The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...

DISCOURSE. The Fourth Motive. Its affinity with the old exploded and condemned Errours of the Stoicks and Manichees.

THe Opinion of the Stoicks was, that all actions and events were inevitable, and determi∣ned, either by the revolutions of the Heavens, and the qualities of the Starres, which raigne at mens births, or by the Concatenation of naturall things, and the disposition of the first matters of all things, being so put together from eternity, that one thing must needs follow another as it doth, and the Materia Prima being so disposed, that all things cannot suc∣cessively come to passe otherwise then they doe, but must of necessity be as they are, even invito Deo, though God would have some things to be otherwise then they be.

The Manichees held, that all mens actions, good or evill, were determined too: Good actions by a good God, who was the author of all good things created, and of all good actions that fell out in the World: Evill actions by an Evill God, who was the primum principium malt, the first and princi∣pall author of all evill things that were extant in the world.

The Maintainers of the absolute decree, doe say one of these two things; either that all actions na∣turall and morall, good and evill, and all events likewise are absolutely necessary, or that all mens ends (at least) are unalterable and undeterminable by the power of their wills, which is upon the matter all one. For in vain is our freedome in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined, sith, Omnis actio est propter finem, All actions are done for the ends sake, that it might be obtained by them, which without them could not.

Now in these three Opinions, we may note two things.

1. The substance and formality of them, which is an unavoidablenesse of mens actions and ends whatsoever they be; In this all of them agree and holding that in all things, undeclinable fates, and insuperable necessity doe domineere. And therefore Melancthon doth not slack in many of his com∣mon Places, to call this absolute decree, Fatum Stoicum, Tabulas Parcarum, and to charge the Church of Geneva (the great defender of it) with a labour to bring in the Stoicks errours, as we may see in a certain Epistle of Melancthons to Peucer, where he speaks thus, Scribit ad me Laetius de Stoico Fato us{que} adeo litem Genevae moveri, ut quidam in carcerem conjectus sit propterea quod à Zenone differret. O Misera Tem∣pora! Doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam dubitationibus obscuratur. And Beza too speaking of Melan∣cthon saies, Philippus de his rebus itascribere caeperat, ut Genevenses quasi Stoicorum Fatum invehentes nota∣re quibusdam videatur.

2. The Circumstances or the grounds of their Opinions. The Stoicks derive this necessity from the Starres or first matter, the Manichees from duo prima principia aeterna & coeterna, and these last from the peremptory decree of Almighty God, so that in this they differ, but in this difference, the Sto∣icks and the Manichees in some respects have the better. For it is better to derive the necessity of e∣vill actions, or unhappy events from an evill God, or from the course of nature, then from the decree of that God who is infinitely good. The substance of their Opinions is all one, the ground wherein they differ is but accidentall to their errour.

If it be so, for this very reason alone may this doctrine of absolute reprobation be suspected, be∣cause these dreams of the Stoicks were exploded by the best Philosophers of all sorts: and this of the Manichees was generally cryed down by the Fathers, not only as foolish, but as impious and unwor∣thy of entertainment in a Christian heart, or Christian Commonwealth, not so much for any thing circumstantiall in it, but because it made all things and events necessary, and so plucked up the roots of virtue, planted vice, and left no place for just rewards or punishments.

These are my Reasons of the first sort.

TWISSE Consideration.

OUR Doctrine I see is cryed downe, not only as infamous, but also as Stoi∣call, and Manichaicall. Now I had thought the infamy of it had consisted only in the Stoicality of it, and it is no way fit to coordinate the Genus with the Species, in multiplying criminations. But I remember what the Poet ob∣serves to fall out sometimes, namely, that,

Accedit fervor capiti numerus{que} lucernis.

It calls to my remembrance a story that Mr Bastard sometimes told my good friend D. Hoskins, it was of a neighbour that came to him complaining of a friend of his, that had lost all his five Senses; as for example, his sight and his seeing, and so pro∣ceeded in his amplification: with whom Mr Bastard as it were, condoling, answered, Though he had lost his fight, yet if he had retained his seeing, there had been some comfort. True Sir quoth the plain fellow. In like sort, I might say, that though our Doctrine in this poynt be Stoicall, yet if it were not infamous there were some comfort in it, but the heavy crimination laid to our charge is, that it is not only Sto∣icall, but infamous also. But let this be our comfort, that nothing herein is laid to our charg, which was not laid to the charg of Austin, many hundred years agoe. This Prosper testifies after Austins death, to have been the practice of the Pelagians. Prout sibi obnoxias aliquorum aures opportunas{que} repererint, scripta ejus quibus error Pelagianorum impugna∣tur, * 1.1 infamant, dicentes, eum liberum arbitrium peni••ùs submovere & sub gratiae nomine necessita∣tem praedicare fatalem. Neither was he free from this reproach while he lived, as ap∣pears by divers passages; as Contr. duas Epistol. Pelagiani. lib. 2. cap. 5. Sub nomine, inquiunt, gra••••ae ita fatum astruunt, ut dicant, quia nisi Deus invito & reluctanti homini in••piraverit boni & ipsius imperfecti cupiditatem, nec à malo declinare, nec bonum posset arripere. This is the objecti∣on; His Answer followeth in these words. Nec sub nomine gratiae Fatum asserimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi. Si autem quibusdam omnipotentis Dei vo∣luntatem placet Fati nomine nurcupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus, sed de ver∣bis contendere non amamus. And cap. 6. Fatum qui affirmant de syderum positione ad tempus quo concipitur quis{que} vel nascitur, quas Constellationes vocant, non solùm actus & eventa, veram etiam ipsas nostras voluntates pendere contendunt. Dei verò gratia non solùm omnia sydera & omnes caelos, utrum etiam omnes Angelos supergreditur. Deinde Fati assertores & bona & mala hominum Fato tribuunt. Deus autem in malis hominum meritis eorum debita retributione prosequitur; bona verò per indebitam gratiam misericordi voluntate largitur: utrum{que} faciens non per stellarum tempo∣rale consortium, sed per suae severitatis & bonitatis aeternum altum{que} consilium. Neutrum ergò per∣tinere videmus ad Fatum. And cap. 8. Iam de Gratia & Fato quàm inani alloquuntur ostendi∣mus. Nunc illud est quod debemus advertere, utrum invito & reluctanti homini Deus inspiret boni cupiditatem, ut jam non sit reluctans, non sit invitus, sed consentiens bono, & volens bonum. In like sort, the Pelagians charged Austin with Manicheisme, De Nupt. & Concupisc. lib. 2. cap. 3. to whom he answereth thus, Quid obtendis ad fallendum communis dogmatis tegmen, ut operias proprium crimen, unde vobis inditum est nomen, at{que} ut nefario vocabulo terras imperites, dicis, ne igitur vocentur Haeretici, fiant Manichaei. And more at large, Contr. duas Epist. Pe∣lag. ad Bonifacium, cap. 2. Manichaei dicunt Deum bonum non omnium natuarrum esse creatorem: Pelagiani dicunt, Deum non esse omnium aetatum in hominibus mundatorem, salvatorem, liberato∣rem. Catholica utros{que} redarguit, & contra Manichaeos defendens Dei creaturam ne ab illo insti∣tuta negetur ulla creatura; & contrà Pelagianos ut in omnibus aetatibus perdita requiratur humana natura.

