I beseech you consider, whether this Author, or his Oracle, be not miserably deceived in all this, and that these teterrimae Haereses are not such as Iacobus Andreas with his Lutheran party, laid to the charge of Beza and his Brethren, but rather such as Beza and his Brethren, laid to the charge of the Lu∣therans; and that not in this Conference, but in their Writings, in Scriptis, so goeth the relation. Whereas this Conference was not by writing, but only by word of mouth; Iacobus Andreas not enduring to give way to Beza's motion as touching the consigning of that which they delivered in writing under their hands. For the rela∣tion in Osiander runs thus; Ad haec D. Iacobus respondit, Woortenbergicos Theologos Deum oraturos, ut Bezae & ipsius Collegis oculos mentis aperiat. Ut autem illis dextram fraternita∣tis praebeant non ignor are illos quàm horribilium errorum & teterrimarum haereseω•• in suis Scriptis coram Fcclesiâ ipsos reos egerint; Ideo{que} se mirari quomodo eos pro fratribus agnoscere possint aut velint, aut corum fraternitatem expetant, si pro talibus agnoscant, qui damnatas Haereses ab Orco revocent ut Ecclesiae Dei obtendant. Now these words though at first sight they may seem to be referred, either to the Woortenbergers as accusing Beza and his Brethren, of such errours and heresies; yet the words following, Ideo{que} se mirari quamodo eos pro fratribus agnoscere possint aut velint, aut eorum fraternitatem expetant, si pro talibus agnoscant, qui damnatas Haereses ex Orco revocent: these words I say doe farre more incline to signify, that Beza and his Brethren, laid these horrible er∣rours and heresies to the charge of the Lutherans; and therefore the Lutherans won∣dred, how they could desire their Brotherhood, whom they accounted such hor∣rible Heretiques; rather then the Lutheran party, should wonder how they should affect Brotherhood with Beza, seeing they neither did affect any such, and if they had it was not fit they should wonder at their own actions. But that which followes puts it out of all question; where comes in manifestly, what the Lutheran Par∣ty conceived of the Doctrine of Beza implying thereby, what Beza and his

Fellows conceived of the Lutherans Doctrine, was formerly expressed; the words following are these, Contrà verò in quibus & quàm tetris erroribus ipsi versentur (that is Beza and his company) hac Collatione iis demonstratum esse: In quibus cum adhuc perseverent ipsos intelligere quòd eos pro fratribus agnoscere non possint. In which words Andreas gives the rea∣son why he and his Fellowes cannot acknowledge Beza and his fellowes for brethren, because they maintained, tetros errores (as he calls them;) for proofe whereof he ap∣peales to the present Conference. And this being delivered on the contrary part to that which is delivered before, as appears by the very first word, Contra verò, it fol∣loweth, that in the former part was set down, the reason why Beza and his fellowes, should not desire the fraternity of the Lutheran party, to wit, because they laid to the Lutherans charge, that they maintained horrible errours and most pestilent Heresies, for proof whereof, he appeals not to this present Conference, which was carried wholly by word of mouth, but to their Writings. This being clearely the meaning of An∣dreas, it is apparent, that the charge laid by Beza and his fellowes, upon the Luthe∣rans, was of fouler crimes, by Andreas his relation, then was the charge laid by An∣dreas upon Beza and his Brethren. For Andreas charged Beza only with, errores tetros; but Beza and his are said to have charged the Lutherans with horribiles errores, & haereses teterrimas. So that this Author doth miserably mistake his own evidences, and shame∣fully abuseth himselfe first, and others after him, if they will be abused by him. And whether he hath not taken it from some Achates of his upon trust I know not; and if it be so that some Achates hath helped him hereunto, certainly he hath not proved Fidus Achates in this.

In the close, it will not be amisse to shew, how M^r Mason of S^t Andrews Vndershaft in London, alleageth this carriage of Jacobus Andreas, as a testimony of the Lutheran un∣charitablenesse, in comparison with the charitable condition of their opposites, in a small Treatise of Contentment in Gods gifts. pag. 19. And shall their uncharitable∣nesse plead for the truth of their way, or be any just argument, of the untruth of our way, in any sober and wise mans judgement.

Of Hemingius his leaving his own side, I never heard or read before, unlesse that of a Papist he became a Protestant. But the difference is well known between the rigid and moderate Lutherans, and these are called by the other Semi-Calviniani. And what I pray hath Hemingius deserved, that his authority should be greater then the authority of Zuinglius, Calvin, Junius; Zanchius, Piscator. The Lutherans themselves (I suppose) will hardly think him worthy to be remembred the same day with Martin Luther. And as for Martin Luthers doctrine herein, to my judgement, he is farre more ex∣presse and resolute then Calvin, and I find that Beza in his Conference of Mompelgard, doth sometimes twit his opposites with Luthers Doctrine, whereunto throughout that Conference, I doe not find they answer any thing at all.

When he saith, It is a Morsell, which the greatest part of the Christian Churches cannot swallow; What a wild course doth he take in these his Motives. Must we for every doctrine of ours, examine whether the most part of Christian Churches doe embrace it yea or no? Why should wee not then runne out in this our search, and enquire, what is the Moscoviticall and Grecian Faith, what the Aethiopian, and A∣byssine, and so proceed in our contemplative perambulations, all the World over, and what we have found preacht unto our people also, to their more profound, and substantiall edification, if they list to believe us upon our word. But I suppose he looked no farther then to this Westerne World, secluding the new discoveries within the last hundred years or somewhat more. And very confidently he must exclude all Popish Churches, or presume they are for him in this. Yet as I said, the very last Arminian, I have had to deale with, hath told me to my face, that my Doctrine of absolute Reprobation, I have learned it of the Papists; and another to this purpose, there is no materiall difference between the Gratia Con∣grua of the Jesuits, and Cratia praedeterminans of the Dominicans. And secluding Popish Churches, I know not who they are, whom he calls the greatest part of the Christian Churches. Be it, that the Lutheran Churches are a greater Par∣ty, then the Churches of the Calvinists (which is more then I find in Sir Ed∣win Sands his Relation.) Now suppose the number of the Calvinists and their power were greater then that of the Lutherans; ask I pray any Lutheran in the World whether that were any reasonable motive unto him to change his Religion and turne

Calvinist? If it be of no weight to perswade them, why should it be of any moment to prevaile with us?

I come now to the Fourth and last of these Motives.

DISCOURSE. The Fourth Motive. Its affinity with the old exploded and condemned Errours of the Stoicks and Manichees.

THe Opinion of the Stoicks was, that all actions and events were inevitable, and determi∣ned, either by the revolutions of the Heavens, and the qualities of the Starres, which raigne at mens births, or by the Concatenation of naturall things, and the disposition of the first matters of all things, being so put together from eternity, that one thing must needs follow another as it doth, and the Materia Prima being so disposed, that all things cannot suc∣cessively come to passe otherwise then they doe, but must of necessity be as they are, even invito Deo, though God would have some things to be otherwise then they be.

The Manichees held, that all mens actions, good or evill, were determined too: Good actions by a good God, who was the author of all good things created, and of all good actions that fell out in the World: Evill actions by an Evill God, who was the primum principium malt, the first and princi∣pall author of all evill things that were extant in the world.

The Maintainers of the absolute decree, doe say one of these two things; either that all actions na∣turall and morall, good and evill, and all events likewise are absolutely necessary, or that all mens ends (at least) are unalterable and undeterminable by the power of their wills, which is upon the matter all one. For in vain is our freedome in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined, sith, Omnis actio est propter finem, All actions are done for the ends sake, that it might be obtained by them, which without them could not.

Now in these three Opinions, we may note two things.

1. The substance and formality of them, which is an unavoidablenesse of mens actions and ends whatsoever they be; In this all of them agree and holding that in all things, undeclinable fates, and insuperable necessity doe domineere. And therefore Melancthon doth not slack in many of his com∣mon Places, to call this absolute decree, Fatum Stoicum, Tabulas Parcarum, and to charge the Church of Geneva (the great defender of it) with a labour to bring in the Stoicks errours, as we may see in a certain Epistle of Melancthons to Peucer, where he speaks thus, Scribit ad me Laetius de Stoico Fato us{que} adeo litem Genevae moveri, ut quidam in carcerem conjectus sit propterea quod à Zenone differret. O Misera Tem∣pora! Doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam dubitationibus obscuratur. And Beza too speaking of Melan∣cthon saies, Philippus de his rebus itascribere caeperat, ut Genevenses quasi Stoicorum Fatum invehentes nota∣re quibusdam videatur.

2. The Circumstances or the grounds of their Opinions. The Stoicks derive this necessity from the Starres or first matter, the Manichees from duo prima principia aeterna & coeterna, and these last from the peremptory decree of Almighty God, so that in this they differ, but in this difference, the Sto∣icks and the Manichees in some respects have the better. For it is better to derive the necessity of e∣vill actions, or unhappy events from an evill God, or from the course of nature, then from the decree of that God who is infinitely good. The substance of their Opinions is all one, the ground wherein they differ is but accidentall to their errour.

If it be so, for this very reason alone may this doctrine of absolute reprobation be suspected, be∣cause these dreams of the Stoicks were exploded by the best Philosophers of all sorts: and this of the Manichees was generally cryed down by the Fathers, not only as foolish, but as impious and unwor∣thy of entertainment in a Christian heart, or Christian Commonwealth, not so much for any thing circumstantiall in it, but because it made all things and events necessary, and so plucked up the roots of virtue, planted vice, and left no place for just rewards or punishments.

These are my Reasons of the first sort.

TWISSE Consideration.

OUR Doctrine I see is cryed downe, not only as infamous, but also as Stoi∣call, and Manichaicall. Now I had thought the infamy of it had consisted only in the Stoicality of it, and it is no way fit to coordinate the Genus with the Species, in multiplying criminations. But I remember what the Poet ob∣serves to fall out sometimes, namely, that,

Accedit fervor capiti numerus{que} lucernis.

It calls to my remembrance a story that Mr Bastard sometimes told my good friend D. Hoskins, it was of a neighbour that came to him complaining of a friend of his, that had lost all his five Senses; as for example, his sight and his seeing, and so pro∣ceeded in his amplification: with whom Mr Bastard as it were, condoling, answered, Though he had lost his fight, yet if he had retained his seeing, there had been some comfort. True Sir quoth the plain fellow. In like sort, I might say, that though our Doctrine in this poynt be Stoicall, yet if it were not infamous there were some comfort in it, but the heavy crimination laid to our charge is, that it is not only Sto∣icall, but infamous also. But let this be our comfort, that nothing herein is laid to our charg, which was not laid to the charg of Austin, many hundred years agoe. This Prosper testifies after Austins death, to have been the practice of the Pelagians. Prout sibi obnoxias aliquorum aures opportunas{que} repererint, scripta ejus quibus error Pelagianorum impugna∣tur, * 1.72 infamant, dicentes, eum liberum arbitrium peni••ùs submovere & sub gratiae nomine necessita∣tem praedicare fatalem. Neither was he free from this reproach while he lived, as ap∣pears by divers passages; as Contr. duas Epistol. Pelagiani. lib. 2. cap. 5. Sub nomine, inquiunt, gra••••ae ita fatum astruunt, ut dicant, quia nisi Deus invito & reluctanti homini in••piraverit boni & ipsius imperfecti cupiditatem, nec à malo declinare, nec bonum posset arripere. This is the objecti∣on; His Answer followeth in these words. Nec sub nomine gratiae Fatum asserimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi. Si autem quibusdam omnipotentis Dei vo∣luntatem placet Fati nomine nurcupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus, sed de ver∣bis contendere non amamus. And cap. 6. Fatum qui affirmant de syderum positione ad tempus quo concipitur quis{que} vel nascitur, quas Constellationes vocant, non solùm actus & eventa, veram etiam ipsas nostras voluntates pendere contendunt. Dei verò gratia non solùm omnia sydera & omnes caelos, utrum etiam omnes Angelos supergreditur. Deinde Fati assertores & bona & mala hominum Fato tribuunt. Deus autem in malis hominum meritis eorum debita retributione prosequitur; bona verò per indebitam gratiam misericordi voluntate largitur: utrum{que} faciens non per stellarum tempo∣rale consortium, sed per suae severitatis & bonitatis aeternum altum{que} consilium. Neutrum ergò per∣tinere videmus ad Fatum. And cap. 8. Iam de Gratia & Fato quàm inani alloquuntur ostendi∣mus. Nunc illud est quod debemus advertere, utrum invito & reluctanti homini Deus inspiret boni cupiditatem, ut jam non sit reluctans, non sit invitus, sed consentiens bono, & volens bonum. In like sort, the Pelagians charged Austin with Manicheisme, De Nupt. & Concupisc. lib. 2. cap. 3. to whom he answereth thus, Quid obtendis ad fallendum communis dogmatis tegmen, ut operias proprium crimen, unde vobis inditum est nomen, at{que} ut nefario vocabulo terras imperites, dicis, ne igitur vocentur Haeretici, fiant Manichaei. And more at large, Contr. duas Epist. Pe∣lag. ad Bonifacium, cap. 2. Manichaei dicunt Deum bonum non omnium natuarrum esse creatorem: Pelagiani dicunt, Deum non esse omnium aetatum in hominibus mundatorem, salvatorem, liberato∣rem. Catholica utros{que} redarguit, & contra Manichaeos defendens Dei creaturam ne ab illo insti∣tuta negetur ulla creatura; & contrà Pelagianos ut in omnibus aetatibus perdita requiratur humana natura.

2. Manichaei carnis concupiscentiam non tanquam accidens vitium, sed tanquam naturam ab aeternitate malam vituperant: Pelagiani eam tanquam nullum vitium sed naturale sit, bonum insu∣per laudant. Catholica utros{que} redarguit, Manichaeis dicens non natura, sed vitium est; Pelagianis dicens, Non à Patre, sed ex mundo est, ut eam velut malam valetudinem sanari utr••{que} permittant, desinendo illi tanquam insanabilem credere, isti tanquam laudabilem praedicare.