2. Manichaei carnis concupiscentiam non tanquam accidens vitium, sed tanquam naturam ab aeternitate malam vituperant: Pelagiani eam tanquam nullum vitium sed naturale sit, bonum insu∣per laudant. Catholica utros{que} redarguit, Manichaeis dicens non natura, sed vitium est; Pelagianis dicens, Non à Patre, sed ex mundo est, ut eam velut malam valetudinem sanari utr••{que} permittant, desinendo illi tanquam insanabilem credere, isti tanquam laudabilem praedicare.

3. Manichaei negant, homini bono ex libro arbitrio fuisse initium mali; Pelagiani dicunt

etiam hominem malum sufficienter habere liberum arbitrium ad faciendum praeceptum bonum. Ca∣tholica utros{que} redarguit, & illis dicens, Fecit Deus hominem rectum; & istis dicens, si vos Filius liberaverit, verè liberi eritis.

4. Manichaei dicunt, animam particulam Dei, naturae malae commixtione habere peccatum; Pelagiani dicunt, animam justam non quidem particulam, sed creaturam Dei, etiam in istâ corrupti∣bili vitâ non habere peccatum. Catholica utros{que} redarguit, Manichaeis dicens, Aut facile arborem bonam, & fructum ejus bonum, aut facile arborem malam & fructum ejus malum; Pelagianis dicens, si dixerimus quia non habemus peccatum, nosmetipsos seducimus. His morbis inter se contrariis Manichaei Pelagiani{que} confligunt dissimili voluntate, simili vanitate, seperati opinione diversâ, sed propinqui mente perversâ. Iam verò gratiam Christi simul oppugnant, Baptismum ejus simul eva∣cuant, Carnem ejus simul inhonorant, sed etiam hoc modis causis{que} diversis. Nam Mani∣chaei meritis naturae bonae, Pelagiani autem meritis voluntatis bonae perhibent divini∣tus subveniri. Illi dicunt, debet hoc Deus laboribus membrorum suorum: Isti dicunt, debet hoc vir∣tutibus suorum. Utris{que} ergò merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum de∣bitum.

But come we to the consideration of the particulars delivered by this Author.

1. As touching the opinion of the Stoicks and Manichees. 2. As touching the Parallell he makes, between their opinion and ours, in the poynt of Pre∣destination.