3. Manichaei negant, homini bono ex libro arbitrio fuisse initium mali; Pelagiani dicunt

etiam hominem malum sufficienter habere liberum arbitrium ad faciendum praeceptum bonum. Ca∣tholica utros{que} redarguit, & illis dicens, Fecit Deus hominem rectum; & istis dicens, si vos Filius liberaverit, verè liberi eritis.

4. Manichaei dicunt, animam particulam Dei, naturae malae commixtione habere peccatum; Pelagiani dicunt, animam justam non quidem particulam, sed creaturam Dei, etiam in istâ corrupti∣bili vitâ non habere peccatum. Catholica utros{que} redarguit, Manichaeis dicens, Aut facile arborem bonam, & fructum ejus bonum, aut facile arborem malam & fructum ejus malum; Pelagianis dicens, si dixerimus quia non habemus peccatum, nosmetipsos seducimus. His morbis inter se contrariis Manichaei Pelagiani{que} confligunt dissimili voluntate, simili vanitate, seperati opinione diversâ, sed propinqui mente perversâ. Iam verò gratiam Christi simul oppugnant, Baptismum ejus simul eva∣cuant, Carnem ejus simul inhonorant, sed etiam hoc modis causis{que} diversis. Nam Mani∣chaei meritis naturae bonae, Pelagiani autem meritis voluntatis bonae perhibent divini∣tus subveniri. Illi dicunt, debet hoc Deus laboribus membrorum suorum: Isti dicunt, debet hoc vir∣tutibus suorum. Utris{que} ergò merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum de∣bitum.

But come we to the consideration of the particulars delivered by this Author.

1. As touching the opinion of the Stoicks and Manichees. 2. As touching the Parallell he makes, between their opinion and ours, in the poynt of Pre∣destination.

1. The Chaldeans and Astrologers, did altogether place Fate, in the influencies of the starres, and because those glorious bodies, did infatuate the World with a shew of Divinity (which the Lord Laboured to prevent in the Jewes. Deutr. 4.) no marvail if the vulgar sort did acknowledge no other fate, but that. As Austin saith, De Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 1. Id (Fatum) homines quando audiunt usitatâ loquendi confuetudine non intelligunt, nisi vim positionis syderum, qualis est quando quis nascitur sive concipitur. But I doe not find that the Stoicks did thus distinguish, but by their Series Causarum, they comprehended all causes caelestiall or sublunary. Ramus indeed conceived such a difference be∣tween Possidonius and Chrysippus both Stoicks, but Turnebus makes bold to tell him, that herein he erred. Quod autem Possidonium dicis studio Astrologiae oblectatum, Fatum syde∣ribus attribuisse in eo peccas, quod aliam ejus quam Chrysippi sententiam putas, nec eam totam com∣plecteris. Nam si in simul aegrotantibus fratribus causam esse dicebat in syderum & caeli constitutio∣ne & affectione, non tamen idcircò in aliis rebus Fatum non esse judicabat. Nay he professeth that according to all the Stoicks, Fatum was God himselfe and nature; and that by Fatum they understood, omnem naturae contagionem, which was Cicero's phrase. As indeed the whole frame of nature is knit together per contactum, which Cicero called Naturae contagionem. And he proves as much of Possidonius out of Cicero De Divinatione. For Quintus therein professing according to the opinion of Possidonius, that all force and course of Divination, was derived from God, from destiny, and from nature, he con∣cludes therehence, that all kind of artificiall and naturall Divination, were in his o∣pinion comprehended under the notion of Fate. And out of Cicero's second Book of Divination shewes, that whereas Possidonius his opinion was, Vim quandam sentientem & divinam quae tota confusa sit mundo, ad hostiam deligendam ducere. He concludes thus; Satis ut opinor, significat Possidonium non in syderibus tantum Fatum posuisse, sed per omnem mundi con∣tinuationem & naturae conjunctionem, ordinem seriem{que} causarum permanare credidisse. Idem Pos∣sidonius (saith he) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 scripserat, quod non fecisset, si in syderibus tantum Fatum esse sensisset. And like as Possidonius did not insist only in the starres, for the confirmati∣on of Fate, so neither did Chrysippus in inferior causes. Necessitatem nature acutus interpres (he taxeth Ramus) ad Chrysippum pertinere astrorum ad Possidonium credidisti; errorem errore cu∣mulasti. Nam nec Possidonius in solis astris Fatum ponebat sed in totâ naturae contagione, ut suprà docui: & Chrysippus in eâdem naturae contagione, quâ etiam astra continentur, quod non intellexisti. And that he proves out of Cicero answering Chrysippus in this manner. Ut igitur ad quas∣dam res natura loci pertinet, ad quasdam autem nihil: sie affectio astrorum valeat, sivis ad quasdam res; ad omnes certè non valebit. Chrysippum enim alloquitur (saith Turnebus) ut vel puero notum est, ut me tui pudeat & pigeat, qui Possidonium intelligis. Thus he disciplines Ramus, and proceed farther, saying, Chrysippum autem in astrorum constitutione, & affectione Fatum po∣suisse, audi ex Cicerone; si quis, verbi causâ oriente Caniculâ natus est, is in mari non morietur. Vigila Chrysippe &c. Nihil istud argumentum (thus Turnebus concludes herehence) nisi e∣tiam in astris Fatum poneret. So that the foure opinions concerning Fate, related by Lu∣dovicus Vives in 4. lib. August. De Civit. Dei cap. 8. and that out of Picus Mirandula, lib. 2. Contra Astrologos; The first whereof is said to be Nature; The second, a Series of cau∣ses

necessary knit together, the Third the Starres, the Fourth the Execution of Divine Decree. I say all these make but one Fatum with the Stoicks, yea with all the Stoicks in the judgement of Turnebus. And Austin De Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 8. expresly includes the will of God within that Series of causes, which was accounted Fatum in the Opinion of the Stoicks, and upon that ground approves of it. As for necessitation by reason of disposition of the Matter Prime, whereby things were brought to passe in despite of God; I find no such thing, neither in Austin, nor in those that comment upon him, Ludovicus Vives and Coqueus, nor in Ramus or Turnebus; but rather to the contrary in Ludovicus Vives, who distinguisheth out of the opinion of Plato, as touching one God whom he made Principem Parentem{que} caeterorum; the Caeteri belike were such spirits as wee call Angells. And that Maximi Dei leges were inevitabiles, and this was called Neces∣sity, and such a Necessity, cui ne Deos quidem (that is inferior spirits) resistere posse. Quae verò ab Astris geruntur, talia interdum esse ut evitari sapientiâ, industriâ, labore queant, in quo sua est Fortuna. Quae verò certis causis progrederentur ac permanerent fixa, id dici Fatum quod ta∣men necessitatem non afferat electioni.

That the Manichees maintained two supreme and coëternall causes of all things, we read; the one the cause of Good, the other of Evill: and that every creature was a substantiall part of one or both; and that man in his nature was compounded of both, and that his corruption was essentiall from the supream Author of evill, and not such as acrewed to him of disobedience, We read. But of their opinion that all things were determined by them, both good, and evill, I no where read, but in this Authors Legend. Danaeus hath commented upon Austin de Haeresibus, and to every Head of Heresy draws what he hath read thereof in other Authors. But I find no men∣tion at all of this Article amongst 21 shamefull errours of theirs which he reckons up. The 19^th is this, Voluntatem malè agendi, quod vocant liberum arbitrium, nob is à naturâ ipsâ in∣sitam, non rebellione nostrâ accersitam, vel ex inobedientiâ natam; Quanquam homines propriâ vo∣luntate peccant. And where Austin answereth the criminations against the Catholiques made by the Pelagians, I find no mention at all of this. He should have shewed from whom he takes this, that understanding their Opinion aright, we might the better judge of the reproachfull comparison which he makes.

2 To the consideration of which comparison of his, I now addresse my selfe. He proposeth two things, one whereof he saith, must needs be maintained.

The First whereof is this; That all actions naturall and Morall, good and evill, and all e∣vents likewise, are absolutely necessary.

Concerning which, I say First; I have cause to doubt that this Author understands not aright, the very notions of absolute necessity, and necessity not absolute. There is no greater necessity, then necessity of nature. And this necessity is twofold; either in Essendo, in being, or in Operando, in working. God alone is necessary in being, and his being is absolutely necessary; it being impossible he should not be, as not only we be∣lieve, but Schoole Divines demonstrate, and that with great variety, of evident, and curious conclusions. As for the other necessity, which is in respect of operation: First, this is no way incident unto God, speaking of operation ad extrà, and secluding the mysterious emanations within the Divine Nature; such as are the Generation of the Sonne by the Father, and the wonderfull Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Fa∣ther and the Sonne. But ad extra this necessity of operation is only found in the crea∣ture, and that only in such creatures, as by necessity of nature are determined one way: as fire to burne; heavy things to move downwards, and light things upwards; the Sunne, Moone, and starres to give light; and the heavens to turne round; all natu∣rall Agents in a word distinct from rationall are thus determined, to wit, to work that, whereunto they are inclined by necessity of nature; but yet so that being finite, they are subject to superiour powers, and thereby obnoxious to impediment most of them, even to powers create; all of them to power increate. Whence it comes passe that no work of theirs is absolutely necessary, especially in respect of God, who can either set an end to all when he will, or restraine their operations at his pleasure. We know the Three Noble Children, when they came forth of the fiery oven, had not so much as any smell of the fire upon them. And therefore Durand professeth that these things which are commonly accounted to come to passe most necessarily, doe indeed come to passe meerely contingently, in respect of the will of God.

Neverthelesse we willingly professe, that upon supposition of the will of God, that this or that shall come to passe, it followeth necessarily that such a thing shall come

to passe; like as upon supposition, that God knowes such a thing shall come to passe, it followeth necessarily, that such a thing shall come to passe; but how? not necessa∣rily: but either necessarily according as some things are brought to passe by naturall agents, working necessarily after the manner aforesaid; or contingently and freely according as some things are brought to passe, by rationall agents, working contin∣gently and freely. And therefore as touching the Question of the Schooles about the root of contingency, Aquinas and Scotus concurre in resolving it into the Will of God, but with this difference; Scotus relates it into the will of God as a free agent. Aquinas resolves it into the Will of God, as an efficacious a∣gent. For the will of God is so efficacious, that he can effectually procure, both that things necessary shall be brought to passe necessarily, and things contingent, contin∣gently; and according he hath provided congruous causes hereof, to wit, both agents naturall for the produceing of necessary things necessarily, and agents rationall for the producing of contingent things, contingently and freely. Thus God preordai∣ned that Josias should burne the Prophets bones upon the Altar, that Cyrus should proclaim liberty to the Jewes, to returne into their Country; yet what sober Divine hath made doubt, whether Josias and Cyrus did not herein, that which they did free∣ly. And as in doing, so in abstaining from doing. For God ordained that Christs bones should not be broken; as also that when the Jewes, all the Males, came up to the Lord thrice in the year to Jerusalem, None of their neighbours should desire their land. Exod. 34. 24. Yet what sober man should make question, whether the Souldiers did non as freely abstaine from breaking Christs bones, as from ought else, and so likewise the bordering Nations did as freely abstaine, from invading the land of Israel. And how often is this phrase used in Scripture, Necesse est, of some things coming to passe, which yet came to passe as contingently and freely, as ought else. And unlesse this be granted, that Gods determination is nothing prejudiciall to the freedome of the creatures will, either we must deny faith and repentance to be the gifts of God, or that they are works produced freely, and so every action plea∣sing in the sight of God. For the Scripture expressely professeth, that God it is, who worketh in us every thing that is pleasing in his sight. And whatsoever God workes in us, or bestows upon us in time, the same he determined, to work in us, and to bestow upon us from everlasting. For he worketh all things according to the counsell of his will Ephes. 1. 11. and the counsell of his Will was everlasting, it being the same with God himselfe.

Now I come to the second.

2. And that is this. That all mens ends are unalterable and indetermina∣ble by the power of their Wills; and this he saith is upon the matter all one.

1. Now this is most untrue, there being a vast difference between the actions of men, and the ends of men; The ends of men being the works of God. And what a monster shall he be in the Church of God, that with Vorstius shall dare to affirme, that all the works of God, were not determined from everlasting; or be∣ing determined, they are alterable, and that in such sort, as to be otherwise deter∣minable by the wills of men; especially considering that the very acts of mens wills, being wrought by God, (as all sides now a daies confesse) it consequently followes that they were also determined from everlasting, by the Will and Counsell of God. What should I alleage the 11^th Article of Ireland for this? God from all e∣ternity did by his unchangeable Counsell ordaine, whatsoever in time should come to passe: yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. There is no Arminian that I know dares deny, either that every act of man is wrought by God, or that, look what God doth work in time, the same he did before all time decree, and that from everlasting. I know there is a main, and a most Atheisticall diffe∣rence between us on one part, but I doe not find them willing to shew their hornes directly therein, but carry the matter so, as if they would obtrude upon us the acknowledgement, either of the temporall (not eternall) condition of decrees divine, or at least of their alterable nature; whereas themselves dare not plainly manifest themselves, to be of any such Atheisticall beliefe. Let us instance in particular: Let the salvation of some, and damnation of others, be the ends this Author meaneth. Now dare any of them with o∣pen

face professe, that the salvation of the elect, and damnation of the repro∣bate was not from everlasting determined by God. Be the supream ends of God concerning man, the manifestation of his glory in the way of mercy on some, in the way of vindicative justice on others. Dare any of them professe, that any of these ends are not from everlasting determined by God; or being so determined, dare they professe, that these divine decrees are alterable, or possible to be undetermined by the will of the creature? What a prodigious assertion were either of these? If they dare not say, Gods will is changeable, What an unshamefac'd course is this, to obtrude upon us an alterable, that is, a changeable condition of Gods decrees? But perhaps you may say, here is no mention at all made of Gods decrees, but of mans ends. And I willingly confesse there is not. And I am perswaded, this Author dares not in plain termes professe, that Gods decrees are alterable. But hereby you may perceive, and have a manifest document of the illusions of Satan, and how mens carnall affections, which are more in love with errour then truth, doe make them to shut their eyes a∣gainst the one, and open them unto the other. It were a very harsh thing to say plainly, that Gods decrees are alterable, and that being determined by him, they might be undone, or made undetermined by the wills of men. There∣fore the Devill finds a means to draw us, to entertain the same blasphemous o∣pinion, not barefac'd, but hoodwickt as it were, and that is by changing the phrase. For though it be uncouth to heare of an alterable condition of Gods decrees, yet it seems nothing harsh to discourse of the alterable condition of mens ends. But give me leave to unmask the Witch, and make it appeare how the Devill gulls us in this.