1. The Chaldeans and Astrologers, did altogether place Fate, in the influencies of the starres, and because those glorious bodies, did infatuate the World with a shew of Divinity (which the Lord Laboured to prevent in the Jewes. Deutr. 4.) no marvail if the vulgar sort did acknowledge no other fate, but that. As Austin saith, De Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 1. Id (Fatum) homines quando audiunt usitatâ loquendi confuetudine non intelligunt, nisi vim positionis syderum, qualis est quando quis nascitur sive concipitur. But I doe not find that the Stoicks did thus distinguish, but by their Series Causarum, they comprehended all causes caelestiall or sublunary. Ramus indeed conceived such a difference be∣tween Possidonius and Chrysippus both Stoicks, but Turnebus makes bold to tell him, that herein he erred. Quod autem Possidonium dicis studio Astrologiae oblectatum, Fatum syde∣ribus attribuisse in eo peccas, quod aliam ejus quam Chrysippi sententiam putas, nec eam totam com∣plecteris. Nam si in simul aegrotantibus fratribus causam esse dicebat in syderum & caeli constitutio∣ne & affectione, non tamen idcircò in aliis rebus Fatum non esse judicabat. Nay he professeth that according to all the Stoicks, Fatum was God himselfe and nature; and that by Fatum they understood, omnem naturae contagionem, which was Cicero's phrase. As indeed the whole frame of nature is knit together per contactum, which Cicero called Naturae contagionem. And he proves as much of Possidonius out of Cicero De Divinatione. For Quintus therein professing according to the opinion of Possidonius, that all force and course of Divination, was derived from God, from destiny, and from nature, he con∣cludes therehence, that all kind of artificiall and naturall Divination, were in his o∣pinion comprehended under the notion of Fate. And out of Cicero's second Book of Divination shewes, that whereas Possidonius his opinion was, Vim quandam sentientem & divinam quae tota confusa sit mundo, ad hostiam deligendam ducere. He concludes thus; Satis ut opinor, significat Possidonium non in syderibus tantum Fatum posuisse, sed per omnem mundi con∣tinuationem & naturae conjunctionem, ordinem seriem{que} causarum permanare credidisse. Idem Pos∣sidonius (saith he) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 scripserat, quod non fecisset, si in syderibus tantum Fatum esse sensisset. And like as Possidonius did not insist only in the starres, for the confirmati∣on of Fate, so neither did Chrysippus in inferior causes. Necessitatem nature acutus interpres (he taxeth Ramus) ad Chrysippum pertinere astrorum ad Possidonium credidisti; errorem errore cu∣mulasti. Nam nec Possidonius in solis astris Fatum ponebat sed in totâ naturae contagione, ut suprà docui: & Chrysippus in eâdem naturae contagione, quâ etiam astra continentur, quod non intellexisti. And that he proves out of Cicero answering Chrysippus in this manner. Ut igitur ad quas∣dam res natura loci pertinet, ad quasdam autem nihil: sie affectio astrorum valeat, sivis ad quasdam res; ad omnes certè non valebit. Chrysippum enim alloquitur (saith Turnebus) ut vel puero notum est, ut me tui pudeat & pigeat, qui Possidonium intelligis. Thus he disciplines Ramus, and proceed farther, saying, Chrysippum autem in astrorum constitutione, & affectione Fatum po∣suisse, audi ex Cicerone; si quis, verbi causâ oriente Caniculâ natus est, is in mari non morietur. Vigila Chrysippe &c. Nihil istud argumentum (thus Turnebus concludes herehence) nisi e∣tiam in astris Fatum poneret. So that the foure opinions concerning Fate, related by Lu∣dovicus Vives in 4. lib. August. De Civit. Dei cap. 8. and that out of Picus Mirandula, lib. 2. Contra Astrologos; The first whereof is said to be Nature; The second, a Series of cau∣ses

necessary knit together, the Third the Starres, the Fourth the Execution of Divine Decree. I say all these make but one Fatum with the Stoicks, yea with all the Stoicks in the judgement of Turnebus. And Austin De Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 8. expresly includes the will of God within that Series of causes, which was accounted Fatum in the Opinion of the Stoicks, and upon that ground approves of it. As for necessitation by reason of disposition of the Matter Prime, whereby things were brought to passe in despite of God; I find no such thing, neither in Austin, nor in those that comment upon him, Ludovicus Vives and Coqueus, nor in Ramus or Turnebus; but rather to the contrary in Ludovicus Vives, who distinguisheth out of the opinion of Plato, as touching one God whom he made Principem Parentem{que} caeterorum; the Caeteri belike were such spirits as wee call Angells. And that Maximi Dei leges were inevitabiles, and this was called Neces∣sity, and such a Necessity, cui ne Deos quidem (that is inferior spirits) resistere posse. Quae verò ab Astris geruntur, talia interdum esse ut evitari sapientiâ, industriâ, labore queant, in quo sua est Fortuna. Quae verò certis causis progrederentur ac permanerent fixa, id dici Fatum quod ta∣men necessitatem non afferat electioni.

That the Manichees maintained two supreme and coëternall causes of all things, we read; the one the cause of Good, the other of Evill: and that every creature was a substantiall part of one or both; and that man in his nature was compounded of both, and that his corruption was essentiall from the supream Author of evill, and not such as acrewed to him of disobedience, We read. But of their opinion that all things were determined by them, both good, and evill, I no where read, but in this Authors Legend. Danaeus hath commented upon Austin de Haeresibus, and to every Head of Heresy draws what he hath read thereof in other Authors. But I find no men∣tion at all of this Article amongst 21 shamefull errours of theirs which he reckons up. The 19^th is this, Voluntatem malè agendi, quod vocant liberum arbitrium, nob is à naturâ ipsâ in∣sitam, non rebellione nostrâ accersitam, vel ex inobedientiâ natam; Quanquam homines propriâ vo∣luntate peccant. And where Austin answereth the criminations against the Catholiques made by the Pelagians, I find no mention at all of this. He should have shewed from whom he takes this, that understanding their Opinion aright, we might the better judge of the reproachfull comparison which he makes.

2 To the consideration of which comparison of his, I now addresse my selfe. He proposeth two things, one whereof he saith, must needs be maintained.

The First whereof is this; That all actions naturall and Morall, good and evill, and all e∣vents likewise, are absolutely necessary.

Concerning which, I say First; I have cause to doubt that this Author understands not aright, the very notions of absolute necessity, and necessity not absolute. There is no greater necessity, then necessity of nature. And this necessity is twofold; either in Essendo, in being, or in Operando, in working. God alone is necessary in being, and his being is absolutely necessary; it being impossible he should not be, as not only we be∣lieve, but Schoole Divines demonstrate, and that with great variety, of evident, and curious conclusions. As for the other necessity, which is in respect of operation: First, this is no way incident unto God, speaking of operation ad extrà, and secluding the mysterious emanations within the Divine Nature; such as are the Generation of the Sonne by the Father, and the wonderfull Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Fa∣ther and the Sonne. But ad extra this necessity of operation is only found in the crea∣ture, and that only in such creatures, as by necessity of nature are determined one way: as fire to burne; heavy things to move downwards, and light things upwards; the Sunne, Moone, and starres to give light; and the heavens to turne round; all natu∣rall Agents in a word distinct from rationall are thus determined, to wit, to work that, whereunto they are inclined by necessity of nature; but yet so that being finite, they are subject to superiour powers, and thereby obnoxious to impediment most of them, even to powers create; all of them to power increate. Whence it comes passe that no work of theirs is absolutely necessary, especially in respect of God, who can either set an end to all when he will, or restraine their operations at his pleasure. We know the Three Noble Children, when they came forth of the fiery oven, had not so much as any smell of the fire upon them. And therefore Durand professeth that these things which are commonly accounted to come to passe most necessarily, doe indeed come to passe meerely contingently, in respect of the will of God.