Mens ends are either so called, as intended by man himselfe, or as ap∣poynted by God. If this Author speak of mens ends, as intended by man himselfe, wee willingly grant, that they are alterable at his pleasure; as for ex∣ample, Man intends one thing to day, he may intend another thing to mor∣row, he intends one thing this houre, he may intend another thing the next, and at his pleasure reverse his former intentions. And no marvail, considering that man partly is of a fickle disposition in respect of his affections, studious of change, and subject to innovation as the Moone; partly of an improvident di∣sposition, he knows not what a Yeare, what a Month, what a Day, what an houre may bring forth. And therefore though never so wise and constant in his courses, yet may he have just cause to change his resolutions and purposes. But of such ends of man, to wit, as intended by man, it is manifest this Author speaks not.

But of ends appointed by God, these be the ends he will have to be altera∣ble and determinable anew by the wills of men, which cannot be without the alteration and change of Gods purposes and intentions, which is as much as to say, without the change and revocation of Gods decrees. And an end not yet actual∣ly existing, but only in intention, can admit of no other alteration then in inten∣tion, which this Author considering not, though perhaps he abhorres to say Gods decrees are changeable and alterable, and shuts out so uncouth an assertion at the fore-doore, yet as it were by a back-doore to receive it in, and in the dark and muf∣led, or veyled only with a different phrase, a different expression; Yet forthwith he takes a new course; For whereas by the word unalterable, he did imply that Gods de∣crees concerning mens ends, should be of an alterable condition; in the words fol∣lowing he changeth his tone, and will not have the ends of man to be determined by God at all, but left unto man to be determined; as when he saith, In vaine is our free∣dome in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined. Whereby it is mani∣fest, he will not have the end whereunto men drive to be determined. And this end can be no other then salvation; for that alone I take to be that whereto men drive, and which they labour to attaine, every one naturally seeking after Summum bonum, after happinesse. So that in the issue it comes to this, The salvation of this Author is not yet determined by God, but left to be determined by his will, and that I take to be in the way of a moving cause, and that moving cause I guesse to be, his finall perseverance in faith and repentance, whereupon and not till then, shall this mans salvation be determined by God, as much as to say, that Gods decrees are as meerly temporall as are the executions of them. And herein this Author doth exactly agree with Doctor Jackson perhaps being so happy as to understand him, or perhaps being so happy as to light upon an interpreter of him

some one that breaths the same spirit of opposition to Gods truth, and that after the same way. For sometimes the Doctor pleads for a revocable condition of the divine decrees. For the Pope never bindes his hands by any Grant he makes; and why should God bind his hands by any decree he makes? especially considering that God hath more wisdome and goodnesse to manage such authority then the Pope. But if it be dishonesty for a man to take liberty to break his promises, I pray what goodnesse is required to the managing thereof? Yet that Doctor keeps his course in discoursing of an impotent immutability, and saith, it is indecent to attribute any such immuta∣bility unto God; whereas immutability is a notion which connotates no power of doing at all, but only a power of suffering, and formally denotes the negation there∣of. And what madnesse is it to say, that the lesse power God hath of receiving change, the lesse power he hath of working? Yet this is not all; He hath another device answerable to the latter course of this Author, and that is, that Nothing, con∣cerning any mans salvation or damnation, is determined by God before he is borne, or before his death: and to that purpose he saith that God is still decree∣ing, as if hitherto he had not decreed ought. And would you know of whom he lear∣ned this? Rogers in his exposition of the Articles of the Church of England, a Book de∣dicated to Arch-Bishop Bancroft, & allowed by the lawfull authority of the Church of England, writing upon the 17^th Article, and delivering his second proposition, collected there∣hence, in this forme, Predestination hath been from everlasting; when he comes to set forth the Adversaries of this truth, Those wrangling Sophisters, saith he, are deceived, who because God is not included within the compasse of any time, but hath all things to come as pre∣sent before his eyes, doe say, that God he did not in the time long agoe past only, but still in the time present likewise doth Predestinate.

2. Consider we the reason he gives for so shamefull an assertion, as touching the alterable condition of Gods decrees, or as touching the ends of men, as yet undeter∣mined by God, In vaine, saith he, is freedome in the actions, if the end which they drive at, be determined. Here, First, we have a wild phrase Freedome in actions. For by freedome we understand an active power of working after a certain manner, which power is found in the will, not in the actions. Secondly, a bare avouching that un∣lesse God as yet hath left the ends of men living undetermined, or in case he hath determined them, unlesse these determinations of his be alterable, Freedome of Will is given in vaine; as much as to say, unlesse we admit of such monstrous asserti∣ons, the freedome of mans Will is in vaine. But we say this consequence is most untrue, and we give our reason for it. For whether salvation or damnation be the ends he meaneth, no creature is capable of either, but only creatures rationall; and the one being bestowed by way of reward, and the other inflicted by way of punishment, each of these presupposeth freedome of Will in the parties thus procee∣ded with: Or whether the ends are the manifestation of Gods vindicative and remu∣nerative justice, for the same reason now specified, each of these doth necessarily be∣speak freedome of Will in them, who after either way are made uselesse on whom the glory of God is to be manifested. When he addes saying Omnis actio is propter sinem. This altogether concernes the ends intended, and proposed by the author of the acti∣on, nothing concernes the ends proposed by another. And the ends of a man propo∣sed by himselfe, are either supreame or intermediate, still every action deliberate (for so alone it holds) tends to one end or other, which man himselfe intends. The su∣pream end of every one is his chief good; but as touching that wherein this consists, all doe not agree. Some place it in wealth, some in pleasure, some in honour, some in virtuous life. By the light of Grace we are taught, that as we are creatures, our end, which we should propose unto our selves, is the glorifying of God our Crea∣tor, though there were neither reward nor punishment. But if there be a glorious reward to be gotten by it, and a dreadfull punishment to be suffered of them, that seek the satisfying of their own lusts, and not the glory of God, this is a double hedge unto us, to keep us in the good waies of the Lord, and to move us to make strait stepps unto him; but surely the end of the creature, still is the glorifying or God that made him. God makes it his care to provide for us, let our care be to glorify him; for seeing all things are from him, therefore all things must be for him; and seeing we are reasonable creatures, and know this we must goe on, in conforming our selves hereunto, and seeking his glory. And albeit this Author may conceive, that salvation is the end he aimes at, yet can I

not beleeve that he makes damnation the end that any man drives at. Nothing be∣ing fit to be a mans end, but that which hath rationem Boni, which surely damnation hath not.