Neverthelesse we willingly professe, that upon supposition of the will of God, that this or that shall come to passe, it followeth necessarily that such a thing shall come

to passe; like as upon supposition, that God knowes such a thing shall come to passe, it followeth necessarily, that such a thing shall come to passe; but how? not necessa∣rily: but either necessarily according as some things are brought to passe by naturall agents, working necessarily after the manner aforesaid; or contingently and freely according as some things are brought to passe, by rationall agents, working contin∣gently and freely. And therefore as touching the Question of the Schooles about the root of contingency, Aquinas and Scotus concurre in resolving it into the Will of God, but with this difference; Scotus relates it into the will of God as a free agent. Aquinas resolves it into the Will of God, as an efficacious a∣gent. For the will of God is so efficacious, that he can effectually procure, both that things necessary shall be brought to passe necessarily, and things contingent, contin∣gently; and according he hath provided congruous causes hereof, to wit, both agents naturall for the produceing of necessary things necessarily, and agents rationall for the producing of contingent things, contingently and freely. Thus God preordai∣ned that Josias should burne the Prophets bones upon the Altar, that Cyrus should proclaim liberty to the Jewes, to returne into their Country; yet what sober Divine hath made doubt, whether Josias and Cyrus did not herein, that which they did free∣ly. And as in doing, so in abstaining from doing. For God ordained that Christs bones should not be broken; as also that when the Jewes, all the Males, came up to the Lord thrice in the year to Jerusalem, None of their neighbours should desire their land. Exod. 34. 24. Yet what sober man should make question, whether the Souldiers did non as freely abstaine from breaking Christs bones, as from ought else, and so likewise the bordering Nations did as freely abstaine, from invading the land of Israel. And how often is this phrase used in Scripture, Necesse est, of some things coming to passe, which yet came to passe as contingently and freely, as ought else. And unlesse this be granted, that Gods determination is nothing prejudiciall to the freedome of the creatures will, either we must deny faith and repentance to be the gifts of God, or that they are works produced freely, and so every action plea∣sing in the sight of God. For the Scripture expressely professeth, that God it is, who worketh in us every thing that is pleasing in his sight. And whatsoever God workes in us, or bestows upon us in time, the same he determined, to work in us, and to bestow upon us from everlasting. For he worketh all things according to the counsell of his will Ephes. 1. 11. and the counsell of his Will was everlasting, it being the same with God himselfe.

Now I come to the second.

2. And that is this. That all mens ends are unalterable and indetermina∣ble by the power of their Wills; and this he saith is upon the matter all one.

1. Now this is most untrue, there being a vast difference between the actions of men, and the ends of men; The ends of men being the works of God. And what a monster shall he be in the Church of God, that with Vorstius shall dare to affirme, that all the works of God, were not determined from everlasting; or be∣ing determined, they are alterable, and that in such sort, as to be otherwise deter∣minable by the wills of men; especially considering that the very acts of mens wills, being wrought by God, (as all sides now a daies confesse) it consequently followes that they were also determined from everlasting, by the Will and Counsell of God. What should I alleage the 11^th Article of Ireland for this? God from all e∣ternity did by his unchangeable Counsell ordaine, whatsoever in time should come to passe: yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. There is no Arminian that I know dares deny, either that every act of man is wrought by God, or that, look what God doth work in time, the same he did before all time decree, and that from everlasting. I know there is a main, and a most Atheisticall diffe∣rence between us on one part, but I doe not find them willing to shew their hornes directly therein, but carry the matter so, as if they would obtrude upon us the acknowledgement, either of the temporall (not eternall) condition of decrees divine, or at least of their alterable nature; whereas themselves dare not plainly manifest themselves, to be of any such Atheisticall beliefe. Let us instance in particular: Let the salvation of some, and damnation of others, be the ends this Author meaneth. Now dare any of them with o∣pen

face professe, that the salvation of the elect, and damnation of the repro∣bate was not from everlasting determined by God. Be the supream ends of God concerning man, the manifestation of his glory in the way of mercy on some, in the way of vindicative justice on others. Dare any of them professe, that any of these ends are not from everlasting determined by God; or being so determined, dare they professe, that these divine decrees are alterable, or possible to be undetermined by the will of the creature? What a prodigious assertion were either of these? If they dare not say, Gods will is changeable, What an unshamefac'd course is this, to obtrude upon us an alterable, that is, a changeable condition of Gods decrees? But perhaps you may say, here is no mention at all made of Gods decrees, but of mans ends. And I willingly confesse there is not. And I am perswaded, this Author dares not in plain termes professe, that Gods decrees are alterable. But hereby you may perceive, and have a manifest document of the illusions of Satan, and how mens carnall affections, which are more in love with errour then truth, doe make them to shut their eyes a∣gainst the one, and open them unto the other. It were a very harsh thing to say plainly, that Gods decrees are alterable, and that being determined by him, they might be undone, or made undetermined by the wills of men. There∣fore the Devill finds a means to draw us, to entertain the same blasphemous o∣pinion, not barefac'd, but hoodwickt as it were, and that is by changing the phrase. For though it be uncouth to heare of an alterable condition of Gods decrees, yet it seems nothing harsh to discourse of the alterable condition of mens ends. But give me leave to unmask the Witch, and make it appeare how the Devill gulls us in this.

Mens ends are either so called, as intended by man himselfe, or as ap∣poynted by God. If this Author speak of mens ends, as intended by man himselfe, wee willingly grant, that they are alterable at his pleasure; as for ex∣ample, Man intends one thing to day, he may intend another thing to mor∣row, he intends one thing this houre, he may intend another thing the next, and at his pleasure reverse his former intentions. And no marvail, considering that man partly is of a fickle disposition in respect of his affections, studious of change, and subject to innovation as the Moone; partly of an improvident di∣sposition, he knows not what a Yeare, what a Month, what a Day, what an houre may bring forth. And therefore though never so wise and constant in his courses, yet may he have just cause to change his resolutions and purposes. But of such ends of man, to wit, as intended by man, it is manifest this Author speaks not.

But of ends appointed by God, these be the ends he will have to be altera∣ble and determinable anew by the wills of men, which cannot be without the alteration and change of Gods purposes and intentions, which is as much as to say, without the change and revocation of Gods decrees. And an end not yet actual∣ly existing, but only in intention, can admit of no other alteration then in inten∣tion, which this Author considering not, though perhaps he abhorres to say Gods decrees are changeable and alterable, and shuts out so uncouth an assertion at the fore-doore, yet as it were by a back-doore to receive it in, and in the dark and muf∣led, or veyled only with a different phrase, a different expression; Yet forthwith he takes a new course; For whereas by the word unalterable, he did imply that Gods de∣crees concerning mens ends, should be of an alterable condition; in the words fol∣lowing he changeth his tone, and will not have the ends of man to be determined by God at all, but left unto man to be determined; as when he saith, In vaine is our free∣dome in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined. Whereby it is mani∣fest, he will not have the end whereunto men drive to be determined. And this end can be no other then salvation; for that alone I take to be that whereto men drive, and which they labour to attaine, every one naturally seeking after Summum bonum, after happinesse. So that in the issue it comes to this, The salvation of this Author is not yet determined by God, but left to be determined by his will, and that I take to be in the way of a moving cause, and that moving cause I guesse to be, his finall perseverance in faith and repentance, whereupon and not till then, shall this mans salvation be determined by God, as much as to say, that Gods decrees are as meerly temporall as are the executions of them. And herein this Author doth exactly agree with Doctor Jackson perhaps being so happy as to understand him, or perhaps being so happy as to light upon an interpreter of him

some one that breaths the same spirit of opposition to Gods truth, and that after the same way. For sometimes the Doctor pleads for a revocable condition of the divine decrees. For the Pope never bindes his hands by any Grant he makes; and why should God bind his hands by any decree he makes? especially considering that God hath more wisdome and goodnesse to manage such authority then the Pope. But if it be dishonesty for a man to take liberty to break his promises, I pray what goodnesse is required to the managing thereof? Yet that Doctor keeps his course in discoursing of an impotent immutability, and saith, it is indecent to attribute any such immuta∣bility unto God; whereas immutability is a notion which connotates no power of doing at all, but only a power of suffering, and formally denotes the negation there∣of. And what madnesse is it to say, that the lesse power God hath of receiving change, the lesse power he hath of working? Yet this is not all; He hath another device answerable to the latter course of this Author, and that is, that Nothing, con∣cerning any mans salvation or damnation, is determined by God before he is borne, or before his death: and to that purpose he saith that God is still decree∣ing, as if hitherto he had not decreed ought. And would you know of whom he lear∣ned this? Rogers in his exposition of the Articles of the Church of England, a Book de∣dicated to Arch-Bishop Bancroft, & allowed by the lawfull authority of the Church of England, writing upon the 17^th Article, and delivering his second proposition, collected there∣hence, in this forme, Predestination hath been from everlasting; when he comes to set forth the Adversaries of this truth, Those wrangling Sophisters, saith he, are deceived, who because God is not included within the compasse of any time, but hath all things to come as pre∣sent before his eyes, doe say, that God he did not in the time long agoe past only, but still in the time present likewise doth Predestinate.

2. Consider we the reason he gives for so shamefull an assertion, as touching the alterable condition of Gods decrees, or as touching the ends of men, as yet undeter∣mined by God, In vaine, saith he, is freedome in the actions, if the end which they drive at, be determined. Here, First, we have a wild phrase Freedome in actions. For by freedome we understand an active power of working after a certain manner, which power is found in the will, not in the actions. Secondly, a bare avouching that un∣lesse God as yet hath left the ends of men living undetermined, or in case he hath determined them, unlesse these determinations of his be alterable, Freedome of Will is given in vaine; as much as to say, unlesse we admit of such monstrous asserti∣ons, the freedome of mans Will is in vaine. But we say this consequence is most untrue, and we give our reason for it. For whether salvation or damnation be the ends he meaneth, no creature is capable of either, but only creatures rationall; and the one being bestowed by way of reward, and the other inflicted by way of punishment, each of these presupposeth freedome of Will in the parties thus procee∣ded with: Or whether the ends are the manifestation of Gods vindicative and remu∣nerative justice, for the same reason now specified, each of these doth necessarily be∣speak freedome of Will in them, who after either way are made uselesse on whom the glory of God is to be manifested. When he addes saying Omnis actio is propter sinem. This altogether concernes the ends intended, and proposed by the author of the acti∣on, nothing concernes the ends proposed by another. And the ends of a man propo∣sed by himselfe, are either supreame or intermediate, still every action deliberate (for so alone it holds) tends to one end or other, which man himselfe intends. The su∣pream end of every one is his chief good; but as touching that wherein this consists, all doe not agree. Some place it in wealth, some in pleasure, some in honour, some in virtuous life. By the light of Grace we are taught, that as we are creatures, our end, which we should propose unto our selves, is the glorifying of God our Crea∣tor, though there were neither reward nor punishment. But if there be a glorious reward to be gotten by it, and a dreadfull punishment to be suffered of them, that seek the satisfying of their own lusts, and not the glory of God, this is a double hedge unto us, to keep us in the good waies of the Lord, and to move us to make strait stepps unto him; but surely the end of the creature, still is the glorifying or God that made him. God makes it his care to provide for us, let our care be to glorify him; for seeing all things are from him, therefore all things must be for him; and seeing we are reasonable creatures, and know this we must goe on, in conforming our selves hereunto, and seeking his glory. And albeit this Author may conceive, that salvation is the end he aimes at, yet can I

not beleeve that he makes damnation the end that any man drives at. Nothing be∣ing fit to be a mans end, but that which hath rationem Boni, which surely damnation hath not.