3. His Annotations as touching the three Opinions proposed by him, come to be considered in the next place; and these are two.

1. The Substance and Formality of them, which, as he saith is an unavoidable∣nesse of mens actions and ends whatsoever they be. And in this, he saith, all of them agree, all holding that in all things, undeclinable Fates, and insuperable necessity doe domincere. Whereunto I answer, that this is contradictory to his own premises, as touching the third Opinion. For against the Maintainers of Gods absolute decree, he did formerly object only disjunctively, that either all mens actions were absolute∣ly necessary, that is unavoidable, or at least, that mens ends were unavoidable; which is to inferre, that but one of them is avoidable; but here he professeth (as upon that which he had formerly delivered) that by the Third Opinion, both mens actions and their ends were unavoidable. And as for the second Opinion of the Manichees, I find no mention of the unavoidable condition, either of mans actions or ends at all, in the Relation thereof, by those who have most studied their History. And as for the Stoicks, I no where find, that they denied the liberty of mens will, or that it was in mans power, either to forbeare the doing of that he doth, or to doe the things he forbears to doe; but rather the contrary, that they made choyce, some of them at least, (though Austin delivers it without any such distinction) to exempt the wills of men from subjection unto Fate: though I deny not, but that many vain discour∣ses might be differently entertained by them, having no better light to guide them, then the light of nature, and wanting that which God hath in great mercy vouch∣safed unto us, the light of grace, and that in very plentifull manner. Much lesse doe I find by them, that any thing came to passe, invito Deo. Though I willingly confesse, that such a generation hath risen up in these daies, affirming that God willeth and desireth the salvation of all men, and yet the greater part of men are damned. And what is to come to passe, invito Deo, if this be not, I willingly professe I know not.

But Melancthon, he saith, doth not spare to call this absolute decree, Fatum Stoicum, Tabulas Parcarum, and to charge the Church of Ceneva, with labouring to bring in the Stoicks er∣rours, as appears by Melancthons Epistle to Peucer, and Beza's confession in the life of Calvin. To all which I answer.

1. That this Author either was better read in Melancthon then in Luther, or no so just matter could he find in Luther, to cry down the absolute nature of Gods de∣crees.

2. Beza reports what Melancthon seems to some, and that Epistle of his to Peucer might be their ground. Now therein he delivers his mind meerly upon Laelius his re∣lation, which was this, De Stoico Fato us{que} adeò litem Genevae moveri, ut Quidam in carcerem conjectus sit propterea quod a ••••one differret. This I say is Laelius his relation made unto Me∣lancthon, whereupon Melancthon saith no more then this, O Mijera tempora! doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam disputationibus obscuratur.

3. Melancthon died foure years before Calvin, the one Anno 1560. the other 1564. And therefore if he did passe any censure on the Church of Geneva, it was in Calvins daies, many years before his death. Now Calvin and he were very great: Melancthon so well known and esteemed by Calvin, that more then once he appeals to Melancthons judgement. Once in the point De Caenâ Domini, mentioned by Osiander, Hist. Eccles. Cent. 16. Anno 1558. pag. 666. which was but two years before his death. Likewise in the poynt of Free-will and Predestination, as appears by Calvins Epistle unto him, prefixed to his Books, de Libero Arbitrio, which he sent unto Melancthon: Was it ever known that Melancthon passeth any censure upon them?

4. When Grotius in like manner objected Melancthon, see I pray how Lubbertus an∣swereth him, In Respon. ad Pietatem Grotii. Quod ad Melancthonem attinet, erras si ipsam sta∣re pro Remonstrantibus existimas, &c. Idem Melancthon in 9. ad Romanos, Cur inquit nos ad Evangelium vocavit & non vocavit Alexandrum Macedonem, Augustum, Socratem, Pomponium Atticum, qui non minus civilitèr vivebant quàm nos. Hic necesse est causam rejicere in voluntatem Dei. Et Jacob electus est, Esau reprobatus priusquam quicquam boni vel mali fecissent: Ergo ope∣ra non erant causa, sed voluntas vocantis. Non addam hic, quomodo cavillentur ista nonnulli. Tan∣tum hoc meminerit Lector, si opera secutura in vita erunt causa electionis, non licuit Apostolo dicere,

Non ex operibus. Ex his constat (sait Lubbertus) Melancthonem idem cum Calvino & Luthero de praedestinatione sensisle. Fatetur hoc ipse Melancthon ad Calvinum; suo (inquiens) haec cum tuis congruere, sed mea sunt 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & ad usum accommodata. Idem in Epistolâ ad Erasmum: Ego integrâ conscientiâ non possum Lutheri dogmata damnare. He proceeds farther to shew, the different Method used by them in delivering the doctrine of Praedestination. Calvi∣nus, saith he, à Priori docet, illos qui electi sunt, immutabili Dei consilio electos esse, at{que} inde in∣fert illos perire non posse. Melancthon verò a Posteriori docet, nos ex verâ fide & seriâ resipiscentiâ discere quòd sumus electi, Ego credo in Jesum Christum & seriò resipisco, ergo sum electus: at{que} ita in ipsâ re consentiunt. Hanc enim Melancthonis argumentationem approbat Calvinus, & illam Calvini approbat Melancthon, tantum abest, ut alter alterius doctrinam rejiciat aut contemnat.

5. When I observed this relation made out of an Epistle of Melancthons unto Cal∣vin, I could not rest satisfied untill I had seen the Epistle it selfe: at length I found it amongst Calvins, Epist. 49. Therein coming to the poynt, Ad Quaestionem (saith he) de praedestinatione habebam amicum Tubingae doctum hominem Franciscum Stadianum, qui dicere sole∣bat, se utrum{que} probare, Evenire omnia ut divina providentia decrevit, & tamen esse contingentia; sed se haec conciliare non posse. Here we have gotten one friend more then we looked for, and that a friend of Melancthons also: And to what end doth he make mention here∣of, but to give Calvin to understand, that with him at Tubing, there wanted not such as concurred with him in opinion, and that as touching the eveniency of all things, by the decree of Gods providence, which yet might well consist with Contingency, though we are not able to reconcile these, such is the mysterious nature of Gods pro∣vidence. And herein Stadianus agrees with Cajetan, and Alvarez. For Cajetan having professed that the distinctions devised by the Learned, for the reconciling of Gods predestination with the liberty of mans will, did not, quietare intellectum, thereupon he saith, Ego captivo meum in obsequium fidei; In quo (saith Alvarez) doctissimè & pi••ssimè loqui∣tur. Melancthon goes on to represent his carriage in Teaching, Ego, saith he, cùm Hypo∣thesin hanc teneam, Deum non esse causam peccati nec velle peccatum, posteà contingentiam in hâc nostrâ infirmitate judicii admitto, ut sciant rudes, Davidem suâ voluntate ultrò ruere & eundem sen∣tio, cum haberet spiritum sanctum, potuisse cum retinere; & in eâ lucta aliquam esse voluntatis actio∣nem. All these things he grants afterwards, to agree with the Doctrine of Calvin. But may not a man proceed farther? and to dispute hereof something more accurately then this, He denyes it not: Haec etiamsi subtilius disputari possunt, tamen ad regendas mentes hoc modo proposita, accommodata videntur. In the same manner he goes on, Accusemus ipsi no∣stram voluntatem cùm labimur, non quaeramus in Dei consilio causam & contra eum nos erigamus; sciamus Deum & velle opitulari & adesse luctantibus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (inquit Basilius) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Yet I presume no Arminian will conceive that Melancthon did not acknow∣ledge this very act of willing to be the work of God, considering the Apostle so ex∣pressely professeth, that God worketh in us both the Will and the deed, according to his good pleasure; and Leo Serm. 8. de Epiphan. Dubium non est hominem bona agentem ex Deo habere & effectum operis & initium volumatis: & Fulgentius Epist. 4. Ab ipso (Deo) est ini∣tium bonae voluntatis. And if Melancthon had any conceit opposite hereunto, yet let the Opinion of the Affrican Bishops prevaile in authority above Melancthon, who in their Synodicall Epistle write thus (as it is alleaged by our Divines Act. Synod. Dordrac. pag. 270) In vivificandis hominibus Deus nullum initium humanae voluntatis expectat sed ipsam vo∣luntatem, bonam faciendo, vivificat. And drawing to an end, I doe not write these things (saith Melancthon) to deliver dictates unto you, who are most learned and most ex∣pert in the exercises of Piety. And truly I know (saith he) that these things doe agree with yours, haec cum tuis congruere sed sunt 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, woven with a thicker thred, & ad usum accommodata Thus Melancthon unto Calvin, having received his Books sent unto him, and written of Free-will and Predestination.