3. His Annotations as touching the three Opinions proposed by him, come to be considered in the next place; and these are two.

1. The Substance and Formality of them, which, as he saith is an unavoidable∣nesse of mens actions and ends whatsoever they be. And in this, he saith, all of them agree, all holding that in all things, undeclinable Fates, and insuperable necessity doe domincere. Whereunto I answer, that this is contradictory to his own premises, as touching the third Opinion. For against the Maintainers of Gods absolute decree, he did formerly object only disjunctively, that either all mens actions were absolute∣ly necessary, that is unavoidable, or at least, that mens ends were unavoidable; which is to inferre, that but one of them is avoidable; but here he professeth (as upon that which he had formerly delivered) that by the Third Opinion, both mens actions and their ends were unavoidable. And as for the second Opinion of the Manichees, I find no mention of the unavoidable condition, either of mans actions or ends at all, in the Relation thereof, by those who have most studied their History. And as for the Stoicks, I no where find, that they denied the liberty of mens will, or that it was in mans power, either to forbeare the doing of that he doth, or to doe the things he forbears to doe; but rather the contrary, that they made choyce, some of them at least, (though Austin delivers it without any such distinction) to exempt the wills of men from subjection unto Fate: though I deny not, but that many vain discour∣ses might be differently entertained by them, having no better light to guide them, then the light of nature, and wanting that which God hath in great mercy vouch∣safed unto us, the light of grace, and that in very plentifull manner. Much lesse doe I find by them, that any thing came to passe, invito Deo. Though I willingly confesse, that such a generation hath risen up in these daies, affirming that God willeth and desireth the salvation of all men, and yet the greater part of men are damned. And what is to come to passe, invito Deo, if this be not, I willingly professe I know not.

But Melancthon, he saith, doth not spare to call this absolute decree, Fatum Stoicum, Tabulas Parcarum, and to charge the Church of Ceneva, with labouring to bring in the Stoicks er∣rours, as appears by Melancthons Epistle to Peucer, and Beza's confession in the life of Calvin. To all which I answer.

1. That this Author either was better read in Melancthon then in Luther, or no so just matter could he find in Luther, to cry down the absolute nature of Gods de∣crees.

2. Beza reports what Melancthon seems to some, and that Epistle of his to Peucer might be their ground. Now therein he delivers his mind meerly upon Laelius his re∣lation, which was this, De Stoico Fato us{que} adeò litem Genevae moveri, ut Quidam in carcerem conjectus sit propterea quod a ••••one differret. This I say is Laelius his relation made unto Me∣lancthon, whereupon Melancthon saith no more then this, O Mijera tempora! doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam disputationibus obscuratur.

3. Melancthon died foure years before Calvin, the one Anno 1560. the other 1564. And therefore if he did passe any censure on the Church of Geneva, it was in Calvins daies, many years before his death. Now Calvin and he were very great: Melancthon so well known and esteemed by Calvin, that more then once he appeals to Melancthons judgement. Once in the point De Caenâ Domini, mentioned by Osiander, Hist. Eccles. Cent. 16. Anno 1558. pag. 666. which was but two years before his death. Likewise in the poynt of Free-will and Predestination, as appears by Calvins Epistle unto him, prefixed to his Books, de Libero Arbitrio, which he sent unto Melancthon: Was it ever known that Melancthon passeth any censure upon them?

4. When Grotius in like manner objected Melancthon, see I pray how Lubbertus an∣swereth him, In Respon. ad Pietatem Grotii. Quod ad Melancthonem attinet, erras si ipsam sta∣re pro Remonstrantibus existimas, &c. Idem Melancthon in 9. ad Romanos, Cur inquit nos ad Evangelium vocavit & non vocavit Alexandrum Macedonem, Augustum, Socratem, Pomponium Atticum, qui non minus civilitèr vivebant quàm nos. Hic necesse est causam rejicere in voluntatem Dei. Et Jacob electus est, Esau reprobatus priusquam quicquam boni vel mali fecissent: Ergo ope∣ra non erant causa, sed voluntas vocantis. Non addam hic, quomodo cavillentur ista nonnulli. Tan∣tum hoc meminerit Lector, si opera secutura in vita erunt causa electionis, non licuit Apostolo dicere,

Non ex operibus. Ex his constat (sait Lubbertus) Melancthonem idem cum Calvino & Luthero de praedestinatione sensisle. Fatetur hoc ipse Melancthon ad Calvinum; suo (inquiens) haec cum tuis congruere, sed mea sunt 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & ad usum accommodata. Idem in Epistolâ ad Erasmum: Ego integrâ conscientiâ non possum Lutheri dogmata damnare. He proceeds farther to shew, the different Method used by them in delivering the doctrine of Praedestination. Calvi∣nus, saith he, à Priori docet, illos qui electi sunt, immutabili Dei consilio electos esse, at{que} inde in∣fert illos perire non posse. Melancthon verò a Posteriori docet, nos ex verâ fide & seriâ resipiscentiâ discere quòd sumus electi, Ego credo in Jesum Christum & seriò resipisco, ergo sum electus: at{que} ita in ipsâ re consentiunt. Hanc enim Melancthonis argumentationem approbat Calvinus, & illam Calvini approbat Melancthon, tantum abest, ut alter alterius doctrinam rejiciat aut contemnat.

5. When I observed this relation made out of an Epistle of Melancthons unto Cal∣vin, I could not rest satisfied untill I had seen the Epistle it selfe: at length I found it amongst Calvins, Epist. 49. Therein coming to the poynt, Ad Quaestionem (saith he) de praedestinatione habebam amicum Tubingae doctum hominem Franciscum Stadianum, qui dicere sole∣bat, se utrum{que} probare, Evenire omnia ut divina providentia decrevit, & tamen esse contingentia; sed se haec conciliare non posse. Here we have gotten one friend more then we looked for, and that a friend of Melancthons also: And to what end doth he make mention here∣of, but to give Calvin to understand, that with him at Tubing, there wanted not such as concurred with him in opinion, and that as touching the eveniency of all things, by the decree of Gods providence, which yet might well consist with Contingency, though we are not able to reconcile these, such is the mysterious nature of Gods pro∣vidence. And herein Stadianus agrees with Cajetan, and Alvarez. For Cajetan having professed that the distinctions devised by the Learned, for the reconciling of Gods predestination with the liberty of mans will, did not, quietare intellectum, thereupon he saith, Ego captivo meum in obsequium fidei; In quo (saith Alvarez) doctissimè & pi••ssimè loqui∣tur. Melancthon goes on to represent his carriage in Teaching, Ego, saith he, cùm Hypo∣thesin hanc teneam, Deum non esse causam peccati nec velle peccatum, posteà contingentiam in hâc nostrâ infirmitate judicii admitto, ut sciant rudes, Davidem suâ voluntate ultrò ruere & eundem sen∣tio, cum haberet spiritum sanctum, potuisse cum retinere; & in eâ lucta aliquam esse voluntatis actio∣nem. All these things he grants afterwards, to agree with the Doctrine of Calvin. But may not a man proceed farther? and to dispute hereof something more accurately then this, He denyes it not: Haec etiamsi subtilius disputari possunt, tamen ad regendas mentes hoc modo proposita, accommodata videntur. In the same manner he goes on, Accusemus ipsi no∣stram voluntatem cùm labimur, non quaeramus in Dei consilio causam & contra eum nos erigamus; sciamus Deum & velle opitulari & adesse luctantibus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (inquit Basilius) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Yet I presume no Arminian will conceive that Melancthon did not acknow∣ledge this very act of willing to be the work of God, considering the Apostle so ex∣pressely professeth, that God worketh in us both the Will and the deed, according to his good pleasure; and Leo Serm. 8. de Epiphan. Dubium non est hominem bona agentem ex Deo habere & effectum operis & initium volumatis: & Fulgentius Epist. 4. Ab ipso (Deo) est ini∣tium bonae voluntatis. And if Melancthon had any conceit opposite hereunto, yet let the Opinion of the Affrican Bishops prevaile in authority above Melancthon, who in their Synodicall Epistle write thus (as it is alleaged by our Divines Act. Synod. Dordrac. pag. 270) In vivificandis hominibus Deus nullum initium humanae voluntatis expectat sed ipsam vo∣luntatem, bonam faciendo, vivificat. And drawing to an end, I doe not write these things (saith Melancthon) to deliver dictates unto you, who are most learned and most ex∣pert in the exercises of Piety. And truly I know (saith he) that these things doe agree with yours, haec cum tuis congruere sed sunt 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, woven with a thicker thred, & ad usum accommodata Thus Melancthon unto Calvin, having received his Books sent unto him, and written of Free-will and Predestination.

5. Within two years after I find a Letter written by Calvin unto Melancthon, wherein he professeth his joy of their agreement, as touching the main poynt, in that whereabout their opinions were asked, albeit with some difference in certain particu∣lars, it is Epist. 63. amongst those of Calvins, and the words are these. Deo autem maximas gratias agere non desino, qui dedit ut in ejus quaestionis summâ de quâ rogati eramus, sen∣tentiae nostrae congruerent. Tametsi enim paululum est discriminis in particulis quibusdam, de re ta∣men ipsâ optime inter nos convenit.

The second Annotation of this Author is, the circumstance or the ground of the three opinions mentioned. The Stoicks deriving their necessity from the Starres or first matter; The Manichees from the two supream causes; And the Authors of the

third, from the peremptory decree of Almighty God. And that in this difference, the Stoicks and the Manichees have the better, it being better (as he saith) to derive the necessity of evill actions, or unhappy events, from an evill God, or from the course of nature, then from the decree of that God who is infinitely good. The sub∣stance of the opinion is all one, the ground wherein they differ, is but accidentall to the errour.

To this I answer.

1. Is it so indeed, Better to derive the necessity of unhappy events, from an evill God, or from course of nature, then from the decree of God? Is not God then to be accounted the author of evill in the way of punishment? Is there any evill in the Citty, and the Lord hath not done it? Or doth it lesse become him to be the author * 1.2 of affliction then of prosperity? Doth not the Lord in the same place, and in the same manner professe, that he delights in the execution of judgement, as well as of mercy?