5. Within two years after I find a Letter written by Calvin unto Melancthon, wherein he professeth his joy of their agreement, as touching the main poynt, in that whereabout their opinions were asked, albeit with some difference in certain particu∣lars, it is Epist. 63. amongst those of Calvins, and the words are these. Deo autem maximas gratias agere non desino, qui dedit ut in ejus quaestionis summâ de quâ rogati eramus, sen∣tentiae nostrae congruerent. Tametsi enim paululum est discriminis in particulis quibusdam, de re ta∣men ipsâ optime inter nos convenit.

The second Annotation of this Author is, the circumstance or the ground of the three opinions mentioned. The Stoicks deriving their necessity from the Starres or first matter; The Manichees from the two supream causes; And the Authors of the

third, from the peremptory decree of Almighty God. And that in this difference, the Stoicks and the Manichees have the better, it being better (as he saith) to derive the necessity of evill actions, or unhappy events, from an evill God, or from the course of nature, then from the decree of that God who is infinitely good. The sub∣stance of the opinion is all one, the ground wherein they differ, is but accidentall to the errour.

To this I answer.

1. Is it so indeed, Better to derive the necessity of unhappy events, from an evill God, or from course of nature, then from the decree of God? Is not God then to be accounted the author of evill in the way of punishment? Is there any evill in the Citty, and the Lord hath not done it? Or doth it lesse become him to be the author * 1.73 of affliction then of prosperity? Doth not the Lord in the same place, and in the same manner professe, that he delights in the execution of judgement, as well as of mercy?

2. As touching the necessity he speaks of, whether in good, or in evill actions; consider I pray his carriage, He did not object unto us, that we made all the actions of men absolutely necessary, but either so, or the ends of men unavoidable. Yet here he supposeth the former to serve his own turne in this present crimination, he holds it up, as it were contrary to his own conscience. We acknowledge the actions of men to be free, not one being performed by any, but in such sort, that they had power to forbear it, and still have to forbear the like: But upon supposition of Gods decree, either to work in us any thing, that is pleasing in his sight (which to be his gracious course, the Apostle expresly professeth, Heb. 13. 20.) or to permit any par∣ticular evill, we willingly professe, that as well upon this, as upon Gods foreknow∣ledge, it followeth consequently that necesse est, that such a thing come to passe; but how? not necessarily, but agreeable to the condition of our reasonable natures, con∣tingently and freely. And this Arminius in plain termes professeth in the poynt of e∣vill, to wit, supposing God permits a man to will this or that evill; Necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum, Exam. pag. 153. But I will farther display the doctrine of these Arminians, and prove, First, that no evill comes to passe, but that God did will it. Secondly, that never was there any greater necessity known to the World, then that which these men bring upon good and evill actions, a necessi∣ty that binds the Lord himselfe.

1. As touching the first; These words of Arminius are well known, Deus voluit A∣chabum mensuram scelerum sucrum implere. But I will prove it by their Doctrine of scientia Media: For hereby they maintain, that God foreseeth by what motives sinne will be hindered, or not hindered, without any prejudice to the liberty of the creatures will; As also that God in the storehouse of his wisdome, hath such store of morall impedi∣ments, as that he knows thereby, how to hinder any sinne if it pleased him. His words are these, Praeter illa sufficientia impedimenta, etiam efficacia habet in suo sapientiae & potentiae promptuario, quibus productis certò & infallibiliter peccatum impediretur. And this is the difference with him, between a sufficient impediment of sinne, and impediment effectuall. Effectuall is that upon the use whereof, he knows full well, that sinne will be hindered. Sufficient is that upon the use whereof, sinne will not be hindered, and this is known to the Lord from everlasting. Now let them tell me, why would not God make choyce to use such an impediment, which he knew would prove effectuall, but such rather, as he knew would prove ineffectuall. Doth it not manifestly appear hereby, that it is Gods will, that sinne shall come to passe by his permission? Like as the Scripture is expresse to this purpose, as where it is said, that Herod and Pontius Pi∣late with the Gentiles, and people of Israel were gathered together against the holy Sonne of God, to doe that which Gods hand, and his counsell, had foredetermined to be done. Now this is well known to have been no lesse then the ignominious handling and crucifying of the Sonne of God. Acts 4. 28. And Revel. 17. 17. God put into the hearts of the Kings to doe his will, and to give their Kingdomes to the Beast, as much as to say, to use their Regall power, to the supporting of Antichrist, which we know was in part by Massacring the Saints of God.

2. Now to discover the strange necessity, that these men bring in upon all things: It cannot be denied, but that God knoweth all future things, before they come to passe. Therefore they are presupposed to be future in order of reason before God, knows them to be future; therefore all things future, are either such by necessity of

nature, or by some cause; not by any cause, for if there were any cause hereof, to wit, to make them passe out of the condition of things meerly possible of their own nature, into the condition of things future, then this cause should be found either within God or without God. Not without God can any cause hereof be found. For this passage of things, out of the condition of things meerly possible, into the conditi∣on of things future, was from everlasting, therefore the cause hereof must have exi∣stence from everlasting. But nothing was everlasting, Extra Deum, out of God; Therefore if any cause hereof be to be found, it must be within God; otherwise it must be confessed, that all things became future by absolute necessity of nature. If to help this, they will devise something within the nature of God, to be the cause here∣of, let them tell us what that is. Not the Science of God, for all confesse, that se∣cluding the divine will, Gods knowledge is the cause of nothing. If they say, the will of God, they concurre with us in embracing the same Opinion, which they so much abhorre. Nothing remaines to fly unto, but the Essence of God; If they plead, that I demand, whether the Essence of God working freely, be the cause of the futurition of all things, or as working necessarily? If as working freely, that is as much as to confesse in expresse termes, that Gods will is the cause thereof: But if they say the di∣vine Essence is the cause hereof, as working necessarily, hence it followes, that all things good and evill come from God, as working by necessity of nature. See I pray and consider the abominable, and Atheisticall opinions, that these Arminians doe im∣providently cast themselves upon, when they stretch their witts to overthrow Gods providence, as it is carryed in the 11^th Article of Ireland, which is this, God from all Eternity, did by his unchangeable Counsell ordaine whatsoever in time should come to passe; yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor con∣tingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather.