2. As touching the necessity he speaks of, whether in good, or in evill actions; consider I pray his carriage, He did not object unto us, that we made all the actions of men absolutely necessary, but either so, or the ends of men unavoidable. Yet here he supposeth the former to serve his own turne in this present crimination, he holds it up, as it were contrary to his own conscience. We acknowledge the actions of men to be free, not one being performed by any, but in such sort, that they had power to forbear it, and still have to forbear the like: But upon supposition of Gods decree, either to work in us any thing, that is pleasing in his sight (which to be his gracious course, the Apostle expresly professeth, Heb. 13. 20.) or to permit any par∣ticular evill, we willingly professe, that as well upon this, as upon Gods foreknow∣ledge, it followeth consequently that necesse est, that such a thing come to passe; but how? not necessarily, but agreeable to the condition of our reasonable natures, con∣tingently and freely. And this Arminius in plain termes professeth in the poynt of e∣vill, to wit, supposing God permits a man to will this or that evill; Necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum, Exam. pag. 153. But I will farther display the doctrine of these Arminians, and prove, First, that no evill comes to passe, but that God did will it. Secondly, that never was there any greater necessity known to the World, then that which these men bring upon good and evill actions, a necessi∣ty that binds the Lord himselfe.

1. As touching the first; These words of Arminius are well known, Deus voluit A∣chabum mensuram scelerum sucrum implere. But I will prove it by their Doctrine of scientia Media: For hereby they maintain, that God foreseeth by what motives sinne will be hindered, or not hindered, without any prejudice to the liberty of the creatures will; As also that God in the storehouse of his wisdome, hath such store of morall impedi∣ments, as that he knows thereby, how to hinder any sinne if it pleased him. His words are these, Praeter illa sufficientia impedimenta, etiam efficacia habet in suo sapientiae & potentiae promptuario, quibus productis certò & infallibiliter peccatum impediretur. And this is the difference with him, between a sufficient impediment of sinne, and impediment effectuall. Effectuall is that upon the use whereof, he knows full well, that sinne will be hindered. Sufficient is that upon the use whereof, sinne will not be hindered, and this is known to the Lord from everlasting. Now let them tell me, why would not God make choyce to use such an impediment, which he knew would prove effectuall, but such rather, as he knew would prove ineffectuall. Doth it not manifestly appear hereby, that it is Gods will, that sinne shall come to passe by his permission? Like as the Scripture is expresse to this purpose, as where it is said, that Herod and Pontius Pi∣late with the Gentiles, and people of Israel were gathered together against the holy Sonne of God, to doe that which Gods hand, and his counsell, had foredetermined to be done. Now this is well known to have been no lesse then the ignominious handling and crucifying of the Sonne of God. Acts 4. 28. And Revel. 17. 17. God put into the hearts of the Kings to doe his will, and to give their Kingdomes to the Beast, as much as to say, to use their Regall power, to the supporting of Antichrist, which we know was in part by Massacring the Saints of God.

2. Now to discover the strange necessity, that these men bring in upon all things: It cannot be denied, but that God knoweth all future things, before they come to passe. Therefore they are presupposed to be future in order of reason before God, knows them to be future; therefore all things future, are either such by necessity of

nature, or by some cause; not by any cause, for if there were any cause hereof, to wit, to make them passe out of the condition of things meerly possible of their own nature, into the condition of things future, then this cause should be found either within God or without God. Not without God can any cause hereof be found. For this passage of things, out of the condition of things meerly possible, into the conditi∣on of things future, was from everlasting, therefore the cause hereof must have exi∣stence from everlasting. But nothing was everlasting, Extra Deum, out of God; Therefore if any cause hereof be to be found, it must be within God; otherwise it must be confessed, that all things became future by absolute necessity of nature. If to help this, they will devise something within the nature of God, to be the cause here∣of, let them tell us what that is. Not the Science of God, for all confesse, that se∣cluding the divine will, Gods knowledge is the cause of nothing. If they say, the will of God, they concurre with us in embracing the same Opinion, which they so much abhorre. Nothing remaines to fly unto, but the Essence of God; If they plead, that I demand, whether the Essence of God working freely, be the cause of the futurition of all things, or as working necessarily? If as working freely, that is as much as to confesse in expresse termes, that Gods will is the cause thereof: But if they say the di∣vine Essence is the cause hereof, as working necessarily, hence it followes, that all things good and evill come from God, as working by necessity of nature. See I pray and consider the abominable, and Atheisticall opinions, that these Arminians doe im∣providently cast themselves upon, when they stretch their witts to overthrow Gods providence, as it is carryed in the 11^th Article of Ireland, which is this, God from all Eternity, did by his unchangeable Counsell ordaine whatsoever in time should come to passe; yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor con∣tingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather.

In the Conclusion, that which he vaunts of, as touching the Fathers, is meer wind; for he gives you nothing but his word for it; which of what credit it deserves to be, I leave to the indifferent to judge. And as for the plucking up of the rootes of vertue which he fables of: Consider I pray, what Sect of Philosophers were ever known to be more vertuous then the Stoicks; and how was Zeno himselfe honoured by the A∣thenians, for his grave and vertuous conversation? Hath not Erasmus delivered it, as out of the mouth of Hierome, that Secta Stoicorum was Secta simillima Christianae? Yet I no where find, that they brought in any necessity, that was not subordinate to the Will of the supream God: But these Arminians bring in a necessity of nature from without God, to make him to doe this, or that, if he doth any thing; or at least, to make God himselfe a necessary Agent, devoyd of all liberty and freedome, contrary to that of Ambrose concerning the manner of Gods working, namely, that it is, Nullo necessitatis obsequio, but solo libertatis arbitrio. But according to these Divines it must be quite contrary, Nullo ••ibertatis arbitrio, solo necessitatis obsequio.

And thus much as touching the first sort of this Authors Reasons, which he ac∣counts only Inducing; I come to the other sort, which he esteemes con∣vincing.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Prosp. Epist. ad Ruffin.
• * 1.2

  Amos 2. Ier. 9. 24.