In the Conclusion, that which he vaunts of, as touching the Fathers, is meer wind; for he gives you nothing but his word for it; which of what credit it deserves to be, I leave to the indifferent to judge. And as for the plucking up of the rootes of vertue which he fables of: Consider I pray, what Sect of Philosophers were ever known to be more vertuous then the Stoicks; and how was Zeno himselfe honoured by the A∣thenians, for his grave and vertuous conversation? Hath not Erasmus delivered it, as out of the mouth of Hierome, that Secta Stoicorum was Secta simillima Christianae? Yet I no where find, that they brought in any necessity, that was not subordinate to the Will of the supream God: But these Arminians bring in a necessity of nature from without God, to make him to doe this, or that, if he doth any thing; or at least, to make God himselfe a necessary Agent, devoyd of all liberty and freedome, contrary to that of Ambrose concerning the manner of Gods working, namely, that it is, Nullo necessitatis obsequio, but solo libertatis arbitrio. But according to these Divines it must be quite contrary, Nullo ••ibertatis arbitrio, solo necessitatis obsequio.

And thus much as touching the first sort of this Authors Reasons, which he ac∣counts only Inducing; I come to the other sort, which he esteemes con∣vincing.

Notes

• * 1.1

  2 Cor. 13. 5.
• * 1.2

  1 Cor. 11. 19. 2 Thes. 2. 10, 11.
• * 1.3

  Matth. 24. 24.
• * 1.4

  2 Thes. 2. 13.
• * 1.5

  August. de Praed. Sanct∣c. 3. Fidem elegit Deus in praescientia ut quem creditu∣rum esse prae∣scivit, ipsum eligeret cui Sp. sanctum daret ut bona ope∣rando vitam aeternam con∣sequeretur. Retract. lib. 1. cap. 23.
• * 1.6

  Apol. pro Con∣fes. Remonst. Fol. 95. p. 1.
• * 1.7

  Ezech. 18. 31
• * 1.8

  Revel. 17. 8. Revel. 13. 8.
• * 1.9

  Censura Cen∣surae.
• * 1.10

  2 Thes. 3.
• * 1.11

  Aquin. 1. q. 23. art. 5. Nullus fuit ita insanae mentis ut diceret me∣rita esse cau∣sam Divinae Praedestinati∣onis ex parte actus Praede∣stinantis.
• * 1.12

  Contr. Iulian. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 4.
• * 1.13

  Sueton. Edit. Lugd. 1532. pag. 171.
• * 1.14

  Ibid. p. 175.
• * 1.15

  L. 2. contra Iovin.
• * 1.16

  Prov. 24. 10.
• * 1.17

  De Grat. & lib. arbit. cap. 20.
• * 1.18

  Epist: 28.
• * 1.19

  Exam p. 157.
• * 1.20

  Zabarel. lib. 1. Post. Analyt. 182.
• * 1.21

  Lib. 1. ad Simpli. quest. 2.
• * 1.22

  Exam. p. 157. & 166.
• * 1.23

  Contr. Iulian. Pelag. l. 5. cap. 4.
• * 1.24

  De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. c. 21.
• * 1.25

  1 Pet. 2. 8.
• * 1.26

  Epist. 28.
• * 1.27

  Enchirid. cap. 95.
• * 1.28

  Ephes. 5. 8. 2 Timoth. 2. Acts 11. 18. Heb. 13. 20. Ezech. 30. 28
• * 1.29

  Collat. Hag. Brand. p. 37.
• * 1.30

  Act. Synodal. pag. 3. & 48.
• * 1.31

  August. de Ci∣vit. Dei. l. 12. c. 7.
• * 1.32

  Lib. 2. de A∣miss. grat. & statis peccati. c. 14.
• * 1.33

  Exam. p. 162.
• * 1.34

  Armin. Ex∣am. p. 157.
• * 1.35

  Rom. 9. 18.
• * 1.36

  Defens. Ar∣min. pag. 394.
• * 1.37

  The first Motive.
• * 1.38

  Lib. 3. Instit. c. 22. sect. 1.
• * 1.39

  Beza in Rom. 11. v. 37. Prosper in e∣pist. ad August.
• * 1.40

  Hier. ad Gal. cap. 1. 15. Idem ad cap. 1 Mal. Id. lib. 3. con∣tr. Pelag.
• * 1.41

  Synod. Arelat. 3a. contra Lucedum. Bin. Tom. 2. part. 2. fol. 639.
• * 1.42

  Bibl. l. 5. annot. 101.
• * 1.43

  De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. l. 6. c. 5.
• * 1.44

  Aug. de den. Persev. c. 19.
• * 1.45

  Rom. 9. 18.
• * 1.46

  De dono Per∣sev. 19.
• * 1.47

  Bellar. de grat. & lib. arbit. l. 6. c. 5.
• * 1.48

  Epist. lib. 7. epist. 3. De don. Pers. cap. 20.
• * 1.49

  Apolog: 2. adv. Ruffin.
• * 1.50

  Aug. de doctr. Christ. l. 3. c. 33.
• * 1.51

  Aug. de Praed. sanct. l. 1. cap. 14.
• * 1.52

  Hist. Pelag. lib. 7.
• * 1.53

  Of Providence
• * 1.54

  Praef. in Hist. Pelag.
• * 1.55

  2dò.
• * 1.56

  Beza in Col. Mompelg. pag. 375. Vide etiam O∣siander. Brand. Collog. Hagh. pag. 57.
• * 1.57

  Act. Syn. p. 1. pag. 133.
• * 1.58

  Psalm. 139. 23, 24, Ioh. 3. 20, 21.
• * 1.59

  Aug. de Den. Persev. c. 16.
• * 1.60

  The Doctor directs his speech unto S. Nathaniel Rich.
• * 1.61

  Rom. 9. 22.
• * 1.62

  John 8. 47.
• * 1.63

  2 Corinth. 6.
• * 1.64

  2. Tim. 2. 10.
• * 1.65

  Relat. pag. 194, 198.
• * 1.66

  Ostand. Hist. Eccles. pag. 1040. Colloq. Mom∣pelg. pag. 566, 567.
• * 1.67

  Hist. l. 5.
• * 1.68

  Annal.
• * 1.69

  1 Corinth. 4. 13.
• * 1.70

  Act. 20 2 Cor. 6. 4, 8.
• * 1.71

  Et illud fide amplectendum.
• * 1.72

  Prosp. Epist. ad Ruffin.
• * 1.73

  Amos 2. Ier. 9. 24.